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PUBLISHERS’ ANNOUNCEMENT.

In

calling attention to the issue from our press of Judge John
Hopkins’ work on Personal Injuries, etc., we feel that we can
not better indicate the scope of the work and the spirit in which
it was done, than to quote the author’s dedication, as follows:
L.

“

The questions that were made and determined in
dealt with in this volume are difficult and important.

the

cases

To have
made and presented them for adjudication, as was done, required
unsurpassed ability and untiring industry. To have adjudicated
them, as was done, demanded pure, deep legal knowledge combined with an unfaltering devotion to truth and justice. A careful study of the cases will inspire an impartial, capable student
with a very high regard for the Bench and Bar of Georgia.
For
them, as a labor of love, this book was prepared, and to them, as
a token of esteem, I now dedicate it.”
And when to the

add the
of the
ripest experience and deepest legal learning, and that of the peculiar fitness of Judge Hopkins for such a task, by reason of the
analytical quality of his mind and his painstaking habits of
work, we believe we offer you in the nine hundred pages of this
work a law-book that no member of the Georgia bar can afford
to be without, and one that will soon pay for itself in time and
labor saved to the busy lawyer. The price, $8.00, is, in view of
the labor involved in its preparation, very low, especially when
the fact of its sale being, practically limited to the State is taken
facts that the work

high

purpose

these words breathe

represents the labor of several

we

years

into consideration.
On the two pages immediately following we print testimonials
from the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme

Court of

Georgia and from former Chief Justice Logan E. Bleckley
FOOTE & DAVIES COMPANY.

TESTIMONIALS
From the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.
We have

Atlanta, May 22, 1902.
given the book prepared by Hon. John L.

Hopkins, entitled "The Law of Personal Injuries,"
etc., a sufficient examination to enable us to say,
without hesitation, that it is a work
and utility.
It will surely save the

of great merit

hard-worked
judge and busy lawyer much time and labor by making
the decisions of this court, bearing on the subjects
treated, readily accessible in available form.
The
distinguished author's wel1 - executed plan of grouping
together all kindred decisions shows the relative
value and importance of each, and makes apparent the
true state of the law.
The code
in their integrity, and in many

sections are given
instances, where con-

fusion in their construction has arisen
their contents are accurately restated,

or

so

may occur,
as to make

plain their real intent and meaning.
The index is
exhaustive and admirably arranged, and the table of
contents, which sets forth the general scope of the
work, will facilitate finding the law relating to any
special subject.
The table of cases will enable one
to follow any particular case through the book.
is manifest

It

that

a

vast

amount

of

patient,

painstaking and conscientious labor has been bestowed
upon this volume; and as a result, the judges of
our trial
courts and the profession have at hand a
book

the

use

of which will

hurry necessarily incident

prevent errors in the
to nisi prius proceedings,

and this court has been furnished a much-desired aid
in the prosecution of its arduous labors.
Judge Hopkins has made a timely and most valuable contribution
to the law of personal injuries and tortious homicide,
We most heartily commend it to our brethren of the
bench and bar.

Mr.
above

Justice

was

Henry T. Le'wis
signed.

was

absent when

the

From Ex-Chief-Justice Logan E.

Bleckley.

THE LAW OF PERSONAL INJURIES.
By John L. Hopkins.
have enjoyed the opportunity of reading this book in print before its
publication. Not only have I read much of it line by line, but I have
examined attentively the plan and scope of the whole work, and the method
I

and merit of its execution.

It is

masterly production. The skill of the Author in grouping detached
making them read like a continuous treatise is matchless and
marvelous. The feat of turning the dictionary into a connected essay on
language, were any one to perform it, could scarcely be more admirable.
Another striking characteristic is' the severe conciseness of statement in
which the facts of the cases are presented—a conciseness which excludes
the irrelevant and immaterial but covers and comprehends all the material,
even to the most minute circumstances, and yet is attended with no hardness or dryness of style, and with no jerks or abrupt transitions.
It is safe to say that as much law can be gone over understanding^
cases

a

and

in ten minutes with the aid of this book

The

have

as

in ten hours without its assist-

been

thoroughly and accurately classified, and the
vigilance and fidelity of the Author are so trustworthy that the reader can
be sure no case of any importance has been omitted.
Treated simply as
a contrivance for saving labor the book will be invaluable to the bench and the
bar. No judge or practioner who has any just estimation of time as the
equivalent of money can afford to dispense with it.
But the book is more than a contrivance for saving labor; it is a legal
ance.

cases

illuminator, and casts a light of its own on the path of the law and consequently on the law itself.
This it does, first, by collecting and rightly
focusing the decisions bearing on the same point, thus making a strong
by concentrating several weaker lights; and, secondly, by occasional radiafrom the mind of the Author as a legal thinker and commentator.

tions

radiation is found in Section 87, extending from
Another, less extended, may be seen in Section 37, begin-

fine example of such

A

page

137 to 144.

ning

on

book

54 and ending on page 57. Unless I am much mistaken the
speedily take its place as a notable contribution to our legal

page

will

literature.

Judge Hopkins has special and peculiar qualifications for the preparation
a work.
He is a legal genius, without any of the erratic tendencies
which are supposed to be the inheritance of all genius of whatever kind.

of such

of legal discrimination is unsurpassed. He can probe cases to
bottom, analyze them and expound them clearly. He has the keen
and delicate penetration of a narrow mind, with the breadth and bigness
of the most stalwart intellect.
In brief, he is a microscope and a telescope
in one lens—a single glass. I had not intended to say this until after his

His power

the

death, but the occasion is a fit one to say it now, and I say it.
L.

Clabkf.sville, Ga., May, 1902.

E.

BLECKLEY.-

THE LAW OF
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DEDICATION.
The

questions that

with in this volume

were

made and determined in the

cases

dealt

difficult and

important. To have made and
presented them for adjudication, as was done, required unsurpassed
ability and untiring industry. To have adjudicated them, as was
done, demanded pure, deep legal knowledge combined with an unfaltering devotion to truth and justice. A careful study of the cases
will inspire an impartial, capable student with a very high regard
for the Bench and Bar of Georgia. For them, as a labor of love, this
book

was

are

prepared; and to them,

it.
Atlanta, April 15, 1902.

as a

token of esteem, I

now

dedicate

Jno. L. Hopkins.

PREFACE.
The title of this volume

sufficiently indicates the scope of the
attempt is made to present, in convenient form for ready
use, the decisions treated of -which are reported in volumes 1 to 112,
inclusive, of the Georgia Reports. A very few eases have been omitted, because they were deemed of no value.
work.

The

In railroad cases,
name

of the

the

railway

name

company

If the
be had by

of the plaintiff alone appears.

should be desired, it

can

reference to the Table of Cases.

Subsequent citations of
otherwise, “Cited”

means

place indicated.
Atlanta, Appl 15, 1902.

a case are

noted, and, unless it

appears

that the decision cited is approved at the
Jno. L. Hopkins.
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PEESONAL INJUEIES, AND, INCIDENTALLA,
Damage to Peopeety by Collision
WITH

10.Subject

RaILWAY-TEAINS.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

CHAPTER 1.

DEGREES OF CARE.
1.

2.

Ordinary care, Civil Code, §2898.
Legal standard is invariable, but the care
of a prudent man varies according to
the circumstances of

3.

4.

the

5.

case.

Judges should adhere to the Code definition, and not attempt to point out
specifically the ways of the prudent.
How the jury determine what a prudent
man

1.

would do.

Ordinary diligence.

Extraordinary
Code, §2062.

diligence

defined,

Civil

6. Gross neglect defined, Civil Code, §2063.
7. The comparative degrees are not applica*
ble to children of tender years.
8. Illustrations of the doctrine.
9. Subject continued.

continued.

Ordinary diligence is that care which
similar nature.
neglect. Civil

every prudent man takes of his own property of a
The absence of such diligence is termed ordinary

Code, §2898.
2. The

legal standard is invariable, but the care of a prudent man
according to the circumstances of a particular case.
In Ryles, 84/420, it was held that, though ordinary care as a legal
standard for the measure of diligence is invariable, yet, as the conduct of a prudent man varies with the degree of danger attending
the vocation in which he is engaged, and is more or less cautious
according to circumstances, those who are bound to conform their
conduct to his must graduate it in like manner. This applies both
>to one exposed to danger, and to others not so exposed, whose acts
or omissions affect his safety.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “The standard
of ordinary and reasonable care is invariable, such care being that of
every prudent man.
Civil Code, §2898. But the care of a prudent
man varies according to circumstances dependent upon the degree of
danger. Beach, Contrib. Neg. 21; 2 Thomp. Neg. p. 982, §11, and
notes; Deer. Neg. §§7, 210; Wharton, Neg. §§47, 48 et seq.; Cayzer v.
Taylor, 10 Gray, 274; Morgan v. Cox, 22 Mo. 373; Nitro-Glycerine
Case, 15 Wall. 536, 537; Railroad Co. v. McDaniels, 107 IJ. S. 454.
‘What is the precise legal intent of the term “ordinary care,” must, in
the nature of things, depend upon the circumstances of each individual
case. It is a relative, and not an absolute, term. Chancellor Walworth,
varies

1

§2]
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in the

ease of the Mayor etc. v. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433, says:
“The
degree of care and foresight which it is necessary to use in any
given case must always be in proportion to the nature and magnitude of the injury that will be likely to result from the occurrence
which is to be anticipated and guarded against, and it should be
that care and prudence which a discreet and cautious individual
would or ought to use if the whole risk and loss were to be his own
exclusively.” This doctrine is declared in many other cases. He who
does what is more than ordinarily dangerous is bound to use more
than ordinary care — that is to say, it will require greater care under
those circumstances to amount in law to ordinary care than it would
if the undertaking were less hazardous — and the measure of diligence
required of him is greater or less in the direct ratio of the risks
his acts entail upon others. The duty of a plaintiff is to be measured
by the same rule that is applied to a defendant, and just in proportion as the danger increases must the care of the plaintiff be increased, if it is to be held ordinary care under the circumstances.
It is clear that what might be entirely prudent in one condition of
things would be reckless and grossly negligent in another.’ Beach,
Contrib. Neg., supra. It thus appears that, while ordinary care is
the standard, what amounts to such care depends upon the danger
and other circumstances involved in the particular case.
This doctrine the court recognized in its charge, and applied it to the conduct
of both the plaintiff and the other servants of the defendant con-

nected with' the case.”
The

principle of discrimination in adapting conduct to conditions,
adhering to a single standard of diligence, was recognized in
the Ryles case, supra.
Summerford, 87/631.
In Davis, 18/679, Lumpkin, J., said:
“What will amount to
reasonable care and diligence at a crossing, in a retired place, and
on a straight line in the
open country, would be considered the
grossest negligence in turning a curve, especially if at a crossing
in the neighborhood of a church or other public place.
To dash
through the town of Griffin at the same speed that might be safely
pursued a few miles distant, would exhibit a degree of recklessness
from which even malice might be inferred, should human life be
sacrificed. The rule of diligence will vary, therefore, with the everchanging facts which accompany and surround each given case;
the true test, always to be applied, being — did the defendant use
reasonable diligence; that is. the care and diligence which, taking
while
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into consideration all the circumstances of the case,

the exigency

Cited, 19/438, 442, 444; 70/226.
or kind of diligence which will
be required as ‘ordinary and reasonable’ must necessarily vary under
different circumstances. It can not be measured or ascertained by
any fixed and inflexible standard, because the words just quoted

required and admitted of.”

“What will constitute the amount

are

themselves relative

terms, and what, under

some

conditions,

would be

ordinary and reasonable diligence, might under other conditions amount to even gross negligence.
For instance, for most
purposes, running a passenger-train through the country at the rate
of twenty-five miles an hour would be safe, prudent, and proper,
while to run the same train at this rate over a crossing in a crowded
city would amount to wantonness. The measure of diligence due,
therefore, by a railroad company to any person, is a relative one, and
what is, or is not, due diligence must be arrived at in every case
with reference to the surrounding circumstances and the relations
which, for the time being, the company and the person in question
occupied towards each other.” Lumpkin, J., Holland, 92/753.
Cited, 93/399; 101/422; 106/872.
3. Judges should adhere to the Code definition, and not
attempt
to point out specifically the ways of the prudent.
In Johnston, 106/130, the plaintiff was a passenger, and the trial
judge, in charging the jury, defined the degree of diligence required
of the railroad company to be “an extra high degree of care.” Lewis, J., said: “In charging upon this subject, the proper and safer
method for the judge to adopt would be to confine himself to the
statute.
Its definition can not well be simplified or made clearer
by an attempt to use synonymous terms, or to convey its meaning in
other words.”
The court

not

point out to the jury specifically the ways of
prudent, the law supposing these ways better known to the jury
than to the judge.
The court should warn the jury of the duty on
the part of all others to make their ways like the ways of the
prudent
man.
Howard, 79/44. Cited, 110/338.
That standard is supposed to be in the minds of the jury; and
it is the standard in the minds of the jury with which the conduct
involved in the particular case is to be compared. Harris, 78/525.
The standard is not one for proof by witnesses — it is already in
the minds of the jury. Johnson, 91/470.
the

can
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4. How the

jury determine what a prudent man would do.
Prisock, 97/643, the court, in charging the jury as to the degree of care required of a person when about to cross the track of a
railroad, said: “The precise thing that every man is bound to do
before stepping upon a railroad-track is that which every prudent
man would do under like circumstances.
If you believe from the
evidence that every prudent man would look and listen, so must every
one else, or take the
consequences, so far as the consequences might
have been avoided by that means,” etc. .It was contended that the
instruction that, if the jury believed “from the evidence that every
prudent man would look and listen, so must every one else,” etc.,
was erroneous, as the
jury are supposed to know what prudent men
would do under such circumstances, and are not required to ascertain it from the evidence.
It was held that, the standard of ordinary
care and diligence by which the conduct of a particular person under
given circumstances is to be judged is one which the jury must derive
In

from their

observation, their common sense, and their common knowlThe charge in this case was in accord with this
rule.
Simmons, C. J., said: “It is true, the question of what prudent
men would do under given circumstances is to be determined by the
jury from their own observation, their common sense, and their
common knowledge and experience; but we do not think the charge
of the court was calculated to mislead the jury on this point. What
the court doubtless meant, and was doubtless understood by the jury
to mean, was that if they believed that, under the circumstances
shown by the evidence, prudent men would look and listen, so must
every one else, etc. In addition to the language above quoted, the
court charged at considerable length on this subject and we do not
think there could have been any room for the jury to infer that
they were precluded from relying on their general knowledge and
experience in arriving at a conclusion as to what would have been
the conduct of prudent men under the circumstances in evidence.”
5. Extraordinary diligence. Extraordinary diligence is that ex-

edge and experience.

treme

and caution which very

prudent and thoughtful persons
securing and preserving their own property. The absence of
such diligence is termed slight neglect.
Civil Code, §2899.
A carrier of passengers is bound to this degree of diligence in
protecting the persons and lives of his passengers.
6. Gross neglect.
Gross neglect is the want of that care which
use

in

care
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every man of common sense, however inattentive .soever
takes of his own property.
Civil Code, §2900.

he

may

be,

7. The

comparative degrees, extraordinary, ordinary, and slight,
applied to children in reference to measures to he observed
by them for their own safety.
Due care in a child.
Due care in a child of tender years is such
care as its capacity, mental and physical, fits it for exercising in the
actual circumstances of the occasion and situation under investigation.
Civil Code, § 2901. This section was derived from Young’s
are

not

case,

81/397; 83/512.

Due care, according to age and capacity, is all
child of tender years.
Ordinary care, which

the law exacts of
is that of every
prudent man, is not the standard for a child. Hence it was error
to charge the jury, in effect, that, if a child had not the capacity
to exercise the care of a prudent man, it would not be chargeable
with any negligence at all. Rogers, 104/224.
8. Illustrations of the doctrine.
In Vickers, 64/306, the injured child was ten years of age and it
was held that on account of his tender years and his consequent immaturity of understanding, he was not amenable to so high a standard
of diligence in regard to his own safety as that which adults are obliged
to observe.
Cited, 81/397; 70/236.
In Brinson, 70/237, Hall, J., said: “The injured party had attained an age (fifteen) when by law the immaturity of his understanding was not to be presumed as freeing him from the consequences of his own voluntary act, Penal Code, §33; but under ten
years, and between that and fourteen, the presumption is otherwise;
a

he is not to be held accountable unless he knows the distinction between

good and evil;

below ten years of age unless it be
'impressed with a sufficient sense
of moral obligation,’ or is 'possessed of sufficient capacity to have
deliberately committed the act with a full knowledge of its consequences.’ Penal Code, §34. While this section of the Code relates
to an infant’s accountability for crime, yet in cases of tort, he is
equally responsible, provided he has reached those 'years of discretion
and accountability’ prescribed by the Code for such offenses. Civil
Code, §3904.”
1
or

at

or

shown from the evidence that he is

The child
was

was

of age, in Young, 81/397, 83/512, and it
ordinary care, which is that of every prudent

nine years

determined that
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is not the standard for a child. Due care according to age and
capacity is all the law exacts of a child of tender years. Due care for
its own safety in a child nine years of age is such care as its capacity,
mental and physical, fits it for exercising in the actual circumstances
of the occasion and situation.
Neither the average child of its own
age, nor the prudent man, is a standard by which to measure its diligence with legal exactness.
Such care as the capacity of the particular
child enables it to use, naturally and reasonably, is what the law requires, and Bleckley, 'C. J., said: “While the name ‘ordinary care’
is frequently applifed to the diligence exacted by law of a child, there
is little propriety in doing so — due care is always the better and more
accurate description.
Certainly ‘extraordinary care,’ in any proper
sense of the term, can never be exacted of
young children, and slight
diligence would often be due care on their part, when in adults it
would be gross negligence.
The comparative degrees, extraordinary,
ordinal, and slight, it seems to us, can not be fitly applied to children
in reference to measures to be observed by them for their own security.
Due care on the part of this boy might fall far short of that of a prudent man, and yet exceed that of average boys of his own age. According to the evidence as to his standing at school, he was much above
the average of his class.’-’ Cited, 87/495, 675; 91/358; 93/746;
104/226.
In Rhodes, 84/320, the case stood on demurrer, Simmons, J.,
not presiding, and it was ruled that whether a boy of thirteen
years,
who assumed to assist the servants of a railroad company, at their
request, in moving a loaded ear, without the knowledge, consent or
authority of the company, and while there employed was injured so
that he died, could be held responsible for his acts and conduct, is
for determination by the jury upon the proof as to his
knowledge
of the distinction between good and evil and his capacity to comprehend and avoid the danger to which he was exposed.
Sufficiency of
such knowledge and capacity would prevent recovery for the homicide; otherwise there might be a recovery should the jury believe
the company was negligent.
In the opinion, Blandford, J., says, that,
“in view of the different provisions of the Code on the subject of
responsibility for crime, the court might declare, as a matter of
law, that prima facie an infant under ten years of age has not
sufficient capacity to be sensible of danger, or to have power to avoid
it, and that this presumption will continue until overcome by proof

man,

7]

CHAPTER 1.
Degrees of

[88

care.

showing the contrary; that between the ages of ten and fourteen
the distinction between good and evil in
will be liable for his acts and conduct,
but before he can be held responsible for his acts and conduct it
will have to be shown that he knows the distinction between good
and evil and has capacity to comprehend and avoid the danger to
which he is exposed. Whether he knows that distinction and has that
measure of capacity are to be determined by the jury on the trial.
That an infant of the age of fourteen years is presumed to have
sufficient capacity to be sensible of danger, and have the power to
avoid it, and this presumption will stand until overthrown by clear
proof of the absence of such discretion as is usual with infants of
that age.’''
This boy was a volunteer and not a fellow servant. Cited,
86/42; 87/675; 91/358, 528; 93/514; 97/381.
In Golden, 93/510, Simmons, J., said: “In the ease of Rhodes,
supra, Blandford, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said
that the analogies of the '©riminal law as to the age of discretion
might be followed in determining as to the capacity of an infant
to realize and avoid danger; but in that case he was giving reasons
why the court should not sustain a demurrer to the declaration on
the ground that the facts alleged in the declaration showed that the
boy brought about the injury by his own conduct. What the court
really holds in that case is that, upon such a demurrer, the judge can
not say prima facie that the boy had sufficient capacity to appreciate
the danger of the act which he was about to do, and that the judge
might avail himself of the analogies of the criminal law in passing
upon the demurrer; but, where the case is being tried by a jury,
they should be allowed to decide the question under the evidence,
without being hampered by any presumption.” Cited, 93/746.
In Evans, 87/673, it was ruled that the measure of diligence required of a child under the age of fourteen years is not the same as
that required of an adult.
It follows, that such a child is not bound,
as matter of law, to anticipate negligence on the part of others.
In Ryles, 87/495, it was ruled that, though the analogies of criminal law touching presumptions as to the age of discretion are properly regarded by a court in ruling upon a demurrer where contributory negligence by an infant is involved (as was decided in Rhodes,
supra), it is doubtful whether these analogies have1 any relevancy
on the trial of the case before the jury.
It would seem the better
rule would be for the jury to deal with each case on its own facts,
years, if the person knows
the particular instance, he

[8

CHAPTER 1.

§9]

Degrees of care.

unhampered by presumptions of law either for or against the competency of the child; and Simmons, J., says: “Where a child under
fourteen years of age is injured, and brings his action for the injury,
and there is a demurrer to the declaration on the ground that the
allegations therein show that the child did not observe due care, or
could have avoided the injury by the observance of such care, the
court may overrule the demurrer, on the ground that prima facie
the child did not have sufficient knowledge or capacity to know what
was due care, or sufficient capacity to have avoided the
injury by
its observance, and may invoke the analogy of the criminal law,
and hold that the presumption is that the child did not know or did
not have sufficient capacity, as was held in the case of Rhodes, supra.
But where there is

no

demurrer, and the

case

is submitted to the

jury, there is

no presumption one way or the other, and the jury
must find from the evidence whether the child had sufficient capacity
at the time of the accident to know the

danger, and to observe due
protection. If it has such capacity, and voluntarily
goes into danger or to a dangerous place, it can not recover; otherwise it can.
Young, supra. It depends altogether upon the capacity
of the child at the time of the injury. The better rule would be for
the jury to deal with each ease upon its own facts, unhampered by
presumptions of law either for or against the competency of the
child.” Cited, 93/514, 746.
9. Subject continued.
In Wynne v. Conklin, 86/40, it was held that whether the plaintiff,
a
boy of thirteen years, employed by the defendant to work in a tinshop, was of sufficient age and capacity to appreciate his hazard and
provide against danger, is for the consideration of the jury; it appearing that, several times previous to the injury complained of, he had
been put to work on the machine which did the injury, that it was
large and heavy, that a boy of his size and age was not able successfully
to operate it, that boys in the shop were allowed, when not at work for
the defendant, to use it in making things they desired, and that on the
occasion of the injury the plaintiff had finished his work and in the
presence of the foreman of the shop was cutting out a trinket for himself on the machine. Blandford, J., said: “We think the case made
by the plaintiff was quite a weak one for the consideration of the jury;
yet, we are not prepared to affirm the judgment of the court below
awarding a nonsuit. It is laid down by Shearman & Redfield, in their
work on Negligence (volume 1, §218), and fully sustained by the

care

for its

own

9]

CHAPTER 1„
Degrees of

[§9

care.

authorities referred to, that,
without argument, that the

'it has always been assumed, and usually
general rule limiting the liability of a
master to his servants applies to minor servants as well as to others;
no distinction being made on account of their incapacity to contract
for the assumption of such perils. Thus, where a servant is set at dan-

fact of his minority does not render the master
the servant has sufficient capacity to take care
of himself, and knows and can properly appreciate the risk. .But,
while the mere fact of minority is deemed immaterial, it is well settied, in America at least, that any actual incapacity of a minor to
understand and appreciate the perils to which he is exposed is to he
fully considered, and that he can recover from his master for injuries
suffered from any perils, the nature of which he did not know, or could
not properly appreciate, if he did nominally know, and to which a
prudent and right-minded master would not have allowed him to he
exposed.’ Now, in this case, whether the plaintiff knew of the hazard
or
peril, whether he was of sufficient age and capacity to appreciate
the same, and provide against danger, are questions of fact, which can
not be judicially determined by a court, but must be left to the eonsideration of a jury.” Cited, 91/359; 103/289.
In Faulk, 91/360, it was held that, though a boy twelve or thirteen years of age may have capacity to know that it is dangerous to
climb over the bumpers of a standing freight-train having a locomotive attached to it, yet where the train obstructs a public crossing
contrary to a city ordinance, and the flagman stationed by the railway company to guard the crossing and tell the public when to cross,
and when not, invites such a boy, who has been delayed by a standing train, to cross over the bumpers, it is not negligence in the hoy
to act on the invitation, inasmuch as he might well assume that
the flagman had assured himself that the train would stand still
long enough for the invitation to be complied with safely. It was
consequently error to charge the jury: “If you further believe he
had the capacity I have just described [capacity to know the danger
of crossing between the cars], and had the capacity and intelligence
to understand the risks, and to know the danger of going between
the cars that had the engine attached to them, and with that knowledge the flagman of the company suggested to him to»go, or directed
him to go across, and he, with that knowledge of his own, acted still
on the flagman’s suggestion, he would not be entitled to recover.”
gerous work, the mere
liable for the risk, if

■
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Phillips, 91/526, it was ruled that, as by the law of this State
boy over fourteen years of age is presumably capable of committing
In

a

crime, he is presumptively chargeable with diligence

for his

own

safety

against palpable and manifest peril, such as that of jumping from
a railway-train in rapid motion.
In the absence of any evidence of
the want of ordinary capacity in the particular boy, he should not
be treated as a child of .“tender years,” but as a young person who
has passed that period, and become chargeable with such diligence
as
might fairly be expected of the class and condition to which he
belongs. And Simmons, J., in the opinion says: “We think the
court erred in its charge to the jury in treating the plaintiff as an infant of ‘tender years’ in respect to the care and diligence for his own
safety to be required of him. While the jury could consider his
youth in determining whether the alleged threats and menacing acts
of the defendant’s agents and servants were calculated to and did
produce on his part such fear and excitement as to render him in
some degree irresponsible for his own acts and excuse his conduct in
jumping from the train, and while the conduct of a boy of his age,
under such circumstances, is not to be judged by the same standard
as that of a man, he is nevertheless held to a higher degree of responsibilitv than one whom the law regards as an infant of ‘tender years.’
A young person of the age of this plaintiff is presumed to be capable
of realizing danger, and of exercising the necessary forethought
and caution to avoid it, and is presumptively chargeable with diligence for his own safety, where the peril is palpable and manifest,
as it was in the present instance.
By analogy to the provisions of the
Penal Code touching capacity for crime, this presumption attaches
at the age of fourteen years.”
Cited, 97/381; 112/83.
In Hughes, 92/388, it was held that, as the injured girl was about
seventeen years of age, she should not be treated, with respect to her
duty to care for her own safety, as a child of “tender years,” but
should be treated as a person who is presumptively chargeable with
the exercise of the ordinary discretion possessed by young persons
of her class and condition.
Cited, 97/381; 112/83.
10. Subject continued.
In Golden, 93/510, it was ruled that there is no presumption of law
that a boy between ten and fourteen years of age is not capable of exercising such care as may be requisite for avoiding injury by a railroadtrain in motion, whether the train be run negligently or not. In each
case the question is for the
jury in the light of all the facts and cir-
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cumstances which go

to manifest or illustrate the capacity of the parboy in question. And Simmons, J., says: “In a case of this
kind we do not think the jury should be instructed as to presumptions of law in regard to the capacity of the boy, but the case should
be tried on its special facts, and the jury should determine from
the testimony whether he did have sufficient capacity at the time of
the injury to know that the act which he was about to do was dangerous.” Cited, 93/746.
In Smith, 93/742, it was ruled that, on the trial of an action
against a railway company for personal injuries to a child nine
years of age it was not pertinent and appropriate to charge the jury
that “a child under the age of ten years is not presumed in law to
have arrived at the age to discern between right and wrong, and of
sufficient capacity and knowledge to make him responsible for his
acts, and would not be chargeable of knowledge of right and wrong,
unless it be clearly shown that he had such knowledge and capacity.
If you find from the testimony that the plaintiff was injured, that
he was nine years old or less, the law does not presume that he has
arrived at that age so as to have the proper discretion in judging
between right and wrong, unless it is shown by proof that he had.”
The child being before the jury as a witness, the jury should have
ticular

been left free to determine for

themselves, from his own and other
evidence, what his capacity was for exercising care for his own safety
at the time of the injury.
And, in the opinion, Simmons, J., says:
“The child was before the jury as a witness, and they ought to have
been left free to determine for

his
.

themselves from his appearance and

testimony, and the testimony of others on this subject, what his

capacity was for exercising care for his own safety at the time he was
injured, without being hampered by presumptions of law either for or
against the competency of the child. See Ryles and Golden cases,
supra.
Some children are much more precocious than others. A
child nine years of age, who has been reared in the neighborhood of
railroads, and who has ridden upon them frequently, may have as much
capacity for realizing the dangers connected therewith, and exercising
care for his own
safety, as a youth of fifteen years not familiar with
railroads would have. As to the rule which should be applied to
infants with respect to due care, see Young, supra.”
In Watkins, 97/381, a boy of fifteen years sued for personal injuries. The trial judge charged the jury as follows: “The degree
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of

diligence that the law requires of the plaintiff was that care which
reasonably be expected of a boy of his age and capacity. You
heard the testimony as to his age; you saw him when he was upon
the stand; and, in passing upon what degree of care he should have
exercised on that occasion, you may take into consideration his appearance on the stand, his manner of testifying, and the capacity
would

that he exhibited while

the

a

witness

on

the stand.

As I stated to you,

that the law

requires of him was that care which might be
reasonably expected of a person of his age and capacity.” It was
held that this charge was substantially in accord with the rulings
of the court in the Rhodes, Phillips and Hughes cases, supra.
In
Holsomback, 112/82, it was ruled that, it was on the trial of an
action for personal injuries brought by a young man about twenty
years of age, and involving the question whether or not, under given
circumstances, he was justified in jumping from a moving train,
erroneous to instruct the jury that they might take into consideration
whether or not he was “a man or a boy.” While the determination
of the question above indicated may have depended upon the age,
experience, intelligence and other characteristics of the plaintiff as
evidenced by his appearance and the facts brought out at the trial,
care

there

issue of manhood

childhood in such

ease, and the
by the court of the phrase above quoted was, in effect, submitting
such an issue to the jury.
Lewis, J., said: “It does not follow,
simply because one has not reached majority, that he has not passed
that period in life known as ‘childhood/ In Phillips, supra, this
court decided that a boy over fourteen years of age is presumably
capable of committing crime. He is presumably chargeable with
diligence for his own safety against palpable and manifest peril, such
as that of jumping from a
railway-train in rapid motion. In the absence of any evidence of want of ordinary capacity in the particular
boy, he should not be treated as a child of ‘tender years/ but as a
was no

or

a

use

and become chargeable with
of the class and condition to
which he belongs. Where it appears that parents sued a railway
company for ejecting from a moving train their minor daughter,
about seventeen years of age, .this court ruled that she should not be
treated, with respect to her duty to care for her own safety, as a
child of ‘tender years/ but should be treated as a person who is
young person who has passed that period,
such diligence as might fairly be expected
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presumptively chargeable with the exercise of the ordinary discretion
possessed by young persons of her class and condition.”
In Crawford, 106/870, the case stood on demurrer.
It appeared
that the child was only four and one-half years old, and it was held
that a child of that age was incapable of being guilty of contributory
negligence. Fish, J., said: “Where, from the age of the child,
there can be no doubt as to its want of capacity to avoid danger,
the court will decide this question as matter of law.”
2 Thomp.
Neg. note on p. 1181; Beach, Contrib. Neg. 117; 63 N. Y. 104; 74
Pa. St. 421; 40 Ind. 545. In the State last mentioned this rule
has been applied in the case of a child seven years old, 27 Ind. 513,
and in Alabama, where the child was under five years of age, 67
Ala. 6.

In Illinois and California it has been held that

years old
Cal. 502.

is incapable of caring for its own safety.

a

child six

42 Ill. 174; 52

CHAPTER 2.
ACCIDENT.
11.

Subject continued.

11. No

legal responsibility for accident.
cases concede that an injury arising from inevitable accident, or which in law or reason is the same thing, from an act that ordinary human care and foresight are unable to guard against, is but
the misfortune of the sufferer, and iays no foundation for legal reAll the

Beach, Con. Neg. §36.
injured person and the company were innocent, the
catastrophe was an accident, and there could be no recovery. Moore,
61/153.
If the negligence of either party contributed to or caused the
injury, it did not result from accident. Huggins, 89/505. See

sponsibility.

If both the

65, 66.
CHAPTER 3.
IMPUTABLE
12.

12. When

NEGLIGENCE.

Subject continued.

negligence of one person is imputed to another.
Markens, 88/60, the injury was caused by the defendant’s cars being backed over a public street-crossing in Atlanta, and striking a pubIn
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lie hack in which the
street.

It

was

plaintiff, a female passenger, was traversing the
held that the following charge was correct: “The

negligence of the driver, if he was negligent, is not imputable in
law to the passenger.

A

but exercises no other

who hires a public hack, and gives
place where he wishes to be conveyed,

person

the driver directions as to the

control

over

the conduct of the driver, is not

responsible for his acts of negligence, or prevented from recovering
against the railroad company for injuries suffered from a collision
of its train with the hack, if the same was caused by the concurring
negligence of both the manager of the train and the driver of the
hack. The only negligence on the part of the driver which will defeat or otherwise affect the right of Mrs. Markens to recover is embodied in the following proposition: If the negligence of the driver
was the sole cause and the real cause of the collision, she can not
recover.
If the driver and the manager of the train were guilty of
negligence, both concurring to bring the collision about, such negligence on the part of the driver can not have the effect either to defeat
or diminish the plaintiff’s right to recover."
And it was held that,
a female
passenger in a public hack is under no duty to supervise
the driver at a public crossing, nor to look or listen for approaching
trains, unless she has some reason to distrust the diligence of the
driver himself in respect to these matters.
Cited, 93/788. The
negligence of the driver and owner of a private vehicle, who, by
such negligence, contributes to causing a collision with a locomotive,
is not imputable to another person riding by invitation in the
vehicle, unless that person had some right or was under some duty
to control or influence the driver’s conduct.
Such right might arise
by reason of the two being engaged at the time in a joint enterprise
for their common benefit and, if this were not so, the duty might arise
from known or obvious incompetency of the driver, resulting from
drunkenness

other

Roach, 93/785.
Gravitt, 93/369, the father intrusted his minor son, eleven years
of age, to an uncle.
The uncle went with the child upon a trestle
and both were run over by a train and killed.
The suit was brought
by the mother. It was held that, where a father intrusts his minor
son, a youth of tender years, to the care and custody of another, such
person becomes the legal representative and agent of the father in
discharging the duty which the law imposes upon the latter of guarding and shielding the child from injury. Accordingly, if the child,
In

or

cause.
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by

reason

of the

gross

negligence of his custodian, in taking him

upon a high and dangerous trestle, is run over by a passenger-train
and killed, such negligent conduct is, in law, imputable to the father

himself.

Such custodian could not,

however, properly be regarded
representative or agent of the child’s mother. By
express statute, in this State, the father is vested with the control
of his minor child, and the mother is not accountable for the conduct of a custodian for him chosen by the father. Nor, in a suit ■
by the mother in her own right, as authorized by special statute, is
she chargeable with the negligence of the father merely because of
the conjugal relation existing between them.
Cited, 93/788.
From the Markens and Gravitt cases, §2902 of the Civil Code was
as

likewise the

formulated.

It is

as

follows:

Imputable negligence. For the negligence of one person to be properly imputable to another, the one to whom it is imputed must stand
in such a relation or privity to the negligent person as to create the

principal and agent. In a suit by an infant the fault
parent, or of custodians selected by the parents, is not impu-

relation of
of the

table to the child.
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Definition' of negligence.
Negligence relatively to the safety of any particular person is the
breach of some diligence due to that person. Where no duty of diligence appears relatively to the person injured, there can be no presumption of its breach. Holland, 92/753. Cited, 93/399, and adhered to and enforced in 94'580; 95/361; 98/543; 103/640;
106/872.
Where there is no duty upon a person or corporation to do an act,
there can be no negligence in a failure to do it.
Simmons, C. J.,
Rogers, 104/224.
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14. The breach

of duty to the plaintiff must be the proximate

cause

of the damage.
To give a right of action for negligence the defendant’s breach of
duty to the plaintiff must be the proximate cause of the damage to
the plaintiff. This doctrine is embraced in the following sections
of the Civil Code:

Direct and

consequential damages. “Direct” damages are such as
immediately upon the act done. “Consequential” damages
are such as are the necessary and connected effect of the tortious act,
though to some extent depending upon other circumstances. Civil
Code, §3911.
Damages too remote, when. If the damages are only the imaginary or possible result of the tortious act, or other and contingent
circumstances preponderate largely in causing the injurious effect,
such damages are too remote to be the basis of recovery against the
wrong-doer. Civil Code, §3912.
Rule to ascertain. Damages which are the legal and natural result
of the act done, though contingent to some extent, are not too remote to be recovered.
But damages traceable to the act, but not its
legal or material consequence, are too remote and contingent. Civil
Code, §3913.
The three sections are to be construed together. If the act complained of, though it might in some degree contribute to the injury,
is so small, or of such character as would not of itself produce the
injury, and is of itself an innocent act, and there are other and contingent circumstances which greatly preponderate in producing the
injury, then damages can not be recovered thergfor; but if the act
complained of produces directly the damage, however small such
act may be, then it may be the subject of a recovery.
Where a wrongful act puts other forces in operation which are natural, and which
the act would reasonably and probably put in action, the party who
puts in force the first efficient cause, will be responsible for the injury proved. Cheeves v. Danielly, 80/114. Cited, 103/847. The sections are all based on the sound principle that in every tort there
follow

must be

a

line drawn somewhere

as

to the limit of the

causes

pro-

Human actions and events of all kinds rarely ever have but
one cause; and the law wisely only gives an action for the
prime,
the leading, effective cause.
The rule of remoteness applies to all
cases of damages and not only to the
damages which are the result
of the act, but to the cause of the act. It is not only true that damducing.
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ages which are the direct
is also true that only such
even

a

direct result

are

turing Company, 54/84.
There

product of the act are the limit, but it
acts as preponderate largely in producing
the subject of suit. Rucker v. Manufac-

Cited, 103/849.

in

charging to the effect that the burden was
on the plaintiff to sustain his allegations as to the
injury sustained
by him; that, to entitle him to recover, he must produce evidence
sufficient to satisfy the jury that he has sustained an injury, and
that such injury was the direct and proximate consequence of the
defendant’s negligence; for, to constitute an actionable tort, there
must be damage to the plaintiff and negligence by the defendant,
causing the injury. Especially is this true, where the question of
negligence was fully and fairly submitted to the jury, and they were
instructed that they only could find the fact. Freeman, 75/331.
Cited, 111/534.
In Mayor etc. v. Dykes, 103/847, Fish, J., said: “Assuming that
was no error

the defendants

were

in the

was

tiff’s

case

is,

guilty of negligence, the controlling question

their negligence the proximate cause of plainThere seems to be no absolutely consistent rule to

injuries?
guide us in determining the matter, and each case has been made
by the courts to largely depend upon its own facts. The most generally accepted theory of causation, however, is that of natural and

probable consequences (1 Jag. Torts, p. 74, and cases cited; Gilson v.
Canal Co. (Vt.) 36 Am. St. Rep. 802, and cases cited on page 809,
s. c. 26 Atl. 70); the rule being that, in order to recover for an
injury alleged to have resulted from the negligence of another,, the
injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence; or, as otherwise stated, the wrong and the resulting damage
must be known by common experience to be naturally and usually
in sequence.
The damage, according to the usual course of events,
must follow from the wrong.
Gerhard v. Bates, 2 El. & Bl. 490;
Add. Torts, 6; Cooley, Torts, 69. The principle in this State seems
to be substantially the same.”
Cited, 106/178; 111/534. A party
guilty of negligence by which a loss is sustained shall only be liable
for the proximate consequences of his wrongful act.
To entitle
a party to recover damages of a railroad company on account of the
negligence of the agents it should appear that the negligence was
the natural and proximate cause of the injury; for should it appear
that the negligence of the company would not have damaged the
separate, indeperson complaining but for the interposition of
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pendent

agency, over

which the

company

neither had

or

exercised

control, then the party complainitig can not recover, for the reason
that the causal connection between negligence and damage is broken

by the interposition of an independent, responsible human action.
Perry, 66/746. Cited, 100/571; 103/849; 105/103; 106/178.
15. Illustrations of the foregoing doctrine.
The suit Belding v. Johnson, 86/177, was by a widow against a barkeeper for damages for the homicide of her husband, who was killed
in the defendant’s barroom, and it being alleged that he sold liquor
to the deceased and his slayer in the forenoon, and that the quarrel
between these two then originated in regard to a wager they had made,
but the homicide not having occurred until the afternoon, when the
deceased again entered the barroom, not as a customer or guest, but to
obtain the watch he had wagered to the slayer, the defendant can not
be held liable because he furnished liquor to the slayer when
drunk and failed to protect the deceased against him.
Simmons, J.,
said: “Under §§3912, 3913, of the Civil Code, we think the damages
too remote to be recovered.
‘Other and contingent circumstances’

preponderated largely in causing the homicide, and the damages,
though traceable remotely to the act of selling the liquor, are not the
legal and natural consequences' of the act. They do not arise directly from that act, but from the act of shooting, and indirectly
from the bet made between Belding and Whitlock, Whitlock’s refusal
to give up the watch, and Belding’s return in the afternoon to recover
it, and his preparation for a fight with Whitlock. These indirect
elements are more proximate than is that of furnishing the liquor.
There

many cases in the reports where recoveries have been had
against barroom-keepers for injuries arising from the sale of liquor
to persons, but all of them, so far as we have ascertained, except the
case of Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. St. 579, 11 Atl.
Rep. 779,
are founded wholly upon special statutes
authorizing recovery for
such injuries.
In no other State has the right to recover been placed
upon common-law principles, and several of the courts, in discussing
the question, say that no recovery could be had at common law. We
have no special statute in this State authorizing such recovery.
The
two sections above cited from our Code are declaratory of the common-law of this State, and under these sections the damages claimed
are too remote.”
Cited, 100/572; 103/849.
are

In Henderson

general rule,

v.

persons

Dade Coal

Co., 100/568, it was held that,
in charge of a State convict, whether their

as a
cus-
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tody and control of him be lawful or otherwise, are not liable in damages for a criminal tort committed^by him while at large, although his
being at large was by their permission, or because of their negligence
in failing to keep him safely confined.
Ordinarily, under such circumstances, the convict’s wrongful act would be too remote a consequence of his keepers’ misconduct in the premises to render them
responsible to the person injured. This rule would, of course, be
varied if they were in any way connected with the perpetration of the
tort, or had reasonable grounds for apprehending that it would be
committed. That a “felony” convict, about thirty-seven years old, who
had been continuously in the penitentiary for about twelve years, and
who had five times escaped therefrom, was “a man in robust and vigorous health, immoral, brutish, devilish, of vicious habits, of violent

passions, prone to desire for sexual intercourse,” and a person “not
by any convictions of right and wrong, or governed by any
principles of morality,” and that “all of these conditions and things”
concerning him “were well known, and were understood” by his custodians, “or ought to have been, because of what they knew of his
said person, history, character and surroundings,” did not, without
more, afford such cause for apprehending that he would, when an
opportunity occurred, commit the crime of rape upon an unprotected
woman, as to subject his custodians to liability in damages for the
perpetration by him of this offense at a time when, because of their
fault, he was at large, and in the unrestrained control of his own
movements.
Lumpkin, J., said: “The true rule applicable in a case
like the present was recognized and stated by this court in the case of
Perry, supra, wherein it was said that, in order to entitle a party to
recover damages on account of the negligence of another, it should appear that the damages were the natural and proximate result of such
negligence; ‘for, should it appear that, but for the intervention of a
responsible third party, the defendant’s negligence would not have
caused damage to the plaintiff, then the defendant is not liable to
plaintiff, for the reason that the causal connection between negligence
and damage is broken by the interposition of an independent, responsible human action.’ In support of this doctrine, Judge Stewart in the opinion cited Field, Dam. §§13, 32, 52, 53, 78 ; Wayne, Dam.
§25 ; Whart. Neg. §134; Wait, Act. & Def. title ‘Damages.’ That action was based upon a tort of an altogether different character, but the
principle announced controls the case at bar. The case of Belding
v. Johnson, supra, also has some bearing upon the question at issue,
restrained
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it

being there held that the death of the plaintiff’s husband, who
killed by a man under the influence of liquor, who, when in this
condition, was violent and dangerous, was not occasioned by the act
of a barkeeper who had furnished liquor to the slayer when he was
already drunk, and had failed to protect the deceased from the homicidal assault made upon him in the barkeeper’s place of business.
Although the latter violated a penal statute of this State in so furnishing the liquor, it was, in effect, held that he was not bound to
anticipate that this unlawful conduct on his part would result in a
homicide. A somewhat similar question was dealt with in Shugart
v.
Egan, 83 Ill. 56. There the person furnished with the intoxieating liquors was himself, in consequence of abusive language used
to another, assaulted and killed.
In a sense, the furnishing of the
liquor was an indirect cause of his death, but the court held it was
not the efficient and proximate cause.
In a case decided by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota (Swinfin v. Lowry, 34 N. W. 22) it
appeared that a minor person of the age of eighteen, upon invitation
of the defendants, drank intoxicating liquors with them and their
friends at divers saloons several times during the same evening, some
of the liquor being ordered and paid for by the defendants themselves.
‘He became intoxicated and quarrelsome, and committed an
assault upon plaintiff, resulting in serious injury to him,’ but ‘was
not incited thereto by the defendants, and it was his own voluntary
act.
In an action against them by the plaintiff for damages, on the
groimd that the assault was the result of their acts in furnishing the
liquor supplied to the minor,’ the reviewing court held ‘that the damages were too remote, and were not to be deemed the natural and
proximate result of the alleged wrongful acts of the defendants.’ A
case which, upon its facts, is still more closely in point, is that of
Hullinger v. Worrell, 83 Ill. 220. It was there held that a sheriff
who negligently permitted the escape of a prisoner in his custody

was

under

an

liable in

indictment for

an

assault with intent to murder

was

not

damages for the consequences of a subsequent assault by
escaped prisoner upon the same person upon whom the indictment in question charged that the original assault had been committed. This decision was based explicitly upon the proposition that
the act of the prisoner, after regaining his liberty, was not the natural
and probable consequence of the escape.”
In Ham, 97/411, it appeared that the end of the plaintiff’s finger
was cut off by the car-door slamming against it.
It was an accommothe
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dation train and

plaintiff told the conductor he wanted to get
Crossing. The conductor told him to go and tell
Jackson to put him off there. Plaintiff went into a car to tell
Jackson.
While he was talking to Jackson a train-hand came in and
plaintiff followed him out of the car. Plaintiff was right behind him.
The train-hand passed through the door, and slammed it after him.
Plaintiff was reaching out for it and it caught his hand.
He supposed that he tried to stop the door before it could shut. The train
was running and it threw him off his balance and he missed catching
the knob as he reached for it.
The plaintiff did not know whether
the train-hand knew that he was coming behind him or not. It was
held that, under the facts in evidence, it does not appear that the
defendant was guilty of any act, whether negligent or otherwise,
which could be fairly treated as the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
injury.
In George, 92/760, it appeared that the plaintiff was expelled from
a train.
He was under the influence of liquor, but not so far as to be
ignorant of what he was doing, or in any material respect incapable
of taking care of himself.
The place of expulsion was a proper one,
having regard to his immediate safety. He followed the train about
one mile and the facts indicated that he was killed in
attempting to
board a moving train. Lumpkin, J., said: “Our conclusion is that,
even if his
expulsion from the train was a wrongful act on the part
of the company’s servants, this act was not the proximate cause of
his death.
This case is entirely unlike that where a man who is
helpless from drunkenness or other cause is left in a situation where
he is likely to be injured should he remain, or, in attempting to
leave the point where he was ejected, would be subjected to danger.
The homicide of the deceased did not occur at the place of ejection, or
because of such ejection, but at another time and place, and under
circumstances sufficiently remote, we think, to make it impossible,
with any degree of fairness, to refer his death to the first wrong inflicted upon him by the company, if, indeed, his expulsion from the
irain was any wrong at all.”
In Mayor v. Dykes, 103/847, it appeared that plaintiff, while driviug a horse attached to a two-wheeled road-cart along a street in
Macon, upon which the railroad company had a track, attempted to
drive, while the horse was in a walk, across such track at an angle of
about forty-five degrees. When the wheels of his cart came in contact
with the iron rails of the track, the wheels slipped along the rails,
off at Hamilton’s
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The horse immediately began to kick,
jump, and run, and became wholly unmanageable. He ran at full
speed along the street for some one hundred and fifty feet, when the
cart collided with a wagon, and plaintiff was violently thrown to the
ground, and seriously injured. The height of the rails of the track
and made

a

scraping noise.

above the surface of the street

variously estimated by the witAn ordinance of the city made
it unlawful for any street-railroad company to construct or place
any track in the streets of the city the rails of which should be above
the level of the street.
Fish, J., said: “The negligence of the defendants was not the proximate cause of the injuries of which the
nesses

was

to be from two to four inches.

plaintiff complained. His injuries were not the natural and probable
consequence of such negligence.
The only immediate and direct
effect of the contact of the wheels of the cart with the rails of the
track was the noise.
This noise may have been a natural and probable result of such contact, but it was not 'reasonable and probable
that an ordinarily gentle and roadworthy horse would have been so

frightened by it as to instantly cause him to kick, become entirely
unmanageable, and run away. Such a noise and such an extreme
fright, in an ordinarily gentle horse, as to cause him to kick and run
away, we think, are not known by common experience to be naturally
and usually in sequence; the one does not follow the other, according
to the usual course of events.
The great fright of the horse for such
a cause was
extraordinary and exceptional in a reasonably gentle
roadster. Plaintiff’s injuries can not be traced back to the negligence
of the defendants except through the intermediate action of his horse,
which was evidently disposed to be unruly and inclined to run away,
although plaintiff considered him reliable, ordinarily gentle, and reasonably safe. A horse that had made several attempts to run away,
and, after being driven to a road-cart in which two men were seated,
for twenty-six miles on an August day, instantly kicked, became wholly
unmanageable, and ran away, when the wheels of the cart came in contact with the rails of the track, making a scraping noise, evidently
had a trick or habit not common to ordinarily gentle horses. To
our minds, this vice of the
horse, rather than the negligence of the
defendants, was the conspicuously preponderating, effective, and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
The direct and immediate cause
of plaintiff's injuries was the collision of his cart with the wagon, in
consequence of the running away of the horse ; it not being alleged
that the wagon was a defect in the street.
In Brooks v. Acton, 117
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Mass. 204,

which was an action against a town to recover for personal
injuries caused by a defect in a highway which caused the horse
driven by plaintiff to run, it was held that, if the vice of the horse
caused the running, or contributed to the running, the plaintiff could
not recover
‘the vice of the horse’ meaning some trick or habit of
the plaintiff’s horse other than the natural excitability common to
horses; the reason for the rule being that the vice of the horse, and
not the defect, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
See,
also, Cook v. City of Charlestown, 98 Mass. 80; Spaulding v. Winslow, 74 Me. 533. In these cases, it is true, there was no collision of
plaintiff’s vehicle with the defect in the highway; but, if there had
been such collision, and the vice of the horse had caused him to run,
and plaintiff had been injured in such running, similar rulings would
doubtless have been, made.” Little, J., dissenting.
Cited, 106/178;
111/534.
16. Subject continued.
In order to recover for a physical injury alleged to have resulted
from the negligence of a municipal corporation, the defendant’s
negligence must be the chief and preponderating cause thereof.
Therefore, where a declaration alleged that the plaintiff attempted
to cross a public street in a city after dark; that the gas-lamps had
not been lighted; that a street-car was approaching, and its noise
prevented his hearing the approach of a horse and wagon without
a driver; while the failure to
light the street-lamps prevented his
seeing them, and he was run over by the runaway horse and injured,
and therefore claimed damages against the city, such' declaration
was demurrable.
It is manifest that the proximate cause of the injury was the runaway horse and the noise of the street-car. Gaskins
v.
City of Atlanta, 73/746. Cited, 103/849. Defendant’s negligence goes for nothing if it did not contribute to the injury.
Wilson
v.
City of Atlanta, 63/291. Cited, 75/661.
Where a mule, which was being driven to a wagon over a tollbridge owned and kept by a city, became frightened by a train on a
railroad near by, ran away, and, because of the absence of a guardrail from the approach to or abutment of the bridge, was precipitated
from the structure down a high embankment, the absence of the
guard-rail was a sufficiently proximate cause of the catastrophe to
render the city liable for injuries to person and property thereby occasioned, if such absence was due to the city’s negligence. City
Council v. Hudson, 94/135.
—
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In

Price, 106/176, 110/280, it appeared that the plaintiff

passenger on a train of
nation was Winchester.

was a

the defendant company, and that her destiThrough the negligence of the conductor,
she was not put off at Winchester, but was carried on to Montezuma.
Upon her arrival at the latter place, the conductor advised her to
go to the hotel and spend the night, he agreeing to carry her back to
Winchester in the morning when his train made the return trip. He
accompanied her to a hotel, where a room was assigned her, the
conductor agreeing with the proprietor to pay her expenses. She was
taken to her room by the proprietor or his servants, and furnished
with a kerosene-lamp, which she left burning after she had retired
to bed.
Some time during the night, the lamp, she claims, exploded,
and set fire to a mosquito-net which covered the bed, and, in her
efforts to extinguish the flames, her hands were badly burned. She
sued the railway company for damages. It was held that the conductor, in the absence of express authority so to do, could not constitute the proprietor of the hotel, who was entirely unconnected with
the company, its agent for the purpose of providing safe and comfortable lodgings for the passenger until she could return on the
company’s train to her destination. Simmons, C. J., said: “A conductor on a passenger-train of a railway company is the agent of
the company, and the company is bound by all of his acts within the
scope of his employment. His business is to superintend the running
of the train, look after the comfort and safety of the passengers,
and do such other work, in and about the running of the train, as
is imposed upon him by the rules of the company or by law. Being
only an agent, he had no authority, without express power conferred
by the company, to appoint a subagent. He could not delegate to
another, an agent of his own appointment, the powers conferred upon
him.
Civil Code, §2999. It was not within the scope of his business
to constitute the proprietor of a hotel the agent of the company
for the purpose of taking care of the plaintiff during the night. It
is argued that, whether or not the proprietor of the hotel was the
agent of the company, the contract of carriage was not completed,
and it was the duty of the company, by its agents, safely to care for
the passenger until they had delivered her at her destination. Admitting, for the sake of the argument, that this is true, we still think
that the company would not be liable for the consequences of the
landlord’s negligence. The negligence of the company consisted in
passing the station where the passenger desired to alight, without
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giving her an opportunity to get off. The injury was occasioned by
the negligence of the proprietor of the hotel in giving her a defective
lamp. The negligence of the company in passing her station was
therefore not the natural and proximate cause of her injury. There
was the
interposition of a separate, independent agency — the negligence of the proprietor of the hotel, over whom, as we have shown,
the railroad company neither had nor exercised any control.
Civil
Code, §§3912, 3913; Perry and Dykes, supra; Railway Co. v. Trich,
117 Pa. St. 390, 11 Atl. 627; Wood v. Railroad Co., 177 Pa. St. 306,
35 Atl. 699; Lewis v. Railway Co., 54 Mich. 55, 19 N. W. 744;
Hoag v. Railroad Co., 85 Pa. St. 293; Sira v. Railway Co., 115 Mo.
127, 21 S. W. 905; Railway Co. v. Shields, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 652, 28
S. W. 709, and 29 S. W. 652; Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125, 10
Sup. Ct. 39. The injuries to the plaintiff were not the natural and
proximate consequences of carrying her beyond her station, but were
unusual, and could not have been foreseen or provided against by the
highest practicable care.” Cited, 111/534.
In Hall, 106/786, it was held that, in the trial of a suit against a
railroad company for the negligent killing of stock by the running
of a train, evidence tending to establish that the stock were at large
through no fault of the plaintiff was admissible. When, in such
a trial, the evidence was that the stock killed had been a part of
a car-load of stock which had been transported by the defendant
company, and tended to establish that the stock being at large was
due to the fact that the defendant had failed to provide a stockpen and other proper facilities for unloading stock, it was the duty
of the court, without any request to that effect, to have instructed
the jury that the escape of the mules under these circumstances
would not of itself make the defendant liable in damages for the subsequent killing of the mules, and that the defendant would not be
liable if, at the time of the killing, its agents and employees exercised
all ordinary care and diligence to prevent the same.
The rule here
stated was essentially a part of the law of the case, an understanding of which by the jury was necessary to a fair and lawful trial. A
ground of the motion for new trial was as follows: “The court
erred in not giving the jury instruction to the effect that the negligence complained of on the part of the plaintiff would have to operate
as the cause of the
damage sustained by him, and only such negligence as was the natural and proximate cause of the damage could
be invoked against the defendant.”

Cobb, J., said:

“It

was an er-

CHAPTER 4.

§16]

[26

Negligence.

to fail to

charge the principle referred to in this ground. This
brought for the negligent killing of stock. Even if
the defendant was negligent in failing to provide a stock-pen and

ror

was

an

action

facilities for unloading stock, this had little bearing
It was proper to allege and prove
about the escape of the mules, and
thus account for their being at large, simply to explain how they
came to be upon the track; but these circumstances, no matter how
pregnant with negligence on the part of the defendant, would not
authorize a recovery for the subsequent killing of the stock, if in that
transaction the agents and employees of the defendant were free from
fault. It was, therefore, all-important to the defendant that the
jury should be made clearly to understand that the failure to supply
proper facilities for unloading these mules at the depot would not
render the defendant liable for killing them at the stock-gap; and
that if the engineer and other employees in charge of the train had
exercised that degree of diligence that the law required, both in
keeping a lookout for objects upon the track, and endeavoring to save
the stock from injury after their presence upon the track became
known, there should be no recovery.”
In Edwards, 111/528, the plaintiff was a brakeman on a freighttrain.
The train was running behind its schedule time because of
a defective driving-rod and of the large number of cars.
It was
followed by a passenger-train.
To avoid a collision, the freight-train
was forced into a siding.
There was no switch at the east end of the
siding and the train had to pass beyond the west switch and back
into the siding.
As the train passed over the west switch, the plainother proper

upon the real question at issue.
the circumstances which brought

tiff

the

top of a car and the conductor ordered him to jump
change the switch. When plaintiff jumped from the ladder
his foot became fastened in the frog of the switch — the frog not
having been blocked — and he was injured. The acts of negligence
alleged were, the condition of the driving-rod, the overloading of
the train, not having an east-end switch, and in not blocking the
frog of the switch. It was alleged that there was in use among
railway companies, known to the defendant, a simple device, efficient
and sufficient for the blocking and guarding of the switch-frog, so
that, had the frog been blocked and guarded by such device, the
plaintiff would not have suffered the injuries described, and that the
defendant knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have
known, that the frog was not blocked and guarded. Little, J., said:
was on

off and
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“Neither the fact that the
of

order,

nor

the fact that there
in

Brewer,

was

tiff sustained.

machinery of the locomotive

was

out

that the engine had attached to it too
was

no

many cars, nor
switch at the east end of the side-track

the proximate

cause

If these

causes

of the injury which the plainat

all, they were too remote
The reasoning by which it is sought to
charge the defendant company with the negligence which caused
the injury to the plaintiff must be as follows: If the crank-pin had
not been allowed to get too hot, the freight-train upon which the
plaintiff was employed would have been able to make its schedule
time; and, if it had made its schedule time, then there would have
been no imminence of a collision at Brewer; and if there had been
no imminence of a collision, there would have been no necessity on
the part of the plaintiff to jump from the moving train in order to
set the switch.
But the crank-pin was allowed to get too hot to make
the schedule time, and there was imminence of a collision, and because of such imminence the plaintiff jumped off from the car, and,
as he was
injured in such jump, he was entitled to recover because
the crank-pin was allowed to get too hot.
Or, take the other proposition that, if there had been a switch on the east end of the sidetrack at Brewer, the train would have entered said side-track, and
it would have become the duty of another brakeman to set such
switch, and therefore there would not have been any necessity on
the part of the plaintiff to jump from the moving train, and consequently he would not have been injured. However logical these
deductions may be, they fail to establish a right of recovery in the
plaintiff for the injuries which undoubtedly he sustained. To constitute an actionable tort, there must be damage to the plaintiff, and
negligence by the defendant, causing the injury. The direct and
proximate cause of the injury which the plaintiff sustained was caused
by his jumping from the train, and, if he is entitled to recover damages from the defendant company therefor, it is because of some negligence on the part of said company which caused either the jump
from which the injury resulted, or negligence in not protecting the
place where in fact he did jump. As we have seen, it is not charged
in the petition that the railroad company was, through its conductor;
negligent in directing the plaintiff to jump from the car at the time
he did.”
It was held that an employee who has suffered a physical injury can not maintain therefor an action against his master merely because there may have been on the part of the latter negligent acts or
as

a

basis for recovery.

were
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omissions, which, though they
to

bringing about

may

to

some

extent have contributed

dangerous situation, in which the employee did
injury directly resulted, were not themselves
the cause of the injury.
The only alleged act of negligence on the
part of the defendant which could in the present case have been
fairly found to have been a contributing cause of the injury not having been shown to be in fact an act of negligence, it was error not
to have granted a nonsuit.
If, while upon a pole a considerable distance above the ground, a
person is so burned, shocked, and put in pain by a current of electricity as to lose his strength or consciousness and the control of his movements, and, in consequence, falls to the ground, and dies, it may be
safely asserted that his death was caused by the electric current,
whether in case there had been no fall from the pole, death would
an

a

act from which the

have ensued

or

not.

Under such circumstances it could not be inaccu-

rate to say

that the electric current was the proximate cause of the
Owings, 97/663. Cited, 104/62.
In Bailey, 105/100, it appeared that an engineer while running a
train saw a trespasser upon the track in time to stop before striking
him, but nevertheless without giving any alarm-signal and without
any effort to stop the train, he ran the engine upon the trespasser,
and, killing him, hurled his body against an employee and injured him.
It was held that the negligence of the engineer was the proximate
cause of the injury.
It put in motion the destructive agency, and
the injury sustained was directly attributable thereto; there was no
intervention of a new force or power of itself sufficient to stand as the
cause of the mischief; there was no new and independent force, acting in and of itself, causing the injury, and superseding the original'
wrong, so as to make it remote in the chain of causation; there was
no interposition of a separate, independent agency, over which the

death.

defendant neither had

nor

exercised control.

See 198.

17.

Respective provinces of judge and jury.
judge deals with the question of negligence at four different stages of the procedure in a case — on demurrer to the declaration, on a motion for a nonsuit, in charging the jury, and on a
The trial

motion for
When

a new

trial.

demurrer to the

declaration, if the court can not say as
alleged in the declaration do not constitute negligence on the part of the defendant, the case is for submission to the jury and the demurrer should be overruled.
a

on

matter of law that the facts
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When

motion for

a nonsuit, if the
plaintiff’s evidence, if true,
which, in the absence of any explanation on the part
of the defendant, the jury may infer negligence on its part, the case
should be submitted to the jury. If there be any evidence whatever
to sustain the action, a nonsuit should not be granted.
When the question of negligence is before the jury for determination, they are the exclusive judges of it. It is the duty of the judge
to explain to the jury the degree of care which is appropriate to tne
ease, but he can not direct them that certain facts enumerated by
him do, or do not, constitute that degree of care.
He can not enumerate certain facts and direct the jury that they constitute, or do not
constitute, negligence. The one qualification of that rule is thi^:
In the abstract the commission of those acts which are prohibited by
statute, or the omission of specified acts of diligence, prescribed by
statute, or by a valid municipal ordinance, is negligence per se and
the court may so instruct the jury — it is negligence as matter of
law. Whether it is negligence relatively to the person injured will
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
When on a motion for new trial, and negligence is in issue, a
new trial may be granted for insufficient evidence, or because the
verdict is contrary to evidence, as may be done in other cases. Negligence is a question of fact, and is subject to be examined by the
court on a motion for new trial just as all other questions of fact are.
18. Negligence per se.
In Wyly, 65/120, the judge charged the jury that the law makes it
the duty of a railroad company to have the bell of its locomotive
tolled as it approaches a crossing in a city, and proper diligence ineludes such tolling of the bell. The charge was held to be the law.
Cited, 78/698; 81/417.
In Smith, 78/694, it was held that the omission of specific acts of
diligence prescribed by statute or by a valid municipal ordinance, is
negligence per se, and the court may so instruct the jury. Cited,
81/417; 110/247.
The rule has been limited in its application to cases where negligenee of this nature is negligence relatively to the person injured.
Golden, 93/510. Cited, 93/395, 398; 103/640; 107/75.
It is negligence per se for a railroad company, in violation of a
valid municipal ordinance, to obstruct with standing cars or locomotives a public street or place in actual daily use by the public; and
that the municipality may have acquiesced passively in violations of
the ordinance will not excuse such negligence.
Curtis, 87/416.

on a

shows facts from

•
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In

Barfield, 108/744, it was held that the violation by a railroad
municipal ordinance, by running a train within

company of a valid
the corporate limits

of a city at a prohibited rate of speed, is negliand such negligence may constitute the basis of recovery
by one who, in consequence thereof, received personal injuries while
occupying the position of a licensee upon the company’s track, if he
himself was not wanting yi that degree of diligence which it is
legally incumbent upon him under the circumstances to exercise for
his own protection.
Cited, 112/181.
In Bryant, 110/247, it was held that it is error for the judge, on
the trial of an action to recover damages against a railroad company
for personal injuries occasioned by the running and operation of its
trains, to charge the jury that acts not falling within the class below
indicated constitute negligence.
Only the commission of those acts
which are prohibited by statute, or the omission to do those things
which are prescribed by statute, constitute, under such circumstances,
negligence per se. Whether the commission of acts other than those
so inhibited, or the omission to perform those required, constitutes
negligence is a question of fact, and must be determined by the jury,
and not. by the judge.
In Bond, 111/13, it was held that the violation by a railroad company of a valid municipal ordinance is negligence per se, and the
court may so inform the jury. Lumpkin, P. J., said: “Counsel for
the plaintiff in error relied on the decision of this court in King,
70/261, in which a contrary doctrine was announced. We have only
to say that as the decision announced in Wyly’s ease, supra, is older
in date and has never been formally reviewed and overruled, it is
to be regarded as controlling upon this question.
As will have been
seen, that case has several times been cited approvingly, whilst King’s
ease has never, so far as we have been able to ascertain, been followed
or even referred to in subsequent adjudications upon the subject.”
In
King’s case it was ruled that negligence is a question for the jury
alone, and for the judge to instruct them that if the law provides
that the trains shall run at a certain speed, and they were running
above that speed, it was negligence, was error.
When the question of negligence is before the court on a demurrer

gence per se,

See the title “Pleadings.”
nonsuit should or should not be granted.

to the declaration.

19. When

a

Negligence is a question peculiarly cognizable by the jury, and
plaintiff’s evidence, if true, shows facts from which, in the

when the

81]
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explanation on the part of the defendant, the jury
infer negligence on its part, the case should be submitted to the
jury. If there be any evidence whatever to sustain the action, a nonsuit should not be granted.
This principle is declared in the following cases:
In Cook, 69/619, it was held that a judge is not bound to send a
case to the jury when there is not sufficient evidence to support a verdiet for the plaintiff, if found; nor where, admitting all the facts
found and all reasonable deductions therefrom, a verdict for plaintiff would be set aside, because no recovery should be had. In such
cases he may grant a nonsuit.
On the other hand, a defendant can
not compel the court to take the place of a jury and pass upon the
facts of a case by granting a nonsuit, because he would not be satisfled with a verdict for the plaintiff. The court may always remit
questions of fact to the jury, and he should not fail to do so whenever the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, negligence being
peculiarly a question of fact for the jury; and in a suit against a
railroad for the homicide of an employee, the absence of negligence
on his part and its existence on the
part of the company being in
doubt, a nonsuit should not be granted, but the case should be submitted to the jury. And Crawford, J., said: “We do not intend to hold
that the judge is bound to send a case to a jury when there is not
sufficient evidence to support a verdict, if found for the plaintiff; nor
that he shall send a case to the jury when he would set aside the verdiet, if admitting all the facts proved, and all reasonable deductions
therefrom, the plaintiff ought not to recover. On the contrary, in
all such cases a judgment of nonsuit is the proper legal disposition
thereof.” Cited, 72/224, 341; 75/641; 82/802.
In Sims, 80/807, it was held that if there be any evidence whatever to sustain the action, it must go to the jury, the court having
no discretion in the matter of granting a nonsuit; but on motion for
new trial, the court may exercise its discretion, and in many cases a
new trial should be
granted where a motion to nonsuit would be properly overruled. Cited, 100/133.
20. Subject continued.
The case Perry, 101/400, was brought to recover damages for
injuries to a child six years old caused by running an electric car
over it.
Little, J., said: “In the present case, the injury was
proved to have been inflicted. The presumption of negligence thereupon arose against the company, and the sole question is, was the
absence of any
may
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trial

judge authorized to say, as a logical inference, that the facts
submitted in evidence showed that the defendant had exercised all

and diligence, and therefore rebutted
presumption of negligence, or, conversely, that such facts showed
no negligence on the part of the defendant in the infliction of the
injury? In the management and operation of its line of railroad
and cars in the streets of the city of Macon, the law imposes upon
the defendant the duty of exercising ordinary care and diligence to
avoid the injury to pedestrians and travelers generally upon such
streets, as well as to their property. Actionable negligence arises
essentially from (1) a legal duty; (2) a breach of duty by failure
to observe due care; and (3) such breach proximately causing damage.
The question as to whether a legal duty existed to the party
injured is one of law, and therefore for the court to pass upon.
Whether there has been a breach of that duty, and whether it proximately caused damage to the plaintiff, are questions which depend
upon circumstances, and therefore are usually to be determined by
the jury.
16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 463. If, being charged
with such a duty, the defendant has omitted to do something which
a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or has done something which a reasonable and prudent man would not have done,
negligence is established. Generally, such a question is not to be
decided by the judge, but, being a question of fact depending upon
the various facts and circumstances attending the case, should be submitted to and decided by twelve men, drawn from various walks of
life, who may apply to its solution their average judgment and experience.
2 Thomp. Tr. §1662.
Therefore, while in almost every case
ordinary and reasonable

care

the

that arises there exists

some element which makes the question one
jury, this rule is not invariably applied. If, conceding to
all the evidence the greatest probative force to which, according to
the law of evidence, it is justly entitled, the case is such that reasonable men, unaffected by bias or prejudice, would be agreed concerning the absence or presence of due care, the judge would be quite

for the

justified in saying that the law deduced the conclusion accordingly.
If the facts are not ambiguous, and there is no room for two honest
and apparently reasonable conclusions, then the judge should not be
compelled to submit the question to the jury as one in dispute. Indeed, where there is no evidence of negligence, or so little that no
reasonable man could from it find the fact of negligence, it is error

83
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to submit the matter to the

men

jury, but

a

nonsuit should be ordered by

should not go to the jury where fair-minded
would not differ as to whether the inference of negligence should

the court.

The

case

be drawn from the

facts, taken most strongly against the defendant.
Thomp. Tr. §1665 et seq.; 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 466, 467;
Cooley, Torts (2d ed.), 804. It is upon this principle that courts
have been warranted in declaring that a failure to look and listen on
approaching a railroad is negligence; that falling asleep upon or
walking upon a railroad-track or trestle is negligence; that attempting to cross a railroad immediately in front of a moving train is
negligence; and it is upon this principle that the law of inevitable
or unavoidable accident must rest.”
Cited, 111/838.
Where the law presumes negligence from some of the facts proved,
and when there is scope for legitimate reasoning by the jury, as to
whether the presumption is, or is not, rebutted by the facts in the
plaintiff’s evidence, a nonsuit should not be awarded. Hankerson,
59/593. Cited, 63/490; 64/309; 75/641. This principle applied
when the action was to recover against the proprietor of a tollbridge for damages caused by a failure to keep the bridge in repair.
Jones v. Tift, 63/488.
Cited, 75/641.
In an action for damages by an employee against the master, the
controlling question being whether there was negligence on the part
of the master, if there was evidence from which the jury might have
inferred its existence, the Supreme Court will not reverse the ruling
of the presiding judge in refusing a nonsuit and submitting the case
to the jury.
Neff etc. v. Brown, 70/256. Cited, 75/641.
In Fraser, 75/222, it was held that, although in an action against
a railroad
company to recover damages for a personal injury, the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff may not have been clear on several
essential points, leaving it somewhat doubtful whether the plaintiff
was injured by a person on board of the defendant’s train or the
train of another company which used the same track, or whether the
injury was done by an employee acting within the scope of his duty,
or was the result of his personal wrong while
acting outside of his
authority, or even whether the plaintiff had a right to be where she
was when the
damage was done to her; yet, as inferences favorable to
her might have been drawn by the jury from the evidence, if left
unexplained or uncontroverted on all of those points, and as negligence in the servants of the company was a question for the jury,
a nonsuit should not have been awarded.
Cited, 75/50. Fraser’s
2
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the

of

woman, and there were special circumstances rendering the question of diligence somewhat doubtful. It was a weak
case for submission to a jury, but the special facts made it proper to
give it that direction. Smith, 82/805.
Where the suit is for damages for the killing of two mules, and a
prima facie cause of action is established by the plaintiff’s evidence
as to one of them, the court is not obliged to grant a nonsuit as to
the other, though the evidence as to it he insufficient.
Though the
plaintiff’s evidence was not direct, but only circumstantial, as to the
fact that the mules were killed by the engine or cars of the company,
yet the jury could have inferred that such was the fact; and there
was
no
error
in denying a nonsuit.
Bryant, 89/457. Cited,
111/820.
The plaintiff's evidence, if true, showing facts from which, in the
absence of any explanation on the part of the defendant, the jury
might have inferred negligence on its part, the case should have been
submitted to the jury. Accordingly it was error to grant a nonsuit.
Carey, 95/547.
In Reedy, 87/323, it appeared that Wood was in the employment
of defendant, and Reedy, who had been employed by him as a laborer
in transferring freight, was instructed by Wood to assist in putting
up some wires for defendant. This instruction had been given at
the request of a line-repairer, to whom Wood was informed defendant’s superintendent had directed he should furnish a couple of
was

hands.

There

a

was

evidence to authorize the inference that this

re-

pairer was the servant of the defendant. A ladder was placed against
depot wall, and extended some eight feet above the roof. The
line-repairer directed Reedy to take some wire and carry it up, which
Reedy did, but only went part of the way and stopped. He was
then ordered to go to the top of the ladder with the wire, but refused
to do so.
The repairer, who had been holding the ladder, then let
it loose, ran up it, passed Reedy, taking the wire from him as he
did so, and sprang upon the roof, doing so in such a manner as to
make the ladder fall with Reedy to the ground, and he was thus
injured. Held, under these facts. a jury should determine whether
or not Reedy was injured by the negligence of a
coemployee in the
service of the defendant; whether or not by his own negligence he
contributed to the injury; and whether or not, by the exercise of ordinary care, he could have prevented it.
the

r

case
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Where

foreign railroad company brought suit in
injury received in the State where the
railroad was chartered, although the evidence may have made a very
weak case, yet there was possibly enough evidence, if uncontradicted,
to enable the j'ury to say that the injury was occasioned by the defective machinery of the company, and when the law which should determine plaintiff’s right was somewhat uncertain, and it was doubtful
whether, under the common law, which was of force in the State
where the casualty occurred, he sustained the relation of coemployee
to the company’s agents, whose negligence caused the damage, the
ease should have been allowed to go to the jury.
Hall, J., says:
“This case is within the rule declared in Fraser, supra. The rule
does not commend itself to our judgment, and while we would greatly
prefer seeing it modified, and always feel reluctant when called upon
to enforce it, yet it has been too long and too firmly established to
justify any departure from it.” Woodruff, 75/47.
21. Subject continued.
While, therefore, in a suit against a railroad by an employee, if
negligence on his part is plainly shown, the court may correct an
erroneous finding in his favor, or may grant a nonsuit where there
is no conflict in the evidence, yet, where the fact of negligence is
doubtful, it should be submitted to the jury. Freeman, 66/170.
Cited, 82/805; 74/385.
In Redding, 74/385, it was held that in a suit by an employee
against a railroad company for injuries inflicted by the negligence of
a coemployee it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that the injury
was not the result of fault or negligence on his part.
The question
of negligence belongs peculiarly to the jury, and except in a clear
case, when there is no conflicting evidence as to whether the employee was in fault or was negligent, the court should not withhold
the case from the jury by awarding a nonsuit. Where the evidence
upon this point was doubtful, it should have been submitted to the
jury, and to grant a nonsuit was error. This plaintiff was a carcoupler, and was engaged in a duty calculated, more or less, to divert
his attention from the cause of danger.
Cited, 82/806.
Killian was in the employment of the P. R. & A. Railway Co.
He was directed to go with a train and deliver lumber at a point
on the A. & K. Railroad.
At a curve in the city of Augusta the
an

this State

car was

employee of

on

account of

derailed and he

Railroad.

Negligence

a

an

was

was

killed.

His widow sued the A. & K.

imputed to the deceased, and it was con-

CHAPTER 4.

§21]

[86

Negligence.

tended that he

employee of the A. & K. Railroad Company
of transacting the business in which he was then
engaged, and that in order to maintain this action, he must have
been free from fault. A nonsuit was granted. Hall, J., said:
“But, whether he was a coemployee or not with those in charge of the
train, his widow was entitled to maintain this action against the
defendant, unless he was guilty of negligence; and negligence was a
fact for the jury to pass upon, in that as well as in other cases. Although there was a conflict of testimony on that point, the jury were
not permitted by the court to pass upon the question; and, if upon no
other ground, the judgment awarding the nonsuit must he set aside.”
Killian, 78/749. Cited, 82/807.
In Morris, 97/312, it was ruled that there was evidence upon the
question of the defendant’s negligence from which the jury might
have found it was at fault, and, though the evidence suggests negligence upon the part of the person injured, inasmuch as it does not
require a finding that, if negligent at all, his negligence amounted
to the absence of ordinary care, the judge should have submitted
the case to a jury, instead of granting a nonsuit. Lumpkin, J.,
dissenting.
And in Johnson v. Hilton & Dodge Lumber Co., 103/212, it was
erroneous to nonsuit the plaintiff in an action for a homicide alleged
to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, in furnishing the
deceased, one of its employees, with unsafe and dangerous appliances
with which to do his work, and in knowingly employing and retaining
in its service an unskillful colaborer, by whsoe fault, in connection
with such dangerous appliances, the homicide was alleged to have
been committed, when the evidence for the plaintiff warranted a finding that there was such negligence on the part of the defendant, and
the death of the deceased was not due to any negligence on his part.
In Miller, 93/630, it appeared that the plaintiff, a youth of seventeen years, was a passenger on the defendant’s train from Rome to
Cave Spring. As the train approached Cave Spring, the usual signal of approach to the station was blown by the whistle of the locomotive, and shortly thereafter the conductor came into the car where
the plaintiff was, and called out “Cave Spring,” twice, and then went
out of the front door.
The plaintiff arose, and went to the rear
door of the car, supposing the train was about to stop at the station.
It stopped about two hundred yards before reaching the station. It
was about ten o’clock at night.
The night was dark and drizzly, and
was an

for the purpose

CHAPTER 4.

37]

[ § -I

Negligence.

the train

late.

As

the train stood still, the

plaintiff,
in the darkness, and fell
into a
of the cross-ties, and was
thereby seriously injured. It was held that this case, under the evidence, is not quite clear enough to warrant the trial court in granting a nonsuit. Whether the railway company, having stopped the
train immediately after the conductor called out the station, failed
in extraordinary diligence towards the plaintiff by not warning him
that the station had not been reached, so as to prevent him from
alighting in the darkness of the night at an unsafe place, and whether
the plaintiff, a youth of seventeen years, was negligent in so alighting without first assuring himself that the station had'been reached
or that the place was safe, are questions more proper for submission
to a jury than for determination by the court on a motion for a
was

soon

as

was at the station, stepped off
ditch sloping off from the ends

thinking it

nonsuit.
In Dickson, 82/629, the plaintiff, an employee, was thrown, by a
jerk, from a car loaded with lumber, and the questionable fact on the
merits was whether he stationed himself too far forward in taking
his position on the ear.
That was a question for the jury, and a nonsuit should not have been granted.
Where a passenger on a train standing upon a track at a station,
whence it was to be started, went into the baggage-car for the purpose of seeing the conductor upon legitimate business connected with
the passenger’s journey, and while there was thrown down and injured
by the sudden bumping of another ear against the standing car,
whether or not, in view of all the evidence submitted, the passenger
was rightfully in the baggage-car, and whether or not the injury
resulted from the negligence of the company, and whether or not such
injury might have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary diligence
on the part of the passenger, were all questions for determination by
the jury, and not for final solution by the trial judge. It was, accordingly, error in such a case to grant a nonsuit. Gardner, 97/482.
In Cannon, 110/139, it was held that, inasmuch as the evidence
for the plaintiff would have supported a finding of negligence against
the defendant, and did not necessarily require a finding that the

plaintiff’s husband could by the exercise of ordinary diligence have
avoided the consequences to himself of such negligence, the case
should have been submitted to the jury, and not disposed of by the
granting of a nonsuit.
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In Shiflett

City of Cedartown, 111/834, it was held that, there
being testimony warranting a finding that the municipal authorities
had negligently left in one of the principal streets of the city a dangerous hole, and it being, under the evidence introduced by the plaintiff, who fell therein and was injured, a question of fact whether,
under all of the existing circumstances, he exercised due diligence 'in
endeavoring to avoid the fall, the case should have been submitted
to a jury, and not disposed of by the grant of a nonsuit.
There being some testimony which might have warranted the jury
in finding that the plaintiff’s husband, while upon the track of the
defendant in front of an approaching train, was, either from intoxication or other cause, incapable for the time being of taking the
proper care for his own safety, and that the company’s servants in
charge of the train, being aware of these facts in time to stop it
before it struck and killed him, failed to exercise due diligence in
this respect, the case should have been submitted to the jury, and
the court erred in granting a nonsuit.
Clay, 111/839.
22. Subject continued.
In Burns v. Ocean S. S. Co., 84/709, the plaintiff's evidence tending to sustain his allegations, to the effect that the defendant had a
ladder leading into the hold of its ship, which was defective because
of the absence of one of its rounds, and on which a parson engaged
at the same work with plaintiff attempted to descend, by reason of
the defect fell, and to save himself jumped against a bale of cotton,
which fell through the hatchway leading to the lower hold, where the
plaintiff was at work, injuring him without any fault on his own
part, the case was for consideration by the jury, and the award of
a

nonsuit

v.

was erroneous.

In Cotchett, 84/687, the substance of the evidence for plaintiff
was that he was a passenger on defendant’s train.
The train was
very siowly at the time plaintiff was hurt. He was sitting in
of the cars, and when the train was about to stop got up to get
some water.
There was none in the car where he had been sitting,

going
one

he started into the next

car.
He got to the platform of the next
and stopped there a minute to speak to a man. As he was in the
act of starting on, he put his right foot in the doorway of the car,
and raised his left foot, when the cars separated. He was thrown
off, and the car-wheel went over his foot, crushing it so that it had to
be amputated.
The car was going very slowly. The immediate
so

ear,
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of his

falling was the breaking of the link or of the couplingPlaintiff was perfectly sober at the time of the accident. If
the pin or link had not broken, he would not have fallen, but this
breaking caused the automatic air-brakes to stop the car suddenly,
and the jerk thus caused .threw him out. Plaintiff did not recollect
that there was any sign or notice on the door requesting the passengers not to stand on the platform, although there may have been one,
as there generally is, on passenger-coaches.
There was some evidence
tending to show that the couplings or the pins used by the defendant
were small, suitable for
light suburban work, but not for heavy work,
and more apt to break than the larger couplings. A nonsuit was
granted on the ground that the evidence showed that the plaintiff
was not in the observance of
ordinary care. The judgment was
reversed, the court holding that the case should have been submitted
to a jury.
In Owsley, 86/538, it was alleged that the plaintiff’s injuries were
caused by a defective draw-bar, when he was engaged in coupling
cause

pin.

cars.

The draw-bar

was

used in Macon and worked well.

The next

attempt at using it was at Gordon, where it proved to be tight, so
it could not be raised at the first trial.
It was shaken loose,

that

and
made, when it again failed to work, and the plaintiff was injured.
The court ordered a nonsuit because the plaintiff
ought to have desisted after making one effort to couple the cars at
Gordon, and that he was in fault for making the second effort. It
was held that a second effort, on the same occasion, to
couple cars
with a draw-bar, the first having failed because the bar had become
fixed in its position, and not readily movable, is not necessarily improper or inexcusable where the bar had been shaken loose after the
first effort, and before the second was made, although the second
failed for the same reason as the first, and the plaintiff was thereby
injured. It at least raises a question for the jury whether, under all
the circumstances, the plaintiff would be warranted in reasonably
another trial

was

concluding that the draw-bar would remain loose long enough to be
used in making the coupling; and in making the second effort to
effect the coupling.
In Hudson, 85/203, 89/558, it appeared that plaintiff was a
switchman on defendant’s train. While it was not his duty to give
signals to the engineer to pass or stop at a station, it was customary
for the conductor to direct him so to do when, from the nature of the
road, his'own signals could not be seen. The rules of the defendant
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required the engineer to answer signals with the whistle, thus permitting the person giving them to guard against the jerk caused
by a sudden change of speed. Plaintiff, knowing the train was to
pass the town it was approaching, gave the necessary signal without
a previous direction from the conductor.
Without answering it, the
engineer put on steam, and a sudden jerk threw plaintiff from the
car upon a trestle.
Contrary to custom, the engineer increased the
speed of the train before reaching the end of the trestle. The car
was unprovided with the usual irons to hang on hy.
Held, that
whether plaintiff was acting in the line of his duty, or whether he
was assuming to act in the capacity of a conductor in giving the signals without special directions, and whether he was guilty of eontributory negligence, were questions of fact, and should have been submitted to the jury. Simmons, J., said: “If the evidence had
shown only that the plaintiff was thrown from the car by a sudden
jerk, and a nonsuit had been granted, we would have sustained it
under the ruling in the Sims ease, supra."
23. Nonsuit goes to the whole case.
Where a petition sought to recover damages for the commission of
two separate and distinct torts, a nonsuit should not be granted as to
the claim of damages for one of the torts declared on.
A nonsuit
goes to the whole and not to a part of the plaintiff’s case.
Hardin,
107/379.
24. When the question of negligence should be left to the jury.
In Jarrett, 83/347, it was held that when a motion for nonsuit was
made, or a demurrer to a declaration filed, it is the duty of the trial
judge to pass upon it, although the case be one wherein negligence is
alleged. But if, without a demurrer or a motion to nonsuit, the case
is submitted to the jury, the court must leave to them the question
of negligence, and may not express any opinion on the subject when
it is solely a question of fact.
Cited, 105/240.
The question of what is ordinary care and what is negligence is
one exclusively for the jury, and the court should not take this question from their consideration. Killian, 79/234.
Cited, 82/807.
What amounts to negligence under all the circumstances, is a question,
not of law, but of fact.
Neely, 56/541; 71/222; 66/243.
25. Judge shall not charge that certain enumerated facts constitute negligence.
It is error for the court to charge the jury that certain enumerated
facts, if proven, should constitute negligence. Negligence is a ques-
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tion of

fact, of which the jury are to judge from the evidence, and
question of law. Boring, 51/583.
A charge instructing the jury that given conduct under given circumstances would not constitute negligence was erroneous, when, in
view of the evidence, it was an open question whether or not this
conduct did constitute negligence. Pitts, 112/846. The only exception to this rule is where the law makes a thing negligence in express
terms, as in failing to blow the whistle or ring the bell of a locomotive
in approaching a crossing.
In such a case, the judge may instruct
the jury that the omission is negligence. Thompson, 76/770. Cited,
111/13.
In Tift v. Jones, 77/181, it was held that it is the duty of the
judge to explain to the jury what is meant by ordinary care, but he
not

a

not

rightfully direct them that certain facts recited by him do,
constitute ordinary care in a given case. Negligence and
diligence are questions for the jury, to be determined in each case
upon its own facts, and the judge would invade its province should he
declare when either is proved. The court has qualified this rule to
the extent only of deciding that, where the law itself requires the
performance of any act, the judge may instruct the jury that due
diligence would require the doing of such act. Cited, 111/13. Upon
the trial of an action against a municipal corporation for personal
injuries, it was error to instruct the jury that a given state of facts
would be sufficient to establish negligence on the part of the defendant; these facts not being such as would in law, per sese, constitute
negligence. City of Columbus v. Ogletree, 96/177. Cited, 111/13;
110/247.
In Flaherty, 110/335, Lumpkin, P. J., said: “Complaint is made
that the court, in instructing the jury as to the rights of one who
purchases a ticket and is about to board a train, erred in charging
as follows:
‘He is not bound to be looking to see whether he is
going to tread into a hole or stumble over an obstacle when he is
passing along the platform to the train.’ It can scarcely be doubted
that this charge is erroneous. Applied to the facts of the present
case, it was the same, in effect, as telling the jury that Mrs. Flaherty,
while walking along the platform to the train, was under no duty of
observing any care in looking out for her own safety, and this was
but another way of saying that her failure to do so would not be
negligent. If anything is settled in this State, it is that, as a general rule, questions as to what conduct constitutes negligence are
can

or

do not,

,
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peculiarly for determination by a jury.” And it was held that a
charge which, in effect, instructed the jury that the plaintiff’s omission to look out for her own safety was not negligence ought not
to hare been given.
In Harris, 78/525, Bleckley, C. J., said: “Whether in a given
case due diligence requires that a train should leave on schedule
time, or whether persons upon it not as passengers should alight
from it before the time of departure fixed by schedule, or whether
when a train is starting, or about to start, a person passing in front
of the engine should see to it that the train is not moving or about
to move, are all questions of fact for the jury, and not for decision
by the court in its general charge. The court undertook to instruct
the jury that a train ought to leave on schedule time, and that the
conductor ought not to delay its departure beyond schedule time in
order to give persons an opportunity to get off. It moreover instructed the jury that ordinary diligence would require that a person
passing in front of an engine in the act of starting, or about to start,
should see to it that it was not starting or about to start.
These
were all questions for the jury, under the special circumstances.
They are questions of fact, rather than of law, because diligence has
to be determined in view of the conditions, the special conditions, at
the time the conduct under investigation took place, and the standard
of decision for ordinary diligence is the conduct of a man of ordinary
prudence under like circumstances. That standard is supposed to be
jury; and it is the standard in the minds of the
jury with which the conduct involved in the particular case is to be
compared.”
In Wright, 34/330, the plaintiff's husband was killed while traveling as a passenger, in consequence of the car running off the track.
The plaintiff contended that the axle of the car was two inches too
short. The judge was requested to charge the jury that if they bein the minds of the

lieved that the axle

«

was

two inches too

short, and that the attention

called to it, they might presume that that was the
cause of the injury.
The court declined to give the request in charge,
and stated to the jury that if the facts relied upon in the request
had been proven, they, as well as all other facts in the case, were to
be received and weighed by the jury in determining the question of
diligence; that the effect of the testimony was for them to pass upon,
and not for the court to decide. The act of the court was approved
and it was ruled that negligence is a question for the jury.
Harris.
of the company was

\
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J., said:

“The form of the request is highly objectionable, as it virtually withdraws the question of negligence or culpability from the
jury. The jury, alone, have the right of the determination of this
question. It is a complex and difficult matter, often, to decide; as
many considerations enter into it, and rarely any fact, of itself, is sufficient to establish it clearly.
If it had been a fact proven, that the
axle was too shorj;, still, beyond that was necessary the testimony of
some expert, or persons familiar with the running of cars, to show
that that was the cause of the accident; certainly the judge has no
right to determine what constitutes negligence.” Since that decision
the question has not been an open one in our courts.
Cited, 56/277,
459; 66/173, 243; 67/317; 70/263; 110/247.
In Woolf oik, 56/458, the judge was requested to charge the jury
that “the failure to keep the right of way clear of brushes was negligence.” Upon his refusal the Supreme Court say: “The question
of negligence is for the jury, exclusively for the jury.
Had this
charge been given, it would have been taken from them and controlled
exclusively by the court.” Cited, 66/243; 67/317.
In Singleton, 67/307, when the judge said that not to stop the
train was not to afford a reasonable opportunity for the plaintiff to
get off in safety, it was deciding what was and what was not a reasonable opportunity for a safe departure from a train. It was a question of fact, not of law, and should have been sent to the jury.
26. Subject continued.
The court was asked to charge: “If the plaintiff’s cow fell down
a hank and rolled under the train after the engine had passed her,
or if the cow
jumped on the track fifteen feet in front of the engine,
then the accident was unavoidable and the company is not liable.”
Whether the company was negligent or not it was for the jury to
find, and it was not the duty of the court to decide whether or not,
under such circumstances, there was negligence.
Fleming, 48/515.
Cited, 58/348.
In the trial of an action against a railroad company for damages
claimed to have been sustained by the killing of a horse upon the
track of the company, one hundred and thirty-five yards beyond a public-road crossing, it was error to charge the jury as follows: “If, at the
time or after the engine reached the blow-post for this crossing, the
horse came upon the railroad-crossing, and the engineer did not blow
the whistle of his engine and did not slacken the speed of his train,
and if, by blowing the whistle and slackening the speed of his
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train, the accident could have been avoided, that would be a lack
of diligence, for which the railroad company would be liable.”
Such
a charge was equivalent to instructing the jury that the facts recited
would show the defendant company to have been negligent. Whether

negligent, was a question for the
Clary, 103/639. Cited, 107/75.
Where a suit, Mozeley, 79/463, was brought against a street-railway company to recover for an injury alleged to have been received by a passenger in leaving a car, it was error to charge the jury
that, “If the plaintiff rang the bell as a signal to the driver to stop,
and the car stopped, and the plaintiff, without fault on his part, was
in the act of alighting, and before he had completely left the car — as
by having one foot upon the ground and another still on the step — the
car suddenly started forward at the will of the driver, and the plaintiff was, by reason of the start or jerk, thrown to the ground and injured, the defendant would be liable.” Such a charge was equivalent to instructing the jury that the facts recited would show the defendant to be negligent. Whether or not the defendant was negligent, was a question for the jury. Cited, 81/275; 83/446; 103/640 ;
110/247.
In Neighbors, 83/444, the court charged the jury: “If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was directed by the yard
conductor to go in to make a coupling, and that he signaled the engineer to stop, and that the engineer stopped, and that the plaintiff,
in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence on his part to avoid the
injury, was proceeding to shift a coupling-pin from a lower to a
higher bumper, in order to make a coupling, and that the engineer,
without any notice to him, and negligently, came back, and that the
plaintiff’s hand was caught and injured, the plaintiff would be entitied to recover.” Simmons, J., said: “The charge leaves to the jury
to find the facts, including negligence or no negligence, and in substance tells them that if the facts mentioned in the charge are found
to be true by them, including negligence, then they would be authorized to find for the plaintiff.
The extract excepted to says that, if
the jury believe from the evidence that such and such facts (enumerating them) are true, and that the engineer negligently pushed the
train back, the defendant would be liable.
Instead of telling them
what had been proven, the court leaves it to the jury to say whether
these facts had been established by the evidence or not, and whether
the engineer was negligent or not. The court also left it to the jury
or

not the defendant company was

jury.
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to say

*

.

whether the plaintiff could have avoided the injury to himself

by the exercise of proper care. There is a wide difference between
the charge in the Mozeley case, supra, and the charge now under
consideration. In the charge in that ease, the court did not submit
to the jury the question whether the acts mentioned in that charge
constituted negligence, but assumed that they did. In this case the
court leaves it to the jury to find whether the facts enumerated are
true, and whether it was negligence for the engineer to push back his
train.
In the Mozeley ease the court did not submit to the jury
whether the plaintiff could have avoided the injury to himself or not
by the exercise of reasonable care. In this case, as we have shown,
that question was directly submitted to the jury by the court in its
charge.”
’
It was error to charge: “If the defendant’s agents were guilty of
negligence in failing to stop the train a reasonably sufficient time to
allow plaintiff to get off, and after the train was in motion at a speed
which made it unsafe for plaintiff to jump off in the dark, and, under
the circumstances, if plaintiff, of his own motion, jumped off the
train, and was thus injured, then he could not recover.” It took from
the consideration of the jury the question of whether the jumping
from the train, under such circumstances, was an act of negligence or
of ordinary care and diligence.
That was a question for the jury, and
not for the court.
Covington, 81/273.
In a suit against a railroad company by a widow for the killing of
her husband, who was an employee of the company, a request to charge
grouping together certain alleged facts tending to show negligence on
the part of the deceased, and instructing the jury that if these facts
be true the plaintiff can not recover, without leaving the jury to determine whether such facts did or did not constitute negligence on his
part, was properly refused. Hubbard, 86/623. Cited, 90/837.
In a suit against a railroad for killing a cow, in a county where the
law provided that stock should not run at large, requests to charge
that if plaintiff permitted his cow to run at large, and it was killed
by the defendant’s cars, the plaintiff would be guilty of negligence
and could not recover, were properly refused. It was not for the
court to single out any one of a number of facts, and tell the jury
that it constituted such negligence as would deprive the plaintiff of
her right to recover. Hamilton, 71/461.
In a suit against a railroad for damages to personalty, the question of negligence is one of fact; and therefore, where the case turned
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that question, on certiorari from a magistrate’s court, the
judge should not render final judgment, but remand the case
for a new trial, if errors have occurred. Jackson, C. J., after citing
several cases, says: “These cases decide the principle that on a writ
of certiorari, as in other causes, facts are for the jury, law is for
the court. Indeed it is the universal rule in our Georgia jurisprudence, and we derive it from the common law of our English
ancestors.
It is deemed so valuable as to be incorporated in the Constitution, State and federal. The only question, therefore, is, are
facts involved and in dispute in this case? The cow was killed by
the train; the presumption is that it was done by negligence of the
defendant’s agents. That presumption was attempted to be rebutted
by proof of diligence, and the fact of diligence or negligence, testified
to variously by witnesses, made the issue in dispute.
Questions of
negligence are always issues of fact, and for the decision of the jury.”
Mitchell, 66/242.
27. Subject continued.
Under section 4652 of the Civil Code, upon the hearing of a ceron

tiorari wherever the

case can

be determined

as a

matter of law, the

final

disposition of it. Where it involves both
law and facts, when there is no dispute as to the facts, the superior
court may make a final disposition of the case, or may remand it to
the court below for another trial. Where the facts are conflicting,
court must make

the court

can

a

not make

a

final decision in the case, but if he sustains

the certiorari, he must order a

78/705.
The

rehearing in the court below.

Ransom,

Cited, 78/710; 101/169.

Turner, 81/336, was twice tried by a jury in a justice’s
court, who returned the same verdict both times, and the verdict was
fully sustained by the evidence; this being true, it was error for the
case

court to set the second verdict aside

certiorari.

The

credibility
jury entirely.
Where it was proved that a cow was killed by a railroad-train, this
imposed on the company the burden of showing that it was in the
exercise of all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, or that
the damage was caused solely by the negligence of the owner of the
cow, or to diminish damages, that both were at fault.
Negligence is
a question for the
jury, and the issues thus presented necessarily
depend upon facts. Therefore, where the plaintiff obtained a verdict
on the appeal trial in a justice
court, and the defendant carried the
case to the superior court
by certiorari, if the judge sustained the
of the witnesses

was

for the

on
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certiorari, it
of the

was proper

a new trial and not to finally dispose
Cited, 101/119; 111/820.

to order

Bird, 76/13.

case.

That the

question of negligence is for the jury alone is strongly
Opie, 58/347. It was an action to recover damages
by reason of the killing of a mare. Three concurrent ver-

illustrated in
sustained

diets
on

were

found for $300.

motions for

new

trials.

The first and second
The third motion for

aside

set

were
a

new

trial

was

overruled

by the court below upon the ground that, “although the
opinion of the court upon the law and facts, submitted on the trial,
is that the defendant is not liable to the damages assessed by the verdiet, yet there having been three verdicts to the same effect, the court
will not now disturb the decision of the jury by again granting a new
trial.”
The verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to require
the Supreme Court to order a new trial, when the presiding judge had
twice done so, on like verdicts, and had declined to interfere a third
time.
The issue being a question of negligence, and there being some
evidence from which the jury could infer negligence, repeated finding,
to the same effect, ought to be respected.
In Branham, 78/35, two judges sitting, it was held that where
a boy about eleven years of age, to amuse himself and to steal a
ride, mounted on the ledge of the tender of a railroad-engine while
it was switching to make up a train of cars preparatory to leaving a
town, he being there contrary to the expressed wish of the defendant’s
employees, and remaining notwithstanding their orders to leave, and
paying no attention to their repeated requests to dismount, which he
had opportunities to do; and where one of the hands on the engine
threw cold water upon him while thus on the ledge of the engine,
and he then jumped, and fell under the wheels of the locomotive
while it was moving at a rapid rate, and was thereby seriously hurt;
and where, on a suit for such injury against the railroad company,
under a charge of which no complaint is made, the jury found a
verdict in favor of the defendant, and the presiding judge refused to
grant a new trial, this court will not interfere. Questions of negligence

jury.

resulting in such injuries
Cited, 91/359.

as

those complained of

28. Where

a,

Where

new

before the court on
negligence is in issue, a

are

for the

motion for a new trial.
trial may be granted for insufficient evidence, or because the verdict is contrary to evidence, as may
be done in other cases. Like all other questions of fact, it is subject
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on a

motion for

a new

trial.

Kenney,

58/485.
On a motion for a new trial, the court may exercise its discretion,
and in many cases a new trial should be granted where a motion to
nonsuit would be properly overruled.
Sims, 80/807. Cited, 100/133.
29.

Plaintiff must exercise ordinary care. If the plaintiff, by ordihave avoided the consequences to himself caused by
negligence, he is not entitled to recover. But in
other cases the defendant is not relieved, although the plaintiff may,
in some way, have contributed to the injury sustained.
Civil Code,
§3830.
The rule which requires one to avoid the consequences of another’s
negligence does not apply until he sees the danger or has reason to
apprehend it, and when there is a sufficient interval of time to guard
against it. See 135.
nary care, could
the defendant’s

CHAPTER 5.
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30.
31.
32.
33.

Venue of suits against railway companies.
Construction of §2334.
Residence of railroad corporations.
To what causes of action the section

34. Jurisdiction.
35. Waiver of jurisdiction.
36. Proof of venue.

applies.

30. Venue

of suits against railroad companies. All railroad companies shall be sued in the county in which the cause of action originated, by any one whose person or property has been injured by such
railroad company, its officers,
agents or employees, for the purpose of
recovering damages for such injuries; and also on all contracts made
or to be performed in the county where suit is brought;
any judgment rendered in any other county than the one in which the cause so
originated shall be utterly void. But if the cause of action arises in
a county where the railroad company liable to suit has no agent, then
suit may be brought in the county of the residence of such company.
Civil Code, §2334.
The lessees of any railroad, or the person or company having possession of the same, shall be liable to suit of any kind in the same
court or jurisdiction as the lessors or owners of the railroad were
before the lease. Civil Code, §2335.
Wherever a railroad company, incorporated under the laws of this
State, shall have, in violation of the provisions of paragraph four of
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section two of article four of the Constitution of this

State, acquired
by purchase, lease or otherwise, the ownership or control of the line of
railroad of a competing railroad company in this State, the venue of
a suit
brought against said first described railroad company for the
purpose of setting aside and having annulled such unlawful act of
acquisition, shall be in any county through which may run the line of
railroad so unlawfully acquired. Acts of 1898, p. 238.
31. Construction of section 233Jf.
In Devereux, 111/855, it was held that section 2334 of the Civil
Code requires all suits against railroad companies for damages to
person or property to be brought in the county wherein the cause of
action originates, with the sole exception that, if the cause of action
arises in a county where the company has no agent, the suit may be
brought elsewhere. The sole jurisdictional fact being the place of
the origin of the cause of action, and the statute not superadding the
further fact of the residence of an agent as one requisite to jurisdiction, it must be held that the scheme of the law is to make the jurisdiction exclusive in the county where the cause of action originates
when there is such residence, but elective when there is not. While
no question as to the manner of effecting service is presented by the
bill of exceptions, a court with jurisdiction of the person and subjectmatter of an action necessarily has the power to take proper steps to
have service duly made. “We think the scheme of the statute (Civil
Code, §2334) is to fix the jurisdiction in the county wherein the cause
of action originates when the company has an agent there, and to
constrain the bringing of it fin the county of the residence of such
company/ when it has no such agent. The word ‘may/ in the last
sentence of the section, has the force of ‘shall/ or else that sentence
adds nothing to the meaning of the law.” Per Little and Lewis, JJ.,
dissenting.
32. Residence of railroad corporations.

competent for the General Assembly to make the residence
corporation for the purposes of suit the same as that
which the lessor corporation had when the relation of lessor and
lessee originated.
By section 2335 of the Code, the lessee or person or corporation having possession of a railroad is liable to suit
in the same court or jurisdiction as was the lessor or owner before
the lease.
A declaration which names the defendant corporation
as lessee of a specified railroad, and which indicates that the defendant is in possession and operating the road, is to be construed
It is

of

a

lessee
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seeking to charge the defendant in its character as lessee, though
lease be set out or expressly alleged. As the statute virtually
makes the county of the principal office or place of business of
the lessor before the lease the county of the principal office or place
of business of the lessee, a declaration against the lessee, alleging
that its principal office within this State is in the county where
the suit is brought, shows jurisdiction over the person of the
lessee, though the latter be a foreign corporation. The lessee of a
line of railroad partly within this State and partly within the State of
Alabama is subject to suit here by an employee for a personal injury
sustained in Alabama while engaged in his duties as an employee upon
the line. Bleckley, C. J., said:
“By the Constitution, the county in
which a defendant is subject to be sued is ordinarily that in which he
resides, and no other. Code, §5874. But a person may be a resident
of two or more counties at the same time.
Code, §1825. Where a
railroad is not confined to one county, but extends from one to others,
so as to be partly in several, the owner may, relatively to causes of
action arising out of or connected with operating it, be treated by
the legislature as residing in each of the several counties in which
as

no

the road is located.

This has been done to

a

limited extent by cer-

provisions of the Code. Sections 2226, 2334. Where the owner
is a domestic corporation, the general rule of law that it resides also
where its principal office or place of business is situated still prevails.
The corporation has this common-law residence for general purposes,
in conjunction with the superadded statutory residences for special
purposes which the Code ascribes to it.
By making it a resident of
each and every county in which the road is located, for the purpose
of certain specified suits brought against it, the Code does not make it
cease to be a resident of the county in which its principal office or
place
of business is located, for all purposes whatsoever, including the same
classes of suits which, by reason of the special enactment, may be
brought against it elsewhere. The qualified residences do not absorb
or obliterate the unqualified one, either wholly or partially.
They
merely supplement, without otherwise affecting it. In this State
there is certainly legislative competency to establish this composite
system of residence for all railroad corporations which the General
Assembly has chartered. It follows, obviously, that there is like competency to make the residence of a lessee corporation, for the purposes
of suit, the same as that which the lessor corporation had when
the relation of lessor and lessee originated.
This has been done by
tain
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the Code, §2335, which declares that the lessees of any railroad, or
the person, or persons, or company having possession of the same,
shall be liable to suit of any kind in the same court or jurisdiction as
the lessors or owners of the railroad were before the lease.” Watson,

Cited, 94/783.
causes of action the section applies.
In Dietzen, 101/730, suit was brought in Richmond county, Georgia, to recover damages for ejection from a train in the State of
South Carolina. The defendant company was a foreign corporation,
having its principal office in the State of South Carolina, and having
an office in Richmond county, the only county of Georgia in which it
operated a railroad. It was held that section 2334 of the CiviL Code
refers to causes of action originating in the counties of this State, and
does not apply to causes of action arising outside the limits of the
91/222.

33. To what

State.

As to the

latter, the law in force at the time of the passage of
codified in section 2334, is not affected by

the Act of 1892, which is
the terms of that section.
34. Jurisdiction.
For

a

tort to

der this section,

personal property,

a

railroad

company

must, un-

be sued in the county where the tort was com-

mitted, if the company has an agent in that county; and, if the
action is within the

jurisdiction of ' a justice’s court, it may be
brought in the justice’s court of any militia district in which the company’s railroad is located. Simmons, C. J., said: “It has been held
by this court, in several cases, that, for the purposes of suit and of
taxation, a railroad company resides in every county through which it
runs.
The section requires that a railroad company shall be sued in
the county where the tort was committed, if the company has an agent
in that county. That is the residence fixed by the legislature for the
railroad company, for purposes of suit. If, therefore, the
company
resides in the county we see no reason why it may not be sued in a
justice’s court in any district through which it runs in the county.
If the running of the road through the county makes it a resident of
the county, it also makes it a resident of each district through which
the road runs.’’
Johnson, 96/655. Cited, 103/211.
The action, Gilbert, 104/412, was brought in Richmond county to
recover damages for personal injuries.
The petition alleged that the
plaintiff was a resident of Richmond county, that the principal office
of the defendant company was in the same county, and that the injuries occurred in the county of Columbia; but there was no allegation
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that the defendant did not have an agent in the latter county. The
defendant demurred to the petition, on the ground that it appeared

therefrom that the court had

jurisdiction of the cause of action,
brought in the superior court of
Columbia county.
It was held that the act requiring suits to be
brought in the county in which the cause of action originated, was
constitutional, and that in a suit against a railroad company in the
county where its principal office is located, by a plaintiff resident in
that county, the petition, alleging that the injury complained of occurred in another county, but failing to allege that there was no
agent of the railroad company in the latter county, failed to allege
sufficient facts to give the court jurisdiction, and should have been
dismissed on demurrer. Cobb, J., said: “It was further contended
no

and that the suit should have been

that the act under consideration
lated that

was

unconstitutional, because it vio-

provision of the Constitution which declares that ‘all other
civil suits [except certain ones previously enumerated] shall be tried
in the county where the defendant resides/
Civil Code, §5874. While
the case of Davis, 17/323, is not directly in point, we think the principle at the foundation of that decision is controlling on this question. It was there held that the act of the General Assembly which
permitted railroad companies to be sued in counties other than the
county in which the principal office of the company was located was
constitutional and valid, the ground upon which the decision was
based being that the General Assembly had a right to declare what was
the residence of all persons, both natural and artificial.
If the General Assembly could declare that a railroad company resided in every
county through which its lines of road run, it was undoubtedly within
its power to declare also that suits against railroad companies should
be brought in the counties where the cause of action in each case
arose.
The constitutional provision simply prescribes that the suits
must be brought in the county of the defendant’s residence, and the
whole subject of domicile and residence of persons, both natural and
artificial, is left to be determined by the General Assembly. The petition not alleging that there was no agent of the defendant in Columbia county, and the Act of 1892 not being in violation of the Constitution of the State in any way, there was no error in dismissing the
petition, notwithstanding that there was an allegation that the plaintiff resided in the county in which the suit was brought, the same being the county where the principal office of the defendant was located.”
Cited, 105/274, 486; 108/753.
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Pickett, 87/734, cattle were delivered to
be carried from Atlanta to Savannah. Suit

the railway

company to
brought in Fulton
county to recover for injury to them. It was held that the superior
court of the county in which delivery was made to the common earrier, and in which the violation of the carrier’s duty commenced, has
jurisdiction of the action, although the tort may have been only partially completed in that county, and its full completion took place in
another county. Lumpkin, J., said:
“The injury to plaintiffs’stock
began in Fulton county, before the train upon which they were loaded
left the city of Atlanta; and it is more than probable this injury materially contributed to, if it did not actually cause, the further damage
to the stock which occurred during the journey. It does not appear
in what county or counties these further injuries to the stock took
place; but, as the perpetration of the tort began in Fulton county, it
seems
entirely consistent both with law and common justice that
the action may be maintained in that county, although the tort may
not have been fully completed before the train had passed its limits.
Unquestionably plaintiffs can sue in Fulton county for any injury to
their property actually occasioned therein, and this they might do in
each county through which the train passed for injuries in such county
sustained; but what would be the sense or propriety of thus cutting up into several actions a cause or causes of complaint which
might as well be included in one, even if plaintiffs could know and
prove what injury or injuries their property sustained at partieular points along the journey, and in what county or counties
these points were located? As so doing would be exceedingly difficult, if not altogether impossible, we see no reason why plaintiffs
should be subjected to such unnecessary hardships, especially as it
could result in no fair or proper advantage to defendant.
Treating
the action as one for a tort, we may safely say, under the facts of this
case, it originated, and was properly brought, in Fulton • county.”
Where an action was brought for a failure to properly protect a
passenger, allegations of other conduct on the part of the employee
in charge of the train amounting to a similar failure of duty on the
same trip may be properly alleged as matter of aggravation.
A recovery may be had on account of such matters of aggravation, notwithstanding it appears at the trial that the conduct of the employees
relating to such matters occurred in a county other than that in which
the suit on the main cause of action was brought.
O’Bryan, 112/127.
was
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A company was sued for a homicide committed by its depot-agent
No matter where the contract of employment by the

in his office.

company with the agent was made, the homicide
the agent at the place where he was assigned to

being committed by
duty, and where he
was serving the company at the time of the wrongful act, the cause
of action originated at that place, and the superior court of that
county has jurisdiction. (Christian, 79/460.
35. Waiver of jurisdiction.
Where the alleged injury was in one county, and the suit was
brought in another, and these facts appeared on the face of the declaration, appearance and pleading to the merits, without objecting to
the jurisdiction, waived the objection, and the question could not be
raised at a subsequent term by withdrawing the plea and moving to
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. Suddetli, 86/388.
36. Proof of venue.
In DeBray, 71/406, it was insisted that the proof did not show
that the injury complained of was done in the county of Pike, the

37.Introducy

venue

of the action.

It

was

held that

no

issue

as

to the

venue was

made,

as the defendant had filed no plea to the jurisdiction. Were it
otherwise, the testimony showed that the injury was done at Barnesville, near the depot; and the court will take judicial cognizance of
the fact that Barnesville is in Pike county.
Cited, 77/587.
In Gamble, 77/584, it was held that where a declaration alleged
that the injury complained of was done in the county of Talbot, and
the proof showed that it occurred between two points, both located on
the line of the railroad in that county, this was sufficient proof of the
venue.
The courts will take judicial cognizance of the fact that

places named, where there are post-offices, are located in a certain
county. Unless the jurisdiction has been properly' denied by plea,
the venue laid in the declaration need not have been proved.
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Forrester, 11 East, 60. The defendant, for the purpose of repairing
house, which was close by the roadside, put a pole partly across
the street on his side, leaving free passage along the street on the

his

other side.

The plaintiff who was riding rapidly through the street
dusk, but before it was dark, not observing the obstruction, rode
violently against it and was injured. Lord Ellenborough said: “A
party is not to east himself upon an obstruction which has been made
by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do not himself
use common and ordinary caution to be in the right.
In cases of
at

persons riding upon what is considered the wrong side of the road,
that would not authorize another purposely to ride up against them.
One person being in fault will not dispense with another’s using ordi-

for himself. Two things must concur to support this acobstruction in the road, by the fault of the defendant, and
no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.”
In Bridge v. Grand Junction Railway Co., 3 M. & W. 248, it is
said “the rule of law is laid down with perfect correctness in the
case of Butterfield v. Forrester; and that rule is, that, although there
may have been negligence on the part of the plaintiff, yet, unless he
might by the exercise of ordinary care have avoided the consequences
of the defendant’s negligence, he is entitled to recover; if by ordinary
care he might have avoided them, he is the author of his own wrong.”

nary care

tion,

A

an

qualification of the general rule was enunciated in Davies v.
Mann, 10 M. & W. 5469. The plaintiff fettered the fore legs of his
donkey and turned him out to graze in the public highway. While
there, the defendant, who was driving recklessly, ran over the donkey.
Abinger, C. B., said: “As the defendant might, by proper care,
have avoided injuring the animal, and did not, he is liable for the
consequences of his negligence, though the animal may^ have been improperly there.” Parke, B., after referring to Butterfield v. Forrester and Bridge v. Grand June. R’way, as sustaining the plaintiff,
added: “Although the ass may have been wrongfully there, still the
defendant was bound to go along the road at such pace as would be
likely to prevent mischief.”
The Georgia statute of 1847 provided “that the several railroad
companies of this State shall be liable in law for any damage done to
live stock or other property by the running of the cars or locomotives
of said companies on their roads respectively.” It was said in Davis,
13/68, that the impression existed, that railroads, by virtue of their
charters, were exempted from the common-law rule, and negativing

CHAPTER 6.

§37]
Actions

that

[ 56

against railway companies —continued.

impression, the object of the Act of 1847 was to provide a new
remedy — the legislature did not intend to create a new liability, but
to declare the liability of railroads to the old common-law ride.
The
rule of common law is that all persons shall so use their own property
as not to injure that of another person.
They are bound to reasonable care and diligence, and will be liable for gross neglect. In cases
arising under this rule, the question is left to the jury, whether with
reference to the caution which a man of ordinary prudence would observe, the defendant has been guilty of gross negligence.
In such
eases, the plaintiff can not recover, if the injury complained of is
with his consent, or caused by his negligence. As modifications of
these rules it seems to be settled that if both plaintiff and defendant
are in default, the plaintiff can not recover, unless the injury was
intentional on the part of the defendant, or unless jt is impossible
with ordinary care and diligence for him to avoid the consequences of
defendant’s negligence. The above-mentioned
common-law cases,
with other authorities, were cited to support the decision.
In Brannan v. May, 17/136, it was held that to maintain an action
for an injury received from an obstruction in a highway, two things
must concur: an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff. This was an injury to property. In support of the decision
the court cites Butterfield v. Forrester and Bridge v. Grand June.
R’way Co., supra. They were the basis of the ruling, Bloomingdale,
74/614.
In Davis, 18/679, it was ruled that railroads were held to reasonable care and diligence, and that notwithstanding the plaintiff may not
be without fault, still if the injury could have been prevented, in the
exercise of proper and reasonable precaution on the part of the defendant, and was not, the defendant will be liable. Same principle,
Davis, 19/437.
In Winn, 19/440, it was held that when both parties are negligent,
and the plaintiff, in the exercise of common care and caution, could
have avoided the injury, he shall not be entitled to recover of the
defendant, notwithstanding he was also in fault. In this case, and
Davis, 18/679, supra, the same rule is applied to both parties. It is
a useful and
salutary principle, that in order to entitle a party to
damages, he must not be, directly nor indirectly, the author of his
own
wrong. He must not voluntarily incur the injury of which he
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complains; and not to prevent it by ordinary care, is to court it. Citing Brannan v. Mays and Butterfield v. Forrester, supra.
In McElmurry, 24/75, the rule was stated to be that although the
plaintiff he somewhat at fault, yet if the defendant be grossly negligent, and thereby occasioned or did not prevent the mischief, the
action may be maintained.
In Winn, 26/250, the verdict was complained of as being excessive.
Lumpkin, J., said: “It has been argued that inasmuch as there was
fault on both sides, that the misconduct of the plaintiff should mitigate the damages; and, at first, I was inclined to adopt this suggestion.
In a proper case, I am inclined to think the principle is a
correct one.”
Mr. Justice Benning dissented and in his opinion said:
“I think I am justified in concluding, that if there is, in cases like
the present, negligence on both sides, the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover damages for the whole loss, but only for the part of the loss
which results from the defendant’s share in the negligence; in other
words, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover only such an amount of
damages as shall bear to the whole loss the same proportion which
the defendant’s share in the negligence bears to the whole negligence.”
In Davis, 27/113, Mr. Justice Benning adhered to his opinion in
Winn’s

case.

The other members of the court knew of

no

rule for

graduating the damages in that way, and in their opinion said: “But
if the parties are not equally in the wrong, how can the damages be
apportioned ? It would be difficult to set off negligence against negligence and apportion the damage. He who is guilty of the greater
negligence or wrong must be considered the original aggressor, and
accountable accordingly.”
In Flanders v. Meath, 27/358, Lumpkin, J., said: “There was
a
principle referred to in Winn, supra> which we hold to be sound
law
although we did not think it applicable to the facts of that
case
where both parties are in fault, but the defendant most so, the
fault of the plaintiff may go in mitigation of damages.”
In Kenney, 28/111, it was held that if the person who is injured
is himself culpable, the damages, if any, should not be as large as if
—

—

he had been free from fault.
38. Such

was the state of the law on this
subject when the first
Georgia took effect. From the Act of 1853-4 as extended
by the codifiers, and from the foregoing decisions, three sections of
the Code of 1863 were evolved. They have undergone no change and

Code of

are as

follows:
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§2321. Damages by the running of cars, etc. A railroad company
damage done to persons, stock or other property by the running of the locomotives, or cars, or other machinery of
such company, or for damage done by any person in the employment
and service of such company, unless the company shall make it appear
that their agents have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and
diligence, the presumption in all cases being against the company.
§ 2322. Consent or negligence. No person shall recover damage
from a railroad company for injury to himself or his property, where
the same is done by his consent, or is caused by his own negligence.
If the complainant and the agents of the company are both at fault,
the former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished by the
jury in proportion to the amount of default attributable to him.
§ 3830. Diligence of plaintiff. If the plaintiff by ordinary care
could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant’s negligence, he is not entitled to recover. But in other cases the
defendant is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have
contributed to the injury sustained
39. These sections are in pari materia, and the principles embraced
in them may be stated in this form:
1. A railroad company shall be liable for any damage done to persons, stock, or other property—
(1) By the running of its locomotives or cars, or other machinery; or,
(2) By any person in its employment and service; and,
(3) In all such cases the presumption shall be against the comshall be liable for any

.

pany.
2. But the

plaintiff shall not recover—
(1) If the company shall make it appear that its agents have
exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence; or,
(2) If the injury to himself or his property is done by his consent;

3.

or,

(3) Is caused by his own negligence; or,
(4) If both parties were at fault and he by ordinary care could
have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant’s negligence.
If the plaintiff and the agents of the company were both at fault
and the* plaintiff may in some way have contributed to the
injury, and he could not have avoided the consequences to
himself caused by the defendant’s negligence if he had exer-
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ordinary care, he may recover, but the damages shall be
by the jury in proportion to the amount of default

diminished

attributable to him.
40. Construction

of the sections.

Johnson, 38/409, McCay, J., said: “Taken together, as we
understand the two sections, 2322 and 3830, the rule is this: If the
In

plaintiff, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided the consequences to himself of the defendant’s negligence, he can not recover
at all.
But in other cases (that is, in cases where by ordinary care
he could not have avoided the consequences of defendant’s negligence)
the circumstance that the plaintiff may have in some way contributed
to the injury sustained shall not entirely relieve the defendant, but
the damages shall be apportioned according to the amount of default
attributable to each.”
Cited, 64/479; 70/222; 71/441; 74/611;
101/221; 104/246.
In Neely, 56/540, the plaintiff hobbled his mule and turned her
and a colt out to graze. Both went upon the track of the railroad at
night, and were struck by a passing train. The mule was killed, and
the colt ruined. The engineer discovered them as far ahead of the
engine as the headlight would enable him to see. He immediately
reversed his engine, blew on the brakes, and make every effort to stop
the train, but was unsuccessful, owing to the grade down which he
was running.
When he first discovered the animals on the track,
some sixty to seventy-five yards ahead of him, he whistled continuously for the purpose of frightening them off. Plaintiff lived near
the railroad.
The engineer testified that, as the train approached the
mule appeared to be making great efforts to move from the track,
and he thought she would have done so had she not been hobbled.
The plaintiff swore that the hobbling did not affect her powers of
locomotion. The jury evidently apportioned the damages. It was
held that the company’s agents were not wanting in ordinary care or
reasonable diligence, and that the verdict which was rendered on the
basis of contributory negligence could not be upheld, as the burden
of proof cast by law on the defendant had been successfully carried,
and that ordinary domestic animals and railroad-trains are equally
free, as respects each other, to pass over uninclosed lands. If they
come in collision with damage to either, the diligence of their respective owners will become material on the question of compensation.
Bleckley, J., said: “Corporations are not bound to fence their lines,
nor farmers to confine their ordinary domestic animals.
Nor is it
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incumbent upon either to prevent trains and animals from crossing
each other’s track.
A locomotive and a mule may well pass over
the

same ground, so that they pass at different moments of time.
If,
however, they contend for the same place at the same instant, and a
collision ensues, with damage to either, the diligence of their respective owners may be challenged and compared. In two respects the
comparison will influence the pecuniary consequences of the collision;
it will decide whether any compensation is flue to the owner of the
injured property, and if any, whether it should be full or only partial.
In advance of all testimony on the point of diligence, our law, Civil
Code 2321, presumes that the corporation was altogether in fault.
From this it results, that until evidence is brought forward which vindicates the company’s diligence or impeaches that of the other party,
the company has no claim to compensation, when the property injured
is the locomotive or cars; and that, when the property injured is the
mule, the owner of it is entitled, prima facie, to compensation in full.
Supposing the action to be, as in the present case, for killing the mule,
the killing established and value proved, the company opens its defense with a complete case against it for full damages. To change
that case into one for no damages at all (granting the mule to have
been killed and of some value) the evidence must make out one of
three propositions: That the plaintiff consented to the injury, or that
he caused it by his own negligence, or that the agents of the company
exercised all ordinary care and reasonable diligence.
Civil Code,
§§ 2321, 2322. If the plaintiff consented to the injury the matter is
plain. If his own negligence was the sole and only cause of it, there
is still no difficulty; for the establishment of that affirmation either
negatives the fact of negligence on the part of the company’s agents,
or renders the fact immaterial.
Of course, however negligent these
agents might have been, if the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole
cause of the injury, their
negligence was no part of the cause; hence
its immateriality. If the plaintiff neither consented to nor caused
the injury, care and diligence of the company’s agents must be shown
to have been ordinary and reasonable.
Ho less degree will suffice for
complete exoneration. If that degree can not be established, the
plaintiff must recover something; and the question will be, whether
his recovery can be reduced to partial compensation only. Rut one
thing will so reduce it; and that is, proof of contributory negligence
on his
part. For the same reason that recovery is wholly defeated
when his negligence is shown to have been the sole cause of the injury,
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it will be defeated in

part when his negligence is shown to have been
part of the cause. However slight, it will count against him, and
though the company be chargeable with something, he, on the other
hand, must lose something. For the apportionment of damages according to the relative fault of the parties, there seems to be no standard more definite than the enlightened opinion of the jury.
Civil
Code, §2322. But it should not be overlooked that the defendant is
not to be deemed at fault at all, unless there was a failure to exercise

and reasonable diligence. For simply falling short of
extraordinary care and diligence, the defendant is not
liable even to contribute.” In Lavier, 71/222, this decision is approved
and declared to be the law of the State. Cited, 68/748; 70/222,
235; 71/222, 440; 74/611; 60/341; 61/154; 76/217; 95/290;
106/789.
41. Subject continued.
In Stewart, 71/428, it was held that sections 2322 and 3830 of
the Code are in pari materia, but not identical. They provide for '
separate defenses to suits against railroads. The first applies where
the person injured causes the injury to himself, or consents thereto;
the second applies where the consequences of the present or antecedent negligence of the defendant are impending, but may be
avoided by ordinary care on the part of the other party. Both inelude the doctrine of contributory negligence, and provide for a recovery in part, in case the negligence of both parties contributed to
the injury.
Jackson, C. J., said: “The meaning of section 3830 is
clear, as held by this court in Neely, supra, that where defendant has,
by its negligence, brought impending danger on plaintiff, he must
get out of the way, if he can by ordinary care avoid the consequences
of that danger to himself.” Cited, 74/613; 101/221.
It is true, as stated above, that both sections 2322 and 3830 include
the doctrine of contributory negligence, but they do not relate to distinct cases
they both deal with the one ease to which the doctrine
applies. It is this: If both parties are at fault and the plaintiff,
by ordinary care, could not have avoided the consequences to himself
of defendant’s negligence, he may recover, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of default atordinary

care

extreme and

—

tributable to him.
In

Luckie, 87/6, it was held that upon the trial of a suit against a
for personal injuries to the plaintiff, it was error
charge as follows: “If, by the exercise of ordinary care and dili-

railroad company
to
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genee, the plaintiff could have avoided the consequences to
of the defendant’s negligence, she can not recover; but if both

herself

parties
were at fault, and the alleged injury was the result of the fault of
both, then, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence, she would be
entitled to recover, but the amount of the recovery would be abated
in proportion to the amount of the default on her part.”
The error
consisted in stating, in immediate connection with each other, and
without proper explanation, two distinct rules of law, and thus qualifying the former by the latter, which is not the purpose of the statute.
Lumpkin, J., said: “Section 3830 of the Code, relating to actions for
personal injuries, declares, in substance, that if the plaintiff, by ordinary care, could have avoided the consequences to himself caused
by the defendant’s negligence, he can not recover. This section sets
forth one of the defenses which railroad companies are permitted to
make to such actions.
It further provides: ‘But in other cases the
defendant is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have
contributed to the injury sustained.’
The ‘other cases’ referred to
are manifestly those in which the plaintiff could not by ordinary care
have avoided the consequences of defendant’s negligence.
In cases
of that kind, both parties being at fault, the damages are apportioned.
This also is undoubtedly the meaning of the latter sentence of sectfon 2322 of the Code, which reads as follows: ‘If the complainant
and the agents of the company are both at fault, the former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion
to the amount of default attributable to him.’
to the

same

kind of ‘other cases’ which

that is, cases in which it appears

are

This sentence relates

referred to in section 3830;

that the plaintiff could not, by exercising ordinary care, have avoided the injury to himself caused by
defendant's negligence.
It seems to be the clear meaning of our law
that the plaintiff can never recover in an action for personal injuries,
no matter what the negligence of the defendant
may be, short of
actual wantonness, when the proof shows he could, by ordinary care,
after the negligence of defendant began or was existing, have avoided
the consequences to himself of that negligence. The law also clearly
contemplates cases in which, while the plaintiff is to some extent
negligent, he nevertheless could not, by using ordinary care, have
avoided an injury resulting from defendant's negligence.
Of course
there can be no recovery when the defendant is entirely free from
negligence, and uses all proper care to prevent injury. The law of
contributory negligence is applicable only where both parties are at
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fault, and when, also, the plaintiff could not, by ordinary care, have
avoided the injury which defendant’s negligence produced.
The
charge given by the judge below, in effect, makes the defendant liable
if the jury should find both parties negligent, notwithstanding they

might have believed that if the plaintiff had exercised ordinary care
she would not have been hurt.
He correctly charged the law set forth
in section 3830, but improperly qualified it by charging the law contained in the latter half of section 2322, without making the proper
explanation as to the class of cases to which this latter charge is applicable. If he had said: ‘But if both parties were at fault, and the
alleged injury was the result of the fault of both, and you find from
the evidence that the plaintiff could not by ordinary care have avoided
the alleged injury to herself, occasioned by defendant’s negligence,
then, notwithstanding she may have been to some extent negligent,
she would be entitled to recover, but the amount of damages should be
apportioned,’ etc., the charge would have been correct, because it
would have fully met all the requirements of the sections referred
to.”
Cited, 95/291; 97/489; 99/229; 101/221, 422; 102/487;
103/658; 104/225, 245; 108/91.
The law embraced in section 3830 and the latter part of section
2322 of the Code should not be given in immediate connection with
each other, without making the proper explanation as to the class of
eases to which the latter section is applicable.
Moore, 99/229.
In Roberts, 104/805, they were fairly given by the court separately
and distinctly and not in immediate connection one with the other.
The two sections are separate and distinct, and it is not the purpose of these statutes to qualify the one by the other.
The ruling
made in Luckie’s case, supra, has been steadily adhered to by the
court, and was followed in Holmes, infra. Rogers, 104/224.
In Holmes, 103/655, it was held that in a suit against a streetrailroad company for personal injuries resulting by its car coming in
contact with one who was undertaking to cross its track, the plaintiff
can not recover, if,
by the exercise of ordinary care, he could have
avoided the consequences of defendant’s negligence at any time after
such negligence had become apparent, or he had reason to apprehend
its existence.
The following charge of the court, without qualification,
was therefore error:
“Indeed, the plaintiff could recover, if the injury was inflicted under these circumstances, if his going upon the
track had been in the exercise of ordinary care, notwithstanding he
may have been himself in some degree of negligence.
If his going
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was proper,

under the evidence, in that it

was

not

contrary to the exercise of ordinary care, and he was injured thereafter, he would be entitled to recover, even though you should believe he
was at some fault himself, in failing to avoid the injury.”
After the

plaintiff has become apprised of the existence of defendant’s negligence of which he complains, if he could avoid its consequences by the
exercise of ordinary diligence, and fails to do so, such negligence on
his part will defeat a recovery. It was therefore error for the court
to charge the jury as follows:
“If he (the plaintiff) was advised of
the defendant’s negligence, the moment he was so advised, or the moment he had reason to apprehend the defendant’s negligence, he was
bound from that moment to exercise ordinary diligence to keep from
receiving any injury by reason of the negligence of defendant; and,
to the extent he failed to exercise such diligence, he would be negligent. Such negligence would not defeat his recovery, but would lessen it in accordance with what you believe its proportion bore to the
defendant’s negligence.” Lewis, J., said: “Some confusion is liable
to arise, even in the legal mind, on account of the apparent conflict
in the two provisions of the Civil Code — one relating to the doctrine
of contributory negligence, which does not necessarily defeat a recovery, but reduces the amount which the plaintiff would otherwise be
entitled to recover; the other relating to the rule upon the subject of
exercising ordinary care to avoid an injury, and declaring a failure in
this particular on the part of the plaintiff will entirely defeat a
recovery.
A party can not be charged with the duty of using any
degree of care or diligence to avoid the negligence of a
wrong-doer until he has reason to apprehend the existence of
such negligence.
No one can be expected to guard against
what he does not see, and can not foretell. The rule, therefore,
which requires one to exercise ordinary care and diligence to avoid
the consequences of another’s negligence, necessarily applies to a case
where there is opportunity of exercising this diligence after the negligence has begun, and has become apparent.
On the other hand,
while the facts and circumstances of the case might show that the
injured party could not have avoided, by the exercise of due care, the
consequence of the wrong-doer’s act, yet they may further show that
the plaintiff, by his own negligence, contributed to the injury; as, for
instance, where one voluntarily places himself in a place of peril, but
at the same time there is nothing to put him upon notice of any
negligent act of a wrong-doer which really caused the injury. The ef-

«*
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feet of the

contributory negligence of the plaintiff in such a case
defeat, but simply to diminish, a recovery for the injury sustained. Applying this principle to the charge of the court
first above quoted, there was manifest error. Under the instruction
of the court, if the plaintiff had been in the exercise of due care up to
the time of going upon the track, no amount of negligence on his
part thereafter could possibly have defeated a recovery. Of course,
there was as much reason for the plaintiff to exercise ordinary care
and diligence to avoid the consequences of the defendant’s act after
he was on the track as there was before he placed himself in this perilous position.
In the first portion of the second charge quoted, the
law is correctly stated, but in the latter part of the quotation a principle was enunciated directly in conflict with the law; for the court
charged the jury, in effect, that the plaintiff, from the time he was
apprised of defendant’s negligence, or had reason to apprehend it,
was bound to exercise ordinary diligence to avoid the consequences
of such negligence, ‘and, to the extent he failed to exercise such diligence, he would be negligent.’ This was immediately followed by
the declaration that such negligence (i. e. a failure to exercise ordinary diligence to avoid the injury) would not defeat his recovery
whereas he should have charged exactly the opposite.” Cited, 104/225.
It was held in Watson, 104/243, that it was, in the trial of an
action for damages to personalty against a railroad company, erroneous, after reading section 2322 of the Civil Code, to charge, without qualification or explanation, as follows: “That is what we call
contributory negligence. If both parties are at fault, the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover, but the jury would have the right to
6cale his damages.” Little, J., said: “This charge, while the statement of a correct legal proposition, does not measure the right of
recovery in such cases, and, if left to stand alone, is error.
Its legal
effect is to establish the proposition that, without qualification, whenever the plaintiff and the agents of the company were both at fault,
the plaintiff might recover, but the jury would have the right to lessen his damages.
While this principle is contained in the section of
the Code above referred to, there is another provision of law which
the judge probably overlooked in his charge. That is to say, if the
plaintiff, by ordinary care, could have avoided the consequences to
himself caused by the defendant’s negligence, he is not entitled to
recover.
These sections of the Code are not in conflict. They must
both be allowed to stand as the law governing cases of this character,
would not he to
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and when construed with reference to each
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other, the provision of law

at fault, the plaintiif may nevertheless
cases be diminished by the jury
of default attributable to him, but, if
the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences to
himself caused by the defendant’s negligence, he is not entitled to
recover at all.
Civil Code, §3830.”
In Gibson, 97/489, Simmons, C. J., said: “In the case of Luckie,
this court, construing sections 3830 and 2322 of the Code, held, in
substance, that the plaintiif in an action against a railroad company
for personal inj'uries can not recover, even though the company may
have been negligent, if, after the negligence of the defendant began
or was existing, the person inj'ured could, by
ordinary care, have
avoided the consequences to himself of that negligence; also that, if
the person inj'ured could not, by the exercise of ordinary care, have
avoided the injury, and the injury resulted from the defendant’s negligence, he can recover, although to some extent negligent himself,
but the amount of the recovery should be diminished in proportion to
the amount of fault attributable to him; and that this latter rule is
not a qualification of the former.
The first rule prevents his recovery
at all, if, by ordinary care, he could have avoided the injury; the second allows him to recover, although negligent himself, if he could not,
by the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided it.” Cited, 102/487.
42. Applicable to injuries to property as well as to person.
In Neely, 56/544, Bleckley, J., said: “Section 3830 applies, in
terms, to personal injuries, and if its meaning can be extended to
injuries affecting property, it would seem to be applicable only where
the plaintiff’s duty is to act after the defendant’s negligence has commenced and become apparent. When the consequences of a present
or antecedent negligence are impending, whoever can shun them
by
ordinary care, and fails to do so, ought not, perhaps, to be heard to
complain of them, whether they touch his person or property.”
In Stewart, 71/447, Jackson, C. J., said:
“It is true that in
Neely’s case property alone was involved, but the construction is applied to persons as well as property. I know of no case wherein this
that, when both parties

are

recover, and the damage shall
in proportion to the amount

in such

construction has been reviewed and reversed in terms.”

It is true, as stated

by Bleckley, J., in Neely, supra:, that section
applies in terms to personal injuries. That section was formulated by the codifiers from prior decisions of the Supreme Court of
"•he State, which, in turn, were based upon decisions of the English
3830
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In some of the English, and also in some of the Georgia, decisions, the principle was applied in cases where property was involved. In Davis’s case, 13/68, 18/679, 27/113, the action was for
courts.

killing

slave and injuring a carriage, and in Brannan v. May,
mules. There can be no doubt that from
decisions on which they were based, section 3830 was derived.
The principle was of too great importance,
and was too well settled, when the first Code of Georgia was adopted,
to admit of the thought that there was any purpose on the part of
the codifiers to limit the scope of its operation in shaping and locating that section.
In Miller v. Smythe, 95/288, it was held that the principle that
“if the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the conseqnences to himself caused by the defendant’s negligence, he is not
entitled to recover,” is applicable as well to injuries to property as
to injuries to person.
This was an action by a tenant against a landlord to recover damages caused to goods by the negligence of the landlord in failing to repair shelves in a store.
43. Principle is of general applicability.
In Evans, 108/270, which was an action to recover damages for a
personal injury, Lewis, J., said: “There can be no doubt about the
soundness of the principle, that if this injury was caused by the plaintiff’s own negligence, or if she could have avoided the same by the
exercise of ordinary care and diligence, she can not recover. This
principle constitutes a valid defense in all actions of this kind,
whether against an individual, a county, a municipality, or a corpoa

supra, the injury was to two
these cases and the English

ration.
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44. Damages by running of cars, etc. A railroad company shall
be liable for any damage done to persons, stock, or other property, by
the running of the locomotives, or cars, or other machinery of such
company, or for damage done by any person in the employment and
service of such company, unless the company shall make it-appear

that their agents

have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and
diligence, the presumption in all cases being against the company.
Civil Code, §2321.
45. What railroad companies are embraced in this section.
Under the Constitution of this State, the superior courts have no authority to grant charters to railroad companies. A company to which
a charter was granted by the superior court for the
purpose of “carrying on the general business of sawing all kinds of lumber by machinery
run
by steam, or such power as may be best adapted to the business, to
place said lumber on the market,” etc., is not a railroad company,
although, according to its charter, it had authority “to buy, lease,
sell, use, and operate locomotives and railroad-engines on tramroads
and railroads; to build, construct, and project railroads and tram-

69

CHAPTER 7.

]
Actions

[ § 46

against railway companies—continued.

roads

contiguous to, and in connection with, and for the purpose of
furthering, facilitating, and more readily and easily carrying on, the
aforesaid business of sawing, manufacturing, etc., as proposed.” The
fact that such company did, on some occasions, transport passengers
and freight for hire, did not make it a railroad company, as to one of
its own employees who was injured by the movement of a locomotive
at a time, and upon an occasion, when the company was in no sense
engaged in transacting business as a carrier for the public, and section 2321 is not applicable to an action against such a company by'
one

of its employees.

Ellington

v.

Beaver Dam Company, 93/53.

Cited, 112/289.
The Georgia Marble Company had no charter as a railroad company, but was acting as a railroad qompany by running and operating
a railroad and running a train of cars thereon, and hauling freight
for itself and others. Whilst thus engaged, a brakeman was injured
by the negligence of the engineer, and suit was brought to recover
damages. It was held that the liability of the defendant was referable to the general law bearing upon the relation of master and servant; for, while the defendant was engaged in running and operating
a railway-train, it was a mere
private institution, not operated under
and by virtue of any franchise granted by the State, and therefore,
does not fall within the provisions of the Code imposing liability
upon railroad companies in favor of an employee injured, when without fault himself, in consequence of the negligence of a fellow servant.
Taylor v. Georgia Marble Co., 99/512.
The case of Gunn, 74/509, was an action of trespass on the case
for

personal injury caused by the careless running of a boat on
plaintiff was a passenger. The action was against the Central
Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia and Whitesides. It was
alleged that they were partners in running the boat. The declaration
a

which

demurred to,

and the case was dismissed, on the ground that the
corporation did not confer upon it the power to form
a partnership; that its acts and contracts
pertaining to the business
of such an association are invalid as against the firm and the corporation as a member thereof, and that it is not liable to an action for a
tort arising from a breach of duty created by a contract, of such
a firm.
Cited, 75/569.
46. Where one company allows the use of its franchises and road
by another company.
Hull & Co. were the contractors for constructing the Macon and
was

charter of the
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Augusta Railroad. Printup was superintendent of construction under Hull & Co., and Hazlehurst was a member of that firm, and he
also

president and chief engineer of the railroad company. Dethe engineer of an engine employed by Hull & Co. Mayes
was a hand employed in laying the railroad-track.
The fireman
on
DeBogan’s engine was sick, and Mayes, under orders from
Printup, took his • place. On the day involved, Hazlehurst was
on the engine which was going towards Milledgeville.
The evidence
was conflicting as to whether the road had been entirely completed
and formally turned over by the contractors to the railroad company.
There was an excursion train, which belonged to the Georgia Railroad, running on the road towards the DeBogan engine. It was run
without legislative authority, at the instance of Hull & Co., and was
passing over the road by invitation — whether of Hull & Co., or of
Tyler, vice-president of the railroad company, the testimony was conflicting. The train and the DeBogan engine collided, Mayes was injured, and he brought suit against the Macon and Augusta Railroad
Company. It was held, that, when a railroad company permits other
companies or persons to exercise the franchise of running cars drawn
by steam over its road, the company owning the road, and to which
the law has entrusted the franchises, is liable for any injury done, as
though the company owning the road were itself running the cars.
McCay, <7., said: “To pass over the road with steam-cars, from
point to point, for the purpose of carrying Hazlehurst, was a use of
the franchise of operating the railroad by steam, and the corporation is
liable no matter who did it. The case might be different if the contractors were in the prosecution of their proper work, as moving
dirt, etc., under circumstances, when they were not exercising the
franchise of the company in operating the road by steam-cars, so as to
do that which, without the franchise, would be a nuisance.”
Mayes,
49/355. Cited, 62/691; 70/467; 79/244, 489; 85/494; 90/203;
93/488; 97/27, 780. In Mayes’s case there was no legislative authority for the company that was using the road, to use the franchise.
Banks, 112/657.
In an action brought by a passenger, it was held that a railroad
company which has leased its road, cars and engines, and allows the
lessee company to operate the same in the name of the lessor company, is liable to third persons or the public for the carelessness and
negligence of the lessee company, in the absence of statutory provision
to the contrary.
A railroad company can not, without special au-

was

Bogan

was

r
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thority of statute, alienate its franchise or property acquired under
the right of eminent domain, or essential to the performance of its
duty to the public, whether by sale, mortgage or lease. The original
obligation of a railroad company to the public can not be discharged
except by legislative enactment consenting to and authorizing the
lease, with an exemption granted to the lessor company from liability.
Legislative consent to the lease is not alone sufficient.

There must be

release from the

obligations of the company to the public. Singleton, 70/464. Cited, 85/494; 93/488; 97/28. The duty of safely
transporting Singleton was a duty owing to the public as such, in the
exercise of one of its most important franchises — the transportation
of passengers. There is a distinction between the rights of a passenger and those of an employee of the lessee as against the lessor company. Banks, 112/659.
A chartered railroad company permitting a construction company
to use its franchises by running passenger-trains over and upon its
railway is responsible for torts to persons not connected with either
company negligently committed by the servants engaged in such running; and these servants, by whomsoever employed, are to be deemed
and treated, relatively to the public, as the servants of the railroad
company. Whitehead, 89/190.
A railway company permitting, by contract or otherwise, another
railway company to use a section of its main line, not at a terminal
point, but to reach such point, is liable to one of its own employees
for a personal injury resulting to him from the negligence of the latter company in running its train over and upon the section used in
common by both' companies; it not appearing that the negligent company had any legislative authority to adopt and use as its own any
part of the main line of the other company. In such case, both companies should be considered as using the franchise of the one owning
the line, and the principle of Mayes, 49/355, applies. Passmore,
90/203. Cited, 97/780.
a

Where the contract between the railroad and construction companies

provided that the latter should operate the railroad so as to be
completed and equipped for two years, and should receive the earnings, the railroad company was liable for injuries occurring by the
negligence of the construction company during that period; such
operation being by virtue of the franchise of the railroad company,
and .with its knowledge and sanction. Liddell, 85/482.
Cited,
93/488; 97/27, 780.
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A chartered railroad company permitting
over its railway, and thus to use its

another company to run
franchise, is liable to a
passenger upon one of such trains for a personal injury sustained by
him by reason of a derailment resulting from negligence in failing to
have and maintain a safe track. Phinizee, 93/488.
Cited, 97/27,
trains

780.

The suit Davis

was brought against the CenGeorgia Railroad for the killing of a bull on
the track of the Central by the engine and cars of the Georgia Railroad. The court required the plaintiffs to elect which road they
would proceed against, and they elected to proceed against the Georgia Railroad. It was held, that whether or not a suit could be
brought against both companies jointly, or whether or not it was
proper to require the plaintiff to elect, no injury resulted from it.
The .plaintiff having elected to proceed against the company whose
train caused the injury, if that company was not liable, the company
which merely owned the track would not be so, and therefore no harm
v.

Hatcher, 75/645,

tral Railroad and the

was

done.

47. Joint

of tracks at terminal points in a city.
depot and track used in common by two chartered railroad companies (in the city where their lines connect) though belonging to
one of them
exclusively, may be considered as belonging to each relatively to its own operations and business. Each must protect its
own passengers from the other’s
negligence, so long as passengers are
in their proper places, but not when they are out of place.
Perry,
58/461. Cited, 79/489.
use

A

In

Friddell, 79/489, it

was

held that two

or more

chartered rail-

way companies whose lines terminate at the same point, that is, at
the same town or city, are not bound as a matter of law to have and
use

separate terminal facilities, hut

use

the

the corporate limits,
common
ownership,
and when they do so, a track thus used, though the exclusive
property
of one of the companies, is, for the time being, the track of each company so using it, and the proprietary company is not responsible to its
employees for personal injuries which they sustain solely by reason
of the negligent use of the track by the
employees of another company.
The risk of service covers it. The redress for such
injuries is against
the company whose employees are at fault.
To passengers the rule
of liability would be different. In such use of a common track belonging to the companies jointly, or tracks in common belonging to
same

track in

common

may, within
with or without

73

CHAPTER 7.

]
Actions

[ § 48

against railway companies—continued.

them

severally, each company would be upon its own franchise. It
exercising the franchise of the other company. That is
the distinction. Where numerous railways connect in the same city,
the city is a common station for all; and interchange in the use of
tracks is a needful practice for the accommodation of traffic. It promotes the common interest of the companies, and the interest of the
public, and employees who are unwilling to expose themselves to the
would not be

risk of

so

reasonable

a

method of business

are

not abreast with the exi-

gencies of railway service. In Mayes, 49/355, the negligent company
was using the franchise as well as the track of the proprietary company. In Perry, 58/461, 66/746, the injury was to a passenger.
In Coggin, 62/685, the negligence was by an employee of the proprietary company, and the injury was to an employee of a telegraph
company.
48. When lessee is lialle.

The

Georgia Southern Railroad was leased by authority of law to
Jones brought suit against the company and the
lessees for an injury sustained by him as a track-hand in the service
of the lessees, whilst they were operating the road and it was in their
possession. The injury was caused by the negligence of a coemployee. The attempt to serve the lessee failed, and the case proceeded
against the company alone. A nonsuit was granted, as the plaintiff
was the servant of the lessees and not of the company, which was the
only defendant before the court, and the evidence failed to show
either that he was without negligence or that there was negligence on
the part of his fellow servants. Jones, 66/558. Cited, 70/472.
Jones was a servant of the lessee and not a passenger. A different
rule applies to passengers. Banks, 112/657.
In Banks, 112/655, it appeared that the defendant, under legislative authority, leased its franchises and road to the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Company.
There was no statutory exemption
absolving the lessor company from liability. The plaintiff was an
employee of the lessee, and was injured by the negligence of a coemployee. It was held that the defendant was not liable for the homicide. A distinction was drawn between the rights of a passenger and
those of an employee of the lessee as against the lessor company, the
duty of safely transporting a passenger being a duty owing to the
public as such in the exercise of the franchise for the transportation
Walker & Tucker.

of passengers.

§§ 49, 50 ]

CHAPTER 7.
Actions against

In

[ 74

railway companies—continued.

Whitehead, 74/442, the injury complained of occurred at a

station

the

Augusta and Savannah Railroad. The plaintiff amendby alleging that the defendant was the lessee of the Augusta and
Savannah Railroad. The amendment was properly allowed. It was
held by a majority of the court, Hall, J., dissenting, that the fact of
the lease might be proved without producing the writing. Jackson,
C. J., said: “Nothing in the writing can possibly prevent the liability of the actual carrier holding itself out to the public as such,
if it be negligent. As between itself and the lessee, it might regulate
the payment of damages. • As respects the public it can not.
So if
the lease showed that the lessor had to pay all the damages, it could
not alter the responsibility of the actual carrier.”
77/807.
In an action for damages for personal injuries, caused by the negligence of a railroad company, where the declaration contains two
counts
one that the defendant
company was operating the road on
which the injury occurred under a lease; the other that it was using,
controlling, and running the road, without specifying the form of
contract or agreement — it is sufficient to sustain a verdict, if the
evidence shows that the defendant was using and controlling the
road. Gamble, 77/584.
49. When owner is in possession, no presumption of a lease.
When a railroad company chartered by a public law of this State is
in fact in open possession and use of its own line, there is no presumption that another company, who sends an engineer with an engine to
haul the trains temporarily, has leased the road from the proprietary
company, or is otherwise using its franchises, although another company may own a majority of the stock, vote the same at stockholders’
meetings, thus electing such directors and officers as it sees fit, and
has and uses a connecting line, and pays habitually from its regular
pay-car the operatives of its ally or dependent.
It is the duty of an
engineer running trains upon a chartered railroad to know who is in
possession of the line and its franchises, or to use due diligence to
ascertain; a public law of this State putting him upon notice of the
ownership. Dunlap, 81/136.
50. Common carriers judicially noticed.
Railroad companies of this State, having charters which authorize
them to take private property for public purposes, are common carriers in conducting their freight and passenger business, and so are
their lessees, when engaged in such business in the use and exercise
of the franchises of the companies, respectively.
The fact that they
on

ed

—
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such carriers may

be judicially noticed, without being expressly
It would be better, however, to allege plainly all such important facts, and relieve the parties and the courts of the time and
labor which must be spent in disposing of questions arising from a
failure to do so. Caldwell, 89/550.
51. Where neither company loses its identity.
Although one railroad may be leased to and operated by another,
by which the latter makes itself responsible for acts done on the road
leased, yet neither loses its identity, and any tort committed upon the '
line of the one or the other should be so alleged and proved. Especially is this true where both roads are constructed through the territory of the same country. Brinson, 64/475.
52. Consolidation of corporations.
Where, by reason of the consolidation of two corporations, one of
them goes entirely out of existence, and no arrangements are made
respecting the liabilities of the one which ceases to exist, the corporation resulting from such combination will, as a general rule, be entitled to all the property, and answerable for all the liabilities, of the
corporation thus absorbed.
are

pleaded.

Where

a

statute authorizes the consolidation of two railroad compa-

nies

“upon such terms as may be agreed upon,” and does not declare
existing liabilities or obligations of either shall be settled or
performed, and a consolidation thereunder between two such companies is effected by a written contract providing for the absorption of
one of them by the other, but making no provision at all for a certain class of liabilities existing against the absorbed company, these
liabilities become binding upon the new or surviving company — at
least, to the extent of the assets of the absorbed company, or of its
ability to perform the contracts out of which such liabilities arose.
Where an agreement between two such companies, designated respectively as the “first party” and the “second party,” in effect provided that the second party should cease to exist, and that all its
property, rights, and franchises should go to the first party, and stipulated that “the first party hereby assumes the payment of all and
every indebtedness and liability of the second party; it being understood, and the second party hereby covenanting, that there are no liabilities for unsecured debts, and that the only secured debt and liability is its bonded debt,” held, that such an agreement did not provide
for the performance of contracts of carriage embraced in mileage or
trip tickets which had been issued by the second party, and it was
how the

.
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incumbent

the

company to carry out such contracts as if they
by itself.
The expulsion from a passenger-train of such new company of a
person who presented for passage a ticket of this kind, which had
not expired by limitation, was wrongful, and gave him a right of
action against such new company. Tompkins, 102/436.
53. Company succeeding to rights and privileges of another comon

new

had been made

pany.
A railroad company

which succeeds to the rights and privileges conby its charter, becomes also subject to the same
51/585. Cited, 102/441.
In Fulghum, 87/263, it was held that a railroad corporation,
whether de facto or de jure, and whether foreign or domestic, is subject to suit in this State in personam by a citizen thereof, if it owns
and operates a railroad in this State which was built by virtue of an
act of the legislature authorizing another corporation, chartered by
an adjoining State, to build and operate said railroad, and which act
declared the corporation so building and operating it subject to sirr
by citizens of this State in the county in which the road is located. A
corporation, in the actual use and exercise of all the rights and privileges of another corporation, is subject to its burdens, and, among
them, to suit for like causes of action for which suits could be maintained against such other corporation were it in possession of the
franchises which have been acquired from it, or else usurped.
Under the Act of 1853 (Acts 1853~54, p. 464), in relation to the
Wills Valley Railroad Company of Alabama, an employee (a brakeman), whose business was upon one and the same train running over
the line of road, partly in Georgia and partly in Alabama, can maintain an action in Georgia for a personal injury sustained in Alabama,
service of process being made as upon a domestic railway corporation.
ferred upon another
liabilities. Boring,

2 Redf. R. R.

633, and notes; 1 Ror. R. R. 677; 1 Beach, R. R. 54;
Harris, 12 Wall. 65; Railroad Co. v. Wightman’s
Adm’r, 29 Grat. 431; Railroad Co. v. Noell’s Adm’r, 32 Grat. 394;
Graham v. Railroad Co., 118 U. S. 161.
Cited, 90/525.

Railroad Co.

v.

By the authority of law the Central Railroad and Banking Comabsorbed the Macon and Western Railroad Company, and the
voluntarily went out of existence as a corporation. One of the
provisions of the act cast upon the former all the contracts of the

pany
latter

latter, but the act
became liable to

was

silent

answer

for

as
a

to torts.
breach of

It

was

held that the former

duty by the latter

company
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towards

a person who was rightfully upon one of its trains, and who,
being carried thereon, sustained a personal injury by reason of
such breach. Coggin, 62/685. Cited, 79/489.
54. Where lessee was made a body corporate.
The Act of November 12, 1889, providing for the lease of the
Western and Atlantic Railroad, declares that “the persons, associations, or corporations accepted as lessees under this act, if not already
a corporation created under the laws of Georgia, shall, from the
time of such acceptance, and until after the final adjustment of all
matters springing out of this lease contract, become a body politic
and corporate under the laws of this State, under the name and
style of the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company, which body
corporate shall be operated only from the time of their taking pos-

while

session of said road

lessees; and it shall have the power to sue and
by said company, in any county through
which the road runs, after the execution of saiid lease, or for any cause
of action which may accrue to said company, and to which it may
become liable.” When, therefore, the Nashville, Chattanooga and St.
Louis Railway Company became the lessee under this act, a new corporation under the laws of Georgia was created, under the name and
style of the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company; and for any tort
committed in the operation of its railroad that corporation, and noi
the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway Company, is liable.
In such case section 2335 of the Code does not apply, and an action
against the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway for the tort
is not maintainable, though the declaration alleges that “the defendant operates as lessee the Western and Atlantic Railroad,” the act rebe sued

on

as

all contracts made

quiring that the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company shall be
sued. Edwards, 91/24.
Cited, 110/301.
55. When corporation becomes complete.
In Watson, 111/10, the plaintiff sued the Albany and Northern
Railway Company, and alleged that he was in the employment of that
company as a train-hand and was injured. It appeared that certain
persons purchased, at judicial sale, the property of the Albany, Florida and Northern Railway Company and they petitioned for incorporation. A certificate of incorporation was issued to them. After the
date of the certificate, and before the purchasers formally organized
the corporation, the plaintiff was injured. The court directed a verdiet against him on the ground that, at the date of his injury, there
was no such corporation as the one he had sued, and that conse-
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quently he had failed to prove that he was an employee of the defendant company. It was held that the issuance by the secretary of
State of a certificate of incorporation to those who had purchased
at judicial sale the property and franchises of a railway company does
not, ipso facto, create a corporation authorized to operate the railroad
and exercise the franchises of that company.
Such a corporation
does not come into complete existence until after organization under
the certificate in the maimer prescribed by law. And Lumpkin, P. J.,
said: “It is to be observed that under paragraph 11 of section 2167
of the Civil Code, the party or parties acquiring by purchase the title
to the property and franchises of a railway company sold under judicial process may, if they choose, operate the railroad without obtaining a new charter. If they do this, they are, of course, responsible to the public and to their employees for the manner in which
their business is conducted. In case they elect to form a railway
corporation, this same responsibility will rest upon them until they
shall have proceeded so far in the organization of such corporation
as to have duly appointed officials authorized, in behalf of the corporation, to accept from the purchasers a surrender of the property
and franchises of the old company. Until this point is reached, the
liability of the purchasers must necessarily continue, and not until
it is reached can the liability of the new company begin.”
56. Presumption m case of a slave.
A railroad company is liable only for such damages as result from
its mismanagement, neglect, or the want of due care and attention.
And it is necessary for the plaintiff to show some act that will cast
the burden of proof on the company.
The fact that a slave is run
over and
injured while being transported by the road as a passenger,
is not sufficient for that purpose.
To have been run over as he was,
he was, necessarily, not inside of the car where he ought to have been.
Mitchell, 30/22.
Where a slave was killed by the cars running over him on the
track, it was held that to charge the company with the loss it must
affirmatively appear that the act was the result of neglect, mismanagement, or carelessness of the company or its employees, and in the
absence of such proof a nonsuit was awarded. Mann, 32/345.
In McAfee, 32/465, a slave was hired to the railroad and on his
return from the car-shed, where he had been sent by an
agent of the
road, to the place of his general duties, he, of his own accord, and
without the direction of any of the employers, chose to ride back
by
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getting up and standing on the steps of the platform of the car of the
passenger-train that was going out, a thing that he was frequently
in the habit of doing within the knowledge of the employees of the
road, and getting off when the cars reached the place of general work,
and while the cars were in motion. On the morning in question, the
train was going at a much greater speed than was usual, or than the
rules allowed, and in attempting to get off at his usual place, he was
run over and killed.
This was such culpable mismanagement and
neglect on the part of the road as made‘it liable for the accident.
57. Common-law rule.
The

presumption that where it has been shown that a passenger on
was hurt or damaged by the running of its trains or
machinery, the company was negligent, is a common-law presumption
and did not originate with the Act of 1853-4, Civil Code, §2321, nor
a

railroad

is that act in violation of the Constitution of the United

the

States,

on

ground that it abridges the privileges and immunities of the company and puts upon it a presumption not enforced against private
citizens. Randall, 79/304.
58. Ordinary and reasonable care required of company.
Railroad companies^ are liable for injuries resulting from want of
all ordinary and reasonable care in all cases, in general, and for the
want of extraordinary care in the case of passengers and others under
their care. What is ordinary and reasonable care depends on the facts
of each case. Stewart, 71/428. Cited, 74/611.
59. Extraordinary diligence not required.
A railroad company is liable for any damage done to persons, stock,
or other property by the running of its trains, unless the company
shall make it appear that their agents exercised all ordinary and
reasonable care and diligence to prevent such damage; but where, in
an action for killing a horse, the court, after
charging this principle,
added, “that is, might say, a full measure of care and diligence — all
that could be expected,” such charge was error; the effect of it being
to require extraordinary diligence of the company.
A full measure
of care and diligence, all that could be expected, could, in no reasonable view, be held to be less than extraordinary diligence; and this
is more than is required by law.
King, 70/261.
A charge of the court which might be understood by the jury as
requiring of a railroad company all possible care to avoid killing
live stock by the running of its trains, although the charge be, in
other parts of it, correct, on the measure of diligence required of such
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companies, is cause for a new trial, in a very doubtful case. Daniel,
91/768. Cited, 99/245.
It was error, upon the trial of an action against a railroad company
for the killing of live stock, to charge: “Whether the railroad company
did use reasonable care, or ordinary care and diligence, and every effort, to prevent the killing of stock, is a question for the jury to determine from the evidence.” Requiring the company to use “every
effort” to prevent killing the stock was imposing upon it a rule of
diligence more strict than the law exacts. Wideman, 99/245.
“In charging upon this subject the proper and safer method for
the judge to adopt would be to confine himself to the statutes. Its
definition can not well be simplified or made clearer by an attempt to
use synonymous terms, or to convey its meaning in other words.”
Lewis, J., Johnston, 106/130.
60. This standard of diligence never changes.
What are known as the stock laws, embodied in the Code, sections
1772_1775, are not in pari materia with sections 2321, 2322. They
deal with distinct subjects, and do not modify or alter the rule of diligence to be observed in the running of trains; but the existence of a
stock law in any locality is a fact which the jury may consider, in
ascertaining the amount of care and diligence exercised by each of the
parties to the transaction, and in apportioning the extent of the liability of the company, if any. Hamilton, 71/461. And in Summerford, 87/626, it was held that though the existence of the stock law
is pertinent, and may be material on the question of ordinary and reasonable care and diligence in guarding against killing stock by the
running of trains, yet a request to charge in general terms that a less
degree of diligence is required in a county where that law prevails
than in a county where it does not may be declined. The court may
also decline a request to charge that a less degree of diligence in looking out for stock is required while running through a field than while
running through lands uninelosed. Bleckley, C. J., said: “The rule
of diligence declared in section 2321 was not modified or altered by
subsequent legislation known as the ‘stock law.’ Hamilton, supra.
With or without the stock law, the degree of diligence required of
railroad companies is one and the same; it is ‘ordinary and reasonable.’ What would amount to that degree of diligence in each particularicase under all the circumstances, including the application or
nonapplication of the stock law at the particular locality, and including also the scene of the occurrence, whether in an inclosed field or
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upon uninclosed lands outside, is a question for the jury.
The jury
can and should take into consideration all the pertinent and material

facts, and in the light of the whole determine whether the care and
diligence observed in the particular instance came up to the degree of
ordinary and reasonable, or fell below it. The instructions requested
and refused in this case sought to relieve the company, or to authorize the jury to relieve it, from as high a degree of care at the place
of this occurrence as might be due from it at some other place. This
is not allowable, for one and the same degree of care is due alike at
all times and places; but what conduct will come up to that standard
may not, and indeed would not, be alike at all places.
To tell the
jury that the degree of care and diligence might be varied is a very
different thing from instructing them that, while ordinary and reasonable care and diligence would be always required, the requirement
might be met, if in their opinion it could be done, under all the circumstances, by using less vigilance or watchfulness at one place than
at another, always, however, keeping such lookout as would be reasonably necessary at the time and place in question to avoid coming
in contact with animals that might happen to be at large and stray

the track of the railway. Of course it would be reasonable for
according to the less probability of such
accidents, and more strict where the probability was greater. While
this, perhaps, may have been the distinction intended by counsel in
submitting the request to charge, yet, as the language used was busceptible of another construction, the court was justified in declining
the request, and committed no error in so doing.
The principle of
discrimination in adapting conduct to conditions, while adhering to
a single standard of diligence, was recognized in Ryles, 84/420.”
61. Scope of the term “running of locomotive or cars."
In Morrison, 105/543, it appeared that the railroad company transported a car-load of lumber which was consigned to Campbell, at Elberton.
At Elberton, it was placed on a side-track leading to a planing-mill, for which it was intended. Campbell hired the plaintiff to
unload the lumber from the car.
The plaintiff was injured by being
thrown from the moving car to which he was endeavoring to apply the
brakes. He contended that the brake was defective, that the defective
upon

the lookout to be less strict

condition

was

unknown to him and should have been known to the

company. It was held that a railway company is
sonal injuries received by an employee of one of its
a

loaded

not liable for perpatrons in moving

freight-car which had been delivered and left safely standing
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side-track for the purpose

of being unloaded, even though such
been occasioned because of a defect in a brake atand the company was chargeable with notice of its
condition, if the person was injured in consequence of his having
voluntarily placed himself in a perilous situation, and failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence as to the matter of his own safety.
Little, J., said: “Evidently the running of locomotives or cars reon a

injuries

may have
tached to the ear,

ferred to in the statute is confined to those

by its servants, agents,

cases

where the company,

employees, is operating the cars or locomotives in some manner. Even in these cases, notwithstanding the
presumption, no one can recover damages for injuries to person or
property sustained by such running of the locomotive or cars where
the injury is caused by his own negligence. It is elementary
law that where there is no duty there is no negligence, and
that a party who bases an asserted right of action upon the negligence of the defendant must show the breach of a specific duty owing
to him.
Elliott, R. R. p. 602. We are of the opinion that no presumption of negligence arises, under the facts of this ease, against
the railroad company, because the injury was not occasioned by the
operation or running of the ear by any servant, agent, or employee of
tiie railroad company.
The injured man was a stranger to the company.”
62.

Servant, when

or

one

One of the railroad

is.

company’s engineers, running upon the company’s road, is still its servant while in its pay and while liable to
be discharged by it, though in running its locomotive and cars he may
be temporarily subject to the orders of a telegraph company represented in the immediate control of the train by one of its employees,
and though the train, with the railroad company’s permission, be
engaged, for the time being, solely in transporting materials for the
telegraph company, with a force of attendants employed by the latter
company to handle the materials and discharge them from the cars.
Except as to acts and omissions dictated by express orders referable
to the telegraph company, the engineer must observe the general law
of diligence applicable to his vocation; and his failure to do so is
negligence imputable to his master (the railroad company), who is
liable for a personal injury resulting therefrom to one of the servants
of the telegraph company rightfully upon the train as an attendant
or laborer.
Coggin, 62/685; 73/689. Cited, 79/489. See Morrison, supra.
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In

Phillips, 90/829, it was held that where a railroad company
a contractor engaged in constructing an extension of the
company's railroad an engine and train, upon which a fireman already
in the service of the company is, by it, ordered to work, the company
is liable for personal injuries to him, caused while obeying this order,
by defects in the engine, attributable to the company’s negligence,
although the track of the extension in progress is in possession of
the contractor, and the operation and movements of the train are
furnishes to

under the latter’s exclusive control.
If

railroad company employed another corporation to
railroad .under a contract by the terms of which,

construct
if strictly
carried out, the other corporation would be an independent contractor, and consequently the railroad company would not be liable for
injuries occasioned by defects in the construction of the road-bed, but
if afterwards the parties abandoned this contract, and the railroad, by
its own officers and servants, took charge of and supervised the work,
gave directions as to how the road-bed should be constructed, and assumed general management and control of the enterprise, the railroad
company could not relieve itself of liability for injuries occasioned by
negligent or improper construction, but would be primarily respona

for it

a

sible.
If

railroad company

contractor, for use in conof its locomotives, together
with the engineer and fireman employed thereon, and the latter, remaining in the service of the railroad company, is, without fault on
his part, injured by the running of such locomotive, the presumption
of law arises that the injury was occasioned by the negligence of the
railroad company.
The general rule on this subject is not changed
because at the time of the injury neither the engineer nor the fireman
was engaged in the usual and ordinary business of the company as a
common carrier of freights and passengers.
63. Negligence must exist.
In Moore, 61/151, where plaintiff’s husband was killed and found
near the track, it was held that if the company shows itself without
fault, by showing that its agents have exercised all reasonable care
and diligence, there can be no recovery against it. If it was without
fault, it is wholly immaterial whether the person injured was or was
not at fault. 'If both were innocent, the catastrophe was an accident,
and there could be no recovery; if both were at fault and the plaintiff's husband’s fault did not cause by itself the injury, then there
a

structing

an

furnishes to

extension of its road,

a

one
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a modified recovery for contributory negligence; if, though
the company had been at fault, the plaintiff’s husband could have
avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care, and neglected to

would be

do so, then there could be no recovery.
tion is against the company every time

It is true that the presumpand on every issue, after the
killing by the road has been proven, but when the company has
proved either that the deceased by his own negligence caused his own
death, or that the company was not negligent, but used all reasonable
care and diligence, the burden is shifted; because either will relieve
the company.
Cited, 71/649.
In Watters, 77/69, where it appeared that the,horse which was
killed went upon the track of the company, ran up the road and
upon a trestle and fell through and was killed, and there was no negligence on the part of the company or its officers, agents, or servants,
a nonsuit would have been proper; and after a verdict against the
company, a new trial should have been granted.
Upon the evidence properly before the court for consideration, the
certiorari ought to have been sustained, for the reason that the plaintiff failed to prove that the animal, for the alleged destruction of
which he sued, was in fact killed by the railroad company.
The case
should have been remanded to the magistrate’s court for a new trial.
Poe, 112/90.
In Howard, 112/917, it was held that there was, in addition to
the

legal presumption of negligence against the defendant company,
evidence warranting a finding that it was in fact negligent, and
it does not appear that the court erred in overruling its certiorari.
Lewis, J., said: “From the testimony of the fireman of the engine
that struck the cow, it appeared that when first discovered the animal
was from two hundred to two hundred and
fifty yards in front of the
engine, and on the track; that the engineer brought his train to a slow
speed after blowing his whistle, and that the cow got off to one side
of the track. It seems, however, according to the same witness, that
the engineer, without waiting for her to reach a safe distance to the
side, again increased the speed of the train, and that she got on the
some

track

second time and

was killed.
In this view of the case, the
certainly authorized to find that the engineer was not free
from negligence.”
The plaintiff’s mare having run along the railway-track ahead of
the train of her own accord until, reaching a trestle or
open culvert,
she fell into it, and was injured, and the evidence
showing that the

jury

a

was
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almost

stopped to give her time to escape, and that the
continuously blown to frighten her from the track, and
that the disaster was caused by her own obstinacy in following the
track when she might have left it, the owner of the mare had no
cause of action against the owner of the railway, and the presiding
judge did not err in granting a nonsuit. Gay, 86/103.
was

whistle

was

Mere

permission by, or implied license from, a railway company for
yard for the purpose of carrying meals to their
fathers, there being a perfectly safe way for the children to pass and
repass without going under freight-cars standing upon tracks in the
yard, will not subject the company to liability for injuries caused
to one of these children by pushing upon him a car under which he
had suddenly gone for the purpose of getting a ball which had been
thrown there, but for the throwing of which the company was in no
way responsible; and it not appearing that the company’s servants
by whom the car was put in motion knew, had reason to know, or
were in a position to discover, that the child was under it at the
time.
The sudden throwing of the ball, the child’s being attracted
thereby, and his rapidly following it under the. car, all together, constituted an emergency which the company could not reasonably have
anticipated or guarded against and consequently the unexpected catastrophe which resulted from the movement of the car at the very
moment when the child was exposed to danger was a mere casualty
or accident, for which the company should not be held liable.
Atkinson, J., dissenting. Waller, 97/164; 105/463.
64. And it must be negligence relatively to the person injured.
In Holland v. Sparks, 92/753, the plaintiff’s son, for whose homicide the suit was brought, was walking along or near the track of the
railroad. Warned by a companion of the rapid approach of a freighttrain, he stepped aside, and went a sufficient distance from the track
to escape injury if all the cars had remained on the rails; but, for
some unexplained reason, several of the cars left the track, and he
was killed at a distance of about twenty feet from the rail.
The place
where the tragedy occurred was in the country, where there was no
road or pathway in customary use by pedestrians. It was held that
negligence relatively to the safety of any particular person is the
breach of some diligence due to that person. Where no duty of diligence appears relatively to the person injured, there can be no presumption of its breach, notwithstanding the broad language of section 2321 of the Code.
That section imposes the burden of proving
children to enter its
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the observance of such

'

diligence as was due, not the burden of proving that none was due. For a railroad company to be exempt from
liability for a personal injury done by the running of its locomotives
or cars, it is
only necessary for it and its agents to exercise all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence (if any) due from it and its
agents relatively to the person injured. A failure of diligence by
these agents towards the company, unless that failure also involves
negligence as between the company and such person, will afford the
latter no cause of action, and, in case of his death from the injury,
would be no cause of action in favor of any person legally interested
in his life.
Relatively to persons casually near the margin, but outside, of a railroad company’s track in the country, where there is no
road or pathway in customary use by pedestrians, the company owes
no duty or diligence in respect to the speed of its trains; and if, in
consequence of very high speed, a train, or some of the cars, leave
the track, and thereby a person thus casually exposed be wounded
or killed, there is no cause of action, in the absence of evidence disclosing that there was reason for anticipating the presence of some
one near

the line of the road at the

scene

servants of the company in charge of the
son there before the derailment occurred.

of the accident, or that the

train actually saw some perLumpkin, J., said: “Relatively to one to whom no diligence whatever is due, there can, in
legal contemplation be no negligence at all in causing him a personal
injury. Where some degree of diligence is due to another with reference to his personal safety, failure to observe that degree of diligence will be negligence as to that person.
In other words, negligence relatively to the safety of any particular person is the breach
of some diligence due to him. When an action is brought for a personal injury caused by the running of a locomotive or ear of a railroad
company, the presumption of negligence does not arise against the
company unless it appears that, at the time of the injury, there was
due from the company to the person injured some degree of diligence
to prevent that injury.
The burden of proving it owed no diligence
is not upon the company, but the plaintiff must show that, relatively
to the safety of the person injured, some diligence was due by the
company.
As soon as he does this, the presumption immediately
arises that the company’s negligence caused the injury, and in order
to escape liability it must rebut this presumption by showing the observance on its part of such diligence as was due.
After much deliberation we are satisfied that nothing, even in the broad language
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of section 2321 of the

Code, relieves the plaintiff, in cases of this
character, from the necessity of showing that a duty of diligence, such
as we have mentioned, existed, or imposes upon a railroad company
the burden of proving negatively the contrary. A presumption of
negligence is neither more nor less than a presumption that there was
a breach of
diligence. Such a breach could not, of course, be presumed in a case where it was affirmatively proved, as a matter of fact,
that no diligence at all was due.
If, therefore, it is incumbent on
the plaintiff to make the duty of diligence relatively to the person injured appear, and he fails to do so, the case must stand upon the same
footing, for, as to what a plaintiff is required to show, 'that which does
not appear does not exist.’ When the presumption of negligence has
once been raised against a railroad company under the section above
cited, and the company satisfactorily shows that its agents exercised all
ordinary and reasonable care and diligence to prevent the particular
injury for which the action was brought, it establishes its observance of
the diligence due by it. .
.
.A person injured by the running of a
railway-train must, as we have already indicated, depend for recovery
upon the negligent failure of the company, either by itself or through
its servants, to observe proper care and caution to prevent inflicting
upon him the very injury of which he complains; and it is clear, from
what has been said above, that there should be no recovery because of
negligent conduct on the part of the company^ servants which in no
proper sense involved the breach of a duty due to the person injured. The failure of diligence by these servants in respect to any
duty they owed to the company itself, unless that failure also involved
negligence as between the company and the person injured, would
afford the latter no cause of action.
See Bish. hTon-Cont. Law, §446;
1 Shear. & R. Neg. §8; O’Donnell v. Railroad Co., 6 R. I. 214.
Of
course, in ease of the death. of such person in consequence of the
injury, such failure would not be a ground of action in favor of anv
party legally interested in his life. In the present case it was insisted
that the servants in charge of the defendant’s freight-train were running it at a high and dangerous rate of speed, and that this conduct
on their part amounted to negligence.
Most probably it was a violation of the duty which these servants owed to the company, and to
those whose property was being transported by the train, and in this
sense their conduct may have been
negligent. But we do not think
their failure to observe due care and diligence in running the train was
negligence as against one in no way connected therewith, and whose
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was a consequence so re-

to

require almost the gift of prophecy to anticipate. .
In the case before us the deceased was in a place where those in charge
of the train had no reason to expect any one, and therefore the company owed him no duty with respect to the speed at which its train
approached that point.” Cited, 93/399; 101/422; 106/872.
as

65. Accident.

Where, without the knowledge of the conductor or the engineer,
unauthorized person

applied a brake to the car attached to a
dummy-engine on a street-railway while the engine and car were ascending a steep grade, and thus the progress of the engine was arrested, whereupon the conductor, in order to enable the engineer to
go forward, had the brake taken off, and the engineer, not knowing
that the brake would be taken off, and intending to go backward down
the grade, reversed the engine at about the same moment when the
brake was taken off, and in consequence of this inharmonious action
of two minds under pressure of the emergency, each intending a
proper object, and neither knowing of the intention of the other, the
train backed too rapidly, and consequently collided with a wagon
which was not expected to be on the track, and not known to be on
it until it was too late to stop, and which would not have been there
but for the mules drawing it having become suddenly frightened by
the backward movement of the train, the calamity was a pure aceident, and the driver of the mules, who sustained a personal injury in
consequence of the collision, can not recover.
McGinnis, 94/229.
In Sparks, 82/156, it was held that the plaintiff’s evidence showing that he put himself under the conductor to work his way instead
of paying his fare as a passenger, and that without the conductor’s
instructions he took orders from a brakeman to couple a car to the
train, and was injured while so doing, the injury being due to the
temporary effects of cold weather on the coupling, and not to the
fault or negligence of the employees of the company, a judgment of
nonsuit was not erroneous.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “His injury resuited, not from the negligence of the company or any of its employees, but from the unknown and unforeseen fact that the coupling
was frozen in a way to
prevent it from working freely. He testified
that, had not the coupling proved to be in that condition, the injury
some

would not have occurred.

He knew the state of the

many years’ experience as a
him to anticipate the effect of

weather, and had
railroad man, and it was as easy for
frost upon the coupling as for the serv-
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ants of the company

to do so. He was a volunteer in the work he
undertook, and his failure to accomplish it successfully was due to
accident. He complains that the car to be attached was moved too
rapidly, yet says that the speed was not unusual, and that he had formerly made couplings when it was three times as great. He complains, also, that no brakeman was on top to work the brake, yet he
saw there was none before he
exposed himself. He was unfortunate,
and is therefore entitled to sympathy, but the victim of a mere casualty has no cause of action.”
In Reid, 81/694, it appeared that the plaintiff was employed by the
defendant to dig and clean out wells along the line of the road. On
one

occasion he

was

ordered to clean out

a

certain well, and it ap-

that the rope which had been furnished to him was not long
enough to reach the bottom of the well, and the road-overseer obtained a rope, which the plaintiff tied or spliced onto the rope he already had. He testified that the road-overseer told him the rope was a
good one; that he had obtained it from the company for that well,
and that it had been used there for about a year; that he (plaintiff)
replied that if the rope was good at first, and was only a year old, and
had been taken care of, it was a good rope; that the overseer told
him it had been, taken care of, and that he told the overseer that, if
that was so, it ought to be a better one than the one he (plaintiff)
had.
The one plaintiff had was a two-inch rope, and the one the
pears

furnished was an inch and a half.
He used the rope for
days in cleaning out the well, and about dark, on the second
day, when he was being drawn out by the servants of the defendant,
the rope which had been furnished him by the overseer broke, and he
fell into the bottom of the well, injuring himself severely.
He said
he had been engaged in the occupation of well-digging for twentyeight years, and had been handling well-ropes for that length of
time; that he had examined carefully the rope that broke, and thought
it was a good rope, and sufficient for the work he had been sent to do;
that, in his judgment, he had a better opportunity to know how good
a
rope it was than any one else, for he tried to examine it carefully.
The overseer examined it carefully also; he and the overseer together
spliced it; and when they had done so he was satisfied it was a good
rope; otherwise he would not have gone down on it.
The morning
of the day he got hurt he examined the rope again, and was satisfied
with it.
The court granted a nonsuit.
Simmons, J., said:
“We think the court was right in granting this nonsuit. So far as
overseer

two
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testimony discloses, the rope furnished this plaintiff by the de-

fendant for the purpose

of cleaning out the well was a good rope. It
carefully examined, both by the plaintiff and the overseer of the
road, and there was no defect in it which could be discovered by the
use of
ordinary care. There was no negligence shown by the testimony on the part of the defendant or the plaintiff. Both parties pronounced it good. It appears from the evidence to have been one of
those accidents which could not have been foreseen, so as to have been
provided against by either party.” Cited, 83/77.
In Palmer, 89/161, it was shown that the plaintiff’s cattle were
found near the track of defendant’s road, either crippled or killed.
was

The defendant’s counsel contended that it

accident.

It

was

held that the

was

a case

of unavoidable

question of unavoidable accident was
explaining the details and

not in the case, there being no evidence
attendant circumstances of the tort.

Where

employee of a railroad company brought his action
against it, alleging that he was injured by a coemployee’s negligence
in dropping a bar of iron which they were lifting, and the railroad
company defended on the ground that the iron was not negligently
dropped by the coemployee, but that its fall was caused by the accidental slipping of his foot, and, there being some evidence to sustain this theory, it was error in the court to refuse to give in charge
a written
request of the defendant that, “if the evidence shows that
the injury was caused by the accidental slip of the foot or stumble of
the witness Seay [the coemployee], then the plaintiff can not recover.”
While, as a general proposition, a charge that, if the injury was
the result of an unavoidable accident, the plaintiff could not recover,
may have covered the request, the case was a proper one for applying
the principle to the specific defense relied upon.
Smith, 91/176.
Although obstructing the public street by leaving a freight-train
standing across it for a considerable length of time was an unlawful
act on the part of the railway company, the company was not liable
in damages to one who, in attempting to climb over a flat car, which
formed a part of the train, put his foot in a stirrup attached to the
car, and accidentally fell to the ground, and, by reason of his foot
hanging in the stirrup, was seriously injured. The unlawful act of
the railway company was not the proximate cause of the injury, but
the same was the result of a pure accident, for which the company
can not be held
responsible. Lumpkin, J., said: “The obstruction
of the public street in the manner alleged was undoubtedly an unlawan
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of the company, but it was
act which would reasonably or

not malum in

se.

probably cause an
injury to the plaintiff in the manner set forth. Indeed, such a consequence was nothing|more than a remote possibility, and it therefore
falls within the domain of pure accident, for which the company can
not be held responsible.”
Montgomery, 94/332. Cited, 103/849.
The evidence showing that the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from a
pure accident, and not from any act of negligence chargeable to the
defendants, the verdict in his favor can not be lawfully upheld, and
the court erred in not setting it aside. The facts in this case were not
reported. Spencer, 111/868.
66. Subject continued.
In Cross, 109/170, it was ruled that a railroad company is not liable for damages for a personal injury to a boy more than seven years
old, when the evidence shows that the boy was running along a path
six feet from the track, with a rope tied around him, and trailing
behind, and that, after the engine and half of the train had passed
him, the rope was by some means drawn under the train, and the boy
pulled thereunder, and injured. Such an occurrence was an accident
which could not have been guarded against by any reasonable degree
of diligence on the part of the servants of the company. This aecident occurred within the limits of an incorporated city at a point between two public crossings, but more than three hundred yards from
either of them. The engineer did not ring the bell nor blow the whistie, and the speed of the train was from eighteen to twenty miles an
hour. Simmons, C. J., said: “Under these facts the company could
not properly be held to have been in fault, and liable in damages, and
it was, therefore, not error to grant a nonsuit. The company was not
liable unless it had been negligent, and it was not negligence to fail to
do what it was under no legal duty to do. Simply because the boy was
running along and keeping within a path parallel with the railwaytrack, and some six feet from it, the law did not make it the duty of the
company’s servants to slow up the train, ring the bell, or blow the
whistle. Had the hoy been running at an angle with the track, and
been apparently about to cross it, the case might have been decidedly
different. As it was, the boy was not on the track, and did not appear
to be in any appreciable danger, and the proximate cause of the injury
was the engagement of the
rope with some part of the passing train —
something which the company’s agents could not have foreseen, and
have been expected to guard against. For this reason we think the
was

an
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injury is shown by the evidence to have been the result of an accident
for which the company can not be held liable.”
In Vaughn, 48/464, there was a common inclosure.
By mutual
consent it embraced the road on plaintiff’s land.
Into that common
field plaintiff turned his mule, with a full knowledge of the danger and of the mutual arrangement.
He knew the trains would pass
at night. The mule was killed by a train at night.
He had the
right to expect that the agents of the company would exercise care
and prudence in running the train. Under such circumstances the
company would not be liable unless there was some actual negligence
in managing the train, and it appeared affirmatively that there was
no negligence or want of care.
A railroad company is not liable
for an unavoidable accident even under the statute relating to stock.
If, with every reasonable precaution, proper lookout, and proper
speed and attention, an unavoidable damage ensues, the company
which has, by law, a right under such precautions to run its trains
is not responsible.
Cited, 56/460.
In Hardwick, 85/507, the material allegations of the declaration
were as follows:
Plaintiff, in company with his minor son, who was
under his employment, control, and oversight, boarded defendant’s
night passenger-train at Madison station, having tickets purchased
from defendant. The conductor collected plaintiff’s fare to Conyers station, and the fare of his son to Almand station; his son at the
same time telling the conductor to stop the train at Almand, where
he wanted to get off. But the train ran past that station at the usual
speed — fifteen to twenty miles per hour — making no effort to stop,
though this was a usual place to take on and discharge passengers.
Not wishing to be carried by in this manner, especially as it was dark,
plaintiff’s son arose and went forward on the train in search of the
conductor, in order that the train might be stopped for him to get
off. About this time the conductor approached and passed plaintiff
from behind, going through the rear door of the coach, and leaving
it open.
As he passed, plaintiff asked him why he did not stop the
train to let young Hardwick get off, as he had been directed to do.
Receiving no reply, and the door being open, plaintiff arose and went
to the door, naturally feeling great anxiety for the safety of his son
under the circumstances.

Just

as

he reached the door, the conductor,

notification whatever, seized a rope and gave it a strong
jerk, causing the train to come to a sudden and violent stop. Plaintiff naturally threw his left hand against the facing of the door for
without any
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support, and to keep from falling, and a part of his left forefinger
caught between the door and the facing, and a portion of it was
thus entirely cut off. The train was not stopped until it had passed
the station about four hundred yards above where plaintiff’s son got
off. The defendant was negligent in not stopping the train at the
was

place, and in making no effort to do so; and in stopping so suddenly and recklessly at the place where it did stop, and in not propping or fastening the door hack so that it would not shut while passenproper

not replying to plaintiff’s question asked
C. J., said: “We concur with the court
below in thinking that the declaration sets forth no cause of action.
The failure of the company to stop the train at the station was, it is
true, negligence, and a violation of duty; but that and the plaintiff’s
injury were not related to each other as cause and effect. Leaving
the door of the car open while "the train was in motion was not negligence, for, as matter of general information, it is known to all travelers that the doors of passenger-cars can be left open temporarily
without exposing passengers to unusual danger.
Nor was it negligence for the conductor to stop the train suddenly in order to repair
as speedily as possible the error he had committed in passing the station without stopping.
Although the plaintiff’s injury resulted from
the stopping of the train and the fact that the door was open, yet it
seems to have been a pure accident, for no such thing would have
happened if the plaintiff had not chanced at the moment to be standing
gers were alighting; and in
of the conductor. Bleckley,

the

door, instead of occupying one of the seats in the car. His
exposed position was not known to the conductor, or at least it is not
alleged to have been known. Taking the declaration as true, the injury was an accident, and courts, in the present state of the law,
must recognize accidents as such, even when they occur upon railroads.” Cited, 89/320.
See 11.
near

67. When the

injury is shown the presumption against the

company

arises.
Where it

appeared that cattle were killed by a railroad-train, and
agent of the company, when applied to for pay for the cattie, offered to pay for them, the proof was sufficient to cast on the
company the onus of proving that the injury was not the result of
negligence. In the opinion, Benning, J., says: “We incline to
think that the mere fact that the company’s train killed the cows was
sufficient to raise the presumption that the killing was the result of

that the
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negligence in the company’s servants. When one man kills another,
the law implies malice in the killer; so if one man kills another’s
cattle, ought there not, in like manner, to be an implication of malice
or negligence in the killer?”
Willis, 28/317.
Whenever a person, not an employee, is injured by the running of
railroad-cars, the presumption is that the company is at fault, and
the onus is on it to rebut the presumption.
Singleton, 67/306;
Hartley, 73/5.
In McMillan, 101/116, an action was brought in a justice’s
court against a railroad company to recover damages for injuries
to a cow.
On the trial the only question at issue was whether the
cow was struck and injured by the running of the locomotive or cars,
or whether the injury was caused by the cow falling from the top
of a steep and high bank to the side of the track, where she was
found fatally injured.
The eviderfce clearly established that the
animal did so fall, and there was no evidence whatever showing that
after the fall she was struck by a passing locomotive or car.
It was
therefore error in the trial judge to dismiss the certiorari. The presumption against the railroad company does not arise under this
state of facts.
Little, J., said: “It was incumbent on the plaintiff to satisfactorily prove that the cow was injured as alleged.
The
law does not raise any presumption that a particular injury was inflicted by the running of the locomotives or cars of a railroad. It is
only when the injury is satisfactorily shown that the presumption of
law arises that such injury occurred by the fault or negligence of the
agents of the company; and when the injury is traced to the company, the burden rests on it to make it appear that it exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence in the management and
operation of the locomotive and ears which occasioned the injury.
It, of course, is not necessary to show that the injury was inflicted
by the running of the locomotive or cars by positive proof. Such injury may be proven to have been inflicted by the circumstances, as
well as by positive proof, but the circumstances must he such as will
afford
The

a

reasonable inference that the

injury

was so

inflicted.”

plaintiff, while in, his proper place on the crossing, having
been injured by a stick of wood which either fell or was thrown from
the tender of a passing locomotive on the defendant’s railway, and
there being no evidence tending to show that the stick was
willfully
or
maliciously thrown at him, the case was one resting on the doctrine
of negligence, either in permitting the stick to fall, or in easting it
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from the tender without due caution

or circumspection.
The charge
covering, and not going beyond, these elements, was
proper.
That the negligence was chargeable to the company’s employees while acting within the scope of their duties is, under section
2321 of the Code, a necessary inference from the absence of any evidenee to the contrary. Slater, 92/391.
68. In whose favor the presumption arises.
In Nelms, 83/70, the plaintiff was employed to assist in
changing
the gauge of the company’s track, and the company furnished him a
hammer with which to take up the iron rails and refasten them to
the cross-ties. The hammer had a latent defect, and in using it
pieces flew off and injured the plaintiff. It was held that a hammer
thus used is not included in the term “machinery” as used in section
2321 of the Code.
And Simmons, J., said: “And the plaintiff not
having been injured by the running of the cars or machinery or by
any other employee of the company, there was no presumption in his
favor against the company under section 2321 of the Civil Code, but
his case falls under the general law of master and servant, under
which the burden was upon him to show negligence on the part of
the company in furnishing him with a defective hammer.” Cited,

of the court

110/337.
In

Thompson, 101/26, it appeared that the plaintiff’s husband lost
through a defect in a platform which had been erected as a
part of a contrivance for weighing cars, and it was held that a
charge to the effect that a presumption of negligence arose against
the defendant company was entirely inapplicable to the facts. Cited,
110/337.
In Flaherty, 110/335, it was alleged that the defendant, for the
purpose of rolling trucks across its passenger-depot in the city of
Savannah, the floor of which was elevated above the railway-tracks,
had constructed a crossing, at each end of which was a steep incline
his life

from the level of the floor to that of the tracks.

ception of
ladies’

car

A train for the

passengers was so placed in the depot that the steps
thereto attached were immediately over the incline

end of this

crossing.

re-

of the
at

one

The plaintiff undertook to enter the ladies’ car

a passenger, her right foot encountered the unsuspected slope
the moment she was raising her left foot to place it on the step
as

the

car.

Her

right foot slipped from under her, and she fell.

court gave in charge to the jury section 2321 of the
in effect, instructed them that, under its provisions,

at
of
The

Civil Code, and,
there w#s a pre-
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gumption of negligence against the company in the present case.
Lumpkin, P. J., said: “The plaintiff certainly was not injured by
‘the running of the locomotives, or cars, or other machinery’ of the
company. Everything it owned or possessed having any connection
with her fall was at a dead standstill.
Nothing was ‘running.’
Was the' damage to her ‘done by any person in the employment and
service’ of the defendant? We are prepared to say with the utmost
confidence it was not. Granting that the incline was improperly
constructed or kept, and that the placing of the steps of the car over
the slope of the incline was, relatively to those invited to hoard the
train in this position, a negligent act, it still can not be said that any
particular employee of the company did any direct wrong to the'plaintiff. Neither the construction of the crossing nor the hacking of the
train to the place at which it had been stopped when the plaintifE endeavored to enter the car was an act of a person in the company’s
service which, in and of itself, could possibly have caused hurt to
Mrs. Flaherty. The words last quoted embrace only acts done by
employees which are the direct and efficient cause of inj'ury to another. Ip other words, there must he such an act as would subj'ect
the employee himself to an action of tort. Applying this test to the
present case, it would be impossible for Mrs. Flaherty, under the
facts alleged in her petition or proved at the trial, to designate any
servant of the defendant against whom she could maintain an action.
The language of the section under consideration is plain and unambiguous, and it seems clear that, in order to render its provisions applicable to a given case, it must affirmatively appear, as the law itself
declares, that the injury complained of resulted either from ‘the running of the locomotives, or cars, or other machinery’ of the company,
or from some
wrongful act of an employee which itself was the immediate cause of the damage to the person injured. The case of
Nelms, supra, is directly in point.” It was held that when, on the
trial of an action against a railway company, it
affirmatively appeared that the damage complained of was not caused either “by the
running of the locomotives or cars, or other machinery of such company,” or by some person in its employment and service, it was erroneous to
charge that a presumption of negligence arose against the
company.
69. Defenses open to
In Brinson, 64/475,
mitted

by

a

the

company.

it was held that “where an injury is comrailroad, the presumption is always against the road, yet
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it may rebut that presumption by showing
cised all reasonable and ordinary care and

that its agents have exerdiligence to avoid the injury; or that the damage was caused by the plaintiff’s own negligence; or that the plaintiff, by ordinary care, could have avoided the
injury to himself, although caused by the road’s negligence. If both
the plaintiff and the road are at fault, the damages are to be diminished in proportion to the fault attributable to the plaintiff, Brinson.”
Cited, 71/439. This statement of the principle of liability is too
broad. It should have been confined to injuries caused by the running of the locomotives or cars, or other machinery of the company,
or for damage done by any person in the employment and service
of the company. Flaherty, 110/337.
In suits against a railroad for damages to personal property
caused by the running of its trains, after the injury has been established these defenses are open to the railroad — that the plaintiff consentecl to the injury, that he caused it by his own negligence, or that
the defendant exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence.
In cases of injury to the person, another defense is open to
the road
that the plaintiff could have avoided the injury by the use
of ordinary care.
Thomas, 68/744. Cited, 71/440; 74/612.
70. Defense not to be arbitrarily disregarded.
A defense established by the positive and uncontradicted testimony
of unimpeached witnesses can not lawfully be arbitrarily disregarded.
Beason, 112/553.
71. Plaintiff’s own negligence caused the injury.
Where one, at his own request, was put off of a railroad-train at a
point some distance from the depot, on a dark night, but reached the
depot in safety, and afterwards, instead of following the public road,
relied on his knowledge of the locality and sought to follow a by-path
which passed a pit on the land of the railroad, which he himself had
formerly cleaned out, and to carry his own baggage along such pathway in the dark, if he missed the path, fell into the pit and was injured, he could not recover, although the underbrush in and around
the pit had been cut by the railroad hands, according to their custom
of annually clearing the right of way, and although this had been done
while plaintiff was absent from home and without his knowledge, and
a snag left in the pit injured plaintiff when he fell.
The real cause
of the injury was plaintiff’s own negligence. Henderson, 69/715;
73/718. Cited, 73/504; 82/591.
—
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Where defendant’s

passenger-train was temporarily stopped some
depot for receiving and delivering passengers until
two freight-trains in advance of it could be moved out of the way, and
the plaintiff boarded such train in search of his wife and child, who
were thereon as passengers, and in attempting to move from one car to
another, by passing around an intervening car, stepped off the platdistance from the

form into
on

a

pilvert fifteen or twenty feet deep, which he could not see

account of the darkness

of the

night, thereby causing serious

personal injury, the company was not liable therefor, even though the
lights in some of the cars had been blown out by drunken and disorderly men. The exercise of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff
would have avoided the injury.
Stiles, 65/370.
If one voluntarily becomes drunk, and consequently falls down, or
lies down, in a state of insensibility on a railroad-track, so that he is
injured by a passing train, he can not recover for injuries so received
even
though there may have been contributory negligence on the part
of the employees of the road. Warner, C. J., said: “If he was not
drunk, and could not have controlled his powers of locomotion from a
sudden attack of disease or other involuntary cause, and in consequence
thereof was involuntarily upon the track, then the question of defendant’s negligence might have arisen under the 2322d section of the Civil
Code.” Hankerson, 61/114. Cited, 70/235; 72/139; 74/612;
84/785; 102/290. On another trial of Hankerson’s case, the question
whether the plaintiff was voluntarily drunk, and in that condition
placed himself on defendant’s road, or whether he had a sudden access
of disease, by reason of which he fell upon the railroad, and was injured by the negligence of the defendant’s agents in running its trains,
was submitted to a
jury, they found a verdict for $550, and it was
not set aside.
Hankerson, 72/182.
In Mapp, 80/631, the plaintiff was an employee of a gas company,
and was engaged in unloading coal from cars on a side-track belonging to his company. He was warned a few minutes before the accident

occurred, that he must not move the
danger of somebody getting hurt.

would be
the

cars,

It

for if he did there
his duty to keep

was

in the condition in which he found them.

He applied his
collision occurred and he was
injured. It was held that, where one causes injury to himself he can
not recover.
If he can avoid the accident which results in his injury,
it is his duty to do so. Where he causes it, there is clearly no case of
cars

crow-bar to

them, set them in motion,

a
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contributory negligence, and no right to any recovery. This accident
resulted solely from the negligence of the plaintiff.
In Rawlston, 94/536, it appeared that the plaintiff, who was a trackwalker, was engaged in repairing a break in the rails of the track.
The train ran over him and injured him.
He knew the train was
coming. When it was about two hundred yards off he was standing
astraddle of the railroad. He turned his head, and looked at the train
without moving the position of his feet. There was nothing to prevent him from seeing the train for about a mile down the track, nor
was there anything to prevent him from getting off the track sooner.
There was no error in granting a nonsuit.
In Blake, 101/217, 108/764, it was held that where, in an action
against a railroad company to recover damages for personal injuries
by the running of a locomotive and cars within the limits of a city, it
appears that such locomotive and cars were running within the limit of
speed lawfully prescribed by the city, and it also appears from the evidence of the plaintiff himself that, having previously seen the moving
train

approaching the crossing, he miscalculated the time in which he
safely cross, and placed himself on the track immediately in
front of the moving locomotive, was caught by the pilot, and injured,
such injury is directly attributable to'negligence and want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff, which bar his right of recovery.
Cited, 104/246; 110/89.
In Morrison, 105/543, it was shown that the defendant railroad
company transported a car-load of lumber to its destination and placed
it on a side-track leading to a planing-mill to which it was to go. The
engineer employed plaintiff to unload the car. He was moving the
car to a more convenient place when he was injured.
It was contended that the agent of the company consented that the consignee
should move the car. It was held that whether the agent of the railroad company did or did not consent that the consignee should move
the loaded car from the place of delivery to a point on the track more
convenient for the consignee, if in so moving the car it conclusively
appears that the person injured stood on the bumper of the car, with
one foot against the lumber with which it was loaded, and in this position attempted to control the movements of the car by the use of the
brake while passing down a grade, and if it be further shown that
while in such position he fell and was run over by the car, such gross
negligence and want of care will bar a recovery against the railroad
could
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company, whether the car was or was
the railroad company.

not moved with the consent of

Parish, 102/285, was brought by a mother for the homicide
daughter. There was no evidence tending to show that the
daughter was killed by the railroad, except the fact that she was found
lying dead near the track, her body bearing certain marks of violence.
It was held that, even if the evidence in the case was sufficient to find
that the homicide of plaintiff’s daughter was caused by being stricken
by some part of a locomotive or car attached to a moving train, it also
shows the further facts that the person injured was on the track, and
in some other than an erect position, either sitting or lying thereon,
and that such injury occurred at night, between twelve o’clock and
daylight. These facts being true, it is a conclusion of law that the injured person could at least have avoided the injury by the exercise of
ordinary care, and there could be no recovery. The nonsuit was therefore right. Lumpkin, P. J., and Atkinson, J., dissenting.
Cited,
110/89.
72. Deafness of plaintiff does not affect degree of care required of
The

ease

of her

him.
Where it

appeared from the testimony that the hearing of the plainimpaired, and it was inferable that for this reason he did not
hear the approaching ear that struck him, it was not error for the
court to charge the jury that “the fact that he was partially deaf, if
such was the fact, would not affect or lessen the degree of care required of him; that care being the degree of care which every prudent
man would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.”
Bates,
103/333.
73. The rule applies where the danger is seen or apprehended.
The rule which requires one to avoid the consequences of another’s
negligence does not apply until he sees the danger or has re.ason to
apprehend it, and when there is a sufficient interval of time to guard
against it. In every case of alleged personal injury by negligence,
where there was any considerable interval of time between the discovery
of the negligence and its injurious effect, the jury ought to be made
acquainted with the rule of law which puts the plaintiff on the exercise of ordinary care to avoid the consequences of the defendant’s negligence. Akridge, 90/232. Cited, 105/103.
In Attaway, 90/657, plaintiff alleged that his injury was caused
by a piece of steel which flew into his eye in consequence of the negligent use of defective tools by the overseers under whom he was

tiff

was
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working. It was held that where an employer furnishes tools to his
employees which are reasonably safe if used in a proper manner, and
an employee is injured by their use in some improper manner, which
he could not have foreseen, a charge that he could not recover if he
could have avoided the consequences of the employer’s negligence by
the use of ordinary care would not be applicable, because no one who
is himself free from fault is bound by this rule unless he sees the danger, or has reason to apprehend the same.
Simmons, J., said: “According to the evidence, the tools, even if defective in the respects
claimed, could have been used safely if used with due care and caution and the plaintiff was not bound to anticipate that they would be
used in any other manner. Until it became apparent that they were
being used, or about to be used, carelessly and negligently, it was not
incumbent upon him to guard against the consequences of their use in
that manner. The rule which requires one to avoid the consequences
of another’s negligence does not apply until he sees the danger or has
reason to
apprehend it. It is unquestioned in this case that if the danger was at all apparent, the injury followed so closely that there was no
sufficient interval in which to guard against it.” Cited, 103/658^
In Central Railroad

held that where

v.

Brunswick & Western Railroad, 87/386, it

collision between the

plaintiff’s train and the
by them in common, while
the plaintiff or its agent was engaged in the violation of a valid city ordinance limiting the rate of speed in the running of trains in the city,
and the jury believed from the evidence that the collision would not
have occurred but for such violation, the plaintiff could not recover;
it not appearing that the defendant could have avoided the consequences of the plaintiff’s negligence after becoming aware of the same.
Simmons, J., said: “The court in effect charged the jury that defendant, when using this track, would have the right to suppose that the
plaintiff, coming in with its train, would run in accordance with the
provisions of a valid ordinance of the city/and that if there would
have been no collision if the plaintiff had observed that ordinance, then
the plaintiff could not recover. It was equivalent to instructing the
jury that running a train within the limits at a speed prohibited by a
valid ordinance would be negligence. This is certainly a correct statement of the law and as it appears that defendant, after becoming
aware of this negligence on the part of the plaintiff, could not have
avoided the consequences of it, it follows that plaintiff ought not to
was

a

defendant’s train occurred

recover.”

on a

track used
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In

Lloyd and Read, 110/165, the plaintiffs, when driving along a
were injured by a wire of the defendant company which had
sagged from the poles. The plaintiffs did not see the wire until they

street,
were

within twelve inches of it.

From the time it

was seen

until the

injury was inflicted, they could not stop the horses or avoid running
against it. Lloyd, who was driving, was looking straightforward along
the street, as it was his duty to do, and he did not see the wire; he
could have seen it one hundred yards if his attention had been directed
to it.
Read was not looking ahead, but, as was his custom, relied upon
his driver to look out for obstructions. A nonsuit was granted on
the ground that the plaintiffs could not recover, because they could
have avoided the results of the negligence of the railway company
by the exercise of ordinary care; that, while both plaintiffs testified
that they did not see the wire until too late to avoid the consequences
of the company’s negligence, still, by the exercise of ordinary care, they
could and should have seen the wire earlier, and have avoided the danger. Simmons, C. J., said: “Generally, the principle announced in this
opinion is sound, if the facts of the case are such as to make it applicable; but, under the facts of the present case, we think it is not
applicable. When a person sees that he is in danger in consequence
of the negligence of another, he is bound to avoid that danger, if he
can do so by the exercise of ordinary care; or, if he has reason to
apprehend danger occasioned by another’s negligence, he must exercise ordinary care to avoid it. For instance, if one should walk upon a railroad-track the track itself would be an intimation of danger, and he
would then have to exercise ordinary care in looking and listening for
the approach of a train or locomotive. If he fails to do this, and is injured, he can not recover. If one on the street sees another driving
recklessly, and the former can, by the exercise of ordinary care, avoid
the negligence of the driver, he must do so, or failing to do so, can not
recover, if injured by reason of the reckless driving. If one turns the
corner of a street, and does not see the reckless driving and has no
reason to apprehend that any one is driving recklessly, and he is injured, he can recover. If, upon the other hand, one is himself negligent, and is injured by the negligence of another, then if, after he had
perceived the danger or had reason to apprehend it, he could not have
avoided it by the exercise of ordinary diligence, he can still recover in
proportion to the negligence of himself and the other, provided the defendant’s negligence is greater than his own. Applying these prineipies to the facts of the present case, did Read or his driver see the dan-
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brought about by the negligence of the company (if there was any
negligence), or have reason to apprehend it, in time to have avoided
it by tly exercise of ordinary care ?
They were upon the street, where
they had a right to be, were driving in an ordinary manner, and had
no reason to apprehend that a wire would be across their pathway,
and there was nothing to put them upon their guard against such an
obstruction. When a person is in the habit of traveling the streets of
a city day after
day, and these streets are clear of obstructions,
whether ordinary care would require that he should look out for unusual obstructions we, as a court, do not know. Whether he ought to
see a wire the size of the little finger, when he is looking straight
ger

ahead in the direction of the

wire, and could have seen it a much
greater distance, if his attention had been called to it, is, it seems to
us, a question for the jury, and not for the court.
Assuming that the
jury would find that the plaintiffs-in these cases ought, by the'exercise of ordinary care, to have seen the wire, this would be conclusive
that there was negligence on their part; but still, if the defendant
was also negligent, and the plaintiff’s negligence was less than that of
the defendant, they can recover, if, after seeing or having reason to
apprehend the danger, they could not then have avoided it by the exercise of ordinary care. For these reasons, we think the court ought
to have submitted the

case to a jury.”
affirmatively appearing from the evidence that the defendant
company was not, relatively to the plaintiff, guilty of any negligence,
and also that the latter, by the exercise of ordinary care, might have
avoided the injury he received, the court was right in granting a nonsuit.
Simmons, C. J., said: “The plaintiff, while walking along the

It

main track of the defendant’s

railroad, heard the noise of a train
him, and stepped aside until the engine passed, hio cars were
attached to the engine, and he did not know that any were following
it. When it passed, he stepped back on the cross-tie, without looking in the direction from which the engine came, and two cars which
had been cut loose from the engine, and were following about one
hundred feet or more behind it, ran into him, inflicting the injury on
account of which this action was brought.
When the cars struck him
they were running at a speed variously estimated at from eight to
fifteen miles an hour. One or more employees were on the cars, putting on or trying to put off the brakes, which were midway of the two
cars, and the speed was gradually decreasing.
The cars ran about as
far as the public crossing, about one hundred yards beyond the point
behind
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plaintiff

was injured.
It is clear from this evidence that
not, relatively to the plaintiff, guilty of any negliThe evidence shows that it was impossible, after the plaintiff

the defendant
gence.

was

stepped back upon the track, to stop the cars in time to avoid striking
him; and the failure to comply with the statutory requirements as to
giving signals, etc., while approaching the public crossing, was not negligence as to him, inasmuch as these requirements raise no duty as
between the railroad company and strangers who may be upon the
track elsewhere than at a public crossing.
It is also clear that the
plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, and that,
by the exercise of such care, he could have avoided the injury. He
knew that this train, which was engaged in hauling rock from a neighboring quarry, at which he was employed, passed frequently at that
point, and that other trains might pass at any moment. Ordinary
care required, when he undertook to walk along the track, that he
should look behind to
to do

him.”

74.
there

if

train

approaching; and his failure
by the fact that an engine had already passed.
Martin, 95/361.
If the consequences could have been avoided by ordinary care,

so

see

a

was

is not excused

can

not be

a

recovery.

In
the

Smith, 78/694, it was held that as matter of fact, to walk along
middle of a railroad-track between crossings, when it is dark, and

without

knowing and remembering whether a train is due or not, and
looking out in both directions for trains that may be due, and
without listening attentively and anxiously for the roar and rattle of
machinery, as well as for the sound of bell or whistle, is gross negliwithout

gence.
A person,

while grossly negligent himself, has no legal right to count
diligence by others, but is bound to anticipate that others, like
he has done, may fail in diligence, and must guard, not only against
negligence on their part which he might discover in time to avoid the
consequences, but also against the ordinary danger of their being negligent, which he might not discover until too late. Bleckley, C. J.,
said:
“Smith, shortly before day, while it was still dark, got on the
railroad-track in Jonesboro at a crossing, and turned down the track,
using it for a walk, and had gone only about sixty or sixty-five yards
when the train, running at high speed, struck him, threw him off
the track, crushed his leg, gnd injured him seriously. The evidence
as to the negligence of the railroad pompany was somewhat conflicting, but there was an admitted failure to ring the bell when approachon

due
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ing and passing over the crossing. Smith, however, was not on the
crossing, nor on that side of it which the engine was upon in approaching it; he was on the further side of the crossing. The train was
probably running at a much higher rate of speed than it ought to have
run so near to a crossing.
There was some evidence tending to show
that the speed was low; but grant that it was high, too high, and that
there was very great negligence on the part of the railroad company,
yet it is manifest that Smith was out of his place at the time he was
injured. Grant that the track was often used by persons to walk
along it; that there was no objection to such use; that Smith was there
by implied or tacit license — he was there under circumstances that
required him to have all his senses on the alert for trains, and to get
out of the way when any of them approached.
It would be flagrantly
unreasonable and improbable to presume that he or any one else had
the shadow of a right to use the track, especially at such an hour,
on any other condition.
The train was on its regular schedule time.
He quietly walked along upon the track as if it belonged to him; the
train struck him, knocked him down and broke his leg, those on the
engine not seeing him or being aware of his presence. It was at least
as much his business to look for the engine as it was the engineer's
business to look for him.
The engine was a much larger object than
he was; it carried a headlight, and could have been seen as far as he
could. It was not possible for the engineer to have discovered him'
on the track sooner than he could have seen the headlight.
The presence of the engine was more to have been expected by him than his
presence was to be expected by the engineer. He had much less reason

surprised than the engineer had. If he had been on the crossat any place he was entitled by right to be, he would have
Been warranted in assuming that the whole world would be diligent in respect to him and his safety, but as he was engaged in
an act of gross negligence himself, he ought to have anticipated
that somebody else also might fail in diligence, and that the consequences might come down upon him before he discovered the negligence.
This view of the law of the case was not presented by the
court in charging the jury, but, on the contrary, it seems to have been
the opinion of the judge, and so announced in the charge, that unless
Smith,could have avoided the consequences of the company’s negligence by the exercise of ordinary care (his duty to exercise that care
beginning when he might or ought to have discovered the company’s
negligence), he could still recover partial damages, under the rule of

to be

ing,

or
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apportionment laid down in the Code for cases of contributory negligence.
The error of this position, under the facts of the present case,
is that Smith was under obligation, when grossly negligent himself, to
anticipate negligence as well as to discover it. He could not discover
it until it had begun; he ought to have anticipated that it might begin, and that he might not find it out in time to shun the consequences.” Cited, 81/417; 82/405, 669, 801; 83/597; 84/784;
92/93; 93/395; 102/288; 110/247; 112/187.
On a second trial of Smith’s case the evidence for the plaintiff was
the same as that submitted by him on the former trial, and a nonsuit
was awarded.
That was affirmed. In the opinion, Bleckley, C. J.,
said:
“ft is beyond dispute that the company was negligent. But
the evidence makes the plaintiff’s negligence quite as apparent as that
of the company; not only so, but it shows in the fullest and clearest
light, that by the use of ordinary care he could have avoided the consequences to himself of the company’s negligence; and that being so,
the Code declares in express terms that he is not entitled to recover.
This rule of law it is that bars him and renders a recovery impossible.
It is idle to try to evade the rule by dwelling upon the negligence of
the company, for unless there is negligence of the company which
would otherwise render it liable, the rule we are considering would
have no place in the law.
It is only where there is negligence the
•consequences of which are to be shunned, that the plaintiff is charged
with the duty of shunning them if he can do so by the exercise of ordinary care.” 82/801.
In Dixon, 42/327, the facts were that a train, at Gordon, was standing in the usual place after dark, taking wood and water. The publie road was blocked up by it and it also stood across the usual crossing for foot-passengers. Dixon, wishing to cross the track not at a
public crossing, got under the train for that purpose; this he did
twice; the second time the train suddenly moved, and injured him.
As to whether the usual signal was given before moving, the evidence
was
conflicting. It was held that the gross negligence and want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff, in thus undertaking to pass
under the cars, brought him within section 3830, and that he could not
recover, even by proof that the engineer did not give the usual signal
for starting the train. McCay, J., said: “Ordinary care is that care
and diligence which a prudent man exercises in his affairs.
Can it
for a moment be contended that the act of the plaintiff in attempting
to crawl under the cars, only temporarily stopped, as he knew they
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prudent man?

It

was,

in fact,

a

most impru-

dent and rash act, and if the section is to have any force, we think this
ease comes under it.
By the common law, if the plaintiff contributed
at

all, by his negligence, to the injury, he could not recover. Our law
guilty of want of ordinary
If he be negligent, but the
negligence does not amount to want of ordinary care, then, if the
railroad company be also negligent, the jury shall apportion the damages according to the negligence of both parties. We place this case
on the ground that the
attempt to crawl under the cars showed a want
of ordinary care, so as to bring the plaintiff within section 3830.”
Cited, 64/479; 71/440; 74/612.
In Loftin, 86/43, it was held that if it clearly appears from the
plaintiff’s evidence that he could have avoided the injuries from the
use of
ordinary care, a new trial should be granted after verdict in his
favor, whether the railroad company was negligent or not. Simmons,
J., said: “It was broad, open daylight, and a train could have been
seen four hundred
yards from the place where the plaintiff was hurt.
does not go so far as this. He must be
care in order to lose his right to recover.

He

not upon a

public crossing. He testified that he looked and
train, and yet, according to his testimony, by the
time he took three steps across the track he was struck by the engine.
It could not possibly have taken him more than six seconds to have
made the three steps, yet according to his testimony the train must have
come in sight and run two hundred and ninety yards in that time.
It
seems to us that, if the train had been near
enough to strike him by
the time he could make three steps, he could have seen it in time to
have avoided the injury if he had exercised any diligence at all. The
plaintiff’s own testimony having shown that he could have avoided the
injury by the exercise of ordinary care, and it being the only evidence
introduced in his behalf as to the manner in which he was injured, we
think the court below ought to have granted a new trial.
Moreover,
the account he gave of the manner of his injury was so improbable that
it was not worthy of any credit.
To say that the train ran four hundred yards, and struck him before he could take four steps across the
track, and knocked him off without breaking any bones or lacerating his
skin, and that, too, while he was standing in the middle of the track,
is too improbable to believe. We are inclined to think that the account
he gave shortly after he was hurt is the true one; that is, that he saw
the train, but thought he could cross before it struck him.”
Cited,
90/505.
was

listened and

saw no
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Jenkins, 89/756, the plaintiff was a night watchman for the

East Tennessee Railroad

was his duty to watch the
right of the track on which
the cars were that he was examining were two tracks of the defendant, the Central Railroad Company. The three tracks were five, six or
seven feet apart and on the same grade.
In order to cross a ravine
that ran under the tracks he stepped on the cross-ties of one of defendant’s tracks, and was struck by the engine of a passing train. It had
been the custom, for six years, for everybody that passed up and down
cars

Company and it
To the

and notice the seals

on

them.

the ravine

on

the track.

there to

cross

half-hour

The train that struck him

was

late, and

was running at fifteen to twenty-five miles an
public crossings which were four hundred feet apart.
When he got on the track he did not hear or see any train, and did not
expect any. He thought the train had gone in. He had been on the
track about a minute and a half or two minutes. He happened to
stop, and looked at the engine that had come in on the East Tennessee road, bringing ears; and he looked back towards the switch,
and saw a lamp. This is the switch at which passenger-trains are
turned off to come into the depot.
Two signals were given with the
lamp up and down, which mean to come ahead. Those signals indicated that the train was coming in on the Columbus track, not the
track on which he was standing.
He knew what the signals meant,

a

hour between two

for he had set switches himself.

The track

on

which he

was

stand-

ing was a little curved. When he looked at the lamp he heard a roaring and turned to see where it was, and it was “near him out a little
piece.” As soon as he saw it was on the track he was on he Jumped.
As he jumped something struck him, and rendered him unconscious.
When he regained consciousness he was lying twelve or fourteen ties
distant from where he was standing when struck. At the time the
train struck him his face was turned to it.
He saw the lamp of the
switchman giving the signals, and turned back to see if he saw the
train, and the pilot struck him. If it had been running five miles
an hour
(the limit of speed allowed by the city ordinance), he would
have had plenty of opportunity to get off the track. Ho whistle was
blown. He did not think the bell was ringing. A man sitting in
the engine could have seen him two hundred yards. It was a moonshiny
night. The train had four coaches. Had it been going five miles an
hour, the engineer by applying air-brakes could easily have stopped it
in thirty or forty feet; if it was going fifteen or twenty miles an hour,
he could not well stop under one hundred feet. In fact, it ran one
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hundred and

twenty-five or one hundred and thirty feet after striking
plaintiff. It was not more than a car length from him when he
heard the roaring. As soon as he saw it was on the track he was on
he jumped.
He did not get out of the way before, because there was
no danger that he saw or heard or knew of.
From the time he first
discovered the danger until he jumped he could not have got off the
track so as to avoid injury. It was held that the evidence in this
case showing clearly that the plaintiff, by the exercise of ordinary
care, could have avoided the consequences of the defendant’s negligence, there was no error in granting a nonsuit.
Cited, 101/422.
75. Subject continued.
In Ashworth, 94/715, the granting a second new trial was affirmed.
The case was again before the court (97/306) and it was held that,
without regard to the question of the defendant’s negligence, the evidence introduced by the plaintiff showing clearly that by the exercise
of ordinary care he might have avoided the injury, it was a proper
the

case

for

The

a

nonsuit.

plaintiff having testified at the trial that he could easily have
avoided being injured, and having Hailed to explain in his testimony
why he omitted to do so, and his declaration alleging that he was injured after he discovered that the danger was imminent, a new trial
should have been awarded on the general grounds of the motion,
though it was not positive error to deny the motion for a nonsuit.
Huggins, 89/494.
In Evans, 108/270, it was held that there can be no recovery against
a railway
company for personal injuries sustained in consequence of
a defective
bridge on a private crossing over the railroad, when the
person injured, before entering on the bridge, knew of its defective
condition and that the danger of crossing it was exceedingly great and
obvious, and notwithstanding this knowledge undertook to cross the
bridge where there was no emergency nor necessity for incurring the
risk. This is true notwithstanding it may have been the duty of the
railway company to keep the bridge in repair. Such being the ease
as
developed by the testimony for the plaintiff, the court did not err in
granting a nonsuit. Lewis, J., said: “There is nothing in the opinion of Justice Lumpkin, in Sample, 95/110, at all in conflict with
our views in this case.
In the opinion in that case it appears that the
only opportunity the plaintiff had of knowing the condition of the
bridge was the fact that he crossed the bridge with his wagon the day
before.
The principle laid down by Justice Lumpkin in his opinion
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as

a

matter of law

a

defendant in

would be relieved from

liability on account of negligence
by the plaintiff in not using due care and caution, and we think it
exactly fits the facts in this case. It is true it does not follow that because a traveler does know, for instance, that a public highway is
dangerous for traveling in a given place, it is necessarily conclusive
proof of negligence on his part if he undertakes to go over such portion of the highway.
A distinction might be drawn between what
would be negligence on the part of such a traveler on a public highway in the country, and the use by an owner of his own private way.
But even if there was none, the facts of this case do not present such
defects in the bridge as are merely small and trivial, and, while evidently of some danger to one passing, yet not so apparently dangerous
as to impress any prudent man with the idea that he would be incurring an unusual risk in undertaking to pass over. If it is possible for
testimony to make the danger of such a structure obvious and exceedingly great to even a casual observer, the testimony of the plaintiff
presents such an instance. She knew not only of the bad and defective condition of the bridge, but she knew that the planks were not
nailed, that there were large cracks between them, and that some of
them were rotten and liable to break at any time of their own weight.
Besides this, she could have reached her destination very readily without going over the bridge at all, and even if there was a necessity for
her to go to the public highway at the time she did, common prudence
would have demanded that she take the safer, though perhaps the more
circuitous route, rather than the dangerous and more direct one.”
In Barber, 111/838, it was held that inasmuch as it was apparent
from the evidence of the plaintiff that he could, by the exercise of
ordinary care, have avoided, not only the injury, but the consequences
to himself of the negligence of the defendant, even if such negligence
a case

was shown, he was not entitled to recover, and the nonsuit was
properly awarded.
In Taylor v. Georgia Marble Company, 108/807, it was held that
it appearing from the evidence introduced in behalf of the plaintiff
that by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence he could have
avoided the injury he sustained in consequence of the alleged negligence of the defendant, there was no error in the judgment of the
court below granting a nonsuit.
A similar ruling was made in Fulcher, 110/327.
In Coleman, 84/1, it was held that one who
gets upon a fast-mail
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train

during one of its fixed stops at a station, where these are too short
for him to transact his business and get off, has no right to notice, by
signal or otherwise, to alight before the train resumes its journey; it
not appearing that the conductor, or other proper agent, knew that he
had come aboard, nor that there was any usage or custom to give notice or make signals for the benefit of such visitors.
This applies to
a father who, in
conformity to a known custom of travel, attends his
daughter, at her request, under circumstances rendering such attendance necessary, to aid her and her infant children to enter the train
and secure seats as passengers. If, while he is in the car, the train
starts before he has finished his undertaking, he must either remain
until he can make known his wish to get off, or take the risk of alighting while the train is in motion. Cited, 85/504; 96/43.
In McLaren, 85/504, it was held that an injury resulting from an
attempt to alight from a rapidly moving train will generally afford
no cause of action.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “The plaintiff went upon
the train with his daughter and her children to see them seated.
So
far as appears, the conductor did not know of his presence there, or
of his wish to get off. He heard no signal given for starting the
train, but does not prove that the usual signal was not in fact given.
He left the train, knowing it was in motion, and undertook to alight
when it was going, according to his subsequent estimate, at fifteen
miles an hour.
Most probably this estimate is too high, but the important fact is that the speed was unsafe, and so obviously unsafe that
he should not have incurred the risk of attempting to get off without
waiting to see the conductor, and have the train stopped. He owed
that duty both to himself and the railroad company, inasmuch as he
must have known he was exposing himself, and the conductor did not
know of his exposure.
Granting that the company was in fault for
starting the train too soon, it seems to us, as it did doubtless to the
court below, that the plaintiff could have avoided the consequences by
the exercise of ordinary care.
We think the case is controlled in
principle by Coleman, supra. Cited, 96/43.
In the case of Suber, 96/42, it appeared that the plaintiff went to
the railroad-station for the purpose of assisting his sister and three
small children upon one of the regular passenger-trains of the defendant.
Upon the arrival of the train he went to the conductor and told
him of his intention, and the conductor saw him preparing to get on.
After seating his sister and the children, the train moved off before
he had an opportunity to get off.
As he was about to step off, the

CHAPTER 7.

§75]
Actions

[ 112

against railway companies—continued.

train gave a

sudden jerk which caused him to fall, and he was thus
injured. It was held that the ease was one for submission to the jury
and not for determination by the court, and therefore that it was error to grant a nonsuit.
Simmons, C. J., said: “It is not necessarily,
as matter of law, negligent for a person to leave a moving train.
Whether it is negligent or not in a particular case must depend upon
the circumstances of danger attending the act, and the special justification which the person leaving the train had for doing so.
Ordinarily, in cases of this kind, the question of what is or is not negligence is one for the jury; and, unless the danger is obviously great—
as where the train is
moving at full speed — the court can not hold
that leaving the train is, as a matter of law, such negligence as should
preclude a recovery. Covington, 81/273. The cases relied upon by counsel for the defendant in error in support of the holding of the court below are distinguishable from the present case. In the case of Coleman,
supra, the decision was not placed upon the ground that the plaintiff
was
negligent in stepping off the train, but upon the ground that the
railroad company was under no duty to the plaintiff, it not appearing
that the conductor or any other proper agent of the company knew that
he had
to

come

aboard the

train,

nor

that there

was any usage or

custom

give notice or make signals for the benefit of such visitors. In
the case of McLaren, supra, the facts were similar to those in the
Coleman case, supra. Besides, in that case the train, according to
the plaintiff’s own estimate, was moving at the rate of fifteen miles
an hour, while in the
present case it appeared that the train was
moving very slowly. In other cases cited for the defendant in error,
the speed was obviously dangerous. In Barnett, 87/766, it did
not appear that there was any jerk of the train or other act on the
part of the defendant which could be treated as negligent, and which
caused or contributed to the injury. See, on this subject, 2 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law, 762, 763, and cases cited; Railroad Co. v. Crunk,
119 Ind. 542, 21 N. E. 31; Carr v. Railroad Co., 98 Cal. 366, 33
Pac. 213.
Cited, 97/732; 108/90.” Suber’s case recognized not only
the right of one to go upon a train to aid, when necessary, dependent
passengers in being safely seated, but also recognized the duty of the
company to give such persons a reasonable opportunity to safely leave
the train.
With much more force can it be urged that such a duty
is due by the company to a passenger to give him an opportunity
to be safely located on the train.
Moore, 108/90.
In Andrews, 86/192, it was held that though a standing railway-
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train be

an unauthorized obstruction of a public crossing, a person
attempting to pass between the cars by climbing over the platform
and bumpers, if injured thereby, in consequence of a sudden movement of the train, can not recover unless the engineer, conductor,
or some other person having control of the train’s movements, knew
of his attempt to cross, or had notice of his exposure to danger.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “But the obstruction, and the nature of it,
were open and visible and there is no sufficient reason alleged why
the plaintiff should not have anticipated that the train might move
at any moment.
Nevertheless, instead of waiting for the train to
get out of the way, applying for it to be moved, or attempting to go
around it, he voluntarily and without warning any one of his intention, exposed himself between the cars by climbing upon their platforms adjacent to the bumpers, and was injured.
There is nothing
alleged from which it can rightly be inferred that his presence and
position were known to the engineer, or to any person controlling
the movements of the train. If the engineer, conductor, or any
other person whose duty it might have been to keep the train still
while the plaintiff was passing between the cars, knew that he was so
passing, or had notice of his exposure to danger, it was easy to allege
it. Why should such a material fact — the only fact which would
give the plaintiff a right to any diligence in his favor when in such a
hazardous position — be left to conjecture or supposition, instead of
being plainly and distinctly set forth as a part of the cause of action ?
Code, §4960. In the absence of such an averment, the plaintiff’s
hurt, by having his foot caught between the bumpers and crushed,

must be attributed to his

76. It is
In

own

rashness.”

question for the jury.
Howard, 79/44, it was held that
a

a failure of the injured party
ordinary care, by untimely stepping upon a railroadtrack at a public crossing, is no complete bar to the recovery of damages, unless, by the use of ordinary care, the consequences due to the
negligence of the other party could have been avoided; and whether
they could or not is a question for the jury. Cited, 82/807. It is a
question of fact for determination by the jury. Parks, 93/228.
The court can not point out to the jury, specifically, the ways
of the prudent; the law supposing these ways better known to the
jury than to the judge. It is not incumbent on the court to instruct
the jury that it is the duty of one who attempts or intends to cross
a railroad-track to use his senses of
hearing and seeing before stepin the

use

of
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on the track.
The precise thing which every man is bound to
do before stepping upon a railroad-track is that which every prudent man would do under similar circumstances.
If prudent men

ping

else, or take the consequences,
been avoided by that means.
The court can not instruct the jury what a prudent man would do;
for, in legal contemplation, the jury knew it better than the court
Howard, 79/44. Cited, 79/247; 82/807.
77. Must use care appropriate to perilous situation he unnecessarily
puts himself in.
In Daniel, 89/463, it appeared that the plaintiff was knocked
from the railroad-track by the defendant’s passenger engine and train.
It was held that he was bound to use that degree of diligence for his
protection which every prudent person uses who puts himself unnecessarily in a perilous situation. The evidence in the record strongly
indicates that, had the injured party come up to this measure of diligenee, he could and would have avoided the consequences to himself
of the negligence of the company; and a new trial is ordered on this
question alone, with direction to render judgment for the amount
already assessed, or dismiss the action, according as the finding of
another jury may be in the affirmative or the negative touching this
one question.
Cited, 93/397; 101/222.
In Briscoe, 103/224, it was held that no one is entitled to relief
from the consequences of neglecting to exercise ordinary care for his
own protection and safety, because failure to do so arose from an
emergency brought about by his own act in voluntarily placing himself in a situation of peril. The evidence showing that the plaintiff,
by ordinary care, could have avoided the injuries of which he complains, he was not entitled to recover, though the defendant was in
some respects negligent; and consequently there was no error
in
granting a nonsuit. Lumpkin, P. J., said: “The plaintiff went, at
night, into an exceedingly dangerous place, with knowledge of the
fact; and, even if his presence there was not wrongful, it was certainly incumbent upon him to conduct his movements with reference to the situation as it
actually existed. When, therefore, he
backed from one of the exposition tracks to escape collision with a
moving train, he was not exercising ordinary care in stepping upon
the other exposition track without looking to see if a train was coming upon it from the opposite direction. It was practically conceded
in the argument here that the proposition last announced would,
would look and listen, so must every one
so far as the consequences might have
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under

ordinary circumstances, be undoubtedly true, but that the rule
diligence therein indicated should not be applied to the plaintiff,
because he was confronted by an impending danger, which prevented
his exercising that degree of care which should otherwise be required
of him.
Speaking for myself, I am of the opinion that the situation
of

in which the

plaintiff found himself was an ‘emergency.’ Some of
disposed to hold otherwise. But we all agree that,
even if there was an emergency calculated to unfit the
plaintiff for
the exercise of ordinary care, it was one of his own making. The
exact condition of things at the place of the injury, brought about
by the movement of these trains, was one of very frequent occurrence;
and he was completely aware that just such a condition might exist
at any moment, and necessarily was to be expected.
We are therefore
my

brethren

are

confident that he is not entitled to be relieved from the consequences
of neglecting to exercise ordinary care for his own protection and

safety, because his failure to do this

arose from a sudden crisis,
concerned, was brought about by his own
act in voluntarily placing himself in a situation of imminent peril.
He ought not to be permitted to do a thing which deprived him of
that presence of mind requisite to his preservation and safety, and
then allege that, for want of such presence of mind, another, not
responsible for it, should be made to suffer. It was not contended
that he was upon the right of way by invitation.
At best, his presence there was only tolerated.
This being so, it must unquestionably
be accepted as true that the railway authorities had done nothing to
exempt him from the operation of the rule of law which requires
all persons to exercise ordinary care for their own safety.
We do
not mean to say that there was no evidence of negligence on the part
of the defendant company.
The jury might certainly have found
that it was guilty of negligence in running its train more rapidly than
the city ordinance permitted, and the evidence might have warranted
inferences of negligence in other respects; but there was no testimony
upon which a finding that the company’s servants in charge of the
train were guilty of wantonness, or of a willful disregard of the
plaintiff’s safety, could stand. He was struck at the very instant he
got upon the edge of the track. There was no time for the company's servants to do anything after he placed himself in this position.
The collision was then inevitable.”
Cited, 110/304.
A person who declares that he was upon a railroad-track by consent of the company and was injured by the running of the cars,

which,

so

far

as

he

was
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by unusual loading of the same — the timbers projecting
and he standing that distance from it at
night, supposing himself safe at such a distance from the rails, but
was prevented from getting still further by a heap or thicket of
briers left growing on the right of way, several other trains, properly loaded, having passed without injury to him, has the right to
go to the jury, the question of negligence being one peculiarly for
the jury, the presumption in all cases being against the company, and
a declaration alleging such facts should not be dismissed on demurrer.
Baston, 60/339. Cited, 70/237, 253. On the trial of this
case, subsequently, it did not appear that the plaintiff was on the
embankment of the company by its consent,- expressed or implied,
and it did appear that the agents of the company used all reasonable
care and diligence in running the train according to schedule
along
the road at the time of the alleged injury, and that plaintiff was voluntarily on a dark night on the embankment of the defendant, when
a public road, within one hundred and fifty feet thereof, ran parallel
thereto to the place where he was going; that he was not seen by
defendant’s agents in control of the cars, and would have got further
from the track but for briers, thereby recognizing, as he testified himself, the place where he stood as dangerous. The evidence rendered
it improbable that he could have been hurt by the cars at such a distance from the track, as they had passed depots adjacent to the
spot
where he stood without striking obstructions nearer the track than he
was standing, and the agents of the
company had examined the cars
shortly before the alleged hurt, and found no such projecting timber.
caused
seven

feet beyond the track

A verdict

was

rendered for the company,

and

a new

trial

was

refused.

Baston, 63/164.
78. Person

put in peril by negligence of company.
safety of a person is put in imminent jeopardy by the
gross negligence or want of ordinary care of the servants of a railroad, and in attempting to escape injury he is seriously damaged, it is
no relief to the
company that the person misjudged as to the danger, unless the plaintiff acted from a rash misapprehension as to the
true situation. This principle was
applied to the case of a stranger
when a collision occurred at a public
crossing. Winn, 26/250.
79. Whether the presumption has been rebutted is a
question of
fact for the jury.
In Hubbard, 86/623, it was held that whether or not the
presumpWhen the
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tion of

negligence, which section 2321 of the Code provides shall in
be against a railroad company, has been removed, is a question of fact for the jury, and not one of law to he determined by
the court. Lumpkin, J., said: “Under the law, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of this presumption against the company, in con*
nection with all the facts, in having the jury arrive at a proper conelusion. In other words, this presumption goes through the entire
trial, the question always being whether it has or has not been removed or rebutted by the evidence. Of course, it may be so rebutted,
and this can be done by evidence introduced by plaintiff as well as by
defendant; but the jury, and they alone, must say whether the presumption remains or has been removed, and it is not for the court to
deprive them of this right, or relieve them of this duty, by any instruction given.”
Cited, 90/837.
In cases where the presumption of negligence arises against a railroad company under section 2321 of the Code it is generally a question for the jury, and not for the court, as to whether or not by the
proof of certain specific facts this presumption is removed. Phillips,
90/829.
80. Where plaintiff’s right depended upon presumption and it was
all

cases

rehutted.

Trimmier, 84/112, was an action for

killing

a cow.

The plain-

found near the track of
the railroad. Defendant’s witnesses, who were not contradicted, testified that while the train was running rapidly, down grade, they
saw the cow near the track; that she turned, and came on the track;
and that it was impossible to stop the train in time to prevent the
accident, though every effort was made to that end. Held, that the
evidence did not support a verdict for plaintiff.
Blevins, 92/522, was for damages to a cow, and it was held that
the plaintiff’s right to recover depended entirely upon the presumptiff showed that her cow was killed and was

negligence raised by law against the railway company, and the
having, by the uncontradicted testimony of the engineer,
fully overcome this presumption, and it appearing that the fireman,
who was not introduced as a witness, could not have thrown any additional light on the case, because he was at the time occupied in supplying the engine with fuel, the verdict rendered in the magistrate’s
court was contrary to law, and the court erred in overruling the cer-

tion of

defendant

tiorari.
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By two witnesses, who knew the facts with absolute certainty, the
presumption of negligence was fully overcome; and, apart from the
presumption, there was no proof whatever of negligence. Consequently the verdict was without evidence to support it. Lumpkin,
J., said: “The plaintiff depended for a recovery solely upon the
presumption of negligence which the law raises against a railway
company.
That the animals were killed by the defendant’s train was
admitted; but by the evidence of two witnesses for the company —
the engineer and the fireman — who knew with absolute certainty the
facts of the transaction, it was conclusively shown that the company
and its servants in charge of the train were free from all negligence
in the premises.
So the legal presumption against the company was
fully overcome. It is true, the plaintiff did introduce two witnesses,
who, according to their testimony, exhibited wonderful and extraordinary powers of vision in seeing through a dense fog at or about
daylight in the morning. They did not, however, see the catastrophe,
and what they swore amounted to no proof of negligence, and should
not have been allowed to overcome the positive testimony of the engineer and fireman, the former of whom
appears, from the report of
his evidence, to have been an. unusually straightforward, candid, and
honest witness.” McConnell, 94/352.
As the plaintiff’s alleged right to recover depended entirely upon
the presumption of negligence raised by law against the defendant
company, and as this presumption was fully overcome and rebutted
by the undisputed evidence introduced in its behalf, which showed
conclusively that there was upon its part no negligence at all, the
verdict for the defendant

was demanded, and therefore should not be
Bolden, 102/558.
This being an action for the killing of live stock by a train, in
which the plaintiffs alleged right to recover depended
upon the
presumption of negligence raised by law against the defendant-, and
the uneontradicted evidence in its behalf showing that its servants
in charge of the train exercised ordinary care and
diligence in endeavoring to prevent the collision, this presumption was rebutted;
and consequently the verdict against the
company was contrary to
law, and should have been set aside. Wood, 105/499.
In Holmes and Seig, 110/282, it was held that the
legal presumption against the railway company, upon which alone the
right qf the
plaintiff in each of these cases to recover depended, having been fully
overcome by uncontradicted
testimony conclusively showing that the

disturbed.
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defendant’s servants in

charge of the train used due care and dilito prevent the injuries complained of, the verdicts against the
company were contrary to law, and ought to have been set aside.
In Waxelbaum, 111/812, it was held that the legal presumption of
negligence, upon which alone the plaintiff’s case rested, was overcome
by the testimony of three witnesses, which fully established due diligence on the part of the defendant.
This testimony was practically
uncontradieted, for the mere differences of opinion among the witnesses as to time, distances, the range of vision, etc., did not involve
questions of credibility, or produce conflict as to the actual facts of
gence

the

occurrence.

In

Bowman, 108/798, it

was held that a verdict against a railroad
of live stock by the running of a train of cars
when the plaintiff’s right to recover depends
entirely upon the presumption of negligence which the law raises
against the defendant, and when the uncontradicted evidence offered to rebut the presumption conclusively shows that the servants
and agents of the company, who were-in charge of the train at the
time the stock was killed, exercised all ordinary and reasonable care
and diligence to prevent such killing.
In Thompson, 111/731, it was held that the railway company introduced positive testimony which fully overcame the legal presumption upon which alone the plaintiff’s case rested. Its witnesses were
entitled to be believed, for they were not directly contradicted; and
the circumstantial evidence by which it was sought to discredit them,
while consistent with the theory that they did not swear truly, was
also consistent with the theory that they did. In such case the positive testimony must control.
Cited, 112/556.
81. Where presumption is rebutted by uncontradicted testimony of
employees.
In Wall, 80/202, it was held that where it is shown that damage
has been do,ne to live stock by the running of a railroad-train, a presumption of negligence arises against the company; but this presumption is subject to be rebutted.and overcome by evidence; and when
this has been done by the uncontradicted testimony of the employees
of the company, a verdict finding against it is contrary to law and
evidence. The testimony of employees of a railroad company, in the
absence of anything to discredit or contradict it, can not be arbitrarily disregarded. Bleckley, C. J., said: “The law, by raising a
presumption of negligence and requiring the company to rebut that
company for the killing
can not lawfully stand
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presumption by showing that all ordinary and reasonable diligence
was observed, means to accept such explanation as, according to the
manner of conducting business, it is possible to make.
It is generally out of the power of the company to show this diligence except
by its employees. The law, therefore, certainly means to receive
their evidence as the evidence of other witnesses is received, subject
to be weighed, and if there be anything against it discredited, but to be
credited and respected if there be nothing against it. There is no
other way to carry out the scheme of the law, which is, to require
the railroad company to show the observance of all ordinary and
reasonable diligence. To arbitrarily reject the explanation because
it comes from employees is to cut off the company from defense altogether; it is to stand on the presumption and treat ic as impossible
to make defense.

law that entitles

Cited, 111/129.

That is not the scheme of the law.

There is

no

jury not to recognize due proof when it is made.”
The case Harris, 83/393, in its facts was exactly

a

like the Wall case,

and the decision in the latter case controlled it.
And, in the element of negligence, Bryant, 89/457, was controlled by
the Wall

case.

In

Sanders, 111/128, it was held that when it is shown by a plaintiff, in an action against a railroad company to recover damages for
killing a cow, that the animal was killed by the running and operation
of a train of cars, the law raises a presumption of negligence against
the company, and, without more, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
the value of the animal killed.
Such presumption, however, may be
rebutted; and when the evidence of the engineer and fireman on the
locomotive which struck the animal is to the effect that she came upon
the track suddenly, and immediately in front of the locomotive, and
that all reasonable and

ordinary diligence was used to prevent striking the animal, but without avail, such presumption is successfully
rebutted; and, when there is no evidence disproving or tending to
disprove this evidence of the train-men, the owner is not entitled to
recover.
Cited, 112/556.
In Neidlinger, 110/329, it was held that a railroad company is not
liable for an injury simply because at the time it was occasioned the
train causing the same was being operated in a manner forbidden by
law. To make the company liable, the failure to properly conduct
the train must have operated as a cause of the injury. Accordingly,
when, in the trial of an action to recover damages for killing a cow,
proof is made that the train was passing through a town at the speed
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an hour or more, and that such speed was not checked
approaching a crossing, and it did not appear that there was any
ordinance or by-law of the town regulating the speed of passing railroad-trains, the presumption of negligence which arose by showing
that a cow was struck and killed by the locomotive was rebutted when
it was conclusively shown that the injury did not occur on a crossing
or public road, but at a point some forty or fifty yards beyond the
same, and that the animal suddenly came on the track at a point so
nearly in front of the locomotive that, notwithstanding all possible
efforts, the progress of the train could not be arrested before the animal was struck.
The failure to check the speed, not being the cause
of the injury, did not render the company liable.
In Davis, 19/437, it appeared that mules were loose and, getting on
the track, were killed by the train, and Benning, J., said: “The
owner of the mules was guilty of some degree of negligence in letting
them run at large in the vicinity of the uninclosed railroad-track;
and when they got on the track, that made him, I think, a trespasser.
He had no right to have his mules on that track, but the company
had no right to kill the mules merely for being there. Notwithstanding the owners may have been guilty of some degree of negligence
in suffering the mules to run at large in the neighborhood of this
uninclosed railroad-track, yet that did not excuse the railroad company from the observance of ordinary care in running its train, to
prevent it from striking against the mules.” Cited, 70/222.
In Baber, 42/300, it was said by Loehrane, C. J., that, “Under the
well-known policy and laws of this State, owners of cattle are not
compelled to keep them up, or send caretakers to watch them. Cows
are, ordinarily, milked and turned out.
Mules are a class of animals
generally kept up; their value and disposition to stroll off making
it a matter of common prudence to have them tended near an unin-

twenty miles

in

closed railroad-track.

But with cattle it is different.”

And it

was

ruled that the fact of

contributory negligence can not be presumed
against the owner of such cattle as ordinarily are turned out, by
turning such animals out, and the act of their going upon an uninclosed track does not constitute him
In

a

trespasser.

Lester, 30/911, it

was ruled that loose stock are not trespassers
uninelosed lands in this State. A horse was killed on the rail-

on

road-track.
While the evidence showed that the
the

plaintiff’s cow was killed by
running of the defendant’s train, the presumption that the de-

/
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negligent, arising from this fact, was fully and completely rebutted by uncontradicted evidence, and therefore the verdict
in favor of the plaintiff was contrary to law.
Woolsey, 112/365.
82. Presumption rebutted.
When the evidence shows conclusively that the servants of a railroad company used all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence to
prevent the killing of a certain cow, a verdict in favor of the owner
for the value of the animal is contrary to law and the evidence, and
should be set aside. Walker, 87/204.
Cited, 111/130; 99/303;
107/751.
In Powell, 108/437, it was held that in the trial of a suit against
a railroad
company for the killing of a mule by the running of its
trains, where there was no evidence tending to contradict the positive testimony that the defendant’s employees could not by the exercise of all ordinary care and diligence have prevented the injury, a
verdict for the plaintiff should, upon motion of defendant’s counsel,
have been set aside on the ground that it was contrary to evidence.
Cited, 112/556.
The presumption of negligence against the company arising from
proof of the killing of live stock by the running of its train was rebutted and overcome by uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony
clearly showing that the defendant was in the exercise of all ordinary
and reasonable care and diligence when the injury occurred. The verdiet for the plaintiff, therefore, was contrary to evidence, and the
judge erred in not sustaining the petition for certiorari on this
ground. Early, 105/512.
Where there was no conflict in the evidence, and it showed that a
railroad-train killed a mule; that the night was a clear, starlit night,
hut at the place where the casualty occurred the track was enveloped
by a smoke or fog, so that the engineer and fireman, who were on the
lookout, were unable, in consequence thereof, to discover the mule on
the track until they were within fifty or sixty yards of it, when it
was impossible to have
stopped the train so as to avoid killing the
mule; and that the whistle was blown; the presumption of negligence arising from the killing was rebutted, and a verdict against the
company was without evidence to support it. Wilhoit, 78/714.
Where it was shown that a mule was killed by the running of the
engine and cars of a railroad company, this raised a presumption of
negligence on the part of the defendant; but when this presumption
was
fully rebutted by the testimony on behalf of the company, to the
was
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effect that the

was not the result of negligence on the part of
its agents, but that it used all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence to prevent the injury, and where this was
not contradicted by any other evidence, a new trial should have been
granted, on the ground that the verdict was without evidence to support it. Newell, 74/809.
Proper diligence having been shown by the agreed statements of
the

defendant,

injury
or

facts

on the part of the railroad company, the presumption of law
against the road was rebutted, and the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover.
Bartley, 60/182. Cited, 72/207.
While, by the use of extraordinary diligence, the company might
have saved the life of the horse by adopting different means of releasing him from his confinement in the trestle, yet the evidence
shows clearly that the company used all ordinary and reasonable diligence, both to avoid driving him upon the trestle, and to release him

therefrom after he fell and became confined between the cross-ties.
The court erred in not

granting a new trial for this reason. Buice,
88/180.
It affirmatively appearing from the evidence introduced for the defendant that the company’s servants were guilty of no negligence in
bringing about or causing the accident by which the plaintiff, a child
of tender years, was injured, and there being no real or irreconcilable
conflict between this evidence and that introduced by the plaintiff,
which merely tended to show that the conductor permitted the boy
to remain upon the train after being aware of his presence, and this
mere tendency not being sufficient to overcome the conductor’s positive
evidence to the contrary, the verdict was contrary to law and the evi-.
denee, and a new trial should have been granted. Fuller, 92/482.
It affirmatively appearing from the undisputed evidence introduced
by the defendant that its servants exercised full diligence, and the
evidence as a whole showing conclusively that the destruction of the
plaintiff’s mules was not due to the defendant’s negligence, a verdict
for the latter was the only one legally possible in the case. Such a
verdict having been rendered, it should not have been set aside, even
if some errors were committed by the trial judge in charging the
jury; and, consequently, the court erred in granting a new trial because, in the judge’s opinion, the charge was in some particulars erroneous.
Green, 95/362.
The testimony of the plaintiff, who was the sole witness in his
own behalf as to the circumstances under which he was injured,
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making at best a very weak and doubtful case, it being as a whole utterly inconsistent with itself, and self-contradictory as to the most
vitally important facts, and one version of it showing clearly that he
was not entitled to recover; and the defendant’s evidence, which was
perfectly consistent with this version, establishing a complete defense, the verdict in the plaintiff’s favor was unwarranted, and the
ends of justice require a new trial. Lumpkin, J., said: “Every
witness is under a solemn obligation to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth; and this obligation is especially binding
upon one who seeks, by his own testimony, to establish a substantial
right against another. Beauchamp, 93/6. It surely can never be
unfair to a party laboring under no mental infirmity to deal with his
case from the standpoint of his own testimony as a witness.
Where
a party calls witnesses who conflict with each other in their sworn
statements, he is not to be held responsible for the contradictions
among them, for it is not within his power to prevent their occurrence; and a reviewing court will generally give to a party the benefit
of the most favorable version of such testimony as a whole which the
jury would be authorized to accept. But a party testifying in his
own favor has no
right to be intentionally or deliberately self-contradictory; and, if he is so, the courts are fully justified in taking against
him that version of his testimony which is most unfavorable to him.
Being peculiarly in a position to state fairly and definitely the facts
which he professes to know, he is under a duty of so stating them as
to give a candid and intelligible account of what occurred.
The
courts are also authorized to give great weight to statements unwillingly made upon cross-examination, when these statements have every appearance of being the real truth, though reluctantly told. It
is evident that the plaintiff below did not deal fairly with the court
and jury. He was not candid, and evidently did not wish to disclose
all he knew as to the cause of his injury.” Evans, 96/481.
Cited,
107/32.
In Crawley, 82/190, it was held that the presumption of negligence was satisfactorily met by the company.
Simmons, J., said:
“The company showed, in substance, that its train was running its
usual schedule at the time it arrived at the blow-post, four hundred
yards from the public crossing. When it arrived at this blow-post,
the whistle

was

time the whistle
mules

come

upon

blown in accordance with the statute.
blown at the

About the

blow-post, the engineer saw these
the track at the public crossing, four hundred yards

was
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the track in the direction of the train. Imbrakes,” gave the “stock-alarm,” sanded the
track, and reversed the engine. When the engine collided with the
mules, he had reduced the speed from twelve miles an hour to four
miles an hour, and had run only three hundred and twenty yards
of the four hundred between the blow-post and the crossing, the
mules having gone eighty yards towards the engine. The testimony
was positive by the conductor and engineer that the speed of the
train! had been so checked that they could have stopped before
they reached the crossing. It appears further, from the testimony,
that these mules had escaped from the lot of the owner, and were being pursued by one of his servants, and to avoid this pursuit they ran
up the track, towards the engine. We think that, under this state
of facts, the court below was right in setting the verdict aside. It is
true that two of the witnesses for the plaintiff in their testimony said
that they did not think the speed of the train had been checked when
the collision with the mules occurred. But the careful reading of
their testimony will show that they were not in as good a position to
judge of the speed of the train as were the officers and servants of the
railroad company. One of them was sitting in the depot, and looked
at the train as it was approaching, without his attention being particularly called to the necessity of checking the train, or to the emergency for so doing.
The other testified that when he heard the stockalarm he ran one hundred and fifty yards towards the engine, and, in
his opinion, the speed had not been checked. These were mere opinions, against positive testimony of persons who were on the train,
and who had every opportunity of knowing whether it had been
cheeked in its speed or not, and much better means of knowing this
fact than the two witnesses above alluded to.” This case again,
87/191. Cited, 93/399.
In Moye, 83/669, plaintiff sued for damages for killing a horse.
Simmons, J., said: “The horse was tied at a station on the line of the
defendant’s road, and that when the cars moved away from the station
he became frightened, broke loose and ran down the road in front of the
engine. The engineer saw him, and gave the cattle-signal. The brakes
were put on, and the train came nearly to a
stop. The horse disappeared, it being a dark night. The engineer blew off brakes, and
started the train, moving at the rate of four or five miles an hour.
The engineer and the fireman, according to the evidence, were on the
lookout for the horse, thinking, as they swore, that perhaps he would
up

mediately he “blew

on
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on the track again.
The engine had a good headlight. After
running about six hundred yards from the place where they first slowed
up, they discovered the horse again upon the track.
The engine was
then about seventy-five feet from him. The engineer immediately blew
on brakes, reversed the engine, and gave it steam; but it was a heavily loaded train, and going down grade, and it seems to have been
impossible to stop the train before reaching the horse, and he was
killed.
The place at which he was killed was a small trestle, and the
great preponderance of evidence was that the horse's legs had fallen
through the trestle, and that he was lying upon the track. The supposition of two of the plaintiff’s witnesses was that he was standing

get

with his

body across the track, and remained standing until he was
by the engine, and killed. If the testimony of the engineer,
fireman, conductor, and a passenger on the train is to he believed,
against the supposition of two witnesses, the railroad company exercised ‘all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence’ to prevent the
accident; and this is so, in our opinion, whether the horse had fallen
through the trestle or was standing still. The court, therefore, did
not err in granting this new trial, even though it was the second time
a new trial had been granted in the case.”
In Parks, 91/71, it appeared that the plaintiff’s mule got out of
struck

the lot and onto the

railroad, and tried to go across the railroad
It got about ten feet on the bridge and fell through,
and was fastened., so that one Glover, who was trying to catch
the mule, could not do anything. The mule stayed there about
three-quarters of an hour before defendant’s accommodation train
came along.
When it came Glover was standing on the bridge,
holloed, and waved his hat, but the train went on and struck the
mule. According to Glover’s testimony, the persons in charge of
the train just looked at the mule and went on.
He never saw the
bridge watchman until after the train had gone over the bridge. The
engineer testified: “Reached the bridge about 5:48 in the morning.
Blew whistle on approaching, and was looking out ahead of the engine, and in my place on the engine approaching the bridge and
crossing it. Slowed down on approaching the bridge at the rate of
six miles an hour.
The bridge is one hundred and fifty to two hundred feet long.
On arriving at the bridge saw the watchman at the
end towards Covington, which was the proper place for him to be. It
was foggy and before good daylight.
First saw the mule when within
about twenty yards of him.
The mule was about three ties from the

bridge.
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bridge, near where the embankment stopped, about
Did not know what it was at first. It looked like

of clinkers

the track.

five or
heap

a

Witness reversed his

engine and put on
it, and nearly stopped the train.
The engine lifted the mule up, and carried him about the length of
the engine. Witness stopped the train with part of the baggage-car
and the balance of the train standing on the bridge. He saw no man
standing, and there was none, on it near that mule.
The
train stayed there between five and ten minutes to repair one of the
cylinder-cocks. The signal-whistle was blown on approaching the
bridge.
.Was very close to the mule when he saw that it
was a live object, and did not know
really it was a mule until the
engine was stopped and it got up and ran off.” The bridge watchman testified:
“I was in my place at the east end of the bridge when
the train arrived, and had been there about twenty minutes before it
arrived.
Nobody came to me before it arrived, nobody called to me,
and I never heard any unusual noise at the other end of the bridge.”
It was held that the presumption of negligence was overcome by
the evidence, for the conipany showed that its servants exercised all
reasonable care and diligence at the time of the injury. Moreover,
the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff shows that there was ample
time for his servant in charge of the mule to have found the bridgewatchman and given him notice that the mule was fast in the trestie. The failure to do this was the real cause of the subsequent disbrakes

as

on

soon

as

he discovered

.

.

.

.

.

aster.

In

action

against a railroad company for killing stock on the
night, the testimony of a witness for the plaintiff showing
that the stock ran suddenly upon the track, about fifteen feet in
front of the locomotive, which was running down grade, and in his
opinion nothing which the engineer could have done would have
prevented the accident, and there being no evidence to the contrary,
the legal presumption of negligence arising out of the mere fact of
the injury was rebutted, and it was error to deny a motion for a nonsuit.
Middlebrooks, 91/76.
The mere opinion of a locomotive engineer that a heavy passengertrain, consisting of a locomotive and six cars, running down grade at
forty-five miles an hour, could be stopped within a distance of one
hundred yards, is not sufficient to overcome the positive and uneontradieted evidence of the engineer and fireman upon the identical train
that all was done which could possibly be done to stop it, and that,
an

track at
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distance of over four hunyards, especially when the evidence of these witnesses was
strongly corroborated by others, who were experts in such matters.
Gravitt, 93/370.
In Powell, 108/791, it was held that a charge the effect of which
was to instruct a jury that it was an open question for their determination whether or not, upon a given state of facts, a railroad company
had exercised due diligence, was erroneous when, upon that state of
facts, it was manifest, as matter of law, that the company had exercised due diligence. The evidence showed that the plaintiff’s mule
was killed by the running of the defendant’s train, and thereupon the
legal presumption arose that the defendant was negligent; but as this '
presumption was fully and completely rebutted by uncontradicted
evidence, the verdict was wholly unwarranted, and therefore contrary
nevertheless, it

was

not stopped within

a

dred

to law.

In Walker, 108/262,

it was held that on the trial of a suit for
damages resulting from the alleged killing of plaintiff’s horse by the
running of defendant’s train, when there is positive and uncontradieted testimony by eye-witnesses that the animal was not thus killed,
and when such testimony is entirely consistent with all the other facts
and circumstances developed by the evidence, a verdict for the defendant is demanded.
The petition for certiorari and the answer of the
magistrate thereto in this case showing that such was the character
of the evidence upon which the jury in the justice’s court found a
verdict for the plaintiff, and showing further no contradiction of positive testimony that the defendant’s agents in charge of the train
were in the exercise of all ordinary care and diligence at the time of
the alleged accident, the judge of the superior court erred in not sustaining the certiorari on the ground that the verdict was contrary to
the evidence.
In

Bennett, 110/288, it

held that whether the presumption
negligent in the operation of its train
of cars, which caused the destruction of the
plaintiff’s property, was
rebutted, depended on the weight and character of the evidence submitted by the defendant. As this evidence was, to some extent at
least, conflicting, and the trial judge refused to grant a new trial,
this court can not say that there was an
improper exercise of his
judicial discretion.
that the

railway

was

company was
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Presumption not rebutted. Employees should show what they
guard against the catastrophe.
Glass, 60/441, was taken aboard the cars at Atlanta, drunk. He
failed to give his ticket to the conductor and was put off the train.
He lay down on the track and the up-train from Macon ran upon and
injured him. When the train from which he was ejected met the
up-train, some twelve miles from the point of his ejection, the conductor and engineer of the up-train were told by those of the downtrain that they had put off a drunken passenger up above, at or near
Adamson’s crossing, and to have a lookout for him. The law presumes that the train which did the damage was negligent and the
presumption was not rebutted, as the officers do not show that'they
were diligent in looking out, notwithstanding the warning.
They do
not show what they did, what measures they took to guard against
the catastrophe which ensued.
Cited, 61/154; 64/584; 70/247;
84/783.
In Sims, 111/820, it was held that as the evidence would have authorized the jury to have found that plaintiff’s husband was killed
by the running and operation of defendant's train of cars — thereby,
under the statute, raising a presumption of negligence on the part
of the railroad company — and as there was no evidence to rebut such
a
presumption, or to show that plaintiff’s husband, by the use of ordinary care, could have avoided the casualty, a nonsuit should not have
been granted. Simmons, C. J., dissenting on the facts.
In Pounds, 111/851, it was held that there being some conflict in
the evidence as to whether the engineer on the locomotive which
struck and killed the cow “exercised all ordinary and reasonable care
and diligence” to prevent striking the animal, and the jury having
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the proven value of the
cow, there was no error committed in overruling the certiorari.
Where in a suit against a railroad company for the killing of
stock, the killing is admitted, the onus is on the defendant to show
the use of all ordinary and reasonable diligence. And where the
evidence of the engineer is, that as soon as the cattle were seen by
him on the track, he did all in his power to prevent running into
them by reversing his engine, etc., the legal presumption of negligence is not rebutted. Whether the engineer exercised diligence in
being at his proper place, and in looking down the road to see if
there was anything on it, does not appear. Griffin, 61/11. Cited,
65/632, 715; 72/207.
did to
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Fisk, 65/714, it was held that the presumption of negligence
rebutted, and Jackson, C. J., said: “The cow was killed

not

spring of water near an abrupt curve in the railroad-track,
were frequently killed before, and neither the fireman
nor the engineer swear that either of them was on the lookout for
cattle there. The consequence was that the engine was too near the
cow to be checked when killed.
So the justice court and the superior court must have reasoned, and we can not say it was error. It
is true that the cow was hobbled and another cow did escape unhurt,
as testified by the engineer or fireman; but other witnesses swore
that the speed of this cow and its free locomotion were not impeded
by the condition it was in, and it might have got off the track had a
watch been kept on the road-bed at this dangerous curve, and the
whistle been blown and thus the animal alarmed, as it was in evidence
that she had been seen to outrun men and dogs, and to jump fences
with this chain on her. The law is that the company must “make it
appear that their agents havo exercised all ordinary and reasonable
care
and diligence” in order to rebut the presumption.
Cited,
72/207.
The evidence being undisputed that the mule was killed by the
running of the defendant’s locomotive, and the presumption of law
being that there was negligence, and there being conflict in the evidence as to whether the observance of due diligence would have been
effectual in preventing the injury, and consequently whether such diligence was in fact observed, the verdict was not so palpably unwarranted as to justify the Supreme Court in setting it aside, over the
approval of the presiding judge in the court below. McComb, 92/374.
Although the evidence for the defendant tended strongly to show
that its servants in charge of the train used ordinary and reasonable
care to prevent the
killing of the plaintiff’s horse, yet as there was
evidence for the plaintiff from which, if true, the
contrary could be
reasonably inferred, and as the trial judge was satisfied with the verdiet, this court will not set it aside. Hill, 99/76.
After proof that a cow had been killed by a railroad-train, the
presumption of negligence arose against the company, and in the absence of sufficient evidence to rebut such
presumption a verdict for
the plaintiff was right.
Steadly, 65/263. Cited, 111/820.
In Hudson, 62/679, it appeared that the railroad
company had
erected a wire fence to keep stock off its track. The posts of the
at

a

where cattle

Isi ]
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fence

were sixteen feet apart, connected by two wires, the
top wire being about three feet from the ground. It was held that it was not
a lawful fence as defined by the Civil Code, and was not such a fence
as would justify the company in relaxing the full measure of diligence
required by law in guarding against injuries to live stock from the
moving of locomotives and cars; that the company must use due
diligence in running its trains, not only to avoid injuring live stock
upon the track, but to avoid precipitating them by fright upon the
fence and causing them to be thus mangled or bruised.
84. Subject continued.
In Woolf oik, 56/457, it appeared that there was an inclosed pasture of several hundred acres of land through which the railroad ran.
Cattle-gaps were constructed where the fence crossed the road.
Within the inclosure a cow was killed by the train.
Some bushes
were left standing within the right of way, contrary to a regulation
of the company, and it was attempted to be proved that the engineer
failed to see the cow on account of the bushes. There was a publicroad crossing on the outside of the pasture and within a short distance of it, and the engineer failed to blow the whistle and check the
train in approaching the crossing.
The cow was killed within sixty
feet of the crossing. The engineer testified that he could not see the
cow; that the killing was unavoidable; that he could not have seen

her

on

account of the

fence,

even

if the bushes had been out of the

way, and that he was using all diligence.
It was held that
in all cases where stock is killed by a railroad, even in a

though
pasture
which incloses the road, the presumption of negligence is against
the company, and the burden is upon it to show the absence of negligence, and that the accident was unavoidable; yet when evidence on
the subject is before the jury, and the law has been correctly given
in charge, and the jury has found for the company, the verdict will
not be set aside.
Cited, 66/243.
Where in a suit for negligently killing a cow, the evidence was condieting as to the distance at which the cow could have been seen by
the agents of the company, and the court below refused to disturb
the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff, this court will not
control his discretion thus

legally exercised. Sigman, 77/71.
plaintiff’s evidence, aided by the legal presumption, making
a prima facie case for a recovery, the verdict in his favor, after its
approval by the trial judge, will not be disturbed. Although the testimony of the defendant’s main witness may, when taken alone, have
The
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been sufficient to establish due

diligence on the part of the defendant,
warranting the jury in discrediting the testimony of this witness. Thornton, 97/301.
Where suit was brought against a railroad for the killing of a horse,
and it was shown that the horse was killed by the running of the defendant’s train, a presumption of negligence arose, and although the
engineer testified to facts showing that he was in the use of all ordinary and reasonable diligence, yet where there was some evidence
tending to contradict his account of the occurrence and to sustain
the presumption of negligence, and where two juries had found in
favor of the plaintiff and the court had refused a second new trial,
the Supreme Court would not interfere.
Phillips,^78/619. Cited,
111/820.
Though the evidence of a single witness for the defendant, if true,
was sufficient to overcome the legal presumption of negligence, yet,
as that evidence was in conflict with the testimony of a witness for
the plaintiff, a question of credibility was thus raised for the jury to
decide, and, they having found for the plaintiff, and the judge of the
superior court, on review by certiorari, being satisfied with the verdiet, the judgment is affirmed. Peterson, 91/74.
Where the evidence as to the diligence used by the employees of a
railroad was conflicting, the presumption of negligence being in all
eases
against the company, and the jury find for the plaintiff, and
the presiding judge is satisfied with the verdict, this court will not
interfere.
Cox, 64/619.
In Bowen, 108/810, it was held that on the trial of a suit against a
railway company for damages for killing live stock, where there is
some evidence authorizing the
jury to find that the agents of the
company were not in the exercise of due care and diligence to avoid
the injury, this court will not reverse the judgment of the court
below, overruling the petition .for certiorari, on the ground that the
verdict was contrary to the evidence.
Whether the proper procedure in suing out the certiorari from the
city to the superior court was observed, or not, there was no error in
dismissing the certiorari. The only complaint being that the verdict
was contrary to law, the evidence, and the
charge of the court, and was
excessive, and there being, in addition to the presumption raised by
law against the company, evidence in the plaintiff’s favor from which
the jury could properly infer negligence on the part of the defendant,
and the latter having introduced no evidence, and consequently havthere

was

other evidence

*
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ing failed to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie ease, or in any manner
show the exercise of due diligence, and it not appearing that the verdiet was excessive, this court will not reverse the action of the judge
of the superior court in declining to set the verdict aside. Jackson,
95/366.
Although, upon a careful examination of the record, the verdict
rendered in this case is not satisfactory to this court, and, in its
opinion, the trial court would have been well warranted in granting
a new trial,
yet as the evidence was conflicting, and that portion of it
most favorable to the plaintiff, if it represented the real truth o'f the
case, was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding, the responsibility
of allowing the same to stand will be left where the law placed it,
and the judgment below will not be disturbed. Butler, 105/509.
Tn Burney, 85/635, it was held that where the verdict against a
railway company for killing stock by the careless running of a train
is satisfactory to the trial judge, and is also satisfactory to this court
upon the substantial merits of the controversy tested by the evidence
adduced by the company itself, the ease will not be remanded for a
new trial on account of mistakes or inaccuracies in the charge of the
court to the jury.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “The mules were upon the
side of the track, near the end of the cross-ties. They were seen in
full time to avoid injuring them.
Even if they had strayed in consequence of the owner’s negligence, the result of his negligence was
discovered in time to save both parties harmless by the use of ordinary and reasonable care.
It was no case of surprise, and catching
the employees of the company off their guard. They were on guard,
and saw the peril, but used no efficient means to ward it off.
The
whistle could have been blown, and, if necessary, the train slowed up
or
stopped. The engineer does not pretend that what he did had
any result upon the position or movement of the mules. He saw
that it failed to drive them off, and yet did not try the effect of the
whistle or anything else. That the whistle sometimes does more
harm than good may be true; yet it is matter of public knowledge
that the whistle or stock-alarm is constantly used to frighten stock
away from the track.
The nature and instincts of animals must be
considered; and to run a train at high speed along close to where a
number of them may be standing or walking, when a slight change
of position by them would result in their destruction, has the
appearance of recklessness.
The baggage-car is usually next to the engine; and, as it was that car which struck and killed the mule the
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animal must have been in very

close proximity to the track when the
not time for it to get much nearer;
and from the fireman’s evidence it appears that it was only the act
of attempting to turn round which brought about the catastrophe.”
engine passed it.

There

was

Cited, 107/75.
In Howard,

79/44, Bleckley, C. J., said: “The facts of the case
and somewhat complicated. The witnesses were
in conflict; especially about the speed of the train, and some other
material facts. The general impression produced upon the mind by
reading the whole evidence, consisting of some two hundred pages in
print, is that, in all probability, this railroad company observed due
diligence — in all probability; but it is not certain, and there is evidence to warrant the jury in finding as they did. To reach their finding, they had to run over and set aside a great deal that was stated by
witnesses; but we can not absolutely pronounce, as a legal judgment,
that they violated their duty in so doing.
Cut away a considerable
portion of the defendant’s evidence, or all of it, and there is ample to
found the verdict on; cut away the plaintiff’s evidence relating to
diligence, and there is ample left for successful defense. But when
the two are combined and fused together, different minds would
probably differ touching the effect of it as a whole. Its effect upon
my own mind is that the company was not at fault; but this is a
mere perhaps.
The jury have found to the contrary, and the court
below, who was near to them, nearer to the case than we are, upheld
their finding; and because we are constrained by the law (for all the
members of the court share in the doubt), we affirm the judgment.
As matter of stern legal duty this court yields its strong doubts of
the correctness of the verdict.” Cited, 82/807, where it is said that,
when the jury are consulted, they are the sole and exclusive judges.
The evidence was conflicting, but, being sufficient to sustain the verdiet rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and the same having been
are

very numerous,

approved by the trial judge, this court will not overrule his discredenying a new trial. Brooks, 97/314.
There being a conflict of evidence, the judge of the superior court
did not abuse his discretion in sustaining the certiorari, and remanding the cause to be again tried in the magistrate’s court. Fennell, 100/474.
Although the evidence would well have warranted a finding for the
defendant, it also warranted the verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the
weighing and balancing of the whole being a matter for the jury.

tion in
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There

in

denying a new trial. Falvey, 93/244. And in
DuBose, 93/247, the evidence was conflicting and there was no abuse
of discretion in denying a new trial.
The evidence of the plaintiff in his own behalf being in conflict
with that of the sole witness for the defendant as to a physical fact
somewhat material, to wit, whether there was a curve, or whether
the line was straight at the scene of the injury, there was no abuse
of discretion in overruling the motion for a new trial, the jury havwas no error

ing found consistently with the plaintiff’s evidence, and that, together
legal presumption in his favor arising under section 2321
of the Code, being sufficient to warrant the verdict. Powell, 94/524.
The evidence showing beyond doubt that the plaintiff’s mule was
killed by the defendant’s train, and the presumption of negligence
being against the company, a prima facie right to recover was shown.
The evidence relied upon by the defendant to show due diligence was
contradicted by other evidence, and therefore, on the whole, the verdiet was sufficiently supported, and there was no abuse of discretion
in denying a new trial. Irwin, 99/628.
85. Duty as to looking out for obstacles on the track.
In Martin, 78/603, Blandford, J., said: “It was shown that at
the time this cow was killed the train was going down a steep grade,
quite rapidly, and that the engineer alone was on the lookout, sitting
at the right of his engine, and that, by reason of the smokestack between him and the cow, he could not see the cow.
The fireman, the
only person on the engine with him, was at the time firing up the
engine; and nobody was looking out on the left side of the engine,
the side on which it was said the cow got upon the railroad.
The
jury may have considered that the fact that nobody was on the lookout on the left side of the engine was negligence on the part of the
railroad company; and they may have concluded that, if anybody
had been looking out on that side, the cow could have been seen in
time to stop the train, and avoid hurting the cow. We affirm the
judgment of the court below with this hint, which we throw out:
That, where it is necessary to have a lookout, the railroad company
may rely upon its fireman, if it thinks proper to do so, provided the
fireman does look out; but, if his duties require him to fire the engine, they had better get somebody else to look out.” This case was
reviewed and overruled, Atkinson, J., dissenting, in Rogers, 109/699,
and in the latter case it was held that relatively to the question of
liability upon the part of the railroad company for the killing of live
with the
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stock

by the running of a train, it is not incumbent upon the company
require the fireman employed on the locomotive to be upon the lookout for animals upon the track at times when he is necessarily engaged in the performance of other duties indispensable to the running of the locomotive, nor to have thereon a third employee, charged
exclusively with the duty of keeping such a lookout. Cited, 102/153.
In Reynolds, 99/638, it was held that an employee, of a railroad
company, not on duty, but simply being transported upon a locomotive, is not required to look out for obstacles on the track, and his
failure to do so is not imputable to the company as negligence; but a
request embodying this principle was properly refused, when it contained, in addition, or could reasonably be construed as containing,
a statement by the court to the effect that another employee actually
on duty
upon the locomotive was exercising due diligence.
86. Cotton-yard — duty of company as to keeping it in order.
Where a railroad company has a cotton-yard which had been
planked over for public use in the removal of cotton, it was the duty
of the company to keep such yard and flooring in good order for
that purpose, to the extent and limit of such use; and if it be made
to appear that damage to property has been occasioned by the negligence of the company in not keeping such yard in repair, so as to be
safely used by those engaged in the removal of cotton therefrom, the
company would be liable unless its agents exercised all ordinary and
reasonable care and diligence to prevent such damage. If both the
company and the property-owner, or his agent, were at fault, the doctrine of apportionment of damages would apply. As to liability for
injuries to persons and property, by reason of not having safe and
secure ways and roads for ingress and egress to and from a warehouse or place of deposit for goods and freight which are to be delivered to consignees, the company stands upon the same footing as any
other person. Its liability is the same as that of others in like circumstances; no greater and no less. If the company did keep the
yard in proper repair for the purpose of hauling, and the damage occurred by reason of the property-owner, or his agent, undertaking to
use a part of the yard not designed for that purpose, or arose from
want of ordinary care to avoid the injury, either in the manner of
driving, or in his conduct at the time of the injury, there could be
no recovery.
Gleason, 69/200; 72/742. Cited, 109/795.
to
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company

over

its

tracks, right of way, and cars.
The company is not bound to fence in
its tracks.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Degree of diligence required in crossing
or using the track as a passway.
Trespassers, who are, and the duty the
company owes them.
Passenger not a trespasser.
When cars block the highway, pedestrians

may turn aside and pass over
company’s ground.
by consent, watchmen of different companies
stand on each other’s

94. Where

tracks.
95. Pay-train, seeking to ride thereon.
96. When engineer may presume person on
the track will get out of the way.
97. When the duty of exercising ordinary

arises.
98. Habit of the

public in walking at the
place where the injury happened.
an

individual to

use

the track.

Trespasser not to be hurt wilfully
negligently after he is discovered.

or

101. License or consent to go upon the right
of way.
102. Turntable case.
103. A child trespasses on a moving car.
104. Platforms, duty of keeping in safe con
dition.
105. Switches, protecting from interferences.
106. In suits for damage by fire, it must
be shown that the company caused
the fire and that it was the result of

negligence.
107. Evidence as to a particular engine and
fires caused by that and other engines.
108. Plaintiff must show his ownership of
the property injured.
109. Entire defense should be submitted to

the

jury.
right and duty of the company as
making noises.
A felony convict may sue.
Dogs do not come within the statute.
Passengers fight each other and the injured one sues the company.

110. The

to

care

99. Habit of
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111.
112.
113.

87.

Preliminary observations.
change in the facts or conditions of the occurrences
causing personal injuries, there arises a corresponding change
of duty, and the problem to be solved
by the courts is to
formulate, as near as may be, the principles which will serve
as
safe guides through all the ever-varying facts of the different eases as they arise. The Georgia cases on the
subject
either follow immediately below, or may be found at appropriate
places elsewhere in this book. If all that is here written be
With every

not

expressed in

in the decisions, it is believed that
will appear. The decisions carry
with them much that hereafter will find expression as occasions arise,
for they appear to hold fast to the central controlling principles governing such cases. It may be that a remark, here and there in some
of the opinions, may be modified or changed, but the principles involved in the decisions are settled law, and it is probable that they
no

.

conflict

or

so many words
want of harmony

will not be disturbed.

The

legislature authorizes the construction of railroads for the purof travel and transportation. The right of way is acquired and
held for those purposes. The ownership of the company in the right
of way is as complete and as exclusive as that which every other
owner has in his own
property. In order to accomplish the purposes
for which the corporation was created, its exclusive and uninterrupted use of its tracks is absolutely necessary. It owes important
poses
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duties to the

public which it is compelled to perform, and to enable
perform such duties it should have the unobstructed use of all
the means which the law places at its disposal for the purpose.
The
agents of the company may presume that no one will become an active
wrong-doer and violate the right of the company by trespassing on
the track, and they may act on that presumption. They must exercise ordinary care with reference to the condition contemplated by
law, a condition which consists of the performance of legal duties,
and the observance of legal rights, by all persons.
This condition
may he styled normal, and it continues until the agents of the company know, or have reason to suppose, that a human being may be
on the track at a
particular place. When that occurs a new condition is made up, and from it spring new duties.
Ordinary care, which is the degree of care required in the class of
cases with which this
chapter deals, is the standard of the law. The
exercise of that degree of care is a legal duty. The failure to exercise it is negligence.
Neither party can lower the standard, or, which
is the same thing, neither can put ofE the duty.
What amounts to
ordinary care under the circumstances of the case, the jury are to determine, but they can not hold the parties to a higher standard, nor
can they find anything negligence which is less than a failure to discharge that legal duty. The law is inexorable in its demand for the
exercise of this degree of care in all who have the capacity to exercise it.
The rule is of universal application, that no one shall recover damages for injuries caused by the negligence of another, if,
by the exercise of ordinary care, the consequences of that negligence
could have been avoided. If one may avoid and does not, he is the
author of his own wrong; his own negligence is the proximate cause
of the injury. No amount of negligence in one party can absolve
the other from his legal duty. The legal effect of a failure to discharge it, varies according to the kind of case, but the duty itself is
ever present and in the one form.
It never varies, it is inflexible.
it to

It should be borne in

mind, that when the rule of ordinary dilibecause of increase of danger, demands the exercise of more
care or caution than would be
requisite under conditions less hazardous, the rule applies alike to both parties; both are dealing with the
same danger.
Thus, in a crowded city the public have a right to
expect on the part of the company an exercise of care commensurate with the danger, and there is a corresponding obligation on the
part of the public to observe like care. The increase of vigilance

gence,

.
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required of the company and of the public should be equal, and
question of liability of the company where it would stand if
the injury had occurred at some other place on the track.
leave the

The courts in the different States have taken two views

as

to the

duty of railway companies to trespassers. One view is that the comof using precautions for the' trespasser’s safety.
44 Penn. St. 375, Strong, J., in speaking generally, said: “It is time it should he understood in this State that
the exclusiveness of a railroad-track, cutting, or embankment, is exelusive of the public everywhere, except where a way crosses it. This
has more than once been said, and it must so be held, not only for the
protection of property, but what is far more important, for the preservation of personal security, and even of life. In some countries it
is a penal offense to go upon a railroad. With us, if not that, it is a
civil wrong, of an aggravated nature; for it endangers not only the
trespasser, but all who are passing or transporting along the line.”
In other courts the rule has been modified, and has been expressed
thus: “If, after discovering the danger in which the party had
placed himself, even by his own negligence, the company could have
avoided the injury by the exercise of reasonable care, the exercise of
that care becomes a duty, for the neglect of which the company is
liable. When it is said, in cases where the plaintiff has been guilty
of contributory negligence, that the company is liable if, by the exercise of ordinary care, it could have prevented the accident, it is to be
understood that it will be so liable if, by the exercise of reasonable
care, after a discovery by the defendant of the danger in which the
injured party stood, the accident could have been prevented, or if
the company failed to discover the danger through the recklessness
or carelessness of its employees, when the exercise of ordinary care
would have discovered the danger and averted the calamity.”
This latter view, in substance, has been adopted in Georgia.
As a general rule, one who without the invitation or license of the
pany is under no duty
In a case, reported in

company, express or implied, goes upon the track or premises of a
railroad company, except at a public crossing, station, or other place
where he has the right to go, is a trespasser. When he enters upon
the track he changes the condition above mentioned and styled as

normal, and out of the
An adult

new case

thus made new duties arise.

trespasser on a railroad-track is an active

wrong-doer.

voluntarily, and in violation of another’s rights, goes into a
place of great danger. The physical evidence of the dangerous use
He
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to which the track is devoted is

spread out before him, and every
is a warning to him to beware of danger.
When he, in this manner, incurs the peril, the law imposes on him
the duty of exercising care commensurate with the danger.
To a trespasser, as such, the company owes no duty except to do
him no wanton or willful injury.
That duty it owes to all men.
Negligence may be compared with and weighed against negligence,
but not with or against willfulness, intentional wrong-doing.
The
plaintiff’s negligence counts in a battle with the defendant’s negligence, but where the defendant’s wrong-doing was intentional, the
plaintiff’s negligence is no defense, and, unless the intentional injury can be justified under some rule of law, the right to recover
damages for it exists. A reckless indifference to the rights of others
is equivalent to an intentional violation of them.
A reckless and
wanton disregard of consequences, evincing a willingness to inflict
injury, may amount to willfulness although there is no direct proof
of actual intention to inflict the injury.
Although the trespasser has placed himself in a condition of peril,
in tender regard for human life, the company is required to treat
him as *one whose perilous condition demands consideration.
If it
be simply a trespass, with nothing of legal significance connected
with and preceding it, the relation of the company to the trespasser
begins when he is discovered. Prior to that time, as there is no
duty of anticipating his wrongful act, there is no reason for precautionary measures. When he is discovered the condition with
which the company has to deal is made up, and an ever-present
rule of law requires that ordinary care appropriate to that condition
shall be used. As a general rule it is an exercise of ordinary care to
presume that the trespasser is in full possession of his senses, that
he will appreciate his danger, and that he will act with discretion
and get out of the way.
On this presumption the engineer may act
until he discovers that the trespasser is not likely to escape the peril.
When that occurs, the condition changes to one of increased danger,
and ordinary care as to it requires increased action to avoid the
calamity. If the trespasser was known by the engineer to be deaf,
or if the engineer could see that he was drunk, or disabled or
helpless, or that he was on a high trestle or in other position from which
he could not extricate himself, the presumption would not arise, and
increased care should be exercised accordingly.
cross-tie

on

which he steps
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The normal condition mentioned above may be
ways.
It may be changed by the introduction of the

changed in various

element of infancy,
being here used with reference to minors so near mato be chargeable as adults of average capacity and experi-

this term not

jority

as

ence.

As has been elsewhere

shown, the comparative degrees, extraordinot applied to children in reference
them, for their own safety. As to
them, the term “due care” has been adopted instead of “ordinary
care,” and due care in a child of tender years is declared to be such
care as its capacity, mental and physical, fits it for exercising in

nary, ordinary, and slight, are
to measures to be observed by

the actual circumstances of the occasion and situation under inves-

tigation.
Accordingly
exercise
infants

more

a

railway

care

company is, relatively to infants, bound to
and caution than is required as to adults, while

only required to use such care as their capacity fits them
exercising. Manifestly there can be no presumption that a child
will appreciate its danger, or will act with discretion and get out
of the way of an approaching train. When the engineer first discovers the child on the track he knows the probabilities are that it
will contribute nothing toward avoiding a collision, and that the
collision is inevitable if he does not prevent it; therefore, it is his
duty to stop the train whenever the child is seen on the track. If,
when he discovers the child, he can avoid the collision by the exercise of such care as is commensurate with the danger, and he fails
to de it, the company will be liable for the injury.
If, on the other
hand, the train was upon the child before it could be seen, or if it
are

for

unexpectedly and suddenly threw itself in the way of the engine,
and the engineer could not, by such care, save it, the company would
not be liable.
Where there is no reason for apprehending the presence of a child on the track, the precaution of looking out for one is
not required.
Another instance where the normal situation is changed is in the
case of licensees.
Where,*by permission of the company, but without invitation, pedestrians for their own interest or convenience, use
a track fop purposes of travel, they are licensees.
The permission
of the company takes them out of the class of trespassers, and it is
the duty of the agents of the company to exercise caution and increased care, as to them, at that place.
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permission is given but there is a habit on the part
or the public of traveling over the track on foot, and
nothing is done to prevent it, that does not modify or change the
legal rights or obligations of either the public or the company. By
such use the public are not tacitly licensed to go upon the track, and
the consent of the company to the use is not implied, but the fact
that they do go there enters into the situation as it is known to
the company and affects the caution and amount of care required in
running the trains.
Wherever the agents of the company, who are engaged in the running of the trains, have reason to apprehend that there may likely be
a human being on the track at a particular place, that fact becomes
part of the situation which finds its culmination in the tragedy if
the person should actually appear and be run over and killed. With
the knowledge of that reason for apprehension the responsibility as
to that person begins, and the duty of caring for him is set in motion.
He may not be in sight of the engineer, but some fact or circumstance
as a forerunner, has foretold his
probable coming, and the way should
be prepared for afterwards meeting without injuring him. If the
engine keeps on its course at a high rate of speed, it may be that the
engineer will not be able to stop it after the man is actually discovWhere

no

of individuals

ered.

In

law, that man was discovered when the agent was notified
probable coming. And in this outlying region which is beyond
the range of actual vision, that incalculably valuable rule that the
duty of exercising ordinary eare is ever-present is of force. Ordinary care must be an efficient factor in acquiring knowledge, as well
as in acting on it after it is
acquired. In law, whatever woulj become known
by the exercise of ordinary care is known, and the
knowledge of the facts thus, in theory, acquired, together with the facts
actually known, make up the ease with reference to which ordinary
care is to be exercised.
The law does not prescribe specific acts to be
of his

done after the
acts of

danger becomes imminent,

nor

does it call for specific

precaution before it becomes imminent. It may be that technical “looking out” would be sufficient, or sometimes more or less
than sufficient. What the law does call for is the way of a prudent
man in the engineer, in view of the fact that there
may likely be a
human being on the track at a place to which his mighty machine is
making its way. The token that there might be danger ahead may
be slight or it may be strong. In principle it matters not which it
is.. Whatever it may be, it has a corresponding duty which calls into
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commensurate amount of

Though the child, or the
licensee, or the trespasser, is out of place and consequently the duty
of looking out for him which arises under the circumstances indicated
imposes a burden on the company and interferes with its business, it
can not for this reason shirk the duty.
If, under existing laws, it has
no adequate remedy by action or prosecution, it must suffer the inconvenience. It can not get rid of it by killing the helpless or the lawa

care.

breaker.

In

which

result, or which may probably result, in
personal injuries, the one safe rule which will solve all difficulties and
lead invariably to right results is this: Duty and diligence shall keep
pace with cause for apprehension.
In consideration of the gravity of this subject some further remarks may not be out of place.
Since the present policy was entered upon, radical changes have
grown up in the State, and the law, as it now stands, is not equal to the
present demands of the public interests. The old modes of travel have
been done away with, and people now resort almost exclusively to the
railway. This habit applies not only as to long journeys, but to short
ones, and men, women and children go by railroad from neighborhood
to neighborhood, on business or for pleasure. The life of every one of
these people is endangered by the trespasser on the track. As time
has passed and as the markets of the world have opened up, and are
competing with each other, rapid transit, as to passengers and freight,
has become more of a necessity. Successful competition rests upon
rapid transit, and rapid transit is impossible without a clear railroadtrack. Without mention of countless other interests, who can estimate the value of a clear track and rapid transit to the fruit and vegetable growers of the State? Every time a train is checked up or
stopped by an obstruction on the track, so as to prevent a collision
with some object, the business of the company, which is the business
of the public, is interfered with.
That the conduct of the trespasser
endangers his own life and the lives of others, and that it impedes and
embarrasses the commerce and business of the people of the State,
are well-known facts.
These obvious consequences have been, and are,
not sufficient to prevent trespassing on the track.
The remedy for
the evil appears to be such further legislation, penal in character if
need be, as will emphasize the duty of not trespassing on the track
of the railroad.
Safety of person, human life and the business interests of the State all call for a clear track, that the railway comoccurrences
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pany may be allowed to reach the highest rate of speed known to
business of railroading. And then, when the opportunity for
most efficient service is afforded

89.'

to its

the
the
the companies, let them be rigidly held

performance.

Many years ago the Supreme Court of the State spoke with impressive emphasis of “the fearful frequency of the unauthorized use
of railroad tracks and embankments as footpaths, and of the perils
to which

pedestrians,

as

well

as

the trains themselves, the

persons

managing them, the passengers and freights with which they are
loaded, are constantly exposed from this highly reprehensible practice,” and that court felt it a duty “to call the attention of the General Assembly to the growing evil of using railroad tracks and embankments as footways, and to invoke their interposition to prevent, by
appropriate legislation, a practice so fraught with peril, not only to
the running of the trains and the passengers and freights upon them,
but also as a safeguard and protection to the unwary and reckless,
who commit such trespass and take such frequent and frightful
hazards.” No attention has been paid by the legislature to this solemn appeal, and the failure to respond to it has cost more loss of limb,
life and money than can be estimated.
88. Dominion of company over its tracks, right of way, and cars.
The dominion of a railroad corporation over its trains, tracks, and
right of way is no less complete or exclusive than that-which every
owner has over his own
property. Hence the corporation may exclude
whom it pleases, when they come to transact their own private business with passengers or other third
persons, and admit whom it
pleases when they come to transact such business. Fluker, 81/461.
Company not bound to fence in its track.
It is not made the duty of a railroad company to fence in or place
guards along its road, where there may be cuts or embankments,
notwithstanding a public road may run parallel to such railroad.
Collier, 76/611. Cited, 107/758.
The failure of a railroad company to inclose its tracks so as to prevent children and others from trespassing upon the right of way can
not be imputed to the company as negligence.
It was therefore error
for the court to charge the jury that such failure “is evidence to be
considered along with all the other evidence, in determining whether
or not the- defendant has been guilty of negligence
in this case.”
Simmons, C. J., said: “The plaintiff was injured in the city of Cartersville, upon the railroad-track of the defendant. This track was
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'

not inclosed at the

point where plaintiff was injured. In charging
this subject, the judge informed the jury that the law did not
require the railroad company to inclose its tracks, but that a failure
to so inclose them ‘is evidence to be considered by you, along with all
the other evidence, in determining whether or not the defendant has
been guilty of negligence in this case.’ There is no statute of this
State requiring the company to inclose its tracks, nor any provision
of the common law making it its duty to do so, and the
charge of the
upon

court

was so

there is
be

far correct.

The remainder

we

think

erroneous.

Where

duty upon a person or corporation to do an act, there can
negligence in a failure to do it. No duty being imposed upon
company to inclose its tracks, an omission to so inclose them is
a breach of
duty to the plaintiff, or to any one else.” Rogers,
no

no

the
not

104/224.

Cited, 107/759.
King, 107/758, it was ruled that, where, in an action against
a
railway company for personal injuries occasioned by falling into a
railroad-cut at night from a public street immediately adjacent to
and running parallel with the cut, the only thing alleged against the
defendant as negligence is its failure to place a guard-rail or light at
the place in question, it not being one to which sections 2220 and 2221
of the Civil Code are applicable, or one at which, under the facts alleged, the company, relatively to the plaintiff, was under a duty of
erecting a guard-rail or placing a light, there is no error in sustaining
a demurrer to the plaintiff’s petition.
Little, J., said: “It is not an
open (juestion in this State that a railroad company is not required
to fence in or place guards along its road where there may be cuts
or embankments, notwithstanding a public road may run parallel to
such railroad.
What we have, said as to the absence of any law which
requires a railroad company to fence its right of way or premises apIn

plies in full force as to its duty in lighting such right of way and
premises at night. There is neither at the common law nor by our
statute any such requirement.”
'90. Degree of diligence required in crossing the track or using it
as a
s

passway.

In

Raiford, 82/400, it was held that

ordinary

care,

by

one cross-

a railway upon a public crossing, is not the measure of ordinary
care for one using the track to walk upon, although at the moment
he may he at or on such a crossing.
One who undertakes to make a

ing

railroad must use that degree of diligence which every
who puts himself unnecessarily in a perilous sit-

passway

of

prudent

person uses

10

a
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The evidence in the record

strongly indicates that, had the
to this measure of diligence, he could and
would have avoided the consequences to himself of the negligence of
the company; new trial is ordered on this question alone, with direction to render judgment for the amount already assessed, or dismiss
the action, according as the finding of another jury may be in the
affirmative or the negative touching this one question. Bleckley, C.
J., said: “He may have exercised that degree of care which such
a
person would have used in crossing a railroad upon a public crossing, but that would not suffice; for one who walks upon a railwaytrack, using and intending to use it as a passway, not only at the
crossing, but on both sides, must be much more on the alert than
when he merely attempts 'to cross from side to side of the railroad.
The train was a heavy freight-train, going slowly up grade, and it
seems to us that if Raiford had given even slight attention to the
perils of his situation, he would have discovered the approach of the
train in time to protect himself.
He must have been not only negligent, but grossly negligent, to have been run down by such a train
under the circumstances.” Cited, 83/597; 84/785; 92/93. In Daniel, 89/463, the same principles were declared and a similar order

injured party

was

come up

made.

In

Howard, 79/44, the court was requested by the defendant to
as follows: “When one attempts or intends to cross a railroadtrack, it would be his duty, before stepping on the track, to use his
senses of hearing and seeing; and if he fails to do it, and you believe
that in such failure he was not in the exercise of ordinary care, and
that ordinary care required him to look and listen, and, if he had done
so, he would have avoided the injury, then your verdict should be for
the defendant.” The judge declined to give the charge.
Bleckley,
C. J., said: “The precise thing which every man is bound to do
before stepping upon a railroad-track is that which every prudent man
would do under similar circumstances. If prudent men would look
and listen, so must every one else, or take the consequences, so far as
the consequences might have been avoided by that means. The court
can not instruct the
jury what a prudent man would do; for, in legal
contemplation, the jury know it better than the court. If instructions on that subject had to be given, the jury would be the instructors, and the court the instructed; that is, the jury would charge the
judge on that part of the case, rather than receive a charge from
him.
It is not for the court to teach the jury the ways of the
pru-

charge
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dent man, but to warn them of
make their ways like his. The

the duty on the part of all others to
court can not point out to the jury

specifically the ways of
better known to the jury

the prudent; the law supposing those ways
than to the judge. It is not incumbent upon
the court to instruct the jury that it is the duty of one who attempts
or intends to cross a railroad-track to use his senses of hearing and
seeing before stepping on the track.” Cited, 79/247; 82/807;
89/567; 90/504.
A specific charge, which is legal, and adjusted to a distinct matter
in issue involving the right of the plaintiff to recover, and which
may
materially aid the jury, should be given as requested, although in
principle and in more general and abstract terms it may be covered
by other instructions given by the court. A request in this case to
charge that "the precise thing which every person is bound to do
before stepping upon a railroad-track is that which every prudent man
would do under like circumstances. If prudent men would look and
listen, so must every one else, or take the consequences, so far as the
consequences might have been avoided by that means,” was legal, and
applicable, and should have been complied with. The case being a
close one, under the evidence, and its pressure being upon the matter
as to which this charge was asked, the refusal of the
request is ground
for a new trial. Johnson, 90/501. Cited, 103/16; 91/176.
91. Trespassers, who a/re, and the duty the company owes them.
One who walks upon a railroad-track, not at a road-crossing, is a
trespasser thereon; and while the road would be liable for a wanton
or willful wrong of its agents, acting within the scope of their
duty,
or for gross negligence or carelessness, evincing reckless disregard of
the safety of others, or where they perceive the danger of a party in
time, and make no effort to avoid it, still the company is under no
such obligation to a trespasser as to those who are properly and lawfully upon its premises. Brinson, 70/207. Cited, 71/444; 74/737;
74/866; 105/102; 112/183.
In Bailey, 105/100, Little, J., said: “It may be stated as a general
rule that

one

who goes upon

the track

or

premises of

a

railroad

com-

pany, except at a public crossing or in a highway, without the invitation or license of the company, express or implied, is a trespasser.
3

be also stated as a general rule that
trespasser upon its track, except to
injury A trespasser is a wrong-doer, and
general principle of jurisprudence that the courts will not aid

Elliott, R. R. § 1252.

It

the company owes no duty
do him no willful or wanton
it is

a

may

to

a
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wrong-doer. The fact that the trespasser is a wrong-doer does not,
however, justify malicious, wanton, or willful maltreatment of him;
and the failure to use reasonable care to avoid injury to him after
the discovery of his danger may sometimes be sufficient evidence of
a

•

willfulness.

But neither

negligence nor willfulness can
ordinarily be shown in this way where an adult, or person apparently
able to take care of himself, is upon the track, because the railroad
employees have a right to assume, in the absence of anything to the
contrary, that he will get off the track, or take such other precautions
as may be available to avoid injury to himself.
Id. §1253. If
after discovering the danger to the trespasser, and his inability to
escape, the company fails to exercise reasonable care, it will be liable,
if the exercise of such care would have prevented the injury; and,
although there is a clear distinction between negligence and willfulness, yet a reckless and wanton disregard of consequences, evincing
a willingness to inflict injury, may amount to willfulness, although
there is no direct proof of actual intention to inflict the injury complained of. The presumption that a person, apparently of full age
and capacity, who is walking or standing on the track, will leave
wantonness

or

it in time to
who is

save

himself from harm, will not avail when the person

the track appears

to be intoxicated, asleep, or otherwise
p. 331, and authorities cited. A
like doctrine is announced in the case of Brinson, supra.
The company is at liberty to act on this presumption, and to continue to act
on it, until it discovers that the person is not
likely to escape the peril,
and then it is bound to exert itself to avoid the calamity.” And it
was ruled that if an engineer, while
running a train, saw a trespasser
upon the track in time to stop before striking him, but nevertheless
“carelessly, negligently, recklessly, and wrongfully, allowed and permitted” the train to “run at a reckless and dangerous rate of speed
without any bell or whistle being sounded, or without any other
danger
or alarm signal
being given, or without any effort to stop said train
being made,” and the trespasser was thus killed, and if his body was
hurled against an employee of the railroad company, who was free
from fault or negligence, and in his proper place,
performing his
duties as a servant of the company, and he was in this manner injured, he had a cause of action against the company. See Denson’s
case, 198.
“Railroad companies are entitled not only to a clear track, but to
the unobstructed use of all the means
indispensable to the discharge
off his

on

guard, etc.

Pierce, R. R.
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But while the

or even

gratuity, still,

obligation of the

company to a tresto passengers, employees
business with it and whose presence there is
to persons who were there by its consent as a favor

passer on its track may
or other
persons having

not be the

same as

one who places himself upon
violation of the statute, does not forfeit all right
or

[§»1

its road, even in
to have its agents

regard his personal security or life, or exempt it from liability for
injury, if, by the exercise of proper precaution on its part, the casualty could have been avoided. If a person appears upon a railroadtrack in a helpless condition, and the engineer and his assistants discover him in time to stop the train before reaching him, but recklessly, or even incautiously, neglect to do so, the company would be
liable in damages, in proportion to its own default and that of the
other party.”
Hall, J., Stewart, 71/427. Cited, 74/737; 84/785;
105/102. The statute referred to above by Mr. Justice Hall was
not. as broad as he supposed it to be, and it probably did not embrace
one who merely walked on a railroad-track.
In Denson, 84/774, Blandford, J., said: “In Rorer on Railroads
it is laid down as the law that ‘at‘ places other than crossings, or in
public highways, a railroad-track is the private property of the company, and no one other than the company’s servants or employees, in
the necessary discharge of duties there, have any right to be thereon;
and more especially so as to their using the same as a thoroughfare

pathway on which to walk or travel; and though the company may
wantonly injure persons thus intruding upon and using the
same, yet, if the person be an adult, not known to those in charge of
the train to be deficient in discretion, or in physical ability to take
care of himself, or not known to be deficient in his faculty of hearing,
and not in any way presenting indications of being disabled, or incapable of taking care for his safety, then the persons in charge of
the train have a right to conclude, and to act on that conclusion,
that such person is in possession of all his proper faculties to enable
him to do so, and will leave the track in time to save himself from
injury, and are not bound to stop or check up the train on his account;
but, as a matter of ordinary prudence and care, it is their duty to
sound the whistle and ring the bell as a warning of the approaching
danger.’ 2 Ror. R. R. 1122; Finlayson v. RailroadCo., 1 Dill. 579.
See, also, Shear. & R. ISTeg. §§480-482. In the case of Baumeister
v. Railroad Co., 30 N. W. Rep. 337, the Supreme Court of Michigan
say that, ‘if the deceased had stood still and faced the train as it apor

not

CHAPTER 8.

§§ 92, 93 ]
Actions

[ 150

against railway companies — continued.

proaehed him, it would furnish no excuse to the defendant for running its engine over him and killing him. If the engineer saw he
did not intend to get off the track, and there was time enough to stop
the train, contributory negligence can not be relied upon in such a
case.
Neither can it in any case where the action of the defendant
is wanton, willful, or reckless, in the premises, and injury ensues as
the result.’ And many authorities are cited in support of this proposition, among them, 2 Thomp. Neg. 1160; Cooley, Torts, 674;
Beach, Contrib. Neg. 29 et seq.” Cited, 93/397; 105/101. See this
case, 198.
92. Passenger not a trespasser.
In Thompson, 76/771, the case of a passenger, the court charged
the jury: “A man is not a trespasser for. merely walking on the
track; and certainly he is not, if, at the time he walks on it, it is not
known to him that the trains are coming.”
Jackson, C. J., said:
“No man is a trespasser for merely walking thereon when no train
is coming upon it, but a passenger certainly is not, if at the time he
is so walking he sees nothing thereon. Surely it can not be the law
that a passenger is a trespasser if he walk on the track of his carrier.” Thompson left the car before it reached the station, and while
he was making his way to the station was run over by a backing
freight-train.
93. When cars block the highway, pedestrians may turn aside, and
pass over the company’s inclosed grounds.
In Smith, 84/698, the plaintiff was a boy nine years of age at
the time of the injury. He was on his way home from school. When
he reached the street-crossing he found it blocked by a string of cars
standing on the center track. There were two other tracks, one
on each side of the center or main one.
The plaintiff paused a
few minutes on reaching the crossing, and finding it blocked, but
being in a hurry to get home, he went around the south end of the
train that was standing on the center track to get to the other side
of the crossing, attempting to cross the east track also.
Standing
on the east track just south of the street were two cars uncoupled
from each other; they had been there several weeks. Plaintiff was
crossing the east track south of them when he was suddenly struck
and run over by the last car of defendant’s train which was being
backed upon the east track from the center one. It was held that,
after waiting a reasonable time for cars blocking the highway to be
removed, a pedestrian may turn aside to avoid the obstruction, and

151

CHAPTER 8.

]
Actions

C § 94

against railway companies — continued.

the company’s inclosed grounds. In so doing, he 'will he
trespasser. While upon the company’s grounds, under such circumstanees, the diligence for his safety due from the company, as
pass over
no

well

as

his

mination

own diligence in guarding against danger, is for deterby the jury. If the jury think his presence ought to have

been foreseen

anticipated, ignorance of it would make no difference.
of diligence appropriate for use by each
party should be left to the jury.
94. Where, by consent, watchmen of different companies stand on
Particular

or

means or measures

each other’s tracks.

Where, by mutual consent, evidenced by practice and by aequiestherein, with knowledge on the part of the superintending
officers, two railroad companies having their tracks adjacent and
cence

parallel, on some of which cars in large numbers are habitually left
standing, permit the watchmen employed by the companies respectively to walk and stand upon the unoccupied tracks of each other,
including the main lines, for the purpose of examining the standing
cars with a view to take and report the initials and numbering inscribed thereon, a watchman, while so employed and deporting himself in the usual way recognized as fit and proper by both companies,
is not a trespasser upon the track of the company which did not employ him, any more than he is a trespasser upon the track of his
own company.
He is not a trespasser at all. How, if, by the negligent and too rapid running of a train of the other company, he is
suddenly stricken and injured, failing to protect himself in consequence of his attention being occupied with his duties, it is a question
for a jury whether, under all the circumstances, he could have avoided
the consequences of the company’s negligence by the exercise of ordinary diligence. If he could not, he might recover; but if he could,
he would have

granted.

no cause

of action.

Watts, 89/277.

A nonsuit should not have been

Citing, Pittman, 73/325.

On the second trial of the Watts case, 92/88, there was no evidence
that by mutual consent, arising out of practice by watchmen and

acquiescence therein, with knowledge on the part of the superintending officers, the railway companies permitted the watchmen employed by them respectively to walk and stand upon the unoccupied
tracks, including the main lines, for the purpose of examining the
standing cars, with a view to take and report the initials and numbering inscribed thereon. This being so, there was nothing to relieve
the plaintiff below from the exercise of full diligence to protect him-
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self, and, had he exercised the ordinary diligence which is due from
every intruder on a railway-track to care for his own safety, he
could have avoided the consequences to himself, caused by the defendant’s negligence. Bleckley, C. J., said: “The defendant was
under no duty to anticipate the presence of the plaintiff, when he
went upon the track, and so long as he remained upon it, he was bound
to look out for his own safety and to be on his guard against the
approach of the defendant’s trains. There is nothing in the evidence
to show recklessness or wantonness on the part of the defendant's
employees in charge of the train, after the plaintiff was discovered
on the track.
It appears that they did all that could have been done
to stop the train in time to avoid running into him. Before that
time they were under no duty to look out for him.”
95. Pay-train, seeking to ride thereon.
A railroad company providing sufficient trains and cars to accommodate all the traveling public over its line, has the legal right to
run special trains over its road for the purpose of carrying provisions
and paying its employees, and to prohibit any person from traveling
on such trains, and one who enters a car attached to the same, knowing its character, without the consent of the corporation or its agent,
becomes a trespasser. If one enters a pay-train for the purpose of
riding thereon, and by the rules and regulations of the company, passengers were not allowed to ride on such trains, it would be his duty
to leave the train as soon as he prudently could, when notified of
the rule. If he sustains an injury whilst so wrongfully upon the train,
the fact of being on the train will be an element in determining his
prudence and want of care and the liability of the corporation. Singleton, 66/252.
96. When engineer may presume person on the track will get out
of the way.
In Sims, 28/93, the negro was sitting on the end of a cross-tie on
the road, and beyond the reach of every part of the train except one
of the side angles of the cow-catcher. A few inches change of place
would have put him beyond the reach of the cow-catcher. He was
struck by it and killed. He could have been seen by the engineer at
a distance of several hundred yards and he could have seen the train
a thousand yards up the road.
It was in the daytime, the sun was
shining, and was not at or near a crossing. The train was running
at the rate of about twenty miles per hour, and the whistle was not
blown until the cars came within about twenty steps of him. He gave
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was

allowed

on

the ground that

guilty of gross negligence, and the agents of the
ordinary care to prevent the collision. The engineer
to presume that the negro was awake and would get
out of the way of the train.
That presumption would continue until
the train approached so near to the negro that an ordinary person, in
his place, if awake, would begin to move aside. If then the engineer
discovered that the negro was not likely to escape the peril, he was
bound to exert himself to avoid the calamity. That he did. The
signal was given in ample time to admit of escape from the track.
Cited, 70/234; 71/445; 74/736; 84/785; 101/221; 102/287.
A locomotive engineer is not entitled to assume in all cases that
persons on a public crossing will get off in time to save themselves.
In running a train at a public crossing in a city, he is bound to observe reasonable diligence before.he discovers peril as well as afterwards, and the company is responsible for his negligent errors of
judgment. Lumpkin, J., said: “While it is generally true that a
locomotive engineer may assume that a person on a railroad-track
in front of an approaching engine will get off in time to save himself, he is not entitled to act upon this assumption at all times and
under all circumstances. The public have a right to go upon the
track of a railroad at public crossings, and our statute requires railroad engineers to have their engines under such control that they
can be
stopped at such crossings, whenever necessary, to prevent injury. It is[ especially incumbent upon engineers to observe this
requirement of the law in approaching public crossings in cities and
towns, where it is so much more likely that people will be upon such
crossings than in the country. In such places engineers should be
extremely careful, as well before as after discovering persons upon
the track; and railroad companies are responsible, not only for actual
negligence, but also for negligent errors of judgment on the part
of their engineers. Any other rule on this subject would expose the
people of our crowded cities and towns to constant dangers and great
injuries, for which they would have no adequate remedy. Of course,
people who cross railroad-tracks even at public crossings must observe the ordinary rules of
prudence and common sense, and exer-'
cise due caution in protecting themselves. These duties between the
public and the railroads are mutual, and should be carefully observed
on both sides.”
Evans, 87/673. Cited, 87/722; 88/64.
company used
had the right

.
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heed to the notice.

the negro was
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against a man upon the track, about forty
crossing, while the engineer is engaged in a
a public law by not checking the speed of the
train in approaching a public crossing, it is not true, as a matter of
law, that the engineer has a right to assume, on first seeing the man
on the track, that he would get off in time to save himself, and act
on that assumption until he discovered, too late to check the train
effectually, that the man was not attentive to the danger which
threatened him. Daniel, 89/463.
Cited, 93/397.
97. When the duty of exercising ordinary care arises.
Where a person not an employee, without permission of a railroad
company, and against its will, and without its knowledge, goes into
a yard covered and interlaced by tracks, which are being used by the
company, by its engines and ears, in switching, drilling and changing
cars, such person is bound to use diligence commensurate with the
peril in which he has placed himself; and if he fail to do this he can
not recover for any injury he may sustain from the running of the
engines and cars of the company. Under such circumstances the
company would owe the trespasser no duty other than not to injure
him if they knew or saw him in time to prevent it. The company
would not be bound to look and watch for such person as it would for
one of its own employees, and as it would for a person on its main
line of travel while going on its accustomed duties in transporting
persons and things from one place to another.
Tolbert, 85/447.
Cited, 112/668.
The homicide of a person walking upon a railroad-track between
a blow-post and a public crossing, when affirmatively shown not to
have resulted from wantonness or recklessness on the part of the
locomotive engineer after the peril was discovered, is, at most, a
negligent homicide only; and where the perilous situation was caused
by the gross negligence of the deceased, and he could, by the exercise
of ordinary care, have protected himself, the company is not liable.
Lumpkin, J., said: “It is the grossest kind of negligence to walk
upon a long and very high trestle of a railroad, over which trains
are constantly passing.
The exercise of ordinary care and prudence
would have prevented the plaintiff’s husband from exposing himself
to danger by going upon the trestle, and, even after he went upon it,
he might, after becoming aware of the approaching train, have saved
himself, if he had not incumbered himself with the care of a small
boy. The evidence shows that the company’s servants did all in
a

yards from

run

a public
criminal violation of
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their power to stop the train after seeing the man and boy on the
trestle, and strongly tends to show these servants, the engineer and
fireman, saw the persons on the track as soon as it was possible for
them to do so. If they were guilty of any negligence at all, it was
in failing to see these parties sooner, and this failure would not, under the circumstances, make the company liable. Not only was there
a complete absence of wantonness or recklessness, but the negligence,
if any, was slight and, the person killed being a mere trespasser, the
company, by its servants, exercised all the diligence to which he was
entitled. Leach, 91/419. Cited, 93/390; 112/36.
In Gravitt, 93/369, a man was killed in the country upon a long
and

high railroad-trestle, and it was held that the duty to observe all
ordinary and reasonable care and diligence towards a person, who,
without license from the company, is walking upon a railway-track
between a blow-post and a crossing, arises when his presence becomes
known to the engineer and not before. A failure in such care and
diligence after that time, from which injury results, unless it could
have been avoided by the use of ordinary care on the part of the
person hurt, will render the company liable. In the opinion, Lumpkin, J., says: “There is, however, to some extent, a distinction between what would be the duty of persons in charge of a railroadtrain with reference to cattle

or

other domestic animals, and with

the track. J The company’s servants
ought to endeavor to stop the train as soon as animals are seen on
the track, because there is no presumption that they will leave it so
as to escape the danger; but, as has been often ruled, the persons in
charge of the locomotive need not always begin to immediately check
the speed of the train, or endeavor to stop it, when a human being,
apparently without infirmity, is seen upon the track, for the nresumption is that he will leave it, for his own protection.
Jin a case like
the present, however, it was the imperative duty-ef^he engineer to
endeavor to stop his train immediately upon seeing the man and the
boy. They were upon a high trestle, and it was obviously out of
their power to escape danger except by going forward to the end of
the trestle. They could not leave their place of danger by going off
to one side. It was therefore no place for a presumption that they
reference to human

beings

■would be able to take

of themselves.”

Cited, 95/362; 106/872;
In Gravitt case, the person killed was at a place where those
charge of a train had no reason to expect any one, and therefore

112/36.
in

upon

care
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held that the company

owed him no diligence until the engineer discovered his presence there. Crawford, 106/872.
As to a trespasser walking upon the track of a railroad, the duty
of observing ordinary care and diligence for his protection does not
devolve upon the company’s servants in charge of a train until his
presence upon the track becomes known to them. Hambright, 112/36.
In this case the facts are not reported.
In the headnote the Leach
was

and Gravitt
of those

cases

are

cited

as

authorities for the decision.

the person killed was at a place
of the train had no reason to expect any one,

In each

where those in charge
and in a case of that
kind the rule stated above is unquestionably correct.
98. Habit of the public in walking at the place where the injury
happened.
The suit Meigs, 74/857, was brought by the plaintiff to recover
damages for the homicide of her husband. He was killed by a locomotive drawing a passenger-train in the city of Atlanta. There
were several tracks of railway at the place where the killing occurred,
and it was a constant habit of the public to pass along these tracks
at all hours.
Deceased was walking on the main line with his back
to the engine which struck him.
On his right was a switch-engine,
somewhat in advance of the passenger-engine, and moving in the
same direction.
The bells on both were ringing, and the whistle on
the passenger-engine was blown when in about one hundred and
twenty-seven feet of the deceased. It is evident from the testimony that he attributed the signals to the switch-engine, and
did not seem aware of the danger from the other till it was
too late to save himself.
The place of the homicide was several hundred feet from the Foundry street crossing, which the
train had passed and the testimony is conflicting as to the rate
of its speed when the deceased was struck, the plaintiff’s witnesses making it from
twelve to fifteen miles an hour, and the
defendants eight to ten miles an hour. It was held that there was
no error in
admitting the testimony relating to the habit of the public
in walking on defendant’s tracks at and near the place where the
injury happened, though it was neither a crossing, nor other such
place as the public had a right to be. Lumpkin, J., said: “While
this habit, even if acquiesced in by the railroad company, did not
prevent the deceased from being a trespasser, it was a circumstance
which the jury might properly consider in determining whether or
not the person in charge of the train showed proper diligence at the
cases
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time the

killing occurred. Railroad engineers should observe more
running at places where they know persons are likely to
be on the track than elsewhere, even if those persons are trespassers,
and especially is this true when the company has at least tacitly consented to this otherwise unauthorized use of its property by the publie.
While railroad companies do not owe to trespassers the same
degree of care and diligence which they are bound to exercise towards their passengers, or to the public generally, at crossings and
such other places on their right of way as the public has a right to
be, still they are liable, even to trespassers, for gross negligence, and
it would be stating the rule too strongly to confine such negligence
to acts of the company’s servants, amounting to actual wantonness
or malice, or a reckless and willful disregard of human life
and
safety.” Cited, 84/783; 82/806; 105/102. The plaintiff recovered
a verdict, and, subsequently, Bleckley, C. J., in
reviewing the case,
says that another train was near and the injured person’s attention
might have been directed to it and thus withdrawn from the danger
that threatened, and it belongs to a class of cases where there were
complicated facts,' or else some explanation either furnished or
suggested by the evidence which might serve to account in whole
or in
part for the apparent failure of the party injured to protect
himself
something from which the jury might, by probability, infer
that the attention was naturally and justifiably withdrawn for the
moment from the danger or the cause of danger.
Smith, 82/805.
In Holmes, 37/593, a slave was killed about seventy yards from
the public road, on a part of the railroad-track which was used
very much by foot-passengers to make a short cut from one public
road to another, which was known to the company’s agents. It was
ruled that the slave was on the road of defendant at a place where
he had no right to be.
The fact that so many persons traveled on
foot over the portion of the road where he was killed did not make
the railroad a public road. In deciding the question of what would
be reasonable care and diligence, possibly this fact might be taken
caution in

—

.

into consideration, in connection with all the other facts of the case.

Cited, 70/244; 84/785.
In Barfield, 112/181, the train that did the injury was being
operated at a rate of speed which was in violation of a city ordinance.
The plaintiff was on the right of way and on or near a path between
the tracks, which path pedestrians were accustomed to use. Little, J.,
said: “It is contended by the’ company that the plaintiff was a tres-
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that no duty was owing to him until his presence was diseovered, and that it did not know of his presence until he was injured;
to which the defendant in error replies that there was a commonly
used pathway between the tracks of the railroad company along the
route which he was going, that pedestrians were accustomed to use
this path, and that he therefore had an implied license to do so, and
having such, the company owed to him the duty of ordinary care and
diligence to prevent his being injured. We are of the opinion that,
under the evidence, the defendant in error can not in law be regarded
as a licensee at the time he was injured.
While it was shown by a
number of witnesses that pedestrians were accustomed to pass along
this right of way, it was not shown that such was done by the permission of the company; and the most that can safely he deduced
from the evidence is that the railroad company did not take any
steps to prevent it. The true rule on this subject, as we understand it, is thus stated in Beach on Contributory Negligence,
§212: ‘Where the track of a railway company is used by pedestrians
for purposes of travel, by permission of the company, such pedestrian thereby becomes a licensee. He is no longer a mere trespasser
upon the track at his peril; and this consideration enhances the duty
of the employees of the company to exercise caution and increased prudenee in operating the road at this point. But that there has grown
up a habit on the part of individuals, or of the public generally, to
passer,

travel

over the track on foot, and that no measures have been taken
prevent it, does not change the relative rights and obligations of
the public and the company. It is not the less a trespass in that it is
repeated, or that there are many trespassers. A contrary doctrine is

to

declared in several recent

cases

to the effect that when the railroad

permits people to pass over their grounds, they thereby tacitly license
the public to come upon them, and they do not become trespassers if
they do so in a proper manner. This is, however, contrary to the
general course of authority in this country.’ See also Id. §§213, 214.”
In Crawford, 106/870, it appeared from the declaration that the
plaintifE’s daughter, four and a half years of age, was gathering
berries in a cut through which defendant’s road runs, within the corporate limits of Griffin. A train approached, running at a speed of
twenty-five to thirty miles an hour. The child in alarm ran upon the
track and was struck by the engine and killed.
It was held that
where, in an action by a father against a railway company for the
killing of his minor child, the petition alleges that the child was
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struck and killed

by a locomotive drawing a train running “at a high
negligent rate of speed, to wit: at the rate of from twenty-five to
thirty miles an hour,” “within the limits of an incorporated and
populous city”; that this rate of speed “was grossly negligent, and
showed a reckless disregard of human life”; that, “by the observance
of proper attention and ordinary care on the part of the engineer,”
the child “could have been seen by him for over one hundred yards before reaching the point at which she was struck”; and that the engineer “was not in the discharge of his duty and not keeping a lookout
ahead of him as the engine rushed to the point where the child was
killed”—held, that the petition shows a case for submission to a
jury, in order that they might determine, in the light of all the evidence introduced, whether the running of the train at the place in
question at the speed designated was or was not negligent, whether
or not the engineer was under the duty of looking out for the deand

•

ceased, and, if so, whether or not he failed to observe such duty.
Fish, J., said: “Admitting, for the sake of the argument, that the
general rule is that a railroad company owes no duty to a trespasser
who is upon or dangerously near its track, in~front of a moving train,
until its servants have discovered his presence there, and therefore,
so far as his
safety is concerned, is not obliged to maintain a lookout
in the direction in which, the train is moving, we do not think that
this could properly be held to be a uniform, fixed, and invariable
rule, applicable alike to all cases and under all circumstances. Conduct which might, under one set of circumstances, show that all

ordinary and reasonable
under

care

and diligence had been observed, might,

different set of

circumstances, be insufficient to show an observance of such care and diligence.
We think that such a ride could
mean no more than this: Taking the locality where the train is running, and all the surrounding circumstances, if those in control of
the movement of the train have no reason to apprehend that there
may likely be a human being on the track in front of the engine, they
are under no duty to one who may in fact be there, until they have
a

actually discovered that he is there. But if, from the locality or surrounding circumstances, there is reason to apprehend that the track
in front of the locomotive may not be clear of human beings, then,
it seems to us, it is the duty of the employees of the company to keep
a lookout ahead of the train
most assuredly so, unless they are
performing some duty which prevents their looking out upon the
track in the direction in which the train is moving.”
—
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99. Habit

of an individual to use the trade.
Hill, 101/340, it was held that knowledge on the part of a seetion-master that a railroad bridge-keeper’s wife was in the habit of
In

occupying with him, at night, a small house which the railroad company, for the purpose of protecting the keeper in bad weather, had
caused to be erected near a trestle forming an approach to the
bridge, and that the wife, in times of high water, used this trestle
as a means of reaching the house, together with knowledge on the part
of the supervisor of the railroad-track, and also on the part of the
supervisor of its bridges, that the wife stayed at this house with her
husband, did not constitute such notice to those charged with the
running of trains upon the railroad as to raise a duty on their part
to warn the woman of the running of an extra freight-train on the
Sabbath day, for the want of which warning she was exposed to
danger and death. Cobb, J., said: “Not having any connection with
the company, her presence in the house provided for the husband as
bridge-keeper was simply for his convenience and comfort, and did
not raise any duty on the part of the railroad companies to her.
In
order for the duty to notify her of the passage of trains to arise against
the companies, if, under the circumstances, any such duty would ever
arise, it certainly must be shown that her presence from time to time
upon the track of the company was known to those officers of the companies who had in charge the running and operating of trains. The
evidence fails to show notice to any one connected with that department of the railroad companies which manages the running of their
trains, or to any individual employee connected in any way with the
operation of trains. The section-master, who had charge of the roadbed near the bridge, and the supervisor of the track, whose duty it was
to see that the track was kept in proper condition, and the supervisor
of bridges, whose duty it was to see that the bridges were safe, knew
that plaintiff’s wife was using the house and trestle. Not one of these
employees described was connected with the running of trains. The
plaintiffs wife, therefore, being upon the trestle without authority
and without the knowledge of the defendants, the only duty which
was owing to her was to use all
ordinary care to prevent harm coming
to her after her presence upon the trestle was discovered.”'
100. Trespasser not to be hurt willfully or
negligently after he is
discovered.
In

Higgins, 98/751, it was held that a railroad conductor repreby which he is employed in determining what

sents the company
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persons are entitled to ride upon trains committed to his care; and
his act in expelling from a train a person not entitled to ride thereon

by him in the line of his duty,
Even a trespasser who intrudes
upon a freight-train under a fraudulent arrangement with an inferior employee who has no authority in the premises is entitled to protection against violence on the part of the conductor wantonly and
unnecessarily exercised in expelling him from the train; and for injuries to his person resulting from such violence the railroad company
is liable. Lumpkin, J., said: “The plaintiff’s action was dismissed
on demurrer.
IIt appears from the allegations of his declaration that
he was riding upon a freight-train of the defendant, £on top of a
caboose,’ with the permission of a flagman, but without the knowledge
or consent of the conductor.
The latter, upon discovering the plaintiff,
cursed him; and while he was running 'across the caboose, in order
to get off,’ shot him with a pistol, inflicting a severe and dangerous
wound upon his thigh. Undoubtedly it is the duty of a railroad conductor to determine what persons are entitled to ride upon a train
committed to his care, and to expel any person found upon such train
who has no right to be there. In so doing, his acts are, in legal contemplation, the acts of his master, for the reason that they are performed in the line of his duty. For the purpose of expelling such
a
person from a train, the conductor may lawfully use whatever
amount of force is reasonably proper and necessary; but he certainly
can not commit, even upon a trespasser, a malicious, wanton, and murderous assault. The plaintiff, according to his own allegations, was
undoubtedly a trespasser. The permission given him to ride upon
the train by the flagman amounted to nothing, and the conductor
would unquestionably have been justified in ejecting the plaintiff
from the train if he had done so in the proper manner.
It is certainly true that the means employed by him were not only unauthorized, but criminal. At the same time, the object he sought to
accomplish was strictly in the line of his employment, and the master is, in law, responsible for the damages which resulted to the
plaintiff through the violent and unlawful means employed by the
conductor in discharging his duty.”
This case differs from that of
Wood, 94/124. Cited, 104/657; 101/34; 107/510; 110/231.
There being evidence to show that the plaintiff’s child was wantonly pushed from a car forming a part of a moving train of the
defendant, and seriously injured, and also evidence from which it
passenger, being one performed
is in law the act of the company.
as a
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could have been inferred that the person
of

by whom the child

was

at the time in the employment and service
the defendant on that train, the case should have been submitted
the jury. Though the child may have been a trespasser, the com-

pushed from the
to
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pany was,

car was

under §2321 of the Code, liable for the injuries he sus-

tained, if they were caused by the willful act of its employee upon the
train; and this is so whether ejecting trespassers therefrom was or
was not within the scope of this employee’s duties thereon.
Smith,
100/96. Cited, 110/231; 104/657.
In Godkin, 104/655, the plaintiff, a minor, alleged that while
descending from the top of a car of a moving freight-train, after a
brakeman connected with the train had directed him to leave, he
fell, and his arm was so mangled by the train, which was moving at
the rate of twenty-five miles an hour, that it had to be amputated. He
was on the train with the knowledge and by the invitation of the conductor in charge of it. He so informed the brakeman, and told the
brakeman that the train was going too fast for him to get off; but the
brakeman approached him with a long stick in his hand, and in a
threatening manner compelled him to descend the ladder at the side
of the car, and, as he was descending, a jerk of the car threw him
under the wheels.
He further alleged that his -injuries resulted
wholly from the wrongful and unlawful acts of the defendant, as
stated; that the conduct of the defendant, its agents and servants,
was unlawful, wanton and willful; and that, by reason of the circumstances attending the wanton and unlawful conduct of the defen dan t, its agents and servants, it was liable to him for punitive
damages, in addition to actual damages. The conductor and
brakeman contradicted the facts alleged and sworn to by the
plaintiff, and testified that he was a mere trespasser. It was held
that the wanton, willful, and forcible expulsion of a person from a
freight-train in rapid motion, by an employee of a railroad company
engaged in its service on such train, from which personal injuries result to the party thus expelled, will give him a right of action
against the company, whether he be on such train lawfully or unlawfully. In such a suit it is not error to give in charge to the
“It was
jury §2321 of the Civil Code. And Lewis, J., said:
contended that this principle did not apply in a case where the
party was ejected by an employee who was not acting within the scope
of his employment, it not appearing that the train-hand or brakeman
had anything to do with ejecting passengers or trespassers from the
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of Smith, supra, and Bostwick, it was held by this
action would lie against the company although the

wrongful act was committed by an employee whose business did not
relate to ejecting from such train persons not rightfully thereon.”
Cited, 107/510; 110/231.
101. License or consent to go upon the right of way.
In Fluker, 81/461, it appeared that the plaintiff had for some
nine years, without objection on the part of the company, exercised
the privilege of coming upon the right of way, and dealing with
passengers by supplying them with lunches. A part of the time he
had even used the platform of the company for this purpose, and
perhaps also had been allowed to enter the cars. The privilege, exeept as to coming upon the right of way, was revoked some four years
previously to October, 1886, at which time the plaintiff received notice to cease the exercise of the privilege as to the right of way, and
was also informed that the exclusive right of serving lunches to passengers had been leased by the company to one Hart.
About a week
after receiving this notice the plaintiff’s servant was on two or three
occasions expelled from the right of way by a servant of the company, and in one instance the company’s servant, in controlling the
action of the plaintiff’s servant, did not desist where the right of way
stopped, but conducted the intruder across the public street, and up
to the plaintiff’s door.
The plaintiff, seeing that he could not carry
on his business through the medium of a servant, undertook to conduet it himself, and he also was expelled; both Hart and the defendant’s servant co-operating in his expulsion, and Hart, but not the
servant continuing the use of force beyond the right of way, and into
the public street. The plaintiff, after this, undertook to advertise his
business by ringing a bell in the street in front of his premises; and
Hart alone interfered with that, and committed an assault upon him
in the street.
The court granted a nonsuit. It was held that the dominion of a railroad corporation over its trains, tracks, and “right of
way” is no less complete or exclusive than that which every owner has
over his own property.
Hence the corporation may exclude whom it
pleases, when they come to transact their own private business with
passengers or other third persons, and admit whom it pleases, when
they come to transact such business. This applies to selling lunches
to or soliciting ordersi from passengers for the sale of lunches.
A
mere implied license, no matter how long enjoyed, to transact such
business, for which no consideration has been paid, is revocable at any
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time, and such revocation results from notice not to prosecute the
business in the future.

One who

persists in using the license, after
termination, may be prevented from so doing by such
force, not extending to life or limb, as may be necessary to effectuate
his expulsion from the premises. A lessee or licensee of the exclusive
privilege of entering the cars or upon the right of way to sell or supply lunches, is not a servant or agent of the corporation, so as to render it liable for an assault, or an assault, and battery, committed by
such lessee or licensee upon a competitor who seeks lawfully, on his
own premises, to obtain the patronage of passengers.
In Rylee, 87/491, it was held that only express consent would serve
to license a thoroughfare under stationary ears.
Mere knowledge by
a railroad
company or its servants that numerous persons, including
children, without any public or private right of way, passed daily and
hourly through its yard, situate in or near a populous part of the city,
and crawled under stationary cars occupying its tracks, will not render
it liable for an injury accruing to a child by a sudden and involuntary
movement of a long line of such cars, resulting from the negligence
of the company’s servants in handling other ears several hundred yards
distant from the scene of the accident, such other cars rolling against
the standing cars and setting them in motion while the child was passing under one of them. Simmons, J., said: “It is such gross negligence and want of care and so reckless an act for persons to attempt
to pass under cars which are left standing upon the track and are
liable to be moved at any moment, that we do not think a license can
be implied from the fact that the company had
knowledge that people
were in the habit of passing under the cars there.
Where, under such
circumstances, a person attempts to pass under the cars and is injured,
before he can recover upon the theory that he had a license to
pass
under the cars, he must prove to the satisfaction of the
jury an express license from the company. It would be unreasonable to hold
the company bound by an implied license or permission when the act
is of such a negligent character. It would be unreasonable to hold
the company bound by an implied license when it is
occupying the
notice of its

track with its

own ears.

It would be unreasonable to hold that it had

agreed that others might have a joint occupancy of the tracks at the
using them for its own purposes. The joint
use
by the company and by the public of the tracks at the same timo
would be so inconsistent and so dangerous that the law will not
imply
a license from the
company to the public for such joint use.
The
time the company was
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placing of stationary cars in its yard on the tracks where people are
accustomed to pass is notice to the public not to attempt to pass while
the cars remain, and if a person undertakes to pass under the cars
he does so at his peril. It is different where the public pass over a
track which is occupied by a railroad company with its cars only
a few times a
day, and then when the track is not being used by the
company. In a case of that kind, where the railroad company permits people to pass over its track when not in use by the company,
the permission may amount to an implied license; hut when the
company is in continuous occupation of its tracks, either in running
its cars or in keeping stationary cars thereon, a license will not he
implied.” Cited, 112/668.
In a railroad-yard in which there are several tracks in continuous
use for the purpose of storing and switching cars and making up trains,
and the like, and where the dangerous character of the place is manifcst and obvious, there can he no implied license to the public to
cross the tracks, either through open spaces casually left between the
cars, or under or over the cars. In order to render the company liable for injury caused to a person who was passing between two cars
in such a yard, and whose presence and danger were unknown to the
agents and employees of the company, there must be proof of an
express license from the company. Under such circumstances the
company owed to the injured person no duty, except not ,to hurt him
willfully

or

negligently after he

was

discovered

or

his danger known.

Grady, 112/668.
In Clardy, 112/37, it was ruled that a railway company is not
liable to a pedestrian who, even as a licensee, uses its right of way as
a
footpath, for injuries occasioned by a blow from a stone which
formed a portion of the ballast of the company’s track, and which
was
casually dislodged from its place therein and hurled against him
by a passing train. Lumpkin, P. J., said: “But, granting that he
should be regarded as a licensee, and that accordingly he was using
the right of way under some sort of an implied invitation to do so,
we are still confident that the judgment of nonsuit was right.
Certainly it can not be claimed that, under the facts appearing, it was
incumbent on the railway company, relatively to the plaintiff’s protection from injury, to exercise more than ordinary diligence. The
dislodgment of the stone was a mere casualty. Other trains had
passed over the spot where it lay without dislodging it from its place,
and, even under the theory that the company was under any duty at
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all of

protecting pedestrians from being injured as the plaintiff was,
that the company was wanting in ordinary care and prudence as to the manner in whith its track was
ballasted and kept in order. It would be going a great length to
hold that such a theory was good law in any ease, for railway companies can hardly be expected to construct or maintain their roadbeds with a view to protecting people who choose, even permissivelv,
to walk along rights of way from such a catastrophe as that which

it would at least have to appear

happened in the present instance. One who uses a railroad right of
way as a pathway is surely chargeable with knowledge of the uses
which the company

ordinarily makes of property of this kind, and
necessarily takes the risk of casualties occasioned by such use. If the
defendant company ought to have foreseen the particular casualty of
which the plaintiff complains, he, too, ought to have foreseen it, and
selected some other and safer place to walk.”
In Burton, 98/783, it was held that where a railroad company for
a
long time kept in a smooth and even condition a space lying longitudinally between its tracks, this space extending from one public
street to another, in a much-frequented part of a town, though its
only purpose in keeping it in such condition was to enable its passengers to safely alight from and board its trains, yet where this
space, with the company's knowledge, had for a long period been
daily, continuously and regularly used by the general public as a
footway, “as much so as any street or way in the town,” so that it
could reasonably be inferred that, even if the company had not dedicated the space in question to the public use, its conduct at least
amounted to a license or to an implied invitation to the public to pass
over the same, it would be liable to one who,
though not a passenger,
was injured by stepping at night, without
any negligence on his part,
into a hole dug therein by the company, and which was negligently left
unprotected and unguarded, so that one using the way would have no
notice of its existence.
The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's
declaration.
Simmons, C. J., said: “Whether the conduct of the
railroad company was such as to amount to a dedication, or to an implied invitation, to the public in general, or not, it was at least such
as to impose upon the company the obligation—which is due even to
a bare licensee
of giving notice of hidden dangers or traps. 2 Jag.
Torts, 889 et seq., and cases cited. While an acquiescence by an
owner of land in the use by others of a road or
pathway thereon, under
circumstances which do not amount to an invitation, does not impose
—
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upon him the duty of keeping the premises in suitable condition for
6ueh use, yet if he digs a dangerous hole, into which persons passing

along the way we liable to fall if not warned of it, he is under the
duty of warning them, or of guarding against such an occurrence. In
the present instance the defendant, having permitted, without objection, the use of this space between its tracks as a street or passway,
not merely by its passengers, but by the public in general, for a long
period, and not having undertaken to confine the use of it to passengers on its trains, was bound to anticipate that on the occasion in
question persons not passengers would be walking along the way; and
it had no right to place a pitfall in their route without such notice
or safeguard as would prevent injury therefrom.
The declaration
stated a cause of action, and the court erred in dismissing it.”
The use of the track by pedestrians, with the company’s knowledge,
does not bind it to the exercise of extraordinary care and diligence to
protect them. If such use amounts to a license, it must be on condition that the pedestrian shall exercise ordinary care and diligence
to avoid injury.
White, 83/595. Cited, 92/93.
102. Turntable

case.

Negligence is a question peculiarly cognizable by
when there is evidence tending to show this, and which

the jury, and
is not rebutted
by the same evidence, a nonsuit should not be awarded. In the present case there was proof going to show that the plaintiff was injured
by the defendant’s turntable, and that it was negligently kept > that it
was in an exposed public place, much frequented, and that it was not
secured by fastenings on the morning of the injury; nor will it authorize a nonsuit because the father of the child was a night-watchman
at the depot, was kept awake all night and had promised to give such
supervision and take such care of the defendant’s property at tins
yard as he could without entirely depriving himself of sleep during
the day; that he had gone home to his breakfast, and in his absence
had left his son to watch and act for him, and that the child was sent
to carry breakfast to her brother.
Ferguson, 75/637. Cited, 105/50.
When Ferguson’s case was a second time before the court, 77/102, it
was held that when a railroad company leaves a dangerous machine,
such as a turntable, unfastened in a city, on a lot which is not securely inclosed, and where people and children are wont to visit it
and pass through it, this is negligence on the part of such company;
and where

an

infant of ten

or

twelve years

of

age

resorted to the

turntable, and in riding upon it was dangerously and seriously in-
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jured, the company is liable for damages for the injuries. And this
is so, notwithstanding the father of the infant permitted her to go
near the turntable to carry breakfast to a minor
bother, who had
been left by the father to protect other property of the company than
the turntable.
The fault of the father, if any, is not attributed to
the infant, the action being brought by the infant herself.
103. Child trespasses on moving car.
In Underwood, 105/48, it was alleged that a hoy of ten years of
age was injured while attempting to get upon the ladder of a moving
freight-car, and it was not alleged that the attempt was known to
any of the employees of the company.
It was held that the petition
did not set forth a cause of action.
Cobb, J., said: “The plaintiff
being a trespasser, the only duty which the railroad company, through
its employees in charge of the train, owed him, was not to injure him

wantonly

.

or

willfully after his

presence

in

a

perilous position became

apparent to them. That he was in a perilous position being unknown
to them, there was no duty owing to the plaintiff in the present ease.
A railroad company is under no obligation to station watchmen about
its crossings and rights of way to prevent boys from swinging on its
moving trains, and a failure to do so is therefore not negligence. The
fact that the boy in this case had been permitted by certain employees of the railroad company to do acts similar to that which he
was
attempting to do when injured can not be construed as an invitation on the part of the company to do so on other occasions.
It
is contended, however, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover under
the allegations made upon the doctrine of what are known as the
‘turntable cases.’ The principle of these cases is that where any person has
dangerous machinery, stationary in its character, which is
calculated to interest and attract children, it is the duty of the owner
of such machinery to so guard it that children allured by it will not
be able to injure themselves in any way.
Ferguson, supra. While
the doctrine of the turntable

eases

is well settled in

some

of the

States, this being among the number, in others it has been severely
criticised, and in some entirely repudiated; but, no matter what may
be the opinion entertained in regard to the rule laid down in the
turntable eases, in no jurisdiction, so far as we know, has this doctrine been applied to a moving ear upon the track of a railroad company.
The application of it to moving trains would, it seems to us,
impose upon the railroad companies a burden which it is not reasonable that they should bear.
Nothing is more alluring to a child
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passing vehicle, whether it he a buggy, carriage, dump-cart,
railway-train; and if railroads are to be liable because
boys, without the knowledge of the employees in charge, attempt
to swing upon their passing trains, then the owners of the other vehides named would be equally liable if a boy, without the knowledge
of the person in charge, was injured while attempting to swing upon
the rear axle or other part of such vehicles: See the case of Catlett
v.
Railway Co., 57 Ark. 461, 21 S. W. 1062, where the facts appear
to he very similar to the case under consideration.”
104. Platforms, duty of keeping in safe condition.
Even if a defect in a platform from which a railroad company is
loading a horse upon a car would, under any circumstances, excuse
the company for injuring the horse by reason of such defect, it certainly would not do so in the absence of full diligence to discover
the defect before exposing the horse to the risk of injury. Herman,
92/384.
Where a platform constituting a part of a contrivance for weighing cars is so constructed as to become a portion of a railroad-track
which is used, not only when cars are weighed, but also, generally,
for switching them from place to place in the yard of the company
a

wagon, or a

.

wherein such track is

situated, and where, in the course of this work,
constantly rolled over such platform, the party upon whom
rests the duty of keeping and maintaining the entire track in a safe
condition is bound to keep such platform in like condition, because
the duty referred to relates to this portion of the track as much as
to any other portion of the same.
A railroad company which rents
and gives complete possession and control of its yard and the tracks
therein to the receiver of another railroad company in consideration
of a stipulated rental in money and in undertaking by the tenant to
do certain switching for the landlord in the yard, but which remains
bound to keep such tracks in safe condition, is, relatively to the receiver’s employees, under a duty of so keeping the tracks as to render their use harmless to these employees, and is responsible to one
of the latter for the consequences of its own negligent failure to
comply with this duty. Thompson, 101/26. Cited, 107/43.
105. Switches, protecting from interference.
The mere fact that a railroad company fails to recover from a discharged employee a key which controls the turning of a switch is not
of itself sufficient to make the company liable for the criminal act of
cars

such

are

employee in maliciously displacing a switch for the purpose of
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wrecking a train. The company is not bound to anticipate that,
purely out of revenge for his discharge, a former employee might secretly commit so heinous a crime against it and the public. Nor is
the company bound to exercise constant vigilance to prevent all persons whatsoever not in its employ from having the means or opportunity of tampering with its switches or its tracks. Whether or not
in any particular case the company exercised the proper degree of
care in
protecting its switches from interference is a question for the
jury, in determining which they may look to the evidence to ascertain
if there was any reason for the company to apprehend such interference, and if so, whether, under all the circumstances, it used due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the same.
In its charge to the jury,
the court should not state or assume that a given state of facts would
show negligence on the part of the company in the respect indicated.
Kane, 92/187.
DAMAGE BY

FIRE.

106. It must be shown that the company
was the result of negligence.

caused the fire and that it

When a railroad company has used a piece of ground as a woodyard for a long time, all persons building contiguous thereto are
chargeable with a knowledge of the fact, and of the right of the company to pile up wood upon any part of the premises, when it suits
their interests or convenience to do so.
This principle was declared
in a case where the fire was communicated by sparks from an engine
to a pile of wood belonging to the road, near plaintiff’s premises, and
from the wood to the premises themselves, resulting in their destruction.
McConnell, 27/481. Cited, 49/30. When this case was a
second time before the court,

it

was

held that the road had the

right to have the wood piled at that station, in such quantities and to
such extent as its agents or employees thought proper, and that to
make the road liable for the burning of the house, it must be shown
affirmatively that a fire originated from some act of gross neglect or
carelessness on the part of its agents or employees. McConnell,
31/133.
Cited, 33/112.
If property of a person has been destroyed by fire caused
by the
running of the engines of a railroad, without fault or negligence of
the latter or its agents in any way, the railroad
company is not liable.
Lawrence, 74/534. Cited, 101/750. See Griffin, 86/172.
In Edmondson, 101/747, it was held that, to authorize a plaintiff
to recover damages from a railroad company for the destruction of
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property by fire caused by the running of its locomotive, it must appear that such damage was occasioned by the fault or negligence of
the company or its agents. If, without more, it should be shown that
the fire was occasioned by operation of the locomotive, negligence
on the
part of the company would be presumed. When, however,
the evidence only raises a suspicion that fire was communicated to
the property destroyed by the passing engine, and the uncontradicted
testimony was that the engine was in good order, and equipped witli
a proper spark-arrester in good condition, and no evidence appearing
that in the handling of the engine sparks were emitted or fire thrown
therefrom at the time, before, or after the conflagration for which
damages are sought, a legal recovery can not be had, and the court
erred in refusing to grant a new trial. Little, J., said: “The doctrine is now established that when the legislature has sanctioned and
authorized the use of a particular thing, and it is used for the purpose for which it is authorized, and every reasonable precaution is
observed to prevent injury, the sanction of the legislature carries
with it this consequence: that, if damage results from the use of such
thing, the party using it is not responsible. Therefore, in case
of railroads authorized to propel their cars by steam, the gist of their
liability for injuries caused by the escape of fire is negligence. We
have in this State no statute law which changes this rule of liability
and, unless in cases of this character the fire is occasioned by some
act of negligence on the part of the company or its agents, no liability attaches to the railroad company to respond for the damages
sustained. Lawrence, supra.
See, also, 61 Tex. 660; 2 Am. & Eng.
R. Cas. 275, and note. This negligence must refer either to the condition of the locomotive from which the fire

emanated,

or

to its

48 N.
W. 227.
liability
is not exhaustive of the entire scope of a railroad's responsibility in
fire cases, but is applicable to the questions made by the pleadings and
evidence in this case.
Modern science and ingenuity have not yet
reached a point where it is possible to propel locomotives by the use
of steam in such manner as to absolutely prevent the emission of
sparks of fire in their operation. The law does not require that engines shall be so constructed, equipped, or managed as that no sparks
of fire shall escape from them; and, even if a fire does originate from
a spark thrown out by a locomotive, that of itself does not, without
more, render the defendant liable.
Negligence must be made to ap-

handling

or management at the time the fire was occasioned.
It will be understood, of course, that this rule of

-

CHAPTER 8.

§ 106]
Actions

[ 172

against railway companies—continued.

Assuming in this case that the burning of the house was ocby fire thrown out from the engine, the defendant is to be
held liable or not, as the facts establish or fail to establish negligence
on its part; and, in determining that question, the condition of the
engine and the manner in which it was handled at the time of the
fire will control the finding.
We may take it as the established law
of this State that when proof is made that the property of one person
has been injured or destroyed by fire occasioned by sparks from a
locomotive, the burden is on the railroad company to show that the
emission of such sparks, or the escape of the fire from the locomotive,
was not due to the want of ordinary diligence on the part of itself or
its servants, either as to the condition of the locomotive or in its management and operation. It is always incumbent on the plaintiff to
make proof that the fire was communicated by the locomotive of the
defendant. But few eases will occur, however, where the fact that
the fire was communicated is susceptible of direct proof. Consequently,
such proof must be more or less circumstantial. The evidence, however, must be sufficient to establish a reasonable inference that the
fire originated from sparks or fire emitted or thrown out by the locomotives of the company. If it raises only a mere conjecture as to
whether the fire was or was not so occasioned, no recovery can be
pear.

casioned

-

had.

86 Wis. 468.

If it is sufficient to fix the

source

of the fire

upon the railroad company, the law.of this State, by the presumption
before referred to, makes a prima facie case, which, if not rebutted,
entitles the plaintiff to a recovery.” Cited,
101/759; 108/166;

111/815.
In

Brown, 98/372, it was held that, there being evidence from
jury might have inferred that the plaintiff’s woods were

which the

burned

by a fire originating from sparks which escaped from a locooperated by a servant of the defendant, and ignited straw and
other combustible material on the railroad right of way, and that
the fire thus started burned continuously until it reached the plaintiff’s land, it was error to grant a nonsuit.
Simmons, C. J., said:
“It was argued that the burden was upon the plaintiff to show that
the fire originated from the defendant’s locomotive, and that the
evidence did not show this, but showed merely that it might have
come from that source.
It was not necessary, however, that the
cause of the fire should be shown
by direct evidence. It could be
shown by evidence wholly circumstantial. The evidence in this case
showed a strong probability that the fire originated from the engine,

motive
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sufficient to authorize the submission of the

to the

jury.
Hesters, infra; 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, ‘Fires by Railways,’ p. 7,
and cases cited; 2 Shear. & R. Neg. § 675; L. R. 6 C. P. 14; 10 C.
B. (N. S.) 89; 52 Pa. St. 379; 79 Pa. St. 405; 70 Mo. 243; 29 Minn.
12; 11 N. W. 122; 21 Minn. 60; 39 Md. 251. The case of Inman,
infra, relied on by counsel for the defendant in error, was very
different in its facts from the present case. In that case it was not
shown that the smokestack or spark-arrester of the locomotive was
defective, and it was shown that the fire was probably caused by a
cotton-gin running, and that it was very improbable that it was
caused by an engine of the company. Besides, that case was submitted to a jury.” Cited, 101/755.
In Harris, 108/800, it was held that this was an action for damages alleged to have been occasioned by the destruction of growing
fruit-trees by fire which the plaintiff contended originated from
sparks falling from a locomotive of the defendant railway company
and igniting grass and other debris on its right of way, while the defendant insisted that the fire was started by tramps at a camp located
elsewhere. There is no complaint that the issue thus made was not
properly submitted to the jury, and the evidence warranted a finding
that the defendant was liable for the damages sustained.
Even if
the court improperly admitted certain evidence offered to show the
value of the trees destroyed, the error, if any, thus committed was
cured by an order, to which the plaintiff assented, reducing the amount
of the verdict in his favor to a sum to which, in any view of the evidence as to the admissibility of which there was no question, he was
clearly entitled.
In Hesters, 90/11, it was held that the declaration alleging, in
effect, that the railway company, by its negligence and that of its
agents, servants and employees, in and about the running and operating of its locomotives and machinery, did on a day named negligently and carelessly throw, or otherwise set out, fire from said locomotives, whereby plaintiff’s property was burned, the rule of the
was

Code

ease

(§2321) raises presumption of negligence from proof that plainwas burned by a fire resulting from the emission of
sparks by one of the company’s locomotives while being run on defendant’s railway. The burden of proof would then be upon the company to show the exercise of all ordinary and reasonable care and
diligence. Such care and diligence would include keeping the locomotive in proper condition to be run with ordinary safety, as well
tiff’s

property
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properly managing and operating it while the running was in
A railway company is
negligent setting out of
fire in pine woods where the ground is covered with straw, grass and
other combustible material, if the fire burned continuously from the
point where it was set out to the property in question, and the spread
of it was not occasioned by any intervening cause, although such
property may have been situated two miles or more from the place
where the fire originated. A high wind, unless shown to be extraordinary, by which the fire was facilitated in passing from one side
to the other of roads traversing the district, would not be considered
as an intervening cause.
Cited, 90/171, 668; 101/750; see 90/4, 83.
107. Evidence as to a particular engine, and fires caused by that
and other engines.
In Brown and McDowell, 101/753, it was held that, where, in a
suit against the receiver of a railroad company to recover damages
resulting from the burning of woodland by fire alleged to have originated from sparks thrown out by the locomotive, the negligence alleged was that the spark-arrester was out of order and unfit for use,
and that the engine was defective and dangerous, and, in consequence
of the defective condition of the spark-arrester and engine, sparks
and cinders were emitted in dangerous quantities, etc., such allegations were broad enough to admit evidence touching the condition of
the grates of the engine at the time of the fire; and, accordingly, it
was error to rule out testimony to the effect that on the day of the
fire the grates of the engine were burned out, and large quantities
as

progress at the time and place in question.
liable for injury to property caused by the

of fire would fall out of the fire-box down

on

the track.

Evidence

showing the condition of the spark-arrester of the same engine just
preceding and a short while subsequent to the date of the fire, and
also that other fires were caused prior thereto by the same engine,
was admissible as showing the condition of such
engine at such times,
from which, in the absence of testimony showing that the locomotive
was in
proper condition at the time of the fire, the jury might infer
that the defective condition of such engine existed at the date of the
fire. The testimony admitted, together with that improperly exeluded, was sufficient to send the base to the jury for them to determine whether or not the fire originated from sparks thrown out
bv the locomotive of the

of the
not in

defendant, and whether or not, at the time
fire, the defendant was negligent, in that the locomotive was
proper and reasonably safe repair; and therefore it follows
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that the court erred in

granting a nonsuit. Little, J., said: “As
tending to show that fire was set out by the defendant, it has been
held competent to prove that, at various times before the fire occurred, the engines of the company set out fires along its line in the
vicinity.. 91 U. S. 454; 144 Pa. St. 461; 22 Atl. 851; 32 N. Y. 339;
49 N. Y. 420; 23 Pac. 820; 74 Cal. 323.
Where the particular engine which set the fire is known and designated, proof that it set
other fires is admissible.

sible of other

*

79 Mich. 163.« Where evidence is admis-

fires, it must appear that the fires were not very remote
from the fire causing the damage. If the fires are remote in time,
it must appear that the machinery and appliances remained in the
same condition of repair, or the evidence will not be admitted.
109
N. Y. 243.
Reasonable latitude must, of course, be allowed. The
purpose of such proofs would be defeated if they were confined to
the exact or precise time of the occurrence.
144 Pa. St. 461. It
has been held competent to show that coals of fire had previously
dropped or been found on the track at or near the place where the
injury occurred. 10 R. I. 22; 11 Kan. 47. Where the plaintiff
seeks to confine the setting of the fire to a single engine, proof that
the same engine set other fires is admissible.
87 Mo. 117; 16 Kan.
252; 12 Ind. App. 691; 150 Ill. 27. That evidence of other fires
set out by the same engine is admissible as tending to show negligence, and that former fires by the same engine are admissible as
evidence tending to prove its continued condition or construction, see
79 Mich. 163; 60 Mo. 227; 76 Ya. 443; 58 Wis. 335; 60 Iowa, 215;
68 Iowa, 502; 4 Md. 242; 27 Fla. 1; 3 Elliott, R. R. §§ 1243, 1244.”
In Akins, 111/815, it was held that there was, on the trial of an
action against a railroad company for damages alleged to have been
caused by setting fire to the plaintiff’s woods, no error in rejecting
evidence warranting an inference that shortly before or shortly after
the day upon which a particular fire occurred, a locomotive of the
company had thrown out sparks from which straw had become ignited; there being no evidence in any manner tending to 'show that
this locomotive was run on the day in question. While the evidence
was sufficient to raise a suspicion that the fires complained of were
set out by the defendant’s locomotives, it did not require a finding to
this effect. This being so, and no material error of law having been
committed, the verdict in favor of the defendant will not be disturbed; for there was sufficient evidence to warrant it, either upon the
theory that the defendant did not actually cause the fires, or that, even
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did, it exercised due diligence in keeping its locomotives in good
repair, and in operating them in a proper manner.
In Inman, 90/663, it was held that, it being alleged that the
burning of the plaintiff’s property was caused by sparks which escaped from one of two engines described in the declaration, by reason
of the defective condition of the engine, and the negligent manner
in which it was operated, the refusal of the court to admit evidence
that other engines of the defendant besides these two, and not shown
to be of like construction, had at other times emitted sparks at or
near the same place, is not ground for a new trial.
Simmons, J.,
said: “The declaration alleged that one of two particular engines
caused the burning, and the engines referred to were distinctly identitied. One was the Nancy Hart, and the other the Ellen B. Peeples.
It was not claimed that the fire was caused by any other. The question
before the jury was whether it was caused by one of these, and the
negligence alleged was negligence in the condition and management
of these two. How, then, could it be material or relevant to show
negligence on other occasions, and in regard to other engines than
these, especially when there was no attempt to show that such other
engines were of like construction? The cases cited in support of
the contention that this testimony should have been admitted are
clearly distinguishable from the present case. In some of them the
evidence as to other occasions related to the particular engine which
was alleged to have caused the fire, and in the other eases the
engine
that caused the fire was not identified. Where the engine that caused
the fire can not he fully identified, evidence that the defendant’s engines frequently emitted sparks on former occasions near the time of
the fire in question is generally held relevant and competent to show
habitual negligence, and to make it probable that the
plaintiff’s injury proceeded from the same quarter; but when the engine is identifled, the same reason does not operate, and evidence as to the condition of other engines, and of their causing fires, is
clearly irrelevant. To this effect, see 2 Shear. & R.
Neg. (ed. 1888) § 675, and
cases cited.
See, especially, the following cases: 98 Pa. St. 316:
if it

’

78 Pa. St.

293; 60 Mo. 227; 42 N. H. 97; 79 Mich. 163; 58 Wis. 335.

In Hester’s case, supra, the evidence for the
company
all the locomotives of the
company were kept

showed that
substantially in the
same condition.
Besides, in that case there was a general allegation that the fire was caused
by the defendant’s engines, and no particular engines were described or identified.”
Cited, 98/374. *

177

CHAPTER 8.

]
Actions

[ §§ 108, 109

against railway companies — continued.

Where the company

attempted to show its diligence as to the condiparticular locomotive by evidence tending to prove that all
its locomotives run over the road were kept in substantially the same
condition, and that such condition was good, this evidence might be
rebutted by evidence that on previous occasions, and at different places,
the company’s locomotives had emitted sparks which caused, or were
capable of causing, similar fires. Admitting the rebutting evidence
as a part of the plaintiff’s evidence in chief*the company having afterwards adduced evidence which would have made the plaintiff’s evidence admissible in rebuttal, was only an irregularity, and not retion of the

versible

Hester, 90/11.

error.

108.

Plaintiff must show his ownership of the property injured.
In Newman, 95/434, it was held that, the action being for damages
alleged to have been occasioned to the plaintiff’s land by setting fire
to and burning wood, undergrowth, straw, leaves and timber thereon,
and it appearing from his own testimony that the land belonged to
himself and his children, and there being no proof showing the number of the children, or what particular share, or interest was owned
by the plaintiff himself, there could be no legal recovery in his favor,
and it was error to refuse a nonsuit.
The alleged injury being to the
freehold, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show what interest he
owned therein, in order to enable the jury to arrive at* his just proportion of the compensation which should be allowed for the entire
injury.
A paper purporting to be a last will and testament, which is attested by only two witnesses, and which has never been probated, is
not admissible in evidence as such.
Title to personalty belonging to
the estate of

an

intestate

can

dence that all the other heirs

not be shown to be in his widow
save

one,

who

was a

by eviminor, had agreed

that the

property should belong to her, especially where it does not apthat the estate is free from debt. As the plaintiff in the present
case failed to show title to the
property alleged to have been destroyed
by the defendant, a recovery in her favor was unlawful, and the superior court erred in not sustaining a certiorari in the defendant’s favor.

pear

Redding, 112/62.
109. Entire defense should he submitted to the jury.
In Rawson, 112/471, the plaintiff brought suit for damages resulting from the alleged burning of cord wood belonging to petitioner
stored near the right of way of the defendant. It was alleged that
the fire* was caused by the carelessness of defendant's agents and em-
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ployees in the operation of its train. Defendant, in the first place,
denied that the fire was caused by the emission of sparks from its engine; and, in the second place, contended that, even if it was, it was
not the result of the carelessness or negligence of any of its employees,
but that its machinery was operated with due diligence, and its appliances were in good order.
It was held that, when the defense to an aetion against a railway company for the destruction of property by fire
alleged to have been set out by sparks from a locomotive was not
only that the company did not cause the fire in question, but also that
its machinery and appliances were in good order, and operated with
due diligence, and there was evidence supporting both branches of
such defense, it was erroneous to give to the jury an instruction which,
in effect, made the question of liability turn exclusively upon whether
or not the
company in fact caused the fire.
110. The right and duty of the company as to making noises.
While a railroad company has the right to make all the noises incident to the movement and running of its engines, and to give the
usual and proper signals of danger, as the sounding of whistles and
ringing of bells, and while it will not be liable for injuries occasioned
by horses driven upon highways taking fright at such noises, if it
exercised the right in a lawful and reasonable manner, yet, when approaching or running alongside public streets or thoroughfares, it is
the duty of the company to so operate its ears as not to unnecessarily
interfere with the rights of individuals traveling such streets or thoroughfares by other modes of travel, or to endanger such travel by unnecessary noises, frightening horses, and for damage resulting from a
breach of such duty the company would be liable.
Carr, 73/557.
Cited, 77/793; 101/69 108/808.
A railroad company has no right to continue blowing a locomotivewhistle in a city, town or village, for the purpose of giving a signal of
approach to the station, after the engineer discovers that a blast of
the whistle already given has frightened a horse drawing a vehicle
along the public road, and that the horse will probably be more frightened by continuing to blow till the signal is completed, the driver
seated in the vehicle being engaged in an effort to control the animal.
But it is a question for the jury whether the circumstances were such
as to apprise the engineer, or put him on
notice, of the peril which
would be occasioned by continuing to blow the whistle.
Akridge,
90/232. Cited, 105/103.
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Xewsome, 60/492, it was shown that the plaintiff was riding

buggy

near

the railroad-track; that

as

the train passed, the

en-

gineer caused the engine to whistle twice in quick succession, which
frightened plaintiff’s horse and caused the plaintiff to be thrown from
the

buggy and injured. There was evidence tending to show that the
engineer acted through malice towards the plaintiff. It was held that
the presumption fixed by §2321 against the company is not rebutted
by proof that the engineer, whose negligence, carelessness and improper conduct in the use of the engine and whistle, caused the injury, was prompted by personal malice and revenge towards the plaintiff, but the plaintiff may recover from the company the same amount
of damage for the injury, as if it had been a case of carelessness and
improper conduct unmixed with personal grievances of the engineer.
•Tackson, J., said: “The plaintiff could recover from the company for
the improper conduct of the engineer in the use of its engine and
whistle, though that conduct was superinduced by a private quarrel
with the plaintiff.
If the engineer had pulled out a pistol and shot
the plaintiff, then the act would have not been done by the'use of the
company's machinery, and the engineer in propria persona would alone
have been responsible; but as he used the thing he was intrusted with
by the company, the company is liable.” Cited, 72/294.
Barclay, 102/546, sued on account of a personal injury .sustained
by him from a fall from his wagon. He was driving two mules and
was sitting on the
top of a load of hay with which the wagon was
loaded. He was in a road parallel with and about thirty or forty
feet from the railroad-track going in the same direction with a freighttrain which came slowly by. This was between a blow-post and a
crossing. He had not heard the whistie blow. He first saw the train
when it was about seventy-five yards back. When the engine was
about twenty yards from a point opposite the wagon, the cylinder-cocks
were opened, and the noise of the escaping steam frightened one of the
mules so that he shied and ran, the other mule also running, but not
being scared. While this was transpiring the engineer and fireman
looked at plaintiff and laughed, but made no effort to stop the noise.
While the train ran about three hundred yards, the mules ran about
two-thirds of that distance, and then ran the wagon into a ditch,
throwing plaintiff to th# ground. He had been working along the
road a good deal, and that was the first he ever knew of this mule getting scared. It is necessary on occasion to open the cylinder-cocks, or
the steam would blow out the cylinder-heads.
The noise can be
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stopped instantly by closing the cocks.
and it

was

held to be

[ ISO

The court granted

a

nonsuit

error.

It is

only where the company’s servants make unusual and unnecessary noises in the running of their trains, and where no necessity for
the making of such noises is made to appear, that it is liable for injuries resulting in consequence thereof. Morgan, 77/778. Cited,
101/69; 108/808. The same principle is enunciated in Hill, 101/66.
In Hollinshead, 81/208, it was held that where there is evidence
suggestive of such a theory, the court may instruct the jury that if the
whistle was blown to frighten the animal, and not to keep it from
going upon the track, this could be considered.
In Pool, 108/808, it was held that when a horse in a city, town, or
village was quietly grazing on an unused street, between the railroadtrack and a barbed-wire fence near by, in plain view of the employees
of the railroad company having control of an approaching train, the
company is liable to the owner of the animal for injuries it sustained
in consequence of being frightened by the wanton, unnecessary and
unusual blowing of the locomotive-whistle, which caused the animal
to become injured by running into the fence.
There was evidence to
sustain this theory of the plaintiff’s case, and the court, therefore, did
not err in overruling defendant’s petition for certiorari on the ground
that the verdict of the jury in the justice’s court was contrary to evi•

dence.
111. Felony convict may sue.
While at common law one convicted of

felony or treason forfeited
rights of citizenship and was deemed to be civiliter mortuus,
as these consequences do not in this State follow conviction of
felony,
an action for injuries received
by one while a felon and in confineall his

ment is maintainable.

Dade Coal Co.

v.

Haslett, 83/549.

112.

Dogs do not come within the statute.
dog is not property except in a qualified

A
mon

law

or

under the statutes of this State.

sense, either at comThe owner may main-

an action of trespass vi et armis for the wanton and malicious
killing of his dog, but he can not maintain case for its unintentional
though negligent destruction; and where a dog was killed by a railroad-train, a presumption did not arise against the company, as in
cases of
injury to persons or property. Jemison, 75/444. Cited,
93/114; 100/435.
*
113. Passengers fight each other and the injured one sues the com-

tain

pany.
In

Davis, 110/305, it

was

held that where, in

a

difficulty between

i81
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two passengers on a

and the
is not

railroad-train, one cuts the other with a knife,
the railroad company for damages, it
for the trial judge to refuse to give in charge to the jury

injured

error

passenger sues

§3321 of the Civil Code, which makes a railroad company liable for
any damages done by the running of its cars, or by any person in its
employment or service, unless the company shows due care on the part
of its agents.

CHAPTER 9.
RAILROAD-CROSSINGS.
128. Train

114. The Code, $$2*220-2221.
115. What crossings are embraced.
11(5. What the crossing includes.
117. Approaches to a bridge.
118.
119.

129. All

ing

Steps at a crossing in a city.
This
statute
should be strictly

con-

strued.
the statute
121. To what trains it

requires.
applies.
Applicable only to accidents at publicroad crossings.
Not necessary to check before reaching

120. What
122.
123.

post.
the

124. When
on

duty is
public road.

a

125. When

a

failure

to

due to
observe

a

traveler

the precau-

tion is negligence per se.
126. When blowing is, or is not, proper

dili-

a

unlawful

town

or

to blow

city.

114.

the whistle in

in

be checked in a city.
check and give warn-

must

approaching

the

crossings in

cities.
130. When the statute does not apply.
131. Use of the section and proof of failure
when the accident did not occur at a

public crossing.
the track beyond the crossing, and failure to observe the statute.
133. The
failure
must
be
the
proximate
cause of the injury.
134. No recovery if by ordinary care the person could have avoided the
injury.
135. Ordinary care after knowledge of engineer’s failure to observe the statute.
132. A person on

136. Onus is on
137. Reciprocal

gence.

127. When

must

trains

138.

the

company.

duties and rights of the
public and the company.
Diligence at a much-used crossing not
in a city and not a public road.

Railroad-crossings.
companies shall keep in good order, at their expense,
the public roads or private ways established pursuant to law, where
crossed by their several roads, and build suitable bridges and make
proper excavations or embankments, according to the spirit of the
road laws. Civil Code, §3220.
Extent of such crossings. Such crossings include the width of
land on both sides of the road allowed by charter or appropriated by
the company therefor, and for as many feet beyond, each way, as is
necessary for a traveler to get on and off the crossings safely and conveniently. Civil Code, §2221.
A post to be erected. There must be fixed on the line of said roads
and at the distance of four hundred yards from the center of each of
such road-crossings, and on each side thereof, a post, and the engineer
shall be required, whenever he shall arrive at either of said posts, to
blow the whistle of the locomotive until it arrives at the public road,
and to simultaneously check, and keep checking, the speed thereof,
All railroad

§§ H5, H6]
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as

to

track

on

so

stop in time should any person or thing be crossing said
said road.

Civil Code,

§2222.
Neglecting to erect such posts. Should any company fail or neglect
to put up said posts, the superintendent thereof shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Civil Code, §2223.
Failing to blow the. whistle. If any engineer neglects to blow said
whistle, as required, and to check the speed, as required, he is guilty of
a misdemeanor: Prodded, that within the corporate limits of a city,
town or village, the several railroad companies shall not be required to
blow the whistle of their locomotives on approaching crossings or publie roads in said corporate limits, but in lieu thereof the engineer of
said locomotive shall be required to signal the approach of their trains
to such crossings and public roads in said corporate limits, by tolling
the bell of said locomotive, and on failure to do so, the penalties of this
section shall apply to such offense. Civil Code, §2221.
115. What crossings are embraced.
This section (2220) embraces public roads and private ways established pursuant to law. Where there was a way about eight feet wide,
which had been used for twenty or thirty years by persons residing
in the neighborhood, generally as a footway, or by persons riding on
horseback, and only occasionally by persons riding in carriages on
wheels, and the railroad severed that way by a cut eighteen or twenty
feet deep, and made ways from the old one to grade-points at each
end of the cut, it was not a private way in the sense or spirit of the
road laws. Berry, 72/137.
In Cox, (58/44(5, the injury was caused by a defective bridge at
a private crossing on the plaintiff’s farm.
The bridge was narrower
than the road at the crossing.
The company had kept the bridge in
repair for a number of years. It was constantly used by the plaintiff
in crossing from one part of his farm to another.
It was not the
duty of the company to build and keep in repair a bridge at a crossing on a way of that character. Cited, 107/791; 95/433.
Nor is the section applicable to a crossing if the road has never been
established as a public road in the manner pointed out by law, although it may have been used to
Shaw, 98/543.
116. What the

a

greater

or

less extent by the public

crossing includes.
crossings shall include. It relates
to crossings only, not to roads running
parallel to railroads. It is
not made the duty of a railroad company to fence in, or place guards
The statute defines what the
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along its road, where there may be cuts or embankments, notwithstanding a public road may run parallel to such railroad. Collier,
70/611. Cited, 107/758.
117. Approaches to bridge.
In Mayo, 92/223, the bridge crossed the track in a strictly diagonal
direction.
It was over a deep cut and the railing did not extend beyond the edge of the cut. Ho safeguards were provided by the company along the approaches to the bridge to prevent vehicles or animals traveling along the public road from falling into the cut. Mayo's
mule became frightened near the middle of the bridge, and backed
the wagon to the end of the bridge, and then, cutting the hind wheel
to the side, backed the wagon off at a place where there was no railing, on to the top of the cut, and off down into the cut, causing the
injury. It was held that it was the duty of the company to maintain
a safe
crossing, and if the bridge reasonably required a railing to
project from the bridge a short distance along the margin of the highway in order to render the crossing safe, it was the duty of the company to put it there, and the company would be liable for such injury
as accrued in consequence of the absence of the railing.
It was for
the jury to determine whether the bridge reasonably required the railing in order to render the crossing safe. And it was also for them
to determine whether the defective condition was the proximate cause
of the injury, although the mule may have been a refractory animal.
Cited, 94/139.
118. Steps at crossing in a city.
The case Railroad Co. v. City of Atlanta, 74/774, was this: Where
Foundry street crossed the track of the railroad there was a pair of
steps joining a part of the street, and the company allowed them to
be out of repair. The defect caused an injury to Montgomery.
He
sued the city and recovered on the ground that the city was bound
to see that the streets were kept safe for the passage of persons.
The
city brought this suit to recover the damages it had been compelled
to pay, and it was determined that the ultimate liability was upon
the railroad company, as it was bound, under these sections, to keep
street-crossings in rcqjair. Cited, 78/287, 780.
119. This statute should be strictly construed.
This statute is penal in its character.
It subjeets employees failing
to observe its provisions to indictment and punishment, and it should
he strictly construed.
Morgan, 77/788 ; MeElroy, 98/259. In Crawley, 82/193, Associate Justice Simmons says: £T am not disposed to
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extend the

liability under this statute, as it is well known that the
such a requirement and carry on the
commerce of the country.
It is sufficient to hold them to the strict
letter of the law, without extending its provisions further than the
law prescribes.” Cited, 93/399.
Grade-crossings are meant. Section 2222 is applicable to gradecrossings only. Where the track of the railway company crosses the
public highway upon a bridge or trestle above the latter, the section
does not apply.
McElroy, 98/257, Atkinson, J., dissenting.
Public roads only embraced in section 2222. The whole subject of
legally established private ways is dropped when this section is reached.
Private ways are not embraced in it.
In Cox, 61/455, the facts were that a mule was killed by a train at
or near the crossing of a private way.
The public road formerly
crossed at that point, but was discontinued some years before the injury. There was still a crossing there; it was in bad condition, was
seldom used, and then only for plantation purposes.
It was held
that in approaching the crossing of a private way, no special acts
of diligence were prescribed by this section, and that it related to the
crossings of public roads only. Cited, 98/544.
In Shaw, 98/543, it was held that the provisions of this section
have no application except to crossings where a public road established
pursuant to law crosses the track of a railroad, and consequently the
statutory duties of blowing the whistle of the locomotive, and checking the speed of the train are not incumbent upon an engineer when
approaching the intersection with a railroad of a road which, though
to a greater or less extent used by the public, has never been established as a public road in the manner pointed out by law, and that no
one has a right to assume that, in
approaching a crossing of the kind
last indicated, an engineeer will observe these statutory requirements,
and that the omission to do so is not, in law, negligence per se. Simmons, C. J., said: “Where a railroad-crossing is in a populous locality, and is much used by the public, even though the provisions of this
section are not applicable, greater care is required of railroad companies with respect to speed and signals than is to be expected at
places where the railroad is crossed by unfrequented country roads,
not established by law as public roads; but non-compliance at such a
place with the statutory requirements applicable to public roads established by law is not, as a matter of law, negligence per se.
It is
generally for the jury to say whether, under such circumstances, the
railroad eaki not comply with
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railroad company was negligent or
taken into consideration when we

not.
come

This distinction is also to be
to consider the conduct of

attempting to cross the railroad at such places. Where the
crossing is one to which the statutory requirements above referred to
are applicable, a person about to cross has a right to expect that the
railroad company, in the running of its trains, will comply with these
requirements; and his reliance upon the discharge of its duty in the
premises may in some degree excuse a want of full diligence on his
part in looking out for the approach of a train. Where, however, the
statute is not applicable, a person about to cross must assume a greater
burden of care than he would be required to assume if the crossing
were one to which the statute applied.”
Cited, 106/298.
120. What the statute requires.
The statute requires two distinct things to be done.
One is to
check and keep checking the speed of the train, so as to stop in time
should any person or thing be crossing the railroad; the other is to
begin blowing the whistle four hundred yards from the crossing and
keep blowing until the crossing is reached. The first of these requirements means that the engineer must have his train under such control that he can bring it to a complete stop, if necessary to prevent
a collision
upon the track itself.
One purpose in blowing the whistle,
the other requirement, is to- give warning to persons riding or driving
along the public road and approaching the crossing, in order that they
may get their animals under control, watch them carefully, or, if liable
to become frightened by the locomotive, and consequently to do mischief, to keep them at a safe distance until the train has passed.
Bowen, 95/691, 692. A grade-crossing was involved in Bowen’s case.
McElroy, 98/259.
The train must be so checked as to enable the engineer to stop his
machine at crossings, to avoid collisions, and it is not incumbent upon
the plaintiff to show that the speed was reckless and that the engineer
could not have stopped his train before reaching the crossing, or that
he saw the obstruction and heedlessly proceeded.
McElmurry, 24/75.
Cited, 89/566; 93/390; 84/783.
121. To what trains it applies.
In Morgan, 77/788, the train was working exclusively between the
blow-post on either side of a public road, and it was not in a city,
town or village.
It was held that this section did not apply to such
a train, but that it
applied to trains approaching or passing beyond
points where blow-posts should be located. Cited, 88/64; 93/398.
persons
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122.

Applicable only to accidents at public-road crossings.
Holmes, 37/593, a slave was killed about seventy-five yards from
the public road on a part of the track which was used very much by
In

In the opinion, Walker, J., says: “This act was
protection of persons and property at public crossings
of the road. The public have a right to cross the railroad-track at the
public-road crossings. When traveling the highway persons are lawfully on the railroad-track, at the point of crossings; and if an injury
is done at such public crossings, then the provisions of the Act of
1852 become material.
In this case, the accident having occurred
elsewhere, the provisions of this act are not applicable.” The Code
foot-passengers.

intended for the

.

sections cited above

In

are

codifications of the Act of 1852.

of the

subsequent cases there are apparent departures from
notably, in Main, 64/649, and Jones, 65/631. In
Gravitt, 93/369, the subject was considered, and Lumpkin, J., made
some

this doctrine,
an

in

exhaustive review of the
far

cases.

The

cases

of Main and Jones,

they conflicted with the doctrine in the Holmes case,
pronounced to be unsound. It was determined that the Holmes
case had never, in terms, been overruled in the manner prescribed by
statute, and that the doctrine announced in it was still of force, and,
after this careful and thorough review, the court put the question at
rest by holding that, relatively to a person who, without license from
the company, is walking upon a railway-track on a trestle, though
such trestle be situated between a blow-post and a public crossing, the
omission of the engineer to comply with the statutory requirements
as to giving signal and
checking the speed of the train is not negligence, inasmuch as these requirements raise, no duty as between the
company and a stranger who may be upon the track elsewhere than
at public crossings.
The duty to observe all ordinary and reasonable
care and diligence toward such
persons arises when his presence becomes known to the engineer, and not before.
A failure in such care
and diligence after that time, from which injury results, unless it could
have been avoided by the use of ordinary care on the part of the person
hurt, will render the company liable. If no negligence is imputable
to the company, except failure to observe these requirements, it is not
liable for results occurring upon the track of its road elsewhere than
at the public crossing.
The underlying principle is that the breach
of a given duty is not negligence relatively to one to whom the duty
in question was not due. In this instance, the duty of whistling and
checking is due to a person or thing upon a public-road crossing.
so

were

as
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This doctrine

adhered

to

and enforced

in

Smith, 94/580;
Martin, 95/302, 690; Shaw, 98/543; Clary, 103/640; New, 105/481,
and Ross, 107/75.
123. Not necessary to diedc before reaching the post.
In Crawley, 82/190, it was ruled that the law does not require the
was

regular speed of the train to be cheeked before reaching the blow-post.
It appears in this case that mules were injured between the blowpost and the crossing. The whistle was blown at the post, and the
speed of the train was so checked that it could have been stopped before it reached the crossing. It was argued by counsel that the track
being down-grade at that place, it was impossible for the train to
have stopped within the four hundred yards from the blow-post to
the crossing, and that it was the duty of the company to have slackened their speed before the train arrived at the blow-post, in order to
allow them to get full control of the train.
In the opinion, Associate
Justice Simmons says: “In reply to the first of these propositions, it
is sufficient to say that the testimony shows that the train was checked,
and could have been stopped by the time it reached the crossing, in
accordance with the statute. The statute only requires the engineer
to blow his whistle at the blow-post and to check his train, in order
that he might be able to stop at the crossing, so that no one on the
crossing could be injured or damaged. In reply to the other proposition, I will say, for myself, that I think the law has prescribed
the exact point where the checking of the train shall commence.
It
is not necessary for the railroad to check its regular speed before
reaching the blow-post. Under the law, it must commence checking then, in so far as it is necessary for it to do so, in order to stop
the train before it reaches the crossing.” This language was used
in strict reference to the

before the court, and there is nothing
negative the idea that the speed before
reaching the blow-post, whether it be the regular rate or not, must
be such as to admit of stopping the train before reaching the crossing by commencing to check at the blow-post. The duty imposed is
to stop in time, and the speed before reaching the blow-post, the grade,
in it that

was

case

intended to

and all else, must be such

as to admit of stopping
by such checking
prescribes.
124. When the duty is due to a traveler on a public road.
In Bowen, 95/688, it was ruled that, relatively to a traveler on a
public road, driving an animal attached to a vehicle, and approaching
a
railroad-crossing over which he is about to pass, the company is
as

the law
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'under

duty to obey these requirements; and if, by reason of a failduty, the locomotive comes so near to the animal
that it takes fright, runs away and injury results to the person in
consequence of being thrown from the vehicle, the company is liable
for such injury, although there was no actual contact between the
locomotive and the vehicle, or its occupant.
Lumpkin, J., in substance, said: “The law was created for the protection of travelers
on
public roads, intending to cross railroads at points where the two
kinds of road intersect each other. A traveler has as good a right
to be upon a public crossing as the company has to run trains on it,
and the company has no right, by a disobedience of law, to prevent
him from using such a crossing safely.
When he is on his journey
in the highway, intending to presently use the crossing just ahead
of him, the traveler’s right includes not only the right to approach
it for that purpose, but, also, the right to go upon and have it without
being hindered or put in danger by any unlawful act or omission on
the part of the company. The law was intended to prevent such
injuries as might be caused by actual collision on the track, and, also,
injury resulting from the animal taking fright and running away,
when the act of crossing was about to begin, was in progress, or had
just been completed.” Cited, 98/259; 108/547; 112/867.
In Wyme, 42/332, the signal was not given, and, when a carriage
was on the
crossing, a train came suddenly around a corner near
the carriage, frightened the mules, and they ran away and caused the
injury. The company was held liable, although there was no actual
collision of the engine with the person or property injured.
In Durham, 108/547, it was held that, relatively to a person who
is traveling in a vehicle drawn by a horse upon a public road which
crosses a railroad-track, the railroad
company owes the duty of complying with the statute in reference to blowing the whistle and checking the speed of a train approaching a public crossing, if such person
is, at the time that the train arrives, within four hundred yards of
such crossing, approaching with intent to cross, crossing over, or leaving the crossing; and if the railroad company fails to comply with
either of these requirements of the statute, and the horse takes fright
at the approaching or passing train, and thereby injury which could
not have been avoided by ordinary diligence on the part of the oecupant of the vehicle is occasioned, and this injury is the proximate
result of such negligence on the part of the railroad company, such
urc

a

to observe this
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has a right of action against the railroad company for the
damages sustained.
125. When a failure to observe the precautions is negligence per se.
The failure to comply with these requisitions does not necessarily
make a road liable for damages; nevertheless, it will be sufficient,
usually, to constitute a prima facie ease of want of due diligence.
McElmurry, 24/75. In Wyly, 65/120, the judge charged the jury
that proper diligence required the railroad company to have the bell
of its locomotive tolled as it approached a crossing in a city, and, in
the opinion, it is said that, “Whilst, as a general rule, questions of
negligence are for the jury, yet, when the statute makes the act imperative on the agents of the company, and the rigid enforcement of
it is of so much consequence to society, the court may tell the jury
the law, and that the omission to comply with it, if it was omitted, is
negligence.” This case is controlling'upon this question. 111/13;
Thompson, 76/771. It is negligence as matter of law. Young,
81/397. In Smith, 78/694, the plaintiff was hurt seventy yards
from a crossing, and, in the opinion, Bleckley, C. J., says:
“The omission of specified acts of diligence, prescribed by statute, or by a valid municipal ordinance, for safety at public crossings, is negligence per se; and the court may so instruct the jury.
While negligence is always a question of fact, where the law is silent
touching the specific act done or left undone, yet, where a statute
expressly enjoins an act, the act is then within all degrees of diligence, even the very lowest, and its omission is negligence as matter
of law.” Cited, 81/417; 82/405; 111/13; 112/865.
The rule thus stated has been limited in its application to cases
where negligence of this nature is negligence relatively to the person
injured. In Golden, 93/510, the injury occurred seventy-five yards
from a public crossing, and it was held that the failure to observe the
statutory requirements, while, in the abstract, negligence per se,
might not be negligence at all relatively to a person thus injured.
It might be no more than a fact to which the jury could look in ascertaining whether the company was negligent relatively to him or
not.
Had the injury occurred upon a public crossing, the rule of
negligence per se would have been applicable without qualifications.
Sec Gravitt, 93/395.
In Tribble, 112/863, it was held that when, in an action to recover
damages from a railroad company for injuries to person and property
person

occasioned

by the running and operation of a train of cars over a
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city, it was conclusively shown that the speed at
being run was higher than that prescribed by
a valid municipal ordinance, and that no effort was made to so cheek
the speed in passing over the crossing as to be able to stop if necessary
to prevent injury to one attempting to cross, the company was, relatively to such person, negligent, as a matter of law ; and in order to
prevent a recovery it must have been shown that the injury was done
with the consent of the injured person, or that he could, by the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the consequences of the negligence
of the company.
In such a case proof that the injured person contributed to the injury may he shown in mitigation of damages or to
defeat a recovery, if such contribution itself amounted to a want of
ordinary care under the existing circumstances.
126. When Wowing is or is not proper diligence.
Blowing the whistle, as required by law, is only proper diligence
on the part of the company, and it is not responsible for any injury
-resulting therefrom. Where one is crossing the road ahead of the
train, under circumstances which would induce a prudent man to
attempt the crossing, and without any fault on his part, and after he
street-crossing in
which the train

a

was

has crossed, the whistle blows and continues to blow after it passes
the crossing, where no necessity exists for it, and causes the fright of
a

horse, which

the injury, the defendant is liable. If the
carelessly or recklessly, hut for the purpose of

causes

whistle is blown, not

removing obstruction from the track, or other lawful purpose, as a
signal of danger, the company is not liable. There is no restriction
as to blowing,
except in approaching crossings. It may he blown as
often as the necessity of each case may require, to he determined
by
the engineers, due regard being paid to the safety and
rights of the
public. Thomas, 73.350. Cited, 77/793 ; 101/68.
127. When unlawful to blow the whistle in a town or citg.
Section 2224 of the Civil Code amends, and is to he construed with,

§2222, and thus it becomes unlawful for an engineer to blow the
a city, town or
village as the train approaches a crossing or
public road. The ringing of bells is substituted for the blowing of
whistles. In approaching a crossing, it is
necessary to give warning
as before, hut the mode of
warning is changed from a whistle blown
to a bell rung.
If the whistle is unlawfully blown in approaching a
public crossing or street in a city, and a horse is thereby frightened
and injury accrues, the railroad will be liable.
Carr, 73/557. See,
also, Wvlv, 65/122.
whistle in
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This ringing of the bell instead of whistling is confined to signaling for the approach of crossings. It is not unlawful to make,

by whistling, proper and necessary signals of approaching a station,
as
warning to adjust the switches. Abridge, 90/232. Nor is it negligence for an engineer to blow the stock-alarm whistle in a town or
city, to frighten an animal from the track, in case of a sudden
emergency, nor where it is necessary to save the life of a man or beast.
Phinizy, 83/192.
128. Train must be checked in a city.
In Russell, 75/810, a train came around a curve in the city of
ITaeon, and approached a street-crossing at a speed of twenty-five or
thirty miles per hour, without checking its speed, running down
grade, so as to render it impossible for the engineer to stop, and it
was held that the law requiring the checking of trains in passing a
road-crossing applied to the crossing of streets in a city. It seemed
that the legislature had conferred upon the city power to regulate the
moving of trains over the streets, and that the power had not been
exercised.
In the opinion it is said that the court rather thought
that the grant of such a power would not nullify the general law,
even if the city had acted
upon it, and that from the failure to act
no inference could be drawn of removal of restrictions on the
speed of
trains. That the law requires the checking of trains in passing a
road-crossing of streets in a city is well settled. Wyly, (55/120; Carr,
73/558; Young, 81/417.
129. All trains must check and give warning in
approaching the
crossings in cities.
In Markens, 88/60, the injuries were caused by a
switch-engine
with cars being backed over a public street-crossing in Atlanta and
striking a public hack in which plaintiff was crossing the street. The
report of the case does not show at what distance from the public
crossing this train was put'in motion, but it seems the distance was
sufficient to allow it to get under way. The court held that the
statute requiring the checking of trains and ringing of bells in
ap■proaching public crossings was applicable to the case, without reference to the distance from the crossing to the point at which the train
started.
In the opinion delivered by Lumpkin, J., it is said: “The
law meant that in towns and cities, engineers and other persons in
control of trains should always be cautious in approaching crossings,
and have their powerful machines under such control as in every instance to be able to prevent collisions in such places.”
Cited, 109/369.
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apply.
a train started at or upon a public
crossing should be checked and kept checked while passing over the
crossing. The statute contemplates a state in which there can he
less motion, not one in which, to make progress at all, there must
be more. Harris, 78/526. Cited, 93/398; 109/369.
In Hall, 109/367, it appeared that at a point some half-mile from
the depot in the city of Americus, and at a public crossing within
the city limits, the plaintiff’s team and wagon were run over by defendant’s engine.
The “crossing law” contained in §§2222, 2224
of the Civil Code, was not observed as to cheeking the speed of the
train. The testimony was conflicting as to whether the hell was
rung or not.
The judge gave in charge the sections referred to,
which was excepted to.
Simmons, C. J., said: “There was no error
in giving the law in relation to the duties of railroad companies in
approaching public crossings. It was argued here that this law was
inapplicable to the facts of the case, as the crossing was so near the
starting-point of the train that it would be impossible to comply
with the law.
We understand from the record and the argument of
counsel that this crossing where the injury was inflicted was some
half a mile below the depot from which the train started. It was
held in the case of Harris, supra, that the statute does not require
that a train started at or upon a public crossing should be checked,
and kept checked, while passing over that crossing. This was held,
for the reason that the train could never pass over the crossing if it
was checked.
Where the crossing is a sufficient distance from the
starting-point of the train to allow it to get under way, we think that
the law is applicable, as was held in the case of Markens, supra. Where
the servants of the railroad company fail to observe it, and any person
or
property is injured upon the crossing, the company can make no
defense except that the injury was done by the consent of the
person
injured, or that he could have avoided the injury by the observance
of ordinary care, or that his negligence contributed to it, in the wav
of mitigation of damages.”
In Partee, 107/789, it was ruled that on the trial of an action for
damages, brought against a railroad company for the killing of a
horse by one of its trains, where there is no evidence
authorizing the
conclusion that such killing occurred at a
public crossing, or that
the failure of the company’s servants in
charge of the train to observe
the statutory requirements as to
approaching such a crossing had any130. When the statute does not
The statute does not

require that
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thing to do with the injury complained of, it was error to give in
charge to the jury the law prescribing the duties of railroad companies in approaching public crossings with their trains.
131. Use of the section and proof of failure when accident did not
occur at a public crossing.
In Williams, 71/723, the person injured was walking on the track
without permission of the company and had passed beyond the crossing of a public road, about two hundred yards, when he was injured
by a train coming up behind him. It was held, Hall, J., dissenting,
that proof showing a non-compliance with this statute might go to
the jury as a circumstance showing negligence. In Bloomingdale,
74/604, the injury did not occur at a crossing, and the jury were
allowed to consider a failure to observe the precautions prescribed
by a city ordinance and the law in determining whether the defendant
exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence.
Cited,
82/404.

Meigs, 74/857, such proof was allowed to go to the jury for
was worth.
In Raiford, 82/400, the injury occurred at or
near a street-crossing, but the plaintiff was using the highway for the
purpose of walking along it, and not for the purpose of crossing; it
was held that relatively to a person walking upon the track, a failure
to comply with the statute was evidence of negligence to be considered by the jury.
So, also, in Daniel, 89/463. In Phinizy, 83/192,
a mule was killed away from a crossing, and Chief Justice Bleckley
said: “The sections, and the conduct of the company under them,
are
simply for consideration of the jury. Their importance is
nothing like the same when the injury occurs at a distance from the
public crossing as when it occurs on the crossing. Still, they have
some relevancy in either ease.”
In Golden, 93/510, it was held that
it was not error to give this section in charge to the jury in a case
when the accident occurred two hundred yards from the crossing, but
that the failure to observe the statutory requirements, while in the
abstract negligence per se, might not be more than a fact to which
the jury could look in ascertaining whether the company was negligent relatively to him or not. In the opinion, Simmons, J., says:
“This court, so far as I know, has never held, relatively to a person
that distance from the crossing, that the omission to give the signal
required by law is negligence per se. It has held that the evidence
of non-compliance with the statute is admissible, and the jury may
be instructed by the judge that they may consider it. This, I think, is
In

what it
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far

as

the court has gone upon

this subject. These decisions

may

be

correct, upon the idea that the proof of the omission of this duty,
the

part of the company’s servants, might give rise to @n inference
they were in other respects negligent or reckless. This court,
while holding, as above announced, that the evidence was admissible
and the charge thereon proper, has never definitely and accurately
determined what weight or effect it ought to have on the jury.”
Cited, 103/640; 107/75.
In Gravitt, 93/370, the person injured was upon the track between
the blow-post and the crossing, and this principle was announced.
Although omission of the statutory requirements, when a part of
the res gestae, may be considered by the jury in passing upon the
question of negligence relatively to the person injured or killed, yet,
where the evidence, as a whole, shows there was no negligence imputable to the company or its servants, except failure to observe these
on

that

requirements, the company is not liable for results occurring upon
track of its road elsewhere than at a public crossing. Lumpkin,

the

J.,
generally be sufficient, on the trial of an action against
a railroad company for an injury occurring upon its track in the vicinity of a public crossing, for the judge to inform the jury that the
mere failure of the company’s servants to observe the
provisions of
§2222 of the Code in approaching the crossing would not, of itself,
be a.ground of recovery against the company, but that they might
take this failure into consideration in determining whether there was
on the
part of the company, in the given case, any act of negligence
which would make it liable. And it would also be
very appropriate
for the judge, in this connection, to explain
clearly to the jury the
question of negligence really involved. In most eases of this kind,
the plaintiff relies upon the statutory
presumption of negligence
against the company, and also strengthens his case by whatever available evidence he may have at his command. On the other
hand, it
usually happens that the company undertakes to vindicate its diligence by calling as witnesses its servants who were present when the
injury was inflicted. In this manner, the issues submitted to the
jury are formed. Where an employee of the company is put on the
stand as a witness for the defendant, his entire conduct at the time
of the transaction under investigation, whether such conduct be disclosed by his own testimony or by that of others, may be considered
by the jury in determining what weight should be given to his te>timony. Suppose, for instance, it was charged that an engineer, after
said: “It would
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seeing a person or an animal on the track, failed to take the proper
precautions to prevent a collision, and rushed forward regardless
of consequences, and that this charge was stoutly denied by
him.
Then, certainly, all he did at the time would he material in weighing what he said as a witness.
If it appeared that
he deliberately disobeyed a public law of the State, this fact might,
in the opinion of the jury, throw some light upon the question as to
whether or not he had disregarded any other duty devolving upon
him. We do not say it ought to do so, but it is a matter for them.
If, on account of the exigencies of commerce and travel, the law as
to crossings is generally and notoriously disobeyed by all railroad companies, the fact that no attention was paid to it in a given instance
would be of less importance, as a basis of reasoning, than would be
the case with respect to some other law, which is almost universally
obeyed. Again, to run a train without checking over a public crossing but little used would tend in a far less degree to show that the
engineer was a reckless man than would the running of a train at a
high rate of speed over a crossing in a populous district, or in a city,
where crowds of people were constantly in the habit of using the
crossing. If a railroad company had a rule requiring its engineers
to run over bridges at a low rate of speed, and it appeared that an
engineer had violated this rule by running over a given bridge at a
dangerous rate, this fact might have some bearing upon the question
whether or not he was reckless or negligent in the infliction of an injury immediately thereafter upon a person or property upon the track.
This would be so, although the act of negligence mentioned was merely
the breach of a duty which such engineer owed to his employer, and not
a violation of a duty which the company owed to the
person injured,
or a matter as to which the latter had any right to complain.
The
instances above given are not exhaustive, and are intended to be merely
suggestive. We leave the law, as announced, to operate as the general
rule, and will trust to the trial courts and juries to make the proper
application of it in each particular case.”
132. Persons injured on track beyond crossing, and failure to observe

statute.

In Reynolds, 99/638, a child nineteen months old was injured at
place which was two hundred yards beyond a public crossing. It
was held that if the engineer fails to comply with the statutory requirements, and a stranger is discovered on the track, not at a public crossing, the company, through its agents, must use all ordinary precaua
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tion to

prevent an injury to the stranger, and if, after using all ordito prevent it, it does occur, the company will not

nary precaution
be liable.

Clary, 103/639, it was said by Simmons, C. J.: “Relatively to
thing on a railroad-track, one hundred and thirty-five
yards beyond the crossing, it is not negligence per se for the servant
of the railroad company to fail to check the train and blow the whistle
before arriving at the crossing. Gravitt, supra; Golden, supra. A
In

a

person or

failure to check the train and to blow the whistle is admissible in evi-

dence, and may be considered by the jury, as was held in both of the
cases just cited.
When, therefore, the trial judge instructed the jury
that if the servants of the company failed to check
a lack of diligence, such charge was equivalent to

and blow, it

was

instructing them
that such failure on the part of the servants of the company would
be negligence. In this State, negligence is a question for the jury
only; and the judge can not, except in certain cases, tell the jury that
such and such acts constitute negligence.
If, in the present case, the
horse had been killed upon the crossing, the trial judge could have
instructed the jury that the failure to blow the whistle and check the
train was negligence per se; for the statute requires that these things
be done in approaching a crossing, and a failure to do so is made a
penal offense. But where the horse was killed one hundred and
thirty-five yards beyond the crossing, relatively to it or its owner it
was not negligence per se to fail to blow and check.”
Cited, 107/75.
133. The failure must be the proximate cause of the injury.
Where a mule attached to a wagon being driven along a public road
in the direction of a railroad-crossing, ran away, reached the crossing,
and, finding it obstructed by a passing train, swerved aside and ran
parallel with the railroad for one hundred and fifty yards, and, getting ahead of the train, attempted to cross in front of it at a private
crossing, and the driver was killed by the train colliding with the
wagon, there was no cause of action for the homicide, notwithstanding
the servants of the company violated the statute in
running too fast
upon, and in approaching, the public crossing, and in not blowing
the whistle, as required by the statute, this violation not
being the
proximate cause of the injury, it appearing by the evidence that those
in charge of the train did all
they could to stop after they discovered the mule was in the act of
running away. Williams, 93/253.
Cited, 110/329.
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Where the plaintiffs horse took fright while being driven along the
public road running parallel with the railroad, and the cause of the
fright being the headlight of the engine, and not the speed of the
train, the failure of the engineer to comply with the statute by blowing the whistle and checking the train while approaching a public
crossing one hundred and twenty-five yards beyond where the injury
took place will not render the company liable for the consequences
resulting to the horse and buggy under fright thus occasioned. Douglass, 88/282.
Nor would the failure to cheek the speed of a train and to blow
the whistle, in approaching a crossing, render the company liable for
damages in consequence of the killing of a colt, when the colt was
not on the railroad-track at the time of such failure, but subsequently
attempted to cross the track at a point three hundred yards below the
crossing, and in so doing ran against the engine, and was thus killed
by its own act. Burke, 93/319. Cited, 110/329.
In Ivy, 88/71, the train was running too fast and the bell was not
rung in approaching the crossing, the injury did not occur at the
crossing, but some distance from it, and did not result directly from
the company’s negligence, but from the sudden and unnecessary conduct of the plaintiff himself in stepping upon the track immediately
in front of the train and

so

near

to the locomotive that it

was

im-

possible to avoid striking him after he thus put himself in a position
of danger. Cited, 93/397; 101/221; 110/329.
A failure to give precautionary signals, when in no manner causing or contributing to the injury, does not impose a liability upon the
company. If the traveler knew by other means of the coming train,
the omitted warnings can not be the cause of the collision. Brinson,
70/209.
,
In Neidlinger, 110/329, it was held that “A railroad company is not
liable for an injury simply because, at the time it was occasioned, the
train causing the same was being operated in a manner forbidden by
law. To make the company liable, the failure to properly conduct the
train must have operated as a cause of the injury. Main,
64/649. Accordingly, when, in the trial of an action to recover damages for killing a
cow, proof is made that the train
was
passing through a town at a speed of twenty miles an
hour or more, and that such speed was not checked in approaching a crossing, and it did not appear that there was any ordinance or
by-law of the town regulating the speed of passing railroad-
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trains, the presumption of negligence which

arose by showing that a
by the locomotive was rebutted when it was
conclusively shown that the injury did not occur on a crossing or public
road, but at a point some forty or fifty yards beyond the same, and that
the animal suddenly came on the track at a point so nearly in front
of the locomotive that, notwithstanding all possible efforts, the
progress of the train could not be arrested before the animal was
struck.
The failure to check the speed not being the cause of the
injury, did not render the company liable. See 14.
134. No recovery if by ordinary care injured person could have
avoided the injury.
Where the husband of the plaintiff, at the time he was killed, was
lying upon the track where the public road crossed it, she could not
recover, as her husband could, by ordinary care, have avoided the consequence to himself caused by the defendant’s negligence, assuming
that defendant was negligent in not blowing the whistle and checking
the train as Required by law. Johnson, 60/667. Cited, 71/440;
73/139; 74/613.
To go to sleep on a public crossing is such negligence and recklessness as will prevent a recovery, even though the railroad
company may
be negligent. Raden, 78/47.
Cited, 103/388.
135. Ordinary care after knowledge of engineer’s failure to observe
cow was

'

struck and killed

the statute.

Though a traveler upon a public highway in approaching a railroadcrossing may not observe that amount of care and diligence which
would be exercised under like circumstances by an ordinarily prudent
person, he is not necessarily precluded from recovering for injuries to
his person or property received on the crossing, if, after it is apparent
that the engineer of the company is disobeying the provisions of §3333
of the Civil Code, he then exercises ordinary care and diligence in endeavoring to escape the consequences of the company’s negligence.
Fish, J., said: “It,will therefore be seen that if the requirements of
this section are strictly observed, a collision at a public-road crossing
can seldom, if ever, occur; and it follows that the
danger of driving
a vehicle
upon and over such a crossing without first observing the ancient rule that a traveler, before so doing, must ‘stop, look and listen/
is not one so patent as to warrant the conclusion that it is negligence
per se to endeavor to cross without taking such precautions. At any
rate, our General Assembly has seen fit to prescribe that the traveler
shall be given ample warning of the approach of a train by a continu-
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blowing of the whistle of the locomotive from the time it reaches
‘blow-post’ until it arrives at the crossing; and, in the event the
company fails to discharge its duty in this respect, it does not lie in its
mouth to say that the traveler has voluntarily, and through,his own
negligence alone, placed himself in a situation of peril by driving on
the crossing,without taking steps to ascertain whether or not a train
was
approaching. The circumstances under which he did so may perhaps have been such as to negative the assumption that a person of
ordinary prudence would have done likewise;,still his exposure to
danger would be traceable, not alone to his own heedlessness, but to
the culpable omission on the part of the company’s servants to give, him
in time the warning to which he was entitled under our statute.
If
the. company’s negligence ends here, and,the traveler sustains injury
by reason of being thrown from his vehicle because unable to control
his horse, doubtless the company might reply to any claim upon it
for damages that he himself was not without fault, and might
by the exercise of ordinary care, ‘have avoided the consequences
to himself caused by’ his negligence.
See Civil Code, §3830,
above quoted.
But this defense could not be urged if the company, after omitting to warn the traveler of the impending danger,
follows,up his negligence in this regard by a total failure to observe
the additional! duty imposed upon it*by statute of having its train under
perfect control, and itself inflicts the, injuries by negligently running
otis

the

him down with its locomotive.
efficient

cause

of the injury

This would be the immediate and

inflicted

upon

him; and if,

as soon as

his

apparent, he used all diligence to avert the catastrophe, it
could not be said that by ordinary care he might have escaped the consequences to himself of this particular and most aggressive act of negligence on the part of the company. Therefore, he would not be entirely precluded from recovering damages, although, being chargeable
with contributory negligence, because acting in concert with the company in bringing about the situation of peril to.himself, he could not

peril

was

good conscience, or (as is more to the point) under §2322 of the
Civil Code, recover damages undiminished in proportion to the amount
of default attributable to him.” Barfield, 102/485. Cited, 112/866.
in

See 29.
136. Onus is

the,company.
by a railroad company, in running its trains,
presumption of negligence is attached by law to the company, and
onus is on it to show all ordinary and reasonable care by its

When
the
the

one

on

is killed
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agents, or that deceased’s own negligence was the cause
death, or that by ordinary care he could have avoided the

officers and
of the

consequences of the negligence of the company.
Where a homicide occurred from the running

of a train at a public
city, and where another railroad-track ran along beside the one on which the killing occurred, if it appeared that the blowposts were not erected, the whistle was not blown, and the train was not
checked, as required by law, the exercise of all ordinary and reasonable care was not shown, so as to rebut the presumption.
Hoover,
74/426. Cited, 82/806.
In Gassett, 100/85, it appeared that the plaintiff's cattle were killed
by the defendant's train, which made a prima facie case in plaintiffs
favor.
It was shown ,by defendant that the killing took place at- or
near a crossing, when the train was
running at such a rate that it could
not be stopped upon the crossing.
The evidence was not sufficient to
overcome the .legal
presumption of negligence against the company.
crossing,

It

was

near a

sufficient to warrant the inference that the accident occurred

upon a crossing, and that being so, it was incumbent on
in order to show that it exercised the degree of diligence

the company,
required of it
one to which the

by law, to prove affirmatively that the crossing was
provision of this section did not apply.
In Newton, 85/517, it appeared that the husband of the
plaintiff
was killed at a public crossing in the
city of LaGrange. It was held
that the defendant was negligent in running its passenger-train at a
high rate of speed within the city of LaGrange and over public crossings, and in not checking its speed so as to stop in time should any
person or thing be crossing the track.
The company may defend by
showing that the injury was done with the consent of the deceased,
or that he could have avoided it by the exercise of
ordinary care, or
(in mitigation of damages) that he contributed to it. Cited, 87/408;
89/566; 92/192; 109/370. Those are the only defenses that the
company could make under such circumstances. Tribble, 112/866.
137. Reciprocal duties and rights of the public and the company.
In Blake, 101/217, the injury occurred at a crossing of the railroadtrack and a public street, and Little, J., in speaking of the reciprocal
rights and duties of the public and the company, said: “There is no
question of the perfect right of the plaintiff to use the street-crossing
for, passing over the railroad-tracks there situate at his will and pleasure.
There is, on the other hand, no question of the right of the railroad company to cause its trains of cars to pass on its tracks over such
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crossing, whenever it may be necessary for it to do so. In the exercise
of these reciprocal rights, the law imposes a duty on the person crossing to use care and caution to prevent injury to himself, and upon
the railroad company to use care and caution to prevent the infliction
of any injury upon persons who may be passing over such crossing.
Neither has the absolute right to the crossing to the exclusion of the
other; and,,when an injury occurs, and we have no reason to doubt
they will occur, as they have in the past, to ascertain which of the parties has violated the duties imposed becomes the underlying question
in the case, and, when the fault is found, the liability is determined.”
Same case, 108/764.
In Gibson, 97/489, Simmons, C. J., said: “It appears from the
record that the railroad company’s track extended longitudinally
through Bay street, one of the principal thoroughfares of the city of
Brunswick, and that the trains of the company ran from one end of
the street to the other.

The locomotive and train which

ran

over

and killed the

plaintiff’s son were at the upper end of the street,
standing still, and blocked a crossing which was in general use by
the people in that locality. In order for the train to run down the
street, the locomotive had to

backwards, with the tender in front.
a short distance beyond the
crossing, and while he was crossing the track the train suddenly
started, and ran over him. The declaration alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to have a flagman or some other person
The deceased started

at the

across

run

the street

of the locomotive while it

was being run backwards, so as
who were crossing or attempting to cross the track
as
approaching. The court, in its charge to the jury,
submitted to them whether, under all the circumstances disclosed by
the evidence, the failure to do this was negligence. The defendant,
in its motion for a new trial, alleged that this was error, because
there was no statutory requirement or ordinance requiring the company to make any provision of this kind for warning persons crossing the track. As before remarked, the track at this point ran
through a leading thoroughfare of the city; a large number of peopie doubtless crossed it every hour, and whether there was a statute or
ordinance requiring it or not, we think the jury would have a right
under the circumstances to say that the railroad company ought to
have had some person stationed at the end of the train at that point
to give warning.
It was contended on the part of the railroad conipany that the crossing blocked by the train on that occasion was a

to

rear

warn

persons
the train was
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private crossing.

If the street

was a

public one, we do not see how

private crossing upon it. Nor do we agree with
counsel for the railroad company in his contention with regard to the
right of the public to cross the street elsewhere than at certain points.
It is true that in most cities streets are usually crossed at certain
points, generally at the intersection of other streets, but there is no
law which requires people to cross only at such places.
If the
street is a public one, people have a right to cross it at any
place along its line, and the law will protect them from being run
over, either by ordinary vehicles or railroad-trains.
The only difference in the duty of a railroad company towards persons crossing at the usual places of crossing and towards those crossing at
other places in the street is in the greater degree of care required
in the one case than in the other.
On the other hand, there is
a corresponding duty on the part of persons who cross the street
elsewhere than at the usual crossings to exercise a greater degree of
care for their own protection than would be
required of them at such
crossings. And of course no person would have a right to cross the
track in front of a moving train when it would be dangerous to do
so.” And it was held that, it appearing that the deceased was killed
by a locomotive moving backwards upon a railroad-track running
longitudinally through a public street in a city, and the declaration expressly alleging that the defendant company was negligent in failing
“to have a flagman or some other person standing on the rear end of
said locomotive while it was being run backwards as
aforesaid,” there
was no error in
submitting to the jury for their determination the
question whether or not such failure was an act of negligence.
Cited, 102/487.
138. Diligence at a mucli-uscd crossing not in a city and not a
public road..
In Cromer, 106/296, it was held that where a railroad-crossing is
in a populous locality, and is much used by the public, but the same
is not within the limits of an incorporated city or town, and is not a
part of a public road established pursuant to law, what rate of speed
in approaching and running over such crossing would be
negligence,
and what signals ordinary care would require to be given, are matters
to be determined by a jury.
Cobb, J., said: “ ‘Where the crossing is
one to which the
statutory requirements are applicable, a person
about to cross has a right to expect that the railroad company, in the
running of its trains, will comply with these requirements; and rethere could be

a
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liance upon

the discharge of its duty in the premises may, in some
degree, excuse a want of full diligence on his part in looking out for
the approach of a train. Where, however, the statute is not applieable, a person about to cross must assume a greater burden of care
than he would be required to assume if the crossing were one to which
the statute applied/ In the case of Thomas v. Railroad Co., 19
Blatchf. 533, 8 Fed. 729, Wallace, J., says: ‘Railroad corporations
may ordinarily maintain such rate of speed with their trains as they
see fit.
They may even permit their officers to enjoy the luxury of
special trains and dash over their roads with a single car, almost
noiselessly, and at lightning speed. They may use their side-tracks
near the intersection of highways or private roads for the storing of
empty cars. While these things may not be agreeable to the general
public, they are, nevertheless, within the privileges with which railroad corporations have been invested; and the public has no right to
complain, because they are legitimately within these privileges. But,
when these privileges come in collision with the rights of those who
use the highways or private roads to cross the railroad, they must give
way, because, as to these persons, the railroad corporation is under
the obligation of exercising reasonable care to prevent injury. What
is reasonable care, or,

conversely, what omission of precaution is negby general propositions; the application
the circumstances of the particular case/
Applying these principles to the case under consideration, it was for
the jury to determine whether, under all the circumstances, it was
the duty of the railroad company to have given a signal of the train
approaching this crossing, and to have slackened the speed of the
same, and, if in this respect there was a failure of duty on the defendant’s part, then whether the deceased by the exercise of ordinary
care could have avoided the
consequences of its negligence#in not giving the signal and reducing the speed of the train.”
ligence,

can only be defined
of which must depend upon
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of passengers. A carrier of passengers is bound also
extraordinary diligence on behalf of himself and’ his agents to proteet the lives and persons of his passengers. But he is not liable
for injuries to the person, after having used such diligence.
Civil
Code, §2266.
140. Greatest possible degree of care not required.
In Lucas, 110/121, it was held to be error to charge as follows:
“As a carrier of passengers, the railroad company, its officers and
servants, are bound to exercise more than all ordinary and reasonable
care and diligence; that is to
say, a company will be liable to passengers for injuries to them unless extraordinary care and diligence
be used, and slight neglect on the part of the agents and servants
to

CHAPTER 10.

205]

[§141

Passengers.

of the company will be sufficient evidence to fix its
law is laid in wisdom, as human life is at great risk,

liability. The
especially when
the public carriers employ steam for rapid transit; and too much
diligence can not be required at their hands. For slight neglect
they are, and ought to be, responsible; and, outside of the provisions
of

statute

law, such, it is believed, is the rule everywhere in
Lewis, J., said: “We do not see how the degree of diligence could have been more strongly expressed than by
the language used in this charge. It certainly puts upon the carrier
the very utmost diligence that it could possibly exercise. The law
does not thus define the term ‘extraordinary diligence/ nor has this
court ever decided that these words just quoted mean the greatest
our own

the civilized world.”

possible degree of

that could be exercised.”
and diligence required. The “extraordinary” diligence due by railroad companies to passengers is “that
extreme care and caution which very prudent and thoughtful persons” exercise under like circumstances; and it was error to charge,
without qualification, that such companies “are required by law to
observe the utmost care and diligence” for the safe carriage of passengers, and for their delivery at destination.
Even if the word “utmost” is synonymous with the word “extreme,” the omission from
this charge of any reference to the standard of diligence observed by
“very prudent and thoughtful persons” rendered it too strong a statement of the law against the company.
Miller, 95/738. Cited,
99/245; 110/123.
141. A perilous mode of charging the rule.
In Abbott, 74/851, it was ruled that the giving of section 2321 in
charge to the jury in a case where the injury occurred while the person injured, having alighted from the train on which he was a
passenger, was making his way to the baggage-car after his trunk, was
care
Xor is the utmost

not

error.

care

In immediate connection the doctrine of

extraordinary

given. Cited, 107/137.
It may be remarked that the charge in Abbott’s case is not a safe
one to follow.
As reported, it is calculated to create confusion in the
minds of a jury as to the degree of diligence required in reference to
passengers. As “ordinary and reasonable care and diligence” have
nothing to do with it, why should that degree of care be mentioned
at all?
In Sanders, 107/132, the charge left no doubt as to that
matter, and it was held that in an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in alighting from a moving
diligence

was
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it was not error in the presiding judge to read to the jury section
2321 of the Civil Code, when in immediate connection therewith, the
ear,

judge instructs the jury that the duty of carriers to passengers is that
of extraordinary diligence, and that the burden is on the carrier to
show such diligence, when the injury has been made to appear.
142. The rule stated.
A railroad company, as a

carrier of passengers, is liable to passenfor injuries to them unless extraordinary care and diligence__is
used, and slight neglect on the part of the agents and servants of the
company will be sufficient evidence to fix its liability.
Crawford’,
62/566; 76/782.
Extraordinary diligence- is the measure of care which must be exercised toward passengers. Homer, 73/251.
143. To what the rule of' extraordinary diligence applies.
In duties towards a passenger directly involving his safety, the
company is bound to extraordinary diligence, and in those touching
his convenience or accommodation, to ordinary diligence. The rule
of extraordinary diligence applies to the receiving, keeping, carrying,
and discharging passengers. It does not apply to precautions adopted
to prevent them from being left if they are unnecessarily late in taking their places after full and fair opportunity of doing so has been
afforded. Perry, 58/461.
Cited, 79/489.
The rule of extraordinary diligence should govern the conduct of
the railroad company throughout the existence of the relation it sustains to one of its passengers. It applies to its conduct in receiving,
transporting, and discharging passengers. Moore, 108/84.
In Stevens, 80/19, the plaintiff alleged that he purchased from
the defendant’s agent at the ticket-office at Marshallville a ticket entitling him to passage over the defendant’s road, and that, while
walking in the dark across the grounds of the defendant on his way
to meet the train at the usual point of embarking and to take passage
thereon, he unexpectedly came to an abrupt step or break in the ground
which caused him to stumble, and in attempting to recover himself
he stumbled upon and fell over a bank of sand, thereby sustaining injuries to his wrist and spine, and other serious personal hurt. He
alleged that these injuries were caused without fault or negligence on
his part, but were due to the negligence of the defendant in failing
to keep its grounds in safe condition and properly lighted at night for
the protection of passengers.
The court charged the jury: “ A railroad company is bound to extraordinary diligence on behalf of itself
gers

207]

CHAPTER 10.

[ §§ 144, 145

Passengers.

and its

agents to protect the lives and persons of its passengers, but
injuries of passengers after having used such diligenee.
Diligence is of two kinds — ordinary diligence, which is that
care which every prudent man takes of his own property of a similar
nature (absence of such diligence is termed ordinary neglect), and
extraordinary diligence, which is that extreme care and caution which
every prudent and thoughtful person uses in securing and preserving
his property (absence of such diligence is termed slight neglect).
it is not liable to

You

perceive the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary diliWhen a person has purchased his ticket and arrived at the
point of departure, though he has not entered the cars, he is a passenger; and while waiting for the train to set out he is, as to all the duties of the company directly involving his safety, entitled to extraordinary diligence; as to all duties involving merely his convenience
and accommodation, to ordinary diligence. The company is charged,
under the state of facts Just supposed, with extraordinary diligence
so far as it involves the safety of the passenger; so far as it merely
involves the convenience and accommodation of the passenger, it is
only bound to ordinary diligence. That is the distinction to be borne
in mind. If a railroad company has used all proper diligence in
providing a suitable place for passengers to enter the cars, and has
given full and fair opportunity to enter the cars at that place, a passenger who has declined to enter until the last moment is entitled
only to usual and ordinary diligence in keeping him from being left.
The rule of extraordinary diligence applies only to receiving, keeping,
carrying, and discharging of passengers, and to their safety.” This
charge was held to he fair and impartial.
144. The manner of its exercise depends upon the circumstances of
gence.

the

case.

A

railway company in coupling a freight-train to a passenger-car
having passengers already in it, to be carried by the train, is bound
to exercise extraordinary diligence — that is, such diligence as very
prudent persons would use with a like train under like circumstances;
and the court may instruct the jury that the rarity of an injury will
furnish no excuse to the company for omitting that degree of diligence in the particular instance. Huggins, 89/494.
Cited, 91/784;
108/89.
145. Mixed trains.
In Moore, 108/84, it was ruled that when a railroad company furnishes as the only means of transportation over its road a “mixed
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train,” composed of
and when
train it

on

can

a passenger-coach and a number of freight-cars,
account of the character and construction of such a

not start from

a

station, after stopping thereat, without

its movement

being attended with a jerk which may endanger the
safety of those on board who are unseated, it becomes the duty of
the company to use extraordinary diligence in protecting against such
danger a passenger who has boarded the train, by stopping a sufficient
length of time to give such passenger a reasonable opportunity to be
seated. The company is, therefore, liable to the passenger for any
injury he may sustain in consequence of its negligence in this particular.
It is, on the other hand, the duty of the passenger in such a
ease to exercise ordinary care in obtaining a seat on the coach; and if
the jolting of the train when starting was unavoidable, after it had
stopped a reasonable length of time to allow a passenger to be seated,
an
injury resulting in consequence of unnecessary delay of the passenger in obtaining a seat will be attributable to his fault, and the
railroad company will not be liable therefor. Where a lady passenger is accompanied by a little girl and encumbered with hand-baggage
and parcels which she can not unaided place promptly and safely upon
the train, and consequently has to procure the aid of another in carrying her baggage aboard, such other person has a right on the train
for such purpose, especially when the agent of the company in charge
of the train sees the situation of such passenger, offers no assistance,
himself, and does not object to such assistant of the lady going upon
the train. In such a case the fact that the sudden jolting or jerking of the train on starting throws the man accompanying the lady,
with a valise, against her and causes him to thus knock her upon the
seat whereby she is injured, without fault on the part of either, does
not relieve the company from liability.
146. Passengers on freight-trains.
In Crine, 84/651, the court charged the jury substantially as follows: A man who voluntarily takes passage upon a train which is
not a passenger-train, but only an ordinary freight-train, is only entitled to look for such security as that mode of conveyance is reasonably expected to render. In that case, if he receives an injury
while he is seated inside of the cab, and such

injury is caused bv a
jar such as is usual and necessary in coupling the cars of a
freight-train, he can not recover. When a passenger-train is provided,
for the transportation of passengers on .a railway, and one voluntarily takes passage on a freight-train, rather than wait for the passenjolt

or a
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ger-train,

a railway company
received from a jolt or jar in

would not be liable to him for injuries
the coupling of their ears, if it was such
as was usual and
necessary; the burden being upon the railroad to
establish the necessity of the same. If, notwithstanding the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of the railway company,
such injury resulted, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover.
But, unless such diligence was established on their part, if the plaintiff received injuries in consequence of the negligent acts of the defendant described in the declaration, he would be entitled to-recover.
And, further, that the jury were authorized to inquire whether it was
such an injury as might reasonably be expected to occur under the
circumstances; and, if they found that such injury was reasonably
to be expected, then it was the duty of the company to carefully
guard against a jolt in coupling the cars which would produce such
an
injury. But if, on the contrary, it was an injury of a character
never before known to occur, and therefore not an
injury which might
reasonably have been expected, under the circumstances; and if, in
coupling and uncoupling, the machinery was handled as machinery
of like character would be handled by a prudent and thoughtful person irf the exercise of extreme care and caution, and the jolt was no
greater than the jolt usual under such circumstances — then, even if
the plaintiff was injured thereby, the jury would be authorized to
find for the defendant.

Blandford, J., said: “We think, under the
fair charge, and presented the law

facts in this case, that this was a

correctly.

error took passage upon a freight-train
few hours for the regular passenger-train. He was

The plaintiff in

rather than wait

entitled to

no

a

accommodations other than those which

are

usually

freight-train; and it must be presumed that he intended
to risk any jolts and jars that might occur on such a train which
were not caused by the negligence of the agents of the railroad company, but were usual and consequent upon such mode of traveling."
provided

on a

Cited, 91/781.
The

of

Smith, 76/209, 80/526, was twice before the Supreme
plaintiff alleged that the defendant agreed to carry him
safely to the city of Savannah on a freight-train; that upon arriving
at his destination, the train was stopped, so that the caT upon which
he was riding was carelessly and negligently placed in close proximity
to a dangerous and exposed pitfall or retaining wall, in the dark and
without a light; that this wall was twenty feet high from the ground,
and without any railing thereon to serve as a guide or protection;
Court.

14

case

The
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that

no

the wall

was furnished and no notice given of the existence of
his proximity thereto; and that in attempting to make

light
or

his way from the ear to the passenger-depot
the wall, and was greatly injured.
A

of the defendant, he fell
verdict was rendered for
$10,000. It was set aside as being excessive, and a new trial granted
upon the question as to contributory negligence.
But Hall, J., said:
“A party who makes an arrangement to be carried on a freight-car
impliedly agrees to accept and be satisfied with such accommodations,
as
regards carriages and seats, and places of entering and leaving the
carriages, as may be found in the usual course of the business. If the
cars, at the time of agreeing to his passage and taking his seat, are
at a freight-depot, he should be satisfied with such means of entering
them as are provided for the loading of freight. If the ears are, at
the time, standing on a part of the track where there is no provision
for landing or receiving either goods or passengers, he should be satisfied with such means and facilities as may casually be within his
reach. The company is not bound in either case to make landings
or any provision whatever for the reception or discharge of
passengers where none are expected to be.”
On the second trial, the court
was requested to give the last sentence in the above extract in charge
to the jury.
And it was held that, as the complaint was, not that the
plaintiff did not have proper facilities for getting on and off the car,
but that the car was stopped near a precipice without a light, and
without notice to the plaintiff of its dangerous proximity, it was not
error to modify the request.
And it was further held that railroad
companies are not bound to take passengers on their freight-trains,
but when they do and receive their money, they must not set them
down in dangerous places on dark nights, without light and without
notice of the danger. And that when the defendant brought the
plaintiff to the place where he was going, all it was bound to do then
was to see that he was offered reasonable
immunity from danger and
reasonable protection in getting away from the point where he had
over

been landed.
In

Mabry, 91/781, it

was held that
carrier to a passenger

the degree of diligence due
is extraordinary, no matter
what means of conveyance may be employed; but what is extraordinary diligence by a freight-train is different, in many respects, from
that which is such diligence by a passenger-train.
Simmons, J.,
said: “The standard of diligence is the same, but the manner of its
exercise must depend upon the circumstances of the case, taking
from 'a

common

211]

CHAPTER 10.

[§147

Passengers.

into consideration the character of the

train, and the

manner

in which

it is

usually made up and run, and in which the cars are usually
coupled to one another. It is well known that jolts and jars are
usual and necessary in the running of a freight-train, much more so
than in the running of passenger-trains; and a passenger who voluntarily takes passage on a freight-train takes the risk of the usual and
necessary jolts and jars which happen in the making up and running
of such trains. A jolt or jar which would be unusual and unnecessary in a passenger-train might be usual and necessary in a freighttrain.
But, where a common carrier takes a passenger on a freighttrain, he must use extraordinary care in preventing unusual and unnecessary jolts and jars, so as to protect the passenger, just as he is
required to do to prevent any jolts or jars on a passenger-train which
would be likely to injure the passenger.” Cited, 110/681.
147. The duty of extraordinary diligence can not he waived or released.
In

Lippman, 110/665, it was held that the liability of a common
goods is that of an insurer, and in cases of loss no excuse
avails such carrier, unless occasioned by the get of God or the public
enemies of the State. He may not limit his legal liability by a notice
to the shipper, but he may, with certain restrictions, make an express
contract, and both parties entering into it will be bound by its terms.
The liability of a carrier of passengers is not that of an insurer, but
such carrier is bound by law to extraordinary diligence to protect
the lives and persons of his passengers.
This duty he can not waive
or release, even
by an express contract. Being one in which the publie has an interest, public policy forbids such a waiver or release.
A carrier who received a passenger on one of its freight-trains is
bound by the same standard of diligence as if the passenger were being transported on a regular passenger-train. What will amount to
extraordinary diligence varies with the character of the train. A
passenger who voluntarily seeks to be transported on a freight-train
takes the risk of the usual and necessary jolts and jars which occur in
the operation of such train, but the carrier is not relieved from the
use of extraordinary diligence to the passenger to prevent unusual
and unnecessary jolts and jars.
An express contract entered into by
the carrier and the passenger, under the terms of which the carrier
is released from all liability to the passenger for personal injuries
received while a passenger on such freight-train, is in effect a contract
by which the carrier undertakes to relieve itself from the consequences
carrier of
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of the

negligence of itself and servants, and

can

not be enforced.

Cited, 110/681; 111/842.
Under general law, a carrier of passengers can not limit his legal
liability for the consequences of his own negligence, even by express
contract.
Watson, 110/681. Cited, 111/842.
148. Negligence presumed when injury is shown.
After charging that a railroad, as a common carrier, was bound to
use extraordinary diligence to transport passengers safely, and to
protect them from injury, there was no error in adding that, where a
casualty occurred, it would authorize an inference that it-was occasioned by defendant’s negligence, and from it the jury might presume negligence.
Hall, J., says: “It is true that section 2266 does
not in terms declare, as does section 2321, that in all cases of injury
the presumption is against the railroad company, but it does contain
what is equivalent in these words: ‘But he is not liable for injuries
to the person after having used such diligence.’
Whether this is a
correct view is quite immaterial, since the common law, which imposed the same rule of diligence, asserts in unequivocal language,
that when an injury is shown the plaintiff proves a prima facie case
of negligence against the party having the railroad and train under
his exclusive management.” Freeman, 75/331.
It was not incumbent upon the plaintiff, where the injury complained of was caused by the running of the defendant’s cars, to prove
the alleged negligence of the defendant by a preponderance of the
evidence. Upon showing that he was injured in this manner, the
legal presumption arose that the injury was due to the company’s
negligence; and in such case the law embraced in section 2321 of
the Code ought to have been given in charge as a part of the general
law of the case,

without any request to that effect.

Killian, 97/727.

Cited, 108/89.
149. What must appear to rebut the
In

Sanders, 73/513,

that the verdict

was

presumption.

one ground of the motion for a new trial
not supported by the evidence, and, in

was

passing
on that, in the opinion,
language was used from which the reporter
made the following headnote:
“Where one is injured by the running of a car and engine of a railroad company, the law presumes
that such injury was the result of negligence on the part of the company, and to relieve itself of such presumption, it must show that it
used all ordinary care and diligence to prevent the injury. It is not
enough for them to insist that they do not know how the ac-

CHAPTER 10.

218]

[ § 149

Passengers.

cident

occurred, and that it is impossible for them to find out. It
appeared in this case that the company did not have a suitable
track; that the outside of the curve where the accident occurred was
lower than the inside; and that the train was behind time and was
running rapidly to catch up, when the train left the track, causing
the injury sued for. A verdict for the plaintiff was, therefore, not
without evidence of negligence to support it.” The question as to
what constituted ordinary and reasonable care and diligence as to
passengers was not made in the case.
Cited, 76/316. Afterwards,
in Miller, 95/738, two judges presiding, that question was made.
The trial judge charged the jury that, in case of a passenger, “all
ordinary and reasonable care” meant “extraordinary care.” The
charge was excepted to and it was held that as railroad companies are
bound to exercise extraordinary care and diligence for the safety of

of negligence which the law raises in
of injury will not be rebutted by the
company’s showing the exercise of only ordinary care and diligence.
Lumpkin, J., said: “It has been frequently held by this court that a
passenger injured by a railroad company was entitled to the benefit
of the presumption of negligence raised by section 2266; and, after
considerable deliberation, we have reached the conclusion that, in arriving at what the company should do in such cases to rebut this presumption, section 2321 should be read and construed in pari materia
passengers, the presumption
favor of a passenger in case

with the section first above cited.

It will be observed that it is in-

cumbent upon the company to make it appear, not only that its agents
have exercised all ordinary care and diligence, but also all reasonable care and diligence. The question therefore arises, what is ‘reasonable’

care

with reference to the

safety of

passengers ?

The obvious

is, 'extraordinary’ care; for this is the plain and unequivocal
meaning of section 2266 of the Code, which applies to all carriers of
passengers, and uses the emphatic language that they are bound to
extraordinary diligence to protect the lives and persons of passen- *
gers.
When, therefore, a passenger is injured, and the legal presumption arises in his favor, the company fails entirely to rebut that
answer

presumption, unless it shows that it used extraordinary diligence —
this, and nothing short of it, being, in such a case, the ‘reasonable’
diligence required by law.”
In Abbott, 74/851, Lumpkin, J., says: “Whenever the simple
fact appears that one has been injured by the running of the locomotive, or cars, or other machinery of a railroad company, the pre-
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sumption immediately arises that the company’s servants were negligent, and the company must make the contrary appear. This may
be done, however, by any testimony in the case, no matter by which
side introduced.
The presumption against the company may be rehutted by any facts stated by the plaintiff himself, or his witnesses,
which in any way show that the servants of the company showed
proper diligence or were not in fault, and if such is made to appear
by the plaintiff’s testimony, it is a sufficient compliance by the company with the demand of the law.
In many cases, very slight evidenee should remove the presumption against the company, but unless this is done by some testimony that presumption must stand, for
so the law is plainly written.”
In Murphy, 89/832, it appeared that the plaintiff, who was a passenger, went into the first-class ear, and took a stand in the aisle near
the water-closet, braced his left hand on the door of the closet, and
caught hold of the arm of the seat on the opposite side with his right
hand, to steady himself, and prevent the motion of the cars from
throwing him down. He gave the conductor his ticket. He did not
__

ask the conductor for
same

a

seat, but Baker, who boarded the train at the
conductor for seats for both of

station with him, asked the

them

(they were standing together), and the conductor said he would
try to get them seats. The plaintiff saw nothing more of him. After traveling about seven miles to the next station, the train stopped
and plaintiff went into the next coach to get a seat, and, finding none
vacant, at once returned into the first-class coach, and resumed his
stand as before. The train again moved, and after going about half
mile the defendant’s

flagman came through the car, approaching
plaintiff from behind, and suddenly opened the door of the closet,
and looked in. The plaintiff was standing talking to Baker.
As the
door opened, his fingers immediately slipped into the crevice next to
the hinges, and the flagman suddenly closed the door, before plaintiff
had time to remove his hand, catching his middle and third fingers
between the shutter, and crushing them.
He did not know the fingers
were in till they were crushed, it was so sudden.
There was nothing
to prevent the flagman seeing the position of plaintiff’s hand.
It was
held that under the facts disclosed by the evidence in this case, it
appears to the satisfaction of a majority of this court that the injury
received by the plaintiff resulted from a mere accident, and was not
due to any negligence on the part of the railroad company or its servants.
The presumption of negligence which the law raises against
a

the
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the company was

rebutted by the evidence introduced by the-plaintiff
himselfj and the court, therefore, did not err in granting a nonsuit.
Bleckley, C. J., dissenting.
150. Presumption rebutted.
In Green, 95/736, Atkinson, J., said: “It appears that the plaintiff was a passenger upon one of the defendant’s trains; that she had
in her possession, two or three small bundles; and that when she entered the train, finding that the receptacles fastened to the side of the
car above the seats for holding packages and bundles of passengers
were beyond her reach, she stood upon a seat, and placed her bundles
in the receptacle herself. No servant of the company saw her do
this, nor did she ask any assistance in so doing. When she reached
a point on her journey where it was necessary to change cars, she arose,
stood upon the seat, and attempted to take down the bundles; and
while in this position the cars suddenly moved, and she was thrown
from the seat on which she was standing to the floor and injured.
It appears that the train safely reached its destination, stopped at
the usual place for passengers leaving the cars, remained there long
enough for all of the passengers to alight, saving this plaintiff, and
then moved down a few steps, where it stopped again. It does not
appear that in the movement of the train there was any unusual
jerk. It does not appear that this plaintiff called the attention of
any servant of the defendant to the situation of her bundles, or requested any assistance from them in her efforts to remove them from
the place where she had deposited them.
The servants of the company were outside the car, assisting the passengers who were alighting. None of them saw her attempt to get up on the seat. In con-

of her fall she

injured, and brought this action.

We do
Railroad companies, in the transportation of passehgers, are bound to
extraordinary care. They are not bound to take the greatest possible
degree of care in the discharge of duties towards passengers, but the
extraordinary care required of them is defined by the Code to be
That extreme care and caution which very prudent and thoughtful
persons use’ in and about similar matters. It is true, the presumption of negligence arises when the fact of injury is shown, but in the
very circumstances out of which the presumption arises it may likewise be rebutted. This plaintiff was .in a perfectly safe situation.
The company had provided her with a means of transportation which
afforded every possible immunity against injury, as long as she ensequence

was

not think the facts make

a case

which authorizes

a

recovery.
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joyed it in the manner usual to passengers, and in the manner designed by the company. The seats were made for the aceommodation of passengers sitting upon them.
It was not designed that they
should be employed as footstools. The company had the right, reasonably, to expect that the passenger would not so use these contrivances, designed for his comfort and convenience, as to expose himself to danger; and, in moving its cars, it had the right to presume
that the passenger would not employ these seats, designed for his
convenience, and as well for the security of the company, in such a
way as to expose himself to hazard and the company to loss.
Its
agents could not anticipate that at the time when this passenger was
supposed either to have left the car, or to have been seated within it,
she would be standing in a dangerous position upon one of the seats
in the car. We do not think that this injury, therefore, can be attributed to any act of negligence upon the part of the company.
The evidence points out no duty imposed by law or contract, the performance of which was omitted by the agents of the company, and
it points out no act of negligence committed by them.
This occurs
to us to have been one of that class of injuries against the infliction
of which no reasonable degree of human foresight could have made
provision, and, so far, as the company w#s concerned, it may be
stated as resulting from pure accident. If not an accident, it is
saved from that classification only by reason of the negligence of the
passenger in exposing herself unnecessarily, in a hazardous position,
to dangers against which the exercise of ordinary care and prudence
upon her part would have afforded perfect immunity.” It was held
that the circumstances attending the infliction of the injuries sued
for, as detailed by the plaintiff's testimony, showing that no negligent act of the defendant's servants was the cause of these injuries,
the verdict was contrary to law.
In Gale, 56/322, a train was on schedule time, and was running
fifteen miles an hour, down-grade.
It was in the night, and in turning a short curve in the road, the train ran over a bull on the track
and was thrown off; the headlight, owing to the curve in the road, did
not enable the engineer to see the bull on the track in time to stop
the train so as to prevent the accident. As soon as the engineer
saw the bull on the track he
put on brakes and endeavored to stop
the train, but could not do so.
The proof rebutted the presumption of negligence on the part of the company, and .showed that the
accident was unavoidable.
It was .held that a railroad company is
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bound to exercise
sengers;

I

extraordinary diligence for the protection of
but this done, it is not liable for injuries sustained.

151. Who

are

One who has

the

pas-

deemed passengers.
a

railroad-ticket and is

present to take the train at
passenger, though he has not en-

ordinary point of departure is a
cars.
Perry, 58/461.
In Huggins, 89/494, it was held that a passenger who has been
carried on the line of a railway in a passenger-car which that company switches off upon the line of a connecting railway sustains the
relation of passenger to such connecting railway company during the
time the ear is stationary and he remains in it, if, according to the
usual course of business, that company is accustomed to receive presently cars so delivered to it, couple them into its trains, and carry
them over its own line. This is true whether the passenger, at the
time of being injured, has procured a ticket or paid his fare for passage over the connecting line or not.
Simmons, J., said: “On this
subject we quote the following from a leading work on carriers: cIt
is universally agreed that the payment of the fare, or price of the carriage, is not necessary to give rise to the liability. The carrier may
demand its prepayment, if he chooses to do so; but if he permits the
passenger to take his seat or enter his vehicle as a passenger, without
such requirement, the obligation to pay will stand for the actual payment, for the purpose of giving effect to the contract with all its obligations and dpties. Taking his place in the carrier’s conveyance,
with the intention of being carried, creates an implied agreement upon
the part of the passenger to pay when called upon, and puts upon
him a liability to the carrier, from which at once springs the reciprocal duty and responsibility.’ Hutch. Carr. §565. And it is held
that the relation of passenger may thus arise although the conveyance
has not started on its journey.
See 2 Shear. & R. Neg. §§488, 490;
Dewire v. Railroad Co. (Mass.) 19 isf. E. Rep. 523; 68 N. Y. 306.”
Cited, 97/484.
A person who goes to a flag-station on a railroad at which there
is no ticket-office, for the purpose of boarding a train, is, upon properly signifying an intention to get upon a passenger-train which has
actually stopped, entitled to the rights of a passenger. Yoils, 98/446.
A child nine years of age who was carried several blocks, the
driver (who was also conductor) knowing him to be on board, was a
passenger, whether he intended to -pay fare or not, and was entitled
tered the
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to the

diligence due to passengers of his age and discretion. Moore,
83/453.
In Higgins, 73/149, it appeared that the plaintiff was voluntarily
on the train when he was injured, by the invitation of the conductor,
made at his own request; he paid no fare and none was expected of
him; he selected an open flat car, on which he rode rather than in a
passenger-coach, and was in a position where he was more exposed to
accident from sparks and cinders than he would have been had he
taken

a

seat in

closed coach.

a

It

was

held that he

was

entitled to

look

only for such security as that mode of conveyance was reasonably
expected to afford; and having voluntarily incurred the injury of
which he complains, resulting from getting a cinder in his eye, he was
not entitled to recover from the railroad, even if it were somewhat
at fault.
It is doubtful if, under the circumstances, he was a passenger at all in the full legal sense of that term.
At most, he was
so only sub modo and to a limited extent.
Cited, 74/611.
152. When the relation ends.
In

Whitehead, 74/441, it was held not to be error to charge the
jury that the liability of the carrier begins at the starting-point, and
does not end until the passenger lands in safety.
In Moore, 101/684, the plaintiff was a passenger on defendant’s
train from Alapaha to Willacoochee.
The train stopped at Willa-

cooehee, according to the plaintiff, just long enough for him to leave
it.
He testified that he had just reached the ground, and taken two
steps, when the conductor shot him. He denied that he applied to
the conductor the

opprobrious epithet testified to by the conductor,
(plaintiff) had anything in his hand. The conductor testided that after making the usual stop at Willacoochee he gave the
signal for the train to go ahead, and it had gone about a car length
and a half when he heard some tine say, “You damned old whiteor

that he

headed

of

bitch.”

He leaned out, and saw a man

running
along by the side of the train, and it looked like he had something in
his right hand.
He said, “It is you I am talking to, you damned
son

white-headed

a

son

of

a

bitch,” and the conductor shot him.

He

was

running along by the side of the coach.
recognize this boy, but he could see it was
all.

Plaintiff

the train and
when the shot

The conductor could not
a white man, and that was
testified that he did not run along by the side of
curse the conductor, that the train was moving along
was

fired at him.

of carrier and passenger

is

once

It

was

held that where the relation

established, unless that relation be
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by the voluntary act of the passenger, or by the carrier
justify such a course, it continues
until the passenger is safely deposited at his point of destination,
and until he has left, or has had a reasonable time within which to
leave, the premises of the carrier; and if, during the continuance of
this relation, he suffer injury in consequence either of the negligent,
wrongful, or wanton tort of one of the carrier’s servants, the carrier
is liable.
A verdict against the company was allowed to stand.
Cited, 107/754.
In King, 107/754, Little, J., said:
“It can not be said that the
defendant owed any duty to the plaintiff as a passenger, under the
allegations which he makes. It is true that the plaintiff went into
the car of the defendant at the city of Milledgeville to be carried to
Savannah, and while at the station and on the ear of the defendant
for the purpose of being so transported the relation of carrier and
passenger existed.
But on arrival at the town of Gordon, where the
passenger had to remain several hours in order to make connection
with the train for Savannah, he was safely delivered at the station
in Gordon, and voluntarily left the premises of the railroad
company
and went to the hotel to be entertained; and it could hardly be
claimed, until he again entered the car for the purpose of being carried to Savannah, or at least came upon the premises of the defendant for the purpose of boarding the ear, that he could be considered
as a passenger.
If it were the purpose of the plaintiff to hold the
defendant company responsible for his safety as a passenger, he
terminated

under circumstances which would

should have remained at the station where he could have been looked
after

by the officers or agents of the company. By voluntarily leaving its premises, he, at least for the time being, severed the relation
of carrier and passenger which prior to that time had existed between
them. When a passenger has actually left the premises of the company, he ceases to be a passenger.
2 Am. & Eng. Ene. L. 745. Elliott in his treatise on the Law of Railroads, vol. 4, §1592, says, that
the relation of carrier and passenger does not terminate until the passenger has alighted from the train and left the place where passengers are discharged.
In note 2 of the same section a number of cases
are cited to support the proposition, that where a passenger leaves the
train and voluntarily walks along the track, the relation of carrier
and passenger ceases.
It must therefore be held, under the allegations made in the petition, that when the plaintiff in error alighted
in the town of Gordon, left the premises of the defendant company
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a hotel, the relation of the defendant as a carrier ceased
him, and that it could only be resumed when he again entered

and went to
to

as

the

station-ground for the purpose of taking the car for Savannah.”
Signals at starting and stopping.
In Perry, 58/461, it appeared that the plaintiff bought a ticket
from the defendant company at the city of Macon by which it contracted to carry him to Savannah. The train by which he purposed
going was a night freight accommodation train. The passenger153.

coaches attached to it stood under the

car-shed, the

rear

end of the

last coach
after he

being near the ticket-office. Before the train started and
had purchased his ticket, the plaintiff engaged in conversa-

tion with

The

a

friend

on

the floor of the

car-shed,

near

the ticket-office.

proper time, started out, without his observing either
the signals given for departure. He started in pursuit

train, at its

its motion
of the

or

a portion of the way on the track. When he
reached the lower end of the car-shed, arid while in the gateway lead-

train, running

ing out of it, he collided with the engine of another
into the car-shed
citement of the

over

the track of defendant.

company coming
Plaintiff in the ex-

chase, blinded by passing from a lighted car-shed
darkness, rushed upon the pilot of the incoming engine without
observing it until too late. The depot and track were used in common
by two companies, and the engine was coming in in the customary manner, and was moving at the rate of about three miles per
hour. It was held that the rule of extraordinary diligence does not
apply to precautions adopted to prevent passengers from being left,
if they are unnecessarily late in taking their places after full and fair
opportunity for doing so has been afforded. In giving signals to
tardy passengers who needlessly neglected to board the train, the
purpose is to prevent them from being left in consequence of their
own want of
promptitude. Ordinary diligence as to such signals, according to what is usual on like occasions, in like circumstances, is
required on both sides — on the side of the company in giving theirs,
and on the' side of passengers, in looking, listening, or observing.
What kind of signals will come up to such ordinary diligence, by
what means to be made, and with what degree of loudness or distinctness, are questions for the jury and not for the court. Ordinarily the place to board a train, and the sole place, is that provided
by the company for the purpose. Whether, under the circumstances,
pursuit with the intention of boarding a moving train could properly be undertaken at all, or could properly be continued until the
into
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injury was received, should be left for determination by the jury, in
the light of all the evidence. Bleckley, J., said: “Ordinarily, a
railroad company has a right to expect that passengers will get on
and off at the places provided for them, and there only. It can not
be stated as a proposition of law, that it is a duty to keep the track
clear for passengers, or that a passenger has a right to chase a flying
train.
As a general rule, on the contrary, no such right exists; and,
for the sake of the public, as well as of the company, it is better they
should not exist.” Cited, 109/795.
Should a passenger -needlessly linger about a depot or station, and
neglect to board a train, then the company as to such passenger is
only bound to ordinary diligence; and it would be the duty of such
passenger to use caution in observing signals which might be given
by the agents of the company. It is the duty of a railroad company,
through its agents, to give reasonable signals of the departure of its
trains from its stations and depots, such signals as would ordinarily
attract the attention of passengers and those interested in the movements of the ears of the company.
Perry, 66/746.
In the absence of

custom to

give signals for passengers to get off,
give any signal for such purpose,
kept it standing at the station a
sufficient time to allow passengers to alight by the exercise of ordinary
and reasonable diligence on their part. If, after the allowance of
such time, a train moves off without giving any signal, and a passenger is then in the act of alighting, none of the employees connected
with the train knowing of his delay or of his exposed position, and
he is injured in consequence of the movement of the train, the company is not liable for the consequences.
Dickerson, 89/455. Cited,
107/138.
Less care and caution is necessary by the employees of a railroad,
when stopping for wood and water only, than when stopping to
put
off or take on passengers. If a train stop at a wood and water station, and start again in an unusually short time, or with unusual
speed, or without blowing the signal-whistle at all, or sufficiently
long before starting to put persons on their guard, and an injury happens at the time to a slave passenger, any one of these facts will be
sufficient evidence of neglect or mismanagement to charge the road
for all damages received at the time by such negro, unless the defendant can show affirmatively that the injury did not result from
a

railroad company is not bound to
after having stopped its train and
a
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or neglect, but from some other cause for which
wholly without fault. Mitchell, 30/22.
reception of goods, etc. A common carrier, holding
himself out to the public as such, is bound to receive all goods and
passengers offered that he is able and accustomed to carry, upon compliance with such reasonable regulations as he may adopt for his
own safety and the benefit of the public.
Civil Code, §2278.
Railroad companies may make reasonable rules for the conduct of
their passengers, and a rule that passengers must not stand upon the
platform of the cars is such a reasonable regulation, and it is the duty
of passengers to comply with it. McCay, J., said: “The platform, as
is plain to the meanest capacity, is not made to stand upon.
The
company provides seats, and a shelter, for its passengers, and the platform is, as to them, but the passway to their proper place.
It is a
rule for the railroad’s own convenience; passengers are in the way,
a hindrance to the proper management of the train, in that position.
It is also true that it is a place of danger. Whilst the cars are running it is emphatically so, but even when the cars are not in motion,
it is an unsafe place.” If such a notice be proven to have been posted
in large metal letters, upon the doors of the passenger-cars of a railthe

mismanagement

the company was
154. Duty as to

road company, a passenger
that knowledge be denied,

knowledge is
111/589.
155. Care
In

upon

will be presumed to know the rules, and if
the burden of establishing such want of
the party denying it. Johnson, 38/410. Cited,

required of

passenger.

Johnson, 38/409, it

was held that if a passenger on a railroad
injured by a collision of the trains, and the evidence shows that,
though the company, or its agents, was guilty of negligence, yet the
party injured could, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, have
avoided the consequences to himself of that negligence, he is not entitled to recover any damages from the company. If a passenger be
injured by a collision of trains, and it appears that both the defendant and the plaintiff were guilty of negligence, and it does not further appear, from the evidence, that the deceased could, at the time
of the injury, have avoided the consequence to himself of the
negligence of the railroad company or its agents, he is entitled to recover;
but it is the duty of the jury to lessen the amount of their verdict in
proportion to the negligence and want of ordinary care of the passenger. McCay, J., said: “The man who neglects ordinary care to avoid
an
injury has no, just right to seek redress, if that injury is produced

be
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by the negligence of another, and we see nothing in the character of
a railroad company which should subject it to damages for an
injury
caused by the neglect of its agents, when the person injured might
by the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the consequence to him6elf. We can not but think that the jury have not given due consideration to the negligence of the deceased. The evidence is conclusive that
he was on the platform, and that his position was, in fact, the occasion
of his death.
There is evidence, too, that he was warned by one of the
company’s employees of the impending danger, in time to have
avoided the consequences; others did avoid it under the same warnings. We are not disposed, however, to hold a man, under the circumstances, to the same coolness and wisdom of action as after the
event, and as calm spectators, we may think we would have made use
of.
Something, perhaps much, must be allowed for confusion and
alarm and temperament. We do not, therefore, hold that, under the
evidence, it is clear he could have avoided, by ordinary care, the consequences of the defendant’s negligence.
We do think, however,
that though the company was at fault, the deceased was also very
careless, very reckless. He had no business on the platform; it was a
place of danger and always is. It was known to him that a train
was coming.
He was warned by several of the danger, and warned
by one of the company’s employees to get off, as danger was imminent.
After the warning, and after he heard the coming train, a
passenger went into the car, got his valise, came out, again warned
the deceased, got off the train, went to the side of the track, saw the
coming train, and again, in a loud voice, gave warning, and yet deceased, foolishly or recklessly, stood his ground. It is, too, a significant fact that he had been drinking, and was on the platform, with
his hat off.
We think both parties were at fault, and the damages
ought to be diminished by the jury, in proportion to the fault of each.
We would not measure their verdict with accuracy.
The jury are
the judges of the facts, and it is only when they are so wide of the
mark as to indicate passion, mistake, or some error based upon misunderstanding of law, that a court ought to interfere. We think in
this case the jury have either mistaken the law, or have acted und|jr
the influence of passion, natural, perhaps, in view of the parties, but
still illegal.” Cited, 42/330; 52/468; 53/16; 60/668; 64/479;
70/222; 71/441; 74/611; 101/220.
In Johnson, supra, the plaintiff’s husband stood on the rear platform of the passenger-car

while it

was

standing still, and there re-

CHAPTER 10.

§ 156]

[ 224

Passengers.

mained until

freight-train ran into it and killed him; his negliof ordinary care consisted in going where he had no
and in voluntarily putting himself in a place of danger. Bloomingdale, 74/611.
In Huggins, 89/494, the plaintiff was a passenger and he was in a
stationary car which was to be coupled to an approaching train. He
had gone to the platform to see the conductor to have the seats in
the car turned. He saw the train approaching, and knew that it
was at a rapid speed for coupling.
He could have stepped off. He
hurried back into the car, and to about the middle of it, passing several vacant seats, and as he turned to go into a seat, the train struck
the car, and he was injured. It was held that after instructing the
jury that the plaintiff was bound to use ordinary diligence to avoid
being injured, it is not error to refer it to the jury whether or not,
under the circumstances, he ought to have left the car or taken the
seat nearest to where he stood when he discovered the danger.
This
being a matter for the opinion of the jury in the light of the evidence,
it could he referred to them under the phraseology, “If you think
a

gence or want
business to go,

under the circumstances he

ought to have done this in order to preinjury.”
In Blitch, 76/333, the plaintiff testified that he was a passenger
on defendant’s car.
When within three or four hundred yards of the
station at which he was to stop, the conductor passed through the
car, announced the station, and said to the plaintiff, “I wish I was
as near home as you are,” and passed on to the platform on the next
car, leaving open the door of the car in which plaintiff was.
The
train was in motion, running rapidTy.
The plaintiff followed the
conductor, and when he reached the platform of the car in which he
was riding, he
attempted to catch the railing, but was precipitated
from the car by its motion, and was injured. It was held, that a
nonsuit was properly granted. The customary announcement of the
station which the train was approaching was not
negligence; the
plaintiff’s injury was caused by his own negligence; and if the company’s agent was negligent the plaintiff could have avoided the consequences thereof by the use of ordinary care and diligence.
156. Boarding the train.
Where the conductor of
freight-train having a cab attached
thereto for the accommodation of passengers announced
distinctly
in the hearing of persons assembled at a
place where the train did
not usually stop to receive passengers that
they would not get aboard
vent the
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there, but that the train would move out and stop for them elsewhere,
a person who did not hear the announcement was not entitled to have
the train remain standing at the place where the announcement was
made until he got aboard. If he was injured while attempting to
board the train at that place, neither the conductor nor any other
person engaged in moving the train or controlling its movements
being aware that he was endeavoring to board it, and the cause of
his

injury was the starting of the train before he had passed from
platform of the cab to the inside of the vehicle, his injury was not
attributable to any fault of the company, and he has no cause of
action against the company for compensation.
On the facts in evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and any errors committed by the court in charging the jury were immaterial and harmless.
There was no error in denying a new trial.
Curry, 92/293.
A railway company selling a ticket at a way-station for a train soon
to pass is bound to stop the train long enough to afford the purchaser
reasonable time to board it in safety; and if he, without any delay
beyond that which is forced upon him by passengers coming out of
the ear and crowding upon the platform, endeavors to get aboard just
as the train is starting off, and is injured in consequence of the too
hasty starting of the train, which caused the door of the car to close
suddenly, it not being securely fastened back, he is prima facie entitled to recover. The controlling fact in this case being that there
was not sufficient time allowed to board the train, it is
distinguishable
from Hardwick, 85/507; Poole, 89/320.
Cited, 108/88.
In Wilson, 71/22, the facts were as follows: Plaintiff was a
minor fifteen years of age, resident in Atlanta, who went with two
friends to spend a day in Marietta and return on an evening train.
He heard the whistle blow, and starting, with valise and umbrella in
hand, went hurriedly down the street leading to the railroad-track,
it being the shortest route to the depot. As he reached the track he
saw the train on which he was to return
moving on almost in front
of him. His evidence is that he was “dazed” at the sight, and
stopped for the moment on the roadside, but just then a person in
the uniform of the railroad company, and who he thought was the
conductor, but who was a brakeman, standing on the platform of the
car, beckoned to Wilson to come on.
He did so, and the brakeman
took his valise, and tried to assist him to get on the car, but failing
in this, called to Wilson to catch the next railing.
Wilson tried to
do so, but it was too late^ and he tried to catch the railing of the rear
the
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as the train was moving at the rate of
hour, he failed in this attempt, and his
feet striking a brake-bar he was thrown on his back, with one leg
caught under the wheel and crushed so that it had to be amputated.
He stated, in his evidence, that he would not have attempted to get

platform of the
twelve

or

same ear,

fifteen miles

but

an

on

but for the invitation of the brakeman.

for

$4,500.

It

was

held, that the law

as

He recovered

a

verdict

to diligence and negligence

correctly given in charge, and the question was one exclusively
jury. They had the right to weigh all the facts, to consider
the youth of the injured party, the circumstances surrounding him
and urging his return to his home with his young companions on the
train where the injury occurred, the short time allowed for decision
and action, and the invitation given by an employee of the road,
dressed in its uniform, and who, though humble, was in this action
the representative of the company and for whose action it was responsible; and there was no reason to overrule their finding. Hansell, J.,
said: “The verdict of the jury seemed to have been based upon section 2322 of the Code, as they diminished the damages considerably
below the amount in evidence, and they probably held both parties
at fault.”
Cited, 71/422.
In George, 92/760, the plaintiff's husband, for whose homicide
the suit was brought, was ejected from a train.
He was to some extent under the influence of liquor, but not so far so as to be ignorant
of what he was doing, or in any material respect incapable of taking
care of himself.
The place of expulsion was a proper one, having
regard to his immediate safety, and the means at hand for leaving
there without being subjected to peril. It was just outside the corporate limits of a populous city, near the company’s railroad-shops,
where the employees of the company and other persons frequently
passed in going to and from their homes. Hear by, a public road
crossed the railroad, and along this he could easily and safely have
returned to the city, had he been disposed to do so. It was still daylight when he was put off the train—“about sundown; light enough
to see,” as stated by a witness whose testimony was uncontradicted.
When left by the train he was in no immediate danger, and there
was nothing to prevent his going at once to a place of absolute
safety. Instead of returning to the city, as he had a full opportunity
to do, he must have continued on foot in the directiofi of his original
destination, following the train from which he was ejected, because,
something more than an hour later, his dead body was found on the
was

for the
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railway, about a mile from the place where he had been
ejected. It was held that the prima facie case in behalf of the plaintiff, so far as establishing negligence by the defendant is concerned,
resting alone upon the presumption of negligence raised by statute
against the railroad company, and this presumption having been fully
overcome by the uncontradicted evidence introduced by the defendant, and the undisputed physical facts manifestly indicating that
the death of the plaintiff’s husband was caused by his own gross negligence in attempting to board a moving train, the verdict against the
company was not authorized by the evidence, and was therefore eontrary to law.
The officers of a railroad company have the right to presume that
passengers will only attempt to get on and off its cars at the places
designated by the company for such purpose, and it is not the duty
of the railroad company to keep its track clear for those who may
see proper to pursue the cars while
leaving a depot or station; and
more especially would this be true as to those who
pursue the cars to
a point beyond that
assigned by the company for receiving and discharging passengers. Perry, 66/746. Cited, 109/795.
157. Exit for passengers.
It is the duty of a railroad company so to arrange its station or
depot that a passenger who gets off at the depot or place to alight
may get off the car without danger; and it is also its duty to furnish such a way of exit from the depot over its right of way that thepassenger may go away from the place at which he is invited to get
on and off, without danger to life or limb; but it is not its
duty to
see him safe and secure in his exit from the track and over its
right
of way.
The carrier is not bound to secure him a safe exit from the
depot, but to insure only a safe way for him to use for an exit.
Thompson, 76/770. Cited, 109/795.
158. Suitable place for alighting.
It is the duty of a railway company to carry its passengers safely
to their destination, stop a sufficient length of time to allow them to
leave the train in safety, and provide a suitable place for their so
doing. Daniels, 96/786. Cited, 104/130.
In Wilkes, 109/794, the plaintiff, a passenger, alleged that as she
stepped from the car to the floor in the passenger-station a large
wooden splinter being detached from the floor of the station penetrated her foot. The alleged negligence consisted in allowing the
splinter to be in the place where it was and in stopping the car and
track of the
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compelling passengers to alight where it had been left. It was held
that it is the duty of a railroad company to exercise due diligence in
the arrangement and maintenance of a station-house, including the
thereof, so as to enable its passengers to alight from a car in
safety. When, in a given case, it is alleged that a passenger, in so
alighting, has been injured because of the neglect of the company so
to perform its duty, the particulars being properly set out, it was
error to dismiss the petition on demurrer.
On the contrary, the same,
together with such legal evidence as was offered, should have been
submitted to the jury for a determination of the questions of fact
involved, under proper instructions from the court. Little, J., said:
“In 2 Shear. & R. Neg. §110, referring to the duty of a railroad
company to maintain its stations or depots, the rule is laid down that
such shall be made safe and convenient for persons lawfully entering
therein for the transaction of business, or under any actual or implied
invitation; that as' to such persons it is bound to use ordinary care.
While laying down the rule on this subject, Barrows, in his Law of
Negligence (§19), says, on authority, that: ‘Although the carrier
is not held to so high a degree of care in these matters [equipping
and maintaining stational facilities] as in the act of transportation,
it is still his duty to see that all reasonable precautions are taken
to insure both the safety and comfort of persons who are on the
premises as passengers. Approaches to the station and platforms
must be properly built and maintained in good order/ citing a number of authorities in note 29 on page 208. We may therefore safely
assume that, as the plaintiff in error was a
passenger on the train
of the railroad company, it was the duty of the latter to exercise at
least ordinary and reasonable care in the maintenance of its stationhouse, including the floor of the same, to prevent her from being injured, and to afford to her a safe place to alight from the car.”
In Usry, 82/54, it appeared that Mrs. Usry in alighting from a
regular passenger-train at a regular station, being slightly advanced
in pregnancy, was injured so that miscarriage ensued, and serious illness followed.
The train stopped at the usual place. When she left
the car there were two tracks, and between them was a sink.
The
conductor gave her his hand in assisting her from the car. The
distance from the car-step to the ground was so great she could not
step it, and she had to jump. She was injured by the jump. After
receiving the injury she was taken in a buggy, over a country road,
three-quarters of a mile to her home. It was held that, whether by
floors
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the

of

ordinary care a pregnant woman could avoid the conseto herself of the negligence of a railway company, in not providing a safe and suitable place to alight from the cars, the conductor
having designated the place as suitable and assisted her to alight, is a
question for the jury. The matter being doubtful, and the doubt
not being soluble by the record to the satisfaction of this court, the
judgment of the superior court denying the company a new trial will
use

quences

not be reversed.

159.
In

Alighting at

a

place not intended for the purpose.

Wood, 84/363, it was alleged that defendant's train was stopped

a bridge for the-purpose of attaching some cars which were in the
railroad-yard about a quarter of a mile away; the engine was detaehed from the train and went for the cars.
The passenger-car in
which Wood was sitting was stopped immediately over and above a
cut about twenty feet in depth.
That the trestle which supported the
railroad-bed at that point was not supplied with any guards or railing.
Xo warning of any sort was given to Wood of the dangerous place at

at

which the passenger-car was

stopped.

The door of the car was not

guard stationed at the door of the platform to
warn
passengers of the danger to which they would be exposed in attempting to leave the car. That, after the car had been standing at
tills place some time Wood had occasion to leave the car, to attend to
a sudden and urgent call of nature, and walked out upon the platform and onto the steps thereof, and in stepping down, as he believed, upon the ground, he fell through said trestle to the ground
below and was killed, without any fault or negligence on his part.
That the privy or closet on the car was locked, and no one of defendant's employees was present to unlock 'the same, and there was no
other place provided for the use of passengers who wished to attend
locked,

nor was any

to calls of nature.

Defendant knew that said Cut

dangerous
not and did not
see or
cut, but believed
he was alighting upon the ground.
Defendant had been in the habit
of stopping at said place and taking on passengers there.
The defondant demurred to this declaration upon the ground that it set
out no cause of action.
The court sustained the demurrer, which was
held to he error.
Simmons, J., said: “We can not say, as a matter
of law, that the facts alleged in the declaration do not constitute
negligence on the part of the defendant, and when that is so, the case
is for submission to the jury.
We think the court should have sub-

place.

It

was in the'night-time, and Wood could
know that the car was immediately over said

was

a
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mitted the facts to the

jury and allowed them to determine whether
negligence on the part of the defendant in locking the privydoor and having no place prepared for its passengers to attend to calls
of nature; in sending all of its servants and agents away from the
car, so that the water-closet or privy could not be unlocked, and in
stopping the car over a cut twenty feet in depth without giving notice
it

was

to the passengers of the danger to which they would be exposed if
they attempted to leave the car. If these facts are established on the
trial of the case, we are inclined to think that the jury could infer
negligence therefrom, and that the defendant would he liable.”
Cited, 93/631.
160. Assistance in alighting from the cars.
In Daniel, 96/786, the judge charged the jury that, “It is not incumbent on defendant to assist infirm persons in getting on or off
the train.
The defendant is bound to receive every person offering
to go and to pay the usual fare, but it is a duty outside of a contract
of a person needing assistance to get such assistance outside of defondant’s employees.” It was held that, if, under any circumstances,
a railroad company is under a duty to render an infirm passenger
physical personal assistance in alighting from a train, yet, as the evidence in the present case fails entirely to show such a state of facts as
would require the rendering of such assistance to the plaintiff, the
verdict was right upon the substantial merits of the case; and if the
charge complained of was in that respect erroneous, it is not, in this
case, cause for a new trial.
In this case the plaintiff's son told the
porter of the train that his mother was sick, that she was going to
Ringgold and would need help in getting off the car. The porter
said he would help her.
The assistance was not rendered. Cited,
104/130.
In Earwood, 104/127, it was held that a voluntary promise by a
conductor to aid a passenger in getting off a railroad-car at a certain
station does not impose upon the company any liability for a failure
of the conductor, after reaching such station, to enter the car and
assist the passenger from her seat to the place of exit from such car,
where it does not appear that the conductor had any notice of any
condition or circumstances of the passenger that woidd render such
assistance necessary.
Simmons, C. J., said: “It is undoubtedly the
duty of a railway company to provide suitable and safe means for entering and alighting from its trains. But having done this, and having stopped its train in proper position to enable passengers to avail
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themselves of those
to render them

meai^s in

entering or alighting, it is not bound

personal assistance. The contract of the carrier is
that he will carry the passenger safely, and in a proper carriage, and
afford him convenient and safe means for entering and alighting from
the vehicle in which he carries him, but he does not contract to render
him personal service or attention beyond that. Nowhere in the record
is it shown or alleged that any particular reason was given the conduetor why the wife needed assistance. He was not informed, and
testifies that he did not

know, that she

was

sick

or

in need of assist-

account of

physical infirmity. Had he been so informed,
perhaps the company would have been liable in the event of a failure
on his part to carry out his promise.
A knowledge of the wife’s eondition might have imposed upon the company the duty of rendering
her the assistance promised.
Hutch. Carr. (2d ed.) §§617a, 670;
2.Shear. & R. Neg. (5th ed.) §510. No reason of this kind was given
the conductor, and inasmuch as it is not the duty of the servants of
a railroad company generally to assist passengers to alight from the
train, a promise by a conductor to assist a passenger who is not known
to him to be sick, infirm or in need of assistance, is a me^k Voluntary
promise, for which the company is not responsible, and by v^hich it is
ance

on

not bound.”

Where a train stopped at a flag-station at which there was no
ticket-office, and, after an employee thereon had assisted some passengers to alight, started to move on, and the plaintiff then informed
this

employee of her design to get aboard, and he thereupon signalled
engineer to stop the train, which was done, the train stopping
at a low place, where it was difficult to mount the platform steps, and
the employee then undertook to assist the plaintiff to get upon the
train, it was, under these circumstances, a question for the jury
whether or not the employee, in so doing, was acting within the scope
of his duty. Upon the assumption that he was so acting, the company
was liable for injuries received by the plaintiff on account of a fall
occasioned by the employee’s negligence in rendering the assistance
mentioned.
Simmons, C. J., said: “Whether it is generally the duty
of the conductor or other servants of a railroad company to assist
passengers to enter its trains or not, we think there was, under the
particular facts of this case, such a duty on the part of the defendant’s servants. If the train had stood where it first stopped, and
where the other passengers alighted, the plaintiff would not have
needed assistance, for the height of the first step from the ground
to the
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that she could not get upon the platt^ain moved off from that
place and stopped at a place where she was unable to get on the platform without assistance, and she was invited to enter the car at this,
place, it was the duty of the company to render her, by its servants,
such assistance as may have been necessary, and if the servant who
undertook to render her such assistance was negligent in the manner
in which he did so, and by reason of his negligence she was injured,
she was entitled to recover against the company.’’ Voils, 98/446.
Suit having been brought by a colored woman for an injury which
occurred at a railroad-station, alleged to have been caused by the sudden jerking of the train while a passenger was in the act of landing,
without giving her a reasonable opportunity^to do so in safety, there
was no error in charging to the effect that the liability of the carrier
begins at the starting-point and does not end until the passenger
lands in safety.
The court did not charge or intimate that it was the
duty of the conductor to help the woman injured in this case from
the car. And when he charged that the servants or agents of the
company must not be at fault, having reference obviously to the
jerks of the engines, it was not error to add that the conductor was
not bound to help women from the cars.
Jackson, C. J., said: “If
the train stops long enough for the passenger to get off and keep
still, then the company’s servants have done all they could, and the
fault is the passenger’s, but if jerks, sudden jerks, while he is
getting
off, injure him, he having not time to get off safely, reasonable time,
then the servants of the company have not exercised all reasonable
and ordinary care due to everybody, and
certainly not that extraordinary care and diligence due to a passenger.” Whitehead, 74/441.
161. Reasonable time and opportunity to alight safely.
One of the questions in issue being as to how long a train stopped
at a given station, the plaintiff contending that the stop was not
sufficiently long to allow him time to alight safely from the train, and
the | defendant insisting that the stop was long enough for this purpose, evidence that the train was behind time was admissible as tending to show the existence of a reason or motive for making only a
short stop, and therefore as supporting the plaintiff's contention.
Killian, 97/727.
Whether or not a passenger about to alight from a train, and incumbered with hand-baggage or parcels, was, under the circumstances,
afforded by the company reasonable time and opportunity to leave
at that point was not so great
form without assistance; but

when the
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the train in

safety, is a question for determination by the jury, and
by the judge. Simmons, C. J., said: “In determining whether
reasonable time and opportunity for leaving the train in safety were
afforded the plaintiff, the jury had a right to take into consideration
his condition at the time, and it was for them and not for the court
to say whether the fact that he was incumbered with hand-baggage
and parcels called for greater care in his behalf than was exercised
by the defendant’s agents in charge of the train, and ought to have
caused them to allow him more time for leaving the train than they
did.
Where a railroad company takes upon its train a passenger
incumbered with hand-baggage and parcels, it must have due regard
to his condition in this respect when the time comes for the passenger
to leave the train.
It was accordingly error to instruct the jury
that the fact that the plaintiff was so incumbered could not operate
against the defendant.” Killian, 97/727.
162. Passenger must use care in alighting.
In Sanders, 107/132, it was held that it was not error for the court
to charge that if, at the time, it was obviously dangerous for the passenger to alight, on account of the rapid motion of the train, without
not

the direction of the conductor

or

under the direction of the conductor,

if the circumstances from such

rapid motion would make it likely or
seemed likely to him, as an ordinarily prudent man, that it would be
dangerous to do so, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover.
Little, J., said: “The correctness of the principle embodied in this
charge is found in §3830 of our Civil Code, which declares that if
the plaintiff, by ordinary care, could have avoided the consequences to
himself caused by the defendant's negligence, he is not entitled to
recover.
This court has repeatedly ruled that the principle charged
is a correct one.
The charge is sustained, where it was alleged that
directions were expressly given by the conductor for the passenger
to jump from the train, by the case of Hughes.”
In the

that the

same

case

plaintiff lived

it

was

near

held that where the evidence showed

the place where it

was

alleged he received

the

injury in attempting to alight from the train, and was more or
less familiar with the locality, it was not error to charge the jury to
consider the question as to whether the plaintiff was familiar with

particular place, and whether or not his familiarity with the
place was such as to make it dangerous for him to alight under the
this

circumstances which he claimed surrounded him at the time.
a

charge

was proper,

Such

and the knowledge which the plaintiff had of
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locality should have been considered by the jury in determining
question of whether he himself was negligent. Little, J., said:
“Because one is a passenger, and fully entitled to protection as such,
affords no reason why he should not, in alighting from a train, not only
bring to bear his judgment as a reasonable man as to whether it
would be safe for him to alight or not at a particular place, but, if
he had a knowledge of the locality and personally knew as to the conformation of the ground at that locality, or of any impediments or
obstacles to his safely alighting there, it was his duty, with a due
regard to his own safety, of which he is not relieved under any circumstances, to have acted upon such knowledge as he had; and if
he had knowledge that any such defects or impediments existed, so as
to make his alighting dangerous, it was negligence in him to attempt
to alight at such place; and whether he had such knowledge or not, and
if he did, the extent of it, were questions for the jury, and the substance of the direction of the court was that they should consider what
knowledge he had of the particular place at which he alighted.”
163. Relative duties of company and passenger as to tickets.
In Strickland, 90/562, it was held that, under the law and rules
prescribed by the railroad commission of this State, it is the duty
of railroad companies to keep their ticket-offices open for the sale
of tickets for a reasonable time before the departure of trains from
ail stations, provided that offices at way-stations may be closed one
minute before the arrival of trains; and it is the duty of passengers
to use proper diligence in supplying themselves with tickets before
getting upon the trains. A railroad company is not bound to keep
a ticket-office open each and
every minute up to the time it may lawfully close the same, provided a reasonable opportunity is afforded
all persons desiring tickets to obtain them; nor is a passenger bound
to wait at a ticket-office an unreasonable time for the
appearance of
the agent to sell him a ticket, or to call again and again at the office
to procure one, provided, in good faith, and with due
diligence, he
eudeavors to do so before the time for closing the office arrives. In
each case it is a question to be determined by the jury whether or not
the parties, respectively, performed the corresponding duties devolving
upon them, and it is not the province of the court to decide what
particular facts will constitute negligence or diligence by either party,
and thus restrict the jury in the exercise of their duty in this respect.
If a passenger has not been afforded a reasonable
opportunity to purchase a ticket at the station where his journey began, he is not bound
the
the
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to leave the train at a station en route and purchase a ticket back to
the station whence he started and another to his destination. If he

is

rightly

intended

on the train without a ticket, it is his right to complete his
journey by paying the ticket rate for his fare.
Cited,

104/696.
In Johnson, 108/496, the plaintiff alleged that it was the custom
of the defendant company to issue round-trip tickets on Sundays from
its regular station at Dunlap to Crawford for the sum of twenty-four
cents.
He went to Dunlap and sought to procure a ticket, but the
office was not open and he was unable to procure a ticket.
He took
passage on the train, offered to pay the regular Sunday round-trip
rate, which was refused and he was ejected, because he refused to pay
the regular train rates of three cents a mile. It was held that the
mere fact that a railroad company has been accustomed, on a given
day in each week, to sell round-trip tickets between two stations along
its line of road at a rate of fare below the maximum rate fixed by law,
does not entitle a person who fails to_procure such a ticket by reason
of the fact that the agent is absent and the ticket-office closed to be
carried the round trip between such stations upon a tender to the
conductor of the fare which the company has been in the past aecustomed to charge.
The closing of the ticket-office is prima facie evidence that the company intended to abandon its custom, which it had
a right to do, and, in the absence of facts
showing that such was not
its intention, such custom can not be relied on to constitute a contract
of carriage at the reduced rate which the company was formerly in
the habit of charging.
Cobb, J., said: “The maximum rate at which
the defendant was authorized to sell tickets was three cents per mile,
and any person presenting himself as a passenger upon one of its
trains without a ticket can be required to pay four cents per mile, unless
the company either had no ticket-office at the place where it received
such passenger, or, Having a ticket-office, had failed to keep the same
open immediately before the arrival of the train the time required by
the regulations of the railroad commission, and thereby the passenger
was
prevented from procuring a ticket. The plaintiff in this case,
however, is not one who presents himself upon the train as a passenger, and demands to be carried upon paying the ticket rate of fare
because he has been prevented by the act of the company from obtaining a ticket at the rate of three cents per mile. He does not allege that
there was any rule or regulation of the company, which had been'
promulgated, declaring that it would sell round-trip tickets at the
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rate of fare which he claimed it had been accustomed to

charge. It
alleged that any notice was published in any way stating that
round-trip tickets would be sold either on the day on which plaintiff
boarded the train or on any day. The allegation is that ‘it was the
custom of said defendant company to issue round-trip tickets on
Sundays, from Dunlap to Crawford and return. This is, in effect,
an allegation that on Sundays, in the past (for how long it does not
appear), the defendant had seen proper to sell persons at a reduced
rate round-trip tickets between these stations.
Railroad companies in
this State are required by law to sell tickets to persons desiring to
become passengers for three cents per mile, and it is made their duty
to provide a place at which these tickets can be procured.
If they
fail in this, such persons may nevertheless board the train and insist
upon being carried upon tendering the amount which they would
be required to pay for the ticket.
This is all that the railroad companies are compelled to do.
They may, if they see proper, carry a
passenger for a less sum than this rate, but they are not compelled
to do so, and any offer on their part to make a contract of
carriage
for a less sum is entirely voluntary. Being under no legal obligation
to make the offer, when made, it may be withdrawn at any time that
the company sees proper.”
is not

164. Election to

Our

own

sustained

sue on

contract

reports afford

or

numerous

declare in tort.

instances where

one

who has

damages

declare in tort

may bring an action upon the contract broken, or
for the defendant’s violation of a duty imposed

bylaw.

See Bigelow, (18/219; Brauss, 70/3(58; Eskew, 86/641;
Caldwell, 89/550; Strickland, 90/562. These were all actiops against
railroad companies, in each of which the defendant, in violating the
contract rights of the plaintiff, was also guilty of a breach of its public
duty as a common carrier. Spinks, 104/692.
165. Tender of fare after steps taken to eject.
In Nix, 68/572, it was held that if a passenger be ejected from a
railroad-train for failure to pay his fare, and after the train is in
motion he tenders

it, the conductor is not bound to stop the train

to receive his fare and take him

while the train

on

board.

If the tender

were

made

standing still, the conductor was bound to receive
the fare and admit the passenger.
Though a passenger on a railroadtrain may have failed to pay his fare when demanded, yet if before bewas

‘ing ejected he tendered it, it was the duty of the conductor to receive it
and not eject the passenger.
This case was reviewed, in Asmore,
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38/529, and it was overruled in so far as it lays down in universal
and unqualified terms the proposition, or its equivalent, that a passenger by making a tender at any time,before his ejection may acquire the right to remain on board and be carried. In this latter
case the court held that a passenger on a railway-train, who refuses
to accede to a wrongful demand for fare, is entitled to be carried,
on acceding to the demand, though the train may have been stopped
with a view to his expulsion; but if the demand upon him is rightful
he can not avoid expulsion by tendering the fare while the train is
being stopped, or after the stoppage. Where the failure of the passenger to have a ticket is due to the non-attendance of the agent at
the ticket-office, or to other fault or default of the company, the
passenger is entitled to be carried at the ticket rate of fare;
but where his failure is attributable to any other cause
he
has no right to be carried without paying the higher lawful

the company. Bleckley, C. J.,
refuses to accede to a just and
lawful demand made upon him by the conductor for the payment of his fare, after being allowed reasonable time and opportunity to comply, he renounces his fight to the position and the privileges of a passenger, and subjects himself to expulsion from the train.
If he changes his mind, and tenders the fare .before anything is done
towards bringing the train to a stop in order to eject him, his refusal
will be retracted in time, and his right to remain and be carried will
stand unaffected.
If he haggles and hesitates until he becomes a
proper subject for ejection, and until steps have been taken to that
end, he is too late. The plaintiff contended for the ticket rate, upon
the ground that he tried to get a ticket, and that the agent was not
at his place.
The conductor insisted upon the higher rate, which was
the usual and legal one exacted of passengers who had not procured
tickets. According to sound legal principle, the right of the plaintiff
to remain upon the train and be carried on payment or tender of
the tipket rate should depend alone upon the fact whether the nonattendance of the ticket-agent at the office, or any other fault or default of the company, was the true reason why the plaintiff was not
supplied with a ticket. If his failure to have it was due to his own
neglect, or to any cause not chargeable to the company, its agents or
employees, the tender of the ticket rate had no relevancy whatever
to the right of the plaintiff to be carried, or to shun ejection from
the cars.
He might as well have tendered nothing as not enough.
rate

said:

exacted

by the rules of

“Whenever

a

passenger
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On the other

hand, if it

was

the company's omission

or

fault that

prevented the plaintiff from having a ticket, the conductor had no
right to demand the payment of fare at a higher than the ticket
rate; no right to reject that rate when tendered; and after its tender
he could not lawfully expel the passenger for not complying with his
unlawful demand of payment of a higher rate.
This test of the
respective rights of the passenger and the carrier goes to the foundation and rests upon the actual state of facts, and not upon mere belief or good faith either of the passenger or the conductor. It requires them to know their respective rights and to act accordingly.
Of course, this applies only to instances occurring ^between stations
and where the sole reason for stopping the train is to effect expulsion.”
Cited, 90/568; 112/126.
In Coyle, 112/121, it appeared that the plaintiff purchased in
Chattanooga, Tenn., a railroad-ticket from that point to Dalton,
Ga., which had been issued to a woman, and which, under the terms
a special contract constituting a part of the
same, and signed by
her, was good for passage for herself only over the defendant’s road.
This contract also embraced a stipulation that no agent or employee
of the company had authority to alter, modify or waive in any particular the conditions in the contract set forth.
The plaintiff
“doubted the validity of the said ticket,” but, upon exhibiting the
same to the company’s ticket-agent at
Chattanooga, was informed by
the latter that the plaintiff could ride upon it from Chattanooga to
Dalton.
After receiving this information he boarded a train of the
defendant and presented the ticket to the conductor, who declined to
honor it for passage, but nevertheless took it up and demanded of
the plaintiff $1.10, the train rate of fare between the stations above
mentioned.
The plaintiff declined to pay this sum, but tendered
$1.15, which he claimed was the ticket rate of fare between these
points. On reaching Ooltewah, a station in the State of Tennessee,
the conductor required the plaintiff to leave the train. He alighted
therefrom and undertook to purchase from the agent there a ticket
to Dalton.
The agent, being engaged in other duties, refused to sell
the plaintiff a ticket, but, in the presence of the conductor, informed
him that he would be transported to Dalton, his destination, at the
of

ticket rate

of fare.
To this remark the conductor made no reply.
plaintiff then again boarded the train, and, after it had started,
the conductor repeated his demand for $1.40, and the plaintiff once
more tendered him
$1.15, which was not accepted. When the train
The

289

]

CHAPTER 10.

[§165

Passengers.

arrived at

Apperson, Term., the next station, the plaintiff was ejected,
and, at the instance of the conductor, forcibly prevented by another
official of the company from again entering the train before it resumed its journey.
The official just mentioned used no more force
than was actually necessary to prevent the plaintiff from entering
the train, and after it was under way released him, and did not, otherwise than narrated, interfere with his movements or commit upon
him any act of violence or discourtesy. The defendant introduced
in evidence Rule 8 of the Railroad Commission of Georgia, which dedares that: “When a railroad company has provided agents and
offices ready and open for the sale of tickets, and passengers fail from
want of proper diligence to supply themselves therewith before getting
on the train, then four
(4) cents per mile for each passenger twelve
years old and over, and two (2) cents per mile for each passenger five
years old and under twelve, may be demanded and collected: provided,
however, offices at way-stations may he closed one minute before the arrival of trains.” It was also proved that the rules and regulations of
the railway company operative in the State of Tennessee were, as to the
matter of paying fares upon trains, closing ticket-offices, etc., identical
with the official rule on the subject of force in the State of Georgia.
The court instructed the jury that the ticket upon which Coyle undertook to ride did not authorize him to do so, and that he was not
entitled to passage thereon. Also that he was not entitled to demand
a ticket at Ooltewah, for the reason that it was the right of the company to close its ticket-office one minute before the arrival of the
train upon which the ticket desired was to be used; and, further, that
under the undisputed facts of the case the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover unless the servants of the company used more force than
was
necessary in putting Coyle off the train, or in keeping him from
getting back upon it. It was held that a railroad-ticket having thereon
a special contract, signed by the person to whom such ticket was issued, stipulating that it shall be good for the passage of that person
only, does not entitle any other person to transportation; nor has a
purchaser from the original holder any right to act upon, an assurance
given by a ticket-agent that the ticket will be accepted for such pur-

when it is in the contract further stipulated that no
agent shall have authority to alter, modify or waive in any particular
the terms or conditions therein set forth. One who offers to purchase
a railroad-ticket, to he used upon a given train, after the ticket-office,
so far as relates to the sale of tickets for that train, has been lawfully
chaser’s passage,
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closed,

not demand the right to ride upon that train without pay-

can

nor can one who
station to another without

has been transported upon
producing a ticket or tendering the proper fare claim the right to resume his journey on that
train from the latter station without making a proper settlement for
the ride he has actully been permitted to take thereto. When a passenger was lawfully ejected from a train and prevented from reentering the same, he had no cause of action, unless more force than
was
necessary to accomplish these ends were employed.
In Partee, 72/347, plaintiff alleged that, as a passenger on the
defendant’s freight-train, he had tendered his fare at the proper rate,
ing the train rate of fare;
a

train from

but

one

had been demanded

by the conductor, and he had been
ejected from the train. It was held that the regulations of the railroad commissioners, fixing the rates of fare for passengers who obtain tickets from the agents of the companies at their depot, as well
as for those who do not, and
prescribing the manner in which ticketoffices shall be kept open before and at the arrival of trains, do not
apply to freight-trains, but only to regular passenger-trains.
more

166. Whether ticket constitutes the contract.
In

Boyd

Spencer, 103/828, Cobb, J., said: “A ticket issued
does not constitute the contract
by express agreement. It is in
the nature of a receipt for the passage-money, and is generally only
a token, the purpose of which is to enable the carrier to recognize the
bearer as the person entitled to be carried. Any other system by
which the business of the carrier would be equally facilitated would
answer the same purpose as the ticket system.”
Citing, Ray on Pass.
Carriers, §145, p. 515; Fetter on Car. of Pass. §275; 17 N. Y. 306.
In Watson, 110/685, Little, J., said:
“Many apparently wellconsidered authorities go to the extent of ruling that the terms and
conditions printed upon the ticket constitute the contract between the
parties. Others, however, entitled to equal weight, declare that the
words placed upon the ticket which the passenger receives do not constitute the contract, but that it is simply evidence of the receipt by
the carrier of the passage-money, and a token that a contract of
carriage has been made. The latter view seems to be more in accord
with the views heretofore expressed by this court in several cases than
the former. It may not be amiss, however, to remark that it is somewhat singular that, admitting the ticket to be only the token of a contract, yet, when that token bears on its face statements that the conto

v.

passenger by a common carrier
between the parties, unless made so
a
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tract of which it is

an evidence is subject to certain limitations and
conditions, that the contract is not in any way affected thereby. If
in an ordinary business transaction one receives from another a sum
of money as a consideration for the performance of a particular act,
and as evidence of such payment issues a receipt therefor, containing
stipulations as to the character and terms of the performance to be
made, such terms and manner of performance, if not binding, in any
event are at least prima facie evidence of conditions which are binding
on both
parties.”
167. Holder’s right to carriage lost by lapse of time.
In Boyd v. Spencer, 103/828, it was held that when a common
carrier issues to a person a ticket between two points along its line
of road, receiving the full amount the carrier is
lawfully authorized
to charge for such ticket, and there is no express contract between
them as to the time in which the ticket shall be used, the carrier is
bound to carry the person between the points designated at any time
before the right of the purchaser would be lost under the law by lapse
of time. Whether or not a carrier could by express agreement with
the purchaser, limit the time in which a ticket for which full fare
has been charged could be used is not now decided.
168. When a ticket is transferable.
Where through coupon passenger tickets of a particular class were
issued by a railroad company over its own line and those of other
railway companies, including a system of railways in the hands of a
receiver, which were being operated by him in separate divisions,
the fact that, with the receiver’s knowledge, conductors in his employment had been recognizing and honoring as valid the coupons for
his lines of this class of tickets, in connection with the fact that a
coupon of a particular ticket of this class was accepted for passage
over one of these divisions, sufficiently established, in behalf of the
holder of the same, the agency of the initial company for the receiver
in issuing that ticket. Where a system of railways, though owned by
one company, or operated under one management, is divided into separate divisions, a valid ticket, having attached to it coupons for each
of such divisions (in the absence of any specific contract or express

restriction upon

the ticket to the contrary), entitles the person

hav-

ing the right to use the ticket to break his journey and “stop over”
at the end of each division, and then resume it again upon the next
coupon of the same
fixed by the ticket.
16

ticket, provided this is done within the final limit
Such is certainly the law as to coupon tickets
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the lines of different companies, and, upon reason and principle, it is applicable to tickets having separate coupons for different
over

divisions of the

same

line.

Under the facts of this case,

the ticket

held

by the plaintiff, though not purchased by him originally, was
transferable, and he had the right to use it, and was using it lawfully
when expelled from the train. Lumpkin, J., said: “In the absence
of terms rendering a railroad-ticket non-assignable, it passes from hand
to hand by delivery.
Bish. Non-Contr. Law, §1077.” Lovejoy,
96/657. Cited, 98/681.
When a ticket has been delivered by a railroad company for passage
over its lines to a newspaper, with power in the latter to sell and
transfer the same, but its validity has on its face been expressly limited to the first purchaser, the effect of the transaction is to constitute the newspaper the special agent of the company to dispose of
the ticket on the terms named. No authority being given such agent
to vary the terms of the sale, it follows that after a sale by the agent
to a purchaser and an insertion of the purchaser’s name in the ticket,
it becomes- valueless in the hands of any other person.
The above
facts appearing in a petition by one who claimed to have bought the
ticket from the first purchaser of the agent and who was suing the
company for damages on account of being ejected from defendant’s
car by a conductor who refused to honor such ticket, the court did
not err in sustaining a demurrer to the petition on the ground that
it set forth no cause of action against the defendant.
Davis, 107/420.
In Foley, 98/678, it was held that although a railroad company in
Illinois may be the agent of the receiver of a railroad in Georgia to
sell in Chicago tickets from that city to Jacksonville, Fla., and return,
with coupons thereon for passage over the railroad operated by the
receiver, each of such tickets having upon it a special contract, to be
signed by the original purchaser, and stipulating that the ticket should
be used by him only, there is no presumption that the Illinois company was authorized by the receiver, directly or indirectly, to place in
the hands of a ticket-broker, or “scalper,” for sale, in Atlanta, Ga.,
tickets of this kind, stamped at the Chicago office of the Illinois company, but with the contract thereon unsigned by any purchaser, and
with the coupons for the railroads between Chicago and Atlanta detached.
it

Where

a

ticket-broker in Atlanta sold

one

of these

tickets,

being at the time in the condition just described, and also bearing
the signature of an agent of the Illinois company, preceded by the
word “witness,” this signature
being placed upon the ticket exactly
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it would have been had this

witness, actually attested
the real purthese circumstances, to assume that the sale to him by the broker was regular and
authorized, or to occupy the position of a bona fide first and original
purchaser. In a case involving the validity, upon the railroad operated by the receiver, of such a ticket, sold and purchased as above
indicated, it was incumbent on the plaintiff, who asserted that the
ticket was good over that railroad, to show affirmatively that he was
entitled to use it as an original purchaser, by proving that the sale
by the broker was authorized, or at least connived at, by the receiver.
Atkinson, J., dissenting. Cited, 107/423.
169. Rule for construing tickets.
In construing a special contract embodied in a railroad-ticket, and
limiting the purchaser’s rights, language of uncertain or doubtful
meaning should generally be taken in its strongest sense against the
company by which the ticket was issued and sold, and in favor of the
purchaser. If the meaning of the contract embraced in the ticket
below described is not, plainly and unequivocally, that which is there
ascribed to it, the same result is properly reached by the application
of the above-stated rule of construction. A railroad-ticket entitling
a designated person to a stated number of single continuous trips,
for each of which a separate coupon is attached, “between” two specified stations, and stipulating that “passage shall be taken only on
such trains as stop at the above-named stations,” and also that “this
ticket shall be good only for continuous trips between” these stations,
confers upon that person, upon surrendering one of the coupons, the
right to ride from an intermediate station to either of the two stations mentioned in the ticket, or from either of those stations to the
intermediate station, provided he boards a passenger-train which,
upon its regular schedule, stops, not only at the two specified stations,
but at the intermediate station also. Lumpkin, J., said:
“The rule
as

the

agent,

as a

signature of

a purchaser of the ticket in Chicago,
chaser from the broker in Atlanta had no right, under

of construction announced in the first headnote is in accord with

The

which it is based was well recogabundantly supported by precedent.
This principle was invoked in the cases of Mitchell, 92/77, and
Bussey, 95/584. Those cases, it is true, deal with the construction
of regulations prescribed by railroad companies for the government
of their employees; but the reasoning upon which they are founded is
alike applicable to the construction of tickets sold and issued by such
common sense.

nized at

common

principle

law and is

upon
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It may be fairly presumed that one who himself writes
prepares a written contract in which he is interested will he sure
to use language which he conceives is best adapted to secure to himself the full benefit of everything he could claim under the agree-

companies.
or

ment the

writing is intended to evidence. It is therefore allowable
just, at the instance of the opposite party, to scan critically the
phraseology employed. It can hardly be doubted that, before placing
on sale tickets of the kind which the
plaintiff in the present case purchased, the form to be used was carefully prepared and deliberately
adopted by the company. There being a presumption that this form
was
thoroughly considered, the tickets (in the language of Chief
Justice Bleckley, 92/83), ‘ought to be construed more strongly
against the party who made them and adopted them than against
one who merely assented to and agreed to be bound
by them when
they were presented to him as a basis of contract.’ This is obviously right for the additional reason • that as the purchaser had
nothing whatever to do with preparing the ticket, and had no voice
in the wording of it, it was his right to claim under it the benefit of
the strongest interpretation which could be made in his favor.
Certainly, it was his undoubted right to insist that the words used in the
ticket should be taken in their plain and literal significance, and not
extended by mere implication.” Clarke, 97/706.
and

170. Tickets with time limits.
In

Watson, 110/681, it was held that a carrier of passengers has
legal right to make reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of its business in the transportation of passengers. When a
regulation is made affixing a limit to the time in which a ticket shall
be good, and the time of the limit affords to the passenger ample opportunity to make his journey with safety and convenience to himself, such a regulation, if otherwise reasonable, becomes a part of the
contract of carriage; and if, after the expiration of the limit of time
specified on his ticket, the passenger tenders the same for his transportation, and for refusing to pay fare is ejected from the train in a
decorous and proper manner by the conductor, such ejection affords
no cause of action against the carrier.
A regulation so limiting the
period of transportation, when it embraces a provision for refunding
the purchase-price of the ticket, or any unused part thereof, if not
used within the limited period, is, as a matter of law, held to be reasonable. Cited, 111/842.

the
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In

Howard, 111/842, it was held that no right of action accrues
railway-train for ejection therefrom when it appears that under a reasonable regulation of the company the ticket
which he offered as his right for transportation was limited as to the
time in which the carriage was to be performed, and such limit had expired.
In Lewis, 93/225, the plaintiff purchased at a reduced rate a ticket
at Birmingham to Atlanta via Chattanooga. Just before taking the
train for Chattanooga, between two and three o’clock A. m. on February 1, he asked for a ticket which he knew was a one-day-limit
ticket. He had bought and used similar tickets many times before.
The ticket read that it was good until used unless limited by stamp
or written indorsement, or canceled by punch in the margin, and if
limited as to time, would be void after midnight of date canceled
“L” punch in the margin.
On the back was stamped, “TJnion Depot, B. Feb. 1, 1892,” and the date February 1, 1892, appears canceled in the margin.
On February 2, and between twelve o’clock M.
to

a

and

passenger upon a

one

o’clock

p. m.,

the plaintiff left Chattanooga for Atlanta

by de-

rejected and plaintiff was expelled
from the car. It was held that there being no evidence that the plaintiff, in ordering his ticket, communicated to the agent who sold it that
a ticket was wanted different from that which he received, and that
ticket having expired by its own limitation, according to its face, before he took the train from which he was expelled, there was no error
in granting a nonsuit.
Cited, 103/830.
171. When ticket expires,
A railroad-ticket issued during the day of the 6th, and limited to
be used within two days from the date sold, did not expire until twelve
o’clock on the night of December 8. This was a ticket to go from
Cave Spring to Rome and return. It has on it the words “Rome
and return if used within two days from the date sold.” The date
the ticket was sold was December 6, and that date continued the
6th up to twelve o’clock that night, when a new date commenced, to
wit: the 7th of December; within two days then, from twelve
o’clock the night of .the 6th, the plaintiff was entitled to retujn on the
ticket. On the night of the 8th of December, before ten o’clock, the
conductor refused to receive the ticket, claiming that the time had
expired, and ejected the holder. Bigelow, 68/219. Cited, 104/696.
In Bigelow’s case the defendant in violating the contract rights of the
fendant’s road.

The ticket

was
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plaintiff was also guilty of a breach of its public duty as a common carrier.
Spinks, 104/696.
When a passenger has purchased a through ticket, and surrendered it to the first conductor

on

his demand, if

a

is satisfied of this upon the evidence exhibited by
has no legal right to expel the passenger because he

'

second conductor

the passenger, he
does not pay fare
or produce the ticket, although the rule of the company may require the
expulsion under such circumstances. The law is of higher authority
than the rule. King, 88/443.
172. Express contract imposing limitations on use of ticket.
In Phillips, 93/356, the plaintiff purchased a round-trip ticket to
Augusta which contained the usual provisions as to validating it at
Augusta, and it contemplated the signature of the holder assenting
to the conditions.
He was not asked to sign it and did not do so.
The ticket was refused for return passage within the time limit, and
he was ejected.
It was held that according to the Code (section
2276) a common carrier can not limit his legal liability by any notice or entry on ticket sold.
Without making an express contract
with the passenger, a railroad company can not, after selling a return
ticket, and receiving pay therefor, exact of the passenger, as a condition of returning on the ticket, that he shall sign it, and that the
signature shall be attested by a given agent, who shall stamp it. This
is true, although the ticket delivered to the passenger be sold at a reduced price, and limited as to time, and may indicate on its face
that it is to be signed, attested and stamped, and that it can not be
used unless these requisites be complied with.
Cited, 103/829;
108/294; 110/670, 671, 689.
In Boyd v. Spencer, 103/828, it was held that an entry on (he
ticket to the effect that it must be used within a time therein specified
does not make an express contract, unless the purchaser, at the time
the ticket was delivered, knew of the entry, and assented to its terms.
Cobb, J., said: “A ticket without a limitation as to time being good
for use any time within the statute of limitations, the burden of
showing that there was an express contract limiting its use to a certain
time is on the carrier.
In order to make a prima facie case in controversies of the character now under consideration, it is only necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he had a contract of carriage
which has been disregarded by the defendant.
The carrier might defend by showing an express contract limiting the time in which it
was to be
performed. The plaintiff could, however, successfully meet
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this defense

by proving that he had no notice of a limitation upon
ticket, and did not assent to the same. The issues thus raised
are
properly for determination by a jury.” The case of Lewis, supra,
does not conflict with the ruling here made. In that case the purchaser was furnished by the railroad agent with the character of
ticket which he was accustomed to buy, from which knowledge of its
contents might have been reasonably inferred, and the ticket was
sold at a reduced rate. Cited, 109/341; 110/670, 689.
In Ricks, 109/339, it was held that one who purchased a railwayticket having upon its face an express stipulation that it would be
good for passage only during a specified period of time, and who in
consideration of its being sold to him at a reduced rate assented to
the

this

stipulation, had no lawful cause of complaint against the railejecting him from a train, after the expiration of
his refusal to pay. Lumpkin, P. J., said: “The
final limit of the ticket, as indicated upon the margin thereof, was
twelve o’clock noon on Monday, March 21, 1898. The purchaser
boarded a train of the railway company leaving Macon at 11.20 A. m.
on the day last mentioned, which was scheduled to arrive at Americus
way company for
that period upon

at about two o’clock that afternoon.

After the hour of twelve o’clock

arrived, the conductor demanded fare of Ricks for the remainder
journey, and, payment being refused, ejected him from the train
an intermediate station.
This ease is clearly distinguishable from

had

of his
at

that of

Boyd

v.

Spencer,

supra,

for the company’s defense did not, in

this

instance, rest upon the idea that it had a right to limit its liabiL
ity by a mere printed stipulation upon a ticket, of which the purchaser
did not know, and to which he did not assent, but upon the widely
different

simply enforcing against Ricks an
valuable consideration, and mutually
binding upon him and upon it.” Cited, 110/670, 671, 689.
173. When holder fails to comply with conditions.
Where, upon the sale of a round-trip ticket with coupons attached
for passage over two roads, a special contract was made to the effect
that the passenger should sign his name in Jacksonville, Florida (the
terminal point of the trip), before the agent there, before he could
return on the ticket, such special contract controlled; and if the passenger failed to sign as agreed, the company had the right to eject
him. This being done politely by the conductor the passenger was
not entitled to damages.
The ticket being for the purpose of passing
him over two roads, each had the right to stand on the contract; and
express

proposition that it

contract, based

was

upon a

§ 178]

CHAPTER 10.

[ 248

Passengers.

passed him, the other was not bound thereby to pass him also,
special contract. The fact that the conductor of
the contracting road, upon the return of the passenger, detached the
last coupon before refusing and returning it and the ticket to the
passenger did not affect the action brought by the latter for being
ejected. With or without the coupon, he was not entitled to travel
over the road on the ticket against his contract.
Moses, 73/356.
Cited, 108/2&4. He had omitted his duty, he was in default, and had
no right to a return carriage.
Head, 79/364. Cited, 104/217.
In Wenz, 108/290, it was held that where, upon the sale of a
round-trip ticket, a special written contract was made between the
passenger and the railway company, and signed by the former, that
the ticket should not be good for a return passage unless the holder
should identify himself as the original purchaser to the satisfaction
of the authorized agent of the railway company at the point of destination, who should officially sign and date in ink and stamp the
ticket, and where the consideration for such a contract was expressly
if

one

in the teeth of the

stated therein to be the reduced rate at which the ticket

the passenger was not entitled to he transported on the
return passage when he had entirely failed to comply

was

sold,

ticket upon his
with the above

provision of the contract.
In Morse, 102/303, Simmons, C. J., said: “Under the principles
of Head’s case, infra, Morse, the plaintiff in this case, w#s entitled
to recover from the railroad company if he had fully complied with
the conditions of his contract with the company. Whether he did
fully comply therewith was, in our opinion, a question for the jury,
on which we now express no opinion.
On the next trial, on that
branch of the case the question will be whether Morse identified
himself to the satisfaction of the agent. If he did so, and the agent
arbitrarily refused to validate the ticket, and Morse, notwithstanding
this fact, got upon the train, and was ejected therefrom by the conductor, he would be entitled to recover. If, upon the other hand, he
did not comply with the conditions of his contract, and failed to furnish such proof of his identity as would satisfy the agent, then he
can not recover.
In his contract he agreed to do this. He agreed
to furnish such proof of his identity as would satisfy a reasonable
man
a man who was seeking to do justice between his company
and the other party. Ho rule can he laid down as to the amount of
proof such a person should furnish in order to satisfy the agent. I
should think it would depend largely upon the circumstances and
—
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upon

the

person

who

was

seeking to identify himself.

The agent

may be acquainted with one person and his character, and might
deem that person’s signature and his own knowledge of him sufficient,

while, upon the other hand, if the applicant were an utter stranger,
agent might require more proof. At all events, the ticket-holder

the

must furnish such
man.

We think

proof of his identity

as

would satisfy

a

reasonable

that, under the terms of this contract, the agent

not

disregard reasonable proof of identity, and arbitrarily deLumpkin concurred specially. Cited,
102/313; 104/217; 106/831.
A special contract upon a railway excursion ticket signed by the
purchaser and in one item stipulating that the ticket should not be
valid for the returning trip unless signed by the purchaser in the
presence of a designated agent, and “also witnessed and officially executed by said agent for the returning trip,” necessarily implied that
it was incumbent upon the purchaser to use reasonable means of
identifying himself as such to this agent. Where, in another item
of such contract, the purchaser agreed to sign his name and otherwise identify himself as the original purchaser of the ticket, “whenever called upon to do so by an agent or conductor” of the lines named
on the ticket, held that, construing the two items together, and taking into consideration the nature and purposes of the ticket, the word
“agent,” as usued in the latter item, was intended to embrace and
refer to the validating agent mentioned in the former, and that consequently the purchaser, if so required, was under the duty of identifying himself to that agent otherwise than by signing his name.
Barlow, 104/213. Cited, 106/832; 110/670, 671, 689.
In Cannon, 106/828, it was held that when the purchaser of a reduced-rate excursion railway-ticket, by signing a special contract
thereon, agrees with the company issuing the ticket that “it shall not
be good for returning passage unless the holder identifies himself
as the original purchaser to the satisfaction of” a designated agent of the company in the town or city to which the purchaser is to be transported on his “going passage,” that “when
officially signed and stamped by said agent, this ticket shall then be
good for return passage,” and “that the holder will identify
himself
as the original purchaser of this ticket by
writing his name, or by other means, if necessary, when required by conductor or agents”—it is incumbent upon such purchaser, as a condition precedent to having the ticket so signed and
can

cline to validate the ticket.”

.

...
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stamped, to furnish such proof of his identity, and of the fact that
was the original purchaser, as would be sufficient to satisfy a reasonable man.' Under such a contract the validating agent is entitled
to call for other proof of identity than that afforded by the holder’s
writing his name. It was, on the trial of a case involving the determination of the question whether or not there had been due compliance with the terms of such a contract, erroneous to instruct the
jury that, if the proof furnished to the validating agent by the ticketholder as to his identity, etc., was satisfactory to them, he was entitied to have the ticket validated. It was, in such a trial, also erroneous to give in charge to the jury language authorizing them to infer
that, if the ticket-holder produced to the validating agent evidence
sufficient to show that the former “was the man he represented himself to be,” this would identify him as the original purchaser of the
ticket.
When, in such a trial, it was apparent that the manner in
which the purchaser’s name was written at the time of obtaining the
ticket was peculiar and unusual, and therefore a matter of much
consequence upon the question of identification at the time the ticket
was
presented for validation, it was erroneous to charge that, “if the
plaintiff signed said ticket in the presence of the validating officer,
it is immaterial as to the nature and character of this signature.”
The court ought not, in such a trial, to have given a charge to the
effect that, if the validating agent refused to sign and stamp the ticket,

he

and the holder boarded

train, tendered the ticket to the conductor,
he represented himself to be, and as the
original purchaser of the ticket, at the same time informing the conductor that the ticket had been offered for validation, and the conductor thereupon refused to accept the ticket and ejected the holder,
he was entitled to recover.
If the purchaser of such a ticket, at the
identified himself

time of

as

the

a

man

buying the same, intentionally adopted, as the method of
signing his name, the making of the letters thereof in the form of
printed characters, and thus render it impossible to identify himself
as the original purchaser by
reproducing his signature, the burden
was on him to find other means of
satisfactory identification. Merely
proving by witnesses that his name was the same as that “printed”
upon the ticket would not in every case, and under all circumstances,
be sufficient or satisfactory proof that he was the original purchaser.
174. When the failure to validate is company’s fault.
In Head, 79/358, it appeared that the plaintiff purchased a ticket
at Tallapoosa for passage to New Orleans and return.
It was to be
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void unless certain conditions

complied with, to all of which the
that the ticket was to be validated in New Orleans.
There were two irregularities in the execution of the ticket.
The agent’s stamp was on the wrong margin and
one signature of the
plaintiff was made in the wrong place. He
signed twice when he bought the ticket — once in the fight place
for the selling-station, and then again at the place where he should
have signed in New Orleans. Both signatures were made .at the time
and place of sale and were attested by the agent who sold the ticket and
dated there by him.
At New Orleans the plaintiff went to the proper
agent, identified himself, and urged the agent to recognize him, and
to recognize and stamp the ticket.
The agent declined to do it, and
afterwards the ticket was refused by the conductor and plaintiff was
ejected. It was held that, if the purchaser of a round-trip ticket,
after paying for and receiving it, perform all the stipulations of the
contract on his part, or offer to do so in proper time and manner,
the company is bound to recognize and honor the ticket when and
wherever duly presented, notwithstanding any mistake or omission by
its agents in signing or stamping the same. Reviewed and reaffirmed,
Lumpkin, P. J., concurring specially, 102/302. Cited, 102/313,
476; 104/217.
plaintiff agreed.

were

One of them

was

Section 2276 of the Civil Code is

as

follows:

“A

common

carrier

not limit his

legal liability by any notice given, either by publication or by entry on receipts given or tickets sold.
He may make
an express contract, and will then be
governed thereby.” In the eases
of Phillips, Boyd, Barlow and Ricks, supra, it was assumed by all the
parties that this section applied to passenger-carriers. The question
was not made in any of them, and the issues raised and determined
were on the facts.
Because of the defenses made, no criticism has
been made by the court of the judgments there rendered, although in
the discussion of each ease the section was treated as being applicable
to passenger-carriers.
In the subsequent case of Lippman, supra,
the question was made, and it was ruled that the section does not apply in any way to a carrier of passengers, but does apply exclusively
and alone to a common carrier
that is, a carrier of goods. And as
a consequence of that view, it was held that the duty of exercising extraordinary diligence to protect the lives and persons of passengers
could not be waived or released even by an express contract, because
can

—

it is

a

duty in which the public has

bids such

a

waiver

or

release.

an

interest and public policy forthe ruling was

And in Watson, supra,
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adhered to and it

was

also held that in the absence of any

further

contract, a time limit placed upon a ticket, in pursuance of
regulation, bound the passenger, as a rule of the company governing the contract of passage.
'
175. Holder’s right to return on a particular train.
A railway agent who sells a Sunday-excursion ticket consisting of
two parts, one of which signifies that it was to be used in going and
the other in returning, hut neither of them indicating any particular
train, is a proper person of whom to inquire, at the time the ticket
is purchased, as to whether it would afford the right to return on a
fast train, called the “Cannon Ball,” of the same day or night. His
reply in the affirmative, together with the possession of the return
part of the ticket, and its production to the conductor of the fast
train, would entitle the passenger to return on that train, and be
put off at the proper station, unless he knew, or had sufficient reason
to believe, that the agent was misinforming him, or that there was
some rule or order of the
company either denying to the agent authority to answer such a question, or forbidding the recognition of such
a ticket
by the conductor of the fast train. If the passenger was not
told by the agent that he could return on the fast train, and if he
knew that the fast train did not usually stop at the station, he would
have no absolute right to return on that train, provided there was another on which he could return before his ticket expired.
There being no conditions on the face of the ticket, and no controversy as to
the right of the passenger to return on some train, it was error to
charge the jury that one who buys a return ticket has a right to return, if he performs all the conditions of the ticket, and that, if the
agent told the passenger that he could go and return on this ticket,
the passenger had a right to presume that he could do so, and if, in
his effort to do so, he was put off at any other station, he would be
entitled to damages. The pressure of the ease was upon the right of
the passenger to return on the fast train, and the charge, though correct as abstract law, was not pertinent to that question, and might
have misled the jury. Roberts, 91/513.
176. Holder using ticket in tad faith.
In Barlow, 104/213, it was held that one who enters a railwaytrain in possession of a ticket entitling him to ride thereon is, if he
does so with the bona fide intention of using the ticket for the purpose
of making the journey for which it is good, entitled to recover whatever
damages he may sustain by reason of a wrongful expulsion, although he

notice
a

or
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may, before going upon the
ticket would not be accepted

train, have had reason to believe the
for passage by the conductor thereon.
On the other hand, if one in possession of such a ticket enters a train,
not for the purpose of making the journey called for by the ticket, but
for the purpose of being put off, so as to make a case for damages
against the railway company, he is, if ejected, entitled to nominal
damages only. One of the defenses relied upon in the present
case being predicated upon this rule of the law, and- there being evidence in support of the same, it was error to give in charge to the
jury language which, in effect, entirely deprived the defendant of the
benefit of this defense, in case the jury believed its contentions of fact
were well founded.
Approved, 110/671, 689.
177. Right of action exists when unauthorized employees forcibly
eject a passenger.
A passenger injured by being unlawfully and forcibly thrown from a
moving train by an employee of the railroad company in its service
on that train is entitled to maintain an action against the company,
although it was not within the line of this employee’s business to eject
from such train persons not rightfully thereon. Bostwidk, 100/96.
Cited, 104/657.
178. Conductor’s agreement as to fare.
In Murden, 86/434, it was held that where the passenger got
aboard the train at a flag-station, for the purpose of going to Augusta,
and there was a dispute between him and the conductor as to the
proper rate to be charged, and the conductor informed him that he
could ride at four cents

a

mile to the next office where tickets

were

sold, and could get off the train there and board it again, and might
ride the rest of the way for three cents a mile, and the passenger
agreed to this, and paid the four cents a mile to the next station, got
off the train for the purpose of procuring a ticket, and could not do
so because the ticket-office was closed, and then boarded the train
again for the purpose of continuing his journey, and tendered the
conductor three cents a mile, the conductor had no legal right to put
him off the train because he refused to pay four cents a mile, although
he had received instructions to charge four cents a mile.
Simmons,
J., said: “The passenger had a right to rely upon the statement of
the conductor, and if he acted upon this agreement, and partly performed it, the conductor could not put him off the train, although
^his instructions were to charge four cents a mile. The passenger is
not presumed to know the private or secret rules given by the com-

CHAPTER 10.

§§ 179-181]

[ 254

Passengers*

pany to its conductors, but has a right to rely upon their
as to what the rules are in contracting with them.
But it

statements
is said, in
reply to this, that the passenger knew that the conductor had no authority to make such an agreement, because the conductor showed
the passenger his rule-book. The rule shown to the passenger, as it
appears in the record, is as follows: 'Georgia Railroad Commission
Rule. Number 9 of the rules governing the transportation of passengers.
The regulation of the railroads as to passengers without
tickets is a matter of police, with which the commission will only interfere upon complaint of abuse. An extra charge of more than one
cent per mile, full fare, or one-half cent, half fare, is regarded as
excessive, unless such extra charge would fall below the minimum
above given/ We do not think this rule put the passenger upon notice that the conductor had no right to make the agreement.”
179. Illegal ejection of passenger actionable.
The illegal ejection of a passenger entitled by contract to be carried over a railway is itself an act for which damages are recoverable.
The measure is for the jury. Homer, 73/251.
And the jury in
fixing the amount may take into consideration the inconvenience he
may be put to by being ejected.
Strickland, 90/562.
180. When burden was on the carrier to show ejection was lawful.
The burden of showing that the expulsion of a person from a passenger-car was lawful does not devolve upon a railway company until
it be shown that this person was rightfully in the car.
Cannon,
106/828.
In case of the ejection from a railroad-train of a passenger who had
previously delivered up his ticket, and who sues for damages on account of such ejection, the presumption is against the company; and
it devolves on it to show that the conductor, who put the passenger
off, acted rightly and under authority of law, and thus to lift the
burden cast upon it by law. Homer, 73/251.
181. Passenger need not wait to be forcibly ejected.
In order for

a

train, it is not
him.

passenger

to recover for wrongful expulsion from a
the conductor should have put his hands

necessary that
A conductor may

expel a passenger as effectually by orby pushing him off. He is a man in authority and
may exert that authority by word as well as by using physical force.
Roberts, 91/513.
A passenger need not wait to be forcibly ejected.
If before or after the train reaches a certain station he is ordered
by the conductor
on

dering him off

as
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to

get off at that station, the order seeming to be peremptory, and the
understanding it, he may yield to the conductor’s authority, and leave the train at the station indicated, though the conductor be not immediately present when this is done. In such case,
if the passenger acts contrary to his own will, and in obedience to
the conductor’s command, he is coerced, and is entitled to redress for
his expulsion. Bleckley, C. J., said: “All passenger conductors are
by statute invested with the powers of police officers while on duty
upon their trains. Penal Code, §902. A passenger, whether right
or
wrong in any contention or misunderstanding with a conductor, is
under no duty, legal or moral, to stand out until the conductor appeals
passenger so

to force

for the execution of his commands.

If the passenger obeys
will does not consent, he is
coerced. Homer, supra.
So far from being under a duty to resist,
he would generally put himself in the wrong by offering resistance.
For the sake of peace and good order, he ought to submit.” Eskew,
86/641. Cited, 104/696.
The passenger lost nothing by not resisting and requiring force to
eject him. On the contrary, he was right to yield to authority and
throw himself upon the law for remuneration.
Homer, 73/257.
182. Colored tram-hand may aid conductor.
In Strickland, 90/562, it was held that a railroad company has a
right to employ a colored train-hand, and a conductor may properly
call upon him to assist in ejecting a passenger who ought to he
ejected from the train. If a white passenger is wrongfully ejected
from a train, the fact that a colored train-hand was called upon to
assist in so doing will not make the company liable for greater damages than should be recovered if the train-hand had been a white
man.
Lumpkin, J., said: “If the passenger is lawfully and rightly
ejected, he certainly would have no cause of action against the company merely because a colored employee assisted in putting him off.
This being true, the wrongful ejection of a passenger is not aggraand

thereby does

an

act to which his

own

by the fact that the conductor called upon a colored train-hand
making such ejection. Of course, we do not mean
to intimate that there may not be aggravating circumstances attending the improper expulsion of a passenger from a train which should
increase the amount of damages for the wrong done him. Physical
injuries, insults by word or act, personal indignities, actual violence
or unnecessary force, making an improper or unseemly demonstration, calling for assistance when it was manifestly not needed, and

vated

for assistance in
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the

only effect of it would be to mortify and humiliate the passenger,
of like character, may. and should increase
this kind, and we do not desire to be understood as holding to the contrary.
But we do rule distinctly and unequivocally that the race question is not properly involved in such
transactions, and that it is unlawful to hold a railroad company
liable for greater damages than the amount for which it would be
justly liable were the employee aiding in the expulsion of the passenger a man of his own color.”
Cited, 104/696.
183. Disorderly persons. The conductors of a train carrying passengers, are invested with all the powers, duties, and responsibilities of
police officers while on duty on their trains: Provided, nothing
herein contained shall affect the liability of any railroad company for
the acts of its employees. When a passenger is guilty of disorderly
conduct, or uses any obscene, profane, or vulgar language, or plays
any game of cards, or other game of chance, for money or other thing
of value, upon any passenger-train, the conductor of the train may
stop it at the place where such offense is committed, or at the next
stopping-place of the train, and eject the passenger from the train,
using only such force as may be necessary to accomplish the removal,
and the conductor may command the assistance of the employees of
the company and of the passengers on the train to assist in the removal; and the conductor may cause any person violating the proviand many other things
the damages in cases of

sions of this

section,

or

livered to the proper
Penal Code, §902.

the laws of this State, to be detained and deauthorities for trial as soon as practicable.

With or without a ticket, a passenger has no right to
train and be carried when he is disorderly, or uses any

remain

obscene,
defies the

fane, or vulgar language. If a disorderly passenger
ductor, draws a pistol, and thereby induces the conductor to
order to

on a

procon-

arm

in

expel him from the train, and if after expulsion he still
uses
grossly obscene and profane language, reeking with insult, on
which a mutual combat with pistols ensues, the railroad company is
not liable for the consequences, though the expelled passenger be
wounded in the conflict, even if the conductor, excited by danger and
irritated by insult, be not fully excusable for the shooting.
It is
unjust to a master wrongfully to unfit his servant for exercising the
care and prudence which are essential in
guarding the master’s inter-
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est

and

performing the servant’s duty. Peavy, 81/485. Cited,
98/502; 101/34.
In Shropshire, 101/33, it was held that while, under ordinary eircumstances, a railway company will be held legally responsible for
the manner in which its conductor undertakes to exercise its right to
expel from its cars one not entitled to ride thereon, yet where such a
person expressly refuses voluntarily to alight, insultingly challenges
the conductor to attempt to put him off, and then violently assaults
the conductor upon his proceeding in a lawful manner to make the
expulsion, and the latter thereupon resents and responds to the attack by resorting to great and unnecessary violence, the company will
not be liable in damages for personal injuries thus inflicted, provided
the assault made upon its servant was of such a nature as to excite
his passions, and render him unfit for properly performing the duties devolving upon him in the premises. This is so because the person injured, by his own grossly improper conduct, is to be regarded
as having forfeited his right to immunity from unnecessary violence
by inviting the conductor to disregard and abandon his official duties,
and enter into a personal encounter on his own account and upon his
individual responsibility. There being in the present case evidence
to show that the encounter between the plaintiff and the defendant’s
conductor

was

nounced in the

of the nature above

indicated, and the law

as an-

preceding note constituting the main ground of defense relied on, it was error for the court, in its charge to the jury,
to completely ignore the issue thus presented.
Lumpkin, P. J., said:
"As a general rule, a railway company will be legally responsible for
the misconduct of its conductor or other duly authorized agent while
undertaking to exercise on its behalf its right to eject from its ears
a
person not entitled to ride therein. Higgins, 98/751. And
that the company’s servant may have exceeded the authority
with which he was clothed, or have acted in direct disregard
of express orders given him in the premises, and in violation of the duty with which he was intrusted, will not ordinarily
constitute a defense which the company will be heard to urge in its
justification, as against one who has unjustly suffered from the
wrongful act of such servant. This is so for the palpable reason
that, the right to summarily eject intruders from its cars being
coupled with a condition that such right must be exercised in a lawful manner, the company can not delegate to an agent the power thus
conferred upon it by law without at the same time becoming strictly
17
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abuse thereof on the part of its agent. The genhowever, subject to a very just and salutary
exception, resting upon that broad principle of natural equity which
precludes one from complaining of the act of another which the injured party has himself brought about by his own grossly improper
answerable for any

eral rule above stated is,

conduct.”
184.

Negligent mistake of conductor no excuse.
Eskew, 86/641, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for having been wrongfully ejected from a train by the conductor. The
plaintiff and his brother surrendered to the conductor tickets from
Atlanta to Social Circle, and they were expelled at Conyers, an inIn

termediate station.
on

excuse

for

to the

an

error

as

to their

account of his

own negligence.
It was held that it is no
expulsion that the conductor made a negligent mistake
station indicated on the face of the ticket which the plaintiff

tickets,
as

The conductor fell into

had exhibited and surrendered to the

same

conductor.

185. Good

faith of conductor, how regarded.
While the good faith of a conductor, who improperly ejected a passenger, would not defeat the right to recover damages therefor, yet
it might be considered in fixing the amount of damages, which should
not he so high, where the agent acted bona fide; and bad faith on the
part of the conductor might be considered to increase the damages.
Homer, 73/251. Cited, 86/644.
186. When carrier is liable for violence of its servants.
The very fact of a rencounter taking place on board the car of defendant, between its conductor and another, does not of itself give a
right of action to such other person; there must be some breach of
duty by the agent, in connection with his obligations as such agent
to the person complaining, to entitle him to recover from the defendant. Upon the facts of each case will turn the liability of the
defendant to answer for the conduct of its officers in dealing with the
public touching the enjoyment of its franchises. Crawford, J., Turner,

69/827.

187. Mistreatment

of passenger by conductor.
unquestionably the duty of a railroad company to protect a
passenger against insult or injury from the conductor of the train
on which the
passenger is riding; and, this being so, the unprovoked
use by a conductor to a
passenger of opprobrious words and abusive
language, tending to cause a breach of the peace, or to humiliate the
It is
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passenger, or subject him to mortification, gives to the latter a right
of action against the company.
Cole, 102/474. Cited, 103/126.
188. Must protect passenger from molestation.
In Jefferson, 89/554, it was held that a colored passenger upon
railway-train is entitled to the same protection against drunken and
violent men seeking to molest, outrage, and humiliate him as a white
passenger. This protection must be afforded by the conductor to
the extent of all the power with which he is clothed by the company
or by the law, and his failure to afford it, when he has knowledge
that there is occasion for his interference, will subject the company
to liability in damages.
A verdict for $1,000 in this case was not
excessive.
Gober, J., said: “The plaintiff was a colored man; was
a passenger on defendant’s railroad-train from Atlanta to Athens.
He had paid full fare for a ticket, and was in his proper place. He
had complied with all the obligations put upon him by the law to entitle him to be carried to his destination by this defendant. Upon it
was the duty of carrying him with extraordinary diligence on behalf of itself and agents, to protect his life and person, though not
liable for injuries to the person after having used such diligence.
During the course of his journey, the plaintiff was insulted, assaulted,
and beaten.
He was cursed and abused by two drunken passengers.
The conductor was appealed to, and refused to interfere.
The plaintiff was made to dance and sing. He was subjected to many indignities. Under the facts, the question presented is a new one in this
State.
From Hutch. Carr. §595, we have: The passenger is entitled
to not only every precaution which can be used for his personal safety
by the carrier, but also to respectful treatment from him and his serva

ants.

From the moment the relation commences, as

the passenger

has been

seen,

is in g, great measure under the protection of the carrier, even from the violent conduct of other passengers or of strangers
who may he temporarily upon his conveyance. The law now seems
to be well settled that the carrier is obliged to protect his passen.gers from violence and insult, from whatever source arising. He is
not regarded as an insurer of his passenger’s safety against every
possible source of danger, but he is bound to use all such reasonable
precautions as human judgment and foresight are capable of to make
his passenger’s journey safe and comfortable.
He must not only
protect his passenger against the violence and insults of strangers and
co-passengers, but a fortiori against the violence and insults of his
own

servants.”
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In

Cole, 102/474, Fish, J., said:

“The carrier’s obligation is to
his passenger safely and properly and to treat him respectfully; and, if he intrusts the performance of this duty to his servants, the law holds him responsible for the manner in which they
carry

execute the trust.

carrier is

The law

seems

obliged to protect his
whatever source arising.

to be

now

well settled that the

from violence and insult,
from
He must not only protect
his passenger against the violence and insults of strangers and copassengers, but a fortiori against the violence and insults of his own
servants.
If this duty to the passenger is not performed, if this protection is not furnished, but, on the contrary, the passenger is assaulted and insulted, through the negligence or the willful misconduet of the carrier’s servant, the carrier is necessarily responsible.
And it seems to us it would be cause of profound regret if the law
were otherwise.
The carrier selects his own servants, and can discharge them when he pleases, and it is but reasonable that he should
be responsible for the manner in which they execute their trust.
To
their care and fidelity are intrusted the lives and limbs and comfort
and convenience of the whole traveling public, and it is certainly as
important that these servants should be trustworthy as it is that
they should be competent.” Cited, 103/126.
In Peeples, 60/281, the declaration alleged that the plaintiff was
a passenger on defendant’s road, having paid his fare from A. to
W.; that he was in the usual passenger-coach; and while thus situated, at an intermediate station, he was called out of the train by
the conductor in charge thereof, who was defendant’s agent, and was
by him beaten, etc. The declaration was demurred to, and it was
held that the failure to allege in express terms that the agent acted
“in the prosecution and within the scope of his. business” could be
amended. The conductor was in the prosecution of the company’s
business, and was acting within the scope of its authority when he
was engaged in transporting the plaintiff as a passenger on its train
from A. to W. and the plaintiff, as a passenger, was entitled to the
care and protection of the conductor until he arrived at the place of
his destination.
If the conductor had delivered the plaintiff at his
place of destination, and had afterwards beaten him, the company
would not have been liable for it.
Cited, 72/294.
189. Battery by conductor.
In Bryan, 86/312, the conductor, without cause, kicked the plaintiff off the platform of the car while the car was in motion. The
passenger

.

.

.
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plaintiff went immediately to the office of the company for the purpose of making complaint to the superintendent.
He had reached
the office in about eighteen or twenty minutes.
The conductor, who
arrived at about the
It

was

held that

a

same

time, cursed, hit and kicked him again.
is responsible to a passenger for

railroad company

battery by the conductor, committed first on the car, and repeated
shortly afterwards at the office of the company whither the passenger had gone to make complaint to the superintendent.
In Turner, 72/292, it appeared that the plaintiff went into the
cab of a freight-train to treat for passage. It was a thing that had
frequently been done, and was still being done at the time of the trial
by other persons on the same train. In reply to the plaintiff’s inquiry, the conductor insulted him by the use of vulgar and profane
language and abusive epithets, and then, without provocation, beat
him. It was held that, as to the injuries inflicted upon him by the
conductor, the plaintiff stood within the reason and spirit of the
authorities in reference to like injuries done to passengers; that railroad companies are liable for torts committed by their servants in
the prosecution and within the scope of their business, whether it be
by negligence or voluntary. It was held further, that conductors of
through freight-trains may, if required by the rules of the company
or the exigencies of the case, refuse to carry passengers in their cabs
a

or on

and

their trains.

But such refusal should be made known in

a

civil

respectful manner to a person applying for passage thereon, and
opportunity allowed for such person to quit the cab on his

reasonable
own

motion.

If he should refuse to do so, the conductor could use

such reasonable force

as was

acts in violation of these

necessary

to eject him.

matters, in this

cution and within the scope

case, were

The conductor's
done in the prose-

of his business, and for his use of insulting and obscene language in refusing passage to the applicant, and his
violence in striking and injuring him, the company was liable, even
though it was voluntarily done. Cited, 86/314; 102/476; 103/126,
A declaration alleged as follows:
Plaintiff entered one of defendant’s trains as a passenger and took his seat as such. It was a
freight-train with the usual cab and accommodations for passengers provided on such trains. Before entering it, he inquired of
the engineer if the latter would stop at Tilton. The engineer replied
that he did not know, but that they would stop at Beardley’s he knew,
and plaintiff could walk the balance of the way. Upon this statement, plaintiff entered the car orderly and decently, with the money

CHAPIER 10.
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of said company, and
to that relation. Being thus situated, the conductor in charge of the train entered, and
plaintiff asked him the same question that had been asked of the engineer, when the said conductor and servant of the company, while
thus being treated with about matters in the line of his duty, and
without provocation, cursed, abused and ill-treated plaintiff, striking
him, etc., and knocking him out of the car-door. This was an action
of trespass on the case, and was not an action for a breach of contract in not carrying plaintiff as a passenger on the train.
Turner,

to pay his fare and thereby became a "assenger
entitled to all privileges and treatment incident

69/827.
Where

a

railroad

assaulted

a

passenger,

conductor, without apparent provocation, rudely
used to him grossly opprobrious and insulting
language, caught hold of him roughly, and pulled him to the end
of the car, threatened to kill him, appeared about to draw a pistol
on him, and spit tobacco-juice in his face, the
company is liable for
punitive damages, and will not be permitted to prove in mitigation
thereof that on some previous occasion the passenger had used slanderous and indecent language about the conductor’s sister-in-law, and
that this was the reason of the conductor’s conduct, it being the first
meeting between them since the alleged language of the passenger had
been communicated to the conductor, when it does not appear how
long before the assault the passenger had spoken the words ascribed
to him, or how long the conductor had been informed thereof.
If
such facts could be received at all in mitigation of damages, their
occurrence

must have been

acted under the immediate

so

recent

as

to indicate that the conductor

provocation thereof, and had not had time
passion produced thereby. Where the plaintiff
was
a
passenger riding upon defendant's train and entitled to
protection at the hands of the conductor who assaulted him,
it was held that a charge of the court to the effect that
sneers,
looks, and contemptuous gestures will not justify an assault
by a conductor upon a passenger, and that a railroad company is not
released from its contract guaranteeing polite and courteous treatment
to a passenger because the passenger does not smile
upon the conductor, or because he wears a frown, is not erroneous. Fleetwood,
90/23. Cited, 98/496; 103/126.
190. Assault by a station-agent.
A similar charge to that in Fleetwood’s case was given in Richmond, 98/495, where the plaintiff was not, at the time, a passenger.
to

control

the
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He

assaulted

by a station-agent, and in other respects the facts
different, and it was held to be improper, and that the charge
in Fleetwood, supra, should not be taken as expressing a general prineiple applicable alike to all cases of a similar nature. If one who
had purchased a railroad-ticket, intending to take a train about to
arrive, but who failed to do so because he did not succeed in getting
his baggage checked in time to be placed on that train, left the premises of the railroad company, and registered at a hotel, intending
to take a train to his destination the next morning, and afterwards,
on the
day he purchased the ticket, returned to the station to make
inquiries about, or arrange for the storage or checking of, his baggage, he was not at that time a “passenger,” but nevertheless had the
right to go to the station for the purpose stated, and, if he conducted
himself properly, was entitled to respectful treatment from, and immunity from an unlawful assault by, the agent while engaged in transacting with him the business mentioned; and such an assault would,
under such circumstances, give a right of action against the company. If, however, the real purpose in returning to the station was
not to look after or arrange for the checking of baggage, or to attend
to other legitimate business with the agent, but merely to upbraid
him for a real or supposed breach of duty occurring at an earlier
hour of the day, and a difficulty thereupon ensued, the two met as ordinary citizens, and the railroad company had no concern in what
passed between them. Cited, 101/35; 107/754.
In Hopkins, 108/324, it was held that if one who is permitted by
the agent of a railroad company to remain in the depot at a time
when passengers are not usually allowed there leaves the building
and enters a car standing at the station, and is there discovered in
an act of gross immorality, and upon being required to return to the
depot uses offensive and insulting language to and of the agent of
the company who ejected him from the car, and continues, notwithstanding a caution not to do so, to use such language until the agent
of the company is exasperated and commits an assault upon him,
the company is not liable for the consequences resulting from such assault, even though the agent be not fully excusable and the battery
inflicted be entirely disproportioned to the insult given.
191. Assault by baggage-master and conductor.
In Gasway, 58/216, there were two counts in the declaration. The
first count was to the effect that the baggage-master beat and maltreated the plaintiff wrongfully while engaged in having the baggage
was

were
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cheeked; the second, that when he was riding on the cars
afterwards, the conductor awoke him from sleep, and
recognizing him, threatened to shoot him, and made him jump off
the cars when they were running. In support of the first count it
of his wife

with his wife

shown that

dispute arose between the plaintiff and the baggage-master about checking a trunk. As the plaintiff turned away he
said it was a damned bad rule, if it was a rule — referring to a rule
on the subject of checking baggage which the baggage-master said
existed. The baggage-master, who swore that the plaintiff called
him a damned fool, and perhaps might so have understood him,
jumped out of his car and followed the plaintiff alongside of the
train towards the passenger-car, and caught and commenced beating him. The conductor took part in the encounter. The proof supported the second count also. It was held that railroad companies
are responsible to passengers for the torts of the conductors and other
servants of the company employed in running trains, when such torts
was

are

a

committed in connection with the business intrusted to such

serv-

ants and

spring from or grow immediately out of such business.
liability of the company extends to tortious acts of its servants
done about its business, in checking the baggage of passengers at the
several stations on its line of road, and to the platform or area
along the cars necessary to be used or traversed by the passengers in
attending to procuring seats and checking baggage and other lawful and peaceful acts in connection with their travel. Cited, 60/284,
493; 72/294.
192. Assault to rape by baggage-master.
In Quo, 103/125, it was held that a railroad company is liable in
damages to a female for an assault with intent to commit a rape upon
her person by one employed by such railroad company as a baggagemaster upon a train on which such female is at the time being conveyed as a passenger. Simmons, C. J., said: “When a contract of
carriage is entered into between a passenger and a carrier, there arises
out of the relation thus created not only a duty to safely transport
the passenger to the destination fixed in the contract, but also to protect him from injury, violence, insult, and ill-treatment at the hands
of the servants of the carrier who are in charge of, or connected in
any way with, the carriage in which the passenger is being transported. 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.), p. 541. This seems to
The

be the settled doctrine of this State.
owes

a

duty to all of its

passengers,

While

a

carrier of passengers

to protect them from violence
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and insult

the

part of its servants, it owes an especial duty to
to protect them from insult and abuse. In the
case of Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242, Fed. Cas. 2575,
Judge Story, in discussing the question now under consideration, uses
the following language: ‘In respect to passengers, the case of the
master is one of peculiar responsibility and delicacy.
Their contract
with him is not for mere ship-room and personal existence on board,
on

female passengers,

but for reasonable

food^ comforts, necessaries, and kindness. It is

a

stipulation, not for toleration merely, but for respectful treatment;
for that decency of demeanor which constitutes the charm of social
life; for that attention which mitigates evils without reluctance, and
that promptitude which administers aid to distress. In respect to
females, it proceeds yet further. It includes an implied stipulation
against obscenity, that immodesty of approach which borders on lasciviousness, and against that wanton disregard of the feelings which
aggravates every evil, and endeavors by the excitement of terror, and
cool malignity of conduct, to inflict torture upon susceptible minds.
What can be more disreputable, and at the same time more distressing, than habitual obscenity, harsh threats, and immodest conduct,
to delicate and inoffensive females? What can be more oppressive
than to confine them to their cabins by threats of personal insult or
injury? What more aggravating than a malicious tyranny which
denies them every reasonable request, and seeks revenge by withholding suitable food and the common means of relief in cases of
seasickness and ill health?’ In the case of Nieto v. Clark, 1 Cliff.
145, Fed. Cas. 10262, this decision of Judge Story’s was cited
with approval by Judge Clifford. While it is true that in two eases
cited the carrier whose liability was under consideration was a carrier by water, still the doctrine laid down in these cases has been
followed in cases where suits were brought for wrongs of a similar
nature inflicted upon passengers in a railway carriage.”
36 Wis. 657;
85 Ky. 307.
193. Train-hand attempted to commit a robbery.
In Mclver, 110/223, the petition, in effect, alleged that one of the
train-hands, in the presence of the conductor, and impliedly with his
consent, attempted to commit a robbery upon the companion of plaintiff’s son, and while so engaged did hurl plaintiff’s son from a rapidly moving train, from which he received injuries causing his death.
It was held that under such circumstances, the defendant would be
liable, whether the plaintiff’s son was upon the train lawfully or un-
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lawfully, and without regard to what was the character of the train.
Simmons, C. J., and Little, J., dissenting.
194. Retaining servant after the tort.
The principle that a railroad company is liable for the tortious
acts of its servants done in and about its business is

especially

ap-

plicable where the servants of the company are retained after the
torts, and thereby their acts are impliedly ratified by the higher
agents of the corporation. It is a duty that carriers of passengers
owe to the public to employ reliable and gentlemanly agents to conduct and manage their trains, and if they do not employ such, they
should be made responsible for torts committed by those whom they
have employed, and to whom they have given the .power to violate
their duty imposed by law safely to transport the passenger, and
decently to treat him on his journey, so long as he properly demeans
himself. If they discharge such servant, it would show disapproval
of his conduct and may mitigate damages; if they retain or promote him, it may go to aggravate the wrong by ratifying the conduct
of the wrong-doer.
Gasway, 58/216. Cited, 102/476.
195. Train must be stopped at point of passenger’s destination.
When a passenger on a railroad-train holds a ticket to a given
point, it is the duty of the company to stop the train at the point of
destination a sufficient length of time to allow the passenger to leave
it with safety to his life and person; and if he is carried beyond his
stopping-place, by no fault of his, but by the failure of the company’s
agent to do his duty in that respect, he may recover any damages he
may sustain. But it is not necessary to the performance of the ordinary duties of the conductor, in putting passengers off the train,
that he should give them any other than the customary warning and
opportunity to avail themselves of it. A mere voluntary promise on
the part of a conductor to wake a drowsy passenger, and a failure so
to do, whereby the passenger was carried beyond his destination, furnishes no case for recovery against the railroad. Nunn, 71/710.
Cited, 74/449; 104/129.
When, in the trial of a suit against a railroad company by a passenger for damages on account of having been carried beyond his
destination, it appeared from uncontradicted evidence that the passenger had paid to the conductor his fare to a named point, it was
error to.
charge the jury, in effect, that it was a question for them to
determine whether it was negligence for the conductor to fail to ask
the passenger at what station he desired to
stop, and to pass that
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making such inquiry. Cobb, J., said: “It appearing that the plaintiff had paid her fare to the station which was her
destination, the conductor was under no duty whatever to return to
her and inquire at what station she wished to alight.”
O’Bryan,
112/127.
When a railroad company, by its agents, takes the fare of a passenger to a particular station on its road, it is bound to stop at that
station, that he may get off the cars; it is not sufficient that the speed
of the cars be slackened. And if, after passing the station, the speed
of the cars is again slackened, that the passenger may get off, and, under the direction of the conductor, he does get off, and in so doing
gets injured, the company is liable. It is not want of ordinary care,
if a passenger prudently uses the means which the company affords
him to get off the train. .McCurdy, 45/288.
Cited, 51/492; 69/273;

station without

71/712.
In

Caldwell, 89/550, it was held that a railroad which, as a comcarrier, receives a passenger and collects her fare to a particular station, with knowledge on the part of the conductor that she intends and desires to leave the train at that station, is charged by law
with the duty of stopping the train at the station and affording her
an
opportunity to get off; and failure to perform such duty is not
only a breach of contract, hut a tort, and an action for the tort is
maintainable.
Lumpkin, J., said: “A railroad conductor should not
collect and accept from a passenger her fare to a particular station,
knowing she intends and desires to get off there, unless he expects to
stop the train at that station and allow her to alight. In this case
the plaintiff paid her fare while the train was still within the corporate limits of Atlanta, and distinctly informed the conductor
where she wished to leave the train. It was his duty, if he did not
intend to stop there, to tell her so, decline to take her money, stop
the train at once, and allow her to get off in the city. By accepting
the fare under the circumstances stated, he became charged with the
duty of stopping at her station, and affording her an opportunity to
get off. He certainly had no right to carry her beyond this station
to another place.
A breach of a contract made by a common carrier with one of its passengers is a breach of its public duty, for
which it is liable in tort.” Cited, 104/696.
196. Stopping at flag-station.
In Lyon, 89/16, it was held that when a railroad company sells a
ticket to a flag-station at which its trains do not stop unless signaled
to do so for the purpose of receiving passengers, or when there are on
non
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board passengers bound for such station, it is ordinarily the
the conductor, before reaching the station, to ascertain from

duty of
the

pas-

holding such ticket his destination, and to stop the train
there for the purpose of allowing the passenger to leave the train.
This rule, under special circumstances, is subject to exceptions.
Lumpkin, J., said: “There may be circumstances under which a
passenger for a flag-station is carried beyond his destination when it
would not be fair or just to attribute the fact to the company’s negligenee. In a recent Texas ease — Railway Co. v. Ryan (Tex. App.),
18 S. W. Rep. 866 — it appeared that defendant in error bought a
ticket to a flag-station, knowing it was such, and that trains did not
stop there ‘unless some request was made upon the conductor to do
so.’ It would seem that he bought the ticket subject to the condition
that he must notify the conductor of his destination; and, failing to
senger

■

do so,

held he was not entitled to recover. Aside from inthis, there may be other occasions, which we will not attempt now to specify or enumerate, when the conductor will be prevented, without fault on his part, from ascertaining in time the desire of a passenger to stop at a flag-station, or when, under the circumstances, it is manifestly the duty of the passenger to see to it
it

was

stances like

that the conductor has the necessary information. In cases
as to which should take the initiative the question may very
he left to the jury. Cited, 89/554.
In

of doubt

properly

Dorsey, 106/826, it appeared that the plaintiff held a ticket to
flag-station at which the train stopped only when it had
a passenger to put off or when it was signaled to stop to take on a
passenger. She was carried beyond Lovejoy to the next station. It
was held, that while it is the duty of a conductor to ascertain, before
reaching flag-station, whether or not there is on board a passenger
ticketed thereto, there is a corresponding duty upon the passenger
who has purchased a ticket to such a station, upon discovering that he
has been overlooked by the conductor, to call the latter’s attention
to the fact, and surrender the ticket, in order that the conductor may
know the passenger’s destination, and have the train stopped for him
to alight. The failure of a passenger to observe this duty is a material
matter in determining whether or not, in a given instance, carrying
the passenger beyond his station was wholly attributable to the negligenee of the railway company, or whether the passenger, by exercising
the proper diligence, could have avoided being carried beyond such staLove joy, a
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In the trial of

which, under the evidence introduced
by the defendant, the rule above stated is applicable, it was erroneous
to charge the jury, without explanation
or qualification: “You
must determine from the evidence whether, by the exercise of extraordinary diligence, the conductor could, on the occasion alleged,
have ascertained the destination” of the passenger. The failure of
the court to instruct the jury concerning the duty of the passenger,
under such circumstances, is all the more objectionable, when it
clearly appears that the latter was perfectly familiar with the situation, and must have known the train would run beyond the flagstation, unless the-conductor was notified to have it stopped. Simmons, C. J., said:
“We think it is the duty of the conductor of a
passenger-train, when the company has sold tickets to passengers, to
go through the train and ascertain the station at which the passengers wish to alight; but we also think that, in a case like the
present, there is a corresponding duty upon the part of a passenger,
when he sees that the conductor has failed to call for and take up his
ticket, and is ignorant of his presence on the train and of his destination, to notify the conductor of his presence and of his destination,
especially where the ride is a short one, and the passenger knows that
the train will not stop at-his station unless the conductor has notice
that there is on board a passenger for that station. A passenger or
any other person can not sit still when he sees he is about to be injured, make no attempt to avoid the injury, and rely upon recovering
damages for the injury. Under the law, he must exercise reasonable
and ordinary care either to prevent the injury, or, after the injury
has been inflicted, to abate the damages. Here the passenger i wished
to leave the train at a station about fifteen miles from her startingiion.

point.

a ease

to

The conductor failed to take up her ticket or to notice her
Very short time, her destending to show that she

presence, and she must have known that, in a
tin ation would be reached. There is evidence

nevertheless made
of her destination.

no

effort to inform the conductor of her presence or

It therefore became material, in the present case,

jury to determine whether the railway company was entirely
blame, and to be mulcted in heavy damages, or whether the plaintiff, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided being car-

for the
to

beyond her station, and the consequent injury to her.”
112/129.

ried

Cited,

197.When
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conductor agrees to

stop at

a

particular place not

a

sta-

tion.

If the conductor agrees to put a passenger off at a particular place,
a station or regular stopping-place, it would he the

which is not

conductor’s

duty to stop the train at that place so that the passenger
get off in safety. This rule would apply although the passenger
had a ticket only to the last station passed before reaching the place
at which he was to be put off.
If the agreement was not that the
train should be stopped, but that the speed should be slackened, then
it should be so checked that the passenger could get off safely.
Young, 51/489. Cited, 69/273; 71/712.
In Hicks, 108/304, it was held that a promise by a conductor to a
passenger to stop a train when it arrived at a station at which it was
not scheduled to stop, so as to allow the passenger to alight thereat,
accompanied by a direction “to be out on the platform ready to get
off,” did not warrant the passenger, except at his own risk, in leaving
his seat in a car and going out on the platform thereof, when the train
was
rushing by the station at a high rate of speed (in the present instance, forty-five miles an hour), and there was no slackening of its
speed or anything indicating an intention by the persons in charge
of it to bring it to a stop. The evidence introduced for the plaintiff
showing affirmatively that the injuries of which he complained were
caused by his own gross negligence, the court was right in granting
could

a

nonsuit.
198. When

freight-train should stop.
Howard, 111/842, it was held that, one who takes passage upon
a freight-train to a designated city is entitled to
carriage thereon only
to the point or place in such city or its suburbs at which the run of this
train upon its usual and regular schedule is terminated, and can not
demand the right to be transported thereon to a station to which only
passenger-trains of the company are carried for the discharge of pasIn

sengers.

199. Jumping from the train.
Jumping from a rapidly moving train, known to be so moving,
when such jumping is not invited or ordered by the employees or
agents of the railroad company, ,or is not done to avoid some apparently threatened peril, is such negligence as will bar a recovery in
damages. And one who was an experienced train-hand, having been
at such work all his life, ought to have known that it was reckless
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conduct

the

part of any one to jump from a train moving at the
twenty-five or more miles an hour. All the allegations in the
original and amended declarations show that the plaintiff could have
avoided this injury by remaining in the cars. Whenever a person
can avoid an injury to himself by the exercise of ordinary care, he
can not recover.
Jarrett, 83/347. Cited, 105/240.
The evidence for the plaintiff showing that he jumped from the
train when it was in motion, of his own accord, and just before it
stopped at the station which was his point of destination, and after
he had been notified by the conductor that the train was going to stop
at that station, and that the train did stop there, and if he had waited
a minute or two he could have got off without injury, the court below
should have granted a nonsuit; and after a refusal to grant a nonsuit, when the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, should have
granted a new trial. Watts, 82/229. Cited, 83/350; 105/240.
Where the evidence for plaintiff showed that she was transported
to the depot to which she had purchased a ticket, but relied on a
promise of the conductor to let her get off the train at a certain streeton

rate of

crossing,

as

the train

was

going back from the depot to the railway-

yard, and the train not being stopped at such crossing, she jumped
from it while it was in motion and was injured, a nonsuit was properly granted. While she might probably recover for a breach of the
promise, she could not do so for the injuries sustained, which she could
have avoided by ordinary care. Watson, 81/476. Cited, 83/350.
A railroad company is not liable in damages to one who jumps from
its train when there is no necessity for doing so. Whelan, 84/506.
Cited, 105/240.
If a passenger voluntarily leaps from the train while it is in motion
and is injured thereby, he can not, as a general rule, recover of the
company, although the train may not have been stopped at the station long enough to afford reasonable opportunity to get off in the
usual way. Dickerson, 89/455.
Cited, 105/240; 107/138.
In an action of tort against a railroad company for damages resulting from personal injuries, when it appears that such injuries were
caused by plaintiff jumping from a moving train of the defendant, and
at a time when there was no apparent necessity for his leaving it,
and when he was not induced so to act by the defendant, but was told
by its agent not to do so, there can be no recovery. Goodwin, 105/237.
In Bartlett, 50/353, it was held that when a railroad-train was
stopped at a station, but somewhat away from its usual place of stop-
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ping at the station, and when there was not good ground for getting
off, and

a passenger,

thinking that the train would be moved

up

to the

place, failed to get off as he had intended, and after the train
had left the station and was fairly on its way to its next stopping-place
the passenger himself seized the bell-rope, rang the engine-bell and
took his position on the lower step of the platform to get off, and the
engineer having answered the bell, as the cars were coming to a stop,
but before they were stopped, the passenger, deeming the motion slow
enough for safety, undertook to step off, but just as he was stepping
he was, by a sudden jerk of the cars, thrown down and one of his
arms crushed by the wheels of the car passing over it; it was held that
the conduct of the passenger in himself ringing the bell, taking his
position on the step and undertaking to step off whilst the cars were
still in motion, was a want of ordinary care, and showed gross negligence on the part of the passenger.
McCay, J., said: “Assuming
that the employees of the railroad were in fault in not stopping the
cars at a suitable place for the plaintiff to get off, it does not at all
follow that the defendant is liable for the damage which was subsequently inflicted. A prudent man, under the circumstances, would
have sought the conductor, or gone on to the next station, and if any
injury came from this, he would have his right of action, but the
plaintiff took the affair into his own hands. He rang the bell to the
driver to stop the train. This he had no right to do; at least, only
in very extraordinary cases has a passenger a right to do this.
The
rope is not there for the use of passengers, but to enable the conductor to communicate with the engineer.
So dangerous a thing
as a train of cars is not to be at the
mercy of a passenger. The public
interest, as well as the rights of the railroad company, require that
the bell-rope shall be sacred only to the touch of the proper officer.
When the bell was rung, and the drivers commenced obeying it, the
plaintiff had no business on the platform; at least, he was there at his
own risk until the ears stopped.
The platform is not a safe place to
be, and it is not made to ride on; still more careless was he to go
down upon the step, where any sudden jar might throw him off. But,
in our judgment, it was perfect recklessness to attempt to jump off
before the cars stopped, especially as the signal to stop had not come
from the proper person.
That at the moment there was a jerk of
the cars, does not, we think, help the case. Such jerks in stopping
usual

must occur,

and when he undertook to take control of the train and
leap from it in the dark, he should have thought of this liability.
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That he
tune.

thought the speed

And it

stopping its

seems

to

us

was sufficiently slackened was his misforabsurd to say that a railroad company, in

is bound to so stop them as to avoid hanger to pasundertake to get off before the stoppage is complete.
a right to assume that it is safe to get off a train that is
running at any speed, since, until it is entirely stopped, there may
or may not be changes of motion, jerks and other irregularities dangerous to one in the act of getting off.”
Cited, 83/350; 107/138.
A declaration alleged as follows: Plaintiff was a passenger on defendant’s train, and had paid his fare to a given point, where defendant’s agents agreed to put him safely off, but, after having promised to slack up, they negligently directed plaintiff to get off while
the train was in motion.
Seeing that he was about to be carried beyond his destination, and thinking he might safely jump, under
promise of defendant’s agents to slack up, and his notice to get off,
cars,

sengers who
No man has

plaintiff stepped from the train; finding that he would be hurled
against the track if he let loose, he retained his hold on the car,
trusting that the speed would be lessened; but, though defendant’s
agents saw plaintiff’s situation, the speed of the train was negligently
increased, causing plaintiff to be dragged, etc. It was held that a
cause of action was set out, and a demurrer to the declaration was
properly overruled. Smith, 69/268.
In Covington, 81/273, the plaintiff, a passenger, claimed to have
been injured in consequence of the failure of the defendant to stop
the train at the station a sufficient time to allow him to alight from
it in safety. It was held: The only question in this case is whether
the railroad company stopped its train a reasonably sufficient time to
allow the plaintiff to alight in safety. If it did, and he jumped off
the train after it was again in motion, he can not recover. If it did
not stop a sufficient time, and if in attempting to get off he was not
guilty of such negligence as to bar his right to recover, then he would
be entitled to such damages as he may have sustained. Cited,
96/43; 107/138.
200. Jumping under order or with concurrence of conductor or
paymaster.
In Singleton, 67/306, it appeared that the plaintiff had a roundtrip ticket from Harvard to Geneva, and by mistake he entered the
pay-train, which was about moving off. As he walked in he met a
negro who told him that the paymaster was in the next room; he saw
no seats, and went to where the paymaster was, who asked him where
18
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going, and he said, to Harvard; the paymaster told him it
one dollar a mile to ride on that car; his reply was
that he could not pay it, and, according to his testimony, the paymaster told him in an abrupt manner to jump off, which he did,
and broke his leg.
According to the paymaster’s testimony, he said:
“I can’t pay that much and will get off,” and he was told to step out,
meaning at the door beside him, but he went to the rear of the car
and jumped off there, breaking his leg. It was held that, plaintiff
having been informed that it was not a passenger-train, and being
told, as he claimed, to get off, it was not error to charge that reasonable opportunity must have been allowed him to get off, but it
was error to add that such opportunity was not allowed him so long
he

was

would cost him

as

the train

was

in motion.

agent, in charge of

It

was

further held that if

a

conductor,

train, improperly ordered one who entered
it to leave it while in motion, and in iso doing an injury occurred,
though the party may have been negligent in obeying the order, it
would not free the company from liability, but would constitute a
case of contributory negligence.
While a mere direction or command
by the agent of the company requiring one who had entered a train
other than a passenger-train to leave it, would not amount to force,
yet if the latter acted under fear of it, the effect upon his mind was
the same, and a recovery for an injury sustained in obeying the order
would not be prevented by the fact that no physical force was used.
Although a person entering a wrong train by mistake, on discovering
his mistake could have safely left the train, the speed then being very
slow, yet if he remained on until the speed became greater, and then,
under order from the agent in charge of the train, sought to leave it,
and was injured, the case would be one of contributory negligence.
Though one would not be justified in jumping from a train moving
rapidly to avoid paying the fare demanded, although exorbitant, yet
if he refused to pay such fare and was ordered to leave the train, and
in so doing was injured, such facts would constitute contributory negligence on the part of both himself and the railroad.
In Dixon, 80/212, Bleckley, C. J., said: “The plaintiff, being a
passenger upon the defendant’s railway, was injured by leaping from
the train. This took place in Alabama, and the defendant is an Alabama corporation.
The court charged the jury that according to
the law of that State, if the plaintiff contributed to the injury, he
or

could not
of

recover.

a

The facts in evidence made

contributory, but of

gross,

a

clear case, not only

negligence, provided the jury believed
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that the conductor did not

prompt the plaintiff to jump from the
train; and that question was fairly submitted to the jury. Under
the charge of the court, the whole case was made to turn upon it. We
think, under these circumstances, that the effect of contributory negligence, whether tested by the Alabama law or our own, would not,
and ought not, to change the result.
The court was therefore right
in refusing to grant a new trial.”
Cited, 105/240.
If one leaps from a train of cars moving at the rate of fifteen
miles per hour, on the advice or concurrence of the conductor, his
right to recover would involve the question whether he prudently
used the only means provided by the company to get off that the
course of the company permitted him to use, and also his recklessness
and want of

ordinary

could have avoided the

for if, by the use of ordinary care, he
injury, the company will not be liable. Sin-

care;

gleton, 66/252.
201. Person

put in peril by negligence of the company.
a passenger the principle was stated thus: If through
the default of the company or its servants the passenger is placed
in such a perilous condition as to render it an act of reasonable precaution, for the purpose of self-preservation, to leap from the ears,
the company is responsible for the injury he receives thereby, although, if he had remained in the ears, he would not have been injured. Paulk, 24/356. Cited, 26/256; 83/674; 92/660.
In the

case

of

202.
In

Acting under excitement.
Covington, 81/273, the court

asked to charge the jury as
take account of the excitement
where the party is not menaced
with bodily harm, if the circumstances are such as naturally to produce excitement in a prudent person.” Blandford, J., said:
“We
can not say that this is not good law in the abstract, but we do not
think it is strictly applicable to the facts of this case. The plaintiff,
who testified as a witness, did not testify as to any excitement he was
under at the time he jumped from the train; nor does the declaration
state anything in reference thereto.
Hence we can not say that the
court committed such an error in refusing to give this charge as
would warrant us in reversing the judgment of the court below.”
Cited, 96/43.
203. What passengers may be refused. Carriers of passengers may
refus° to admit, or may eject from their conveyances, all persons refusing to comply with reasonable regulations, or guilty of improper
follows:

“The law allows you to
under which an act is done, even

was
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conduct, or Of bad, dissolute, doubtful or suspicious characters; so
they may refuse to convey persons seeking to interfere with their
own business or interest.
Civil Code, §2296.
In Sizemore, 106/307, the plaintiff sued on account of her expulsion from a waiting-room provided by the railroad company for the
accommodation of persons waiting to take passage upon its cars.
According to the plaintiff’s evidence, she was in the ladies’ waitingroom of the defendant’s transfer-station, waiting to take a car to her
home, and was talking to a gentleman, when Flournoy, the president
of the railroad company, walked in, violently shook a paper in her
face and said that place was not prepared for her, and to get out.
The gentleman with whom she had been conversing told her to remain, and that he would walk out and not cause her any trouble.
She did not go at that time, and in a few moments Flournoy walked
back and shook a paper in her face, and told her if she did not get out
of there he would put her out.
He then walked out of the door, and
as soon as he did so she went out and walked home, a distance of
about two miles from the station.
She feared bodily harm from the
wjiy Flournoy spoke to her.
She left because he asked her out and
told her if she did not get out he would put her out.
She had been
in the station about fifteen minutes.
She left the station voluntarily.
According to the defendant’s testimony, the plaintiff bore the reputation of a prostitute, and that was stated to Flournoy on the oceasion referred to, before he went to her. Flournoy testified that after
his attention was called to the plaintiff he walked by the station
and saw her talking with a man.
Their heads were close together
and they were in very earnest conversation. He did not know what
they were saying. He told her that the place was not built for people
of her character, and that she could not come there and make her engagements, and she must keep away from there. He turned immediately, and walked out of the door and took a car for home. He
left the woman and the man sitting there. He used no force or violence and made no threats, nor any effort to evict her.
There was
evidence that on the occasion referred to there was nothing
improper
in the plaintiff's manner.
The judge charged the jury: “It is insisted by the plaintiff that she was evicted.
An eviction may be had
in two ways, either by intimidation or by physical force, -either one of
which would be sufficient. If there was a request, as is insisted
upon,
by the president of this road, that she leave there, and that if she did
not he would put her out, and she acted
upon the request, believing
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that

physical force would be used, then I state to you, if she went out
understanding, there would he a legal eviction in contemplation of law. You may look to the fact as to whether or not she
remained there after Flournoy requested her to leave, and after he
had left, and you may look to the fact as to whether she left immediately, as she insists that she did. If she did, apprehending physical
force, although there was a request simply, accompanied by a threat
that if she did not leave he would put her out, that would be an
eviction in contemplation of law.” Simmons, C. J., said: “A portion
of the charge as given, relating to the law concerning ejectment by
force, as distinguished from ejectment by intimidation, is excepted
to.
No special assignment of error is, however, stated or relied on.
The extract complained of which is thus made is certainly unobjectionable as an abstract statement of well-known legal principles,
which is a sufficient reply to the assignment of error made thereon.
In its answer, the defendant denied all the material allegations of
the plaintiff’s petition.
By special plea of justification, the defendant
sought to make the further defense that the plaintiff was a woman
of loose character, and accordingly it was not only the right, but
the duty, of its officials to eject her from its waiting-room, which it
had provided for the convenience and use of its lady passengers, and
which was not intended to be kept for and occupied by persons who
with that

were

dissolute

or

of doubtful character.

At the instance of the

plaintiff, the court struck this plea. No exception to this ruling was
taken, and the action of the judge in refusing to allow the defendant
to make the special defense sought to be urged is not properly before
this court for review. We therefore wish to be distinctly understood
as not
intimating that this defense was not in law a good one. Had
the striking of the special plea been excepted to, the question respecting it would be a very different one, and would present the case in
another light.”
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CHAPTER 11.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND APPORTIONMENT OE DAMAGES.
204.

and
negligence
apportionment of damages.
Willful negligence of the
defendant.
t~
When the doctrine does not apply.
When the court should submit the doc*
trine to the jury.
The section is imperative, and the court
should hold the jury to it.

Contributory

205.
206.

207.
208.

209. Where plaintiff’s intoxication does not
affect his right to recover.
210. Agent in charge of plaintiff’s property.
211. Standard for the apportionment.
212. No recovery unless plaintiff is less at
fault than the defendant.
213. The negligence in proof must contribute
to the thing that caused the injury.

204.

Contributory negligence and apportionment of damages.
plaintiff and the agents of the company were both at fault,
and the plaintifE may in some way have contributed to the injury,
and he could not have avoided the consequences to himself caused
by the defendant’s negligence, if he had exercised ordinary care, he
may recover, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in
proportion to the amount of default attributable to him. Civil Code,
§§2322, 3830.
^
In Georgia this is the only case to which the doctrine of eontributory negligence and apportionment of damages applies.
If the

For

a

construction of the

sections,

see

40, 41.

205.

Willful negligence of the defendant.
wrong-doing of the defendant is merely negligence, the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff may, as is well understood,
operate as a defense, but when the defendant’s conduct is willful, it
is no longer negligence, and when the injury sustained by the plaintifE
When the

is the result of the wanton and willful act of the

defendant, the

ques-

tion of the

plaintiff’s contributory negligence as a defense can not
arise.
In order to constitute contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff, there must be negligence on the part of the defendant.
It is accordingly the settled rule that when the defendant’s
conduct amounts to willfulness, and when the mischief is occasioned
by his intentional and wanton wrong-doing, the plaintiff’s negligence
is no defense. Beach on Con. Neg. §64.
Citing Newman, 94/560,
in which ease it was held that when the defendant’s wrongful act
was not only a failure in diligence, but was willful, or so grossly negligent as to be wanton and reckless, the mere failure of the plaintiff
or his servant in the exercise of ordinary care will not defeat a recovery.
In Denson,

84/774, it was held that although one injured by the

railroad company might, by the use
have avoided the consequences of that negligence,
negligence of

a

of ordinary

care,

yet if it were so
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to amount to wanton and willful negligence, such want of
care to avoid the consequences of it would be no bar to a
recovery for the injury. Such a case is presented when it clearly appears that the injured one, who was deaf though able to hear to some
extent, walked on the railroad-track in daylight; a train came from
behind him, and the company’s servants could have seen him for
gross as

ordinary

four hundred

yards before reaching him, but though he was between
blow-post and the crossing, they gave no warning by blowing the
whistle or ringing the bell, or otherwise, and made no effort to check
speed until within a few feet of him, when the whistle was blown
twice and he was struck by the train about the same time. Blandford, J., said: “The question here is, what does ‘the defendant’s
negligence’ mean? Is it not apparent that it is the opposite of the
ordinary care required of the plaintiff, and the want of reasonable
and ordinary care required of defendant, such neglect as amounts to
gross, willful and culpable neglect? We are of opinion that the
word ‘ negligence,’ as used in §3830 of the Code, does not mean
gross negligence, or willful and culpable negligence, but in this
case we are of the opinion that the defendant was guilty of gross, willful and culpable negligence. The negligence of the plaintiff will not
bar a recovery where it affirmatively appears that the negligence of
the defendant is so gross as to lead to the conclusion that the same
is willful and culpable.
To this effect are many decisions of the
courts of England and this country.”
Bleckley, C. J., concurring,
said: “Grant that the deceased, also, was guilty of gross negligence
in not foreseeing the danger and guarding against it, yet he did not
thereby forfeit his life and render it lawful to kill him. Against liability for mere negligence resulting in injury or death, the failure of
the suffering party in ordinary care, where the disaster could have
been shunned by the exercise of such care on his part, will be a defense; but willful or wanton torts can not be defended by showing
that the victim was a wrong-doer, and that he recklessly exposed his
own life.
One reckless man can not kill another, and justify himself
to the law by the plea that the other was in his way, and might have
kept out, or gotten out, if he had tried. Human life is too sacred for
the law to recognize this as a good answer.” Simmons, J., dissenting on the facts, but not on the principles of law. Cited, 93/397.
206. When the doctrine does not apply.
No person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injury to himself, where the same is caused by his own negligence, or
the
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where, by the use of ordinary care, he could have avoided the consequences to himself, caused by defendant’s negligence. The doctrine
of contributory negligence is of force in this State, but it does not
apply where the plaintiffs own negligence was the sole cause of the
injury, or where, by the exercise of ordinary care, he could have
avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant's negligence. Bloomingdale, 74/604.
Cited, 82/804; 83/597; 84/785.
207. When the court, should submit the doctrine to the jury.
It is proper for the court to instruct the jury on the law of contributory negligence and apportionment of damages, when the testimony would warrant them in finding that both parties were at
fault. It is the duty of the court to charge the jury upon the law
applicable to all conclusions of fact which they may reasonably reach
from the evidence.
Abbott, 74/851; Meigs, 74/857.
If there be

no

evidence to show that the deceased contributed in the

slightest degree to the injury which caused his death, a charge of the
court on the subject of contributory negligence was not founded on
the evidence and was erroneous. Bain v. Athens Foundry & Machine
Works, 75/718.
It was held in Pierce v. Atlanta Cotton Mills, 79/782, that
when the declaration alleged that the plaintiff was without fault,
and she did not claim damages for contributory negligence in the
court below or in this court, but claimed full damages, and did not
insist before this court that she was entitled to damages if she contributed to the injury, there was no error ill the charge that a servant, to recover of a master on account of negligence, must herself
be without fault, and if the plaintiff in this case was herself negligent in any degree, contributing to the occasioning of the injury,
she could not recover, even though the defendant may have been negligent. Cited, and the same principle declared, in Hill v. Callahan,
82/114.
In Ingram v. Hilton & Dodge Lumber Co., 108/194, the plaintiff
alleged that he was himself free from fault, and he prayed for a recovery of all damages that could possibly be awarded to him under the
facts set forth in his petition, viz., for the actual damages sustained,
for those resulting from physical pain and suffering and from mental
anguish, and also for punitive damages, and it was held that a plaintiff
who alleges that he was without fault, who sues for and seeks to recover full damages, and who does not
request a charge upon the law
of contributory negligence and apportionment of damages, has no just
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cause

to

complain of

him to show that he

an

was

instruction that it

was

incumbent

upon

free from fault.

In

Palmer, 89/161, it appeared that the plaintiff’s cattle, when
by defendant’s train, were in a field that he used as a pasture.
In the field, and on his own land, he had placed a fence about forty
feet north of the railroad, to keep cattle from getting into his crops
in the field north of the railroad. He never lost any cattle by the
killed

railroad before he erected that fence.

The defendant's counsel

eon-

tended that the

building of the fence was contributory negligence. It
plaintiff having, as he had a right to do, built his
pasture fence and located the gate for his cattle on his own land, the
maintaining and use of this fence and gate did not constitute contributory negligence on his part, and the court committed no error
in failing to instruct the jury on contributory negligence.
208. The section is imperative and the court should hold the jury
was

held that the

to it.

The section is

imperative and says that the damages shall be diby the jury in proportion to the amount of default attributable to the complainant, when he and the agents of the company
are both at fault.
When the judge charged the jury that they
“would be authorized to make such reasonable deduction,” but in
the same connection charged the rule of contributory negligence in
the language of the statute, that “the damages shall be diminished
by the jury,” it was held that there was no error which required a
new trial.
This plaintiff was a stranger. Pittman, 73/325. The
same thing occurred in Krogg, 77/215, and Blandford, J., said:
“We think this charge is objectionable, in that it turns the jury loose
to do as they please, and we think the court should hold them well
in hand; but we held, in Pittman, 73/325, that such a charge as this
was cured by other portions of the charge, in which the court confined
the jury to their duty as to their finding.”
In Brinson, 70/207, the trial judge charged the jury as follows:
“A railroad company is bound to use ordinary care in the running
of its trains, to prevent them from coming in collision with the person of-another, and this it is bound to use, even if that other is, on
his side, in some degree negligent; therefore^ if damages happen to
such other person by a collision which the company, by the use of
ordinary care, might have prevented, the company must make good
the damage.” The case was one to which the doctrine of contributory negligence was applicable, and this charge was held to be error,
minished
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it left the

jury to infer that they were at liberty to find the entire
damage done to the plaintiff, without making any
abatement for the negligence chargeable to him, thus withdrawing the
doctrine of contributory negligence as lessening the damages. Cited,
74/613.
209. Where plaintiff’s intoxication does not affect his right to reas

amount of the

cover.

If the

plaintiff’s intoxication did not contribute to his injury, or to
degree of it, his being intoxicated would not affect his right to
recover; nor should it count against him, as disqualifying him to
avoid the consequences of the defendant’s negligence, if the circumstances were such that a prudent, sober man could not have avoided
them by the exercise of ordinary diligence. Phinazee, 93/488.
210. Agent in charge of plaintiff’s property.
In a suit against a railroad for injury to personal property in charge
of plaintiff’s agent, the rule of damages is this: If the injury oecurred wholly by the agent’s fault, there could be no recovery; if by
mixed fault of the agent and the company, there could be a recovery,
but diminished in proportion to the agent’s fault; if wholly by the
fault or negligence of the company’s agents, then there could be a
recovery for full damages. Wyly, 65/120.
Cited, 82/805; 111/17.
211. Standard for the apportionment.
In Neely, 56/540, Bleckley, J., said:
“For the apportionment of
damages according to the relative fault of the parties, there seems
to he no standard more definite than the enlightened opinion of the
jury.” Cited, 76/217.
212. No recovery unless plaintiff is less at fault than defendant.
In Newman, 94/560, the action was for killing a horse and destroying a baker’s delivery-wagon. The declaration alleged that the injuries were done on a public street in the city of Macon, while the defendant’s passenger-train was being run at a high rate of speed, in
a
grossly negligent and reckless manner, without due caution and
circumspection, and without conforming to the requirements of law
in approaching and crossing a public street or highway.
The court
charged the jury that if the damages were five hundred dollars, and
they were both, according to the evidence, equally to blame, the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover but two hundred and fifty dollars;
and, if the plaintiff was three-fourths to blame and the defendant
one-fourth to blame, the same proportion would hold good; or, if the
plaintiff was one-fifth to blame and the defendant four-fifths to blame,
the
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these

proportions would still be carried out. It was held that where
injury complained of was the result of mutual negligence by the
plaintiff’s servant and the defendant, there can be no recovery, unless
the servant was less in fault than the defendant. Cited, 99/192.
^Although a charge to the effect that if a physical injury to the
plaintiff resulted from the mutual negligence of both parties, and if
the plaintiff contributed “three-fourths or one-third, or some other
amount to the injury,” his recovery would be reduced by the amount
■of his default, was, under the ruling of this court in Newman’s ease,
incorrect, yet, where the only complaint made of such charge is that
it was erroneous because “any contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff would defeat a recovery,” the giving of such charge is
not cause for a new trial. Dempsey v. City of Rome, 99/192.
In an action for damages to personalty against a railroad company,
it was erroneous to charge as follows: “To illustrate: If the default
was about half and half, one party as much at fault as the other, the
jury so thought, you would have the right to give the plaintiff half
•damages.” Little, J., said: “The decision in Newman’s case, supra,
rules .the point here where the court expressly charged that, if the
fault was about half and half, the jury would have the right to give
the

plaintiff damages.” Watson, 104/243.
213. The negligence in proof must contribute to the thing that
causes the injury.
In Harris, 76/501, a suit brought by a widow for the homicide of
her husband, the evidence for the plaintiff tended to show that the
deceased was crossing the railroad in front of defendant’s engine,
passing along a public street, and that the engine ran over and
killed him; that no bell was rung as a signal of its moving across the
street.
The defendant’s testimony tended to show that plaintiff’s
husband was on board the train when it started, and attempted to
jump off of his own accord, in spite of an iron barrier over which he
leaped, and thus fell between two cars, and was killed. The defendant was entitled to have submitted to the jury both the question
whether the plaintiff’s husband caused the injury solely by his own
negligence, and also whether, by the use of ordinary care, he could
have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant’s
negligence. Under the evidence for the defendant, if believed by
the jury, the failure to ring the bell could not have affected or contributed to the injury, and an entire omission to notice this branch
•of the defense in the charge requires a new trial. The defense pro-
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vided for in

§3830 of the Civil Code is not identical with that
§2522, and while the doctrine of contributory negligence applies to both sections, yet the particular act of negligence in proof
must be such as contributes to the thing that caused the injury sued
for.
Cited, 76/785; 80/637; 82/113.
under

CHAPTER 12.
EMPLOYEES
214.
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Liability of railway companies to employees.
The class of employees protected by
Section 2297.

*216. Injury by co-employee, §2323.
217. Without fault, what it means.
218.
219.
220.

Employee has the right to due care by
his co-employees.
Right to recover does not depend upon
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defective hand.

Liability of railroad companies to employees. Railroad companies are common carriers, and liable as such. As such companies necessarily have many employees who can not possibly control
.those who should exercise care and diligence in the running of trains,
such companies shall be liable to such employees as to passengers for
injuries arising from the want of such care and diligence. Civil
Code, §2297.
215. The class of employees protected in section 2297.
Section 2297 protects all employees who fall within the descriptive/

.
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words, “can not possibly control those who should exercise care and
diligence in the running of trains,” whether they may or may not be
properly classed as fellow servants of the train-employees. They are
the

legal footing with passengers, and the question of fellownothing to do with it.
In Ayers, 53/12, it appeared that plaintiff’s husband was in the
employ of the railroad company as a track-raiser, and was injured
while being carried on a train of the company from the place of his
work to the camp where he stayed at night.
He did not belong to
the train and had no work to attend to for the company on the train.
It was held that he was upon the train as a mere passenger, and that
he came within §§2297 and 2328 of the Civil Code, so far as his right
to recover damages for the injuries was affected by the question of
negligence on his part; that, though in such a case the company or
its agents may he guilty of negligence, yet if the injured party could
have avoided the consequences to himself of that negligence by the
exercise of ordinary diligence, he is not entitled to recover, and if it
appears that both parties were guilty of negligence, and that the
person injured would not by ordinary care and diligence have avoided
the consequences to himself of the negligence of the company or its
agents, he may recover, but the jury should lessen the damages in
proportion to the negligence and want of ordinary care of the injured party. Cited, 52/468; 61/589; 80/433.
In Webb, 61/589, Bleckley, J., said: “If the employee be upon
the train as a mere passenger, and having no work to attend to for
the company on the train, he would be upon the footing of any other
passenger.” Cited, 69/719.
In Prather, 80/427, it appeared that Prather belonged to the construction-train on which he was injured, and was held to be a coemployee with the balance of the crew, and must be free from fault to
entitle him to recover. Simmons, J., said: “If the Ayers case was
ruled correctly (of which I have grave doubts), it does not conflict
with our ruling in this case. The facts are entirely different. In
that case Ayers did not belong to that train, as Prather did to this.
He was a 'track-raiser,’ a separate and independent employment from
that of a train-hand, who is a part of the crew of the train.”
In Ellington v. Beaver Dam Co., 93/61, Lumpkin, J., in speaking of
the Ayers ease, said: “It being a suit against a railroad company,
it biade no difference whether Ayers, the track-hand, was a fellow
servant of the employees on the train or not, because, under §2297 of
on

same

service has
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the Civil

Code, all employees except those who may be able to control
engaged in the running of trains are placed upon the footing
of passengers as to injuries arising from the negligence of this latter
class of employees, and there can be no doubt that the employees
protected by that section include all who fall within the descriptive
words, 'can not possibly control those who' should exercise care and
diligence in the running of trains,’ whether they may or may not be
properly classed as fellow servants of the train-employees. This
being so, Ayers, by virtue of this section, was in either event given
the right of a passenger, so far as the liability of the company was
concerned, and accordingly it was held that his own negligence, even
though contributing to his death, would not totally defeat the right
of his widow to recover. In other words, this section put the class
of employees to which Ayers belonged on the same legal footing with
passengers, without reference to the question of fellow-service. A
track-hand like Ayers could not possibly control employees running
those

a

train.”
216.

Injury by coemployee. If the person injured is himself an
employee of the company, and the damage was caused by another
employee, and without fault or negligence on the part of the person
injured, his employment by the company shall be no bar to the recovery.
Civil Code, §2323.
By the express terms of the Code an employee is only entitled to
recover for damages caused by the negligence of another
employee in
the running of cars, when the injured employee is without fault himself. The doctrine of contributory negligence laid down in §§3830
and 2322 of the Code does not apply to such eases.
Duggan, .51/212.
Cited, 76/531.
The only distinction between an employee so injured and other persons so injured, is that the
employee must be wholly blameless to
authorize a recovery; others may recover, though partly at fault.
Thompson, 54/509. Cited, 69/720; 70/678; 86/322.
If an employee of a railroad company be injured without fault or
negligence on his part, through the negligence of another employee,
he may recover. Baker, 68/699. Cited, 73/504. If at all at fault,
he can not recover. Green, 73/814. If the injured person be, at
the time of the injury, in the service of the company, if without fault,
he may recover; if at fault, he can not recover. Any other person may
recover, though at fault, but the recovery will be less on account* of
such fault. Ivey, 73/499.
Cited, 86/322; 90/574.
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This was an action against a railroad company for personal injuries, in which the plaintiff established his own freedom from fault;
and, under his pleadings and the evidence, it was a question for the
jury whether he was injured in one of the ordinary risks of his employment, or because of the negligence of fellow servants, for which
the company is, under our statutes, liable. Accordingly, this court
will not set aside, after its approval by the trial judge, a verdict
returned in the plaintiff’s favor.
Hurt, 112/817.
217. Without fault, what it means.
“Without fault” means that the party suing must not have done
anything to contribute to his injury, or must have done everything to
prevent the consequences of the company’s negligence. In other
words, he must show that he did nothing he ought not to have done
and neglected to do nothing he ought to have done.
Lanier, 83/587.

Cited, 97/780; 103/826.
In Austin, 104/614, Simmons, C. J., said:

“While the Code uses
employee, this court
has in many eases construed them to mean the same as ‘without negligence,’ and has used ‘fault’ and ‘negligence’ as being in this conneetion synonymous.”
218. Employee has the right to due care by his coemployees.
An employee, being in the discharge of his duty, has the right to
rely upon other employees doing their duty. Any omission of ordinary and reasonable care by the eoemployees of the plaintiff would
be a violation of his right to the safety and security which the observanee of such diligence would afford.
Parker, 83/539.
219. Right to recover does not depend upon the question of fellowthe words ‘without fault’ with reference to

an

service.
In

while

Goldwire, 56/196, it appeared that the plaintiff was injured

coupling cars in the line of his duty as a train-hand. The injury was caused by the negligence of the conductor or engineer engaged upon the same train, and therefore about the same business
with the plaintiff. They were his fellow servants. It was ruled
that an employee, injured while on duty in connection with the running of the cars, can, if free from fault himself, recover from the
company for the negligence of coemployees without respect to whether
the two were engaged in the same business or not.
This is the invariable rule that holds between railroad companies and their employees under the Code. Cited, 93/62.
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Company liable whether injuries are connected with the running of trains or not.
In Thompson, 54/509, it appeared that the plaintiff was a Switchman in the service of the railroad company.
Other employees of the
company were engaged in carrying iron from one point to another of
the yard of the company, and they let a bar of iron fall on the shoulder of the plaintiff and injured him.
The question made was whether
the company was liable in a case where the injury did not occur in
connection with running the ears. It was held that a railroad company is liable for injuries to the person of an employee by the negligence or misconduct of other employees of the company, whether such
injuries are connected with the running of trains or otherwise.
Cited, 69/203, 720. The distinction made between such employee and other persons injured by employees engaged in business
other than the running of the train of the company, is that the employee must be wholly blameless to authorize a recovery; others may
recover, though partly in fault.
Henderson, 69/720. In Ivey,
73/499, the widow brought suit to recover damages for the killing of
her husband, an employee, by the negligence of other employees of
the company. They were all engaged in building a bridge to enable
trains to enter a town and land passengers at a new, depot.
The
Thompson case was reviewed and affirmed, so far as the principle
stated above was involved. In Brown, 86/320, the plaintiff and others,
all employees of the company, were engaged in working at a planer,
and plaintiff was injured. The court was asked to review the Ivey
case, which was done, and the case was affirmed, the court stating that
they would not further inquire as to the correctness of the decision in
the Thompson case. That case was again cited with approval in Miller, 90/571, so that the principle stated is the settled law of the State,
and upon the doctrine of stare decisis is established beyond further
controversy. Hicks, 95/305.
Though one may be an employee of a railroad company, yet if his
agency is disconnected from the running of trains, and while traveling
he is injured by the running of a train, he stands in the position of a
passenger, and will not necessarily be precluded from recovery by the
existence of some degree of negligence on his part; but in such a case
the. doctrine of apportionment of damages on account of contributory
negligence may apply. (This under §2297.) But where the injury
did not result from the running of trains, and was disconnected therefrom, hut resulted from the existence of a dangerous hole in the
220.
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ground held by the company in connection with its depot, at which
the injured party was an agent, it would be necessary for him to
be wholly blameless to authorize a recovery. If he was an employee
of the road, and was injured, by .coemployees engaged in business
other than the running of trains, it does not matter that he was not
connected with them in regard to the pit where the injury occurred;
to recover he must be blameless.
Henderson, 69/715. On a second
trial of this case the same facts appeared in evidence and a nonsuit
was granted.
73/718.
221. At fmlt m the work for which he was employed.
In Webb, 61/589, Bleckley, J., said: “It is an established rule,
under §2323 of the Civil Code, that for an employee of a railroad
company to recover for damages caused by another employee, the
person injured must have been without fault or negligence on his
part. This means, of course, that recovery is thus conditional where
the injury was received whilst the servant was engaged at the time
in the work for which he was employed. If upon the train as a
mere passenger, and having no work to attend to for the
company
on the train, he would be upon the footing of any other passenger.”
He would then come under §2297 of the Civil Code. Cited, 88/210.
222.

Negligence operating at the time of the injury.

In

suit

by an employee against his employer for damages done by
coemployee, the question whether he himself was free from negligence refers to negligence operating at the time of the injury.
That
he might have been negligent at some other time would not affect
the issue. The right of the plaintiff to recover turned upon what
transpired when the injury was sustained. Johnson, 66/259.
223. Negligence not contributing to the injury will not prevent a
a

a

recovery.

Negligence on the part of an employee of a railroad company, which
no way contributes to injuries received by him in consequence of
its negligence, will not prevent a recovery by the employee for such
injuries. Baston, 99/798.
To entitle an injured employee to recover, he must have been blameless about the business which caused the injury. Negligence or carelessness not contributing to the injury, will not prevent a recovery.
Barber, 71/644. Cited, 85/474; 103/826.
In an action by an engineer, employed by defendant railroad company, for injuries sustained in a collision, plaintiff is not chargeable
with negligence on the ground that he approached a station three miles
in
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from! the place of the'accident at too great

speed, and that the engine

control, where it does not appear that the
accident was caused thereby, and no accident occurred at that station. Bowers, 86/22.
-The evidence showing that the plaintiff, an employee of a railroad
company, in the course of his duty, in the daytime, after examining
a' ladder resting against a coal-car, and testing the security of its position, had safely ascended it, and that, while he was engaged in doing some necessary work in the car, the ladder, without his knowledge,

'was not then within his

was

removed

by another employee of the

company,

who in

a

short time

replaced it against the car apparently in the same position, and that,
upon the plaintiff’s attempting to descend, without re-examining the
ladder or again testing the safety of its position, it slipped from under
him and he fell and was injured, it was a question of fact for the determination of the jury as to whether or not the plaintiff was guilty
of any negligence! contributing to the injury. This question having,
under proper instructions from the court, been decided by the jury
in his f^vor, the verdict will not be disturbed. Garner, 91/27.
224. Negligence must contribute in an appreciable degree to the
cause of the injury.
In Webb, 61/586, it was held that if his own negligence contributed
substantially to the injury, there can be no recovery; the doctrine of
apportionment of damages on account of contributory negligence not
applying in such a case, but the principle of §2329 being applicable,
which section demands that the employee shall be free from fault
or 1 negligence.
Cited, 63/182; 82/210. Any fault of his, however
slight, which contributed to the injury, would defeat his
action.
Kenney, 61/590. Cited, 63/182.
In Mitchell, 63/173, it was held that before an employee can relieve himself of the legal consequences of violating any rule of the
company whatever, no matter how disconnected it may appear to be
with the disaster which damaged him, he must show that his violation of the rule did not contribute at all to that disaster.

Upon
proof that it did not contribute at all thereto, his recovery will
not be defeated by such harmless violation of rule.
Thus, where the
engineer is the plaintiff, and he permitted a brother engineer of the
company to ride upon the engine with him from Bolingbroke to
Macon (the rule prohibiting him from permitting any person to ride
therepn) and the disaster and damage was caused by the falling in
of an embankment near Macon, and it was made to appear from the
clear
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testimony of both engineers that everything possible was done to
catastrophe, and that the presence of the passenger engineer
did not, in the slightest degree, contribute to the disaster, but that
the same was caused solely by the falling in' of the embankment, the
recovery of the plaintiff will not be deflated by his suffering the other
engineer to ride on the engine with him. Bleckley, J., concurring
dubitante, and Warner, C. J., dissenting. In the opinion, Jackson,
J., says: ‘‘If the damage was caused by another employee and was
not caused by the fault or negligence of the employee hurt, then he
may recover. Not only must his fault or negligence contribute to
the damage, but it must contribute substantially thereto, and
such is the spirit of the reasoning of the cases on the subject.”
This
decision was subsequently reaffirmed by a unanimous court, and the
opinion of Jackson, J., was adopted. DeBray, 71/423; Barber, 71/646.
In that opinion Jackson, J., used the following language:
“If the
employee, immediately or remotely, directly or indirectly, caused the
damage, or any part of it, or contributed to it at all, then he can not
recover.” This was but argument to show that if fault was attributable to an employee, it must be such as contributed to the injury,
substantial fault. DeBray, 71/423. It was simply a definition of
the words “without fault,” used in the Code, and is not inconsistent
with what has been ruled in other cases, that the contributory negligence of the employee must be substantial; and again it was adopted.
Prather, 80/433. Cited, 103/826.
avert the

In

Hicks, 95/301, the plaintiff sued for personal injuries caused

by the negligence of a fellow servant, when the plaintiff was engaged
in putting in gas-pipes in the company’s shops.
It was held that
the negligence of the plaintiff, however slight, which contributes in
any appreciable degree to the cause of the injury, defeats a recovery.
Approved, 103/827.
Where

a

rule of the company

prohibited generally the

use

of in-

toxicating liquors by its officers and employees, the use thereof by an
employee who sues for personal injuries would not defeat a recovery,
unless such

use

contributed in

some

appreciable degree to producing

might have
defeat a reThe court therefore properly charged the jury “that, if
covery.
such employee violated the rule in question, the presumption would
arise that such violation contributed to produce the collision, and

injury sustained. That the violation of such rule
done so, if it did not in fact so contribute, would not
the
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the burden of

proof was on him to show that it did not so contribute,
indirectly.” Bussey, 95/584. Cited, 97/707.
If it was the duty of a flagman to make fires in the stove on one
of the cars of a railroad company, which he did, and if there was a
directly

or

defect in the

manner

it unsafe to build

in which the stove

fire therein

was

fastened such

as

to make

account of the

dangers incident
traveling, and this was such an open and patent defect
as he could have easily seen, but on account of his own negligence
he carelessly overlooked it and failed to report it that it might be
remedied, and he was afterwards injured by the overturning of the
stove, he was guilty of contributing, by his own negligence and carelessness, to the injury which he received, and was therefore not entitled to recover. Ray, 70/674.
Cited, 80/436.
a

on

to railroad

225. Must be in his proper
A

flagman

place.

railroad whose place was in the rear car when in
motion, but who had duties which on occasions might call him to
other parts of the train, having brought suit against the railroad company for an injury received while he was in another portion of the
train, resulting from the overturning of a stove in the car where he
was, it was necessary for him to show affirmatively that, at the time
he was hurt, his duty required him to be at the place where the injury
occurred, and if by reason of the shock or the lapse of time, he has lost
the memory which would enable him to establish this fact, it is his
misfortune, but does not vary the law. Crawford, J., said: “His testimony fails to show an occasion at that time, the cars being at full
speed, for his presence near the stove. Not only this, but it is shown
that he was there in a sitting posture on the arm of a passenger-seat.
Even if he had duties calling him there, he should have attended to
them and returned without delay, unless he chose to take the risk of
an accident such as this without the
liability of the defendant to answer therefor.
If the fact be that an emergency or duty requiredhis presence in dangerous proximity to this stove, when, without
such emergency or duty, his place was in the rear car, then he should
show affirmatively the facts making the emergency or duty.”
Ray,
70/674. Cited, 80/436; 106/799.
226. What jury should consider in determining whether engineer
was at fault.
In Kent, 87/402, it appeared that the plaintiff, an
engineer, was
injured by running his engine into a washout caused by a sudden
rainfall, and it was held that, whether or not an engineer exercised
on a
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in looking out for defects in the track is a question
determining which they should take into consider ation the various other duties which he was required to perform in
managing and running his engine, the state of the weather and all
other pertinent facts shown by the testimony.
Cited, 92/192.
227. When there is choice of two Ways, the safer method must he
proper diligence
for the jury, in

selected.

It

not error to charge the jury: “If among many different
performing his duties, some of which were safe, the plaintiff
one less safe or more dangerous, then you will take this cir-

was

modes of

chose

eumstance into

consideration, with all the other facts of the

case,

in

deciding whether the plaintiff

was at fault or not; it is for you to determine from the evidence whether the plaintiff took the risk or
not.” DeBray, 71/406. Cited, 111/713.
An

employee who has the choice of two ways of doing a given piece
one safe and the other dangerous, is under a duty to his
employer to select the former; and if instead of so doing he selects
the latter, when he knows or ought to know of the danger, he can not
recover of the employer for injuries thus sustained, although his conduct in selecting the dangerous way may not have amounted to actual
rashness.
Mosely, 112/914.
In Quirouet, 111/315, it was held that an employee of a railroad
company, who was injured in undertaking to mount a rapidly moving flat car by placing his foot upon the lid of the journal-box, and
seizing a standard which had been inserted in an opening in the side
of the car in order to prevent the freight thereon from falling off,
was not, either under the
general rules of law or any Alabama statute,
entitled to a recovery on the ground that the standard slipped in the
socket and caused him to fall, when there was no testimony tending
to show that the standard was placed on the car as a means of mounting the same, but, on the contrary, positive testimony that it was not
placed there or intended to be used for that purpose. When an employee has his choice of two ways in which to •perform a duty, the one
safe, though inconvenient, and the other dangerous, he is bound to
select the safe method; and if, instead of so doing, he elects to pursue
the dangerous way, and is, in consequence, injured, he is guilty of
such negligence as will bar an action for damages against the master.
The principle here announced is recognized law in the State of Alaof

work, the

bama.

If there was, in the present case, any

show that the

plaintiff acted in

an emergency,

it

evidence tending to
was one of his own

*
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making, and the defendant company could not be held responsible
on the
theory that it had by its negligence placed him in such a position as to relieve him of the duty of exercising ordinary care for
his own safety.
Cited, 111/713.
In Walker, 103/820, it appeared that the plaintiff’s foot caught
in a frog that was raised above the level of the main track, and caused
him to fall, when, in the line of his duty, he was flagging a train
over a street-crossing.
The frog was probably less than a foot from
the right-hand rail of the track on which the engine he piloted was
moving, and if he had walked two feet to the right of the rail on the
right side, he would have escaped the frog and the ends of the crossties, and any part of the engine, had he stopped suddenly. The engine
in passing over the track opposite the frog, would extend out over the
latter about two feet. Little, J., said: “It was contended that, by
occupying a position of at least two feet to the right of the track, the
plaintiff could have discharged his duties equally as well, and at the
same time been out of all danger.
The principle is well established
that if a servant voluntarily, and with no emergency upon him, selects
a dangerous way to perform a duty, when there is a safe way, knowing
the way thus selected to be dangerous, or if the danger is apparent
or obvious, then he assumes the risk, and would be
guilty of contributory negligence. The mere fact that the party was injured because
of the way selected, when, if he had selected the other way, the injury
would have been avoided, alone does not fix upon him contributory
negligence. The result is not the true test. Under the facts of the
present case, it was a question for the jury whether there was a safer
way to discharge the duty than that selected by the plaintiff, and
whether the way actually selected by the plaintiff was one which, to
a
person exercising ordinary care and prudence in the discharge of
duty, would have been obviously more dangerous. It was incumbent
on the
plaintiff to exercise ordinary care while engaged in the line of
his. duty, and whether such care was exercised by him in selecting
the position relatively to the track and moving engine which he did
adopt for the performance of the duty imposed upon him is a question
which should be settled by the jury.”
Cited, 112/762.
In Mathews, 111/711, it was held that, the controlling questions
at issue being whether or not there were two methods for doing the
work in which the plaintiff was engaged, the one safe and the other
dangerous, and whether or not, if this was true, he negligently chose
the latter, and the evidence not being such as to demand findings on
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these

questions adverse to the plaintiff, it was error to grant a nonCobb, J., said: “When an employee of a railroad company
has his choice of two ways in which to perform a duty, the one safe,
and the other dangerous, though convenient, he is bound to select the
safe method.
See Head, Harbin and Quirouet cases, supra. It is
suit.

true that in the two

cases

last cited the court had under consideration

the State of Alabama,
If there is no dispute
about the facts, and the only lawful verdict that could be rendered
would be one finding that there were two ways in which to perform
the duty, the one safe and the other manifestly dangerous, and that
the employee had negligently chosen the latter method, then the court
would be authorized to set aside a verdict finding otherwise, as was
done in the Head and Harbin cases, supra; or to direct a verdict for
founded upon-causes of action arising in
but the principle ruled is the law of this State.
cases

the
an

defendant,
issue

as was

arose as

done in the Quirouet

to whether there

conceding that there

were

case.

If, under the facts,
to whether,

two ways, or as

manifestly dangerous,
employee chose that method, or
whether there were two methods, one attended with less danger than
the other, and the employee chose the more dangerous, then the issues
thus .raised should be submitted to a jury, and it would be error to
grant a nonsuit. Applying the principles above referred to to the
present case, the judge erred in granting a nonsuit. Even if it be
conceded that the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff established that
there were two ways in which the duty he was endeavoring to discharge at the time of the injury could be performed, and one of them
was safe, the evidence raised an issue as to whether the method
adopted
by the plaintiff was one that was manifestly dangerous. It not being
were
and whether in the latter

two

case

ways, one was

the

at all clear from the evidence that either method

which

the

was

entirely safe,

dangerous, it was a question for the jury to
determine whether, under the circumstances, in adopting the method
which he employed, the plaintiff was free from fault.”
228. Acts of reasonable precaution under circumstances of immincnt danger.
In consequence of an ambiguous schedule, or because the agents
did not understand it, a collision of trains occurred. Rhodes was a
baggage-master on one of the'trains, and he was in the baggage-car.
Seeing that the two trains were not more than sixty to one hundred
yards apart, and that a collision was inevitable, he jumped out of the
or

car

was

more

and broke his ankle.

There

was

evidence that the conductor
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told him not to

jump, but he said he did not hear it.

There

was a

passenger in the baggage-car who remained and was not hurt.
was no defense to an action by Rhodes to recover damages for

It
the

injury sustained that the conductor told him not to jump. Where
a collision becomes inevitable, such action becomes one of reasonable

precaution.
In

Rhodes, 56/645.

Cited, 83/674.

Simmons, 92/658, the plaintiff, while on the defendant’s train,

where he

employed as a brakeman, was placed in a position of
peril by the conduct of the engineer in not turning the
engine into a switch, and in going forward without slackening speed,
when another train from an opposite direction was due and about
was

imminent

to meet this train.

It

The

case

stood

on

demurrer to the declaration.

held

that, if, by reason of the negligence of a railway company,
collision of its trains becomes imminent, and an employee upon one
of them, whose life is consequently exposed, is prompted by the conwas

a

ductor to

forward

intervening cars to give warning to the
engineer, and in so doing, without imprudence or negligence on his
own part, falls and is injured, the company is liable to compensate
him in damages. In such case the negligence, whatever it may have
been, which occasioned the perilous situation, is not too remote, provided a collision of the company’s trains was so imminent as to render the conduct of the employee necessary and proper, under all the
run

over

circumstances of the occasion; and whether it was so or not
tion of fact for the jury.
Simmons, J., said: “The case

is

a ques-

is within
the principle of the decisions which authorize a recovery where one
jumps from a train to save himself under circumstances of imminent
danger, and is injured. According to the declaration the plaintiff
found himself in a position of great peril, and this peril was brought
about by the negligence of the engineer.
In the emergency two
modes of avoiding the impending danger were before the plaintiff,
one to jump from the train, and. the other to run forward to the
engine and stop it. The peril of the situation, and the necessity for
instant action in the mode adopted, were impressed and urged upon
him by the conduct and commands of his superior officer, the conductor in charge of the train.
If he had jumped front the train to avoid
a collision, and had been injured in so doing, and if the danger
which led him to jump was brought about by the negligence of the
defendant’s engineer, and was so imminent as to render his conduct necessary and proper under all the circumstances of the occasion, he would be entitled to damages. See the leading case
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of Jones

v. Boyce, 1 Starkie, 493; also, Beach, Contrib. Keg. (2d
ed.) §§40, 42; Patt. Ry. Acc. Law (1st ed.), 14. And the principle is the same if, for the same reason, instead of jumping
to the ground, he jumps, so to speak, to another part of the train,
the difference being that in the one case he resorts to flight, and in
the other to prevention, as the mode of escape. It was contended,
however, that the proximate cause of the injury was the plaintiff’s
falling over the lump of coal, and that the alleged negligence did not
contribute to his fall; and it is sought to analogize the case to that of
Suddeth, where a brakeman in the course of his duty, while passing
over cars loaded with ore,
stepped upon a piece of ore, which turned
his foot, precipitating him from the car. It was there said that,
prima facie, such an occurrence is a mere accident, and that such
casualties pertain to the risks of the service in which the person injured was engaged. In that case, however, there was no act of negligence on the part of the defendant which led to the plaintiff’s passing over the ore. The risks which an employee assumes by entering
the service of the railroad company do not embrace the risk of another employee’s negligence, which he is not bound to anticipate; and
if the negligence of the engineer in this case placed the plaintiff in
imminent danger, and it was to escape this that he passed over the
coal-car, thus encountering a risk which he would not otherwise be
compelled to encounter, that negligence was just as much the cause
of his injury as it would have been if he had adopted the alternative
of jumping to the ground, and in doing so had fallen on a lump of
coal or any other object that might happen to be in the way. The
principle which governs in such cases is stated by Judge Thompson,
in his work on Negligence, thus:
‘If the negligence of B. compels
A. to adopt a particular course which he would not have adopted
but for such negligence, and, in so acting with ordinary prudence,
A. is injured, he may recover damages from B.’ 2 Thomp. Neg.
(1st ed.) 1092.” Cited, 93/573.
Where the want of care and diligence imputed to the plaintiff, who
was a fireman
upon a locomotive, relates to his failure to keep the engineer awake, or take other measures for his own safety, and the
imputed negligence reaches back some hours, a paragraph of the
court’s charge to the jury, which might be understood by them as
restricting the inquiry to a much shorter period, is erroneous; and
for the court, in the same paragraph, to specify certain conduct of
the fireman, and instruct upon it in a way to imply that the same

#
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negligence, .is additional error, the question whether
or would not be negligence being for the jury.
The measure of risk which a fireman ought to incur by remaining
upon a locomotive, and assisting a sleeping engineer to run the train,
is that only which his duty and obligations to the company, under
all the circumstances, impose upon him.
If he subjects himself to
any greater risk, and is thereby injured, he is not without fault, and
can not recover.
It being in question whether a fireman could, by
reporting the facts of his situation to an official of the company by
telegraph, have obtained relief from his peril, evidence is admissible
to show that, under the usage and practice of the company in like or
analogous circumstances, relief would probably have followed in a
specified way, and by the use of specified means. Carroll, 82/452.
229. Allowance made for emotions.
In Smith, 83/671, it appeared that the plaintiff was in the employment of the defendant as a section-boss. He had control of a
hand-car and of a company of workmen. With himself and all the
men on board, he was proceeding, in the line of his duty, upon the
car, to reach a certain station at which a regular train was to pass
would not be

such conduct would

him.

He

was

not out of

time, but

was

entitled to the track, and,

had he not been obstructed, could have reached the station by the
time the other train was to arrive there. His car was running rap-

idly, by gravity or its own momentum, down a descending grade; the
speed being about fifteen or twenty miles an hour, which was not
unusual under similar circumstances.

He had

no

reason

to antici-

pate being met by a locomotive, as, according to the schedules of the
road, there was none due; but, while upon the descending grade, he
looked ahead, and saw a locomotive approaching rapidly — twentyfive miles

an

hundred and

—

at the distance of about three hundred

fifty yards, the

or

three

having just passed the point of a
running down-grade, and between them was an intervening trestle.
The plaintiff immediately
gave orders to his men to apply brakes; but instead of obeying they
commenced leaving the car.
He repeated the order, but no one
obeyed. They all got off, except one man; and the plaintiff, seeing
this, undertook to get off himself. He attempted to jump obliquely
forward, so as to avoid alighting upon the track; hut striking probably against some part of the car, his direction was changed, and he
fell in front, upon the track, was run
over, and seriously injured.
His car had by this time approached to within about one hundred
yards
curve.

«

hour

It,

as

well

as

his

same

own car, was
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of the trestle,

and the locomotive was within perhaps thirty to seventyyards of it on the opposite side, both being in motion. No collision
took place, and, had the plaintiff remained upon the car, he would
probably not have been injured. The car was about three feet high,
and, had he taken a seat on the side of it, he could easily have gotten off, but he was excited, alarmed, and confused, and, his position
being near the front end, he attempted to save himself by jumping,
instead of by sitting down on the side and getting off in that way.
The mode of applying brakes to the car was to introduce poles through
holes made for the purpose, and then press the poles against the
wheels.
It required four men, one to each wheel.
The court granted
a nonsuit.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “There can be no question that
the company was negligent in running upon the track, to the use of
which the plaintiff was entitled for the time being, a ‘wild’ locomofive, or one of which he had no warning either by schedule or by any
other form of notice.
Thus the misconduct of the company in
threatening the plaintiff with a collision may be taken as established.
The open question is whether the plaintiff, after discovering the
danger, acted recklessly or rashly, and thus brought upon himself
a calamity which he might have avoided by more discreet conduct.
All the authorities concur in holding that the duty of a person for
his own safety, in such an emergency, is not to be measured by the
ordinary standard, but that allowance is to be made for the state of
his emotions.
The authorities to this effect which might be cited
amount to scores, if not hundreds.
Whit. Smith, Neg. 392, notes;
Beach, Contrib. Neg. §14; Whart. Neg. §304; Patt. Ry. Accident
Law, 62; 1 Shear. & R. Neg. §89; 2 Thomp. Neg. p. 1092, §8; p.
1174, §20; Roll v. Railroad Co., 15 Hun, 496, affirmed 80 N. Y. 647;
Gumz v. Railway Co., 52 Wis. 672; 10 N. W. Rep. 11.”
230. Rules strictly construed against the company.
Rules prescribed by railroad companies for the government and
direction of their employees, in the discharge of their duties, and for
the non-observance of which an employee forfeits a right of recovery
which otherwise would accrue to him, are to be strictly construed
against the company, and will not, by implication, be extended beyond
their clear and obvious meaning. Atkinson, J., said: “If by the
formulating of rules it undertakes to meet the varying exigencies which
may arise in the conduct of its business, substituting direction to him
for a discretion which otherwise the employee would be required to
five

_
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exercise, and for the exercise of which he would be answerable, their
statutes must be at least

unequivocal, and within the comprehension
whom they are designed to operate.
Nothing should be left to intendment. It should be borne in mind
that the persons ordinarily employed in the conduct of this business,
and for the government of whom these rules are designed, are not
learned or skilled in the technical rules of statutory interpretation,
and therefore, if they be not couched in such terms as to make them
intelligible to employees, or if they be so far equivocal as to express
one thing and mean an'other, it would be a harsh rule of law which
would hold the employee answerable where he conformed to the express direction of the master, but in doing so violated what the latter
may be pleased to term the spirit of a rule.
Such rules are to be
strictly construed against the company, and will not be held to enjoin
upon an employee a particular duty with respect to a particular subject, unless such duty be comprehended within the clear and obvious
meaning of the rule itself. That forfeitures are abhorred in equity,,

of the class of persons upon

and

favored in

old maxim of universal acceptance
ought not to be
held to forfeit the right of an employee to recover where otherwise,
'under the law, he would be entitled to recover, unless there has been
a
plain and manifestly negligent violation of the rule according to its
plain and obvious meaning, nor unless such violation of the rule has
been itself a contributing cause to the injury.” Bussey, 95/584.
Cited, 97/707; 110/690.
A written or printed rule, carefully prepared, which prohibits brakemen “from
coupling or uncoupling cars except with a stick,” and dedares that “brakemen or others must not go between the cars under
any circumstances for the purpose of coupling or uncoupling, or adjusting pins, etc., when an engine is attached to such cars or train,”
does not apply to a ease in which the engine was not attached to any
car or train, and in which the brakeman stationed himself, in the
way usually practiced by employees, upon the footboard of the pilot on
the tender, and while there attempted to withdraw with his hand,
without using a stick, a pin and link from the coupling apparatus of
the engine, the engine and tender moving backwards at the time towards a standing car in the rear, for the purpose of being coupled
thereto. Bleckley, C. J., said: “Certainly the rules as quoted do not,
by their letter, cover such a transaction as that in which the plaintiff
was engaged.
It is said, however, that they do cover it in spirit and
are never

law, is

in the courts of this State.

an

Therefore such rules
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intention.

This

to be

altogether too doubtful, for, as we have
already said, there is a presumption that such rules would be carefully
considered and accurately expressed, and we may add that they ought
to be construed more strongly against the party who made and adopted
them than against one who merely assented and agreed to be bound
by them when they were presented to him as a basis of contract.
Mitchell, 92/77. Cited, 92/493. This principle of construction was
well recognized at common law.” Clarke, 97/706.
Under a rule of a railroad company in these words: “Conductors
and trainmen are required to be at terminal stations thirty minutes
before the leaving-time of their trains. Brakemen must examine the
coupling apparatus and brakes before train starts, and report to the'
conductor such as are not in good order”—it would prima facie be
incumbent upon brakemen to examine brakes only at terminal points,
before the starting of a train. It was improper to leave to the jury
the determination of the meaning of the rule, and evidence was not
admissible to show that employees of the company interpreted and
acted upon the rule as meaning that it was a brakeman’s duty to examine the brakes upon a car taken at a station before the train left
that station, without showing that the plaintiff so understood or so
acted on the rule, or knew that the other employees did so.
An ambiguous rule promulgated by a corporation for the government of its
employees in a dangerous service should generally be taken in its
stronger sense against the corporation, and in favor of the employee.
Moore, 94/457. Cited, 110/690.
231.

seems

Employee hound to observe rules and obey reasonable orders.

In

Prather, 80/427, the plaintiff’s husband was one of a gang employed on a material-train to load and unload the cars. A flat car
loaded with steel rails was thrown off the track, and the men
riding on the car and the rails were thrown off and the plaintiff’s husband and several others

were

killed.

The conductor tes-

tified that he had

always told the men to stand up when the car was
running, and had cautioned them about sitting on the side of the car,
and did not allow them to sit and

hang their feet down. It seems
imputed to the deceased. Simmons,
J., said: “It is certainly a sound proposition, under the decisions of
this court, that before an employee can recover from a railroad company he must be free from fault, and we think it follows that if he
is killed while in disobedience of a rule of the company, or an order
of his conductor, given him while he is under the command of the
that

a

violation of this order

was
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can not recover for his homicide, unless it apfrom the evidence that such disobedience did not directly or indirectly contribute in any degree to the injury. The employee is
bound to obey all reasonable rules and regulations of the company,
and all reasonable orders of the person who is in command of the
squad, given either for the protection of the interests of the company
or the
protection of the employee himself. If he disobeys these rules
or orders, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the disobedience
did not contribute to the injury. The court charged, in substance,
that- if this employee, the plaintiff’s husband, would have been killed
whether standing or sitting with his legs hanging over the car, or not,
his disobedience to the order of his superior would not bar the plaintiff’s recovery. And the court also charged that if the conductor had
given such orders, yet, if they were in the habit of riding that way,
with the knowledge of the conductor, then a failure to comply with
the orders would not bar the plaintiff’s recovery.
Taking the whole
charge upon this subject together, we think it was a fair and impartial
presentation of the law to the jury. The rule is well established that,
if it is shown that the employee has disobeyed the orders of his superior, the burden is upon him to show that such disobedience did not
contribute in any degree to the injury. The conductor was in charge
of the train.
It was an independent train.
He represented the
company.
It was his right and duty to give all necessary orders for
the protection of the interests of the company and the safety of its
servants.
If he gave the order not to sit with the legs hanging over
the side of the car, and it was a reasonable order, the servant must
obey it. If he disobeyed it, and was injured, he could not afterwards
say it was not an order, but simply ‘advice or warning5 against danger.
Nor could he say that while he was ‘riding from one point on
the road to another, and had nothing to do with the
running of the
train, it was not such an order as he was bound to obey.’ The servant is bound to obey all reasonable rules and orders
given him by his
superior in and about the business of his employment. If this was a
proper order for the protection of the interests of the company, or
even for his own
safety as such employee, the deceased was bound to
obey it. If he disobeyed it and was injured, it must be shown to the
satisfaction of the jury that his disobedience did not contribute to his
jnjury. Nor would it have been proper for the court to have instructed
the jury that it was not such an order as
required him to obey. These

conductor, his widow

pear
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and kindred

questions were left to the jury where they properly beCited, 87/105; 97/690; 103/826; 110/198, 329.
There being in the present case affirmative evidence warranting a
finding that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the negligence of
the defendant company, he was entitled to recover, unless his own
negligence in violating the company’s rules contributed to the catastrophe by which the injuries were occasioned. The question whether
his disobedience of those rules did so contribute was fairly submitted
to the jury, and this court can not, in view of the entire evidence, un-

long.”

dertake to say that their finding upon this question was wrong.

Bos-

ton, 99/798.
The

plaintiff being

an expert engineer, and one question being
negligent at the time of the accident which was
the basis of the suit, it was competent to prove by him what were his
duties. He could also testify to the fact that he had complied with
all the instructions given him.
A conductor in authority over an
engineer may testify as to the latter’s duty. Dorsey, 68/228.
232. Not bound to obey an order where it would be rash nnd danger-

whether he had been

ous

to do

so.

Though one may be a train-hand in the employment of a railroad,
if he is injured without fault on his part, by the negligence and carelessness of other agents of the company, he may recover. Where a
conductor in charge of a train ordered a train-hand under him to step
from the cars while in motion, in order to couple cars standing on a
side-track to the main body of the train, coupling being a part of his
business, the obeying of such order will not prevent a recovery by him
for an injury, if he used all reasonable care and skill in so doing.
Blandford, J., says: “Whether or not the conductor had the right to
give an order to plaintiff to get off the train, when in motion, he did
give such order, and whether the plaintiff was required to obey it or
not, he did so obey the order, and the defendant can not now take
advantage of its own wrong, and thereby escape responsibility for its
own wrong act, committed
by one who was acting for it to such an
extent, under the circumstances, as to make the act of the conductor
the act of the corporation. Whether it be the fault of an employee to
obey an order of his superior, depends upon whether it would be rash
and dangerous to do so, and when there was no apparent danger so
to do, it would not be fault on his part.” DeBray, 71/406.
Cited,
72/227; 111/474, 713.

CHAPTER 12.

§ 232 }

[304

Employees of railway companies.

servant of

a

railroad company

servant to mount

a

locomotive running at from six to twelve miles

If

a

obeyed the order of

a

superior

hour, the company is not liable for the injury thereby sustained.
“Even if the boss had ordered him to get upon
the engine while it was moving at this rate of speed, it would not have
protected plaintiff, because the act was so rash and dangerous that he
was not obliged to obey such an order, and if he did so, it would be at
his peril.” Roul, 85/197.
Cited, 87/379; 104/767.
A servant of a railroad company, though he may be, in a general
sense, under the duty of obeying the orders of a conductor, is not bound
to obey an order when so doing will manifestly subject him to peril.
A general order from a conductor to a flagman to “catch” a car will
not justify the latter in attempting to do so at a time when the car
is moving at an obviously dangerous rate of speed. Especially is this
so when the conductor, when giving the order, was not aware of the
speed at which the car would be running when the flagman was expected to catch it, and was not present when the latter attempted to
do so. The trial court was right in granting a nonsuit. Whatley,
104/764.
In the trial of an action for injuries alleged to have been occasioned
to an employee of a railroad company in coupling cars, it was error
to charge that if the employee was instructed by the conductor to
couple the cars without a knife or stick, and when about to enter
upon the discharge of that duty the conductor was in a position to see
that he had no knife or stick, and allowed him to proceed without
them, and the employee was then and there injured, he was not negligent in not having such knife or stick, and was entitled to recover,
if injured without fault on his part, and by the negligence and carelessness of the agents of the company. Atkinson, J., said: “A positive instruction by one in authority to his inferior to perform a particular service in a particular way is one thing, and the omission to
give an instruction when none such was necessary is entirely a different
thing. For the court to say that the alleged negligence of this conductor would acquit this plaintiff of negligence, was to withdraw from
the consideration of the jury altogether the question as to whether or
not the plaintiff was not himself negligent in
obeying such instructions, assuming even that they were given.” Davis, 95/292.
In Bridges, 92/399, the plaintiff was a section-hand.
The foreman
directed plaintiff and others to remove a
pole-car for the use of the
squad to another part of the road. While doing it they were run into
per

Simmons, J., said:
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by a freight-train. They were going through a cut and around a
sharp curve, and the engine was within ninety feet of them before
plaintiff saw it. It was an extra or wild train, and was running at
about twenty miles an hour. It was held that the evidence showing
affirmatively that the plaintiff was injured while engaged in the line
of his duty, under the orders and in the immediate presence of the
“boss” to whose orders he was subject, and that the injury was the resuit of negligence attributable to the company — either the sole negligenee of the boss, or the joint negligence of him and of absent officers
or employees with whom he should have co-operated in so regulating
the movements of his hand-car as to prevent a collision between it and
a train
a recovery by the plaintiff would be defeated only by fault
on his
part amounting to rashness or recklessness in obeying, under
the circumstances, the orders of the boss.
Ryles, 84/420, sued for damages sustained by him while employed
as a train-hand in coupling cars, under orders from the conductor.
The defendant offered to prove that the plaintiff was in the habit of
going in between the cars to make coupling of the cars unnecessarily;
that he would frequently run in to make the coupling and take the
coupling away from Parker, who was an expert; that he was too
quick in attempting to make couplings — all at other places and on
other occasions than this; but along this line of road, and while engaged in this service. The testimony was rejected, and it was held
that the injury involved in the case having been received by the subordinate while acting under orders from his superior, his habit to act
hastily and needlessly upon other occasions was not sufficiently relevant to be admissible in evidence.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “In this instance Ryles was not acting under his general habit, but under the
orders of the conductor. He was told to make the coupling and,
whether he was too quick or not in ordinary cases, he was not more
quick in this instance than his duty in obedience to orders required
of him. It would seem that a man’s habit to act precipitately should
not prejudice him when his duty to act has been determined by a superior and not by himself.” Cited, 87/63i.
233. In the absence of specific instructions general duties govern.
If specific instructions are given to an employee, they will control
him; but if none are given, he will be governed by the general duties
of his position. Where the testimony as to the existence of specific
instructions was conflicting, the general duties of the position could
—

20
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be

proved, as bearing on the case in the event the jury believed no
specific instructions existed. Dorsey, 68/228.
234. Promulgation of rules, and Tcnowledge thereof by employees.
In Clem, 80/534, the plaintiff was injured when in the act of coupling a car to the engine, and Bleckley, C. J., said: “It was insisted
that the plaintiff was himself in fault, because he ought to have used
a stick in coupling; and the evidence does indicate that if a stick
had been used there would have been no injury. In fact, after this
injury occurred, a stick was used by another employee to make the
identical coupling, and it was successfully made.
There was a rule
of the company that required every train-hand to use a stick in coupling; but Clem testified that he did not know of the rule; that he had
never heard of it; and two other train-hands, the only two examined,
testified that they did not know of it; and although there was some
proof tending to show that he had been warned of the rule, yet that
was for the jury; and there was abundant evidence to find that he
neither knew of the rule nor was put upon diligence to inquire about
it.
The truth is that, if the company had such a rule as that, they
ought to have promulgated it, and seen to it that their employees
knew of it.”
Cited, 82/478; 84/431.
In Carroll, 82/452, it was held that an employee of a corporation,
though obligated in writing, as one of the terms of his employment,
to “study the rules governing employees, carefully keep posted, and
obey orders,” is not bound by rules, as such, of which he is ignorant,
and which have never been promulgated to him by the company.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “We agree with the trial judge that the undertaking of the plaintiff, in his written application to the company for
employment, to ‘study the rules governing employees, carefully keep
posted and obey them,’ did not extend to any unknown rules not promulgated to him by the company. The rules of a railway
company stand to its employees as laws for the regulation of
their conduct, and all such laws ought to be promulgated in some
reasonable, practical way. If they are written or printed, each employee should either be furnished with a copy, or informed where to
apply for it, or, at least, where he might call and read the rules, or
hear them read.
Of course, actual knowledge otherwise acquired
would suffice; but it is clear to us that an employee is bound by no
rule of his company which has neither been communicated to him
by it, nor brought to his knowledge otherwise.” Cited, 84/431.
The rules of a railway company for the government of its employees
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not

obligatory as such upon those who are not aware of them and
they have not been promulgated. Ryles, 84/420.
Where rules are prescribed or regulations adopted for the government of employees in and about the discharge of their duties, it is
the duty of the employer to give notice of their existence, and so to
promulgate them as to afford to the employee a reasonable opportunity of ascertaining their terms. Knowledge, either express or such
as the law will imply, without reference to the means by which it is
imparted, binds the employee to compliance. Therefore, a request
to charge to the effect that, if the rules be written or printed, each
employee should either be furnished with a copy, or advised as to
where he can read or hear them read, and which leaves out of consideration all other means of acquiring knowledge, should have been
denied, and the court, in giving such instruction, erred. Atkinson,
J., said: “If by oral tradition, he have knowledge, derived even from
his coemployees, of the existence and terms of such rules, he is bound
to conform his conduct thereto, whether he have either a copy of the
rules themselves, or have had an opportunity to read them or hear
them read. The latter is one means of promulgating the rules, and
probably the most effective; but it is not the only means by which, being received, notice thereof will bind the employee.” Davis, 95/292.
In Parker, 83/539, where a rule-book was offered in evidence, the
plaintiff objected on the grounds that it had not been proved that it
are

to whom

contained the rules of force at the time of the
there

accident, and that

evidence that

plaintiff had knowledge of it and the rules
it contained or was bound by it. It was held that the evidence being sufficient that the rule-book offered contained the rules of the
company of force when the employee was injured, the book was admissible, without first proving that the employee had knowledge of the
rules it contained.
His knowledge was matter for either prior or
subsequent verification. Bleckley, C. J., said: “There was sufficient
was no

evidence that the rule-book admitted in evidence contained the rules
of force when the

plaintiff was injured, and whether he had knowledge
question not going to the admissibility of the
rules, but to their binding effect upon his conduct. That the rules
existed, and what they were, constituted one step in the defendant’s
evidence, and that could be taken without first showing that the plaintiff had knowledge of them.”
Cited, 111/878.

of them

or

not

was a

235. Rules admissible in evidence.
Rules of

a

railroad company,

requiring that

an

employee should be
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stationed at the end of the
it when the train

car

in front, or should move abreast of

running backwards, where he could be seen by
the engineer and could signal him in case of any obstruction on the
track, were admissible in evidence, as showing that the company regarded the moving of the trains backwards as more dangerous and requiring more care than running in the usual manner, although such
rules were not public rules, but only intended for the guidance of the
agents and officers of the company. Williams, 74/723. Cited,
was

103/350.
In Binion, 111/878, it was held that in

a

suit against

a

railway

company by an employee, a rule of the company relative to the duty
of such employee is admissible in evidence in behalf of the company,

without first

proving that the employee had knowledge of the rule.
knowledge may be shown either before or after the admission of
the rule in evidence. Parker, supra. It was error to direct a verdict
for the defendant in this case, the evidence being conflicting on the
main issues
the same being (1) whether the employee’s failure to
get a coupling-stick was due to fault on his part or on the part of the
company; (2) whether the non-observance of the rule to make all
couplings with sticks was so general as to raise a presumption that
Such

—

such non-observance

known to the company,

and to lead the cmployee, although he was shown by the evidence to have had full notice
of the rule, to believe that it was abrogated; and (3) whether there
was any negligence on the
part of the company in running the train
back to make the coupling.
236. What rules are binding on employees.
In Dooley, 86/294, the injury occurred in Alabama, and rule 23 of
the company was as follows: “The conditions of employment by
the company are that the regular compensation paid for the -services
of employees shall cover all risks incurred, and liability to accident
from any cause whatever, while in the service of the company. If an
employee is disabled by accident, or other cause, the right to claim
compensation for injuries will not be recognized. Allowance, when
made in such cases, will be as a gratuity, justified by the circumstances
of the case and previous good conduct of the party. The fact of remaining in the service of the company will be considered acceptance
of these conditions. All officers employing men to work for this company will have these conditions distinctly understood and agreed to by
each employee before he enters the service of the
company.” Dooley
was employed as
flagman on the 21st of June, 1887, and then
was

309

]

CHAPTER 12.

[§236

Employees of railway companies.

receipted for a copy of the book of rules containing this rule. He
promoted to the position of conductor while he was in possession
of the book.
He was familiar with the rule which required employees
to know the rules.
The accident happened on August 2, and he had
been in possession of the rule-book about forty-two days. It was
held that the servant of a railroad company to whom has been delivered a printed copy of its rules governing his conduct as a servant,
and who can read and has had sufficient time to become acquainted
with them, is bound by every reasonable one which is to govern his
conduct while in the service, whether he has read or has knowledge
of it or not. But he is not bound by a rule which requires him to
waive rights not connected with his duty as a servant, although he
knew of it, unless he has expressly agreed to it; especially where it
requires that the officer employing him shall have it distinctly understood and agreed to by him, and nothing is said to, him about it.
Simmons, J., said: “It appears that the last clause of the rule was
not complied with by the officer of the company employing Dooley.
Dooley’s-attention was not called to this specific rule. Nothing was
said to him about it.
Therefore he could not have ‘distinctly understood and agreed’ to it. The object of this clause of the rule was to
have each employee make an express contract with the company, waiving his right to recover for any ‘accident from any cause whatever
while in the service of the company.’ If an express contract to this
effect had been made by Dooley, under the common-law (which governs this case) it is likely he would have been bound
by it; but, inasmuch as he made no express contract, we do not think he was
bound by the rule. It is insisted, however, that, although he made
no express contract, there was an
implied contract between him and
the company, because the company gave him the rule-book, which
contained this rule; and as he had time and opportunity to read it,
and remained in the employment of the company, he impliedly
agreed to the rule, and therefore could not recover. The employer
has the right to make the rules for the government of his employees.
It is to his interest to do so, and he has the right to have those rules
obeyed; and an employee has no right to violate them, and set up as
excuse his want of knowledge of them, after he has had an opportunity to become acquainted with them. He is bound by every reasonable rule which is to govern him in his work or conduct. If one of
these rules should require him to couple cars with a stick, and he
should undertake to couple them with his hand, and in consequence
was
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should be

injured, he would not be allowed to say that he had no
knowledge of the rule. Or if one of the rules should require him to
give so many days’ notice before quitting the employer’s service, or
in default thereof lose his pay, he could not, if he quit the service
without such notice, recover his wages because he was ignorant of the
rule. But where the rule requires the employee to waive certain
rights which are not connected with his duty as an employee, then, in
our opinion, it does not bind him, although he has knowledge of it,
unless he has expressly agreed thereto. The fact that he kept the
rules in his possession, and remained in the service of the company,
would not bar his right to recover unless he expressly agreed to that
particular rule. And this is especially so in this case, as the rule itself requires that the employee shall distinctly understand and agree
to it”

237.

Employee may assume that other employees will observe rules.
general rule an employee of a railroad company, while engaged in the performance of his duties, has the right to act upon the
belief that the other employees will observe the rules of the company
prescribed for the safety of such employees, and municipal ordinances
applicable to the situation. This, however, does not absolve him from
caring for his own safety, in so far as every prudent man would do so
under like circumstances. Brantley, 93/259.
In Kitchens, 83/83, the plaintiff brought suit for the homicide of
her husband, an employee of defendant. ' He was under a car putting
As

a

nut, when the train moved and he was killed. Troutman, a carfor defendant, and a fellow workman with Kitchens, was
engaged in the work. It was a rule of the company that they should

on a

greaser

be furnished with

a
flag, as a danger-signal, and that they should put
they went to work under a car. Kitchens was instructed
in this rule and furnished with a flag.
The flag was not out when
he was hurt. The court charged the jury, that if it was the duty of
Troutman to put up the danger-signal for the protection of Kitchens

it out when

well

himself, and Troutman failed to do it, and if Kitchens rebe justified
the part of
Kitchens, and that they might then find a verdict for the plaintiff;
adding that all this depends, however, upon whether there was fault
or negligence in Kitchens, the jury being the exclusive
judges of the
negligence. It was held that this charge was error and that a rule of
a railroad company, applicable alike to all
persons of a given class,
as

as

lied upon this, and it was not done, then the jury might
in finding negligence on Troutman’s part, and none on
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is not to be evaded

the

by the failure of one person of the class to observe
rule, when another person of the same class is injured thereby.

Where

rule of the company

enjoined upon a coemployee of the
plaintiff the performance of a particular duty, such coemployee was
bound to exercise ordinary care in the discharge of that duty; and it
is not cause for reversal that the court charged the jury that, if such
coemployee failed to exercise ordinary care in discharging such duty,
they “ought to find the defendant company negligent in that regard.”
Bussey, 95/584. Cited, 97/707.
a

In

Allen, 106/572, it was held that even if it is, in any case, proper
judge to submit, to the jury trying an action by an employee
against a master for personal injuries, the question whether a
given rule prescribed by the former for governing the conduct of

for the

the latter in the

performance of his work is reasonable

or unreasona-

ble, the judge should certainly not do so when the evidence fails to
show the existence and terms of the alleged rule with sufficient certainty and clearness to enable the jury to intelligently pass upon the
same.
When, however, the defense in such a case rested upqn the
proposition that the plaintiff had violated a rule of the master, and
in consequence had received the injuries complained of, it was ineumbent

on

the defendant to show the existence and contents of the al-

leged rule; and, failing to do so, the latter could not have been injured
by an instruction of the nature above indicated, and giving the same
is not, therefore, cause for a new trial.
Lewis, J., said: “The error
alleged in the charge consisted in submitting to the jury the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the rule in question. It was contended
by counsel for plaintiff in error that this was a question of law for
the court to decide, and not one to be submitted to the jury.
In the
light of the record before us, we deem it neither necessary nor important to discuss or to solve this question in order to decide this case.
It is inferable from the testimony in the record that the defendant
companies had certain written or printed rules, among which was one
relating to the particular subject of coupling with a stick. It does
not appear from the testimony that such rules were ever furnished
to the plaintiff; nor was any rule touching the matter introduced in
evidence. It is manifest, therefore, that neither the court nor the jury
had sufficient data before them to determine whether
invoked had any application
under the circumstances, its
sonable.

We

to the

or

not the rule

case, or, if it did apply, whether,
requirements were reasonable or unreathink, therefore, that the court erred in giving the jury
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instructions whatever touching the matter. When an employer
against an action of tort, brought by his employee for a personal injury, upon the ground that the injury resulted in consequence
of a violation of a rule prescribed by the former to govern the conduct
of the latter, it is incumbent upon the defendant to clearly establish,
by evidence, the existence, terms, and conditions of the rule. When
it signally fails in this particular, this defense necessarily falls.
238. Schedules, who presumed to know them.
Every employee of a railroad will not be presumed to know the
schedule, but only such as are directly concerned in running the
trains. This was the case of a baggage-master who was injured.
Rhodes, 56/645.
239. Duty to observe schedules.
In McDade, 59/73, it was held that where the official printed schedule furnished to conductors and locomotive engineers prescribes a
given hour and minute for leaving the starting terminus, and no provision is made in the rules and regulations for starting at any other
time, to enter upon the trip fifteen minutes after the prescribed time
has expired, is to vary from the schedule; and if done without express authority from the superintendent, or the proper general officer
any

defends

of the

road, it is

breach of orders.
engineers to abide absolutely and invariably by
the schedules furnished them for running trains, except when clearly
and expressly authorized to vary therefrom, is of the last importance
to both life and property; and where the printed rules which accompany the schedules warn both classes of employees that they will be
held responsible for the satisfactory running of the schedules, an
engineer can not excuse himself for commencing a trip fifteen minutes after his schedule time has expired by the fact that he acted una

For conductors and

der orders of the conductor.

The schedule being prescribed by their
superior, neither could absolve the other from his obligation
to observe it.
The plaintiff was an engineer, and the only time for
the departure of his train was seven o’clock, twenty-five minutes. He
did not go then but went fifteen minutes later.
By this variation
from the plain letter of the schedule, he threw himself on a part of
the track where he had no right to be when the collision occurred,
and he was injured*
Fault in the opposing train does not relieve the
plaintiff. Unless clear himself, he can not recover, whatever may be
common

the blame attached to others.

plaintiff in this

ease,

and it

A third verdict
was sec

was

rendered for the

aside, the court holding that it
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would have been

improper exercise of discretion not to grant it;
plaintiff has no sacredness when the law
is against a recovery; and that it is impossible for the employee of a
railroad company to maintain an action for a personal injury unless
he was himself free from fault. McDade, 60/119. Cited, 63/183;
66/562; 76/531; 83/88; 87/104.
Where, according to regular schedule, one railroad-train is to arrive at a given point thirteen minutes before the time fixed for another train to leave that point daily on a new trip, such point is a
terminus as to the latter train, and not a meeting-point as to either,
especially where real meeting-points are plainly designated as such on
the schedule, and the designation is omitted as to the point in
question.
McDade, 59/73.
240. Burden of proof.
Suits against railroad companies by their employees for personal
injuries present two classes of cases. In one, the injury is the offspring of some act in which the plaintiff participated; in the other,
he is passive and the particular act from which his injury resqlts is
performed wholly by other servants of the same master. When the
employee participated in the act, he has not made out a prima facie
case for recovery without
proving either that he was wholly free from
fault himself, or that there was negligence on the part of his fellow
servants.
If he rests on a presumption of negligence without actual
proof thereof, that presumption applies to him with the same force
as to others who
participated in the same act of common duty, and
to get the benefit of the presumption as applied to the others, he must
rebut it so far as it applies to himself. In this case, the plaintiff
was engaged in
delivering telegraph-poles and participated in the act
causing the injury. Campbell, 56/586. Same case, 53/488. Cited,
58/114; 59/440; 69/351; 66/558; 70/679; 77/687; 95/687.
In the class of cases where the injured party shared directly in the
act which resulted in his own wounding, the rule as to the burden
of proof is this: After proving the fact and degree of the injury,
if the plaintiff will show himself not to blame, the law then presumes,
until the contrary appears, that the company was to blame; or if he
will show, on the other hand, that the company was to blame, the law
presumes, until the contrary appears, that he was not to blame.
So
that, in order to make a prima facie case, and change the onus, he
need not go further than to show by evidence one or the other of these
two propositions; either that he was not to blame or that the
company
that

a

an

third verdict for the
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The company,

taking at this stage the burden of reply, can desuccessfully by disproving either proposition. The disproval of
both is not necessary; but until one or the other shall be overcome,,
the defense is not complete. Bleckley, J., Kenney, 58/485. Cited,
59/440; 69/351; 71/425; 73/505; 80/521; 85/474; 86/389;
95/686; 105/138. The same principle is enunciated in Rouse,
77/404. A charge that it was necessary for the plaintiff to shojr affirmatively both negligence on the company’s part and the absenpe of
negligence on his part, contravened directly the rule as stated in Kenney’s case, and imposed upon the plaintiff a burden greater than the
law contemplates he shall bear. Johnston, 95/685.
Cited, 103/38‘i>;
was.

fend

105/138.
In

Kelley, 58/107, it was held that the presumption of the law
plaintiff, being an employee, is without fault, arises only
when he is wholly disconnected with duties about the particular business m which he was hurt; when he is a party engaged in a duty
in discharging which he is hurt, the onus is upon him to show himself
without fault; so soon as he does that, the presumption arises that
the other employees engaged with him in the duty were at fault or
negligent, and the onus is shifted upon the company to show them
without negligence; and this principle reconciles the cases decided by
the Supreme Court of this State, when applied to the facts of each.
Jackson, J., said: “We think that in this case, inasmuch as this
employee, this plaintiff, was engaged with other employees of the
company about the coupling of the cars, he can not invoke the presumption of negligence against the company, and of faultlessness in
himself, as a passenger could do, or as an employee could do who
was hurt by other employees in matters with which he was
wholly disconnected. For instance, an employee is engaged to sweep the cars,
to wait on passengers, to keep the baggage, check it, etc., etc., and
has nothing to do with the management of the running of the 'cars.
By the negligence or fault of the conductor or engineer in running
the cars, he is hurt. We hold that he is upon the footing of a passenger, and every presumption is against the company, and that he is
without fault, just as it would be in case of a passenger.
But if the
conductor or engineer, who together control the running of the cars,,
sue the coiApany for
damage occasioned by running the cars, the presumption that the plaintiff was without fault and that the company
was negligent would not arise.
In such case the engineer must
show himself without fault, if he sue, and then the presumption
that the
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would be that the conductor

negligent, and it would be for the
In short, it seems to us absurd
a man to presume himself faultless, and others negligent,
when all were concerned in the business that brought about the catastrophe that hurt him.” Cited, 59/440; 95/686; 104/618; 86/389.
If the plaintiff has shown the defendant to have been negligent, to
defealt a recovery, it must be shown that he was likewise negligent or
at faplt.
So when plaintiff has shown injury to himself, without fault
on his part, it would be incumbent on defendant to show that the injury did not result from the want of ordinary and reasonable care
and diligence on the part of its servants and agents. DeBray,
company
to allow

was

to rebut it, or lose the

case.

71/406.
In

Gassaway, 69/347, the evidence was as follows: Plaintiff was
on a trestle some twenty feet above the
ground, lining the
track, using therefor a pinch-bar and gauge, to make the width uniform. It was near train-time, and the boss under whom plaintiff
worked told him to hurry.
Seeing an irregular place in the track
which it was necessary for safety to make uniform, plaintiff used the
“pinch-bar” as a lever to push the track into position, resting one end
of the bar upon the stringer of the bridge. Failing to move the
track on the first and second efforts, plaintiff stooped and threw his
weight against the short bar which he was using. The wood of the
stringer on which the bar rested split off, and plaintiff fell to the
ground, breaking his leg. It was held that a prima facie case was
not made out, and a nonsuit was right.
That an employee of a railroad suing for injuries sustained by him from the negligent performance of an act in which he
participated has not made a prima facie
case for recovery without proving either that he was free from fault
himself, or that there was negligence on the part of his fellow servants.
Any presumption of negligence will apply as well to him as
to others participating in the common act, and to be benefited by a
presumption against them he must rebut it as to himself. Cited,
70/568; 73/504.
While, in order for a railroad employee to recover against the
company for an injury occurring in connection with his employment,
at work

he must be blameless in connection therewith and the company neg-

ligent, yet when the employee shows either that he was blameless or
the company was negligent, a presumption of the other arises, and
the onus is shifted to the defendant. Barber, 71/644.
Cited,
103/826.
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In

Maloy, 77/238, it was held that railroad companies are not liaemployees as they are to passengers; but in an action by an employee against a railroad company, or by one who sues for the death
of an employee, it must be shown that such employee, at the time
the injury was received, was free from fault, or that the defendant
"company was in fault, before any presumption would arise against
the company of negligence. Where it is shown that the company itself is at fault, then the presumption is that the employee was not at
fault; or, where it is shown that the employee was free from fault,
then the presumption would arise that the company was at fault, and
the onus would be upon it to remove that presumption by showing
proper diligence.
But a different rule applies in regard to passengers.
Cited, 103/826.
241. Subject continued.
In order for a railroad employee to recover against' the company.
for an injury sustained in connection with his employment, he must
be blameless in connection therewith and the company negligent, yet
when the employee shows either that he was blameless or the company
negligent, a presumption of the other arises, and the onus of proof is
shifted to the defendant, so that in order for the plaintiff to make out
a
prima facie case, he must go no further than to show by evidence
one or the other of these two
propositions — either that he was not
to blame, or the company was.
If the plaintiff shows that the company was to blame, was guilty of negligence, the law presumes, until the contrary appears, that he was not to blame. Rouse, 77/393.
Suit having been brought by an employee of a railroad company
on account of an
injury sustained by him while engaged in eoupling
cars, and there being evidence that the plaintiff .did not bring about
this injury by his fault or negligence, the onus was shifted to the
company to show that its agents were in the exercise of all ordinary
and reasonable care and diligence, otherwise the statutory presumption of negligence would be against them.
Bryans, 77/429. Cited.
ble to

95/687; 105/138.
In Small, 80/519, Simmons, J., said: “The plaintiff was a trackhand, and he was totally disconnected with the engine that injured him. His duties were to work on the track, and to keep it
in repair, and in proper order for the engines to
pass over it; but he
had nothing whatever to do with the running of the engine that injured him, or with any other engine running upon the road. If he
had been connected with the engine, and had been injured without
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fault on his part, he would have been entitled to recover upon
showing the injury to himself, and showing further that the company
was negligent.
When the plaintiff proves that he was injured, and
that the injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant, the
law then presumes that the defendant was negligent, and the burden
of proof is shifted upon the defendant either to prove that it was not*
negligent, or that the plaintiff was. If it establishes either proposition, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. In this case,
it appears that the plaintiff relied upon the fact of the dejfendant’s negligence. This, we think, he had a right to do, even
though he had been connected with the engine which injured him.
Not being connected with it a fortipri he had a right to prove the
negligence of the company, and rest his case upon it; and this is
what we understand to be the charge complained of.
The meaning
of the charge is that, if the jury should have believed that the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the servants of the railroad company, the burden would be upon the company to show that the injury
was not caused by its negligence, or that the plaintiff was guilty of
negligence himself, and contributed to the injury. The plaintiff, no
matter to what class he belonged, could have shown that he was without fault, and cast the burden upon the defendant.
Or he could have
any

.

shown that the servants of the company were
would have cast the burden upon the company to

in fault; and that
show that it was not
negligent, or that the plaintiff v^as negligent, and that his negligence
contributed to the accident.” Cited, 85/474; 95/687; 105/138.
In Lanier, 83/587, tile court charged the jury:
“The foundation
proposition which underlies all suits in favor of an employee against
a railroad company for personal injuries sustained in the discharge
of his duty is this: to make a prima facie case for recovery, the railroad employee suing the company for personal injuries arising from
an act in which he participated must prove either that he was not to
blame or that the company was. The company, in replying, may defend successfully by disproving either proposition; that is, by showing either that the plaintiff was to blame or that the company was
not.
By ‘blame,’ I mean the ‘want of due diligence.’ The measure of diligence which the law imposes on railroad companies in reference to employees, and on the conduct of employees, in reference
to their companies, is ordinary diligence, or common prudence.”
Blandford, J., said: “Section 2323 of the Code authorizes an
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employee to recover from a railroad company for injuries he susby reason of the negligence of other employees, when he is
without fault or negligence. ‘Without fault’ means that the party
suing must not have done anything to ,contribute to his injury, or
must have done everything to prevent the consequences of the company’s negligence. In other words, he must show that he did nothing
he ought not to have done, and neglected to do nothing he ought to
have done.
The word ‘negligence’ in this section is merely superadded. It adds no vigor, strength or impressiveness to the word fault.
The rule of diligence to be exercised is ordinary diligence.
The company owed to him only ordinary diligence, and he owed to the company
the same diligence at the same time; while his conduct must come up
to the rule of ordinary care and diligence, and it must appear that
he was without fault or negligence. This we understand the court
to have charged, substantially, in the portion of the charge excepted to
on this ground.
As has been decided by this court, it must be shown,
presumptively or otherwise, where an action is brought by an
employee for the negligence of another employee, that the plaintiff
did not contribute substantially to the injury which he received.”
Cited, 97/780; 103/826.
242. Subject continued.
In a suit against a railroad company by one of its servants for injuries sustained by alleged negligence of others of its servants in the
performance of an act with which the plaintiff was connected at the
time of the injury, the presumption of negligence was not against
the company before the plaintiff proved that he was without fault.
tains

Vandiver, 85/470.
In

suit

by

Cited, 91/679; 95/687.

employee of a railroad against his master for damages alleged to have resulted from the negligence of a coemployee,
the latter is competent to prove that he was not at fault.
If the
plaintiff, in his testimony, puts the blame or fault upon the coemployee, it is proper to allow the latter to rebut fully the whole testimony of the plaintiff, so that the jury can pass upon the truth of
the issue between them;. Dorsey, 68/228.
In

a

an

Hicks, 95/301, it was held, as stated in a headnote, that no
presumption of negligence against the company arises until the plaintiff shows, affirmatively that he was himself without fault.
It was
therefore error to give in charge to the jury section 2321 of the Civil
Code. Atkinson, J., said: “That section states a rule of law which
imposes the burden of proof exactly where the true law says it ought
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not to be.

In a case where an employee of a railroad company
brings an action for damages against his employer, the burden of
proof is upon the plaintiff, in addition to th'e injury, to show one of
two things: either that he was himself entirely free from fault, or
that he was injured by the negligence of a coemployee. Thus the
burden is imposed upon the plaintiff to prove his case; but section
2321, which deals with injuries not done to but done by employees of
the company, raises a presumption of negligence against the company
upon the proof of injury alone.” In Burney, 98/1, a suit by an employee, the trial judge gave section 2321 in charge to the jury, error
was assigned on the charge, and it was held to be error.
And again
the headnote states that no presumption of negligence arises against
the company until the plaintiff has affirmatively shown that he himself was free from fault. In the opinion it is said that the rule
stated in the headnote is well settled in this

State, and Hicks’s

case,

In Davis, 103/579, it was held to be error to give
charge in such a suit by an employee, and the Hicks
case is cited.
In McDade, 105/134, the same question was made and
it was ruled in the same way. Citing, Hicks, Burney and Davis, supra. When the precise question which was before the court in each
of the three foregoing cases is considered, it will be seen that the
court did not intend to modify or change the rule as previously enundated in the earlier cases and as repeated by Justice Atkinson in
Hicks, supra.. This becomes manifest from Johnston’s case, 95/685,

supra, is cited.
section 2321 in

which

was a

later decision than that in Hicks’s

case.

In Johnston’s

case, Justice Atkinson states the rule in the language of Justice
Bleckley, in Kenney’s* case. In harmony with the rule as thus stated
is the decision in McDade, 105/134. In the opinion in that case,
Fish, J., conforms to it substantially, as follows: “A concise statement of the rule as to the burden of proof in cases of this character
is that proof that a deceased employee of a railroad company, who
was killed by the
running of its train, was without fault, raises a
presumption that the company was in fault, and proof that the servants of the company who were operating the train were in fault puts
upon the company the burden of showing that the deceased himself
was negligent.”
Citing, Kenney, Bryans, Small, Johnston, supra.
In McDade, 105/134, it was held that proof that a deceased employee of a railroad company, who was killed by the running of its
train, was without fault raises a presumption that the company was
in fault.
Proof that the servants qf the company who were operating
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the train were in fault puts upon the company the burden of showing that the deceased himself was negligent. So much of section
2321 of the Civil Code

a

as

is embraced in the

phrase “the presumption

being against the company” is inapplicable to a case where
railroad company is sued for the killing of an employee, unless the

in all

cases

plaintiff affirmatively shows that the deceased was free from fault;
and consequently, on the trial of such a ease, the law embodied in
this section should not, either literally or substantially, be given in
charge to the jury without plainly and distinctly stating the qualification herein indicated.
Fish, J., said: “The above charges were
substantially in accordance with the rule stated. The court charged
the jury as follows: ‘A railroad company is liable in damages where
a person is killed or injured by the running of its trains, unless the
company shows that its agents and employees were at the time exercising all ordinary care and diligence.’ Plaintiff in error contends
that this charge was not applicable in a suit for the homicide of an
employee of the railroad company. This court has several times held
that, in an action against a railroad company by an employee for personal injuries alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of a
coemployee, no presumption of negligence arises against the company
until the plaintiff has affirmatively shown that he himself was free
from fault. In the case at bar the burden of proof was upon the
plaintiff to make out her case by proving either that the deceased
himself was entirely free from fault, or that his death was caused
by the negligence of his coemployees. Unless a prima facie case
was made out
by the proof of one or the other of these two propositions, no presumption could arise against the company, and to charge,
without qualification, that the company was liable, unless it showed
that its agents and employees were at the time exercising all ordinary care and diligence, was error.
Following Hicks and Davis, supra, we must rule that such error was not cured by the court subsequently charging the correct rule on the subject, without calling attention to the error already committed.”
243. When company not

bound to show how casualty occurred.
When, in an action brought by the employee of a railroad company
to recover damages, the plaintiff shows that the
injury was inflicted
through the negligence of a fellow servant engaged in and about the
common employment, and without fault
upon the part of the former,
the burden is cast upon the company of
showing only that its servants
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exercised ordinary and reasonable care; and an instruction to the
jury^ which imposes upon the defendant the superadded duty of
showing how the casualty occurred is erroneous. Hicks, 95/301.
Cited, 98/14; 110/124.
244. Road should be Tcept in reasonably safe condition.
A railroad company is under obligation to employees to observe all
ordinary and reasonable precaution to keep its road in such condition
as to make their passage reasonably safe, and if it neglect such ordinary and reasonable precaution, and the road becomes unsafe, and employees are thereby injured, then the company is liable for damage
done by such negligence, if the injured employee be without fault.

Mitchell, 63/173.
If

a

railroad company

knows of the improper construction of its

road, and that the cross-ties and other supertructure are rotten, and
if the company

fails to make suitable repairs, this is negligence on*
part, and it will be liable for any injury that might occur on that
account to any one, whether a servant of the corporation or not, notwithstanding that the failure to repair was owing to the negligence of
its

the

general

ter

or

manager and superintendent of the
section-boss. If the unsafeness of the

road, or the roadmasroadway be known to
the officers of the company who are charged with the duty of repairing it, this would be notice to the corporation. Krogg, - 77/202.
In Kent, 84/351, the plaintiff was an engineer.
He alleged that
his engine was suddenly, and without fault on his part, precipitated
into an open excavation in the road, caused by the giving away of the
embankment of earth

caused

on

which the track

was

laid; that the defect

by the negligence of the defendant in not keeping its
good order; that it was defendant’s duty to have known
of said defect in time to warn him; that a sufficient time had elapsed
between the falling in of the embankment and the time his train was
due at that point for the servants of defendant to have ascertained
the existence of the danger and notified him in time to stop the
train. Blandford, J., said:
“The evidence showed that there
had been a sudden and tremendous rainfall at and about the place
of the accident; indeed, it was unprecedented in that locality, so far
as known to the people of the neighborhood.
The culvert and embankment had stood from the time of their erection, about thirty
years, and no difficulty had occurred before at that point. The roadmaster had sent several hands to a place about two miles from that
was

road-bed in
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was supposed that trouble might occur. This heavy
place within an hour and a half or two hours of the arrival of the train at that point. The question is, was the railroad
company negligent in not knowing of the washout, so as to have given
the plaintiff due notice and warning.
This was a question of fact
for the jury. Did the railroad company have time to know the
washout had occurred, so that it would be chargeable with notice
thereof? If the company knew or could have known of this washout,
by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, it
would seem from the authorities that it would be liable to the plaintiff for the damages he sustained. But if it did not know of it,
and if there was no negligence on the part of the company’s servants
in not knowing or trying to know, the company would not be liable.
It seems to us the pressure of the whole case is upon this point, and
in the charge of the court, as contained in the record, we do not think
that this point was prominently brought to the attention of the jury.
This is a matter for the jury to pass upon on another trial of the
case.” And it was further held that the court erred in ruling out the
following testimony: “About three miles west of Cuthbert we previously had trouble by reason of the track rising from quicksand pressure in wet weather.
On arriving at this point it was found in good
condition, and being watched by section forces. After passing this
point, three miles west of Cuthbert, we apprehended no further danger, having passed the only point at which there was any particular
reason to apprehend danger.”
It tended to show that the servants
of the defendant were exercising diligence, and, furthermore, that
they had no reason to apprehend further danger, “having,” in the
language of the witness, “passed the only point at which there was
any reason to apprehend danger.”
The case was again before the

point, where it
rainfall took

court, 87/402. It was then held that a railroad company which has
performed the duty of inspecting and keeping in safe condition its
track and road-bed, with that degree of diligence which the law requires of it, is not liable in damages to one of its engineers for injuries occasioned by running his engine into a washout or chasm
caused by a sudden, most violent, and unprecedented rainfall, such
as the oldest inhabitants of the
neighborhood had never before witnessed, the calamity being directly attributable to the act of God,
for which no individual or
corporation is ever held responsible.
Lumpkin, J., said: “In determining whether the defendant, after
the washout occurred, had sufficient time before the accident to have
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discovered the

danger, and to have given warning to those in charge
approaching train, reference must be had to something more
than the mere lapse of minutes and hours between the two events.
If a servant of the company had been at or near the culvert exactly
at the time the washout occurred, doubtless he could have gone forward, and met the train in time to warn the engineer of the danger he
was approaching.
Indeed, it may be true that, after the washout actually occurred, there may have been sufficient time for an employee
of the company at ‘The Slide/ or anywhere else within the limits
of the section, to have gone to the scene of the washout, and then to
have given notice to the engineer in time to avert the accident. But
it seems to us that there are other questions which ought to be considof the

ered and determined in this
ter of this culvert?

quarter of

same

connection.

What

was

What had been its condition for

the.charac-

more

than

a

century, and how had it withstood. storms and carried
off their angry waters during all these years ? What was its condition
on the very day of this unfortunate accident, but a short time before
the accident occurred? What examination had been made of it by
the section-master just preceding the washout, and what conclusion
had he reached upon the question of its safety? Was his conclusion
justified by the attending facts and circumstances? Did the light
rain which was falling gt ‘The Slide/ where the section-master was
engaged in the discharge of his duty, give any premonition that a
waterspout had occurred, or was likely to occur, at the culvert, four
miles below? If the answers to all these questions, and others of
like kind which might be suggested, establish the fact that there was
no good reason to expect a washout at this point at all, then it was
not legally necessary for the company to keep this place under constant watch. We think, in view of all the testimony contained in the
record, that no such necessity reasonably appeared to exist. There
was far more reason to carefully guard the other place designated as
‘The Slide/ and this, it seems, was being faithfully done. In the
a

view of the almost numbersecurity to which this culvert had been subjected, we think the company was justified in coneluding on this particular day that it was in safe condition and'
would remain so. Of course, if the company, by its servants, had
actually known of the washout; or the circumstances were such
that it ought to have known of it in time to warn the approaching;
light of many years experience and in
less tests of strength, durability, and
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if the facts showed that the company had any reason to
apprehend danger at this point, and failed to provide against the
same
then undoubtedly it would have been a case of such negligence on the part of defendant as would entitle the plaintiff to recover.
But we do not think this negligence on the part of the company existed, and are of the opinion that the proof shows to the contrary. Railroad companies are under legal duty, both as to passengers and their own employees, to keep their tracks and road-beds in a
safe condition, and every engineer has the right to assume that this
duty will be observed. The facts in this case, however, show that the
defendant complied with its duty in these respects, at least to the extent of exercising all ‘ordinary and reasonable care and diligence.’
The simple truth is, this calamity was occasioned by an unusual and
unexpected cause, so awful in its nature, and so disastrous in its consequences, that no human being could have foreseen it, or ought, in justice, to be chargeable with negligence for having failed to provide
against it. It was the act of God, and the authorities holding that
no individual or corporation is, or ever ought to be, held responsible
for His acts, are so strong, so numerous, and so well recognized, it is
unnecessary to cite them.” Bleckley, C. J., dissenting from the judgtrain;

or

—

ment of reversal.

When this

case was a

third time before the court,

91/687, it was held that this case has already been twice before this
According to the opinion of a majority of the court when it
was decided the last time, there should not, upon the actual merits
of the case, have been any recovery against the railroad company.
A third verdict having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff below
upon substantially the same facts, it must be set aside and as it is
manifest, in view of the repeated trials which have taken place, that
the plaintiff can never show a materially different state of facts, direction is given that the case be dismissed. Where the plaintiff, by making a prima facie case of negligence, has put the defendant on a vindication of its diligence, and this vindication has been made in two
successive trials, but the court below has failed to recognize it as complete in either instance, this court, in the exercise of its power to give
direction, may decline to order a new trial, and instead thereof may
court.

direct that the action be dismissed.

In the present case such direcgiven in order to avoid the onerous, and apparently useless,
trouble and expense to the defendant of vindicating its
diligence a
tion

was

third time.
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In

Galloway, 57/512, it appeared that the plaintiff was in the employ of the Western and Atlantic Railroad and he had agreed to assume all risk incident to his
employment. He assisted in carrying a
train over the Mckajack railroad, at night, knowing that that road
was unsafe and dangerous.
Bleckley, J., concurring in the judgment
rendered, said: “The employee of a railroad company is in fault
when he knowingly exposes himself to extraordinary danger at night,
by assisting to carry a train over the unsafe track of another railroad.
The corporation does not ensure his safety against reckless locomotion
which he assists to conduct, with knowledge that it lies outside of his
regular employment, and that it is extra hazardous on account of the
unfitness of the appointments. He can not rightfully presume that
the corporation has authorized, or. will sanction, the order of any officer or agent who directs business to proceed, under circumstances
which place both life and property in obvious and unusual peril.
Warner, C. J., said: “It was his fault to go on the train at night
and take the risk, when he knew the road was unsafe and dangerous.”
Cited, 85/200; 89/318.
It was held, in Dunlap, 81/136, that a railroad company sending
its locomotive engineer (employed by the4 month) with one of its
engines to haul temporarily for another company the trains of the
latter over the line of such latter company, is not responsible to the
engineer for the bad condition of the track,

nor for the want of adapengine to the track, it not being alleged that the employer
company knew of such had condition or want of adaptation, and concealed its information. Bleckley, C. J., said: “The engineer being
employed by the month to run trains upon the road of his employer,
could have declined to go upon another road to run the trains of the
company owning that road.
He consented to go for temporary service, went accordingly, and was injured by reason of the bad condition
of the track, and the want of adaptation of the engine (which belonged to his employer) to the track in its actual condition. It is
not alleged that the employer knew either of the bad condition or the
want of adaptation.
For aught that appears, the parties were on
equal terms as to their knowledge or information touching both these
matters.
Had the engineer needed information more than he had,
he should have obtained it, or declined to go. The question is whether
he had a right to take for granted, as against his employer, that the
track of the other company was not defective, but in a fit condition
to be used under this particular engine with safety.
Did the employer

tation of the
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to him the

diligence of seeing that this was so, before requesting
and accepting his consent to do so? The employer could
not, by authority of the contract, order him to go, for the duty of
going was not embraced in the contract of employment. Had he objeeted and been discharged for it, his wages for the unexpired month
wculd have gone on, notwithstanding. We think the case is much
like that of a farmer sending his hired man to plough for a neighbor
a few days.
If the neighbor’s field is not safe, has sink-holes in it,
for instance, or the plough is not adapted to the soil, and from one or
both of these causes the hired man is injured, his employer, it seems
to us, would not be to blame, and would not be responsible, unless
he knew the facts which exposed his servant to unusual peril, and
concealed his knowledge, or failed to communicate it.”
245. Subject continued — cross-ties.
In Preston, 84/588, a car-coupler sued and the declaration alleged
that, in making a coupling between a standing car and a switch-engine, it became necessary for plaintiff to step between the rails; that,
on attempting to follow the backward motion of the cars, he found
that his left foot was held either by the cross-ties or the iron rail of
the track, causing a ear-wheel to run over the foot; that the cross-ties
were placed too close together, and the spaces between them were not
filled in; that the iron rails were old and worn, and had sharp prongs
protruding from the inner edges; and that plaintiff was ignorant of
these defects when he started to make the coupling.
The case was
dismissed on general demurrer. Bleckley, C. J., said: “We think a
cause of action was alleged.
It does not affirmatively appear on the
face of the declaration that the plaintiff could have known more than
he did know by the use of ordinary diligence.
He alleges that he
was ignorant of the dangerous condition of the track; and, if he
ought
to have been better informed of it than he was, his duty in that respect is matter of defense. It does not appear how long he had been
engaged in the work, or what his opportunities had been, before he
was injured, to ascertain the
dangers to which the bad condition of
the track exposed him.
That it was the duty of the company to
have a fit and proper place for the work in which he was employed,
owe

him to go,

there
In

can

be

no

doubt.

8

Allen, 441; 59 Mo. 495; 59 Tex. 255.

Reynolds, 93/570, the facts were that the freight-train upon
which the plaintiff was a conductor having stopped for some reason,
he started forward to ascertain from the
engineer the cause of the
stop, at the same time sending a flagman back on the track with a
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red

light for the

his

rear.

purpose of warning a train which was following in
Before the conductor reached the engineer, the latter

started the

train, when, by the breaking of a link, it

came apart, and
the conductor then was, began to roll
in so doing, passed the flagman already
mentioned. The conductor, by applying the brakes, succeeded in
stopping the detached portion of the train, and then undertook to go
back on the track himself for the purpose of warning the approaching
train in time to avoid a collision.
That train was not then in sight.
The track in the direction from which the train was approaching was
perfectly straight for a mile or more, and the headlight of an approaching engine could, without difficulty, have been seen for a considerable distance, although it was a dark and rainy night. In going
back to signal this train, the conductor started across a trestle in
great haste, and, when about half-way across, he stepped on a crosstie, on the top of which was a small bit of decayed sap, which slipped
off or came loose from the tie, causing him to fall and to become seriously injured. The flagman already mentioned was the only trainhand the conductor had with him, another flagman who started on
the trip having become injured at a station the train had passed before reaching the place of the accident, and being, in consequence,
unable to continue upon the journey. This fact explains why the
conductor himself went back to flag the train following his own.
The above, in brief, sets forth the substantial facts of the ease. The
declaration alleged that the coming apart of the train resulted from
the engineer’s negligence, and that the company was also negligent
in having a defective cross-tie in the trestle.
It was held that,
although the coming apart of the train, and the running back of
a portion of it, may have been the result of the engineer’s negligence, and have made it necessary for the conductor to go back
and flag an approaching train, yet, as the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury was his slipping and falling upon a cross-tie forming a part of a trestle, the injury was a mere casualty incident to the
business in which the plaintiff was engaged, and he was not entitled
to recover.
This is true, although there was upon the edge of the
cross-tie a small bit of decayed sap, the breaking of which from the
tie itself caused the plaintiff’s fall. There was no negligence of the
company, relatively to the plaintiff, in having a defective cross-tie, the
purpose of having ties not being to make a way for employees to walk

the

upon which
backward down the track, and,
rear

portion,

CHAPTER 12.

§ 246 ]

[ 32

Employees of railway companies.

upon,

but to make a safe road-bed for the running of trains.

Cited,

111/317.
246.

Subject continued — a projecting frog.

In

Walker, 103/820, the plaintiff alleged that, as an employee of
defendant, and while acting in the line of his duty, he alighted from

engine and walked on the side of the track and in advance of the
engine, to clear the street-crossing of people, and while walking and
looking straight ahead, warning passers-by, his feet struck against a
frog which projected one and a quarter inches above the main line of
track, so that he stumbled and fell and the pilot of the engine injured him. Allowing the frog to project above the main track was
alleged as negligence. The plaintiff testified that the frog should
an

have been

on a

level with the main track.

He further testified that

he had been

working in the yards, of which this crossing formed a
part, eight or nine years in different ways; that he had passed over
the Mitchell street crossing two or three times a day every day for a
period of nearly two years, and over this identical frog; that he used
that switch and frog every time he came out with the engine — two
or three times a day; that the frog belonged to the track the switch
was on, and over which the engine plaintiff was accustomed to precede across the street had to pass. It was held that relatively to an
employee of a railroad company, who, in the performance of his regular daily work for the company, had walked over or near a defective
place in the track hundreds of times during a considerable period,
and who had thus become fairly chargeable with a knowledge of the
existence of the defect, it was not, on the company’s part, an act of
neligence to allow the same to remain unrepaired. If, because of
such defect, the employee fell, and was run over and injured by a locomotive, it would be a question for determination by a jury — taking into consideration the nature of the defect, its location, the employee’s movements with reference thereto, and all the attendant facts
and circumstances
whether or not the fall was due to the negligence of the employee, or was merely the result of misfortune or accident. In determining this question, the jury should also inquire
whether or not the employee in the line of his duty should have come
—

in contact with the defect at all.

Under the evidence in the present
the defective condition of the frog was not imputable to the defendant as an act of negligence. As, however, there was testimony
warranting a finding that the engineer was negligent in failing to
stop the locomotive after the plaintiff had fallen, and as the fall uncase,
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doubtedly contributed to the injury the plaintiff received, the case
jury, in order that they might pass
on all questions of negligence, both as to the plaintiff and the defendant, arising upon the facts proved. It was therefore erroneous to
grant a nonsuit. Cited, 112/762.
should have been submitted to the

247. Obstructions too

near

the trach.

In

Wolf, 88/210, it was held that the evidence showing clearly that
the plaintiff, an employee, was not free from fault, and there being no
evidence that the structure, a mail-crane, which caused the injury
was located so as to be dangerous to
employees when engaged in the
line of their duties, the nonsuit was properly granted. For the same
reasons the nonsuit was properly granted as to the action in favor of
the employee’s father, his implied consent to the employment of his
minor son by the railroad company being fairly deducible from the
facts in evidence, and there being no proper foundation for an inference to the contrary. And in Blackstone, 112/762, it appeared
that the plaintiff was injured by being knocked from a moving train
in the yard of the defendant by an electric-light pole which was
erected too near the track; that the plaintiff was a yardmaster in the
employ of the defendant; and that not only were his duties as yardmaster and his familiarity with the yard such as to charge him with
knowledge of the location of the pole, hut there was evidence tending
to show that he had actual knowledge of its location.
Held, that the
plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and a nonsuit was properly
awarded in the

248.

case.

Subject continued — skids on the roadway.
DeBray, 71/406, the plaintiff was a train-hand, and on alighting
from the train for the purpose of making a coupling, at night, his
feet came in contact with two pieces of timber, known as skids, which
were used in loading and
unloading freight from the cars, and which
were then lying crosswise on the roadway of defendant.
The court
was asked to charge that “if to do the
^freight business it was necessary to use a pair of short skids for the hauling of freight, and it
was necessary for the purpose of handling of freight to keep the skids
between the main and side tracks, and the skids were kept for such
purpose in a usual and customary place, the plaintiff can not 'recover.” It was held not to be error to refuse the charge. If the injury resulted from the carelessness and negligence of defendant’s
agents in leaving these skids on the roadway, it could make no difference whether such
negligence had become usual or customary. If the
In
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skids

were placed on or near the track of defendant’s road where the
injury occurred, and they occasioned the injury to plaintiff while in
obediepce to orders, and without fault or negligence on his part, the
company would be liable.
Cited, 87/378.

249.

Subject continued, — misplaced switch.
a fireman on defendant’s passenger-train, was injured by
jumping from his engine as it ran from the main line, over a misplaced switch, into a freight-train standing on the side-track. The
misplacement of the switch was not satisfactorily explained, and the
jury found for plaintiff, who was shown to be free from fault. Held
that, substantial justice having been done, the verdict will not be disturbed, though technical errors may have been committed on the
Plaintiff,

trial.

Lewis, 84/211.

250.
In

Injury caused by improper

use

of

a

platform.

Hamilton, 83/346, it appeared that the plaintiff was a night-

watchman in the

yard of the railroad company. This yard included a
platform (used for transferring freight) one hundred and fifty or
two hundred yards in length, and about eight feet wide. The duty of
the watchman comprehended overlooking the platform as well as the
rest of the yard.
It also embraced, according to his evidence, attention to the switches, and care in seeing that nothingifiappened by reason of the switches being wrong, and that np obstruction occurred to
trains in passing over or through the yard. At night, in the darkness, he ran along the platform with a view to prevent a collision of
trains, and in so doing was thrown and injured by coming in contact with some trucks improperly left upon the platform.
A nonsuit
was
granted, and it was held that where a watchman in a railroadyard uses a platform appropriated to the transfer of freights for
the purpose of running along it at night in the dark, he does so
at his own risk; it not appearing that the platform was intended
by the company for such purpose, or that he had any reason to
think it was so intended. Bleckley, C. J., said: “The question is
whether he had a cause of action. It does not appear that he was expected to run up and down this platform at night, in the dark, or that
it was any part of his duty to do so; and we think there was no obligation on the company to keep the platform clear for that purpose.
If the platform had been set apart or appropriated to that use, it
would have been the duty of the company to keep it in proper condition for such

platform

was

use.

But there is

intended for

any

no

such

trace in the evidence that the

purpose.

The

company was

not
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bound to anticipate that the watchman would use it to run upon in
the emergency which arose; and while it was, doubtless, a very meritorious service on his part to attempt to prevent a collision, we think

that, unless the company had appropriated the platform as the

pass-

way for this purpose, it was his duty, rather than the company’s duty,
to see that it was clear of obstruction at the time he attempted to
pass over it. It lay within the area of his walk as watchman, and its
condition at the time was much more subject to his observation than
to that of the company.
Certainly he, being present, could see
dark better than the corporation which trusted to his eyes.”

in the
Cited,

111/317.
251.

Plaintiff one of several who were using defective tools.
appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff was one of
several hands engaged in using the tools which were alleged to have
caused the injury, though not actually using them himself when the
injury occurred, but merely standing by, ready to assist the others
who were using them, it was not error, as against the defendant, for
the court to charge as if the plaintiff was using them. Attawav,
Where it

90/656.
252.

Night-watchman injured by a moving car.
plaintiff, who was in the employment of the
defendant as a night-watchman, showing that its other employees, who
were engaged in
drilling cars and making up trains in an extensive
yard, where large numbers of ears were being constantly moved and
shifted at all hours, were under no duty of giving him notice when
they were about to put a car or cars in motion; and the proper inference from his own
testimony being that it was incumbent on him, for
his own protection, to inform them when he was about to enter or
climb upon a standing car; and it appearing that he was injured at
night by the sudden movement of a car laden with lumber, upon which
he had climbed without informing the company’s servants in charge
of the engine by which the car was put in motion of his intention to
get upon it, and that they neither knew nor could have known of his
presence thereon; and it not appearing that they were, relatively to
him, in any respect negligent in the manner of doing their work,
the court was right in granting a nonsuit. Lumpkin, 99/111.
253. Section-master injured by his hand-car.
In Kenney, 61/590, the plaintiff alleged that he was section-master
in the employ of the defendant; he was furnished by defendant with
a truck or hand-car for the
purpose of transporting tools, himself,
The- evidence for the
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and the hands under his

charge from place to place along his section,,
security might require, to work on the road. Whilst
this car was being run along the section by Parks, another employee
of defendant, plaintiff was thrown therefrom and run over; Parks
negligently suffered himself to be caught in the crank and thrown
forward against plaintiff, thereby knocking him off. The proof
showed that plaintiff had full and complete charge of the car and of
the hands thereon. The crank caught Parks in some way, probably
by the coat, and threw him against the plaintiff. Plaintiff considered it dangerous to turn the crank with his coat on, and hence always
as

occasion and

removed it whether the weather
coat

The

was

hot

or

cold.

Parks had his

running at a rate of speed that was rather
fast, though there were no orders as to speed. Plaintiff had been
using the car for about six months. He changed the car so that
on.

it could be

the

run

car

was

backwards and he could sit in front instead of behind

sitting in front when he was thrown out; had he
impossible for him to have
been knocked off in the manner that he was, in front of the car.
He had been running the car in that way for two months and did
not consider it unsafe.
It was held that as plaintiff was directly connected, as an employee, with the running of the hand-car, his negligence was a question in the case, and that any fault of his, however
slight, which contributed to the injury would defeat his action, and
that to recover he must have been blameless. Bleckley, J., said: “The
commander of a hand-car ought to see to it that the employees under
his orders do their duty. If they can not safely work with coats on, he
should require them to take their coats off. If they move the car
at too high a speed, he should interpose promptly and prevent it.
If the car is not in a condition to be run safely, he should not have it
run at all.
He stands to the company in a relation of trust, and
should be faithful to its interest as well as his own safety. A most
important part .of his duty is to supervise the employees who areplaced under him.” Cited, 63/182.
254. One outside of his duties, voluntarily operates a
dangerous
crank; he

was

been behind the crank it would have been

machine.
It

plainly appearing from the plaintiff’s own testimony as a witvoluntarily, and without being so ordered by any superior, undertook to operate a dangerous machine, with which he wasunfamiliar, and that it was entirely outside of the scope of his reguness

that he
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employment so to do, and there being no emergency which would
justify a departure by him from his ordinary line of duty, he was
not entitled to recover from his master, the defendant, for injuries
thus occasioned, although, in point of fact, the machine was at the
time in a defective condition. Chapman, 96/769. Cited, 112/239.
255. Injury that occurred in breaking a spike.
In Cosby, 97/299, it appeared that the plaintiff, a track-hand, and
Durham were ordered to repair a place in the railroad-track, and in
the course of the work plaintiff got a spike and cleaver, and Durham
got a hammer with which to strike the cleaver, for the purpose of
tapping the spike on all four sides, and then breaking it in two.
Plaintiff laid the spike on the track, and marked it on two sides; then
turned it on the third side, and started to mark it there, saying to
Durham, “You tap this thing very lightly. It is very cold, and I
don’t want either of us to get hurt.” Plaintiff could not watch
Durham and the spike too. When Durham struck the spike, it flew
up, and struck plaintiff in the eye, gouging it nearly out, cutting his
head to the bone and knocking him to the ground.
He was holding
the chisel, and Durham was to tap the spike on all four sides, and then
it was to be broken. They had tapped it on three sides when it
broke. Durham must have struck a heavy blow. That was the usual
way of cutting the pin.
The hammer was a good, big, iron sledgehammer. Plaintiff did not know how heavy it was.
It had been
used by Durham that morning for the same purpose, plaintiff holding
the cleaver.

He knew what sort of hammer it

was.

He did not

see

Durham when the latter struck the last

blow; was looking at the
that, it appearing from the evidence that the
plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence, and there being some evidenee to warrant a finding of negligence on the part of the defendant,
which it had the opportunity to rebut, but failed to do, this court
will not set aside the verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, after its approval
by the trial judge.
work.

It

256.

held

was

Injury caused by rolling car-wheels.

In

Goss, 80/524, it appeared that the plaintiff was employed, together with other laborers, in rolling trucks, or car-wheels connected
by axles, upon a temporary track into the company’s machine-shop.
These wheels

rolled

by different gangs of men, all of whom
superintendence of Dillon. One portion of the men
placed the wheels on the track, and the others rolled them to the
were

were

under the
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shop, and to
•

track for

one of the latter gangs the plaintiff belonged. This
distance was inclined, so that the wheels would roll

some

down of their

own

momentum, unless they

were

“scotched”

was thus employed, and
had reached the bottom of this incline with the wheels he
as

they termed it.

While plaintiff

“cut,”
when he

or

was con-

ducting, other wheels rolled down upon him from behind, and
crushed his foot. Kelly, one of the witnesses, testified that a short
time before this occurred he (Kelly) had said to Dillon that he had
better put a man there to chock the wheels in order to prevent any
injury of this kind; that if the wheels should injure him, he (Kelly)
would “lay him out”; that there had been a man stationed at this
point for that purpose, but he was not there at the time the injury
took place, Dillon having ordered him away. It was held that the
admission of this testimony was not error. It tended to show negligence in not having a man stationed at the point indicated so as to
prevent the wheels from rolling down upon persons engaged at work
on the track beyond.
Cited, 92/730.
257. Caller negligently falls into a pit between the trades.
In Countryman, 89/835, the plaintiff was caller of the defendant’s
depot. Part of his duties was to carry dispatches from the telegraphoffice to the railroad authorities. Reed, the head telegraph-operator,
told him to carry a telegram to Griffin, the master mechanic, at his
office on the yard. On his way there, passing between the turntable
and the water-tank, he fell into a pit about twelve feet long and three
or four feet deep, and was injured.
He did not know it was there.
He supposed it was there for the purpose of cleaning the cinders
from the fireboxes of the engines. It was just between the tracks on
the yard, near the turntable. He did not see it, because it was dark,
and he could not see it unless he had been watching very carefully for
it. There were no lights on the yards to show it, and he had no light
with him. He was about every night, but generally carried a lamp.
At this time the yardmaster had borrowed his lamp (it was plaintiff’s
private property), and had it further down on the yard. He supposed there were lamps about the depot, but they were very particular about lending them. He does not remember that he made any
effort to get a lamp, nor did he go to the yardmaster for the borrowed, lamp when he found he had the message to carry. The yardmaster was three hundred yards on the lower part of the
yard below
where he

was

hurt, and still

on

ahead.

Plaintiff knew it

was

safer
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to have

lamp, but he

was working under Reed, and had to obey
not furnished with a light by the company.

his
He
was about fifty-four years old, and had been wearing glasses twelve
or thirteen years.
He could not see as well at night as in the daytime.
Probably he might have seen the hole if he had been looking
down closely, but his attention was then occupied looking for the
light in Griffin’s office. It was a dark night. He was right among
orders.

a

a

He

was

nest of railroad-tracks.

watch out for

an

A

man

had to

engine running there.

wards and forwards all the time.

It

was

keep his eyes open and
They were switching back-

held that the evidence show-

ing that, even if the defendant was guilty of some degree of negligence, the plaintiff, being an employee, was himself negligent, and
could, by the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the injuries he
received, a nonsuit was properly granted.

injured while riding on it.
Preyermuth, 107/31, the plaintiff, who was an employee, was
injured while riding upon a hand-car, the immediate cause of the
injury being the falling from the car of a large crowbar, which, as it
descended, caught the plaintiff’s foot and precipitated him upon the
rails in front of the car, which ran over him and crushed him.
Lumpkin, P. J., said: “It appears that the plaintiff was one of a
number of hands whose business it was to keep the railway-track in
order. He testified that it was his duty to look after the tools of
the company, including a number of crowbars, and see that they
were properly placed upon the hand-car, when moved from one place
to another.
He did, it is true, by making other statements in this
connection, undertake to avoid the consequences to his case of what
has just been recited, but it was certainly not unfair to him for the
court to base its action upon what he himself asserted was true in
giving his account of the manner in which he was hurt. On the occasion under consideration, it seems that he did not himself place the
crowbars upon the car, but that this was done by another employee.
Some of the testimony tended to show that the crowbar which fell
was put upon the car in the usual manner; that it had many times
been carried in this identical way without falling from the car; and
that there was no reason to apprehend that it would fall on this particular occasion. Other testimony tended to show that the crowbar
was not properly placed upon the car, but that one of its ends projected too far towards the front, so that, after some jolting resulting
258. Hand-car,
In

v
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from the movement of the car,
view of the

matter, however,

it toppled over and fell. In either
with the trial judge that the

we agree

plaintiff was not entitled to recover. If the crowbar was improperly
placed upon the hand-car, it was the plaintiff’s fault, for it was his
duty to look after this very matter. If properly loaded upon the
car, then it seems that the catastrophe was the result of a pure accident
a thing entirely unexpected and not to be anticipated in the
—

usual

course

of events.”

259. Derrick,
In

well-digger injured by.

Jackson, 77/82, the plaintiff testified that as an employee of

digging a well and was using a
who had charge of the hands, ordered plaintiff to go up on the derrick and unscrew a guy-pole.
Plaintiff did not know one of the guy-poles had been cracked, but he
heard some one say so, and so stated to Palmer and asked him if it
was so, and if there was danger in going up.
Palmer replied that it
was none of plaintiff’s business; that there was no danger at all, and
the company, he was engaged in
derrick for that purpose. Palmer,

•

if he did not do

as

directed he could leave there.

Plaintiff went up,

guy-pole broke, the derrick fell and plaintiff was injured. It was
was error to grant a nonsuit, as the evidence had a tendency to show negligence on the part of defendant. The plaintiff
acted under orders, merely yielding his own apprehensions founded
on report to the assurance of the person in charge of the work.
Cited, 82/806.
260. Injured in unloading timber.
Where two employees of a railway company have worked together
a day and a half, one throwing timber through a window and the'
other receiving it on the outside and bearing it off, and where the
one on the inside
suddenly and without notice changes from a systern of timing his throws through the window which was safe to his
fellow laborer on the outside to a system which was dangerous to the
latter, and in consequence the latter was struck with a piece of timher and injured, the case is one for reference to a jury on the question of negligence and contributory negligence, and the court erred
in ordering a nonsuit. Tuten, 88/228.
261. Orders to couple cars with a stick.
A brakeman upon a railway who is under orders
always to couple
cars with a stick, and who has been in the
employment of the company
for a considerable time, and has always heard that such was the rule
the

held that it
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of the company (as it in fact was), can not recover of the
company
for an injury to his hand sustained while endeavoring to make a

coupling directly with his hand without the use of a stick. It makes
difference that other employees frequently or customarily disregarded the rule, unless the company, with knowledge of their practice,
acquiesced in it in a way to sanction it, or practically to abrogate the
rule.
Nothing less would relieve the plaintiff from abiding by his
uniform orders. Sloan, 86/15. Cited, 86/500.
In Dempsey, 86/499, it was held that an employee who is under
orders to couple cars with a stick only, and is injured while coupling
with his hand without a stick, is himself in fault and can not recover.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “According to the evidence of Dempsey himself, the speed of the engine in backing was open to his observation, and was too high for the coupling to be made with safety.
No good reason appears why he did not notice that the engineer
failed to slacken the speed, and why he did not observe the fact in
time to save himself by getting out of the way. But, waiving this
question, the evidence is clear and uncontradicted that he had been
instructed by the conductor to use a stick in coupling, and not to attempt to make a coupling in any other way. He had no stick and
fails to explain why he did not have one. At the time he was hurt
he was engaged in a breach of orders, and that breach contributed
to his injury; for the conductor testifies that had he used a stick, he
would not have been injured. To this testimony of the conductor he
offered no contradiction, and made no reply. The case is controlled
in principle by Sloan, supra.”
In Bird, 100/616, the plaintiff was a brakeman and car-coupler,
and he alleged that there was a defect in the bumper of one of the
cars he attempted to couple; that the crosspiece had become disarranged, from too heavy pressure, and that it was too low to couple
to the other car; that the link was crooked, so that it could not be
lifted to enter the bumper of the higher car, to which the coupling
was to be made; that he was free from negligence, and that the
receiver was negligent in furnishing this defective coupling apparatus.
Bird testified, in substance, to the facts set out in his intervention—
that he used proper and reasonable care in attempting to make the
coupling; that it was in the night and he could not see the defect
in the coupling apparatus before he attempted to perform his work,
and that by reason of the defect in the apparatus he was injured.
no

22
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He testified further that the rules of the company

required him to
his duty to make a coupling;
that such a stick had been furnished him, but that he did not know
where it was at the time he was injured; he had been notified of the
rules of the company requiring him to use this stick, and he had
given his receipt for the stick; that, in place of the stick furnished
him by the company, he used a piece of an ax-helve which he had
picked up; that, if he had used the stick furnished by the receiver,
he would not have been injured, but that he thought the ax-handle
as suitable for the purpose as the stick furnished by the receiver.
It
was held that where a servant sues his master for a personal injury
resulting to him in consequence of the failure of the master to keep
in proper repair dangerous machinery in connection with which the
servant is required to perform labor, and it appears from the evidence of the plaintiff that, though the master was in this respect alleged negligent, the real, proximate cause of the injury sued for was
to be found in the negligence of the servant in undertaking to perform the service required of him in a manner, and by the use of
means, expressly prohibited by the master in his instructions to the
servant, of which instructions the servant was fully notified, the
responsibility for the resulting injury rests upon the servant, and not
upon the master. Accordingly, in such a case the court did not err
in awarding a nonsuit.
The evidence being that the plaintiff was furnished with a couplingstick to be used till he learned how to couple without it, and that his
injury was received after he had learned to couple without a stick,
and had on many occasions done so, some of the instances being in
the presence of his superior officers, who made no objection, the court
properly denied a request by the defendant to charge the jury that if
the plaintiff, in undertaking the service, was furnished with a couplingstick, and directed to use it in coupling, but did not use it at the time
of the injury, and attempted to make the coupling with his hand instead of the stick, and was hurt in making such attempt, he could
not recover.
Maltsby, 90/630.
262. Attempt to male a coupling, knowing that supply of hands is
deficient.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff below, when he undertook to make the
coupling, knew that the supply of hands ordinarily requisite to the
occasion was deficient, and nevertheless consented without objection
use

a

coupling-stick whenever it

was
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to make the

coupling, and inasmuch as the mode of making it, and
diligence to be exercised, would in no way, after the
plaintiff engaged in the work, be affected by the want of more hands,
the deficiency was irrelevant to the issue on trial, and it was error to
give in charge to the jury anything whatever on that subject. Bleckley, C. J., said: “When the plaintiff undertook to make the coupling
he knew that the supply of hands ordinarily requisite to the service
was deficient.
With this knowledge, and without objection, he consented to make the coupling.
No change in the supply occurred between that time and the time of his injury.
He has no right now
to blame the company, or to excuse himself on account of any deficiency in the supply of which he had knowledge when he consented
to make that particular coupling, and engaged in the work of making
it.
The mode of making it, and the care and diligence to be exercised by him, underwent no variation in consequence of anything
that happened after he consented to make it. If the number of
hands on whose co-operation he relied, or had a right to rely,
had been diminished without his knowledge after that consent was
given, he would have had a right to complain; but, as nothing
of the sort occurred, his duty was to make the coupling in a proper
manner if he could, and, if he could not,
to leave it unmade.”
Mitchell, 92/77. Cited, 92/493.
263. Failure to extricate himself from a perilous situation.
In a suit by one who was coupling cars, brought against the company for an injury to his hand, it was error to charge that the plaintiff
could not recover, unless it was impossible for him to extricate his
hand without injury, when the emergency was upon him.
The rule
is that he could not recover if, by ordinary care, he could have avoided
the injury. Barber, 71/644.
The failure of a railroad-employee to extricate himself from a
perilous situation, when he could do so by the exercise of ordinary
care, will bar him from recovery for a personal injury resulting from
such failure, though the peril was brought upon him by the negligence of a coemployee.
It is his duty to avoid the consequences of
negligence, when he ’can do so by the use of ordinary care, Code,
§3830, and, to recover, he must be without fault, Id. §2323. Parthe

care

and

ker, 83/539.
264.

In

Attempt to couple cars when the engine is moving.
Mayfield, 87/374, it was shown that the plaintiff was injured

§ 265 ]
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in

attempting to couple the engine to a car. A nonsuit was granted.
Simmons, J., said: “The evidence shows that the engine was moving
at the rate of four or five miles an hour; that there was a rim one and
half inches broad around the

pilot; and that the plaintiff undertook
only an inch and a half broad,
while the engine was in motion at that rate of speed. It seems to
us that this was clearly an act of negligence, if not gross negligence.
This act was as negligent as the act in the case of Roul, if not more
so.
There the plaintiff undertook to mount the engine by the steps,
and was injured, and we held that he could not recover. Here he
undertook to jump from the ground and light upon a rim only an
inch and a half broad, without anything to hold to, so far as appears
from anything in this record, after he had got upon the rim.”
In Rebb, 87/631, it was ruled that though attempting to couple cars
when the engine is running at a speed of fifteen miles an hour is apparently not only dangerous, but reckless, yet if it be true in the experience of engineers and railroad men that it is safe, provided the engine is properly managed, and if the failure in question resulted solely
from the fault of the engineer in manipulating the engine, the high
speed will be no obstacle to a recovery by the ear-coupler for a personal
injury sustained by him in making the attempt. Though to non-experts its truth would seem in a high degree improbable, if not impossible, yet, there being direct and positive evidence tending to support
the theory of safety, the court erred in granting a nonsuit.
Simmons,
J., concurring dubitante.
265. A car-coupler with a defective hand.
In Kelley, 58/107, it appeared that the plaintiff’s left hand had
always been comparatively disabled. He was employed as a trainhand and while engaged in coupling cars his right hand was mashed
so as to
permanently deprive him of the use of it. The court was
requested to charge in effect that where one contracts to do a dangerous
thing, the risk is his own, and he must take the consequences, and,
unless he is ordered to act in an unusual manner, he can not look to
his employer, and that if a man with two good hands, acting cautiously and prudently, could have escaped without hurt, then the
jury should find no damages. The court did right in refusing the
request, and it was held that the questions are the fault of the plaintiff
and the negligence of the company, and without regard to the nature
of the business or the condition of plaintiff’s hands. If' the business
a

to mount this

rim, and stand

on a space
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dangerous, the duty was upon both parties to use the more
diligence; if there was a defect in the left hand of the
plaintiff, the defendant should have noticed the patent defect before
employing him about such work. In both cases the responsibility
was equally balanced, and the
general principle of law was unaffected. Jackson, J., said: “The increase of risk, from the danger
of the work, should render the employer more cautious, of course,'
but it should also make the other servants of the company, whose
duty it is to control things in connection with his work, more cauwas

care

very
and

tious, too.

In this

case

it should have made the conductor

tious in

more cau-

giving signals, and the engineer
ing his commands when signaled by him,

more

the

cars

The increased caution of

the

one

more

cautious in what he did.

as

cautious in executwell as the coupler of

is balanced

by that of the others, and the legal principle
cases where
employer and employee are
concerned is unaffected.
So, in respect to the defect of the plaintiff’s left hand. The company employed him knowingly — he was
employed for this work — he held himself competent to do it, and
they thought so, too. He was bound to be so cautious as to be
without fault, and the other employees were bound to be free from
negligence.” Cited, 85/472; 104/618.
which controls all railroad
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RECEIVERS

liability to employees, Code,

§2324.
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pany,

267. When receivers are not
268. All the allegations of
construed together.

266. Receiver’s

OF

269. Contract

subject to suit.
the declaration

of

COMPANIES.

employee with the
when binding on receiver.

com-

270. Venue.

liability to employees. The liability of receivers,

trustees, assignees and other like officers operating railroads in this
State, or partially in this State, for injuries and damages to persons
in their

employ, caused by the negligence of eoemployees, shall be
the liability now fixed by the law governing the operation
of railroad corporations in this State for like injuries and damages;
and a lien is hereby created on the gross income of any such railroad'
while in the hands of any such receiver, trustee, assignee, or other
person, in favor of such injured employees, superior to all other
liens against defendant under the laws of this State.
Civil Code,
§2324.
the

same as
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following decisions were based upon the law as it stood prior
of the Act of 1895, which is codified in the foregoing section of the Civil Code.
267. When receivers are not subject to suit.
Receivers of a railroad, holding possession for a court of chancery,
and operating the road under the orders of that court, are not subject
to suit in their official capacity, for a personal injury to one of their
employees, resulting from the negligence of other of their employees
in the same service.
Henderson v. Walker, 55/481; Thurman,
56/376; Youngblood, 97/152; Robinson, 98/306; Brown, 97/801;
Barry, 100/759. The rule is applicable where the receiver is in under the executive. Cherry, 59/446. According to the principle thus
laid down, special statutes enacted for the purpose of fixing and arriving at the liability of railroad companies, and relating expressly
and exclusively to such companies, can not, by implication or interpretation, he held applicable to receivers of a railroad operating it under the orders of a court. This being true, there is, so far as such rec-eivers and their servants are concerned, no law in this State changing the common-law rules of evidence applicable to actions by servants against masters for personal injuries; and therefore, upon the
trial of an action against such receivers by one of their employees for
injuries of this kind, alleged to have been caused by the defendants’
negligence, there is no presumption of law that they were negligent,
but it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove affirmatively that such
was the fact.
Robinson, 98/306.
268. All the allegations of the declaration construed together.
Where the declaration in such an action alleges that the negligence
of the defendants consisted in improperly moving a train with a
sudden jerk, by which the plaintiff was thrown to the ground, and
in reversing the engine, giving it steam, and allowing it to run back
on him before he could
get out of the way, and thus injuring him,
the case can not be treated as an action to recover damages for injuries arising from defective machinery, merely because the declaration,
after setting forth these acts of negligence as the cause of the injuries, contains the additional words, “and not having brakes upon the
engine attached to said train of cars.” All the allegations of such
petition will be construed together, and, if it appears from the deelaration as a whole that the negligence of a coemployee was the efficient cause of the injuries, a simple allegation that the engine had no
to the passage
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brakes will not,
this allegation.
269.

without more, characterize the action as resting
Barry, 100/759.
Contract of employee with the company, when binding on

on

re-

ceiver.
A written contract of service between

of its

employees and a.
railroad company, which, after the making of such contract, is put
into the hands of receivers, who retain this employee in their servone

ice, is not necessarily and at all events binding between the receivers and the

these

parties,

employee. To make it so, there must be,
agreement to this effect, either express

some

as
or

between
implied.

Brooks, 97/681.
270. Venue.

As receivers of railroads, operating the same under-legal authority,
exercise the charter franchises of the company, they are subject to
suit in any county in which the railroad corporation itself may be
sued for

a

like

cause

of action.

While their

personal residence is

unaffected, their official residence coincides with that of the company they represent; the action being brought to enforce official, and
not personal, liability.
In order to sue a receiver appointed by a
court of the United States, no permission of that court is requisite,
there being an act of Congress dispensing therewith. Mabry, 91/780.

CHAPTER 14.
TRAINS MUST STOP AT RAILROAD-CROSSINGS AND SLOW DOWN AT DRAW-

BRIDGES.
271.

Trains must stop at railroad-crossings,
Civil Code, $2234.

272.

Trains

must

slow

down

at

draw-

bridges.

at railroad-crossings. Whenever the tracks
separate and independent railroads cross each other, all enginedrivers and conductors must cause the trains which they respectively
drive and conduct to come to a full stop within fifty feet of the place
of crossing, and then to move forward slowly. The train of the road
271. Trains must stop

of

put in operation shall have the privilege of crossCivil Code, §2234.
272. Trains must slow down at drawbridges.
Where a railroad drawbridge over a navigable river is approached
on one side by a very long trestle, and where the rules of the company
and a statute (conceded by counsel to be applicable) require trains

first constructed and

ing first.
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to “slow down to

a

will not be

than four miles

speed of not more than four miles an hour before
running on or crossing any drawbridge/’ the restriction as to- speed
applies to the bridge proper, and not to the trestle or approach thereto.
This is matter of construction, for the court, and not a question of
fact, for the jury. If the speed of the train is so regulated that it
more

an

hour when it

runs on

the draw-

bridge, there is no violation of the rule or the statute in approaching
the bridge. Daniels, 90/608. Cited, 94/138.
The obvious purpose of the statute and the rules is to prevent the
precipitation of trains into the river when the “draw” of the bridge
was turned around for the passage of boats.
City Council of Augusta v. Hudson, 94/138.

CHAPTER 15.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
273.

Injuries to coemployees, Civil Code,

§2610.
274. Relation of fellow-servant does not
exist in compulsory service.
276. The test of fellow-service.
276. Illustrations of fellow-service.

277. Where

one

is

vice-principal of the

mas-

ter.

278. Subject continued.
279. Subject continued.
280. When the relation

does not

exist.

273.

Injuries to coemployees. Except in case of railroad companies, the master is not liable to one servant for injuries arising from
the negligence or misconduct of other servants about the same business.
Civil Code, §2610.
274. In compulsory service the relation of fellow servant does not
exist.
A “chain-gang boss” is not a fellow servant of a “chain-gang prisoner,” and the employer of the “boss” is responsible for wrongful or
negligent acts on the part of the latter, by which a prisoner is deprived of his life. Simmons, C. J., said: “Where the service is made
compulsory by law, the relation of fellow servant does not exist. See
McKinney, Fellow Serv. §20; Smith v. Steele, 32 Law T. (N.
S.) 195. The ground upon which a master is relieved from liability
to a servant for injuries resulting from the negligence of a fellow
servant is that the servant, when he enters the employment of the
master, impliedly contracts to assume the risk of such negligence as
one of the risks incident to the service, and that his
compensation is
fixed with reference to this; and, clearly, this reason can not apply in
the case of one not voluntarily in the service, but
merely a. prisoner,
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serving out his sentence for a violation of the law. Indeed, it can
hardly be seriously contended that a chain-gang “boss” is in any sense
a fellow servant of a prisoner working under him.
The “boss,” while
acting in that capacity, is the alter ego of his employer, and the latter
is responsible for any wrongful or negligent acts on the part of such
employee by which a prisoner is deprived of his life. Nor is it necessary, as contended by counsel for the plaintiff in error, that such
wrongful or negligent acts should be criminal in their nature in order
to render the employer responsible.
The Act of 1887, Civil Code,
§3828, declares that the word “homicide,” as used therein, shall be
held to include all cases where the death of a human being results
from a crime, or from criminal “or other negligence.” Boswell v.
Barnhart, 96/521. Cited, 102/161.
275. The test of fellow-service.
The earliest recognition in our court of the doctrine that the principal is not liable to one agent or employee for damages occasioned
by the negligence or misconduct of another agent or employee, is
found in Seudder v. Wood, 1/195, but it was held not to be applicable
to a slave, because slaves from their status were incapable of influencing their associate employees towards fidelity and care in the common business.
Cited, 111/323.
In Mullins, 30/146, in a headnote, it is stated that the doctrine
that servants of the same master can not have redress against the
master for the consequence of each other’s negligence in his service,
being founded upon the policy of making each servant interested in
the good conduct of the rest, can not apply to a case when the respective situations of the servants allow no opportunity for the exertion
of a mutual influence upon each other’s confidence; as when there
was a collision of trains and the engineer whose
negligence produced
the injury was on one train of cars, and the engineer who was injured
was on another train and had no
opportunity of preventing the other’s
carelessness. A majority of the court thought the doctrine relating
to servants of the same master not applicable to the case.
What
Stephens, J., said in the opinion upon the subject was obiter. Cited,
77/214; 93/60; 110/196.
In Krogg, 77/203, it was held that a fellow servant is one employed about the same work with the servant injured and whose negligence caused the injury to the servant complaining, and that the
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general manager of the company was not a fellow servant of the locomotive-engineer who was injured. Cited, 110/197.
In Prather, 80/427, the plaintiff’s husband was one of a gang
employed on a material-train to load and unload the cars. The court
charged the jury as follows: “If this was a construction-train engaged in the business of carrying laborers and material to be used
by them from one point on the road to another, and one or more of
the same class of laborers in which the plaintiff’s husband was, and
selected indifferently from their number — now one and then another
was charged with the
duty of manning the brakes of the
flat car, and keeping a lookout and giving signals of danger ahead,
then the plaintiff’s husband was a coemployee with such other laborers, and with the conductor or boss of the squad and the engineer
and fireman of the engine, and engaged in the same manner with
them; and, in order for the plaintiff to recover on this state of facts,
it must appear that her husband was wholly blameless — that is, that
he himself was guilty of no negligence which contributed to the
cause of the injury.
If he immediately or remotely, directly or indirectly, caused it or any part of it, or contributed to it at all, then
his wife can not recover.”
Simmons, J., said: “It is objected to
this charge, that the court placed the deceased, when riding on the
flat car, as an employee engaged about the work, although at the
time he had nothing to do with the movement of the train; and required him to be blameless before he could recover. We think the
charge was correct. The character of this train and the nature of
the deceased’s employment must be borne in mind. This was a construction-train, used for the purpose of hauling steel rails, dirt, and
anything else that was necessary for repairing the road-bed. The
—

evidence shows that this train would have been useless without hands
to load and unload

it; that it had a crew of from eighteen to twentyconstantly employed; that the deceased was one of this crew, and
his business was to do anything to ensure the successful
working of
the train. The train, equipped for its work, consisted in the locomotive, the steam-power, the cars, and the physical force, of which latter
the deceased represented a part. He belonged to this train, and we
think was an employee on it, and coemployee with the balance of the
crew, although at the time of the accident he had no active duty to
perform. The fact that he had no active duty to perform while riding from one point of work to another did not make him any the
six
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less

employee during those times. He could not be an employee
one mile-post, and having finished there, get on the
car to go to the next mile-post, and while riding the mile become a
passenger, and at the end of the mile become an employee again.
‘The true test of fellow-service is community in that which is the
test of service
which is subjection to control and direction by the
same common master in the same common pursuit.
In
order to constitute fellow laborers
it is not necessary that
the servant causing and the servant sustaining the injury shall both
be engaged in precisely the same, or even in similar, acts. Thus the
driver and guard of a stage-coach, the steersman and rowers of a
boat, the man who draws the red-hot iron from the forge and those
who hammer it into shape, the engineman and the switcher, the man
who lets the miners down into, and who afterwards brings them up
from, the mine, and the miners themselves — all these are fellow
3 Wood,
laborers
within the meaning of the term.
Rv. Law, §388, and authorities there cited. It will be seen, by
reference to the plaintiff's declaration, that she calls him an employee
an

while at work at

—

...

.

.

.

5 »

.

or

.

“train-hand.”

not

.

It must be borne in mind also that this train

was

freight or passenger train, but a gravel or construction train,
used by the defendant as such, and not used as common carrier of
goods or passengers. It is argued that this case is covered by the
case of Ayers, 53/12.
We do not think so. If that case was ruled
correctly (of which I have grave doubts), it does not conflict with
our ruling in this case.
The facts are entirely different. In that
case Ayers did not
belong to that train, as Prather did to this. He
was a “track-raiser,” a separate and independent employment from
that of a train-hand, who is part of the crew of the train. Cited,
87/105; 93/58; 97/690.
In Ellington v. Beaver Dam Lumber Co., 93/53, the defendant
was chartered
by the superior court and was not a railroad company
within the meaning of section 2321.
It was the custom of the company to transport its track-hands, including the plaintiff, who was a
track-hand, upon a locomotive to and from their work. While the
plaintiff was in the act of getting upon the locomotive to be carried
home, the fireman suddenly started the locomotive, and injured him.
It was held that the manager of a vehicle used locally by a lumber
company in the transportation of its supplies and products, and another servant of the company whose business it is to repair and keep
in proper condition the track upon which the vehicle is run, and who,
a
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company, is daily transported
this vehicle, are fellow servants; both being

according to the custom of the
from his work

on

to and
in the

employment of the company, and the work of both, when regularly
carried on, conducing to the accomplishment of a common object, to
wit, the transportation of the company’s supplies and products. The
laws of this State applicable to actions by employees against railroad
companies, as such, are not applicable to an action against a lumber
company, of the kind above indicated, by one of its employees, but
the general law applicable to an action for personal injuries by a
servant against his master must control.
This being so, and it appearing from the evidence that the plaintiff and the fireman, through
whose alleged negligence the plaintiff was injured, were fellow servants, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, even if the negligence
was established and was the cause of the injury.
Lumpkin, J., says:
“The rule for determining who are fellow servants is thus stated in
Wood’s Master and

Servant, section 435. ‘The true test of fellowcommunity in that which is the test of service, which is
subjection to control and direction by the same general master, in
the same common object, but unless they are subject to the same general control, the fact that they are engaged in the same common pursuit does not render them coservants.
It is subjection to the same
general rule, coupled with an engagement in the common pursuit
that affords the test, and unless the two elements concur there
can he no common service, which disentitles an employee under the
control of one master from recovering for injuries received through
the negligence of a servant under the control of another master.
Cited, 108/196; 110/4, 198; 111/431, 472.
“Subjection to control and direction by the same general master
in the same common object” and not the fact that employees are paid
by the same general master is the test of fellow servants. Ingram v.
Hilton and Dodge Lumber Co., 108/194.
In Hamby v. Union Paper Mills Co., 110/1, the plaintiff was an
employee of the defendant’s paper-mill, and a part of his duty was
to guide paper through a cutting-machine.
Another employee, one
Mitchell, had control of the running of the machine, and the plaintiff
was his helper and was working under his direction.
Dautry was
the superintendent of the factory and Mitchell and the plaintiff were
working under him. Under Dautry’s direction, plaintiff was working under Mitchell’s orders. It was held that two persons subject
to control and direction by the same general master, in the same comservice is
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object, are fellow servants, and if one is injured by the negliof the other, the master, save when by statute otherwise provided, is not liable, although the negligent servant has the right to
direct the work of the other. Cited, 110/198.
In Brush Electric Light Co. v. Wells, 110/192, it was held that
where employees are in the service and subject to the general control
and direction of a common master, and the labor of each conduces to
the accomplishment of the same general purpose for which they are
employed, they are fellow servants, within the meaning of the rule
stated in section 2610 of the Civil Code, that, “except in case of railroad companies, the master is not liable to one servant for injuries
arising from the negligence or misconduct of other servants about
the same business,” although they may be employed in different departments of duty, and so far removed from each other that one can
in no degree control or influence the conduct of the other. In this
case, the employee who was killed was a lineman, and when injured,
was on one of defendant’s poles engaged in
repairing the wires. The
engineer at the power-house tprned on a current that caused the
death. Cited, 110/328; 112/290.
In McCosker v. Lumber Company, 110/328, it was held that a petition did not set forth a cause of action which alleged, in substance,
mon

gence

that the plaintiff’s husband was a night-watchman in the employ of
the defendant company, which was engaged in operating a sawmill,
and that while in discharge of his duty as a watchman, he was killed

by the explosion of the boiler of the defendant company used in runiiing such mill, and that the explosion was caused by reason of certain specified acts of negligence on the part of the company’s engineer, who had charge of the boiler at the time. Cited, 112/290.
In Gunn v. Willingham, 111/427, it was held that one who is engaged with others in raising, by means of a derrick, timbers which
are being used in the construction of a house, and whose particular
duties

are

to stand

on a

scaffold and receive and detach such timbers

from the derrick when

they are sufficiently elevated for the use intended, is a fellow servant of one who stands on the ground and
operates the machinery which elevates such timbers, when the persons
so engaged are under one common employment, receiving orders from
as superintendent of the entire construction; and this is so
if the person operating the derrick is invested with authority to
direct how and when the elevation of the timbers shall be made. In

another
even

the

opinion, Little, J., repeated the quotation from Wood’s Law of
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Servant, “It is the subjection to the same general concoupled with an engagement in the common pursuit, that affords

the test.”
Thus the rule is

definitely settled, and the “different department

limitation” doctrine to the effect that the fellow servant rule is not

applicable where the servant injured is employed in a department of
the general service which is separate and distinct from that of the
servant whose negligence caused the injury, is not recognized in this
State. Brush Electric Light Co. v. Wells, 110/199.
276. Illustrations of fellow-service.
In Kerr v. Crown Cotton Mills, 105/510, it was held that in a
suit by an employee against a master, a manufacturing company, for
damages resulting from personal injuries, it was not error for the
court to grant a nonsuit where the evidence did not show that the
injury was the result of defendant’s negligence, but showed that if it
was due to the fault of any onej it was owing to the negligence of a
fellow servant of the plaintiff. The report does not show the capacity in which they were employed. Citing McDonald v. Eagle and
Phenix Manufacturing Company, 67/761; 68/839;
McGovern v.
Columbus Mfg. Co., 80/227. Cited, 106/127.
A wood-cutter and a locomotive-engineer in charge of a train used
for the purpose of hauling timber to a sawmill and of transporting
employees of their common master from the mill to their respective
places of work are fellow servants. Railey v. Garbut & Company,
112/288.
A

steamship company is not liable in damages for an injury to its
employed in storing cotton in the hold of its vessel, by a bale
of cotton thrown down the hatchway, where the injury is caused by
the failure of the hatch-tender (who is usually the engine-driver or
is taken indifferently from the laborers employed in loading the vessel) to give warning of the approach of the falling bale, whether it
be thrown when the hatch-tender is present and fails to give the
warning, or while he is absent it be thrown without notice by another servant engaged in the same business.
In either case the injury is occasioned by the negligence of a fellow servant. Ocean
Steamship Co. v. Cheney, 86/278.
The doctrine that a master is not liable for the negligence of an
employee by which a coemployee is hurt is of force in this State;
and where the evidence of the plaintiff showed that he was an employee working in a picker-room in a factory, and was injured by
laborer

'
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negligence of a coemployee who was working in
and had the direction of the work, for which suit was

the same room
brought against
the master, a nonsuit was properly granted.
McGovern v. Columbus Mfg. Co., 80/227.
Cited, 104/682; 105/511; 110/4; 111/430.
A workman engaged in working in a picker-room of a factory with
two others, and having the direction of the work therein as foreman,
is not a general superintendent of the corporation operating the faetory, so as to render it liable for his negligence in starting a
machine which he and one of the others were engaged in changing, whereby such other employee was- injured. McGovern v. Columbus Mfg. Co., 80/227.
Cited, 104/682; 111/430.
A workman engaged in the same job with others, and having direction of it, is not a vice-principal of the master, but stands on the
footing of a mere fellow servant. Cates v. Itner, 104/679; 111/324.
The ease of McDonald v. The Eagle and Phenix Mfg. Co., 68/839,
was heard on a
general demurrer to the declaration, and it was held
that a workman engaged in the same job with two or three others,
and having the direction of it, is not a general superintendent of a
corporation, so as to bind it as such, but stands on the footing of a
mere fellow servant, and Jackson, C. J., said:
“One of these servants engaged in this work is called superintendent, and is alleged to
have been at the head of the management of the derrick, etc.; but we
do not see that he was such a general superintendent for this corporation as to make it liable'as acting through him.
On the contrary,
the averment only makes him the head of a little job-to do that job;
and to all intents and purposes a fellow servant.”
Cited, 80/230;
104/682; 105/511; 110/4.
Although two servants

were employed by the same master, yet
employed as a blaster for the purpose of removing certain rocks on the master’s property, and alone had charge
of the work of blasting, and the other had nothing to do with it,
but was employed as a wood-workman in the foundry of the master,
they were not fellow servants in the legal sense of the term, and a
charge based on that assumption was erroneous, though it may have
been a correct abstract statement. Bain v. The Athens Foundry and
Machine Works, 75/718. Cited, 77/214; 93/60; 110/197; 111/472.
In Mullins, 30/146, an officer of the Western and Atlantic Railroad
applied to the machinist of the Georgia Railroad shop for an engine and engineer to go up the Western and Atlantic road to bring
down some Georgia Railroad cars. Mullins, a Georgia Railroad enwhere

one

of them

was
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gineer, was sent with an engine up the road with directions to bring
only Georgia Railroad cars. There was a general agreement that for
such services the Georgia Railroad was to be paid by the Western
and Atlantic Railroad. While making the trip, Mullins was subject
alone to the orders of the officers and agents of the Western and Atlantic Railroad, but he was to be paid by the other road. The majority of the court thought that Mullins was the servant of the
Georgia Railroad and not of the Western and Atlantic Railroad,
which had him for a single occasion, had no part in selecting him,
and was under no obligation to pay him. Cited, 78/751; 110/196.
Prior to the passage of the Act of 1856 and the adoption of the
Code, the rule was as stated in the above-mentioned cases. The Act of
1856 changed the rule so far as it applied to railroad companies.
Cannon, 34/422.
277. When one is vice-principal of the master.
As a general rule, a conductor in charge of a regular passenger or
freight train, and having, as such conductor, full control of its movements, is not, while in the performance of his usual and ordinary
duties with reference thereto, a fellow servant of an engineer, fireman,
or hrakeman working under his orders.
Under such circumstances
the conductor is the vice-principal of the railroad company or of
receivers operating it under the orders of a court. Brooks, 97/681.
In Taylor v. Georgia Marble Company, 99/512, it was alleged that
the defendant, though having no charter as a railroad company, was
acting as a railroad company; that plaintiff was in its employment
as brakeman and
car-coupler; McHan was engineer of the train, was
in sole charge thereof, and had, by direction of defendant, control
and management of plaintiff as brakeman and car-coupler; plaintiff
was a subordinate
employee under McHan as defendant’s agent, and it
was his duty to obey McHan’s orders.
By McHan’s negligence he
was injured.
On a demurrer to the declaration it was held that an
agent or employee of a corporation, who, in the discharge of his general duties, has charge of a particular branch or department of the
corporation’s business, as to which he acts in the capacity of viceprincipal, and as such employs and has control of all of the subordinate servants who are to work under him, is, as to one of these whose
duty it is to obey his orders, and who takes his orders from no other
source, a quasi-master, and not a fellow servant, in the sense that
the subordinate will have no right of action against the corporation
for personal injuries caused without fault on his part by the
negli-
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gence of the superior. Atkinson, J., said: “The
determination is whether the person whose alleged

sole question for
negligence caused
the injury was, in a legal sense, a fellow servant with the person injured, and engaged as such in and about the common employment of
the master.
Corporations act only by and through their agents, and
while, in the loose, general sense, all agents and servants of a «corporation, without reference to rank or dignity, are coemployees, they
are not fellow servants in the sense which relieves the
corporation
from liability for the negligent act of one, resulting in injury to another, where the person whose negligence caused the injury occupies
the position of quasi-master as to the person injured. Such a doctrine would result in defeating in every instance a right of recovery
in favor of an employee of a corporation injured in consequence of
the negligence of another employee. Where the master delegates to
one of his
employees such authority as subjects the will and discretion of all other employees engaged in and about the particular business to the direction and control of the
person to whom that authority
is delegated, such person may be well said to he a vice-principal, and
to stand in the relation of the master himself.
The negligence of
such person may properly be imputed to the master as his act, and
particularly is this true with respect to the employees of corporations;
for, if the master be not present in the person to whom it has delegated this authority, it is not, and can never be, present at all. It
appears in the present case, according to the allegations in the declaration, that the engineer through whose negligence the injuries were
alleged to have been sustained had, by direction of the common master, the corporation, sole charge and entire control and management of
the train and of the plaintiff, in his capacity as brakeman and coupler
thereon. It was alleged that the plaintiff was a subordinate employee, under the direction and control of the engineer, and that it
was his duty to obey the orders of the engineer.
The declaration alleges that he was employed by the engineer. These allegations being admitted by the demurrer to be true, the engineer, while a coemployee, was not in a legal sense a fellow servant with the plaintiff.
The master had deputed to the engineer authority over those who
were subordinate to him, and the negligence of the person exercising such authority was the negligence of the master itself. See Railway Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. 184.”
When the case, Cheeney v. Ocean Steamship Co., 92/726, was
again before the court, it was held that where it was essential to
23
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safety of laborers employed by a steamship company in the loading of its ship, whose place of work was in the hold of the vessel,
that a “hatch-tender” should be stationed at the hatchway to warn
them when bales of cotton
it

was

the

the

duty of the

hitchway for that

were

company
purpose.

about to be thrown into the hold,

to supply a person to be stationed at
The superintendence of this work

having been intrusted to Hoffman, if he represented the company
in the duty of furnishing a sufficient supply of employees to effect
the work with reasonable and ordinary safety to those engaged in
performing it, he was, as to this duty, the alter ego of the company,
and not a fellow servant of the laborers.
If Hoffman was general
foreman over the loading of the whole ship, the laborers were entitied to rely upon his promise, when he ordered them to go into the
hold and begin work, that a “hatch-tender” would be stationed at
the hatchway; and if one of them, relying upon this promise, obeyed
the order, and no such person was placed at the hatchway, the company would be responsible for a personal injury occasioned by his being struck by a bale of cotton thrown into the hold without warning,
if he did not know, or had no reason to suppose, that it was about to
be thrown down, although the person who threw it down was a fellow servant, and was negligent in doing so, in the absence of a “hatchtender,” without himself giving notice. If a “hatch-tender” was
duly stationed, but afterwards absented himself without the knowledge of Hoffman, his absence would be the negligence of a fellow
servant, and not that of the company. If there was no promise to
station a “hatch-tender,” and the plaintiff went into the hold knowing there was no “hatch-tender,” he could not recover. On the second trial of this case, nothing appearing from which it could be inferred that there was a “hatch-tender,” employed as such, or that
any person was in fact stationed at, or ordered to attend, the hatchway, the court erred in granting a nonsuit.
Simmons, J., said: “It
is well settled that among the legal obligations of a master to his
servant, forming a part of the implied contract between them, is
that of making reasonable provision to protect the servant against
dangers to which he is exposed while conducting the work he is employed to do, and of supplying a sufficient number of servants to effeet the work with reasonable and ordinary safety to those engaged
in performing it; and if the proximate cause of an injury sustained
by the servant while so engaged is the failure of the master to exercise ordinary prudence in this respect, the master is liable, unless the
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fairly be regarded as having assumed
The failure of the master in this respect

servant may

the risk incident
stands upon the
same footing as the failure to supply suitable and sufficient
machinery
or appliances for conducting the work safely.
Wood, Mast. & Serv.
(2d ed.) §394, and cases cited. The evidence in this case tends to
show that it was essential to the safety of those employed in the hold
of the vessel, at the time in question, that a ‘hatch-tender’ should
be so stationed at the hatchway to warn them when bales were about
to be thrown into the hold, and, if this was so, it was the duty of
the company to supply a person to be stationed at the hatchway for
thereto.

that purpose.

If all the men employed in the loading of the ship
engaged in other parts of the work, from which none of them
could be spared to give warning at the hatch, the number of employees
ought to have been increased and one of them directed to perform
this particular service. So long as no employee was charged with the
duty of giving warning at the hatch, there was a failure on the part
of the defendant to carry out its implied contract with those employees
for whose safety such warning was necessary. The acts of a person
authorized by the master to perform a duty which the master owes
to his servant, in so far as they pertain to that duty, are the acts of
the master himself; and when the servant is injured by reason of a
failure to perform it, the master can not escape liability by setting
up that the duty devolved upon a fellow servant of the person injured.
An obligation which the law imposes upon the master for the benefit
of his servants can not be evaded by shifting it upon one of their
number. See Cotton Factory Co. v. Speer, 69/137, 148; Goss,
80/524; Wood, Mast. & Serv. (2d ed.) 436, 438 et seq., 477, 448;
MeKin. Fel. Serv. §25; 7 Am. & Eng. Ene. Law, 834, and cases cited
by these authorities; Flike v. Railroad Co., 53 K". Y. 549, 553. If
Hoffman represented the defendant in making this promise, the plaintiff had a right to rely upon it when he obeyed Hoffman’s order and
entered upon the work, and his knowledge when he went into the
hold that no one was then at the hatch to give warning would not
preclude a recovery. It does not appear that there was any imminent
danger at the time of his going into the hold, for no cotton was
then being thrown into the hold, and he was there fifteen or twenty
minutes before any came down; nor did anything happen while he
was at work there, and up to the time he was hurt, to indicate that
the promise had not been fulfilled. The bale that struck him was
the first that came down. ‘If the servant, having a right to abandon
were

CHAPTER 15.

§ 278 ]

[ 356

Master and servant.

dangerous refrains from doing so in consethat the danger shall be removed, the duty to
remove
manifest and imperative, and the master is not
in the exercise of ordinary care unless, or until he makes his assurances good.
Moreover, the assurances remove all ground for the ar-

the service* because it is
quence

of

assurances
the danger is

gument that the servant, by continuing the employment, engages to
assume its risks.
So far as the particular peril is concerned, the
implication of law is rebutted by the giving and accepting of the assurance; for nothing is plainer or more reasonable than that the par-

ties may and should, where practicable, come to an understanding
between themselves regarding matters of this nature.’ Cooley,
Torts

(2d ed.), *559, and cases cited. And see Wood, Mast. & Serv.
(2d ed.) §378 et seq.; Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurl. & H. 944; Hough v.
Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213; Railroad Co. v. Young, 1 XT. S. App.
96; 1 C. C. A. 428, and 49 Fed. 723, and cases cited; Lanning v.
Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 521; Thorpe v. Railway Co., 89 Mo. 650, 2
S. W. 3.”
Cited, 95/381; 102/69; 111/474.
278.

Subject continued.

In Blackman

Thomson-Houston Electric

Co., 102/64, it was
employed in the capacity of engineer for an incorporated manufacturing company, but who is likewise under a
duty to obey generally the orders of a person who is placed in authority over him, and who has power temporarily to withdraw him from
the performance of the special duty for which he was employed, and
to assign him to the performance of other and inconsistent duties,
not connected with or embraced within his special employment, is not
a fellow servant with such superior; and if, while
engaged in the
performance of such duties which had been so assigned to him by his
superior, he be injured, he can not be regarded as a mere volunteer.
While the person occupying the inferior position is, in a broad and
general sense, a coemployee, he is not a fellow servant with the person
in authority over him in the sense that he could not recover for injuries sustained by him in consequence of the negligence of such
person. If, in the prosecution of the business of the corporation, the
agent having a general control of its working plant causes a scaffold
to be constructed by other employees, under his direction, for the
purpose of removing heavy machinery, and, after its completion, temporarily withdraws the engineer from the performance of the special duties for which he was employed, and directs him to assist in the removal of such machinery, using for that purpose the scaffold so conHeld that

one

v.

who is
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some imperfection therein, resulting from a
plan of its construction, such defect being unknown to
the engineer, such scaffold falls'and in consequence injures the engineer, he is entitled to recover. Where the person in authority, representing the master, undertakes to plan such a contrivance, and to
superintend its construction by ordinary, unskilled laborers, such per-

structed, and because of
defect in the

son

thinks for the

master, and the servant who

the risk of defects of
in consequence

uses it does not take
design, and the master will not be excused, if,

of such defects only, the servant is injured; but if the

master deliver to such laborers material well suited to that purpose,

leaving it to their discretion to devise the plan of so simple a contrivance as they proceed with the work, no recovery could be had by one
who, as a fellow servant with such laborers, subsequently undertook
to use such contrivance, and, because of defects therein, was injured;
and this is true whether the defect was of plan or construction. In
either case the injury would be imputable to the negligence of the fellow servant. Atkinson, J., said: “Was the plaintiff, according to
this record, injured in consequence of the negligence of a fellow servant, within the meaning of that term as it is employed in the rule
which exempts the master from liability for injuries resulting from
the negligence of a fellow servant? While, in a broad and general
sense, colloquially speaking, all servants of a corporation, without reference to dignity, grade, or distinction, are coemployees, they are not
necessarily fellow servants, within the meaning of the rule above
stated.
As was well said by Chief Justice Jackson in the case of
Factory Co. v. Speer, 69/137: ‘A corporation acts only through its
agents, and, unless responsible for their acts, is wholly irresponsible.
The agent who represents the corporation, as master over other employees, for the time is in the shoes of the corporation, and whether
they fit him, and he wears them with propriety, or not, is their concern, for the reason that the corporation employs him, and puts others
under him, as a skilled and prudent manager. It is negligent if it
fail to employ such a one, because those others under him must be
subject to his orders and obey his directions, or the great purpose and
end of their creation, to wit, organized and systematic labor and its
fruits, are at an end. If, from the negligence of this quasi-master,
this locum tenens, unmixed with negligence of his own, another servant or employee of the corporation is hurt, it must logically follow
that the corporation is responsible, or it can be held responsible, for
no carelessness at all.
From the president and general superintend-
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ent down to the

smallest child who labors day or night, all the

ants of this creature of the

serv-

law, this impersonal entity, are coemployees, differing only in the character of their work, and the amount
paid them for it. If no coemployee can recover for the negligence
of another, it must follow that no servant of a corporation can recover from it, no matter what it does, for it does nothing except by an
employee. It would be thus to except corporations from the rule that
a master is responsible to his employee for torts, and careless and
reckless disregard of life and limb. It would be to endow the artificial person with powers which no natural person can possess, and to
grant that artificial creature immunities which no one of its creators
can enjoy himself.
It can not be good law.’ Id. pp. 148, 149.
The principle here announced was recognized, and applied in the
case of Cheeney v. Steamship Co., supra, in a well-considered opinion of the present chief justice.
In that case this court said:
'If Hoffman had authority to employ such men as were necessary
to effect the work with reasonable and ordinary safety, or authority to direct that one of the employees should attend the hatch,
he was, as to the duty of supplying a hatch-tender, the alter ego of
the company, and was not a fellow servant of the other employees,
in such sense as to cast upon them the risk of his failure to discharge
that duty.’
So that, whatever rules may elsewhere prevail, in this
State coemployment is not, and can not be, the test of fellow-service.
As we have before seen, Conners, the foreman of the plant, was invested by the master with the authority to assign the plaintiff to the
duties which he undertook to perform; and, acting under the direction of such a person, the only one who had authority to speak for the
corporation, he will be held to have acted under the direction of the
master, the corporation itself.” Cited, 111/472.
279. Subject continued.
In City Council of Augusta v. Owens, lll/4(i4, it was held that
though the immediate cause of a physical injury to an employee may •
be the negligent act of a fellow servant, the master is liable, if the
fellow servant did this act under and in obedience to an order given
by a vice-principal of the employer, if the giving of the order was
itself an act of negligence as to the defendant. Where a
municipal
corporation is engaged in operating a rock-quarry which it owns, a
person placed there by its authority as general superintendent of the
work, with power to direct the movements of its laborers, not joining
with them in the labor, and being as to this business the
city’s sole
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and only representative, is the viee-prineipal, and not the fellow servant, of the workmen under his charge; and this is so whether it was

within the scope of his authority
In Woodson v. Johnston &

engage the workmen or not.
Company Limited, 109/454, the
petition made, in substance, the following case: The defendants
were engaged in running a line of steamships from Brunswick to
European ports, in the course of which they employed the plaintiff to
work as a laborer in loading with cotton one of their ships at their
dock in the city of Brunswick. They employed a superior officer,
known as the “walking-boss,” who had power to hire and discharge
men, and who also exercised a general superintendence over the hands
engaged in loading the defendants’ ships. It was his duty, when
about to change the working crew of any steamer from one position
to another in the course of loading a vessel,, to first notify the gang
working in the hold of his intention to make such change, in order
that one of the laborers in the hold known as the “header” might
have an opportunity to notify the new crew of laborers employed on
the deck above not to throw down or lower any cotton until directed
so to do, to the end that the gang below might not be subjected to injury. On a day named in the petition, a bale of cotton was thrown
into the hold of the ship, and the plaintiff was thereby crushed, and
seriously injured. The hurt thus occasioned him was caused by the
negligence of the “walking-boss” in the “changing of the crew on
deck
without notice or warning to the men in the hold
below,
and in replacing said deck crew with a new crew
that was composed of green men, who knew nothing of the work that
they were about,” one of whom threw down the bale of cotton by
which the plaintiff, who was one of the men employed in the hold, was
injured. The conduct of the “walking-boss” in this respect was in
gross violation of his duty and the direct cause of the injury inflicted
upon the plaintiff.
A demurrer to the petition was sustained, which
was reversed, the court holding that an employer is liable in damages
for physical injuries to an employee, resulting from negligence of
one who was the general superintendent of the business of the former,
and who, on the occasion when the injuries were sustained, was acting
as the employer’s alter ego, and not in the capacity of a fellow servant
of the person injured.
.

.

.

to

.

.
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280. When the relation does not exist.
A lessor is not liable to

a

servant of the lessee for

ing from the negligence of the latter, unless

some

damages resultduty remained upon
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perform which the injury arose. It would
injured was originally employed
before the lease by the lessor, was ignorant of the lease, and supposed
that he was still so employed.
Crusselle v. Pugh, 67/430. Cited,
the lessor from

make

a

failure to

difference that the servant

no

80/230.
In

Rhodes, 84/320, the plaintiff

assumed to assist the servants of

a

was a boy of thirteen years. He
railroad company, at their request,

in

moving a loaded ear, without the knowledge, consent or authority
of the company, and while thus employed he was injured.
It was
held that he was a volunteer and not a fellow servant. Blandford,
“Plaintiff’s

J., said:

of the defendant in
be

son was

not a fellow servant with the servants

To be the servant of another, there must

error.

act on the part of the master, which recogservant, either express or implied. It is laid
that a person who assists the servant of another
in an emergency can not recover from the master on account of the
negligence or misconduct of the servant. Such servant can not, by his
officious conduct, impose a greater duty on the master than that which
the latter owes to his hired servant at common law, and it is immaterial whether the injury occurred while assisting the servant gratuitously or at the request of the latter. See Degg v. Railroad Co., 1
Hurl. & H. 773; Osborne v. Railroad Co., 68 Me. 49; 2 Thomp. Neg.
1045.
In Holmes v. Railroad Co., L. R. 4 Exch. 254 (affirmed in
Exchequer Chamber, L. R. 6 Exch. 123), the plaintiff was a person
some

contract,

or some

nizes the person as a
down as a general rule

entitled to the

delivery of

a

wagon-load of coals from the defendant,

railway

company. The usual mode of delivery was impossible, on
account of the crowded state of the station.
He was hence allowed
a

by the company’s station-master to go to another place, where the
wagon was to get the coals; and while so doing he fell through a hole,
owing to the negligent keeping of the company’s premises. The court
held that he was engaged, with the consent of the company, in a transaction of interest to both parties, which prevented him from being
there a volunteer, and entitled him to have the company’s premises
kept in a reasonably safe condition, and he was allowed to recover.
So, also, in the case of Wright v. Railway Co., 1 Q. B. Div. 252. In
this case, the case of Holmes was cited by Lord Coleridge, C. J.,
with approval. The case referred to places the liability of the company upon the ground that the plaintiff was not a mere volunteer,
but was there on the company’s premises for the
purpose of attending to his own business, which was likewise connected with the busi-
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ness

had

of the company. The plaintiff and the defendant seem to have
interest in common in the business to be transacted. But in

an

the

present case there was no business in common between the
plaintiff’s son and the defendant. He was not there even as a licensee by the company.”
Cited, 86/42.
The case of Duke v. Wadsworth, Williams & Co., 50/91, was this:
The defendants owned a steam-boiler, engine and other machinery
which they were using in connection with a flouring-mill. Duke contracted to sell cord-wood to defendants and to deliver it at their mill.

His son, a minor, was at

the mill with a load of the wood, when the
exploded and injured him and the horses and wagon. It was
held that the plaintiff was not an employee of the proprietor, so as to
put him in the situation of one who takes the risk upon himself of
negligence in running the mill, and that he stood towards the defendant precisely as any other man stood who, in consequence of his business wants, had occasion to visit the mill.
McCay, J., said: “Good
faith and good intentions — the absence of willful neglect — does not
excuse from damages a man who puts the lives and the limbs of the
community in danger by setting up in its midst a dangerous machine.
To say the least of it, he is bound to have his machine up to the highest point of the art, and to have it managed by a skillful man, and one
acquainted with the nature of it, and the character of the dangers attaching to the use of it.”'
In Brown v. Smith & Kelley, 86/274, it appeared that Dixon had
a vessel loaded with coal, and
employed Brown, the plaintiff, to assist
in unloading it, and hired from Smith & Kelley a pair of mules and
a driver by whose negligence the plaintiff was injured.
The mules
were to be hitched to a rope, and by this means were to pull the tubs
of coal out of the hold, upon the dock. Although Dixon hired the
mules and driver from Smith & Kelley, he had full control of both.
They were under his control and direction during the time the work
of unloading the coal was in progress, and, when the driver was not
driving the mules, Dixon had the right to put him at any other work
in and about the vessel; and, although he did not pay the driver for
his work, hut paid Smith & Kelley for the hire of the mules and the
driver, he nevertheless had the right under the contract with Smith
& Kelley to discharge the driver and appoint a substitute in his place,
if the driver was careless or incompetent.
Smith & Kelley had no
right to give any directions to the driver while in the service of Dixon,
nor to control him in
any manner during that time, but he was to be
boiler
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under the absolute control of Dixon

It

was

held that for

an

during the progress of the work.
injury inflicted by the negligence of the serv-

ant of the defendants in the

performance of work for which he was
by them to another who has complete control and direction of
him for the occasion, the defendants having no such control, though
receiving payment for the work performed by him, and the person to
whom he is hired having the exclusive right to discharge him and put
another in his place or to put him about other work, there is no liability on the defendants; he being, for the time, not their servant, but
that of the hirer.
Simmons, J., said: “While it is true that the
driver of the mules may have been the general servant of Smith &
Kelley, yet, when they hired him to Dixon for this particular work,
and gave Dixon control over him, and the right to discharge him if
Dixon found it necessary, the driver became the special servant of
Dixon for that occasion, and Smith & Kelley would not be liable for
his negligent acts while thus in the employment of Dixon. Wood,
in his work on Master & Servant (section 317), says:
‘The real
test by which to determine whether a person is acting as the servant
of another is to ascertain whether at the time when the injury was
inflicted he was subject to such person’s orders and control, and was
liable to be discharged by him for disobedience of orders or misconduct.’ In Whittaker’s Smith on Negligence (page 165), it is said:
‘Where a master allows his servant to be hired by another, he remains
liable to the hirer and to strangers for negligence of such servant;
and even where that other himself selects the servants, although the
master might not be liable for mere incompetency, yet he would be
so for negligence.
If the master abandons all control over the servant, and all right to discharge him, and these rights are taken by
hired

the

hirer, of

course

the servant becomes the servant of the hirer.’

Shearman & Redfield

the
the

In

Negligence (section 162), it is said: ‘If
hirer is vested for the time with the exclusive right to
discharge
servants and employ others, he alone is responsible for their

defaults.’ ”

on
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CHAPTER 16.
DUTY OF MASTER 1ST SELECTING SERVANTS.
281.

of master in selecting servants,
Civil Code, §§2611, 2612.
282. The trial judge should confine the eviDuty

dence

and

made

by

instructions

the

to

pleadings.

the

issues

283. Want

284.

of
diligence in selecting and
knowledge of incompetency, or its
equivalent, must be shown.
Knowingly co-operating with incompetent

servant.

281.

Duty of master in selecting servants. The master is bound
ordinary care in the selection of servants, and not to retain
them after knowledge of incompetency.
It must appear that
the master knew or ought to have known of the incompetency
of the othef servant, and it must also appear that the servant
injured did not know, and had not equal means of knowing,
such fact, and by the exercise of ordinary care could not have known
thereof. Civil Code, §§2611, 2612.
282. The trial judge should confine the evidence and instructions
to the issues made by the pleadings.
While, in the abstract, it is the duty of railroad companies to carefully select and superintend its operatives, machinery, appliances, and
appointments of every character used in its business, yet, where the
failure to properly select or superintend its operatives is not made a
ground of complaint in the declaration, and the negligence imputed
to the company was confined to the improper selection of machinery
and appliances, it was error, at the request of the plaintiff’s counsel,
to give in charge the abstract principle of law first above stated, without limiting its application to the subject complained of in the declaration. Atkinson, J., said: “It is well enough for the court carefully to understand the plaintiff's contentions, as stated in the declato exercise

ration, and confine the evidence and instructions to the issues which

presented by the declaration and the pleas. If this is done, the
jury would have no inducement to wander into the field of speculation,
nor would there be in the instructions anything suggestive of a power
upon their part to do so.’’
Davis, 95/292.
283. Absence of diligence in selecting and knowledge of incompetency, or its equivalent, must be shown.
In McDonald v. The Eagle & Phenix Mfg. Co., 67/161, 68/839,
it was held that a principal is not liable for the negligence of a fellow
servant in the same job, unless the principal himself was negligent
in not using ordinary diligence in selecting the fellow servant, or in
retaining him after knowledge of incompeteney or negligence. Nor
will the bare fact that the servant afterwards became negligent show,
are
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without more,

negligence in the principal in selecting. And, JackC. J., said: “It is for his (the principal’s) own negligence or
misconduct that he is liable; and hence his liability rests on his own
negligence or misconduct in the employment of his agents, and if he
uses ordinary diligence in employing competent men, it is enough to
relieve him. Nor will the fact that the person proved incompetent, of
itself, and without more, show negligence of the master, but it must
further appear that the master knew, or might have known by ordinary diligence, the incompetency of the agent or servant. It was contended that this case was taken out of these principles on the ground'
that a special contract was made whereby it was stipulated and guaranteed that the company would employ competent and careful men;
and as to that condition, it was held that one may waive the special
contract and sue in tort for breach of duty, if there were such special
contract, and the contract might warrant the competency and care of
the fellow servant, and be then invoked to change the legal principle
on which the liability of the principal would turn for the tort; but
no special contract is set out in this declaration so as to vary that general legal principle.”
Cited, 67/435; 95/399. The principles determined in the foregoing case, were affirmed in Campbell v. Pugh,
67/430, and it was there said: “The true test of liability is, was the
master at fault or negligent, and did this fault or negligence of the
common master lead to or result in
damage to the servant by his felson,

low servant?”
In Keith

Walker Iron & Coal

Co., 81/49, it was held that a
corporation building a structure composed in part of brickwork and
in part of woodwork is not responsible for the fall of the masonry
upon the carpenter, whereby he was killed, if due care was exercised in
selecting the mason, and if there was no reason why he should not be
fully trusted as an expert in his business, though his work proved defective, and the carpenter thereby lost his life; the two workmen being
coemployees of a common master and co-operating in their respective
departments of labor to a common end, to wit, the erection and completion of the contemplated structure. Bleckley, C. J., said:. “The
company, a corporation desiring to build a magazine, had in its employment a force of carpenters, and also a briekmason. Thu mason
built an arch for this structure; and, after the arch was completed, he
was consulted
by the carpenters, through their foreman, to ascertain
whether it was safe to remove the props that supported the arch ternporarily. He pronounced it safe, and the props were removed.
v.
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While

engaged in the removal, the arch fell, and one of the
The widow of the deceased carpenter brought
damages, and upon the trial the court granted
a nonsuit.
The question is whether the evidence made a prima facie
ease of negligence against the corporation — negligence in the performance of its legal duties to the deceased carpenter. It is certain
that to take the mason’s opinion of the safety of the arch was the best
means that the corporation had of deciding upon. its safety.
The
mason was reputed to be of the first class, and he was paid by the
corporation first-class wages. In the evidence there is no indication
of negligence on the part of the corporation in selecting him. He
was a proper man to intrust with the execution of the work, and with
the decision of its safety. The evidence shows that he made a mistake
in his opinion touching its safety.
The arch proved to be unsafe, but
the indications are that it was simply a mistake in judgment on the
part of a competent expert in the formation of his opinion. We do
not see that this corporation omitted any duty to the carpenter which
the law bound it to perform. It was better to take the mason’s opinion than that of any other agent, officer or employee of the corporation.
His opinion proved to be erroneous; but the corporation was no absolute insurer to its carpenter against accidents resulting from defective
work performed by its mason. All the corporation could do was to
exercise reasonable and ordinary care in the selection of a competent
mason.
And the persons interested, including the master carpenter
and the deceased himself, thought that it was safe to go under this
arch at the time the casualty occurred.
The judgment of the court
granting the nonsuit is correct.” Cited, 110/199.
In Gunn v. Willingham, 111/427, it was held that the servant is
not entitled to recover on the ground that the master negligently employed an incompetent fellow servant, unless it be made to appear
not only that such fellow servant was in fact incompetent, but that
this was known, or ought, in the exercise of due diligence, to have
been known, to the master at the time of the employment, or else that
the master negligently retained such fellow servant in his service under
circumstances warranting a finding that he knew, or was fairly chargeable with knowledge, of such incompetency. Little, J., said: “The
burden in all such cases is upon the servant seeking a recovery to establish the fact that the injury resulted to him because the master did
not exercise reasonable and proper care in the employment of the
servant, and this must be established as a fact in the case, and can not
they

were

was killed.
this action to recover

carpenters
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result

inference from the circumstance that the servant

causing
in fact incompetent. Baulec v. Railroad Co., 59
N. Y. 356; Moss v. Railroad Co., 49 Mo. 167; Davis v. Railroad Co.,
20 Mich. 105. The question, therefore, relates to the want of care on
the part of the master in employing the servant, even when it is shown
that the injury occurred by reason of the negligence or inefficiency of
the

as an

injury

was even

such servant.”
In Ingram v. Hilton & Dodge Lumber Co., 108/194, Lumpkin, P.
J., said: “While a servant is not ordinarily entitled to damages
resulting from injuries caused by the mere negligence of a competent
fellow servant, he is entitled to damages occasioned by the carelessness
or negligence of an incompetent and unskillful fellow servant, if such
carelessness or negligence were solely due to or arose from the latter’s
incompetency or unskillfulness, and if in employing him or retaining
him in his service the master failed to exercise ordinary care, and the
injured servant did not know, and had not equal means of knowing,
or could not by the exercise of such care on his part have ascertained,
the fact that his fellow servant was incompetent and therefore likely
to perform his duties in an unskillful and negligent manner.
In
other words, the liability of the master arises because of his omission
of duty to provide the injured employee with a competent fellow
servant, not because the negligence of the latter is in law imputable
to the master. And it was held that, in a case so requiring, the distinction between the negligence of a competent servant and the unskillfulness of an incompetent servant should be clearly pointed out
to the

jury.

284.

Knowingly co-operating with incompetent servant.
inexperience and consequent incompetency of a fireman to
properly handle and run a locomotive will not subject the railroad
company to an action for a personal injury resulting therefrom
to another employee who, knowing of the inexperience of the
fireman,
made no objection to serve with him in passing over a switch and enThe

tering a siding for the purpose of connecting the locomotive with cars
standing thereon. As the .plaintiff admitted in his testimony on the
stand that he knew of the fireman’s
inexperience, this put that
ground of the action out of the case, and. the court should not have
submitted it to the jury as a possible basis of recovery.
Bleckley, C.
J., said: “If an employee knowing that his coemployee is a ‘green
hand,’ nevertheless co-operates with him without objection, what
ground has he for complaining that his fellow servant was a ‘green

367

CHAPTER 16.

]

[ §284

Duty of master in selecting servants.

Under such circumstances the

negligence of the company in
furnishing such a fellow servant is waived, but the waiver does not
extend to any negligence of which the fellow servant himself may be
guilty. If he fails in any respect to come up to the measure of diligenee which, under the circumstances, he ought to exercise, consent
to serve with him would not cut off the right to recover for any injury
occasioned by that negligence.” Worley, 92/84.
In Smith v. Sibley Manufacturing Co., 85/333, it was alleged that
plaintiff was engaged in running a picker in defendant’s picker-room;
that he stopped the machinery to clean the picker, it having become
clogged; when engaged in cleaning it, and without notice to him,
Benson, another employee of defendant, started'the machinery, and
plaintiff was injured. He had cautioned Benson not to start it behand’?

cause

he had learned that Benson had

machinery after it had been stopped.
Benson to start machines

and

was

on

three occasions started the

Although the propensity of

known to the authorities of defendant

they had been told Benson would kill some one by starting the
machinery improperly, the company retained him in its employ, and
after plaintiff was injured and the company knew Benson’s improper
conduct had caused it, he was not discharged. Simmons, J., said:
“Under the facts alleged in this declaration, there was no error in
sustaining the demurrer. The plaintiff was injured by the negligence of a coemployee, and was therefore not entitled to recover.
Nor would the allegation in the declaration that Benson, the coemployee, had a ‘propensity to start machines after they had been
stopped, and this was known to the officers of the defendant, and
they retained him in its employ,’ authorize him to recover, because
the plaintiff alleges that he had a knowledge of this propensity on the
part of Benson before he was injured. If the plaintiff knew that
Benson was an inefficient and negligent servant, he should not have
engaged in the same service with him, any more than he should work
with a defective tool given him by his employer. The fact that the
defendant retained Benson after the injury was not a ratification.
If ratification applies at all, it is only when a willful injury was indieted by the servant.”

•
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CHAPTER 17.
DUTY OF MASTER IN FURNISHING MACHINERY.
285.

Duty of master in furnishing machinery,
Code sections 2611, 2612.

286. Statement

287. When

of

the

company

rules.

is liable for

an

unsafe

800.

sons.

knew,

car.

288. A defective drawbar.
289. Shuttle
with
defective

290.
291.
292.

293.
294.
295.

in

an

by
299. The

known,

of the

304. Knowingly using
defective machinery.
305. Rule not applicable to a convict.
306. Questions that should have gone to the

jury.
voluntary act outside of the
employment.

307. A

308. Case

309.

not

raised

a lamp going out.
duty of warning an adult of danger.

scope

of

altered that defective tool is
used under command of a superior em-

elevator-floor.

285.

should have

303. Character of the defect may indicate
that master should have known of it.

sion.
297. A defective ladder.
298. Presumption
of negligence

or

defects.

guard.
Spark-arrester not supplied.
Unblocked frog of a switch.
Insecure fastening of a stove.
Master should furnish a reasonably safe
place to work.
Soap-manufacturer leaves reservoir unguarded.
More hazardous powder causes explo-

296. Hole

Warning minors and inexperienced per-

301. Subject continued.
302. Burden of servant to show that master

not

ployee.
Employee should have reasonable time
and opportunity to ascertain the condition of the tool.

Duty of master m furnishing machinery. The master is
ordinary care in furnishing machinery equal in kind
to that in general use, and reasonably safe for all persons who operate
it with ordinary care and diligence.
If there are latent defects in
the machinery, or dangers incident to an employment unknown to
£he servant, of which the master knows, or ought to know, he must
give the servant warning in respect thereto. It must appear that the
master knew or ought to have known of the defects or danger in the
machinery supplied; and it must also appear that the servant injured
did not know and had not equal means of knowing such facts, and
by the exercise of ordinary care could not have known thereof. Civil
Code, §§2611, 2612.
286. Statements of the rules.
In Freeman, 75/331, the plaintiff alleged that his injury was caused
by the breaking of a defective coupling-pin, and it was held that
there was no error in charging the jury that if in selecting and furnishing material, machinery and all appliances necessary for these
purposes, the defendant, acting through its officers and agents, used
proper care and diligence to ascertain by proper inspection and tests
whether or not the machinery and appliances were sound or defective, and furnished none but what appeared to be free from defect,
and were adapted to the purposes intended, so far as such examination enabled them to determine, then they filled the measure of their
duty in this respect, and would not be liable for any injury which
may have occurred; and this is the rule notwithstanding the casualty
may have resulted from actual defect in any of the appliances so
bound to exercise
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furnished

such defect, if it existed,
careful examination.
In Dickey, 90/491, it was held that there is no negligence in the
construction of machinery which, when properly used in the ordinary
manner, is safe under all conditions which will probably arise in any
and every instance of such use. Hence, although it may have a defeet, yet, if that defect be one which does not interfere with its safe
and proper use with reference to the purpose for which it was constructed, an injury to an employee’s hand while accidentally in contact with the defective part of the machinery, but which was very
unlikely to occur, can not be attributed to negligence on the part of
the company in the construction of the machinery.
In Davis v. Augusta Factory, 92/712, Lumpkin, J., said: “The
machine of the defendant from which the daughter received injuries
resulting in her death was, though to some extent dangerous, entirely
safe when properly operated. It is true that this machine was not of
the latest, safest, or most improved design, but it was entirely suitable for the purposes for which it was made, and, relatively to others
used within a recent period, it was improved machinery, and of a kind
still manufactured by the best machine works, and employed in firstclass factories. It is not incumbent upon persons or corporations
using machinery in the prosecution of their business to procure the
very best and safest machinery which can possibly be made.
It is
sufficient if the machinery is of a kind in general use, and reasonably
safe for all persons who operate it with ordinary care and diligence.
‘No manufacturing or business establishment of any kind is bound
at its peril to make use only of the best implements and the best machinery and the safest methods.’ Cooley, J., in Railroad Co. v. Smithson (Mich.), 7 N. W. 791.
The machine in the present case undoubtedly came up to the required standard, and there was no evidence at
all that it was in any particular out of repair; the testimony of all
the witnesses showing, on the contrary, clearly and unequivocally,
that it was in perfect order and condition. In Black’s Proof and
Pleadings in Accident Cases (page 28), we find the following: ‘In
an action
by an employee to recover damages for an injury received
from a machine which the. employee had to operate, the employee, to
recover, must affirmatively establish: First, that the machine or appliance was defective; second, that the master.had knowledge or notice or ought to have known such fact; third, that the employee did
not know, and had not equal means with the master of knowing such
was so

24

(as in

hidden

as

a coupling-pin), provided
not to be discoverable by
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The master is ‘bound to exercise reasonable

fact.’

in the choice

care

of the instrumentalities of his

business, and the specific degree of care
by the nature and character of the
business, the appliances used, and the risks therefrom to those emthat he must exercise is measured

ployed.’

Wood, Mast. & Serv. §§345, 346, and cases cited under

both sections.”
In
a

v. Portner Brewing Co., 112/894, it was ruled that when
employed in a business requiring the use of an animal,
master furnishes an animal which is vicious and dangerous,

Cooper

servant is

and the

and this fact is well known both to the master and the servant, it is

duty of the master to furnish such harness and appliances as will
reasonably safe the use of such animal in the business to be
carried on; and if, on account of the failure to furnish equipment of
this character, the servant is injured by the animal, without fault on
his part, the master is liable to the servant for whatever damages he
sustains by reason of such injury, if it further appears that the harness and appliances furnished were known, or could, by the exercise
of ordinary diligence, have been by the master known, to be unsafe
and unsuitable, and the servant was ignorant of this fact, and could
not have discovered it by the exercise of like diligence.
In Winship Machine Co. v. Burger, 110/296, it was held that this
case, upon its facts as found by the jury, is controlled by the law now
embodied in sections 2611 and 2612 of the Civil Code, imposing upon
masters the duty of exercising ordinary care in furnishing machinery
“reasonably safe for all persons who operate it with ordinary care and
diligence,” and rendering a master liable for injuries to a servant
arising from the negligence of the master in failing to comply with
that duty when he “knew or ought to have known of
the
defects or danger in the machinery supplied,” and when the servant
injured did not know and had not equal means of knowing such fact,
and by the exercise of ordinary care could not have known thereof.
The facts are not reported in this case.
287. When company is liable for an unsafe car.
Where a railroad company furnishes to one of its patrons a car
to be used by him in loading freight to be delivered to it for transportation, it is'liable to a servant of the patron for injuries resulting
to such servant from the defective construction of the
car; provided,
the defect be of such a character as to be discoverable
by the exercise of ordinary care upon the part of the railroad
company, and
provided, further, the injuries complained of were inflicted under
the

render

.
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such circumstances

as that the person injured, by the exercise of orcould not have avoided the consequences resulting to him
from the negligent act of the railroad company in furnishing for the
use of such patron and his servants such defective car.
Booth, 98/20.

dinary

care,

In Booth’s

case

the railroad undertook to furnish

with lumber and that carried with it

cars

to be loaded

duty on the part of the company to furnish safe and suitable cars for the purpose, and this duty,
by force of the agreement, extended not only to the shipper, but to
a

the person whom he employed to load the cars for him.

Morrison,

105/518.
288. A

defective drawbar.

Where the evidence shows that

a

drawbar

supplied by

a

railway

to be used in coupling cars was used on two occasions, working well on the first, but failing to work on the second, though twice
company
tried in

a proper manner, a jury
ation from the company, infer

might, in the absence of any explanthat the implement was defective.

Ousley, 86/538.
289. Shuttle with

defective guard.
brought against a cotton-factory company by one
of its employees, to recover for an injury occasioned by a shuttle,
and it was alleged that the guard of the shuttle was defective, being
an unsafe character of guard, and where the
testimony was conflicting as to the safety of the guard, some witnesses testifying that no
guard was about as safe as a guard, and others testifying that a guard
of the character used was as good as one of a different character,
there was no error in charging the jury as follows: “If you believe
from the evidence that two kinds of shuttle-guards were in general
use on looms, and that ordinarily skillful people,
using the two kinds,
were divided in opinion and in their experience with them as to
which was the safer, and you further believe that, in the use of ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, the defendant could have selected either of the guards for its looms, then the defendant would not
be liable for damages caused by its use of such guards on its looms.”
Blandford, J., said: “It was left fairly to the jury to say
whether the shuttle-guards which were used by the defendant
were
in general, use, and whether ordinarily skillful persons
used two kinds of guards — one that ran all the way, and
one
with an open section in it — and were divided in opinion
and experience as to which was the safer. What could the
factory have done more in the selection of these guards? If those
Where suit

•

was

§§ 290, 291 ]
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who

own a factory select its machinery with all ordinary care and
diligence, and use such machinery as is ordinarily safe in the experience of people who use such machinery, or machinery as safe as
any other of its kind, there being danger in all machinery, it is not
possible that the factory could be held liable for any damage that
might have resulted by reason of any defect in the machinery.” Pierce
v. Atlanta Cotton Mills, 79/782.
Cited, 108/194.
290. Spark-arrester not supplied.
An action was brought against a railroad company for an injury
to the plaintiff’s eye, caused by a spark or cinder from the defendant’s engine. Negligence was imputed to the defendant in that the
engine was not properly constructed nor provided with the best-known
spark-arrester. A witness, who was familiar with the management,
use and construction of steam locomotive-engines, was allowed to
state as follows:
“I never heard of any accident to persons from
sparks from the smokestack of this engine before nor since.” This
testimony was held to be pertinent and material. Hall, J., said: “A
carrier of passengers is not obliged to foresee and provide against

casualties which have not been known to
not be

occur

before, and which

may

reasonably expected. If he has qvailed himself of the bestknown and most extensively used safeguards against danger, he has
done all that the law requires, and his liability is not to be ascertained
by what appears, for the first time after the disaster, to be a proper
precaution against its recurrence.” The testimony of the witness in
this case was confined to the particular engine involved in the controversy, although it might be inferred from recitals in the headnote and
also in the opinion by Mr. Justice Hall, that it had wider
scope.
Higgins, 73/149.
291. Unblocked frog of a switch.
In Edwards, 111/528, the plaintiff’s foot was caught in an unblocked frog of a switch, and he was injured. Little, J., said: “The
question is whether or not the company was negligent in -not protecting or blocking the frog in which the foot of the plaintiff became
fastened, and from which fastening his serious injury was a consequence.
By section 2611 of the Civil Code it is declared that the
master is bound to exercise ordinary care in
furnishing machinery
equal in kind to that in general use, and reasonably safe for all persons who operate it with
ordinary care and diligence. In the case of
Whatley v. Block, our present chief justice quoted approvingly the
rule which governs this subject, taken from 14 Am. & Eng. Enc.
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Law, pp. 903, 904, in the following words: £A custom with referto the adoption of certain safeguards in a given business must
be so general that it is presumed that the defendant had knowledge
of it, in order to make him liable for neglecting to provide the same.’
No general custom of any character was shown to exist in relation
to blocking the frogs of a switch on a railroad-track, either at the
ence

plaintiif sustained his injuries, or at the time of the trial.
plaintiff on this subject only went to the extent
of showing that since he had sustained his injuries certain particular
frogs on the Central Railroad had been blocked, and that on the
Plant System of railroads there existed a number of different kinds of
blocks to such lirogs. But the master, while bound to exercise due care
in protecting his servant in the use of these frogs, can not be bound
to provide a particular contrivance until it is shown primarily that
such a contrivance is a safeguard, to some extent at least, against
such injuries, and that it is a general custom among other persons engaged in the same character of business to employ them. The evidence entirely failed to show that the employment of these blocks was
even a custom among railroads.
Whether they are or not, we do not
know; and, while the evidence of the plaintiff contained in this record
is sufficient to show that they are a protection, it does not show that
they were or are in such general use by the railroads of the country as
to make the railroad company in this case responsible for their nonuse; and inasmuch as this general custom was not shown, and this being the only point set out in the petition as showing negligence on
which a recovery could have been had if satisfactorily proven, it foltime the

The evidence of the

lows that

a

nonsuit should have been awarded.”

292. Insecure

fastening of

On the trial of

a

stove.

action for

damages by an employee of a railbased upon the insecure fastening of a stove
in one of its cars, resulting in damage to the plaintiif, it was not error against the defendant to
charge that it was not liable unless it
road

against the

“knew

an

company,

should have had

to

know,” that the stove was in an
duty rested on the company to properly select
and superintend its operations, its machinery, appliances and
appointments of every sort used in its business.
It was a guarantor that all
reasonable and proper care had been and should be exercised in the
performance of these duties, and its liabilities should be limited to a
failure to meet its obligations in this respect. Ray,
70/674.
or

unsafe condition.

The

reason
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293. Master should

furnish

a

reasonably safe place in which to

work.
In City Council of Augusta v. Owens, 111/464, the plaintiff was
employed in getting out rock from defendant’s quarry, and it was held
that there was no error in the court charging the jury: ‘‘It was the
duty of the defendant to furnish a reasonably safe place for this man
to work. It was the right of the plaintiff to assume that the place
was safe when he was directed to go to it.”
In the light of the pleadings, testimony, and the entire charge of the court, the language
quoted, which is, abstractly considered, a correct statement of a general rule of law, was not calculated to mislead the jury. Lewis, J.,
said: “The objection to this charge was that the overwhelming weight
of evidence was to the effect that practically every place in the quarry
was dangerous, and that any one working there was liable to be injured, and it was claimed that this charge was without evidence to
support it. As an abstract proposition of law, the charge was correct,
and we do not think that in the present case it was calculated to mislead the jury. There is evidence in the record of the dangers that
necessarily attend the working of a quarry, ordinary and usual in their
nature, and the jury doubtless clearly understood by the charge with
reference to a reasonably safe place for a man to work that it meant
such a place under the circumstances and conditions attending the
operation of that business. There is testimony in behalf of plaintiff
tending to establish the fact that when injured he was not in a safe
place. He testified that on the day before, when engaged at work
there, and when the work of removing rock above them began, plaintiff and others were ordered away from that place on account of this
danger, and that he knew nothing about what was going on above him
when he was hurt; and we fail to find any evidence that Elliott, the
employee who loosened the rock that rolled down and injured the
plaintiff, knew he was beneath him.”
The case Barnett, 104/582, was brought by a mother for the homicide of her minor son, who was in the employment of the defendant
as a brakeman.
The alleged negligence on the part of the company
upon which the plaintiff claimed the right to recover, was that it left
an open drain under its track in one of its yards, where cars had to be
coupled and uncoupled, and switched back and forth; it being insisted that such drain, in this condition, was unsafe and dangerous to
life, and that it was the duty of the company to have properly covered
it up. It was held that the rule of law that an employee takes the
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usually incident to the work in which he is employed does not
exempt the master from liability for the death of a servant resulting
from the negligent failure of the master to furnish the servant with a
safe place in which to work, if, at the time his death was occasioned,

risks

he

free from

contributory negligence. Lumpkin, J., said: “It
an employee assumes the risks usually incident to
the work in which he is engaged, and also that a master is generally
under a duty of providing his employee with a safe place in which to
work.
These two rules of law are not inharmonious. A servant, of
course, takes the risk of being injured by defects when he knows, or,
in the exercise of ordinary diligence, ought to have known, of their
existence, and yet, in disregard of the dangers arising therefrom, goes
on with his work.
In so doing, he assumes the hazards attendant upon
such defects; but he does not assume risk of injury from defects of
which he does not know, and with knowledge of which he is not
chargeable. The duty of the master to furnish a safe place for the
servant to work in is not absolute and unqualified.
Some kinds of
work are necessarily attended with dangers against which the master
can not by any degree of diligence provide.
In such case the law>
does not require of him impossibilities; but if, by exercising ordinary
care, he can make safe the place wherein the servant is to labor, it is
the master’s duty to do so. In any given case the jury must deterwas

is well settled that

mine from the evidence what

were

the risks incident to the work in

hand; and, in arriving at a conclusion upon this subject, the ignorance or knowledge of the servant as to the existence of a defect, and,
if he was ignorant, whether his ignorance was or was not due to his
own negligence, are all matters for determination
by the jury. So,
also, it is for them to determine from all the facts and circumstances
in evidence whether or not the master, in the exercise of ordinary
diligence, could have provided the employee with a safe place in which
to do his work, and, if so, whether or not the master was negligent in
failing to perform the duty of so doing.” Cited, 105/137.
294. Soap-manufacturer leaves reservoir unguarded.
A soap-manufacturer conducted his business in a room about
seventy-two feet in length and twenty-two in width. In the front
portion of this room, the ceiling was fourteen feet high, and in that
place benches or tables were located, on which the soap was put into
wrappers. The plaintiff was employed to stand or sit at one of these
tables, have soap and paper furnished her there, and put wrappers
around the former. In the rear portion of the room, the ceiling was

[ 876

CHAPTER 17.

§ 294 ]

Duty of master in furnishing machinery.

only six feet and three inches from the floor, and there were located
business, some of which projected
Through the low ceiling, and also kettles and reservoirs set into the
floor. The paper used for wrapping was kept up-stairs, and brought
down as needed, and put upon the tables when called for.
Women
never had to go after it, nor had they any business in the rear portion
of the building where the fixtures were.
On one occasion, the paper
had been removed from the tables to the rear of the room, to prevent
its being blown about by the wind. The plaintiff returned to her
work at a time which was not within the ordinary working hours, and
the fixtures connected with the

while the other hands
tion of the

were

at dinner.

She went into the

rear por-

after paper,

and in returning, fell into a reservoir
containing lye, impregnated with potash, and was injured. It was
testified by servants who worked for the same master after the accident, that wrapping-paper was kept in different parts of the room,
and

some

room

of it close to the reservoir.

facts there could be

It

was

held that under these

there being no duty resting on the
master which he violated.
Crawford, J., says: “We think it is well
settled, both upon principle and authority, that wherever the facts
raise a duty or an obligation on one to do a particular thing, and the
failure to discharge such duty or obligation causes damage to another,
the party upon whom the duty falls, or obligation rests, is liable
to respond for the injuries thereby sustained.
It follows, of course,
that where no duty exists or obligation rests, though injuries may be
sustained, yet no liability accrues. .
That the defendants
had the right to locate and leave unmolested the reservoir and all
things else necessary for the manufacture and preparation of their
soap for market is, we think, unquestionable. Moreover, that they
had the right to do this, even though they may have been in the
same room where the plaintiff was, and where her work
required her
to be, is likewise unquestionable, because the inclosure thereof was
not a duty which they owed to the plaintiff.
It is charged that defendants were negligent, in keeping the reservoir in a part of the room
too dark for her to discover it herself, and in failing to notify her of
its existence. There was no negligence shown upon the part of the
defendants, unless her work made it necessary for her to go into that
part of the room to enable her to perform her duties. It was testino

recovery,

.

fied that the contract

was

that she

was

to sit

.

or

stand at the table and

that both soap and wrappers were to be furnished her
there, and that it was always done.” Neff & Co. v. Broom, 70/256.
wrap soap;
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295. More hazardous

powder causes premature explosion.
a personal injury to an employee engaged
in blasting, a premature explosion having occurred during the process
of tamping, a declaration which alleged an undertaking on the part
of the employer to furnish suitable powder, and a breach of that
undertaking by furnishing mixed powder, a more hazardous article
(the increased hazard being unknown to the employee), whereby the
explosion took place and the injury was sustained, was sufficient in
substance, on a general demurrer, without specifying what particular
elements in the mixture rendered it less safe than suitable powder
would have been. A failure to specify such elements was matter for
special demurrer, if for demurrer of any kind. Eagle & Phenix Mfg.
Co. v. Welch, 61/444.
296. Hole in an elevator floor.
In Brunner v. Black, 92/497, Black alleged that he was injured
because of the negligent leaving of a hole in the floor of an elevator.
As a witness he stated that the floor of the elevator was greasy, and
had a hole in it, and being let down from the second to the first
floor, with witness and flour on a pair of trucks upon it, it was
lowered below the first floor, and one of Brunner’s employees, under
whose direction witness was working, ordered witness to pull the
trucks back; that witness set himself to pull the trucks back, and
the truck-wheel dropped in the hole, and witness fell backwards on
the floor with the trucks on top of him; that he did not know
there was a hole in the elevator, and had only been employed by
Brunner that day.
There was a verdict for $50. It was held that,
taking the evidence all together, it is manifest that the injury to the
plaintiff below resulted from a defect in the elevator, for which the
owner was responsible, and that it was not incumbent on the plaintiff
to notice the defect, and to anticipate such a casualty as that which
occurred.
This being so, and the amount of the recovery being very
small, it is not cause for a new trial that the court improperly
charged the jury on the subject of rules for working the elevator,
and on the duty of the owner to prescribe rules, or give proper orders
Where the suit

■

was

for

for that purpose.
297. A defective

ladder.
Bolton, 83/659, the plaintiff’s injuries were received in Alabama, and were caused by the use of a defective ladder. Mosely,
In

who
said:

was a

helper under the plaintiff, made the ladder.

“.It is not shown that the

plaintiff

or

Mosely

was

Simmons, J.,

instructed by
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the company or

its agents to use defective, or any other, material in
constructing this ladder. Indeed, there is no evidence going to show
that Mosely was instructed to make this ladder. It seems that a good
ladder had been provided by the company, but that Mosely, without
any instructions from any one, took defective lumber, as it is now
claimed, sawed it into cleats, and nailed them upon a post, for the
purpose of ascending to and descending from the roof of the house-;
and that when the plaintiff had occasion to descend he was advised
by Mosely to go down the ladder thus constructed, instead of going
down the

one

furnished by the company.

The plaintiff took this

injured. Under this state of facts, he was not entitled to recover, and the court did right to grant a nonsuit.
298. Presumption of negligence not raised ly a lamp’s going out.
In Suddeth, 86/388, it was held that the company furnished its
employee with a lamp which became extinguished while the latter
was
making a signal with it in the usual way raises no presumption
that the company was negligent. Bleckley, C. J., said: “The only
act of the company proved is the furnishing of the lamp. Who filled
it with illuminating material, trimmed it, and lighted it, does not
appear. Nor does it appear what caused it to become extinguished
in the act done by the plaintiff himself of moving it up and down in
making the signal in the usual way. There is no suggestion that
the lamp was of poor quality, or that there was any defect
in its construction, or any failure to supply proper materials
with which to keep it lighted.
As the plaintiff was charged
with the custody and use of the lamp, it was certainly his
duty to keep it in a condition for safe use, in so far as the quality
of the lamp and the materials supplied would enable him to do so.
Whether he performed this duty or not, his testimony gives no hint.
He was no less unhurt after the lamp went out than he was before,
so that the
going out of the lamp did not cause the physical injury
for which his action is brought. Even if it had done so, it would not
have raised any presumption against the company, unless he had
proved himself free from fault in all the dealings with the lamp
which devolved on him.” Cited, 92/661.
299. The duty of warning an adult of danger.
In Miller, 90/571, the plaintiff alleged that he sustained
injuries
by reason of the fault and negligence of other employees of the defendant in putting him in a dangerous position and giving him no
warning of the danger. He was a train-hand. The engine gave out
advice, and

was
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side, and he

ordered to go with the fireman under the engine and remove the eccentric on the disabled side of the engine. He
on one

was

went with the fireman under the

engine, and being wholly unacquainted with its machinery and unable to render any assistance except as he was directed, was told by the fireman to hold the eccentric
while the fireman did the work necessary to disengage and remove
it from the engine. While he was thus holding the eccentric when
the last bolt, as he was afterwards informed, was removed, the eccentric, being of great weight, fell upon his right hand. He knew
nothing of the dangerous position in which he was placed, and
nothing of what would he the result of unfastening the eccentric,
and received no warning. He had no notice that the fireman was

thereof.
allegations of the declaration being ambiguous
and uncertain as to whether the negligence intended to be complained
of was only the failure to warn the plaintiff generally that
going under the engine and aiding in removing the eccentrie was dangerous, or the further failure to warn him specially of
the result of unfastening the eccentric, and the consequences thereof,
about to

It

was

remove

the bolt

or

what would be the consequence

held that the

when the fireman

was

doubtful whether it

remove the bolt, and it being very
negligent at all to fail to give plaintiff the

about to

was

general warning indicated, and the evidence of negligence upon the
theory that the special warning was not given being vague
and uncertain, and it being apparent that it can be cleared up
and made more satisfactory so as to show the cause to which the injury was really attributable, the ends of justice require a new trial.
Simmons, J., said: “Assuming, however, that no warning was given,

doubtful whether it was negligence at all to omit a general
warning that the work was dangerous. Before an employer can be
held liable for a failure to warn, there must be something to suggest
to him that a warning is necessary.
If the youth or known inexperience of the employee is such as to put the master upon notice that
the employee may not realize the risk he is called upon to encounter,
the master must, of course, see to it that he is properly warned; butit is very

we

do not understand it to be the law that in the

ease

of

an

adult

employee, about to undertake work which he is subject in the line of
his duty to be called on to do, the master must assume that he is
ignorant of ordinary dangers that may attend the work. The plaintiff was an adult, and had been working three or four months as a
train-hand for the defendant, and the work he was directed to do on
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this occasion, though perhaps unusual for him, appears nevertheless
to have been in the line of his duty; and, if we leave out the testimony
of the defendant’s witnesses as to their having warned him of the

danger, and accept his own testimony as true, it does not appear that
his superiors had any reason -to suppose that he did not know it
might be dangerous to engage in this work. He said nothing to indieate that he was unacquainted with such work, or with the dangers
that might attend it. The whole situation was visible to him. The
part which was being removed, as well as the part he held, was under
his eye.
He could see the fireman taking out the bolts, and saw each
bolt as it was removed, and he knew that the purpose in taking them
out was to disengage and remove the part at which -the fireman was
working. His own end of the blade was in close proximity to other
machinery, and it would seem he ought to have known that the disengaging or removal of the eccentric or eccentric ‘strap,’ to which
the blade was attached, would cause his end to move, and his hand,
perhaps, to come in contact with other parts of the machinery. Under this state of facts, can it be said that it was necessary, or that the
defendant had reason to suppose it was necessary, to inform the plaintiff that the work in which he engaged, or the position in which he
was placed was dangerous?
If no such warning was necessary, the
charge of negligence fails, in so far as it rested on the allegation that
the plaintiff was directed to do dangerous work, or was placed in a
dangerous position without warning. If he saw that the bolt was
being removed, it is clear that the charge of negligence fails in so
far as it rests on the allegation that the plaintiff ‘had no notice that
the fireman

about to

the bolt.

9 99

Cited, 90/836.
Augusta Factory, 82/76, the plaintiff claimed damages for the homicide of her husband.
She alleged in substance that
he was employed as a master machinist and was under the control
of Cogin, defendant’s superintendent; that a fire occurred in the
gas-room and her husband was ordered by Cogin to break down
the door of the room, and in the execution of the order, without fault
on his part, the front wall of the room fell
upon him and killed him;
that the walls were unsafe and defendant knew it, but gave its emplovees no warning of the danger. A demurrer to the declaration
was sustained.
It was held that it was not criminal negligence in
a corporation not to
give warning to the master machinist employed
in their establishment that there was danger of fire in the gas-room,
or that there was
danger that the wall or walls would fall in ease
In Allen

was
v.

remove
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fire

occurred, it not being alleged that he was ignorant of the danger,
causes which produced it.
Bleckley, C. <7., said: “Nowhere is it alleged that the master machinist was any less fully informed of the condition of the building, or of the facts which rendered it insecure in time of fire, than was the defendant. It does
not appear that his employment was recent, or that the previous fires
or

of the

which had weakened the walls occurred before his connection with
the establishment.

For

aught that is alleged, it might be that some of
which he had supervision was' in or connected
with the gas-room. It seems that he bore such a relation to that
room as made it a
part of his business to break open the door in case
of fire; for it is averred that to do so by order of the superintendent
was in the line of his duty.
And as' to the superintendent, there is
no intimation that his knowledge was either more or less than that
of Allen, the machinist. It is consistent with the declaration to assume that the defendant, the superintendent, and the machinist were
all upon an equal footing in respect to information, there b ing no
suggestion to the contrary. We can see nothing which would fix
criminality for the homicide either upon the superintendent or any
other officer or agent of the corporation, and, according to previous
rulings of this court, justifiable homicide, in such a case as this, does
not afford a right of action in favor of the widow of the deceased.
Daly v. Stoddard, 66/145; McDonald v. Eagle & Phenix Co., 67/761;
68/839. These authorities, whether sound or unsound, are not to be
departed from, when, as in the present case, only two members of
the court preside.
Roach, 70/434.
The declaration contains
no
suggestion that there was any unsafety in the use of the
building or of the gas-room for the purposes for which they were
constructed. It was only when fires prevailed that there was danger.
In the nature of things fire is always attended with more or less danger, and is itself a warning to beware.
The allegation that the deceased was without fault is too general, and too much in the nature
of a legal conclusion, to serve as a substitute for the proper allegation of his want of knowledge. If he was .ignorant, that was a specifie fact upon which issue could be taken; and if it was true, there
could be no good reason why it was not alleged. The omission to
allege it is better accounted for on the theory that it did not exist
than on any other.
Our law requires that the cause of action shall
be 'plainly, fully, and distinctly’ set forth, and the rule is that pleadthe

machinery

over
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ings shall be taken most strongly against the pleader. The court
did not err in sustaining the demurrer.”
Cited, 83/711.
In Augusta Factory v. Hill, 83/709, the plaintiff sued to recover
damages for the homicide of her husband, who lost his life at the
same time Allen, supra, was killed.
The defects pointed out in the
Allen case were met by appropriate allegations, and the declaration
was

held to be sufficient.

plaintiff being an adult engaged in the work of cleansing a
an operation the danger of which was obvious without instructions from the master, there was no negligence in failing to give
her warning of the danger; and, it appearing from the evidence
that by the exercise of ordinary care she might have avoided the injury she sustained, there was no error in granting a nonsuit. Simmons, C. J., said:
“The record shows that the plaintiff was over
thirty years old at the time of the injury complained of, and that
she had worked several months in the laundry, and about two months
on the
particular machine by which she was injured. This machine was an iron cylinder, about the size of a flour-barrel, which
revolved towards the person using it, and was used for the purpose
of ironing table-cloths, sheets, etc.
The plaintiff was directed to
wipe it off every Monday morning, and to do this while it was running. In order to perform this duty, it was necessary to wrap a
cloth around her hand, and in this particular instance she left part of
the cloth hanging down from her hand, and this part of the cloth was
caught between the cylinder and the piece against which the articles
ironed were pressed, and her hand drawn into the machine and injured. The superintendent had not warned her of the danger attending the work in which she was engaged, and this is the main ground
upon which she sought to recover. It seems to us from the description of this machine in the record that any person of ordinary intelligence would have known that it was dangerous if proper care was not
taken in working upon it. The plaintiff being an adult, and
having
worked upon it for two months, and having cleaned it several times
before, must have known as well as the superintendent that, if a part
of the cloth wrapped around her hand was allowed to hang down, the
cylinder in its rapid revolutions would be likely to take it up and draw
her hand into the machine, as it did on this occasion; and, when the
danger was as obvious to her as it was to him, what was the necessity
of his telling her that the machine would mash her hand unless she
was careful?
Under this state of facts, the failure to warn plaintiff
The

machine,
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of the

danger was
the court did not

not negligence on the part of the defendant, and
in granting a nonsuit. See Engine Works v.

err

Randall, 50 Am. Rep. 798.” Hoyle v. Excelsior Steam Laundry Co.,
95/34. Cited, 101/715; 110/4; 111/324.
300.

Warning minors and inexperienced persons.
v. Augusta Factory, 92/712, it was held that, it appearing from the plaintiff’s evidence that the machinery of the defendant
from which the plaintiff’s daughter received injuries resulting in
her death, though not of the latest, safest, and most improved design, was nevertheless safe when properly operated; and, it not appearing that the defendant failed to give the deceased warning of
the dangers incident to its operation (if, with reference to the character of this machinery, the age, capacity, and experience of the deceased, and all the surrounding facts and circumstances, it was the
duty of the defendant to give her such warning), the plaintiff was
not entitled to recover, and there was no error in granting a nonsuit.
Lumpkin, J., said: “It is impossible to lay down any inflexible
rule applicable alike to all cases where minors are employed as to
what warning will be requisite; and, without doubt, in some cases
even minors are not necessarily entitled to any warning at all as to
the character of the machinery about which they are at work, or as
to the proper method of operating it and avoiding obvious dangers.
Much depends upon the nature of the machinery, the age, capacity,
intelligence, and experience of the employee, as well as all the surrounding facts and circumstances. It appears that in the present
case the
plaintiff's daughter was fifteen years of age. It may be that
the danger connected with the running of the machine by which she
was injured, and the proper method of operating it so as to ensure
safety, were so obvious that there was no real duty devolving upon
the defendant to give her any special warning or instructions at all.
We do not so decide, nor is there occasion for so doing, because, even
if she was entitled to such warning, there was no evidence showing
that the defendant failed to give her ample warning of the dangers
incident to the operation of the machine in question.
In order to
authorize a recovery by the plaintiff, it was certainly necessary to allege a failure to give such warning; and, in our opinion, the burden
of proof was upon the plaintiff to prove this fact, there being no
presumption that, if it was the duty of the defendant to give any
warning at all, it had failed to do so.
To the general rule
as stated by the text-writers, there are some
exceptions, for the law
In Davis
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distinction between the duty which a
employee, and that which he owes to
an employee who, from his youth or inexperience, or other mental immaturity or infirmity, is not able without instruction to understand the
perils to which he is exposed in the course of his employment. This
distinction, as near as we can express it, is this: That, as to the latter
class of servants, the master must give them full instructions with respect to the dangerous character of the machinery with or about which
they are employed, and of the means necessary to be used to avoid
those dangers/ See note to Fisk v. Railroad Co. (Cal.) 13 Pac.
144, and cases there cited. In this connection it may also be profitable to examine Sullivan v. Manufacturing Co., 113 Mass. 398.” Cited,
94/109.
In May v. Smith, 92/95, it was held that the rule that an inexperienced servant who is employed to work about dangerous machinery
is entitled to warning of any special danger incident to the work is
not confined to the case of young children, but applies as well to a
youth seventeen years of age, who is inexperienced in dealing with a
machine like that by which he is injured, and is unacquainted with
the details of its construction and mode of operation. That the machinery is not defective or out of repair, but is in perfect order, will
not dispense with warning where the danger is not open and obvious.
Whether the master at the time of engaging the servant or afterwards, ought to have inquired whether he was experienced or not, or
should have taken notice, under all the facts, of the probability that
he was not, nothing being said on the subject by either
party, is a'
question for the jury. Bleckley, C. J., said: “There was evidence
from which the jury could infer that the machine
by which the
plaintiff helow was injured was dangerous to an inexperienced person, and that the danger was not sufficiently obvious to be apparent
to such a person without proper
explanation and warning. That the
plaintiff was not a child, but was seventeen years of age, would not
deprive him of the right to be warned if, as a question of fact, the
employers, or the man representing them, ought, under all the circumstances, to have inquired of him as to his experience, or taken
notice of the probability that he was so
inexperienced as to render it
proper to give him warning. That his age alone did not deprive him
of the right of
being warned is established by many authorities.
undoubtedly ‘recognizes
master

owes

some
his adult servant

or

110 Mass. 23; 120 Mass.
427; 135 Mass. 294; 142 Mass. 431; 34
hi. J. Law, 151; 50 Mich.
70; 30 Wis.

G74; 66 Wis. 268

;

64 Tex. 568;
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526; 44 Cal. 187;D Fedj 861. And see Wood, Mast. & Serv.
Cited, 103/289.
Smith, 94/107, the plaintiff, a youth of about seventeen years

66 Tex.

572.”
In

of age, was

employed

as a

train-hand and received

an

injury while

endeavoring to couple two cars. It was held that there is no presumption of law that a minor over fourteen years of age, who applies
for a position involving dangerous service, is aware of the danger
and needs no instruction.
The obligation to instruct an employee,
before

putting him to work, as to any of his duties which are dandoes not necessarily follow, as matter of law, from his minority when employed, his inexperience, the fact that the service is
dangerous, and the fact that his inexperience is known to the employer. In a case like the present, it is a question for the jury
whether the particular service was so dangerous, and its dangers so
obscure, or whether the information of the employee was so limited
or his mind so immature, at the time he was injured, as to render it
needful and proper that instruction should have been given when he
was employed, or at some
time previous to the injury. Cited,
103/289.
301. Subject continued.
In Bibb Manufacturing Co. v. Taylor, 95/615, the action was for
personal injuries to a minor, about eight years of age, alleged to have
resulted from failing to inform the child of the dangerous character
of machinery about which he was put to work in defendant’s factory.
The ease turned upon whether the master had exercised ordinary
care in
instructing the minor as to the uses of the machinery and the
danger incident to his employment in connection therewith. There
was abundant evidence of the fact that he had been
repeatedly advised that the machine was dangerous, and that he himself knew it;
and under this state of facts the court charged the jury, in effect,
that the mere notifying him that the machine was dangerous by an
employee would not be sufficient to relieve the defendant, unless that
employee pointed out to him where the danger consisted — not simply to notice that what he was doing was dangerous. It was held
that where a part of a machine consisted of very rapidly revolving
cog-wheels, the danger from which would be obvious even to a child
of ordinary capacity, and an infant employee, who was such a child,
had been repeatedly and distinctly warned of the danger and told
that the cogs would cut off his finger or his hand, if caught therein,
it was not indispensable to the sufficiency of the warnings that it
gerous,
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should not have been further

pointed out to the child exactly wherein
danger consisted, or explained to him how his hand would be
injured' by the operation of the cog-wheels. The court having
charged to the effect that the warnings would not be sufficient unless
they went to the extent which has been indicated in the preceding
note, this was, in a case where the overwhelming preponderance of
the evidence showed full diligence on the part of the defendant in all
respects, such error as to require the granting of a new trial. Atkinson, J., said:' “The vice of this instruction consists in the expression by the court to the jury of an opinion upon the weight of
the evidence. The question of negligence is one for the jury exclusively, and the law does not undertake to point out how or in what
manner a master shall instruct a minor servant in the
handling of
dangerous machinery. If, as in this ease, the danger be manifest
and obvious, the jury might have found, had they been free so to
do under the charge of the court, that no instruction at all was necessary, and, if necessary, that the precautionary words of a coemployee were sufficient to apprise the boy of the danger to which he
was then
exposing himself, and in consequence of which he ultimately
suffered injury. Whether such instruction would suffice would depend to a very great degree upon the character of the machinery.
If it were exceedingly intricate, invested with many latent dangers,
a jury would probably find that a more detailed instruction was
necessary than was given by the master to the servant in this case.
But if it were a simple contrivance, easily understood, more general
instructions might suffice to satisfy them.
At all events, whenever
the jury find that the master, with reference to this particular matter, has exercised ordinary and reasonable care, he is entitled to an
acquittal.” This case has no reference to the principle involved in a
child acting under the orders of a sub-boss, and being injured in
consequence of his negligence. Cited, 111/324.
In Roberts v. Porter Mfg. Co., 110/474, it was held that there was
no error in granting a nonsuit in an action
by a minor employee for a
physical injury alleged to have been sustained by reason of a defect
in a machine at which he was working when the injury was received, when there was no evidence that the defendant had not exercised ordinary diligence in furnishing a machine equal in kind to
that in general use, and reasonably safe for one operating it with
ordinary care, or that there was any latent defect in the machine of
which the defendant knew, or ought to have known, and of which it
the
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did

not

give the plaintiff warning, but where the plaintiff’s
testimony showed that by the use of such care as his
age, intelligence, and experience fitted him to exercise, he could
have avoided the injury.
Fish, J., said: “There was no evidence
submitted by the plaintiff to show that the machine furnished by
the defendant company was not equal in all respects to those generally used in other mills, or that it was not reasonably safe for any
one to
operate it with ordinary care. It was not contended by the
plaintiff that there was any hidden defect in the machine, or that
there was any latent danger in working it; but he claimed that, on
account of his youth and inexperience, he did not comprehend the
risk incident to its operation.
While it is true that the law does
not exact of a child the ordinary care which every prudent man would
exercise under similar circumstances, yet it is required to use due
care according to its age and capacity; that is, such care, as stated
in section 2901 of the Civil Code, as its mental and physical capacitylfits it for exercising, in the actual circumstances of the occasion
and situation under investigation. Considering that the plaintiff in
this ease was fourteen years old at the time he was hurt; that he had
been working for two 'years at the same machine which injured him;
that when first put to work at it he had been instructed by the foreown

man

how to operate it; that he had been warned ‘to be careful’; and

that the

certainty of having his finger mashed, if he should allow

it to get between the cog-wheels, was so apparent that, in view of
his age, intelligence, and experience, he was bound to have known it
—we are constrained to hold that,
by the use of such care as his

capacity fitted him for exercising, the plaintiff could have avoided
the injury, and that, therefore, there was no error in granting a nonsuit.”
In

Sims, 80/807, it appeared that the plaintiff, a minor, had been
by his father to the defendant for the purpose of transferring
lumber from its cars to the cars of another company.
While engaged in the work, some of the lumber slipped, and fell upon the
plaintiff and injured him. Blandford, J., said: “The work whicl}
the plaintiff was put to do was not extraordinarily hazardous and
dangerous; and it appears that, before his father hired him to the
company, both he and his father had been engaged in this kind of
work, the father having been for some time in the employment of
the company, and the son frequently assisting him in such work;
and the company, when it hired the son, had a right to suppose that
hired
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given him all the instructions necessary to do this
safety to himself, and that he knew all about the danger
attendant thereon. Therefore we do not think the company owed
him any duty as to warning him of such danger, no danger being
apparent; or as to telling him how to do the work ’safely, the presumption being that he knew how to do it, under the facts of this
case.
This case was again before the court, 84/152, and it was held
that for two persons of competent strength to load an open flat car
with lumber of uniform length, breadth, and thickness, by piling
the same in parallel tiers one after another, is to do work which
common laborers can perform without more hazard to their own security than appertains to ordinary manual labor. It requires no special skill or antecedent training, and therefore a youth seventeen
years of age, who engages in it as part of the business for which he
was employed by the railway
company, is not unduly exposed by
reason
merely of being left uninstructed in the mode of doing the work, and unwarned beforehand of any danger attending it. The plaintiff having been injured by some of the lumber falling upon him, and there being no evidence that the
doing of
such work properly was dangerous, or that he did not know how to
do it properly, or that he was wanting in capacity to know, and nothing being alleged in the declaration as to any defect in the car or
any of the appliances, the court was correct in granting a nonsuit.”
The plaintiff, an inexperienced employee, being put to work with
machinery that was deficient, and therefore unsafe, and by reason of
his inexperience not knowing of the danger which he incurred on
account of the deficiency, he was entitled to recover for a
personal
injury which resulted in large part, if not wholly, from the use of
such unsafe machinery. Cartter v. Cotter, 88/286.
Cited, 103/289.
his father had
work in

302. Burden

on

servant to show

master

Tcneiv,

or

should have

known, of the defects.
In Nelms, 83/70, the plaintiff was employed to assist in
changing the gauge of the company’s track, and a hammer was furnished
him by the company with which to take
up the iron rails and refasten them to the cross-ties.
in

that
as

The hammer had

a

latent defect, and

using it pieces flew off and injured the plaintiff.
hammer thus used is not included in the term
used in section 2321 of the Code, and that as the

not

a

injured by the running of the
employee of the company, there

ears or
was no

It

was

held

“machinery”
plaintiff

was

machinery or by any other
presumption in his favor
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under that

section, and the case falls under the general law of master
under which the burden was upon the plaintiff to show

and servant,

negligence on the part of the company in furnishing him with a
hammer, and that the mere fact that this and other hammers were defective and broke at the same work on the same day,
and injury resulted therefrom, was not sufficient to authorize an inference of negligence on the part of the company in their purchase
and selection.
Simmons, J., said: “Before he can recover, under
the facts disclosed by this record, he must show that the hammer was
defective, and that the company knew it, or could have ascertained
it by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence. The mere fact that
the hammer was defective, and that other hammers were defective,
and that the injury resulted therefrom, is not sufficient to authorize
the jury to infer negligence on the part of the company in the purchase or selection of these hammers. Wood, in his Law of Master
and Servant, §368, says: ‘From the mere fact that an injury results
to a servant from a latent defect in machinery or appliances of the
business, no presumption of negligence on the master’s part is raised.
There must be evidence of negligence connecting him with the injury.
The fact that machinery has been previously protected, or that subsequent to the injury guards were provided for it, is not evidence
from which negligence may be inferred. The mere fact that the machinery proves defective, and that an injury results therefrom, does
not fix the master’s liability.
Prima facie, it is presumed that the
master has discharged his duty to the servant, and that he was not
at fault.
Therefore the servant must overcome this presumption
by proof of fault on the master’s part, either by showing that he
knew or ought to have known of the defects.
The burden of proving negligence upon the part of the master is upon the
servant, and he is bound to show that the injury arose from defects
known to the master, or which he would have known by the exercise
of ordinary care, or that he has failed to observe precautions essential to the protection of the servants, which ordinary prudence
would have suggested.’ The same work (section 382) says: ‘The
servant seeking to recover for an injury takes the burden upon himself of establishing negligence on the part of the master, and due
care on his own part, and he is met
by two presumptions, both of
which he must overcome in order to entitle him to a recovery: First,
that the master has discharged his duty to him by providing suitable
instrumentalities for the business, and in keeping them in condition,
defective

.

.

.
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and this involves

proof of something

more

than the

mere

fact that

injury resulted from a defect in the machinery.

It imposes
upon him the burden of showing that the master had notice of the
defect, or that, in the exercise of that ordinary care which he is
bound to observe, he would have known of it. When this is established, he is met by another presumption, the force of which must
be overcome by him, and that is, that he assumed all the usual and
ordinary hazards of the business.’ Mr. Thompson, in his work on
Negligence, page 1053, §48, uses the following language: ‘In an
action by an employee against his employer for injuries Sustained
by the former in the course of his employment from defective appliances, the presumption is that the appliances were not defective;
and when it is shown that they were, then there, is a further presumption that the employer had no notice or knowledge of this fact,
and was not negligently ignorant of it.’
See also Pierce, R. R. 382.
We can not hold
for in our opinion it is not the law — that an
employer is liable to a servant when he furnishes him with an axe,
a wagon, a saw, a hammer, or any other tool which appears to be
first-class, and which subsequently, by some latent defect, breaks
and injures the servant. If such were the law, every farmer, contractor, or other employer would be liable to his employee when he furnished him tools and they broke and injured him on account of some
latent defect which could not be ascertained by the exercise of ordinary care. The defect in this hammer was latent and could not
have been ascertained by the exercise of ordinary care.”
86/424;
90/662. Cited, 83/662; 103/515; 112/290.
303. Character of the defect may indicate that master should have
the

—

known

of it.

In Ocean S. S. Co.

Matthews,- 86/418, the plaintiff, an employee, while in the discharge of his duty- in the lower hold of a
ship, was injured by a falling bale of cotton. He alleged that he
was hurt because the hooks by which the cotton was lowered from
the upper part of the ship were, by the negligence and de'fault of the
defendant, unsafely constructed, in disrepair, unfit for use, of defeetive and improper material, in an unsafe condition, and unfit
for the purpose for which they were being used, being so defective
as not to securely hold the cotton, on account of their
generally defeetive condition, and particularly because the points of the hooks,
being worn smooth, and having been forced from an acute to an obtuse angle, failed to securely catch and hold the cotton; that the dev.
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fendant knew

ought to have known this, and that he himself did
injured without fault on his part. It was held
that the master was not relieved from liability by the fact that the
hooks from which the hale of cotton slipped might, while in their
defective condition, have been used or had been used without injury.
The fact that a servant may, by care and caution, so operate a defective and dangerous machine as not to produce injury to his fellow
servants does not exempt the master from his liability for an omission to exercise reasonable care and prudence in furnishing safe and
suitable appliances. If the defect was one which the master should
have known, he will be presumed to have known it. If he should
have known, he was negligent in not knowing; and negligent ignoranee is equivalent to knowledge.
The patent and obvious character
and apparent age of the defect may indicate that the master should
have known it. It appearing that the servant — the plaintiff —
did not know of the defective condition of these implements, and
that it was not his duty to inspect and apply them, but that his empioyment confined him to the lower hold of the ship, where he did
not, and could not, see them; and it being further shown that the
defendant, whose duty it was to provide safe and suitable implements, on the contrary provided and employed implements which at
and before the time of the injury were obviously unsafe and unfit,
and on their face showed that they had been so long enough for their
unsafe condition to have been discovered by the master in the exereise of ordinary care, the assumption that the master knew of their
condition is proper; and there having been no effort to show otherwise, the verdict should stand. Simmons, J., said: “In the Nelms
case, supra, the defect was latent and could not have been ascertained
by the exercise of ordinary care. Here no latent defect was involved.
There was nothing latent about the bluntness of the one hook or the
bent condition of the other.. Of the abundant authority which could
be cited to sustain what has here been said, the following will suffice.
In Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, §223, it is said:
‘It is
enough to prove that the materials were defective in such respect
that, if a proper inspection had been maintained, the defects would
probably have been ascertained in time to have prevented the injury.’
See, also, Id. §194. In Wood on Master and Servant, §346, it is
said: ‘The fact that the defect might have been ascertained by
proper examination and care on the master’s part is sufficient evidenee of negligence to charge him with liability.’ See, also, Id.
not

or

know, and

was
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In 44 Wis. 44, it was held that, the defect being an

§§848, 368.

obvious one, the refusal of the court to charge that knowledge of the
defect by the master must be proven was not error. It was said that
if the defect ‘was of such a character that the defendant by the exercise of

ordinary care could have discovered and repaired it, it was
an injury sustained by an employee in consequence of such

liable for
defect.

9 99

Waycross Lumber Co. v. Guy, 89/148, it was alleged that the
plaintiff’s injury resulted from a defect in a valve which was improperly adjusted, thus allowing steam to escape into the cylinder,
and causing the saw-carriage to move forward and injure the plaintiff; that this defect was of long standing and was known to the
general overseer in charge of the affairs of the defendant’s mill, and
by reason of its long standing was known to the defendant. The
court charged the jury:
“You will inquire whether this defect existed, whether it was known expressly to the master, and, if not,
whether the superintendent of the mill was reasonably diligent in
looking after the machinery, so as to find out its actual condition.
If, by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care in looking after
the machinery in that mill, he might have discovered the defect described in the declaration, then the law charges him with notice of
the defect.” This charge was held to be correct.
304. Knowingly using defective machinery.
In Johnson, 55/133, the plaintiff was a track-hand in the employ
of the defendant. With other employees he, under the direction of
the boss of the squad, was unloading a hand-car when he was inJured. The injury was caused by a defect in the hand-car. The
plaintiff had been at work with that car for six months. He testifled that it was an old concern, badly worn on the edges, when he
went on the road, and continued to get worse every
day, and he
could see it. It was held that where an employee knowingly uses
defective machinery he can not recover damages for injuries resulting therefrom. Cited, 58/490; 68/706; 70/569, 678; 74/65.
It is the duty of a railroad company to furnish to its
employees
reasonably safe material and tools for their use in its service; but
an employee who is aware of the
dangerous character of any parIn

ticular tool
have

or

redress

70/569; 74/65.

instrument, and uses it,
an action. Bishop,

by

can

not, if he is damaged,

50/465.

Cited,

68/706;
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In Hazlehurst

Brunswick Lumber

Company, 94/535, the plainmule hitched by a rope to a truck used
to haul lumber.
The lumber fell from the truck and injured him.
He alleged that the truck was defective and that it was improperly
loaded. It was held that the evidence showing that the danger of
the work in which the plaintiff was voluntarily engaged must have
been as obvious to himself as to his employer; that there was no
emergency requiring him to expose himself to the danger; and that,
if free from fault himself, the negligence, if any, which r. suited in '
his injury, was that of a fellow servant — he was not entitled to recover, and the court was right in granting a nonsuit.
Cited,
106/571; 111/324.
In White v. Kennon & Co., 83/343, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants had a steam-sawmill and a tramroad, on which engines
and truck-cars were run to haul logs; and by the failure and neglect of said firm to keep their said tramroad in good and safe condition, and by the wanton, reckless, and careless running of said
train by the engineer, the petitioner was damaged; that he was
employed to take charge of a gang of hands and keep up the track
of said tramroad ;■ that said road was in “a fearfully bad condition";
and that he could not, within the time he worked, put the road in
good condition, but had so improved it that it was considered safe;
that he was required to go out on a train with a load of ties, and
had to ride on the ties; and, while on this journey, the train ran
into a bad place in the track, mashed down the track, jolted the
ties and caused them to fall off, thus throwing him from the car,
and injuring him; that the engineer knew of this bad place in the
road, and knew that the petitioner was ignorant of it, and gave him
no notice of it until just as the accident was about to occur.
The
demurrer was sustained, and Simmons, J., said: “There was no
error in sustaining the demurrer.
The plaintiff shows that he had
charge of the track, and that it was his duty to keep it in repair; that it was in a ‘fearfully bad condition,’ all of which was
as well known to him as it was to the
engineer or the defendants.
The law of this State concerning actions of this sort against railroad companies is not applicable to the present case, but it is eontrolled by the principles of the general law between master and servant.
The allegations made by the plaintiff show that he either knew
or ought to have known the
danger of riding on this track on top
of a load of cross-ties, it being his duty, according to the allegations
tiff

was

v.

employed to drive

a
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repair the track of the road. This being true,
think, under the law, he is not entitled to recover. The general
rule is that an employee can not recover for an injury caused by
the use of defective machinery, defective appliances or tools, when
he has knowledge of such defects, and especially when his knowledge
is equal to or better than that of his employer. Nor do we think
he was entitled to recover on account of the alleged negligence of
the engineer. According to the facts alleged in the petition the
engineer was a coemployee-or fellow servant of the plaintiff. Being a coemployee or fellow servant, he can not recover against the
defendants for the negligence of his eoemployee or fellow servant.”
Cited, 93/58; 106/571.
In Daniel v. Forsyth, 106/568, the plaintiff alleged that he was
in the employment of the defendant, engaged in shingling the roof
of a house; that the defendant ordered plaintiff to go upon a certain scaffold, and nail shingles to the roof of the house; that plaintiff complied with this command, and had nailed but a few shingles,
when the scaffold gave way, and plaintiff fell to the ground, sustaining severe injuries. It is alleged that the scaffold was built by the
superintendent of the defendant in a careless and negligent manner, for the reason that the foot-board was a 1x10 or 1x13 inch board,
about twelve or sixteen feet in length, and the braces w.re three or
four shingles, in an almost upright position, against the board, whereas 1x3 strips or
weather-boarding of sufficient length and strength
should have been used for braces. The petition further alleges that
plaintiff was an inexperienced man in working on scaffolds and on
in the declaration, to

we

roofs, and that he did not know at the time that said scaffold was built
in an unsafe and negligent manner, nor was he warned by the defendant of the danger.
Defendant well knew that his superintendent
was a careless and incompetent man, and retained him in his
employment after he had notice of the faet, and, if defendant did not know
this fact, he should have known it. Plaintiff did not, at the time of
receiving the injuries, know that the superintendent was a careless
and incompetent man.
Plaintiff is fifty-three years old, and his
earning capacity has been reduced one-half. The petition' charges
that it was gross negligence on the part of the defendant to order
him to work upon a scaffold that was unsafe and dangerous; that it
was
gross negligence not to warn plaintiff, who was inexperienced, of
the danger in going upon the scaffold; and that defendant was
grossly negligent in retaining in his employment a negligent and
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incompetent superintendent. By amendment, it is alleged that it was
the duty of defendant to have made the scaffolding so strong and
to fasten it so securely that it would safely support the weight of all
persons put to work thereon, together with the supply of shingles
necessary to keep the force then engaged in covering the roof; but
that defendant neglected his duty in this respect, and permitted the
scaffolding to be so weak and insecurely fastened that it was unsafe
and dangerous, and while plaintiff was upon it, engaged in the performance of his duty, the scaffolding gave way, and caused the fall
and injuries alleged. A nonsuit was granted, and Cobb, J., said:
“There

no error in granting the nonsuit.
The evidence shows
plaintiff was a man fifty-two years of age, and that he had
been engaged in sawmill work for thirty years.
There is evidence
that he was inexperienced, so far as nailing on shingles was concerned, but there is no evidence from which a jury would be authorized to find that he was such an inexperienced man that he could not
tell that a plank sixteen feet long, braced to the roof of a house with
three or four shingles, was not sufficiently safe for three men to go
upon it, when, in addition to this weight, there were from one hundred and fifty to two hundred shingles on the staging. If the plaintiff knew the staging was unsafe, and yet went upon it, he can not
recover.
If he ought to have known of the unsafe condition of the
staging, and did not, he can not recover. It is certain that the jury
would not have been warranted in saying that plaintiff ought not to
have known of the unsafe condition of the staging. But, even if
plaintiff was free from fault, the evidence does not distinctly show
that defendant himself built the staging, or that it was constructed
in an improper manner, or that he furnished for that purpose material that was unsuitable.”
Cited, 107/352; 111/324.
In Willingham v. Rockdale Oil & Pert. Co., 101/713, it was held
that where, upon the trial of an action brought by a person to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by
him in the operation of the defendant’s machinery, which was alleged to be defective, it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff
sustained his injuries in an attempt to prevent the running off of a
certain belt; that, a number of times previous to this particular oceasion, the belt had run off, and plaintiff had put it on; and that, at
the time the injuries were inflicted, the plaintiff, seeing that the “belt
had started off again,” and while the machinery was in operation,
“got a piece of soap and was holding it on,” and accordingly “was

that the

was

CHAPTER 17.

§ 304 ]

[ 396

Duty of master in furnishing machinery.

hurt by being caught in the belt, trying to keep it on”; and that
plaintiff could not say whether or not the alleged defect caused the belt
to run off
held that, whether the alleged defect did or did not cause
the belt to run off, the plaintiff in undertaking to hold the belt in
position while the machinery was in motion, knowing the facts above
outlined, assumed the hazards of his venture; and it not appearing
that the alleged defects, which were unknown to him, produced results
which the plaintiff had no reason to apprehend, the presiding judge
committed no error in granting a nonsuit. Little, J., said: “The
injured employee had been acquainted with the machinery for years,
according to the evidence. More than that, at the very time of the
injury he was endeavoring to counteract a defect in its operation in
a
very hazardous manner, adopted without suggestion from the
master or any one else, and one which no prudent man ought to have
undertaken.
He was injured, not in consequence of any defect in the
machinery, but as the direct result of his imprudent and incautious
act.
As a rule, an employee can .not recover from his master for
injuries sustained when he himself was at fault; and we know of no
law or precedent and no principle of justice which would authorize a
recovery when such employee was injured as a result of a rash and
negligent act, not sanctioned by the master, and which exposed the
employee to great risk and danger. If the plaintiff, by the exercise of
ordinary care, could have avoided the consequences to himself caused
by the defendant’s negligence, he is not entitled to recover. Civil
Code, §3830. So that, even if the master was negligent in the matter of furnishing safe machinery, this plaintiff could not recover.
He
could well have avoided the injury.” Cited, 110/4.
In Gunn v. Willingham, 111/427, it was held that even if, in a
given case, it be shown that the machinery and appliances furnished
by the master for the prosecution of the work in hand were defective, he is not liable to a servant for an injury occasioned by defects
of which the latter had knowledge before he was
injured, if, with
such knowledge, and without calling attention to the defects, he continued in the work carried on by the use of such
machinery. Little,
J., said: “It must appear that the master knew, or ought to have
known, of the defects or danger in the machinery supplied, and it
must also appear that the servant
injured did not know, and had'
not equal means of
knowing, such fact, and, if he exercised ordinary
care, could not have known thereof.
The liability of a defendant
—

in

a case

like this arises from the fact that he

was

the

cause

of the
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injury, by employing the servant in a particular work when he knew
or ought to have known that the machinery by which he carried on
the work could not be safely used for 'that purpose, and that its use
was
accompanied by extra risk and danger. 28 How. Prae. 472.
But the rule is universal that he is not liable for injuries occasioned
by such machinery if the servant has the same knowledge of its defects, or the danger incident to its use, as the master, in the exercise of due care, possesses, and at or before the time the accident occurred there was nothing to indicate any danger, such as demanded
or suggested precautions which were omitted; nor, if the instrumentalities of the business are suitable, and proper precautions are adopted,
is the master liable for an injury that results from an improper
or imprudent use of the same by a coservant.
Wood, Mast.
Serv.
§371; 117 Mass. 312; Pitts, 98/C55. See, also, Ingram v. Lumber Co.,
108/190, 197.”
In Kenney, 58/485, it was held that a section-master in temporary
charge of a hand-car must note such defects in it as are discoverable
in the reasonable and ordinary exercise of diligence in the course of
his duty, and decline or cease to use it if it be obviously unsafe;
otherwise he can not recover for an injury to himself which his declaration alleges to have been caused, in part, by the defective character
or

condition of the

ceive human

car.

If the defect in the

car was

such

as

to de-

judgment, the company, as well as the plaintiff, stands
excused. And whatever diligence he exercised in seeing to the apparent safety of the vehicle goes to the credit of his employer, as well
as to his own credit.
Bleckley, J., said: “The person injured being
a section-master
(a position requiring the daily use of a hand-ear),
and having some years experience in the business, and the declaration
alleging that the injury was caused, in part, by a defective hand-car,
which car, according to the evidence, was, at the time, in use by him,
and under his control, he can not recover without making it appear
that he did not discover the defect in time to avoid exposing himself
to the danger, or that the defect was of such a nature as not to be
discoverable in the reasonable and ordinary exercise of diligence in
the course of his duty.” When this case was returned to the court
below, the plaintiff amended his declaration and alleged “that the
crank-car from which the plaintiff was thrown, was not constructed
as crank-cars usually are and were before that time, and of that fact
plaintiff had no knowledge, and said car so constructed, was much
more unsafe than crank-cars constructed as usual, and that of this
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notice, and did not communicate the same to plainrecovery for $2,500, a new trial was denied, and
the case went again to the Supreme Court. 64/100. The judgment
was reversed, Warner, C. J., holding that neither the amendment
nor the evidence offered in support of it took the case without the
ruling when it was there before. Bleckley, J., concurred for the
sole reason that the plaintiff failed to prove the matter of the amendment.
Jackson, J., dissented, and was of opinion that the matter
of the amendment was sufficiently proved, when it was shown that
the supervisor of the track, the immediate superior officer of the
defendant had

tiff.”

There

was a

was a section-master, directed him to attend to some
section other than his own, with which he was unac-

plaintifE, who
business

on a

quainted, and put him in charge of the superior’s crank-car, with
the use and working of which he was also unacquainted,- having been
on it but once with the superior; and although the superior knew
that the car was light and the flange of the wheel was quite shallow,
and that it ran off the track easily at frogs, and had frequently done
so with him,
yet he gave no notice thereof to plaintiff, who did not
know that it

ever ran

off.

of the

which he

was

For want of the notice of the character

thus

placed, and of its having run off the
frogs, he passed the point of danger with less care than he
have used had he been notified of its liability to leave the
at such points.
In Haslett, 74/66, this dissenting opinion
car on

track at
would
track
was

deemed to he

others.

more

in

consonance

with the law than either of the

Cited, 68/706.

In the latter case an employee was allowed
the evidence did not show affirmatively that he had
knowledge of the defect in the machinery which caused his injury,
nor was it clear that it was
any part of his duty either to inspect
the piece of machinery in question or to report its defects. The testimony as to the manner in which he used it and his care in applying
to recover, as

it

was

conflicting, and

as

the presiding judge approved the finding,

the court would not interfere.

No

negligence on the part of the company being alleged in the
declaration, except that “the engine, by reason of the carelessness
and negligence of the defendant, struck against the
freight-car with
violence so great, unnecessary, and unusual as to cause the drawbar
to hurl the coupling-pin from its place,
causing it to strike against
the left side of the head of your petitioner,” and the evidence of the
plaintifE himself showing that there was no negligence in handling
the engine, and that the real cause of the
injury was that the brake

399

CHAPTER 17.

]

[ §§ 305, 306

Duty of master in furnishing ihachinery.
was not in a proper condition for
knew of the defect when he exposed

safe

use, and that the plaintiff
himself to the danger, the court
Nelson, 88/225.

a nonsuit.
applicable to a convict.
The rule forbidding a recovery from his master by a servant who
subjects himself to injury by going, without objection, into a place
known by him to be dangerous is not applicable to a convict, whose
movements are controlled and directed by a guard or boss having and
exercising the power of compelling the convict to obey his orders.
The plaintiff, a convict, having been leased by the State to a penitentiary company, and that company having hired him, with other
convicts, to another corporation engaged in the work of constructing
a railroad, and he having been put to work under the control of a
guard employed and paid by the latter corporation, and being required to obey the orders of such guard, this corporation is liable
to the plaintiff for injuries received in consequence of his having
gone, under orders from the guard, into a place where a dangerous
explosive was being used, although all the convicts so hired may
have been under the general charge of a “captain,” appointed by
the governor. This is true whether it was or was not lawful for
such convicts to be placed under the control and management of the
guard. Chattahoochee Brick Co. v. Braswell, 92/631.
306. Questions that should have gone to the jury.
In Pitts, 98/656, it was held that the company negligently permitted the engine, on which the plaintiff was engaged, to become unsafe, in that the drawbar or coupling necessary to connect the tender
to the engine had, from long use, become worn and insufficient;
whereby the space between the tender and the engine became so great
that when the engine was stopped or started the tender was driven
with great force against the chafing-iron of the engine itself; and
that while .he was performing his duties standing upon the apron
of the engine, the engineer suddenly and without warning applied
and released the brakes, and by reason of the defective drawbar the
tender was thrown with great force against the engine, knocking
the iron apron from beneath plaintiff’s feet and hurling him to the
ground. It was held that where an action is brought against a railroad company by one of its employees for personal injuries alleged
to have resulted from the negligence of the former in furnishing, for
the use of the latter, defective machinery and appliances, in the use
of which, without fault on the part of the latter, he was injured; and
did not

err

in

granting

305. Rule not
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motion for

nonsuit is made at the close of the

plaintiff’s case,
upon the sole ground that, admitting the defendant’s negligence, the
defect complained of was so apparent, and the use of the appliance
so manifestly dangerous, as that the plaintiff knew, or by the exereise of ordinary diligence could have known, not only of its existence, but of the danger attendant upon its use, and was consequently
himself guilty of contributory negligence in continuing the use of
such appliance — in determining whether the nonsuit moved should
be awarded, knowledge of the defect and of the dangerous character
of the appliance are both necessary considerations; and, even though
it might appear that the defect was known to the employee, a nonsuit should not be awarded, unless it further appeared either that
the plaintiff actually knew that the continued use of the defective
appliance was dangerous, or that the defect complained of rendered
the use of the appliance so obviously dangerous as that a person of
his intelligence and understanding could readily perceive the danger.
If in such case, upon the question of notice, whether actual or imputed, either as to the defect or the dangerous character of the defective appliance, the evidence be in conflict, or inferences therefrom
may be drawn favorable to the plaintiff, non-liability of the defendant can not be adjudged as matter of law.
Cited, 111/433.
In McIntyre v. Empire Printing Co., 103/288, it was held that
the evidence presented questions which should have been submitted
to the jury, and Cobb, J., said: “This was an action for p 'rsonal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, a girl of fourteen years, while employed by the defendant, a company engaged in the manufacture of
paper boxes. It appeared from the testimony that she was placed
at work on a machine which was used for setting up lids to boxes,
etc.
She got her orders from one Hirsch, who was foreman of the
a

room

chine.

a

in which she worked.

She had

about it,

never

and had

He told her to go to work on the maon it
before, did not know anything

worked

before had anything to do with a machine
objected when ordered to work on that machine; told him that she was afraid to work on it; and gave as a
reason that she did not know
anything about it. Hirsch had had his
nails cut off on the same machine. He told her something about
being
hurt on the machine, but stated that it was just carelessness in him,
and that it was now arranged so that she could not be hurt.
She
of that character.

Had worked

on

never

She

it about

a

week before she

peared from the evidence that the

use

was

hurt.

of the machine

It further apwas

attended
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with

danger.

off.

She did not know there

The plaintiff, in using it, had two of her fingers cut
was any danger in using it in the condition it was in at the time that she went to work on it, and did
not find it out until after she was hurt.
It appears from the record
that the machine was brought into court, and that the plaintiff, in
the presence of the court and jury, illustrated exactly how she was
hurt.
The machine not being before us, of course we must view the
case entirely from the record.
Whether the character of the machine
was such that the dangers in operating it were patent to a child of
plaintiff’s age and capacity, and whether she was guilty of negligence in the way in which she operated it, and thus brought her injuries upon herself, are questions which should have been submitted to a jury under proper instructions from the court. It may be
that if we could see the case in exactly the way in which it was
presented to the trial judge, with the plaintiff before him working
upon the machine, it would be apparent to us, as it seems to have
been to him, that there was no ground for recovery in the case; but,
viewing the evidence in the absence of the practical demonstration,
it makes a question which should have gone to the jury. We do not
mean to discourage the practice of having before the court and jury

practical demonstrations as aids to ascertain the truth of the
but, from the nature of the case, such things can not be embodied in a record; and, where a nonsuit is granted upon such
ground, the record before us must, as far as it is capable of doing,
present a picture of the actual demonstration. If it does not, as is
these
case;

the

case

now

before us, and the evidence makes it doubtful as to

whether the nonsuit

was proper, the doubt must necessarily be rein favor of the plaintiff. If the case had been submitted to a jury, and a verdict rendered for the defendant, we might
probably, upon the present record, be authorized to presume that
the jury based their finding upon the practical demonstration in
their presence, and allow the verdict to stand; but, as questions of
fact are for determination by a jury, the trial judge, whenever in
doubt, should resolve the doubt in favor of leaving the case to the
determination of the jury.” Cited, 111/323.
307. A voluntary act outside of the scope of employment.
In Allen v. Hixson, 111/460, the plaintiff was employed as an
operative of a mangle in a laundry. She found that the machine
was out of order, and did not attempt to use it, but
reported the fact
to the superintendent, it being her duty to report to him.
He came-

solved

26

by

us
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inspect the mangle. She undertook to show him its condition
by taking hold of some unwrapped cloth to raise it and allow the
^inspection of the rollers that were out of order, and in doing so
-she was injured. It was held that an employee who, as a mere voluntcer, does an act entirely outside of the scope of his employment,
and in consequence receives personal injuries, can not hold his master liable therefor.
Lumpkin, P. J., said: “It affirmatively ap'pears that it was her duty to feed the machine by which she was injured, and it is a legitimate inference that it was also incumbent
upon her to inform the superintendent that this machine was out of
order. Beyond this, it can not be gathered from her petition that
anything more was required of her. It is therefore clear that she
was not injured while in the performance of any duty growing out
-of the service in which she was engaged. It follows that the master
-was under no
duty of protecting her against injuries received while
she was, as a mere volunteer, endeavoring to accomplish something
entirely outside the scope of her employment. The act which caused
her injury was certainly one of this kind; for, in taking hold of the
unwrapped cloth for the purpose of showing the superintendent the
condition of the machine, she volunteered to perform a service not
required of her, and therefore necessarily acted upon her own re-sponsibility and at her own risk. It makes no difference that the
•machine had a defective part of which she was ignorant; for its existence could not, on the occasion referred to in her petition, have
been the source of injury to her, if she had confined herself to the
;performance of the duties pertaining to the service for which she
was employed.
As will have been seen, the plaintiff was an adult,
and actually knew when she first approached the machine that it
was out of order.
Recognizing the danger of attempting to operate
it in that condition, she prudently refrained from so doing, and
made a prompt report to the superintendent in regard to the matter.
Unfortunately, however, she did not continue to exercise the same
■degree of prudence when she went outside the scope of her duties,
and, without any direction or request on his part, volunteered to assist him in ascertaining precisely the extent and character of the derangement which had brought about the condition in which she had
to

'

found the machine.”

308. Case not altered that

of superior employee.
Although the question

may

defective tool is used under
be

one

command

of negligence, yet if the plain-
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tiff fails to make out

a prima facie case, a nonsuit may be awarded.
employee sued the company for damages resulting
from a defective hand-car, and the evidence for the plaintiff showed
that he knew of the dangerous condition of the car, but nevertheless
made use of it, such fact was fatal to his recovery, and a nonsuit
was properly awarded.
It does not alter the case that the employee
knowingly undertook to use a dangerously defective tool under the
immediate command of a superior employee. Bell, 70/566.
Cited,
74/65; 85/200; 101/715.
In Baker, 68/699, the plaintiff and another employee of the
railroad company were engaged in cutting a bar of iron. Plaintiff
was holding a defective cleaver, and the other employee was using a
defective heavy hammer upon the cleaver. A small piece of iron
flew off from the hammer, struck plaintiff in the eye, and injured
him.
The defective character of the tools was known to the plaintiff
and he used them under the order and command of his superior
boss employee.
It was held that it’ is the duty of a railroad company to furnish its employees reasonably safe tools and materials
for their use in its service, but an employee who is aware of the dangerous condition of any particular tool or instrument and nevertheless uses if can not have redress for an injury resulting therefrom.
Nor will the fact that he knowingly undertook to use a dangerously
defective tool under the immediate command of a superior employee
give him the right to recover. Cited, 74/65; 85/200; 70/568; 78/264;

Where

a

railroad

100/478.

Employee should have reasonable time and opportunity to
of the tool or machinery.
In Smith, 90/558, the plaintiff was a brakeman. While he was putting on a brake in the discharge of his duty, the brake-wheel flew
off, and he was thrown to the ground and injured. Simmons, J.,
said: “We think it is clear enough from the evidence that the railroad company was negligent with respect to the condition of the
brake-wheel, and that the injury was due to that cause. A rule of
the company declared that brakes should be considered in bad order
unless the brake-wheel was secured to the shaft with a properly fitted
nut; and it was the duty of the car-inspectors to make regular and
frequent examinations to see that the brakes in this respect, as well
as in others, were
kept in good order. Any failure in this duty was
likely to be attended, as it was in this case, with serious injury to
the. employees whose duty it was to use the brakes. If the threads
309.
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at the head of the staff

nut

was

over

which the nut

liable to work off when the wheel

was
was

fitted

were

used.

worn,

the

A few hours

before the

injury occurred, the car-inspector at Rome examined the
question, but gave a merely casual inspection to the nut.
He did not test it, and did not climb up on the car to look at it.
From examinations made after the injury, on the same night and
the next morning, it was found that the shoulder of the brake-staff
and the threads over which the nut was fitted were broken and badly
worn, and this condition apparently was not new, but had existed
for some length of time. The insecure condition of the nut from
this cause, although not perceptible on a casual and hasty inspection
could easily have been discovered by such an inspection as it was the
duty of the car-inspector to make. It was contended that if the
railroad company was negligent in failing to ascertain this condition, the plaintiff was equally so, as he also was charged with the
duty of inspection; a rule of the company, which was put in evibrake in

dence, required that

every

employee, before using

any

part of the

machinery connected with the running of the trains, should, for his
own safety, examine and ascertain, as far as he reasonably could, as
to its condition and soundness.
This duty, however, is to be measured by the employee’s opportunities in the light of his situation at
and before the time he makes use of the machinery.
The law and
the rule above referred to merely require him to examine as far as
he ‘reasonably’ can.
To charge the plaintiff with knowledge of the
insecure condition of the brake-wheel, and with negligence in having used it in that condition, he must have had reasonable time and
opportunity to ascertain that such condition existed, and must have
failed to examine as far as he reasonably could under the circumstances in which he was placed. Whether the plaintiff exercised due
diligence, and examined as far as he reasonably could, under the
circumstances, the condition of the brake-wheel, etc., before using it,
was a question for the jury.”
Where a train-hand was injured by a defective cog-wheel of a brake,
and the defense was that he knowingly used it, it was held that in
the absence of other evidence upon the point it does not follow that
a hand whose
duty it is to apply the brakes on a train has sufficient
skill to determine their fitness for use by an inspection. One presumably less qualified for this duty it would be difficult to select.
The brakeman is not necessarily a skilled machinist; no such quali-
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fication

seems essential to the simple operation of applying the maehinery provided to cheek the speed or to stop the progress of the
train. Haslett, 74/59. Cited, 78/264.
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Duty of servant and master as to ordinary risks of employassumes the ordinary risks of his employment, and
is bound to exercise his own skill and diligence to protect himself.
If there are dangers incident to an employment unknown to the servant of which the master knows, or ought to know, he must give the
servant warning in respect thereto.
Civil Code, §§2611, 2612.
310.

ment.

A servant

311. What risks the servant
In
serve

■

assumes.

Shields, 15/349, it was held that a servant when he engages to
a master undertakes, as between him and the master, to run

all the ordinary risks of the service; and this includes the risk of
negligence, on the part of a fellow servant, whenever he is acting
in discharge of his duty, as servant of him who is the common master of both.
Cited, 110/199. The Act of 1856, Civil Code, §§2323,
2610, changed this rule so far as it applied to railroads. Cannon,
34/422.
A railroad employee assumes the risks necessarily incident to his
occupation, but not such as result from the negligence of his coemployees. This was the case of a baggage-master who, when he
saw that a collision was inevitable,
jumped from his car and was injured. Rhodes, 56/645. Cited, 83/674.
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The risks which

employee assumes by entering the service of the
do not embrace the risk of another employee’s negligence, which he is not bound to anticipate. Simmons, 92/661, 658.
In Prather, 80/427, the court charged the jury that where an employment is attended with danger, the servant assumes the ordinary
perils which are incident to it; and if he receives an injury from an
accident which is an ordinary peril of the service undertaken by him,
he can not recover damages for such injury.
Simmons, J., said:
“The only adverse criticism we can make upon the charge is as to
the use of the word ‘ordinary.’ Why confine it to the word ‘ordinary5 ? Does not the employee assume the risk of all perils incident
to his employment—necessary, ordinary, and extraordinary—except
the negligence of the company, its servants and agents ?”
There can he no lawful recovery for damages resulting from personal injuries when it affirmatively appears from the evidence as a
whole, including the plaintiff’s testimony in his own behalf, that the
injuries complained of were occasioned by a casualty, the happening
of which was reasonably to be anticipated as a natural incident to,
and consequence of, the work in which the plaintiff was employed,
and that he knowingly took the risk of the same. Noble v. Jones,
103/584.
In Worlds, 99/283, the plaintiff, a yard train-hand, alleged that
a coal-car became derailed; and
petitioner, with others, was ordered
by the yardmaster, one Tuggle, to carry cross-ties for the purpose of
putting the ear back on the track. The cross-ties were about one hundred yards from where the ear was derailed. Petitioner was required
by the yardmaster, under whose instructions he worked, to carry
the ties without any assistance. To this he complained that the ties
were too heavy for one man to carry, and Tuggle replied:
“Go ahead,
and tote them cross-ties. You are as much able as any of the rest of
them.” At this time, petitioner, knowing that his daily bread depended upon his labor, and fearing that unless he obeyed the order
given him by the yardmaster he would be discharged, and wholly ignorant of the serious result that might arise from carrying said heavy
cross-ties, went to work according to the order of Tuggle. It was
held that when one enters the service of another, he impliedly assumes the usual and ordinary risks incident to the employment about
which he is engaged, and, in discharging the duties which he has un dertaken to perform, he is bound to take notice of the ordinary and
familiar laws of nature applicable to the subject to which his emrailroad company

,
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ployment relates; and if he fails to do this, and in consequence i3injured, the injury is attributable to the risks of the employment,,
and the master is not liable. Where an employee of a railroad company, in the discharge of his duties, is directed to lift and carry an.
ordinary object, like a cross-tie, he is bound to take notice that it is
heavy, and that a certain amount of physical strength will be required to accomplish the task; and if he misconceives the amount of
physical strength to be exerted, and overstrains himself in lifting the
tie, and is thereby injured, the master is not liable. The fact that he
was acting under the orders of a superior at the time does not alter
the question, even though he might have had reason to believe that
disobedience of the order would result in his dismissal.
Cited,
106/572.
312.

Jury determine what risks were incident to the service\
McDade, 105/134, the court was requested to charge the jury
as follows: “I charge
you, further, that the danger of being tripped!
up or thrown by the rail in coupling cars is one of the risks incidental to such service; and when plaintiff's son attempted to make
this coupling, he assumed all the risks and dangers incident to the
same; and if his death resulted from his taking such risk, and defendant’s agents were guilty of no negligence, or neglect, or omission
of duty, then the plaintiff can not recover.” It was held that the
court was right in refusing the request and that what risks are usually incident to a given business must be determined by the jury
under the facts and circumstances of each case; and while the judge
may properly instruct the jury that, as a general rule, an employee
assumes such risks, a refusal to specify particular
dangers or perils,
and inform the jury that these are within the rule, is right.
In any given case the jury must determine from the evidence .what
In

the risks incident to the work in hand.

were

Barnett, 104/582.

Cited, 105/137.
313. Machinist

injured in repairing machinery that is out of

or¬

der.
In Dartmouth

Spinning Company v. Achord, 84/14, it was h Id
employed by a corporation in its factory, not to use
machinery, but to keep it in good order, and having knowledge that1
some of it is
imperfect, and that employees can not be relied upon to
prevent it from becoming dangerous for lack of oil, takes the risk
of discovering the condition of the machinery at the time he attempts
to repair it, such risk being incident to his vocation.
The incompethat

a

machinist
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or negligence of other employees, or of officers or agents of the
corporation, resulting in putting the machinery out of order and rendering it dangerous, will not make the corporation liable for an injury which he sustains in handling the machinery while engaged,
without their assistance, in repairing it.
Bleckley, C. J., said:
“While it is the duty of a master to furnish his servant safe machinery for use, he is under no duty to furnish his machinist with
safe machinery to be repaired, or to keep it safe whilst repairs are in
progress.
Precisely because it is unsafe for use, repairs are often
necessary.”
314. Employee voluntarily selected an improper tool.
In Perkins, 8&/1, it appeared that the plaintitf was a machinist,
and when injured he was endeavoring to insert a set-screw in an
eccentric. The hole was not properly tapped out and the screw would
not go in correctly.
It got fastened in the hole, and the foreman

tency

directed him to cut the

screw out with a chisel, which he endeavored
do, and had cut out the greater part of it when the tapering from
the hole made it necessary for him to take another chisel.
The first
blow he took with the second chisel, it blurred, and a chip of steel
from the screw flew into his eye. It was held that a verdict for the
plaintiff was not warranted; there being no sufficient ground for imputing to the defendant any negligence whatever in the matter of
furnishing to the plaintiff an unfit instrument for the work in hand,
but the evidence showing, on the contrary, that the plaintiff did not
wait to have furnished to him such an instrument as the superintendent considered suitable, and promised to furnish.
Lumpkin, J.,
said: “It was not foreseen that any instrument specially adapted to
the work in which plaintiff was engaged at the time he was injured
would be needed, because this particular work was itself made necessary by an accident. As soon as the emergency arose, the superintendent not only offered to supply plaintiff with a proper instrument
with which to do this work, but promptly went off to secure one, and
was
actually bringing it to plaintiff when the injury occurred.
Plaintiff, however, chose to rely upon his own experience and judgment, selected a tool from a large number which had been put in
his charge, and began work before the superintendent could possibly
supply one which would be pffoper. The instruments from which
plaintiff made his selection were not specially designed to do the particular work made necessary by the emergency which had arisen; the
evidence showing that such work required a more
perfect tool. It is

to
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.probably true that the tool with which plaintiff attempted to do this
work was not a proper one for the purpose, but the company did not
hold it out as such, as plaintifE must have known; and, to say the
least, he might have waited until the return of the superintendent
with what the latter considered a proper instrument for this occasion.
.Such an accident as this is likely to happen at any time, and may
have occurred, no matter what sort of chisel the plaintiff had used.
It was one of those unfortunate occurrences incident to the employment in which he was engaged — an accident which, in all probability, no amount of diligence on the part of either plaintiff or defendant could have prevented. It was a well-established rule of law
that every man, when he enters upon a particular employment, must
assume the risks and hazards usually pertaining thereto.”
315. Railroad company injures employee of telegraph company.
In Coggin, 62/685, it appeared that the plaintifE was in the employ of a telegraph company and was engaged, when injured, in distributing poles from one of the railroad company’s trains, which was
being run on its track by its own engineer. It was held that, in the
absence of any express contract' as to risk, a railroad, sued by a servant not its own for injuries received on the train, has no concern
with risks which the servant took

as

between himself and his master.

As between the

plaintifE and the railroad company, the plaintiff took
by negligence imputable to the
•defendant, but none that arose from such negligence.
316. Train-hand falls from the top of the train.
In Smith, 82/236, it was held that the action being by a trainhand for a personal injury alleged to have resulted from the carelessness and negligence of the conductor, in ordering the train to
leave the station before the plaintiff had time to perform a duty assigned him on top of the train and get down, and the evidence failing to show that the conductor gave the order to start prematurely or
improperly, a motion for a nonsuit should have been granted.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “In winter, and at night, the weather being
very cold, and the train behind time, an accident occurred at the
station, by which the bell-rope was broken, and it became the duty of
Smith, the train-hand, to go on top, reunite the rope, carry one* end
of it to the engine, and have it attached to the bell. The conductor
ordered him to do this, but, as it was a part of hife duty, he would
all risks whatsoever not occasioned

have undertaken it without

standing still.

The night

an

was

order.

The

train, at the time,

dark, the wind

was

was

blowing, and the
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roofs of the

covered with ice. Smith, carrying a lantern,
ladder connected with one of the cars, and, having
repaired the rope, he started forward to pass to the engine. As the
train moved off, the conductor spoke to him. He did not reply.
He
thought he could reach the engine before the train got too fast, and
probably would have succeeded had not the rope got fastened. But
it did get fastened so that he had to return along the cars to loose it.
Finding that he could not do so, he concluded that he would wrap the
rope around a brake-handle, and make his way back to the cab; the
smoke from the engine being so dense by this time that he could not
go forward, and the wind being so high—the speed of the train having become very rapid—that he could not remain on top of the cars
without danger of freezing.
In his effort to reach the cab, his
foot slipped on the ice, and he fell to the ground from the top of
the train. These, in brief, are the material facts to which he testified on the trial. In the declaration his injury is attributed alone
to the carelessness and negligence of the conductor in ordering
the train to leave the station before he (Smith) had time to
perform the duty assigned to him and get down from the top
of the cars.
It is plain, from his testimony, that both he and
the conductor thought it practicable to accomplish the business before the speed of the train would become dangerous; and it is evident that the disappointment of their mutual expectation resuited, not from prematurely starting the train, but from the accident of the rope becoming fast, so as to prevent his proceeding
with it to the engine as rapidly as he anticipated. He fails to
show that he knew less about tlite situation than the conductor did.
Indeed, his opportunity, as he was on the cars, was better than that
of the conductor to realize the danger in its full extent. Had he been
unwilling to incur the hazard of the train being put in motion while
he was exposed, he could easily have requested the conductor, either
before he went or after he reached the top, not to give the signal for
starting until the rope was attached. He knew the train was behind
time, and that it was desirable to start as early as practicable. He
fails' entirely to show that it was the duty of the conductor not to
start; and his sole complaint in the declaration is that he ‘did start
the train prematurely. We think the unfortunate result was an incident of the dangers of the service in which he had engaged, and that
he could not recover.” Cited, 82/156.
climbed up

ears were

by

a
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317.

Injured in Hasting.
being for employing an incompetent superintendent,
and for negligence on the part of the superintendent in directing a
hole to be drilled for blasting where a charge blast was already in,
and there being no evidence either of the ineompetency of the superintendent, or that, if competent, he could by the use of proper diligence have known that the previous charge had not been exploded,
The action

the

judgment of nonsuit was correct. The plaintiff suffered a misdangerous class of work in which he was engaged. Houston v. Culver, 88/34.
318. Jerk of a gravel-train.
In Sims, 80/749, it was held that when a gravel or a repair train is
managed as usual, and the jerk complained of is only such as would
be expected to occur on a train of that character in doing its work,
the employees engaged on it or attached to it take the risk as incident to the service, and if injured by the jerk can not recover of the
company. The only negligence complained of was, that the train
slackened up a little, and plaintiff started to step across from the
car he was on to the car the chest was on, reaching out to catch hold
of the chest to assist him in getting over; and just then the engine
gave the train a big jerk, throwing plaintiff between the cars.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “The plaintiff was an employee upon a gravel-train,
and was at the place where he had engaged to work; and the train
being in motion, there was a jerk, and in attempting to step from
one car to another, or when about to make the attempt, he was
thrown from the car. We think that such jerks upon a train of that
character must be expected to occur, and that the risk of employment
embraces them. It would certainly be impracticable to keep up the
repairs of a railroad upon any very strict rule with regard to jerks
in the movement'of the construction-trains.
Employees upon sucli
trains must incur these risks. They are apparently incident to the
fortune incident to the

business.

And

we

think that under the evidence in this case,

there

nothing unusual in the management of this train, and that the
injury that resulted to the plaintiff was simply an occurrence that
took place in the ordinary course of business.”
319. Unusual increase of speed on a dangerous track.
In Lawhorn, 97/742, it was held that even if a train employee, who,
•by reason of his having full knowledge that the track of the railroad
was in a dangerously defective condition, and had so remained for a
considerable period, can be held to have thereby assumed all risks of
was
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injury necessarily incident to riding, while engaged in his work, upon
a train, when being run in the usual manner and at the usual rate of
speed, yet where, upon a given occasion, he was injured by a derailment of a car upon which he was riding in the due course of his
employment, and, on the trial of an action against the railroad company for the injury thus sustained, proved affirmatively that the train,
at the time of the injury, was being run at a dangerous rate of
speed around a sharp curve, it was at least incumbent on the defendant to show that such rate of speed at the point in question did not
exceed that at which the train had usually been run at this place.
Simmons, C. J., said: “Ordinarily a person who remains in the
employment of a railroad company, as a brakeman or train-hand,
with knowledge that the track of the railroad is in a defective and
dangerous condition, is to be regarded as having assumed all the
risks of injury which are necessarily incident to that condition, when
the train is being run in the usual manner, and at the usual rate
of speed; but we do not think it follows, from the mere fact of his
knowledge of such condition, that be is to be regarded as having assumed the risks incident to a more dangerous manner of running the
train than usual.
A person might be willing to remain in such employment, and assume the risks incident to running the train in a
careful and prudent manner, and, if the train has been so run in the
past, might reasonably conclude that it would continue to be run in
the same way. It can not fairly be said, however, that by remaining
in such employment he assumed the risks incident to a sudden, dangerous, and unusual increase of speed of the train in passing, with
heavily loaded ears, over a particularly defective and, under such
circumstances, dangerous part of the track. At any rate, we think
the question should have been submitted by the court to the
jury.
See Wood, Mast. & Serv. §358.”
320. Coupler’s foot caught in a frog of the track.
In Kendrick, 89/782, it appeared that the plaintiff’s husband was
a switchman.
He was ordered by Grimes, who was head-coupler
and whose orders he was bound to obey, to go between cars and
uncouple them. When he went to make the first uncoupling the
cars were
just getting a start, and he made it all right. Grimes told
him to cut off five cars.
He went in between them to obey this second order while they were
running backwards, and was killed by
their running over him.
Grimes, when he discovered Kendrick lying
down between the cars, gave
signals for the engineer to stop. The
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not obeyed and he was killed. Kendrick’s foot was
caught and held in a frog of the track. Grimes testifled that it was customary to go between the cars while in motion,
and that there was nothing wrong in his sending Kendrick in to do
the work. A nonsuit was granted on the ground that it did not affirmatively appear that the deceased was without fault, and hence no
presumption against the company arose. It was held that the action
being for the homicide of an employee of the company, and the evidence not showing affirmatively whether the employee was free from
negligence or not, and no negligence on the part of the company adequate to have caused the homicide under the circumstances being
shown, the most reasonable and probable cause of the disaster being
an accident to the employee by which his life became suddenly exposed to danger incident to his employment, there was no error in
granting a nonsuit.
321. Employee out of his place injured by flake from a swage.
In McNally, 86/262, it was held that the servant of a railroad
company who is injured by a rare and peculiar accident, such as being struck in the eye by a flake of iron knocked from a swage worked
on by other servants and shown to have been in average condition, can
not recover damages from the company for such injury, his place of
labor being elsewhere than at the place where the swage was located,
but his call there being to procure a bolt needed in his department.
He was merely a visitor to the shop.
Cited, 90/662.
322. Injured by stepping on a clinker.
The presence of one clinker of unusual size on the margin of a
railway-track where switching is to he done, and on which a brakeman
accidentally steps in descending from a moving engine, in the due
course of his duties, will not render the company liable to answer
for a personal injury which the brakeman thus sustains. For outdoor premises to be reasonably safe, it is not required that the surface shall be kept clear of every object which by chance might cause
accidental injury. Bleckley, C. J., said:
“The plaintiff’s injury
was purely accidental.
He was probably faultless himself, and he
certainly shows no fault on the part of the company, unless the company is to be treated as an insurer against accidents to its employees,
which, of course, is not its legal character or relation. He was a
brakeman, and, in the course of his duty, stepped from the engine to
the ground, the engine being in motion. In so doing, he struck his
right foot against a large clinker of coal dross, five or six inches

signals

were
found to be
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through one way, and three or four inches the other. It was nearly
covered up with other dross from the engine, which he stepped into.
That dross consisted of rakings from the furnace.
These Takings do
generally consist of pure ashes, but sometimes have clinkers, generally so, unless they have been walked over long enough to be broken
up.
Frequently clinkers are so soft that walking over them will
break them, and he had broken many.
Generally a good many piles
of this dross are along the track. He could not say how far this
particular pile extended. He had seen piles two hundred yards long.
Dross that comes from the engines is taken from the side of the
track, and used for ballast between the rails. At that time, a construction-train was engaged in such removal. This particular clinker
was of unusual size, the average
being about as large as a hen egg.
We have said the injury was an ‘accident.’ It might be termed a
‘double-barreled accident.’ First, one clinker of unusual size got into
a
pile of dross; and, secondly, the plaintiff happened to step out upon
that particular pile, and struck his foot against that particular
clinker. There is no suggestion that the condition of the track or the
neighboring surface was unsafe, save in that one spot, and there is
no suggestion that the
plaintiff’s duty required him to step off at
that spot, rather than any other. Had it not been for the mere
chance of his selecting the particular few inches of space occupied
by that one clinker, he would have, in all probability, performed his
duty in safety. It can not be incumbent on railroad companies or
any one else, in such a world as this, to keep the whole face of the
earth on which servants and employees are to execute their functions clear of every object that may cause an
employee to slip up or
be thrown down. Such a rule would
require that farmers should
keep their premises clear of corn-cobs; for a cob, when stepped upon,
may roll under the foot and produce a fall.
So of small stones, and
sometimes sticks, or other rubbish. The plaintiff’s injury was
simply
a misfortune, the incident of his
employment, and of the risk consequent thereon.” Lee, 86/231. Cited, 86/391.
323. A piece of ore turned under his foot.
In Suddeth, 86/388, it appeared that the plaintiff, an
employee,
was furnished
by the company with a lamp which went out when he
was signaling the
engine with it in the usual manner. To relight
the lamp he climbed upon the train and commenced
going forward
over the
tops of the cars to reach the engine. In passing over a
box car loaded with iron-ore, a
piece of ore turned under his left
not
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foot and he fell off the car. It was held that the employee, while
passing in the course of his duty over a car loaded with ore, stepped
upon a piece of the ore, which turned under his foot, whereby he
was precipitated from the car and severely injured, is evidence of
injury by accident rather than by any fault or negligence of the
company.
That the car was loaded by heaping up the ore at each
end, leaving a depression in the middle, affords no suggestion of
unusual or improper loading.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “It seems to us
that there is no suggestion in this testimony that the car was loaded
in an unusual or improper manner.
Granting that the plaintiff
was free from fault in all he did, his own testimony and that of his
witness screen the company by pointing out mere accident, rather
than the fault of any one, as the cause of injury. While the general
rule is that the company must explain where the fact of injury is
proved and the plaintiff shows himself free from fault, yet where he
is the only employee who directly participates in the act resulting in
the injury, and where the evidence which goes to make out his case
points distinctly to accident, rather than to any negligence whatever
on the part of the company or its
employees, it would seem unreasonable to apply the general rule. The plaintiff’s fall was caused by the
turning of one piece of the ore under his foot. Prima facie, such
an occurrence is a mere accident.
It was an accident that he stepped
on that
particular piece of ore, and an accident that it turned under
his foot. Such casualties, it seems to us, appertain to the risk of the
service in which the plaintiff was engaged. In this case there was no
act of negligence on the part of the defendant which led to the
plaintiff’s passing over the ore.” Cited, 92/661.
324. Burden of proof.
In Whatley v. Block, 95/15, the plaintiff sought to recover for injuries sustained by falling into an elevator-shaft. A nonsuit was
granted. It was held that, irrespective of the question whether the
plaintiff might or might not, by the exercise of ordinary care, have
avoided falling into the elevator-shaft, inasmuch as the evidence
failed to show that there was any negligence on the part of the defendant, the judgment of nonsuit was right. Simmons, C. J., said:
“As this is not a case against a railroad company, the general law
governing master and servant applies, and the presuifiptions are all in
favor of the master, and the burden of overcoming them by evidence
is upon the plaintiff.
In this class of cases the master is not liable
to the servant for the negligence of a eoservant unless it be shown
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employed such coservant with know!; dge that he was
or retained him in the service after his unfitness was discovered. No allegation that the master was at fault
in this respect is made in the declaration. We have carefully read
the evidence in the record, and, in our opinion, the plaintiff totally
failed to establish by his evidence any of the allegations of negligenee made in the declaration. There was some evidence of negligence on the part of a coemployee in moving the elevator without
notice to the plaintiff, hut this, we have shown, is not imputable to
the master.
As to the absence of a railing around the hole in the
floor through which the elevator passed, there was no evidence that
such a railing was necessary in order to perform the work with safety.
No general rule or custom in regard to placing such railings around
other elevators of the same class was shown, so as to charge the master with notice that it was proper and necessary to do so.
‘A custom with reference to the adoption of certain safeguards in a given
business must be so general that it is presumed that the defendant
had knowledge of it, in order to make him liable for neglecting to
provide the same.’ 14 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 903, 904. Besides, if the absence of a railing rendered the work dangerous, the
servant knew it as well as the master; and it is an established principie of law that the servant takes upon himself the hazard of all
known dangers connected with the service.
Of course, if by want
of ordinary care, he fell into the hole, knowing it was there, he could
not recover.” Cited, 111/535.
In Gunn v. Willingham, 111/427, Little, J., said: “The burden of
proving negligence upon the part of the master is on the servant, and
he is bound to show that the injury arose from defects known to
the master, or which he would have known by the exercise of ordinary care, or that the master has failed to observe precautions essential to the protection of the servant which ordinary prudence
would have suggested. Wood, Mast. & Serv. §368. And no presumption of negligence on a master’s part is raised from the mere fact that
an
injury results to a servant from a latent defect in machinery or
other appliances used in a particular business. There must be evidence of negligence connecting him with the
injury.”
In a suit by a servant against a master, not a railroad
company,
for damages alleged to have been sustained on account of the
negligence of the master, the burden of proving such negligence rests upon
the plaintiff, and there is a presumption that the master has disthat the master
careless

or

incompetent,
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charged his duty to the servant, and is not at fault. Railey v. GarCompany, 112/288.
In Brush Electric Light and Power Co. v. Wells, 103/512, it was
held that in a suit against an electric light and power company,
brought by a widow for the homicide of her husband, alleged to have
been killed while in the employment of said company, through the
negligence of the defendant, the burden was on the plaintiff of establishing such negligence on the part of the company; and this
can not be done simply by showing due care on his part.
It was
therefore error for the court to charge, in effect, that the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover if the husband’s life was lost through
the negligence of the defendant, or that it was not the fault of the
plaintiff, and to charge further, that “the servant must show that the
butt &

master

this

was

at

is

fault
not

or

cured

show that he

was

not

at

fault.”

And

by the judge in a subsequent portion
charge giving the correct rule as to what burden the
plaintiff should carry, without calling the jury’s attention to
the mistake made in the previous part of his charge.
Lewis, J.,.
said: “This case is governed by the law concerning the relative duties of master and servant. In a suit by a servant against his master
for personal injuries, the burden is upon the former to show negligence causing the injury by the latter; and this burden is not removed by proof that the servant was, at the time of the injury, in the
exercise of due caution and care.
The law imposes upon the servant, especially while working with dangerous machinery of his master, the duty to exercise due diligence to avoid any casualty to himself; and, if he fails to exercise such care, he can not recover, though
the master may himself have been at fault. The law upon this subjeet is thoroughly and clearly discussed by Justice Simmons in the
case of Nelms,
83/70. Cited, 110/124.
Where the chief duty of an employee was to feed a mill, and an
incidental duty embraced the cleaning-up around it of material scattered in the process of feeding, it was incumbent upon him to look
at the machine, and observe every plain and constantly visible characteristic in its construction and working which rendered the necessary cleaning-up dangerous. If, after working all day, he undertook
to clean up at night, the omission of the employer to supply proper
light for the occasion would not excuse the employee for exposing
himself to unseen and unknown danger in the dark, which he ought
of

error

his
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to have

Atlanta

discovered, had he made proper use of daylight. Stubbs v.
Cottonseed Oil Mills, 92/495.
Cited, 103/584; 110/4.

In Hamby v. Union Paper Mills Co., 110/1, it was held that an
adult who had been for three weeks at work upon an obviously dangerous machine, which was slightly defective, and who was injured,
can not recover of the master, where the proximate cause of the in-

jury was not the defect in the machine, but his own want of care.
Cited, 110/198.
325. He knew of the defects and made no complaint.
In Schnibbe, 85/592, the plaintiff, an employee, was injured by the
falling upon his foot of an iron frame while he was engaged, with
other servants of the defendant, in moving it upon the track. A
nonsuit was granted. Blandford, J., said: “No negligence on the
part of the railroad company was shown. The work in which the
plaintiff was engaged at the' time he was hurt was an ordinary laborer’s work; and he had been employed by the company for several
years, and knew all about the work, and it is to be presumed that
he took the risk of any danger incident thereto. He complains that
there were not sufficient men employed in the work he was engaged
in to perform it safely and securely; but he knew this before he commenced his work, and yet made no complaint to those in authority.
Another complaint is that the truck, which was an ordinary cottontruck, was insufficient for the purpose of performing the work safely;
and yet he shows by his testimony that he was aware of this defect,
and made no complaint in reference thereto. He alleges that while
the truck was being pushed into the defendant’s blacksmith-shop the
wheel struck an obstruction, thereby causing an iron frame which
was on the truck to fall off, and on to the
plaintiff’s foot, which was
badly mashed; yet he did not show by testimony wherein there was
any negligence on the part of the defendant, or any eoemployee of
his.

This

business

seems

to be

one

of those casualties which arise in every

employment, and for which no one seems to he to blame.”
an ordinary risk, or a
pure casualty, no cause of action

326. From

arises.

Taking the. evidence as a whole, and considering it in that light
which is most favorable to the plaintiff’s contention, the occurrence
out of which the injury to the plaintiff arose was either a pure casualty

or one of the ordinary
which the employee necessarily

ity

arose

risks of the particular employment,
assumed. In either event no liabilagainst the defendant, and a nonsuit was properly granted.
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Thomas

these

v.

cases

Atlanta Machine

Works, 112/666; Milner, 112/667.

the facts

reported.

are

not

In

327. Use

of machinery for purpose not intended by master.
Quirouet, 111/315, Cobb, J., said: “It is a general rule of law
that a servant can not recover of the master for injuries resulting
from the use of machinery or appliances for a purpose for which
they were not intended by the master, and for which it was not necessary that they should be used, however defective such appliances
may be.
In undertaking to use an appliance for a purpose for
which it was not intended by the master, the servant takes upon himself the risk incident to such use. Wood, Mast. & Serv. §402; Bailey, Mast. Liab. p. 22; 1 Shear. & R. Neg. p. 346, and numerous
eases cited in note 4.”
Cited, 111/713.
328. Duty of master as to releasing employee from painful situation, and when agreement applies to another road.
In Allen v. Hixson, 111/460, it was held that no cause of action
arises from a failure to perform an act of humanity, if such failure
involves no breach of a duty imposed by law. Lumpkin, P. J., said:
“As to so much of the petition as claims damages because the ‘defendant negligently allowed petitioner’s hand and wrist to remain
between said roller and bar,’ or because of the defendant’s ‘negligently failing ... to effect her release,’ we do not think a
In

329.When

is set forth. When an employee, without fault
becomes placed in a dangerous or painful situation, the master is under no positive legal duty of exercisng all reasonable care and diligence to effect such employee’s speedy release.
Being in no way responsible for the unfortunate occurrence, the master can not be said to be guilty of a tort if he does not promptly take
active steps in coming to the rescue. The only duty arising under
such circumstances is one of humanity, and for a breach thereof the
law does not, so far as we are informed, impose any liability.”
In Galloway, 57/512, it was held that where an employee of a railroad company agrees to assume all risks incident to his employment,
the fact that he was running over another railroad at the time of
the injury does not release him from the agreement. If, while running over such other road, he is in the employ of the former company
so as to make it liable for the injury, his agreement remains binding.
the rule of exemption bf the master does not apply in
case of a child.
good

on

cause of action
the master’s part,
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In

Atlanta Cotton Factory Company, 69/137, it appeared
was under the general management of Harris, a superintendent. Each department under him was in charge of a “boss,”
and in each room there were two overseers, one of whom had charge
during the day, the other during the hours of labor at night. Cobb
was the night overseer, and had control of the operatives in the spinning-room during the hours of labor at night. Plaintiff, who was
fifteen years of age, was one of these operatives. The superintendent did not communicate directly with the subordinate employees.
Saturday nights the work was suspended at three o’clock, and after
that hour the night-watchman was in charge of the factory. The Saturday night plaintiff was injured, the operatives ceased work at the
usual hour.
Some of the children
plaintiff among them — were
afraid to go home and they were taken to a basement room where
the employees were in the habit of taking coffee at night. The general instructions of the superintendent to the night-watchman were
that no employee should be allowed to remain in any part of the factory except this basement room after the suspension of work on
Sunday morning. Cobb, finding it damp and cold in the basement
room, told Mattox, the night-watchman, to carry the children to
Speer

that the

v.

factory

—

what

was

known

as

the cloth-room

on

the second floor.

The watch-

replied that it was against orders to allow them in the mill and
nothing to do with it — he did not actually forbid
it. Thereupon Cobb took the children to the cloth-room. They began to play at hide and seek; plaintiff went out into the passage for
the purpose of seeking a better hiding-place. It was dark out there,
and she* fell into an unprotected hole cut for an elevator, and was
injured. It was held that a corporation acts only through its agents,
and unless responsible for their acts is wholly irresponsible.
The
agent who represents the corporation as master over other employees
for the time occupies the position of the corporation for such time
as to such subordinates.
The corporation is bound to appoint a
skilled and prudent manager to such position, and is negligent if it
employs an imprudent or incompetent person; and if, from the negligence of this quasi-master, unmixed with negligence of his own,
another servant or employee is injured, the corporation will be responsible. Especially was this the case where the injured employee
was a child without access to the
president or general superintendent,
and who received her orders solely from the manager of the branch
of the business in which she was engaged. It makes no difference
man

he would have
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that such subordinate manager

violated the orders of his superior
position of danger; nor does it
matter that at the time the entire factory where the injury occurred
was under the general supervision of a watchman, and that he had
an altercation with the subordinate manager under whom the class
of employees to which plaintiff belonged were at work, in regard to
putting them in the room, in emerging from which plaintiff was injured. The watchman and the subordinate manager having settled
their difference, and the employees having been put in the room,
negligence in doing so was imputable to the corporation, not to the
plaintifE. Crawford, J., dissenting, but the dissent did not contravene the rule that the defendant owed a duty to this child, which
required its agents in authority over her to look after her safety,
while under its charge, and engaged in the performance of her duties. To that extent the judgment was unanimous.
Cited, 72/228;
92/730; 99/517; 102/68; 110/197; 111/322.
In a subsequent ease, the Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72/217, it
was held that in case of the
injury of an adult by the negligence of a
coemployee, where the injured servant used all ordinary care and
diligence to avoid the injury from the principal's other servants, with
whom he was disconnected at the time, and when he was acting in
officer in

placing the employee

in a

obedience to the orders of another servant
bound to

over

him, whose orders he

obey, this court has held that he has a right to recover
for the injury inflicted. And where the injured employee is a child of
tender years, the master is bound to a higher degree of care. Hall,
J., said: “In DeBray, 71/406, we carefully examined our previous
decisions, together with the authorities in the text-writers, and the
cases from the English courts, and the courts of this country, and
came to the conclusion that, where the plaintifE used all ordinary care
and diligence to avoid the injury occasioned by the negligence of the
principal’s other servants, with whom he was disconnected at the
time, and where he was acting in obedience to the orders of another
servant over him, and whose orders he was bound to obey, that he has
a right to recover for the
injury inflicted under such circumstances.”
Cited, 103/289; 111/319, 472,* 474.
In Southern Agricultural Works v. Franklin, 111/319, it was held
that following the decision of this court in Speer’s case, supra, which
was approved and followed
by a full bench in Barnes’s case, supra,
the general rule of law exempting a. master from liability to one
servant for the negligence of a coemployee does not apply to the
was
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case

of

a

child who

was

injured

or

killed in

consequence

of the negli-

gence of a superintendent under whose orders the child was at work,
and which orders the child was bound to obey — the more especially
when the child

by its father hired to the common master of both
superintendent to do a particular kind of work,
which was not dangerous, and was by the superintendent, without the
father’s knowledge or consent, required to do other work, which was
dangerous, and was in consequence injured or killed. Lewis, J., said:
“So far as our research has extended, the Georgia cases, as above indieated, which rule that a sub-boss, though having power to employ
and discharge hands and those working under him, is their fellow
servant, when it appears that there is a master higher in authority,
have been applied exclusively in cases where the injury was to an
was

the child and the

adult.”
330. A servant is hound to exercise his

own

skill and

judgment to

protect himself,
Where

servant is

employed upon some work which, equally with
knowledge of the master and servant, is of a dangerous nature,
the master is not liable for the consequences of an accident occurring to the servant in the course of that employment, unless there
be negligence on the part of the master, and the absence of rashness
on the part of the servant.
A servant is bound to exercise his own
skill and judgment so as to protect himself in the course of his employment, and the master is not regarded generally as warranting
his safety. He is himself bound to exercise proper care, and can
not claim indemnity from the master for an injury resulting to him
which might have been prevented if he had himself been
reasonably
vigilant. Felling v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 78/260. Cited, 101/715;
106/572.
The skill and diligence which the law requires an adult employee
to exercise to protect himself from being injured by defective or
dangerous machinery must at least come up to the legal standard
expressed in the words “ordinary care.” In testing by this standard
given conduct of such an employee, the inquiry should be, not what
degree of care his “intelligence and understanding” would have enabled him to exercise under the existing circumstances, but what
amount of care might, under such circumstances, be reasonably expected of an ordinarily prudent person who had attained his majority. Georgia etc. Mill Co. v. Jackson, 112/620.
the

a
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331.

Degree of diligence in an emergency.
Dickey, 90/491, Lumpkin, J., said: “The plaintiff, together
with several other employees of the company, was engaged in pushing an empty flat car along a railroad-track in the company’s yard.
In

This

car was

about to collide with another

end of which

car on

the

same

track, the

supported upon 'jacks.’ An employee at work
upon the latter car, seeing that a collision would result, not only in
damage to the company’s property, but most likely in injury to some
of his fellow servants engaged with him in making repairs upon the
stationary car, sprang upon the flat car, and, without notice to those
who were moving the same, hastily applied the brake by turning the
brake-wheel. Immediately before this occurred, the plaintiff had put
his hand in the bracket under the car, and by pulling backward, also
was endeavoring to stop the ear.
He did not observe that the brake
was about to be applied, nor did his coemployee who applied the brake
know that plaintiff’s hand was in the bracket. According to the evidence, it was perfectly proper and safe to turn the brake-wheel if no
one’s hand was in the bracket; and there was no danger in having
one’s hand there so long as the wheel remained still. Both of these
men were acting in an emergency, and in perfect good faith.
Each
was doing that which suggested itself to him as proper to avert the
threatened danger. There was no time for circumspection or deliberation, and each was honestly doing his best to prevent a eatastrophe. Under such circumstances, neither could fairly be held to
that degree of diligence which should be observed when there is no
occasion for prompt and hurried action. Nor was this emergency
brought about by any act of the employee of whose conduct on that
occasion the plaintiff complains. If negligence in this respect be attributable to any one, it can be charged only to those engaged in moving the ear. The employee who applied the brake was not one of
those so engaged, and it was not until the emergency was at hand
that he had any occasion to act at all with reference to the moving
car.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, was one of those employed in
moving the car, and, as he directly contributed to bringing on the
impending peril, he can not complain that one who endeavored to
avert the consequences of his act did not, in the excitement attending the moment, act with that degree of coolness and circumspection
which might and should be expected upon far different and less trying occasions. Manifestly the plaintiff did not apprehend that the
brake was about to be turned, or he would have taken his hand from
was
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the

dangerous place.

the brake neither

It is equally certain that the man who applied
could have seen that plaintiff’s hand was

saw nor

in the bracket under the

car.

Just such

a

combination of circum-

these results in what is properly termed an ‘accident.’ The
accident in this case could not fairly be attributed to the negligence
of either party concerned, and consequently it was unavoidable. It
was one of those unfortunate occurrences incident to a business of
stances

as

this

kind; and, the law being that every employee must take the risk
accidents, the plaintiff was not entitled to a recovery.” And it was held by the court that, taking into eonsideration the emergency in which, under the evidence the
plaintiff and his coemployee were acting when the
latter, by applying the brake, caused the injury to the former, neither of them was
guilty of negligence, and it satisfactorily appears that the crushing
of the plaintiff’s hand was simply one of those unfortunate accidents incident to a business of this kind.
Cited, 111/317.
332. Contracts exempting the master in certain cases void.
In Bishop, 50/465, the rule was declared
that, as between employer
and employee, the latter in the contract of
hiring may assume all risks
appertaining to the service, save such as arise from criminal negligence.
The case was followed and the
principle applied in Strong and Hendricks, 52/461, 467; Galloway, 57/512; and Cook, 72/48. Those
cases were reviewed and
affirmed, except so far as they were modified
by the Act of 1876 as to railroad employees, in Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills v. Wilson, 89/318.
That case was determined in the year
and hazard of such

1892, and in it, it was held that the rule that, as between employer
employee, the latter in the contract of hiring may assume all
risks appertaining to the service, save such as arise from criminal
negligence, was declared in the case of Bishop, 50/465 (decided by a
full bench in 1872). This case was followed and
applied in Strong
and Hendricks, supra. It was also recognized, as
authority
in 1876, in Galloway, supra, and again in 1883, in
Cook, supra.
The acquiescence of the legislature in the principle for so
long a
time is strong, if not decisive, evidence of the public
policy of this
State touching the question, more especially as legislative attention
must have been called to the subject when the Act of 1876,
Code,

and

§4586 (b), was passed, which deals with criminal negligence of railemployees, but forbears to interfere with the prior law as to
employees, or as to employers generally. Under these circum-

road
other

stances, this court,

on

a

review of the above-mentioned cases, dethe contrary, affirms the same in so far

dines to overrule them, but, on
as

they

are

unmodified by the statute just cited touching railroad

em-
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ployees.

The

cases

of Beatie, 66/438, and Gann, 68/350, relate to

contracts, not between employer and employee, but between common
carrier and consignor, and consequently do not overrule or in any way
affect the cases now under review.
Construing the contract now in

question in the light of the contract adjudicated upon in Bishop,
supra, the terms, “He further agrees that he will take upon himself
all risks connected with or incident to the employment, and will in
no case hold the company liable for any injury or damage, to his per■son or otherwise, he may sustain while thus employed, whether it
arises from explosion, or the machinery, or accident, or the negligence or misconduct of himself or any other person employed by the
company, or from any other cause,” were intended by the parties to
cover all negligence, including that of the employer in failing to
keep the machinery in safe condition, and in omitting to have it
properly inspected to ascertain its condition.
By the Act of 1895, which has become section 2613 of the Civil Code,
it is declared that,
in consideration of

“All contracts between master and servant, made

employment, whereby the master is exempted from
liability to the servant arising from the negligence of the master or
his servants, as such liability is now fixed by law, shall be null and
void, as against public policy.”

CHAPTER 19.
STREET-RAILWAYS.
.333.

Street-railways

are carriers of passengers
are bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence.
Doctrine applies to the carrier’s agents
on
its parallel lines.
Presumption is against the company
when the injury is shown.
Boarding the car.
Standing on the platform.
Alighting from the cai.
Injury by a jerk in alighting.
Safe place and time for alighting.
Ropes, guards, or gates on the side
next to a parallel track.
Inexperienced minor killed on a parallel

and

534.
335.

336.
337.
33d.
339.
340.
341.

342.

346. Evidence that plaintiff thought
torman would stop the car.

347. Collision between

348.
349.

Jumping from the car.
344. Diligence at crossings.
345. Plaintiff’s want of diligence.

333. Street-railways are carriers
■exercise extraordinary diligence.
In

mo-

years.
350. As to the duty of a conductor to observe the track in front of the car.
351. Company must exercise care to save
the life of one known to be in peril.
352. Sick people entitled to be treated as

such.
353. Evidence

as to company’s diligence generally, not admitted.
rejected when ten-

track.
343.

the

dummy-engine and
the wagon of another in which plaintiff was riding.
Injuries to children.
Care
due
to
a
trespasser of tender
a

354. Rare genuine coin
dered for fare.
355. Rule of the road.
356. Lawful to run cars

of

passengers

on

and

the Sabbath day.

are

bound to

Holly, 61/215, the declaration alleged that the plaintiff was a

of the defendant's street-ears; that two men got to
fighting thereon; that she attempted to get off the cars and in doing
passenger on one
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caught in the door of the ear by the persons fighting and was
badly hurt by being mashed and bruised; that the defendant was
negligent in failing to provide any conductor to preserve order on
the car, and that the driver was negligent in failing to suppress the
fight or to eject the combatants, or otherwise to come to her assistance or interfere to preserve order.
On demurrer it was held that
street-railroad companies are carriers of passengers, and as such, are
bound to extraordinary diligence, and liable for negligence of their
agents and employees in and about such carriage; and when passengers are injured by riotous fighting among other passengers it is
for the jury to say, under all the facts, whether the company was
negligent in not providing a suitable conductor to preserve order,
or whether the person in charge of the car as driver was negligent in
the preservation of order thereon, and the safe carriage of the passengers to the place of destination. And Jackson, J., said: “It is
true there may be a difference between railroads on which ears are
propelled by steam across the country, and those street-railroads in
cities; but both are carriers of passengers, and liable for slight neglect,
or the absence of
extraordinary diligence. And this duty to their
passengers, of earing for their safe and comfortable conveyance from
point to point, is the same.” Cited, 76/317.
A carrier of passengers, whether by street-cars drawn by horses
through the streets of a city, or by ears propelled by steam from
city to city, is bound to use extraordinary diligence; and where one
is hurt by reason of its carriage, the presumption is always against
the carrier. Findley, 76/311. Cited, 98/654.
334. Doctrine applies to the carrier’s agents on its parallel lines.
In Bates, 103/333, the plaintiff alleged that he was knocked down
by one of defendant’s cars as he stepped from the rear platform of
another of its cars, upon which he was a passenger and which had
stopped for the purpose of letting him off, the ear that struck him
being upon a parallel track and approaching from an opposite diso was

rection.

It

was

held that the relation of

common

carrier and pas-

senger exists between a street-railroad company and a passenger until he has reached his destination, and has had a reasonable opportunity
to

alight safely from the car; and the carrier, during this period, is
extraordinary diligence, on behalf of itself and its agents,
to protect the life and person of the passenger.
This doctrine of extraordinary diligence is not only applicable to the agents of the carrier on the car on which the passenger is traveling, but also to its
bound to
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agents having control of another car, approaching on’ a parallel
track, after the latter have discovered that the former car was about
to stop for the purpose of discharging passengers, who might alight
dangerously near such parallel track. Lewis, J., said: “There issome
apparent conflict in the authorities as to whether the relation
of

common

the

watch-out, and to

carrier and passenger

exists after the passenger has
alighted from the car, and before he has had opportunity of passingover and beyond a parallel track of the company’s line, but certainly
the relation exists while the passenger is in the act qf alighting.
When this injury occurred, therefore, the defendant company was
under a legal obligation to use extraordinary diligence to protect thelife and person of the plaintiff. We know of no rule of law that
would necessarily restrict this doctrine to the agents of the company
having in charge the particular car upon which the plaintiff had
taken passage. The rule of the company introduced in evidence
in this case required the motorman on the approaching car to be on
so

have his

car

under control

as

to prevent any

injury, not only to foot-passengers who might be crossing the street,,
but to defendant’s passengers who might be disembarking from the
car that had stopped at the public crossing for this purpose.
To the
ordinary traveler upon foot, the motorman was bound to exercise only
ordinary care and diligence; to the defendant’s passengers, he wasbound to use extraordinary care and diligence. Especially is this
the case when the motorman knew, or had reason to believe, that
passengers were about to alight from the car that had stopped, and
that they might alight dangerously near the track upon which hewas running.”
335. Presumption against the company when the injury is shown.
The presumption being that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by
the negligence of the defendant company, and it having failed toshow affirmatively that it was in all respects diligent, and no error
of law having been committed, this court will not overrule the discretion of the trial judge in refusing to grant a new trial. Simmons, C. J., said:
“The presumption against a railroad company
where an injury is shown to have been occasioned by the running of'
its cars, applies as well to street-railroad companies as to others.
Carson, 98/652. When the injury is shown, the presumption is
against the company. Findley, 74/311; Carson, 98/654.”
336. Boarding the car.
In White, 92/494, it was ruled that it is not per se negligence for
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a

person, with something in each hand, to board or attempt to board
electric street-car while it is in the act of stopping to receive pas-

an

sengers,

and before it has

come

to

a

full stop.

Such boarding

or

may or may not be negligence, according to circumstances.
In this case the circumstances were not so decisive as to dispense with

attempt
a

jury.

an

The court erred in granting

umbrella in
337.

one

Standing

There

hand and

on

a

a

nonsuit.

The plaintiff had

handkerchief in the other.

the platform.

short, steep curve in the defendant’s street-railroad.
In passing it the driver of the car put whip to the horses drawing it,
so as to enable them to mount the
steep curve with the loaded car,
which was done so suddenly as to throw the plaintiff off the platform
of the car, where he was standing. The car was full of passengers,
some standing on the platform; the plaintiff was
standing there when
was

a

the conductor received his fare.

It

ruled that

standing on the
platform of a street-railroad car, in the absence of notice to the contrary, is not such negligence on the part of the plaintiff as to prevent
his recovery for damages sustained by reason of the negligent conduct of the employees of the railroad company. Renz, 55/126.
338. Alighting from the car.
If a passenger on a street-car signaled the driver to stop for her
to get off by ringing the bell or giving any other signal which the
driver recognized, and if he stopped the car for her to get off, but
did not stop long enough to give her a reasonable opportunity to do
so, and she was thereby injured, the company was negligent.
This
was a question of fact for the
jury, and they had the right to believe
the testimony of the plaintiff in preference to that of other witnesses.
Randall, 79/304. This case, 85/297; 86/407.
Whether a person who attended a child in boarding a street-car on
a
particular occasion, for the purpose of placing upon the car small
packages which the child was to have in charge, had frequently before done the same thing at the same place when the same driver of.
the car was on duty, is admissible evidence as tending to show that
the person on this particular occasion intended to get off after depositing the packages, as she had done on the previous occasions, and
did not intend to remain on board so as to justify the driver in
starting the car suddenly while she ,was engaged in getting off. It
being the duty of the driver (there being no conductor) to take notice of all persons entering the car, his knowledge that the plaintiff
did enter it in this instance might be inferred; and, if he knew that
was
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she had withdrawn from the

car and alighted in numerous previous
circumstances, it could be inferred that he knew
or ought to have known that such was her intention on the occasion
in question. The court erred in excluding evidence of the previous
instances, and consequently in granting a nonsuit. Houston, 89/272.
339. Injured by a jerk in alighting.
In Walters, 95/519, it appeared from the evidence of the plaintiff,
who was a passenger upon an open electric car, that he signaled the
conductor to stop, that the speed of the car was greatly reduced, that
while it was yet in motion the plaintiff stepped out upon the run-

instances under like

ning-board, picked up his sample-case with his right hand, turned his
body a little outward from the car, let loose the upright support with
his left hand, and was just in the act of stepping off, when the conductor signaled the motorman to go forward, who obeyed, and the
car gave a sudden and violent jerk, by reason of which the plaintiff
was thrown to the ground and injured.
Under these facts it was
error to grant a nonsuit, as the jury might have found that the
plaintiff was not guilty of such negligence as would bar all right of
recovery. But for the signal to go forward, and the jerk, the judgment of nonsuit would have been affirmed.
In

suit, Mozeley, 79/463, against a street-railway company to rean injury alleged to have been received
by a passenger in
leaving a ear, it was error to charge as follows: “If the plaintiff signaled the driver to stop, and the driver did not stop so as to allow
the plaintiff reasonable opportunity to alight with safety, but the
driver only slackened his speed, and the plaintiff, to avoid being carried beyond his destination, and availing himself of what opportunity was afforded him to alight, endeavored to get'off the car while in
motion and was thrown by a sudden jerk of the car, the defendant
would be liable, provided you believe from the evidence that the
driver was negligent in not stopping the car altogether.” This
charge should have been qualified by saying, if the jury further believed that the plaintiff used all reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence to avoid the consequences of the defendant’s negligence to
himself.
Cited, 81/275; 83/446.
340. Safe place and time for alighting.
Although it is the duty of a street-car company to select a reasonably safe place for landing passengers wherever it may stop a car for
that purpose, yet, if the place be safe for a passenger to get off while
the car is at rest, the company is not responsible for any peril which
cover

a

for

■
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the passenger incurs, without its
after the stoppage has terminated

fault, from attempting to alight
and the car has been put in motion, provided a reasonable time for alighting was allowed while the
ear was at rest, and the conductor did not know that the particular
passenger intended to get off at that place, and did not see him attempting to get off in time to warn or prevent him from so doing
while the car was in motion. When a car stops because of an obstruction on the track, and not to afford any passenger an opportunity
for getting off, the company is not responsible for the safety of the
place as one for getting off, whether the car, at the time the passenger undertakes to do so, be in motion or at rest, the conductor not
seeing the passenger, or being aware of his purpose, at the time the
attempt to get off is made. This, however, would not justify the
company in negligently running over him, if, by accident, he failed
to gain a firm footing on alighting, but fell on a parallel track, exposing himself to danger on that track. Glover, 92/133.
Where a passenger was hurt in leaving a street-car, and his testimony showed that the car started before he completely left it, and
there being no conductor, the driver testified that he did not know
that the passenger was hurt at all, but that his habit was to stop till
all his passengers got off, and that he did so that night, and another
witness testified to hearing the exclamation of the passenger to the
effect that he was hurt, and on going to him, found him injured
where he attempted to alight, even more than slight neglect was
shown. There being no conductor, it was the business of the driver
to see that his passenger safely landed before he started, after stopping to let him land. Findley, 76/311.
341. Ropes, guards or gates on the side next to a parallel track.
Where it was alleged by the plaintiff in his petition that "the defendant, well knowing that it was dangerous to allow passengers to
alight from a car on the side next to that from which another car was
approaching, nevertheless took no steps to prevent passengers from
alighting,” it was not error to admit testimony showing that the defendant had placed no ropes, guards, or other protection to prevent
passengers from alighting on that side of its car next to said parallel
track; the question as to whether such omission amounted to negligence being left entirely to the jury.
Bates, 103/333.
In Glover, .92/132, it was held that an electric-railway company
which has provided its cars with gates to prevent passengers from
alighting on the side next to a parallel track can not defend itself
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against the charge of negligence in not keeping one of the gates
closed, by the evidence of its president “as to observations he had
made in reference to electric street-ear lines, cable-car lines, and
other street-car lines operating on double tracks, that he had made
recently in various cities of the United States in reference to the use
of gates on the cars, and to show that gates are not used.” Bleckley,
J., said: “The negligence charged as to gates was in not having the
gate of this particular car closed on the side next to the parallel track.
We think what the president of the company would have testified as
to his observations

cities

on

other double-track lines of street-cars in various

relevant, and was consequently properly rejected. Two
reasons against the admissibility of this evidence occur to us.
The
first is that the practice of other lines would not serve for comparison on the question of diligence unless it was shown that these
lines were properly equipped and managed, or were so recognized and
reputed to be by experts in the business; the other is that it was not
stated whether the other lines had gates to their cars or not, but
only that gates were not used. If the lines examined by the president were without gates to their cars, their practice in not using
gates would throw no light on the diligence of a company which, like
the defendant, has provided gates, but omits to use them.” Although
there may be no negligence whatever in the failure of an electric
street-railway company to have gates to the platform of its cars, for
was

not

the purpose

of guarding against accidents to passengers by preventing them from leaving the cars on the side next to a parallel track of
the same company, in the street, yet when a particular company has
such gates to the platforms of its cars, not to keep them closed may
or may not be negligence in the given instance, and this is a question
of fact for the jury. Bleckley, C. J., said: “There may be no
negligence whatever in failing to have gates, for the very highest
order of equipment may be dispensed with, provided the equipment is
sufficient to come up to the standard of extraordinary diligence. This
standard may be reached short of the very best or the superlative
of the attainable.
But, when a company has provided gates, due
diligence might require it to use them, and failure to use them might
be negligence in the given instance. Whether it would be or not is a
question of fact for the jury. There was no error in so treating it;
and this is so, irrespective of the particular object which the company
had in view in procuring the gates, or of its own practice in their use.
A hackman might put brakes on his hack for use in descending moun-
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only, and might restrict the use by his own practice to the
making of such descents; but, having them upon his vehicle, it might
bs negligence not to use them on proper occasions, in descending ordinary hills as well as mountains. Extraordinary diligence may require the carrier to use what he has, though it would not require him
to have as much as he has provided.”
342. Inexperienced minor killed on a parallel track.
In Glover, 92/132, a mother sued for the homicide of a minor
son.
The declaration alleged that he resided in the country and
had never before ridden on an electric car. He got off the car, at
which moment another of defendant’s cars, running on a parallel
tains

held that the fact that the
upon an electric car was
the purpose, at least, of illustrating the
cause of his failure to alight from the car in safety.
Bleckley, C.
J., said: “The evidence was admissible, not for the purpose of
changing or affecting the measure of the company's diligence, but
as a fact tending to illustrate the cause of his failure to
alight in
safety. The jury in looking at the facts and circumstances of the
homicide would naturally desire to classify the particular passenger,
not alone by his age, but also by his experience or the want of it
in handling himself on electric cars. Familiarity with this mode of
transportation would qualify him to see and appreciate danger which
he would not be likely to observe if he was wholly without experience.
With experience he might be chargeable with fault; without
it, with none. And hence in the one case his failure to come off
safely might be' attributable to his own negligence, in part or in
whole, whereas, in the other case, he might be treated as free from
any negligence whatever. It may be that the evidence might have
other bearings, but it has this, at least.”
343. Jumping from the car.
It is gross negligence in a passenger on a street-railway to jump'
from the car when it is going at a speed of twenty miles an hour,
whether he knows or does not know that the car is going so fast.
That the city ordinance restricted the speed of the car to seven miles
an hour would make no difference.
The presence of the conductor,
and his silence on hearing another passenger tell the plaintiff that
the car was not going to stop, and he had better get off, will not
justify him in jumping from the car and causing his own injuryMasterson, 88/436.
track,

ran over

and killed him.

passenger killed had never
admissible in evidence, for

It

was

before ridden
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The

plaintiff showing by his own evidence that although he had
requested the driver of the street-car to stop at a designated place,
and had received a rude and profane answer, yet, upon failure of the
driver to stop, plaintiff had jumped from the car while it was in motion, and without again requesting the driver to stop, or notifying
him of his purpose then to alight, and it not appearing that the driver,
when he struck the team, knew that the plaintiff was attempting to
alight, or that there was any such emergency as would justify the
plaintiff in alighting from the moving car, the court committed no
error in granting a nonsuit.
Outen, 94/662.
344. Diligence at crossings.
In charging the jury upon negligence, the court should not enumerate acts or omissions which are wholly outside of any degree of diligence which the law requires. An electric-railway company is under
no duty to stop its cars before reaching the
crossings of public highways for the purpose of looking and listening by the motormen, or
to enable them to look and listen, when there is no apparent reason
for so doing. Simmons, J., said: “These companies are chartered
for the benefit of the public.
The public require rapid transit, and
if a motorman driving one of these cars were compelled to stop and
look and listen for the approach of every wagon or buggy likely to
cross the railway-line, the
public would be greatly inconvenienced,
and rapid transit would be rendered impracticable. The cars of this
railway company had the superior right of way, and people who intend to
to avoid

cross

its track should be careful to look and listen in order

collision with them.

It is the duty of the motorman also
approaching a public crossing, in order to
avoid a collision with persons crossing, and due diligence would
probably require him to ring his bell, or give some signal of his approaeh to the crossing, to put persons about to cross upon notice of
his approach; but we do not think the law requires him to stop the
car for that
purpose, unless he sees that a collision can not be avoided
unless he does stop.
On this subject, see Booth, St. Ry. Law, §304
et seq., and cases cited; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, ‘Crossings/ p. 951,
par. 44, and note.” Beasley, 94/142.
There being evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the defendant’s motorman, after seeing that there might be a collision
with the wagon in which the plaintiff and his driver were riding,
negligently approached the crossing without having his car under
complete control, and also in finding that there was some negligence
a

to look and listen when
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part of the plaintiff or his driver in going upon the crossing,
that, after getting upon the same, they could not then, by the
exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the consequences of the defendant’s negligence, and the recovery being manifestly for a less
on

the

but

amount than that to which the

plaintiff would have been entitled had
was chargeable, the verdict, after
its approval by the trial judge, will not be disturbed. Bryan, 94/632.
A rule of the defendant company requiring, its motormen to keep
their cars under full control on approaching all street-crossings, and
when there is a car standing at a crossing, taking on or letting off
passengers, or if they see that they are about to meet a car on a streetcrossing, to slow up and see that the track is clear before attempting
to pass, was admissible in evidence, as tending to show that the company regarded such a point on its line, when being approached by
one of its cars, as more or less dangerous to passengers and others.
Bates, 103/333.
345. Plaintiff’s want of diligence.
In McGrath, 93/312, which was a suit to recover damages caused by
a collision between a wagon and a street-ear, it was held that, the evidence showing that, in approaching the point at which the injury
occurred, the driver of the wagon was engaged in the violation of a
city ordinance by driving at a prohibited speed, and the circumstances
being such as that if this violation had not occurred the negligence
of the defendant would not have produced the injury if ordinary diligence had been observed by the driver, there was no error in granting
there been

a

no

fault with which he

nonsuit.
In

Cain, 97/298, the plaintiff was injured by an electric car. The
negligence alleged was that the car was operated by a motorman
alone, who was making change for passengers, and neglecting his
duties as motorman, and that no signal was given of the
approach of
the car until it was too close to the plaintiff for him to escape. It
appeared that the plaintiff .stepped upon the track and stood there
until the car struck him. He had time, after he saw the car
coming,
to have stepped out of its way. It was held that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff showing clearly that, even if the defendant was
negligent at all, the plaintiff, after his negligence began, might, by
the exercise of ordinary care, easily have avoided
being injured, he
was not entitled to recover.
The court was therefore right in granting a nonsuit.

•

346.Evidence
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that

plaintiff thought the motorman would stop the

car.

The

plaintiff having testified that there was nothing to hinder the
seeing him, and that there was nothing between the

motorman from

motorman and the witness and his

cart, there

was no error

in allow-

ing him to state he thought or supposed the motorman would stop
the ear, this testimony illustrating and explaining the conduct of the
plaintiff in managing his horse upon the occasion under investigation.
Beauchamp, 93/6.
347. Collision between a dummy-engine and wagon of another in
which plaintiff was riding.
In Powell, 89/601, it appeared that the plaintiff was invited by
Stewart to ride in a wagon that he was driving. The horse took
fright at one of the defendant’s dummy-engines, and became uncontrollable. A collision occurred between the engine and the wagon.
The plaintiff sprang from the wagon, but before she struck the ground,
the collision occurred, and she was caught between the engine and
wagon, and injured. It was held that if the plaintiff herself was
free from negligence, and her injury was due to the concurrent negligence of the railroad company and the person with whom she was
riding in a wagon, he not being her servant, and it not appearing that
she was the owner of the horse or wagon, or that she had any agency
or concern in procuring or in driving the same, and nothing appearing which tends to show that she was aware of any incompetency in
the driver, the company is liable'to her for all the damages consequent upon the injury, and can take no credit as to any part thereof
on account of the contributory negligence of the driver of the wagon.
348. Injuries to children.
The case Perry, 101/400, was brought to recover damages for injuries to a child six years old, caused by running an electric car over
it.
It was held that in an action against a street-railroad company
by a minor to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by being fun over by a moving car, when it appeared by the evidence for
the plaintiff that there was a pile of lumber in the street on one side
of and near the railroad-track, not placed there by the defendant, behind which the plaintiff and other boys were playing, and as the car
approached the end of such pile of lumber the plaintiff suddenly ran
on the track immediately in front of or against the front part of the
moving car, and was struck and injured, and when it further appeared
by the same evidence that the line of track, in the approach to and
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place where the accident occurred, was open to the view of the
from obstruction, that the car was not being run
at a reckless and unusual rate of speed, and that the plaintiff could
not have been seen from the car until he came on or within thirty
inches of the track, and that as soon as plaintiff came on or near the
track the brakes were applied and every effort made to stop the car,
it was not error to grant a nonsuit. It affirmatively appearing that
the motorman could not have seen the plaintiff in the street before
he appeared on or near the track or knew he was there, and there being no proof that such place was used by children in playing, or that
there was anything to put the motorman on notice that persons were
accustomed to be behind the pile of lumber, or that on this particular
occasion children were in fact playing about and behind the same,
his failure to sound the gong on approaching such pile of lumber was
not negligent relatively to one who ran out suddenly in front of a moving car or against it, so as to authorize the latter to recover for injuries so sustained, when no negligence on the part of the motorman is
shown in his efforts to stop the car and prevent the injuries when the
person first came on or near the track, but, on the contrary, it affirmatively appeared that the brakes were promptly applied and the
car
stopped as soon as possible. This is true, even though the
person injured be a minor of tender years. Little, J., said: “It is
undoubtedly the duty of the motorman, in propelling a car through
the public streets, to notice the presence of other vehicles and
peat the

motorman and free

destrians ahead of his car, and at all times be watchful to
the way is clear; and where he has reason to

see

that

apprehend danger, or
should in the exercise of ordinary care become
cognizant of danger,
he should regulate the speed of his car so that it
may be quickly
stopped should occasion require it. Humbird v. Railway Co. (Mo.
Sup.) 19 S. W. 69. If a person be seen upon the track, who is apparently capable of taking care of himself, the motorman may assume

that he will leave the track before the

car reaches
him, and
long as the danger of injuring
him does not become imminent, but no
longer, But he can not act
upon that presumption with reference to a child too
young to appreciate its danger. The
degree of diligence required is proportionate
to the duty
imposed, and the degree of negligence imputed corresponds
to the degree of
diligence exacted. If, to a reasonable mind, viewed,
not from results, but from the situation
and surroundings as they existed at the time of the act which
produced the injurious effects,

this

presumption

may

be indulged

so
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there whs no impending danger, no diligence could be exacted.
'Ordinary care’ is a relative term, the standard of which increases or
diminishes accordingly as the danger is greater or less. If the happening of an event is beyond human anticipation, no one would be negligent in failing to take precautions against that event. Accordingly,
if a child suddenly and unexpectedly appear in the vicinity of a railroad-track, under such circumstances that, by the exercise of proper
caution and attention, the motorman could not have discovered his
presence in time to avert an accident, the company will not be liable.”
In Wynn, 91/344, it was held that whether a boy eleven years of
age has sufficient capacity to understand and appreciate the danger of
riding in an unsafe and hazardous position on a street-car, and
could, by the exercise of that degree of care and diligence'to be expected of a boy of his years and experience, have avoided an injury
to himself while thus exposed to peril, occasioned by the too rapid
driving of the car around a curve, is a question for the determination
of the jury, under proper instructions from the court.
349. Care due to a trespasser of tender years.
Where a boy eleven years of age, without the intention of paying
fare, but with the purpose of stealing a ride, boards a passing street-

and secretes himself from observation so as to avoid detection,
law, a mere trespasser, unless his presence on the car be aetually known, and assented to, either directly or by implication, by
car,

he is, in

the driver

conductor.

Assent to the

boy’s riding upon the car free
by implication from the mere fact that the driver discovered him, knew of his presence, and made no demand upon him
for fare; the driver being charged simply with the duty of properly
managing his team, and neither required nor authorized to collect
the fares, or attend to the wants of passengers — a conductor having
been provided by the street-railway company for these purposes.
While the degree of care which a street-railway company owes to a
trespasser upon its cars is not more than ordinary or reasonable diligence, yet, where such trespasser is a child of tender years, due regard should be paid to the known indiscretion of childhood, and the
inability of children to exercise proper precautions for their own
safety. The duty resting upon the company to employ the proper
precautions to avoid injury to children entering its ears would comprehend the exercise of reasonable diligence to guard and shield from
danger a child not of the age of discretion to understand and appreor

will not arise
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peril of riding in an unsafe and exposed position. Accordingly, it would generally be negligence to allow such a child to ride
upon the steps of the front platform, when his presence in a situation thus exposed to danger is actually known, or the circumstances
are such as would make failure to note his peril palpable neglect and
inattention to duty on the part of those having the control and management of the car. Lumpkin, J., said: “It is proper to add, howciate the

ever,

that the rule herein announced should be construed in its fair

and

legitimate sense, and applied wisely and justly. It can not be required of a driver or conductor that he shall maintain a constant and
unremitting watch over the movements of a child upon his car, and
devote to such child his entire attention, to the exclusion of other
and equally pressing and important duties devolving upon him.
Booth, St. Ry. Law, §351. All that can or should be expected of the
company’s servants is that they shall exercise that degree of diligence
which would be observed by a reasonably prudent and cautious man
under similar circumstances.
Standford v. Railroad Co., 136 Pa. St.
92, 20 Atl. Rep. 799. In all cases wherein it has appeared that neglect of duty in this respect was unquestionably palpable and inexcusable the railroad company has been held liable. Moore, infra;.
Railway Co. v. Caldwell, 74 Pa. St. 421; Brennan v. Railroad Co.,
45 Conn. 284; Wilton.v. Railroad Co., 107 Mass. 108;
Railway
Co. v. Bohn, 27 Mich. 503. The opinion in the case last cited
was delivered
by Justice Cooley, the now eminent text-book writer,
and is an able and comprehensive exposition of the law
upon the subject with which we are now dealing. But care has been taken that
this rule should not operate harshly or oppressively, and where the
company has introduced proof of special facts and circumstances explaining .and justifying the omission of its servants to warn and compel a heedless little one to occupy a place secure from danger, the
courts have uniformly afforded to the
company ample protection
against unjust and unauthorized verdicts. Railroad Co. v. Kelly
(Pa. Sup.), 11 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 123; Clutzbeher v. Railway
Co. (Pa. Sup.) 1 Atl. Rep. 597; Butler v. Railway Co., 139 Pa. St.
195, 21 Atl. Rep. 500; Wrasse v. Traction Co. (Pa. Sup.) 23 Atl.
Rep. 345.” Wynn, 91/344.
In Moore, 83/453, a child nine years of age was injured by a streetcar.
The driver left the plaintiff and a negro boy on the front platform and went inside and sat down to eat his breakfast.

The negro
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pushed plaintiff off, or he fell off, and was hurt. It was held that it
negligence for the driver needlessly to withdraw from the front
platform, leaving the plaintiff and another boy thereon, and it was
negligence not to be there ready to stop the team when the plaintiff
fell or was thrown by the other boy off the platform upon the track
in front of the car, the two boys engaging in a scramble to drive the
horse, the reins having been left within their reach. Cited, 91/353.
350. As to the duty of a conductor to observe the track in front of
was

the

car.

It does not
ductor of

a

and that

follow,

matter of law, that it is the duty of a con-

as a

street-railroad

car

to observe the track in front of the

on either side.
In the absence of any proof showing that he w’as under any obligation of this kind, it was error for the court to instruct the jury that
such was his duty, and a failure in its discharge would be negligence.
car

portion of

a

street contiguous to the track

Holms, 103/655.
351.

Company must exercise care to save the life of one known to
peril.
In Walker, 113/725, the following charge was held to be correct:
“Even if the deceased might have been negligent at the time he
stepped upon this track, still such negligence would not prevent a recovery by his widow in this case, if, after the deceased was put in a
situation of peril and danger by being caught under the machinery
be in

of the car, if he was so
have saved his life by the

caught, the defendant’s motorman could
exercise of ordinary care. If one is put
in imminent peril of life, even though that peril is brought about
by his own negligence, if his presence is known to the railroad company, and if by the use of ordinary care his life could have been
saved, the company is bound to use that care; and if it does not use
such care, and injury ensues, the company would be liable.
If a person is in a situation of imminent
peril upon a railroad-track, a failure of the agents of the railroad
company to exercise all ordinary
and reasonable care to save the life of the person in danger, if his
danger was known to such agent, would be such gross negligence as to
amount to willfulness, and would entitle the plaintiff to recover.
If
you believe that the first force of the collision between the deceased
and the car was the cause of the death of the
deceased, then you
would not inquire into the question as to whether his
being dragged
as alleged in the declaration was
negligence on the part of the defend-

CHAPTER 19.

§§ 352 - 354 ]

[ 440

Street-railways.

find that Mr. Walker's death was caused by
by the car, and before said dragging comonly inquiry would be as to whether, in the event lead-

If you
the first blow stricken
ant company.

meneed,

your

ing up to the collision, Mr. Walker himself was in the exercise of
ordinary care and diligence, or whether the collision was an unavoidable accident, for which nobody was to blame. In this aspect of
the case, if you find that the negligence of Mr. Walker, if there was
any negligence, was not the sole and real cause of injury, and that
by the exercise of ordinary care he could not have avoided the collision, and that the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care, then the
defendant would be liable.”

352. Sick

people entitled to be treated as such.
Hardage, 93/457, was for wrongful expulsion from
a car.
It was held that it appearing that the conductor of defendant’s car was informed that the plaintiff and her child were sick when
they boarded the car, there was no error in allowing the plaintiff to
testify that she took the car because of the sickness of herself and
child, or that her husband desired her to take the car for this reason.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “Surely, it was competent for her to testify
that she took the car because of the sickness of herself and child, or
The suit of

that for this
was a

reason

her husband desired her to take the

fact that she and her child

were

car.

If it

sick, and the conductor knew

it, why should this not go before the jury? If they were sick people,
they were entitled to be treated as such, the conductor knowing of
their condition.

It is true that whether the sickness constituted the

motive for

going by the cars or not was of little consequence, but it
was not
wholly irrelevant, inasmuch as it served to account for the
plaintiff’s presence on the car, and her relation to the company as a
passenger.”
353. Evidence as to company’s diligence generally, rejected.
In Randall, 85/297, it was held that testimony of the president
of the defendant corporation as to the degree of care exercised before
the injury in the selection of drivers for its horse-cars was not material to the question whether the driver was
negligent at the time of
the injury.
The defendant was not charged with employing incompetent men, but that the driver was negligent at the particular time
in question.
354. Rare genuine coin rejected when tendered for fare.
A

genuine silver coin of the United States, distinguishable

as

such,
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though somewhat rare, and different in appearance from other coins
of this government, of like denomination and of later dates, is nevertheless a legal tender for car-fare, and a passenger ejected for refusal to make payment otherwise than by tendering such a coin is entitled to an action for damages. See Railroad Co. v. Morgan, 18 Atl.
904, 52 N. J. Law, 60. That the conductor declined to receive a
coin of this character because he, in good faith, believed it was a
counterfeit will not relieve the railroad company from liability.
Keeny, 99/266.
355. Rule of the road.
In Walker, 93/462, it was held that “the rule of the road” in this
State requires travelers with vehicles, when meeting, to each turn to
the right. One may, from motives of courtesy, or for other reasons,
waive his right to have another observe this rule, hut is not bound to
■do so. The fact that one does waive this right, and in so doing drives
into a dangerous place in the highway, and is thereby injured, affords
no excuse to a wrong-doer who caused the dangerous
place to exist,
and will not prevent a recovery against the wrong-doer by the person
so injured, if free from negligence and otherwise entitled to recover.
Bleckley, C. .T., said: “That rule exists for the benefit of travelers,
and not for the behoof of one who has wrongfully caused a bad condition of the road or street. The wrong-doer has no right to say fhat
Hf you had not waived, in favor of another traveler, the place which
was your due, the other
might have been hurt, but you certainly
would not.’
Such a waiver, whether from courtesy or for any other
reason, was not negligence on the part of the plaintiff, relatively to
the defendant, and could not prevent him from recovering, if he was
otherwise free from negligence. The rule which requires travelers,
on meeting, to pass to the right,
applies between traveler and traveler,
that is, between those who use the road, and not between them and
those

charged with making the road or keeping it in repair.”
Lawful to run cave on the Sabbath day.
In view of the dependence of the people for travel, in the cities
where street-railroads have been established, by that mode of conveyance in going to church, visiting the sick, etc., the court declined to
hold that the running of street-railroads was not the work of necessity
as contemplated by the Code
(§4579), nor that it was unlawful to
run them on the Sabbath day.
Renz, 55/126.
356.
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357.

Recovery for homicide.
By the Act of 1850 in all cases where death ensued under circumstances which would have entitled the

sued, to

an

deceased, if death had not

en-

action against the perpetrator of the injury, the legal rep-

resentative of the deceased

was

allowed to maintain

an

action

against

the persons committing the act, one half of the recovery to be paid to
the wife and children, or the husband, of the deceased, in case of the
estate

being insolvent. Cobb, 476. The case of Paulk, 24/356, was
brought under that act by an administratrix. It was held that railroad companies were embraced under the terms
“perpetrators of the
injury” and “persons committing the act.” The case of Kinney,
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28/111, was also under that act and was by a mother for
of her minor son. It was held that she was entitled to

the killing
sue

as

his

“legal representative” and in no other right, and as such represenshe was only entitled to sue if the circumstances were such,
that they would have entitled him to have sued had the injury
stopped short of killing him. The Act of 1856 provided that if one
should be killed by the carelessness, negligence or improper conduct
of a railroad company, its officers, agents or employees, by the running of its cars or engines, the right of action to recover damages
should vest in his widow, if any, if no widow, in his children, if any,
and if no child, in his legal representative.
The Code of 1863, section.
2920, gave the right of action to recover for the homicide of the husband or parent, to the widow, or if no widow, to the child or children. By the Act of 1878 the plaintiff, whether widow or child or
children, was allowed to recover the full value of the life of the deceased as shown by the evidence. Thus the law stood until the passage of the Act of 1887. It is codified in sections 3828 and 3829
of the Civil Code, and they are as follows:
358. The statute. A widow, or, if no widow, a child or children,,
may recover for the homicide of the husband or parent; and if suit
be brought by the widow or children, and the former or one of the
latter dies pending the action, the same shall survive in the first case
to the children, and in the latter to the surviving child or children.
The husband may recover for the homicide of his wife, and if sheleaves child or children surviving, said husband and children shall
sue jointly, and not separately, with the right to recover the full value
of the life of the deceased, as shown by the evidence, and with the
right of survivorship as to said suit if either die pending the action.
A mother, or, if no mother, a father, may recover for the homicide
of a child, minor or sui juris, upon whom she or he is dependent, or
who contributes to his or her support, unless said child leave a wife,,
tative

husband

or

child.

Said mother

or

father shall be entitled to

the full value of the life of said child.

Civil

recover

Code, §3828.
Definition of terms in preceding section. The word “homicide,”
used in fhe preceding section, shall be held to include all cases where
the death of a human being results from a crime or from criminal
or
other negligence. The plaintiff whether widow or child or
children, may recover the full value of the life of the deceased, as
shown by the evidence. In the event of a recovery by the widow she
shall hold the amount recovered subject to the law of descents, as-
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if it had been

personal property descending to the widow and childeceased, and no recovery had under the provisions
■of this section shall be subject to any debt or liability of any character
of the deceased husband, or parent. The full value of the life of the
deceased, as shown by the evidence, is the full value of the life of the
■deceased without deduction for necessary or other personal expenses
•dren from the

of the deceased had he lived.

Civil Code, §3829.
principles embraced in the two sections may be stated in this

The

form:
In all

where the death of

human

being results from a crime,
negligence, a right of action to recover
•damages for the homicide shall exist as herein prescribed.
1. A widow, or, if no widow, a child or children, may recover for
■or

cases

from criminal

or

a

other

the homicide of the husband

or

parent.

If suit be

brought by the widow, and she should die pending
the action, the action shall survive to the children. If suit
should be brought by the children, and one of them dies
pending the action, the action shall survive to the surviving
child

or

children.

The amount which may

be recovered by the widow shall be held
by her subject to the law of descents, as if it had been personal property descending to the widow and children from
the deceased.

The amount recovered for the

homicide, whether the

had

recovery

by the widow or the children, shall not be subject to
debt or liability of the deceased husband or parent.

be

any

2. The husband may recover for the homicide of his wife.
If the wife leaves a child or children
surviving, the husband

and children shall

sue

right of survivorship

as

jointly, and not separately, with the
to the suit, if either die pending the

action.
3. A

mother,

if no mother, a father, may recover for the homichild, minor or sui juris, upon whom she or he is
dependent and who contributes to her or his support, unless
said child leaves a wife, husband or child.
In all actions herein authorized, the
plaintiff may recover the
full value of the life of the deceased, as shown
by the evidence,
without deduction for necessary or other personal
expenses
cide of

4.

or,

a

of the deceased had he

or

she lived.
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359. Statute construed

strictly.
always been so construed as not to extend the
right by implication to others than those named. At common law
tihe death of a human being could not be complained of as injury
This statute has

in

a

civil court.

In

Wynn, 42/331, the remedy was denied to the husband for the
homicide of his wife, because he did not have it by common law, and
it was not given to him by statute at that date.
Cited, 70/683.
The same ruling was made in Womack, 80/132, but
that if the wife had lived any length of time after the

it was held
injury, the
husband might have recovered for the loss of her services during
that time, and for any expense he might have incurred in her treatment.

A mother could not

recover

for the homicide of her minor

son..

father for the homicide of his minor daughter.
McDonald, 60/320. Nor could a legal representative recover at a
time when such right was not given by the statute. Miller, 55/143.
Under the word “parent” it was held that minor children could
recover for the homicide of the mother.
Venable, 65/55. But not
when the father was living. Scott, 77/450.
In Mott, 70/680, the right of action was denied to an adult son
because the statute was construed to embrace only such children as
were entitled to a support from the deceased.
Cited, 75/780. Nor
has a child the right to recover for the homicide of its stepfather.
Marshall, 103/725.
360. Construction of former acts.
Chick, 57/356.

Nor

a

Prior to the Act of 1887 it

applied to all natural
result of intention

was

the settled construction that this law

or artificial persons, when the
criminal negligence, and that

homicide

was

the

the term “homicide” in the statute meant a case of felonious intent in the killing or
such criminal negligence as constituted an ingredient in the offense
of involuntary manslaughter.
Cottingham v. Weeks, 56/201; Daly
v.
Stoddard, 66/145; McDonald v. The Eagle & Phenix Mfg. Co.,
68/839; Roach, 70/434; Rankin v. Merchants & Miners Trans. Co.,
73/230; Allen v. Augusta Factory, 82/76.
361. Degree of mental conviction required.
In a civil action against the master for damages for a willful or
reckless homicide committed by his servant, it is not requisite that any
element of the case should be established with such certainty as to
leave no reasonable doubt upon the minds of the jury. Barnett,
94/447.

or
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362. The

killing must have been wrongful.
action sounding in tort, and not an action ex contractu,
determining whether the railroad company is liable, the re-

This is
but in

an

lation of the deceased to the

railroad, whether as an employee, or
stranger, are essential elements in deciding whether the
killing was wrongful. The right to sue depends upon the wrongfulness of the killing, and if the killing occurred under such circumstances as by the laws of the place of the killing, or by a legal contract
between the parties, the railroad company was not guilty of any
breach of duty to the deceased, the right of action does not accrue.
It must appear that the killing was wrongful, that is, that the defendant in such killing was guilty of a breach of duty, express or implied, which was due to the deceased, and if there was no such breach
there can be no recovery. Strong, 52/461.
Cited, 70/439; 72/139;
111/589.
For the unlawful, willful homicide of a husband, whether it he
murder or only voluntary manslaughter, his widow may recover
■damages. If committed in resisting a battery, and the deceased was
the assailant, these facts, with the attendant circumstances, will go
in mitigation of the amount. Weeks v. Cottingham, 58/559.
363. Conduct of deceased enters into the case as if he was the
plaintiff.
An action brought to recover damages for a homicide can only be
maintained when the circumstances are such that they would have
entitled the deceased to have sued, had the injury stopped short of
killing him. The nature of his conduct enters as much into the
case as if he himself was the
plaintiff, and consequently if he was
culpable, the damages in case of a passenger or stranger, if any,
should not be as large as if he had been free from fault. Kinney, 28/111.
Cited, 70/222.
A widow may recover for the homicide of her husband; she will
have a right of action whenever the husband, had he lived, would
have had such right, and whatever would have been a good defense to
his suit had he lived will be equally available against one brought
by her. If the husband, by ordinary care, would have avoided the
consequences to himself, even when caused by defendant’s negligence,
passenger, or

he would not have been entitled to
ceased in this
common

evinced

a

recover.

The conduct of the de-

total want of that

would take of himself, and is

care

which

a man

of

nothing short of gross
He voluntarily got drunk — placed himself in a situation

sense

negligence.

case
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of
an

peril, without the intervention of the railroad
embankment into

one

of their cuts and

was

company, fell over
killed. Under these

was not liable, and a nonsuit was right.
Berry,
72/137. Cited, 74/613; 84/785; 108/508; 111/589.
The principle which allows a defendant, when sued by the widow
for the homicide of her husband, to set up any defense which would
have prevented or lessened the husband’s recovery, had he not died,
was very
clearly recognized in Johnson, 38/409; Ayers, 53/12. In
both of those eases it was held, not only that the contributory negligence of the husband would reduce the amount of the recovery the wife
might have been entitled to had he not been negligent, but if the husband could have avoided the consequences to himself, caused by the
negligence of the defendant, by the exercise of ordinary diligence on
his part, there was no right to any recovery.
Hendricks, 52/467.
Cited, 60/668; 71/441; 101/221; 111/589.
The suit Pittman, 73/325, was brought by a widow against the
Georgia Railroad to recover damages for the homicide of her husband. The deceased was employed by the W. & A. Railroad to look
after freight delivered to the Georgia Railroad, and to take down a

facts, the railroad
"

memorandum of the numbers and seals of the
somewhat

cars.

The numbers

high on the sides of the cars, and the ground was
slightly depressed between the tracks, there being several tracks running about that point. They were about four feet apart. It was
common to step back on another track, if vacant, get the numbers of
the cars, and then go up and examine the seals. While doing this deceased was run over by the defendant’s train and killed. The engine
that caused the injury was engaged in shifting cars. It went up
one track and came backing down another at a speed of about two
and one-half or three miles an hour. When it had gone about fifteen
or twenty feet the fireman looked over the tender and saw deceased
making entries in his book and standing on the track with his back
partly turned towards the engine, at a distance of about two and onehalf car lengths.
The fireman shouted, “Look out,” two or three
times, and seeing that it did not seem to draw deceased’s attention,
stepped back and pulled the bell-rope, ringing the bell. He then
went to the other side of the engine to see if deceased had left the
track, and not seeing him, returned to his position and found that
he had been hurt.
The engineer did not slacken the speed of the
engine when the fireman hallooed and rang the bell, but any one
would have had time to leave the track after the bell rang, if he had
were

CHAPTER 20.

§ 863 ]

t 44&

Homicide.

paid attention to it.

There were steam-brakes on the engine by
stopped in five or six feet at the speed at
There was a conductor whose duty it was to

which it could have been
which it

was

running.

the train. He was not with the engine at the time of the
injury, but gave instructions to the train-hand as was very often done.
One of defendant’s witnesses testified that he was engaged on
behalf of the Georgia Railroad in the same position as deceased for
the other road, and was at work with him just before the accident;
that deceased was drunk and he urged him to come out from between
the tracks, and took hold of his arm and tried to urge him out, but deceased pulled away saying that he could take care of himself. The evidence as to deceased’s being drunk was conflicting. The doctrine of
contributory negligence was applied, and there was a recovery by the
plaintiff. Jackson, C. J., said: “The verdict is supported by sufficient
evidence to uphold it, supported as it is by the presiding judge. The
conductor was absent and unaccounted for.
The engineer failed to
stop the train when the fireman cried out, “Look out,” and jerked the
make up

bell.

length

The brakeman did not tell him

the track, a car

which was backing upon him, and thus
he was negligent of human life. The agent and servant of the railroad left deceased, who was killed soon after, drunk, as he thought,
without warning the engineer that he was in danger, though he did
warn deceased.
If drunk, he should have been the more diligent in
letting the engineer know of his being in danger; if sober, he should
have told that he was there, and in danger. More especially was this
his duty, as he was helping the deceased in business in which both
were engaged, the servants of their
respective companies. Therefore the presumption of negligence, so far from being rebutted, was.
strengthened by the evidence. That there was contributory negligenee on the part of deceased appears.
Yet he was on duty and in
the line of his employment by the railroad, and on the track where
he should have been, and there is nothing going to show that he
saw or knew of the
approach of the train. The strongest cireumstances against him is the effort that the servant of the
Georgia
Railroad made, according to his testimony, to get him
away, and the
warning he gave that the train would come back on that track; but
it was for the jury to scrutinize his
testimony, and give it the credit
they thought it entitled to, and his testimony about the drunkenness
of the deceased really is subject to doubt, and contradicted
by other
witnesses, and casts a shadow on all he said on the stand.” Cited,
or

two before the

a man was on

ear
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89/278. In Smith, 82/805, in considering the subject of the injured
person’s failure to shun the consequences of the other’s negligence;
Bleckley, C. J., says: “In all the cases cited there were complicated
facts, or else some explanation either furnished or suggested by the
evidence which might serve to account in whole or in part for the
apparent failure by the party injured to protect himself — something
from which the jury might by probability infer that the attention
was naturally and justifiably withdrawn for the moment from the
danger or the cause of danger. The case of Pittman was one in
which the injured person was engaged in the performance of duties
as an
employee, duties calculated more or less to divert his attention
from the cause of danger.”
In Kinney, 28/111, the suit was brought to
recover. damages for
the killing of the plaintiff’s son, a minor, while a passenger on the
cars.
The car ran off the track and that was prima facie evidence of
negligence in some of the persons connected with the road. The
minor was on the platform; he was told by the conductor that it
was a place of danger, that he was violating a rule of the road, and
that he must come inside the car. That he disregarded and was
killed; whilst another young man who was with him heeded it, went
inside the car, and escaped unhurt. As his legal representative was
only entitled to sue if the circumstances were such that they would
have entitled him to sue had the injury stopped short of killing him,
the nature of his conduct entered

as

much into the

case

as

if he

himself had been the

party plaintiff and it was held that the damages
large as if he had been free from fault. This decision was rendered prior to the adoption of the Code.
364. The widow's right vests at the death of husband.
The right to sue for the homicide of the husband vests in the
widow at the death of her husband, and is not divested by the subsequent marriage of the widow, nor will a subsequent marriage
change the measure of damages to which she was entitled when her
right of action accrued. Garr, 57/277. Cited, 67/700. Nor will
the fact that he and she were living in a state of separation at the
time of his death change the measure of damages. Bond, 111/13.
Nor should the amount be reduced by any insurance on his life received by her. Meigs, 74/857.
365. Number of children, that widow worked in the field, and more
prosperous condition of the family, immaterial.
In Rouse, 77/393, 80/442, it was held that in a suit by a wife
should not be

29

as

.
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for the homicide of her
mot in

issue,

nor

husband, the number of minor children is
is their support. Cited, 85/528; 82/590. And

the fact that the widow worked in the field for
■death is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue

a

livelihood after his

trial, and should
to the jury as evidence. Moore, 61/151. In
dhe trial of an action by a widow for the homicide of her husband
while confined in a chain-gang, it was not error to reject evidence
•offered by the defendant to the effect “that the plaintiff was, to
mot therefore

on

go

well or better provided for now than before dechain-gang; that she and her children were then
•constantly in rags, and in destitute condition; that deceased, before
‘he went to defendant’s chain-gang, was constantly in criminal scrapes,
•often in jail under other criminal charges, and, when out, was at
work to defray expenses of defending himself against such charges.”
Simmons, C. J., said: “We think this testimony was properly ex•eluded. The plaintiff was entitled to recover the gross value of her
husband’s life, without regard to whether she had previously received
anything from him or not, and without regard to what his personal
■expenses may have been. The more prosperous condition of his
family after his death was clearly irrelevant.” Boswell v. Barnhart,
36/521. Cited, 102/161; 111/15.
all appearances, as
•ceased went to the

ACTIONS BY WIDOWS OP STRANGERS TO THE COMPANY..

366.

Negligence of the deceased.
Seats, 86/811, it was held that under the plain provisions of
•our statutes, a widow can not recover damages from a railroad company for the killing of her husband when it appears that, by ordinary care, he could have avoided the killing, and that his death was
•caused by his own negligence.
It plainly appearing from the evidence that the plaintiff’s hus■band met his death because of a total disregard of his own
safety,
and that, by the exercise of even slight care, he might have avoided
the catastrophe which resulted in his death, the judgment of nonsuit
was right.
Lee, 97/311; Sawyer, 112/346.
In Johnson, 60/667, a widow sued for the death of her husband.
He, at the time he was killed, was lying upon the railroad-track
where it was crossed by a public road. He
could, by the exercising
■of ordinary care, have avoided the defendant’s
negligence, assuming
that the defendant was negligent in not
blowing its whistle at the
proper time at the crossing of the public road and checking up the
In
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train, and consequently a verdict in his favor was contrary to law.
Cited, 64/479; 70/229; 71/440; 72/139; 74/612; 101/221.
One knowingly and needlessly walking at night upon a railroadtrack can, by the use of ordinary diligence, avoid being run over
by
a train, unless it
appears that owing to some special fact or eircuinstance, the use of such diligence would prove ineffectual. Wilds,
82/667. Cited, 102/290.
367. Killed at a place that was used by the public as a passway.
In Dowdy, 88/726, it appeared that the husband of the plaintiff
was run over and killed
by one of defendant’s engines. It was in
daylight, at a place that had been used by the public as a passway for
thirty years.. He stepped upon the track, and walked upon it about
thirty feet before the engine struck him. It was held that the evidence showing that the plaintiff’s husband could, by the exercise of
ordinary care, have avoided being killed by the engine, she is not entitled to recover for his homicide, even though the defendant’s engineer may have been in some degree negligent, and the court did
not err in granting a nonsuit.
Bleckley, C. J., dissenting.
In White, 83/595, the plaintiff sued for damages for the homicide
of her husband. He was killed by a passenger-train, while walking
along the track of defendant’s railroad. The train was ten or fifteen
minutes behind its schedule time; it had passed beyond the corporate limits of Atlanta and of West End, and was running, at the
rate of twenty-five to thirty miles an hour; White was walking upon
the railroad-track, going in the same direction the train was going;
there was a public road alongside the track, on which he could have
walked; the engineer could have seen him some four hundred yards;
the danger-signal was given, exactly at what time before the killing
does not appear; there were two colored girls on the track also, between the engine and White, who heard the train and left the track,
and hallooed at White that the train was coming, but he failed to
leave the track, and was run over and killed.
The trial judge
granted a nonsuit. Simmons, J., said: “It is quite apparent to us,
and doubtless would have been to the jury if the case had been submitted to them, that White could have avoided this injury to himself
by the exercise of ordinary care, and that it was gross negligence
on his part to walk along this track as he did, giving no heed to the
signals given by the train, or warning given him by the girls. Nor
is this view of the law changed by the fact that it had been the custom for White and other people to walk along this track, or by the
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fact that the train

was

behind the schedule time.

It does not follow

from the fact that

people use the track in this way, which use is
known to, and thereby licensed by, the company, that the company is
bound to the exercise of extraordinary care and diligence to protect
persons thus using the same.
If the use of the track by pedestrians,
with the knowledge of the company, amounts to a license-at all, it
must be on the condition that persons so using the same shall exer-

cise

ordinary diligence themselves, so as to avoid being injured by
company’s trains. In all such cases as this, if it appears from
the evidence submitted by the plaintiff that the person injured did
not exercise ordinary diligence to avoid the consequences of the company’s negligence, and that he could have avoided it by the exercise
of such diligence, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and a nonsuit is proper.”
Cited, 92/93; 95/362.
'
In Melver, 108/306, the plaintiff sued for the death of her husband, and from the evidence it appears that, in the evening, after
dark, Melver was walking along the defendant’s track in the town of
Cordele, near the corporate limits, and going southward in the direction of his home, which was in the main part of the town, when a
regular passenger-train, due there at or about that time, struck him
from behind and killed him.
This part of the track was in constant
use by the public as a pathway, and, at a point variously estimati d
at from forty to a hundred and ten feet north of where the train
struck the deceased, was crossed by a road which was much used,
but which, according to some of the evidence, had not been established as a public road; and north of this crossing was another, near
which was a blow-post; but the whistle of the locomotive was not
blown at the blow-post, nor at any point between it and where the collision occurred.
The blow-post was within the corporate limits of
the town, and the blowing of locomotive whistles within these limits
was prohibited by a municipal ordinance.
There was evidence that
the train was running at the rate of about forty miles an hour, and
without a headlight, and that the bell on the locomotive was not rung
nor the speed of the train checked before the deceased was struck;
but as to these matters the evidence was conflicting. It was ruled that,
apparently, the preponderance of the evidence in this case required a
finding that the defendant was not guilty of any negligence; but
even upon the contrary assumption, the verdict in the
plaintiff’s favor was not warranted, for it plainly and
affirmatively appeared that
the person for whose homicide the action was brought could by the
the
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exercise of

ordinary diligence have avoided the collision by which his
Though very deaf, and though he had been
specially warned of the danger to which, on account of his infirmity
in this respect, he exposed himself in going upon the track of a railway company, he voluntarily went upon the defendant’s track at a
time when he must have known that a train was approaching; and
the undisputed facts point irresistibly to the conclusion that he neglected to take any precaution whatever for his safety. That the
place on the track where he was killed was constantly used by the publie as a pathway furnished no excuse for the failure of the deceased
to exercise that degree of care which the law requires of all persons
death

was

in such

a

occasioned.

situation and under like circumstances.

368. Deceased went with
In

a

small hoy upon a

Leach, 91/419, the plaintiff sued for the

trestle and

was

killed.

homicide of her hus-

held that where a person who was killed because
of his own gross negligence not only exposed himself by going upon
a high trestle over which the railroad-track passed, but incumbered
himself with a small boy, exposing him also, if such person could
have saved himself after discovering his danger from an approaching
train, had he not been so incumbered, and his care for the boy was
the chief reason why he did not succeed in protecting himself, he "was
nevertheless chargeable with ordinary care for his own safety, irrespective of the presence of the boy. The case stands as if he (the
deceased) had been upon the trestle alone, since it can not be an excuse for him, as against the railroad company, that he neglected his
own safety to preserve the boy, with the care of whom he had voluntarily incumbered himself. Lumpkin, J., said: “Whatever may be
the law with reference to the liability of a railroad company for injuring or killing one who exposes himself to risk and danger by attempting to rescue another in a perilous situation which he had nothing to do with bringing about, certainly when one .directly and by
his own negligence causes the peril to exist, and because of it exposes
himself to danger, he has, as against the company, no excuse for so
doing. If so, it would be, in a certain sense, allowing him to take
advantage of his own wrong. Under the facts of this case, the plainband, and it

tiff

was

his

own

was

not entitled to
utter want of

recover.

and

Her husband’s death

was

due to

prudence in going there incumbered
with the boy, and in failing to take the requisite steps to save himself after the danger from the train became imminent, and opportunity to escape was still at hand.” Cited, 93/390; 112/36.
care
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In

May, 80/363, it was held as follows: The action being for the
negligent killing of the plaintiff’s husband by running a locomotive
against him and throwing him from the track, while he was passing
over or along a trestle forming part of defendant’s railway, and the
evidence for the plaintiff bearing on the question of negligence being
that, as soon as the train, which was a fast mail, rounded a curve
so

to command

as

than

view of the

trestle, which

was

somewhat less

mile

distant, the whistle was blown and the airapplied, but it was impossible to stop the train in so short

one

brakes
a

fourth of

a
a

distance; that from the

curve

to the trestle, and for two

or

three

hundred

yards beyond, the track was straight; that upon a straight
track a man can be seen at a long distance, but not so as to tell
whether he is on the trestle or another part of the track, though at a
short distance this is easy to distinguish; that the trestle was eight
or ten feet high, a clear stream eight or ten feet wide and four or five
feet deep beneath it, and where no water a sand-bed, soft sand, a safe
place to jump, but in some parts overgrown with briers, and some
cane coming up through the sand; that for people to cross this trestie was an every-day practice, but not when trains were coming; that
the deceased was acquainted with the neighborhood, in the habit of
being at a village near the trestle, and probably knew the railroad
schedule; that the train was behind time — one witness said very
little, another that it might have been an hour or half an hour; that
the speed was at the rate of forty miles, when the schedule rate was
thirty-six miles per hour; and that deceased was a young and healthy
laboring man; held, that there was no error in granting a nonsuit.
Any fair and reasonable construction of the evidence makes it more
clear that the deceased was grossly negligent than that the defendant was negligent at all.
It would be impossible for the jury rightly
to infer both that there was negligence by the defendant, and that
the deceased could not have avoided the consequences thereof by the
exercise of ordinary diligence; and hence any recovery by the plaintiff
is not within the range of legal possibility.
Cited, 83/597.
369. Presumption relied on and it was rebutted.
In Adgate, 108/781, it was ruled that the plaintiffs depended for
a
recovery exclusively upon a presumption of negligence raised by
law against the defendant company. This presumption was fully rebutted by uncontradicted evidence, and the evidence as a whole
showed that the homicide for which the action was brought resulted
either from the failure of the decedent to exercise ordinary care and
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diligence,
for the

or

from

an

accident the nature of which is not clearly disthere could be no lawful verdict

Under these circumstances,

closed.

plaintiffs, and the court did not err in directing the jury to

find for the defendant.

Presumption not rebutted.
Strom, 108/758, it was held that as the evidence authorized a
finding that the deceased was killed by the running and operation
370.
In

of the defendant’s train of

cars, a

presumption of negligence

on

the

part of the railroad company arose under the statute, and it was
therefore, on the trial of an action brought to recover damages for
the homicide, erroneous to grant a nonsuit, there being no evidence
showing that the deceased failed to exercise the proper diligence, or
to rebut the

legal presumption against the defendant.
»
being evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the homfcide, for which the plaintiffs were legally entitled to sue, was caused
by the running of the defendant’s train, this evidence, in connection
with the legal presumption of negligence against the company imposed by section 2321 of the Code, was sufficient to carry the ease
to the jury, unless that presumption was fully rebutted by other evidence. The defendant having introduced no evidence at all, and it
not appearing from the evidence for the plaintiffs that this presumption was in all respects completely rebutted, it was error to grant a
nonsuit.
Gammage, 97/62.
371. Where company employs an insane agent.
In an action brought to recover damages for the homicide of the
plaintiff’s husband by an agent of the company and it was alleged
that he was subject to disease and aberration of mind, and that the
There

employed him knowing that fact, it was held that while, as
general rule, any mental disease or infirmity which would excuse
the agent from criminal responsibility would also excuse the company from civil responsibility, this would not be available if the
company employed the agent, and assigned him to duty, with knowledge of his insane condition, or of his being subject to sudden fits of
insanity. Their employment of an improper person to come in contact with the public as their agent would be gross misconduct.
Christian, 79/460. Cited, 86/314.
372. The company is liable whether its agents causing the injury
are engaged in
running trains or not.
Section 2321 of the Code renders railroad companies liable for
damages done by any person in their employment and service unless
company
a

CHAPTER 20.

§ 373 ]

[ 456

Homicide.

their

agents have exercised all ordinary care and diligence, whether

engaged in running trains, etc., or not. And thereis liable fn damages for the wrongful homicide of its customer, committed by its depot-agent in his office, whilst
the customer was lawfully there for the transaction of business with
such agent appertaining to his agency. But 'if, while so engaged,
upon account of some private feud previously existing or suddenly
arising, wholly disconnected with his duties as such employee, and not
pertaining to the business then in process of transaction (the company then not owing to the other person the duty of personal protec-

such persons are

fore,

a

railroad

company

tion), as in the case of a
ney, he commit injury

before the completion of his jouranother, the company
would not be liable.
the present case being
whether the agent of the company wrongfully slew the husband of
the plaintiff, and, if so, whether it was done while he was engaged in
the transaction of the company’s business, in the line of his duty,
because of differences arising in the settlement thereof, or whether
he committed the homicide because of a personal grievance wholly
passenger

upon the person of
The turning-point in

disconnected with the business then in hand, it was error for the
court to

charge generally, and without qualification, as follows: “If
believe from the testimony that Dixon was not justifiable in taking the life of Christian, then I charge you that the plaintiff would
be entitled to recover for whatever
damages the evidence shows she
has sustained by reason of the death of her husband.” If the homicide be wrongful, whether the offense be properly classed as manslaughter or murder would not be material; but, if the agent was justified in its commission, no liability would arise against the
company,
whether the act was committed by him while engaged in the business
of the company, in the line of his duty, or otherwise.
Christian,
79/460; 86/314; 97/56. Cited, 101/35.
373. Questions for the jury.
In a suit by a widow for the homicide of her husband
by a railroad, the question of the defendant’s negligence, or whether the deceased could have avoided the consequences to himself of defendant’s
negligence by the use of ordinary diligence, or how far the deceased
contributed to the injury by his own neglect, are questions alone for
the jury. Lavier, 71/222; 73/794; 75/611.
In this case two verdicts, for the same amount and based on the
same facts, were rendered.
The presiding judge granted a second
new trial on the
ground that the verdict was excessive. It was held

you
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that that

was error;
matters for the jury,

that questions of contributory negligence are

and after two verdicts for the

same

amount

and based upon the same facts, the judge should not have interfered
with the finding, there being enough evidence to justify it, and no
of law

complained of in the rulings of the court on the trial.
Cleveland, 73/793.
In Ramsey, 110/266, it was held that whether the husband of the
plaintiff was killed on the street-crossing or on the track of the railroad away from the crossing were questions of fact, as were also the
questions of negligence on the part of the defendant, and whether
the deceased could have avoided the negligence of the defendant by
the exercise of ordinary care.
There was evidence which authorized
the jury to find that the defendant was negligent in the operation of
the train, and that the deceased was struck and killed at a public
street-crossing; and therefore the rule which governs the liability of
a railroad company to a trespasser on its track is not necessarily involved, as the jury might have legally returned a verdict against the
defendant on the other theory in the case. A new trial was properly
error

refused.
ACTIONS BY WIDOWS OF EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY.

374. What must he shown to authorize
In

suit

a

recovery.

widow against a railroad company for the homicide
of her husband, who was an engineer in its employment, two things
are necessary to a recovery: First, absence of negligence on his part
contributing to the occasion or cause of his death; and, second, negligence on the part of the company or some other agent or employee.
a

by

a

When it is shown that the deceased

was without fault, the presumpnegligence on the part of the road arises. It may, however,
be rebutted by proof. If neither the company nor the employees
were negligent, there can be no recovery.
Jackson, J., says: “It is
for the jury to say on the whole case made by all the proof that plaintiff’s husband is without fault, and that the company is at fault; and
they must say that both things are true before the plaintiff can recover.” Roach, 64/635.
Cited, 83/674. See this ease again, 70/434.
It was not error to charge that the burden was on the plaintiff to

tion of

show that her husband
in fault.

In

was

without fault

or

that the defendant

was

Prather, 80/427.

Maloy, 77/238, it was held that “the doctrine of contributory

neg-

ligence does not apply in the case of ah injury sustained by an employee. He must be free from fault; and, if the injury is sustained
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by him in

consequence

of

any

in this

fault

or negligence on his part, he
the employee being dead, and the

can

not recover, and

suit

being by the parent to recover damages for the killing of a minor
she can not recover unless if he were in life he could recover. She

son,

stands in

no

ease,

better condition than the deceased would have stood in

had he not been killed and

was

present before the court.”

Cited,

111/589.
In

Smith, 97/777, Callaway, J., says: “It is well-established law in
that, in order to recover damages from a railroad com-

this State

for the homicide of an employee, it must be shown that the
employee was without fault or negligence, and that he did nothing
to contribute to the homicide and neglected to do nothing to prevent the consequences of the negligence of others.”
Marsh, an employee of the company^ was run over and killed by a
train while he was engaged in uncoupling the ears. His wife sued
the company for the homicide, and it was ruled that to make a railroad company responsible for the homicide of an employee by the
negligence of coemployees, it is essential that the deceased should
have been free from fault himself; and when the evidence for the
plaintiff shows clearly that he was not, there can be no recovery, and
a
judgment of nonsuit should be affirmed. Bleckley, J., said:
“Whatever created the danger, it was as visible to him then as it
could now possibly be made to a jury. He saw that the train did
not stop for him to uncouple; and he nevertheless rushed in and
tried to uncouple when the cars were in rapid motion; the evidencemakes a case of contributory negligence; and any negligence whatpany

by the deceased employee bars recovery.”
Cited, 63/183.

ever

Marsh,

56/274.

In

Nash, 81/580, the plaintiff sued to recover damages for the
husband, and Simmons, J., said: “It is alleged aserror that the court permitted the plaintiff, after she had announced
her testimony closed, and after the defendant had introduced all of
its evidence, to introduce the testimony of several witnesses, all of
said testimony being in support of the main case made by the plaintiff on the first examination of witnesses, and not in any sense in
homicide of her

rebuttal of the evidence of the defendant.
this

court,

Under the decisions of

employee who sues a railroad company for injuries, after proving the injury, can recover on
proof of either of ,two facts
After proving the injury, if he proves that he was free from negligence, he can recover; or if, after he proves the injury, he proves
an
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that the servants

or

agents of the

sumes

negligent, he can
the law then preburden is shifted
not negligent, or to show that

company were

If he proves that he was not negligent,
that the company was negligent, and the

recover.

upon the company to show that it was
the plaintiff was negligent. Proof of

either of these facts by the

will prevent a recovery by the plaintiff. In this case, the
plaintiff proved the death of her husband, and that he was not negligent, and relied upon that proof for her recovery. The defendant
replied by its evidence, but did not attempt to show that the plaintiff’s husband was in any way negligent when he was killed, and
rested its defense upon the ground that it was not negligent. We
think that in this kind of a case the plaintiff had a right to reply
to the defendant’s testimony, and to show that it was not true.
The
plaintiff would have been entitled to recover on the proof submitted
in her opening evidence. The case was fully made out when she
closed her testimony. She was not put on notice, by the plea of the
.defendant, what its defense was. When, therefore, the defendant
did not attack the proof on which she relied to recover, but set up
as its defense that it exercised due
diligence, and was not negligent,
she was entitled to reply to that theory of the case by additional testimony; and the court committed no error in allowing her to do so.
Besides, it is always within the discretion of the court to allow additional testimony, and it has been so held by this court from its earliest decisions.” Cited, 97/769.
375. Employee failed to display a danger-signal.
In Kitchens, 83/83, it was held that an employee of a railroad
company being himself at fault, and thus contributing to his death,
his widow can not recover. And Bleckley, C. J., said: “The verdiet was clearly contrary to law and evidence, inasmuch as the homicide resulted from the failure of the plaintiff’s husband to observe a
rule of the road requiring him to display a signal when at work under
a ear.. According to the evidence, if this signal had been put out,
there is every probability that the calamity would not have happened.
Employees can not be permitted to violate the rules of the service in
which they are engaged, and thereby create a cause of action in favor
of themselves or their widows. Indirect suicide gives no title to postcompany

mortem reward.”

376.

Engineer killed while running in violation of rules.
case arising under section 2323, was Cannon, 35/105.
Cannon was an engineer and was killed in a collision of trains. He
The first
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higher speed than the rules of the road allowed.
speed put him at a sharp curve, and if he had observed
the rule as to speed, the collision would not have occurred at that
place and might not have occurred at all; a quarter of a mile short of
•that place the trains might have been seen by those upon them in time
to have prevented the accident, though still further on in that direction the collision might have been worse. It was ruled that his
widow could not recover for his loss of life, if by his own fault he
•was

running at

a

That rate of

•contributed to the accident that caused his death.

Cited, 53/15;

55/482; 63/183; 76/531.
Where the

undisputed evidence showed that an engineer of a railviolated its rules furnished for his government in respect to passing switches and turnouts, and in respect to the speed
at which trains should be run, and the precautions to be used by engineers to prevent collisions, and that a collision was occasioned in
whole, or at least in large part, from his negligence in this regard,
and that such collision caused his death, a
recovery by his widow
-against the railroad for his homicide was contrary to law and unsupported by the evidence, whether or not there was also negligence on
the part of the company’s employees on the other train with which the
•collision occurred. Folks, 76/527.
According to the undisputed facts, the plaintiff's husband was
guilty of negligence in running his train in violation of the rules of
the company, of which he had knowledge, and which he had
agreed,
upon entering its employment, to obey.
For this reason, and because
■of errors committed by the court, there should be a new
trial; and if,
upon the next hearing, the evidence is substantially the same, there
road company

should be

a

verdict for the defendant.

377. When

contradictory signals

are

Kane, 92/187.
given to an engineer he should

■stop.
Where

locomotive-engineer is warned, by a signal of danger
ahead, not to proceed with his train, and immediately thereafter
another signal is given, which indicated that he might proceed with
safety, but both signals are continuously displayed together, so as to
leave it in doubt which signal should be regarded,-it is negligence for
the engineer to go on with his train; and if he does so, and a collision
•ensues, in which he loses his life, his widow can not recover from the
eompany for his homicide, thus occasioned; the law being that if an
•employee is guilty of any negligence, contributing to an injury to
himself, he can not recover, if the injury does not result in his death,
a
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or, if it does so result, that no right of action accrues to his widow.
Bleckley, C. J., dissenting. Devine, 89/541.
If there was negligence on the part of the railroad company in leaving a portion of its track in such condition as to render coupling
cars unsafe at that
point, yet, as it affirmatively appeared from the
plaintiff’s evidence, which was the only evidence showing how and
when her husband was killed, that this negligence, if it existed, did
not cause or contribute to his death, and the evidence as a whole
showing that in all other respects the company was free from negligence, the verdict was unwarranted, and therefore contrary to law.
Atkinson, J., dissenting. Esslinger, 95/734. This case again,
99/327.
378. Killed by being knocked from a car by a bridge.
The case Stirk, 79/495, was brought to recover for the homicide
of the plaintiff’s husband. A nonsuit was granted.
Stirk was an
employee of the railroad as a train-hand. At Smithville, while the
ears were en route, a car belonging to the Green Line
Company was

introduced into the train.

It

was a

different kind of

car

from those

ordinarily used by the Central Railroad, and was higher. As the
was approaching Cuthbert, the conductor’s line, which reached
from the cab to the engine, became entangled, and Stirk was ordered
to go forward and release it.
He went forward as directed, and while
on top of the Green Line car the car passed under a bridge, and he
was knocked off by the bridge and killed.
Bleckley, J., said: “Two
questions are made by the evidence. The first is, was the company
negligent in introducing into its train a car higher than the ordinary
cars of the company?
If its ordinary cars were ones upon the top
of which the employees, could stand without danger in passing under
this railroad-bridge, and if the company introduced into its train a
car higher than its ordinary cars, and gave no warning to its employees
of the condition of such car, then the jury might infer that the company was negligent therein, because of the increased hazard and
danger to its employees. Another question is whether or not the deceased could have avoided the consequences of the defendant’s negligence, if there was any, by the use.of ordinary diligence.
These were
questions for the jury. The evidence showed that at the time this
man was killed several persons attached to the train were looking in
his direction, and seemed to apprehend no danger to him, because they
gave him no notice or warning; and it is not probable that he himself
train
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anticipated danger. He had been accustomed to pass under the bridge
daily and knew its height. It was error to grant a nonsuit.”
In Day, 91/676, it was held that there being evidence tending to
show that the

plaintiff’s husband,

a

brakeman employed

upon one

of

freight-trains, was killed by being knocked from the top
by a low bridge over defendant’s road, and there also being
from which the jury might have inferred negligence on the

defendant’s
of

a car

evidence

part of the railroad company in failing
warnings of the approach of trains to the
ing from the testimony introduced by the
was himself guilty of any negligence, the

to keep in suitable order
bridge, and it not appearplaintiff that the deceased
motion for a nonsuit was
properly overruled, and the court rightly submitted to the jury
the determination of the questions of fact involved. In view of
the evidence above

in refusing to charge
railroad company by
one
alleged negligence of
others of its servants in the performance of an act with which the
servant was connected at the time of the injury, then the presumption of negligence was not against the company before the plaintiff
proved that the servant was without fault”; such request being inapplicable to the case presented. Lumpkin, J., said: “Certainly,
the request in question correctly states a well-known legal principle, but one which is not applicable to the facts of' this case.
That principle is that an employee who characterizes as negligent an
act in the performance of which he, as well as others of the company’s servants, was engaged, can not, without showing himself free
from fault, successfully rely upon any presumption of negligence by
the company as a basis of recovery. In other words, where two or
more
employees are engaged in the prosecution of a common enterprise, which results disastrously, the law will not do violence to
reason and
consistency by presuming one who may be injured thereby
free from fault, and at the same time
imputing negligence to his
fellow servants, who were engaged with him in the
performance of
the very act of which he complains. It is manifest, however, that
this rule has no applicability to the facts of the
present case. The
negligence complained of is that the company maintained a 'mantrap’ over its line of road, and signally failed in its duty to provide
proper warnings to those on its trains of approach thereto. This
was a duty
devolving solely upon the master, and was a matter with
which the plaintiff’s husband had no connection whatsoever.
His
the

stated, there

was no error

as follows: “In a suit against a
of its servants for injuries sustained by

jury
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sole

was to perform service to tlie company in the capacity of
If the company negligently failed to keep in proper condition and repair its signals of danger, this was negligence, in which

duty

brakeman.

the

plaintiff’s husband took no part, and with which he could in no
chargeable. Had he been a servant of the company,
whose duty it was to look after, and keep in repair, the telltales at
this bridge, an entirely different case would be presented.”
379. When an engineer should jump from his engine in an emer-

event be made

gency.

engineer having jumped from his engine and been killed, and
question being whether or not he was without fault, the necessity
for jumping, his ability to jump, and the safety with which he could
do so, are all for the consideration of the jury, and it was error for
the judge to charge that, “the fact that he jumped is proof that he
thought jumping was the safest course.” Jackson, J., says: “It is
hardly reasonable to say that an old man of sixty years of age could
safely jump when a young man of twenty might do so with ease and
safety. Moreover, a passenger might be justifiable in jumping from
a train, when an engineer would not be in abandoning his engine.
The passenger has only himself to care for; the engineer has lives
and property of others at stake. The first is unskilled in the running of cars and the imminence of the danger; the other should know
from experience of the risk of collisions from the distance between
trains in danger of colliding; and what would be no fault in the
passenger might be grave error in the officer of the company. All
these are matters for the jury to consider without let or hindrance or
intimations from the bench. We do not rule that the engineer must
never leave his engine; but he must be sure that an emergency is upon
him
imminent and impending — before it can be said that he is
without fault in doing so. In this case had he not left the engine,
he would now be alive.” Roach, 64/635.
Cited, 83/674.
Crosby, 74/737, was an action brought by the widow of an engineer
who was killed in a collision of trains.
Negligence was imputed to
him in that he did not quit his engine in time to avoid injury to himself. It was held that the trial judge did not commit error in charging
the jury to the effect, that if, in the emergency upon him, he believed
and had reason to believe, that in sanding the track, or otherwise
working the engine, he could prevent the collision and save life and
it was necessary to that end that he remain at his post in this moment of danger, then the widow could recover, but if it was not so
An
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necessary, and he knew it, or ought to have known it, then she could
not recover on this issue.
And, in respect to avoiding an injury from
the collision of a freight with a passenger train, by leaping from his

engine, the engineer on the freight-train should remain at his post
so long as his
presence on the engine may be of use to prevent the
catastrophe. Jackson, C. J., said: “In respect t<^ the issue of avoiding the catastrophe by leaping from the engine to save his life, we
all agree that at such a moment, in charge of such a train, in view
of passenger-cars in his front, full of human life, to remain at his
post in the hope of saving other lives would be an act of heroism so
exalted as to constrain approval from all human hearts, and that
courts, however cold and calm duty requires them to be in all cases,
should place themselves in the position of the engineer at the moment of such imminent danger, demanding such instantaneous decision and action, and should not scan closely the grounds of hope he
may have had to save others, though risking himself in the effort.
It is
the policy of the carriers, as well as that of the great public carried
rapidly by their trains, not to encourage the officer in charge of the
engine that moves those trains to abandon his post in the moment of
danger, but to reward the courage of remaining, if there be a hope,
however slight, of saving two trains from collision and wreck and
the lives of hundreds aboard. Whilst, if there be no shadow of hope
of averting disaster to others, the engineer should save himself; yet
on a hope however faint, for reasons, however
inconclusively establishing the soundness of his conclusion, that by risking his own life
he would probably save other lives, he should remain at his post; and
the act of heroism, though inoperative of good either to himself or
others in the particular case, should be regarded as martyrdom to
public policy, rather than want of precaution to save himself. No
man needs much encouragement to save his own life.
Self-preservation is the first law of nature.
It requires kinship to Christ to
die, or to risk death, to preserve the lives of others.” Cited, 83/674;
92/660.
In Roach, 64/635, the plaintiff’s husband was an engineer and
was killed
by jumping from a train when a collision was impending.
The collision was caused by the engineer on the train, next in front,
checking the speed of his engine at a curve. There was evidence in
regard to his being afflicted with epileptic fits, and as to whether the
company was chargeable with notice of it, and it was held that as to
his negligence, it did not depend on his incapacity, by reason of fits
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or

otherwise, to properly handle his train, but on whether, under the
surrounding him at the time of the injury,

facts and circumstances

he

negligent in stopping at the curve. Cited, 83/674.
an employee is at fault by leaving his place.
In Myers, 112/237, it appeared that the plaintiff’s husband was
front or head brakeman on the defendant’s freight-train; that as such
his place of duty was on top of the front cars of the train while it
was running between stations; that he had no duty to perform on
the engine, and while on it could not discharge any of the duties for
which he was employed; that he was killed while voluntarily riding
on the engine of the train upon which he was at work, while it was
running between stations; that his death was due to burns and scalds
from escaping steam, caused by the derailment and overturning of
the engine upon which he was riding; that no one on the train was injured by the derailment except those on the engine; that three of the
front cars were derailed, but maintained their upright positions.
There was evidence from which the jury could find that the derailment was caused by the negligence of the railroad company, and that
plaintiff’s husband and other front brakemen had been in the habit
of riding on the engine, and that he, at the time of the catastrophe,
was so doing with the knowledge of the conductor and engineer, and
that this was in pursuance of a custom known to the officials of the
company.
It was ruled that the widow of the employee of a railroad
company who .was killed by the derailment of a locomotive upon
which he was riding, and whose presence thereon was in violation of a
duty devolving upon him to be elsewhere, can not recover for the
homicide, even if the derailment was due to the negligence of the company. Under such circumstances, it could not properly be held that
the employee was free from fault directly contributing to his death.
That such employee and others of his class had been in the habit
of riding on the locomotive, and that he, at the time of the catastrowas

380. When

phe,

was so

doing, with the knowledge of the conductor and engi-

of a custom known to the offirender the above rule inapplicable, unthe deceased was on the locomotive in
obedience to some order which he was hound to obey, or in the discharge of some duty which it was incumbent upon him to perform.
And Fish, J., said:
“It is well settled that if one employed to work
at a designated place voluntarily goes to some other place, where he
has no duty to perform, he can not successfully insist that he is with-

neer,

and that this

was

in

pursuance

cials of the company, did not
less it further appeared that
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in the

protection of the rule that the master must exercise ordinary
protect him from injury. See 3 Elliott, R. R. §1303. Or,
as stated in 1 Shear. & R. Keg. §207:
‘A servant can not recover
for any injury which he would not have suffered if he had not voluntarily left his post of duty to take a position of greater danger,
even though his act may be well meant, and his object to continue
serving his master.
Where, according to the evidence, the ordinary duties of a conductor do not include the duty to couple and uncouple cars, except in
case of a pressing
emergency, and he is killed in performing such
service, in the absence of such emergency, he is not without fault, and
his widow can not recover damages from the company. Whether the
pressing emergency exists is a question of fact for the jury to determine. If the jury should find that the conductor believed in good
faith that such an emergency was upon him, and they should further
find that he had good reason so to believe, then the mere act of coupling or uncoupling, or attempting it, will not be outside of his duty
and make him to blame.
The emergency must be one that is not
brought about by the negligence of the conductor. He can not, by
his own negligence, create an emergency, and then be held justifiablein acting outside of his regular sphere on account of it. Therefore,
where it is alleged that the emergency was occasioned by the train
being behind time, it is incumbent upon the conductor, or those claiming through him, to make it clearly appear by evidence that the delay of the train was not caused by his fault or negligence.
The presumption is that it was his fault, because he is the master of the train
and all other employees are under his control. If the emergency was
upon him, or if in his judgment it was upon him, and a reasonable
man had a right so to judge from the facts, he would be at fault if he
acted recklessly or imprudently. Even if a pressing emergency were
upon him it was not his duty to do a reckless or imprudent thing.
Sears, 53/630. Cited, 55/281; 56/277; 59/436; 61/279; 63/183;
care

to

> »

106/798; 112/238.
Where, in an action for personal injuries, it appeared that plaintiff,
a freight conductor, was
injured while uncoupling cars, which was no
part of his duty, and contrary to the company’s rules, and that there
was no
pressing emergency for him to perform this duty at that time,
it is not error to grant a new trial on the
ground that the verdict is
contrary to an instruction to find for defendant unless the jury found
that there was a pressing emergency. Kane,
85/858.
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It appearing that the railway company negligently erected the
danger-signal post by placing it too near the track of the railway,
this fact must have been well known by the deceased engineer, the
plaintiff’s husband, and it also appearing by uncontradicted evidence
that he unnecessarily left his place upon the locomotive and exposed
himself to danger for the purpose of getting a view of a hot journal,
when he could have done so safely without leaving that place, his
death was caused, in part at least, by his own negligence, and his
widow was not entitled to a recovery from the company. Lumpkin,
J., said: “Granting that the post was erected too near the track, the

evidence establishes that this fact must have been known to the deceased.

He

over the road almost daily fors a considerable peThe post, as already stated, was near a bridge; and,
in view of all the evidence, it is almost impossible to conceive that
he was ignorant of the existence of the post, or unaware of the dis-

passed

riod of time.

Under these circumstances,

although
his duty to look after the journals under the tender,
informed as to their condition, we think he should
have exercised some care in selecting the place at which he would attempt to perform this duty. It would have involved only a few
seconds delay to wait till the post was passed; and common prudence, surely, would have suggested the propriety of first looking to
see whether there was anything which would render this attempt
perilous at the particular point on the line of the road which his train
was then passing.
Certainly, if he could get a view of the journal
without exposing himself to danger at all, he ought to have done so.
The evidence is clear that, without leaving his seat in the cab, and
without subjecting himself to any peril whatever, he might have seen
the hot journal fully as well as from the position he actually assumed.
To look at the journal from his seat would, it is true, have required a
slight inclination of his head outside of the window of the cab, but
not enough to bring his head in contact with the post, or in such
proximity to it as to be dangerous. Inasmuch, therefore, as there
was a way in which he could have performed his duty with respect to
the hot journal with absolute safety, and he disregarded the safe
method of so doing, and adopted another, which was in the highest
degree dangerous, he was certainly guilty of some contributory negligence; and, this being so, his widow had no right to recover from
the company.” Head, 92/723.
Cited, 111/713; 112/762.
tance it stood from the track.

it may have been
and keep himself
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In

a

suit

by

a

widow against

a

railroad for the homicide of her

husband, the evidence was as follows: The deceased was employed
by defendant to work on a railroad; while so employed, one A., as
“boss,” directed him, together with other hands, to push certain cars
loaded with iron, and directed them to stand on the side and shove
them; the deceased voluntarily placed himself between two fiat ears,
and while

being pushed and in motion, he fell; the car ran
leg, and from the injury he died. It did not appear
when the deceased placed himself between the cars that the “boss”
knew he had done so, or what relation this “boss” sustained to the
deceased and his associates. It was held that the evidence failed to
make out any case against the railroad, and a nonsuit was properly
awarded.
Stanley, 72/202. Cited, 104/682.
The plaintiff’s husband, an employee of the street-railroad company, having been killed by coming violently in contact with a post
very close to the track, while he was riding on the front end of an
extra car, upon which he was being sent to the relief of a disabled
car of the company, and it appearing that, at the time of the collision, he was standing on the step of the platform, leaning outward,
and looking backward underneath the car on which he was riding,
and there being no evidence showing he was then under any necessity
or duty of being in this position, it does not affirmatively appear that
he was free from negligence. Although the evidence warranted a
finding that locating the post so near the track was a negligent act,
it does not show that so doing was violative of any duty due by the
company to the deceased at the time he was killed, and therefore this
act was not, relatively to him, a negligent one, and as no other negligence was alleged or proved against the defendant, the plaintiff failed
to establish that, so far as her husband was concerned, the company
was negligent at all.
Sundy, 96/819.
In Whitton, 106/796, it was held that when, in the trial of an action brought by the widow of a conductor against a railroad company
for his homicide, it affirmatively appeared from the evidence that he
was in charge of and
directing the movements of the train by which
his death was caused, and that, instead of
confining himself to the
line of his duties on that occasion, which did not include
coupling
and uncoupling cars, he
voluntarily, and in the absence of any emergency so requiring, went between two ears, one of which he knew to
be in a defective condition, for the
purpose of unchaining or uncoupling the same, the conclusion follows that he was “outside of
over

_

they

his foot

or

were
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duty, and at fault,’’ and consequently there was no error in granting
nonsuit. Cited, 112/239.
In Webb, 61/586, it was held that a fireman or wood-passer having
been killed while engaged in his business on the train, and his death
having resulted from striking his head against some part of the
fixtures of a water-tank situated on the roadside
most probably
against an iron pipe projecting from the tank and reaching within
a

—

short distance of the train

a

—

his widow

can

not

recover

of the rail-

damages for the homicide, if the husband, though the
pipe projected too far, could have passed it in safety by using due
diligence on his part in the manner of prosecuting the business in
which he was engaged. If his own negligence contributed substantially to the injury, there can be no recovery, as the doctrine of apportionment of damages on account of contributory negligence does not
apply in such a ease, and as section 2323 of the Code demands that
the employee shall be free from fault or negligence. And Bleckley,
J., says: “If he idly and unnecessarily exposed his person by leaning
beyond the line of the engine and ears, and was thereby thrown against
the water-tank, or the pipe which projected therefrom, when he could
have passed in safety by using proper care and diligence in his busiroad company

ness,

he

was

at fault and his widow

can

not

recover.

If he

was

vol-

untarily out of his

proper place or position, when he might and ought
to have remained in it, and was killed in consequence, there can be
no

recovery.” Cited, 63/182; 69/715; 88/210.
of life in rescuing another, when defendant is not negli-

381. Loss

gent.
In Jackson

Standard Oil

Company, 98/749, the plaintiff sued for
Lumpkin, J., said: “The evidence
shows that the plaintiff’s husband, Warren Jackson, lost his life in an
attempt to rescue one Mitchell, who was exposed to the danger of
suffocation from poisonous gas generated in a large iron tank, which
he was engaged in cleansing, as a servant of the Standard Oil Company. The action was brought against this company to recover the
value of Jackson’s life. It appears that Mitchell was, or ought to
have been, fully aware of the danger attending this work, and that he
had been instructed how to guard against it; and it also
appears
that the company was in nowise negligent relatively to Jackson.
Indeed, it may be stated, as a fair conplusion from the evidence, that
the company was altogether free from negligence as to both these
parties. This being so, there is no present occasion for exploring the
v.

the homicide of her husband.
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one through whose neglirespond in damages to a third perto rescue his fellow being thus exposed to danger, and is injured or killed in the attempt. This case,
vast mine of law

relating to the liability of

genee another is placed in peril to
son who in good faith nndertakes
upon its merits, turns upon the
who is guilty of no negligence at

indisputable proposition that one
all can not be made liable to anybody. This is so obviously true as not to require argument. We refer,
however, to the case of Donahoe v. Railway Co., 83 Mo. 560, which is
directly in point; and we also make the following extract from 1
Shear. & R. Neg. §85, which cites the above-mentioned case: ‘No one
is liable at all, unless he is in fault. Thus, a railroad company could
not be made liable for injuries suffered by one who, with the most
praiseworthy motives, ran in front of a train to rescue another, who
was
unlawfully On the track and of whose presence the engineer in
charge had no notice, actual or constructive, the train being prudently
managed. In such a case neither party would be in fault, and therefore neither could recover damages,’ ” and it was held that loss of life
incurred in rescuing another from a situation of peril gives rise to no
cause of action against one who is guilty of no negligence, either as
to the person whose safety was imperiled, or as to the rescuer after
his efforts to make the rescue had begun.
382. Attempted to get on his train as it moved away.
In Reese, 91/97, the suit was brought by the widow of Reese, who
was employed on a freight-train of defendant, and was run over at
night. The evidence indicated that he was attempting to get upon
his own train as it was moving away from a station, missed his hold
and fell, and was Tun over, first by that train and then by another
that followed. The jury found $5,000 for the plaintiff. A new trial
was granted, and it was held that, there being no controlling question
of law involved in the case, there was no abuse of discretion by the
trial judge in granting a first new trial.
383. Not on duty when he was injured, and he may recover.
In Flannagan, 82/579, it was held that the fact that the husband
killed by the running of the company’s locomotive was one of the
employees of the company would not preclude his widow from recovering damages, though he may have been in some degree negligent,
the homicide occurring on a public street, remote from the place at
which the deceased rendered service to the company, and at a time
when he was off duty and had no concern with the business or affairs
of the company. Bleckley, C. J., said: “Flannagan was not only not
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killed, but was
public street of
Savannah and occupied the footing in every respect, with reference
to the running of the company’s trains at that place, of the general
mass of the public.
We think, therefore, that the rule of contributory negligence applicable to the public under like circumstances was
applicable to him. Nor does this'view militate in any degree with the
case of Henderson, 69/715, or any of the eases therein cited.”
384. Negligence of deceased contributed to the injury.
There being clear and uncontradicted evidence that the plaintilf’s
husband, an employee of the railway company, was himself guilty of
negligence in bringing about and contributing to the casualty by
which his death was occasioned, she was not entitled to recover, and
the court erred in denying a new trial.
Hallman, 97/317. Cited,
112/239.
on

duty

not at

servant of the

as a

or near

Where two

the

scene

company

at the time he

of his duties.

freight-cars,

one

He

of which

was on

was

used

was

the

as a

station

ware-

house, had been left “unchocked” and “unbraked” upon a side-track
having a slight downward grade, and, upon being put in motion by a
sudden storm of wind, ran over and killed the railroad-agent, who at
the time was crossing the side-track, holding an umbrella over himself,
inclined towards a blowing rain, so as to obstruct from his view the
approaching cars, the railroad company was not liable for the hoinicide, it appearing that the deceased was the sole employee of the
company at this station, having at the time full charge of the locat-

ing of these

the side-track in question; that on this particuleft exactly as he directed; that he actually
knew that the car by which he was stricken had not been “chocked”
or “braked,” and that it was within the
scope of his duty to know
whether or not the other car (it being the warehouse car) had also
been left in this condition. If leaving the cars without “chocking” or
applying brakes to the same was, under the circumstances, an act
of negligence, it was negligence attributable to the agent himself.
Smith, 97/777.
385. Violation of ordinance is negligence per se.
In Brantley, 93/259, it was held that where a valid municipal
ordinance, broad enough to cover the running of locomotives in yards
of railroad companies within the city, limits the speed to five miles
an hour, it is
negligence per se, relatively to employees whose duty
requires them to cross or he upon the tracks within these yards, to
violate the ordinance by running at a higher speed. If such violation
lar occasion

cars upon

they

were

CHAPTER 20.

§ 386 ]

[472

Homicide.

caused the death of such

employee, and if he was not at fault, and
not, hy ordinary care and diligence, have avoided the consequenees to himself which resulted from such violation, his widow
would, under the statute applicable to negligent homicide, be entitled
an

could

to

recover.

386. Where the tracks

of different companies are used.
was transported over one railroad
to a city, and, at the instance of the shipper, permission was obtained from the superintendent of the road for the train to proceed
over the track of two other roads to a third, and over it to the point
of destination, the train being manned by employees of the first road,
and a person, by direction of the superintendent of that road, aceompanied the train for the purpose of seeing that it was unloaded
promptly and returned to the road to which it belonged, and where
an arrangement was made with the superintendent of the third road
for the train to proceed over its track, and he directed an employee to
Where

a

train loaded with wood

go upon the engine and act as pilot and inform the engineer of the
curves and “tight places” in the track, the only duty or obligation

by the third railroad company to the employees of the first
such train was to have a reasonably safe track over
were to be transported.
The person scut with the
train to see to the unloading and return of the cars was not an employee of the last road over which the train ran, and charges of the
court as to whether he was free from fault and negligence as an employee thereof, and whether it was in fault, were not applicable to the
case.
He was an employee of the first company, and the only obligation the last company was under as to him was to furnish him a safe
track on which the train might safely run. If it failed to do this,
and he was killed solely by reason of the defect in its track, his widow
would be entitled to recover therefor. If the injury was caused solely
by a defect in the trucks of the car belonging to the first company,
she would not be entitled to recover from the last.
If the injury
was caused both by a defect in the track and by a defect in the trucks,
she would be entitled to recover an amount in the proportion that
the defect in the track as compared to that in the trucks contributed
to the injury. The last company, as to the safety of its track, was
liable to Killian as a passenger; and if the injury was caused solely
by a defect in the track, and he was not negligent, or could not have
avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover the amount of damages she has
owed

company upon
which the cars
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sustained.

If he was negligent, but could not have avoided the injury
by the defendant’s negligence, by the exercise of ordinary care,
then the damages should be diminished as in cases of contributory
negligence. This case differs from Mayes, 49/355. There it was
ruled that the company was liable to third persons and to the public
for injuries resulting from a collision caused by allowing a train of
another to come upon its franchise, and did not refer to an employee
of the company thus using the road. Killian, 79/234. Cited, 82/807;
caused

112/658.
Two

companies use the same track at terminal points.
railway companies, each under its own franchise, use the
track of one of them in common, at a terminal point, the one owning
the track is responsible for the consequences of its negligence in failing
to render harmless to the employees of the other company a low bridge
spanning the track, if the duty of taking proper precautions for that
purpose was upon it, and it alone.
The mother of an employee of the
other company, if otherwise in a situation to sue, may recover, for the
homicide of her son, caused by such negligence. In such case, though
it be not alleged that the company not owning the track (that is,
the master of the employee) was ignorant of the danger or of the conditions which caused it, it will not be assumed, in deciding upon a
demurrer to the declaration, that it was negligent in
running the
train to which the employee was attached when injured; consequently
the question whether any negligence of that company could be imputed to the employee, so as to render him chargeable with contributory negligence, is not now for decision. Ellison, 87/691.
387. The cause of the death a question for the jury.
In Davis, 86/76, the plaintiff sued for the homicide of her husband.
The evidence was conflicting upon whether his death was
caused by the negligence of the servants of the company in moving
an engine against a car
upon which he was at work by which he was
thrown from a ladder and injured so that he died, or by a disease not
consequent upon that injury. The jury were properly instructed as
to the law of the ease and having found in favor of the plaintiff, and
there being sufficient evidence to authorize the verdict, a new trial
Where two

was

denied.

388.

Ordinary and reasonable care and diligence shown.
Harbuck, 91/598, a widow sued for the homicide of her husband. Harbuck was a section-boss on the Georgia Pacific
Railway,
the track of which was used by the defendant’s (the East Tennessee,
In
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Virginia and Georgia Railway’s) trains. Hei was walking about the
middle of the track, inspecting it, when he was struck from behind by
defendant’s passenger-train, running about thirty miles an hour and
on schedule time.
The point where the casualty occurred was about
two miles beyond the city limits of Atlanta, near a private crossing
over the railroad.
At this point the Western & Atlantic Railroad ran
parallel to the Georgia Pacific, and freight-trains were passing on the
former. The alleged acts of negligence of defendant’s servants were
in blowing no whistle and giving no warning of the approach of the
train, in not cheeking the speed and endeavoring not to strike Harbuck when he was evidently unaware of its approach, and in not
keeping proper lookout to see if any one was on the track. The
train was between two and three hundred yards from Harbuck and
the men with him when it came in sight, having just rounded a
curve.
It was held that, according to the evidence of those witnesses who must have been best acquainted with the actual facts,
the railway company made it appear that its agents exercised all
ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, and that the killing of
plaintiffs husband took place in spite of such observance. The acts
of diligence comprehended blowing the whistle, sounding the alarm,
applying the brakes, and, so soon as it was discovered that the
signals given were not having their natural and ordinary effect,
making an effort to stop the train. Any and all material conflict
with adverse witnesses may be reconciled upon the theory that the
plaintiff’s witnesses erroneously attributed all the whistling which
they heard to the locomotives which happened to be near by upon
the track of the Western & Atlantic Railroad.
could have been mistaken in

These witnesses

thinking that the whistling which they
on the latter road, but the defendant’s witnesses could not possibly have been mistaken in this
respect. They knew whether sounds were made by the locomotive
of the train of the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway on
which they were traveling, and consequently, without unnecessarily
imputing perjury to them, their testimony on that subject could not
be disbelieved. The number of witnesses who coincided substantially
in their testimony on this material point would forbid the adoption
of any reasonable theory of collusion by which to account for their
evidence; and, without either ignorance or collusion on their part,
the facts must have been in accordance with their testimony.
389. When the relation of master and servant must he shown.
On the trial of an action for damages brought against a railway
heard all

came

from locomotives
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■company on the theory that the relation of master and servant existed
between it and the plaintiff’s deceased husband, who met his death by

of the

negligence of a third person, alleged to have been also
company’s employ, it is error to reject evidence tending to
establish its defense that it had never employed either the plaintiff’s
husband or such third person, but that both were really in the service
■of an altogether different company, operating under a similar name.
Strauss, 110/189. Cited, 111/13; 112/604, 658.
390. Illegal transaction, injured while engaged in.
The case of Cannon, 38/199, was a suit by a widow to recover for
the death of her husband.
The husband was an engineer on the
railroad and at the time of the injury he was engaged in the transportation of Confederate soldiers on the road for the purpose of
making war upon the government of the United States. It was held
that when two or more parties are engaged in the same illegal transnotion, in violation of the supreme law of the land, and one of them is
injured by the carelessness or negligence of the other, the court will
not lend its assistance in favor of either party to recover damages.
Cited, 40/54. The same principle was enforced in Martin, 40/52.
Martin was an officer in command of Confederate troops on his way
to engage in the battle of Chickamauga, and the road was transporting him for hire paid by the Confederate government. And also in
Eedd, 48/102; Redd, 54/33.
reason

in the

ACTIONS BY WIDOWS OF PASSENGERS.

391.

Difference between announcement of station and invitation ta
get off.
In Thompson, 76/770, the plaintiff sued for the homicide of her
husband. The homicide occurred near Station No. 6 of the railroad,
and

was

caused

station at

a

by the deceased’s leaving the car before it reached the
spot some several hundred yards below it, and being run

freight-train while he was making his way towards the staon which he was a passenger had been stopped because
freight-trains blocked its way. The position of the plaintiff was that
her husband was induced to leave the car by the announcement of,
“No. 6 passengers get off,” or words to that effect, by the conductor
over

by

tion.

or

a

The train

authorized officer of the road.

such announcement
It

was

was

held that there is

ment of

a

station

may prepare

The defendant contended that

made, but he left the
a

car

of his

own

no

volition.

difference between the ordinary announce-

the train

approaches it, so that the passengers
to leave the train when it reaches the station, and the
as
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announcement after the train had

stopped; in the latter case, it is
equivalent to inviting the passengers for that station to leave the train.
If the passenger in this case got out without such an announcement,
it was his act; if he was deceived by the announcement it was
the company’s act, so far as fault is concerned. After he is out,
if prevented from getting back by the conductor, though he got
out without the announcement, it is not diligence towards a passenger, if the place be dangerous, not to take him back, even if necessary to stop the starting train to do so; and after he gets out on their
announcement, or is prevented from getting back, if he can avoid the
consequences of such conduct by ordinary care in looking out for
danger and avoiding it, then, if he does not use such care, he can
not recover.
Cited, 109/795.
392. Liability and defenses of the company.
In Thompson, 76/771, a suit by a widow for the homicide of her
husband, it was held: The railroad company contracted to give the
passenger in this case a safe transportation to the station of his destination, and until it carried him to that regular and safe landing, it was
responsible for slight neglect, extraordinary diligence being the measure of its care for him to that place.
But though the company may
have been negligent, it could defend itself and defeat a recovery of
damages by showing that, when the passenger was endangered by its
negligence, he could have avoided the consequences of it by the use of
ordinary care, or that Jiis own negligence caused the injury. Cited,
109/795.
393.

Conspirators causing death.
v. Springfield, 64/159, was

McEwen

for the homicide of her husband.

It

a

suit by

was

a

widow for damages

held that if two

or more

conspire together to do an unlawful act of violence on the
of another, and they embark in the execution of such purpose, the law would not protect each against the consequences of the
others not strictly observing the bargain; each must contemplate that
before joining with his fellow to break the law, and each becomes responsible for the worst act done and the greatest damage caused by
any of his fellows, if done in pursuance of the unlawful purpose.
394. Record of defendant’s acquittal of murder is not evidence for
defendant.
In suit by a widow for the homicide of her husband, the record of
the acquittal of the defendant under an indictment for the murder
persons

person

477 j

CHAPTER 20.

L §§ 395-397

Homicide.

of the husband is not evidence for the defendant.

Cottingham

v.

Weeks, 54/275.
ACTION BY CHILD

FOR

MOTHER’S

DEATH.

395. Construction

of statute.
Yenable, 65/55, 67/697, it was held that this law gives a right
of action against a railroad by the minor children fop the homicide
of the mother, and does not restrict the right to the homicide of the
father; that the word “parent” meant either father or mother in its
ordinary sense, on whom the support of the child was cast by law.
Cited, 70/683; 77/454.
In Scott, 77/450, it was held that where a husband or father is
dead, a right of action arises in favor of children for the homicide of
their mother, but they have no such right of action when the father

397.Wife’s
In

is alive.

Negligence of deceased defeats a recovery.
Phillips, 87/272, minor children sued for the death of their
mother. Deceased was killed by a train at the north end of a trestle
one hundred and fifty yards long and from twelve to fifteen feet high.
396.
In

She and another

of the

woman

had been to

a

water-tank at the other end

their way back. They did not commence
to run until the train had passed the water-tank, where they thought
it would stop.
Deceased fell, and her companion tried to help her up,
but before she could do so she was hit by the train, and thrown from
the track, and deceased was run over and killed. The train stopped
with the front driving-wheels on her.
Held that, under these facts, the
court did right in granting a nonsuit in the case.
It was gross negligenee on the part of two females to attempt to walk upon a trestle
one hundred and fifty yards long and from twelve to fifteen feet
high,
near the time when a train was due; it further appearing that the
servants of the railroad company did all that was possible to be done
after they discovered the females on the trestle.
trestle, and

were on

ACTION BY HUSBAND FOR DEATH OF WIFE.

negligence defeats recovery.
affirmatively appearing from the evidence that the defendant
company was not guilty of any negligence, and that the death of the
plaintiff’s wife was attributable to her failure to observe ordinary
care for her own safety, a verdict for the defendant was demanded.
The trial court having correctly so adjudged, this verdict will be allowed to stand, without closely scrutinizing the various grounds of the
motion for a new trial; for, irrespective of the errors therein alleged,
It
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only result which could.have been legally arrived at upon the trial
reached. Marshall, 103/586.
In Hopkins, 110/85, it was held that where the evidence showed
that the wife, by ordinary care, could have avoided the consequences
to herself of the defendant’s negligence, which was not wanton or
criminal, and that her homicide was the result of her gross negligence,
the railroad company was not liable. Fish, J., said: “Though the
railway company was guilty of negligence, in that its engineer failed
to check and continue checking the train when he reached the blowpost established for the crossing upon which plaintiff’s wife was
killed, yet after the negligence of the railway company began, and it
was apparent to the decedent that the engineer was not checking the
train, but that it was coming to the crossing at an extremely high rate
of speed, it was in her power to have avoided danger from the negligence of the defendant by the exercise of ordinary care.
Instead,
however, of exercising ordinary care, her conduct subsequent to the
period at which the negligence of the defendant company began and
was apparent to her was itself so grossly negligent as to debar her
husband of the right to recover for her homicide. According to the
engineer’s testimony, when he first saw her he was in four or five hundred yards of the crossing, and the train was going at a speed of fifty
to sixty miles an hour.
‘She came up from a little sink, from the
public-road grade, and started on a run towards the crossing.’ She
was between fifty and seventy-five feet from the crossing.
‘When he
first saw her running towards the track, he- was in three hundred
yards of her, and she looked like she was trying to make the public
crossing.’ She was looking right at the train, and did not take her
eyes off it.
‘She seemed to be trying to outrun it to the crossing.’
‘She was running in the direction of the public crossing, looking over
her shoulder at the train.’ The reason he did not stop the train
was because he could not.
He supposed she would stop before she
got to the railroad. ‘Didn’t think that she would run right on to the
track, right in the way of the train, and she looking at it.’ He put
on brakes just before he got to the
crossing, when he saw that she
would attempt to cross ahead of the train, and was then seventy-five
or one hundred yards from her.
This evidence shows such reckless
conduct on the part of the decedent as would keep the railroad company from being liable in damages for her death, unless it was guilty
of wanton or criminal negligence. Civil Code, §§2322, 3830; Blake,
101/217; Parish, 102/285, 40 L. R. A. 364. Under the testimony of
the

was
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O’Neal

do not think that the defendant

guilty of wanton or
negligence. He was the engineer who had control of the locomotive, and the responsibility of the defendant company is to be
measured by his conduct. In the light of his testimony, we do not think
that his conduct was wanton or criminal. (From his evidence it appeared that he, knowing that the deceased saw the train but a short
distance away, approaching the crossing at tremendous speed, naturally
reasoned that she would not attempt to cross the railroad-track immediately in front of it, but would stop before getting near enough to
the rails to be struck by the locomotive, and that as soon as he saw
that, without regard to her safety, she was persisting in her attempt
to outrun the train to the crossing, he adopted the most effective means
to stop the locomotive, but unfortunately it was too late to prevent ihe
we

was

criminal

accident.”
mother’s
398. Mother’s suit

action for homicide of child.

for homicide of child not Towered by father’s suit

for services.
Civil Code, §3828, the parent’s only right
negligent killing of a minor child was for the loss
of the services of the child. Perry, 85/193.
The Act of 1887 does not purport to withdraw from the father any
right of action which he had before by the common law. What it
does is to confer upon the mother a right which neither of the parents
had at common law. The statutory right of the mother is to recover
for the child’s death; the common-law right of the father is to recover
Prior to the Act of 1887,

of action for the

for the loss of services which the child would have rendered him had

by the tort complained of. Factory v.
bar to a suit by the mother for the homicide of her minor son, that the father has a pending suit in which he
claims damage for the loss of the son’s services up to the time the latter would have arrived at his majority.
Glover, 92/132.
399. The right of action.
Under this statute the father has no right of action for the homicide of a minor child, if the mother was in life at the time of the hornicide, and if she dies without suing no right survives to, or is conthe child not been disabled

Davis, 87/648.

And it is

ferred upon, the
action survive to

father.
an

no

Frazier, 96/785.

administrator of

a

Nor does the right of

parent who, being entitled to

bring such action, dies without instituting it.
Cited, 111/581.

Frazier, 101/77.
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Dependence and contributions at the time of the injury.
parent must at the very time of the injury be dependent upon
the child, and the child at such time must be actually contributing
to the parent’s support.
Amos, 104/811.
In order to warrant a recovery by a mother for the homicide of her
child, it must appear, not only that the child contributed to her support, but also that she was dependent upon the child for such support. A charge which eliminates from the consideration of the jury
400.
The

the latter element is inaccurate.

McDade, 105/134.

mother for the homicide of
she could not recover without showing that he contributed to her support.
An instruction to
this effect did not necessarily negative the proposition that it was also
essential for her to prove that she was dependent upon the son; and
the court’s omission to charge upon the subject of dependence will not
be held cause for a new trial, when it appears from undisputed evidenee that the mother was in fact dependent upon the deceased. BarThere was, in the trial of an action by a
her son, no error in charging the jury that

nett, 104/582.
In Smith

Hatcher, 102/158, it

was held that it is essential to
parent for the homicide of his
child that the former should, at the time of the homicide, be to a
material extent dependent upon the latter for a support, and that the
child should then be actually contributing thereto. Accordingly, where
a son, while serving a term as a
penitentiary convict, was unlawfully
killed, but at the time of his death was not actually contributing to
his father’s support, the latter could not recover for the homicide.
The petition alleged that the deceased “contributed to the petitioner’s support” and “petitioner was dependent upon his said son for
support.” Lumpkin, J., said: “It will be observed that the petition
does not allege that the plaintiff’s son was at the time of the homicide actually contributing to the plaintiff’s support, The phrase, ‘contributed to petitioner’s support,’ construed in connection with the
other allegations of the petition, manifestly means that the deceased
son had, before his confinement in the
penitentiary, contributed to the
father’s support. Taking these allegations all together, he could not
be doing so while engaged in his labors as a Convict. The
petition
must therefore be taken to mean that the contribution
by the son to
the father’s support was something which related to the
past; and also
that there was an expectation on the parent's
part that such contribution would be resumed after the son’s sentence in the
penitentiary
v.

the maintenance of

an

action

by

a
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had been served out and he had been

discharged. The statute giving
right of action to a parent for the homicide of a child, and conferring upon the former the right to recover the full value of the child’s
life, is, to say the least, a harsh one, and must be strictly construed.
This court in Clay, infra, held that the word ‘or,’ after the word
‘dependent,’ should be construed to mean ‘and’; therefore, in order to
entitle a parent to recover, it must appear that he or she is dependent
on the child, and that the latter contributes to the
parent’s support.
Special attention is called to the use of the verbs ‘is’ and ‘contributes’
in the present tense. The law does not, therefore, mean that a parent
may recover for the homicide of a child upon whom he or she has
been dependent and who has contributed to the parent’s support; nor
for the homicide of a child upon whom the parent might, at some future time, become dependent, and who might, hut for the homicide,
'have contributed to the parent’s support. The test is applied at the
a

time of the death.
Neither the

The actual condition at that time is to he looked

the possibilities of the
petition in the present
case, the deceased son had been for more than a year before he was
killed, a penitentiary convict, under a sentence which would not have
expired until after the lapse of three years and some months. He
was in the
custody of the law, chained, confined, and, so far as the
petition shows, absolutely without ability to contribute to the father’s
support. The petition does not allege that he was then contributing.
It could not, upon the facts therein stated, truthfully have so alleged.”
Cited, 105/139; 104/811; 111/577.
401. Actions by parents illustrative of the foregoing principles.
The intention of the act of the legislature providing that “a mother,
or if no mother, a father, may recover for the homicide of a
child,
minor or sui juris, upon whom he or she is dependent or who contributes to his or her support,” was not to give the right of recovery to the
mother or father unless he or she was dependent upon the child for
support, and the child, before his death, contributed to the support
of such parent; for the word “or” after the word “dependent” the
word “and” should be substituted. In the absence of an allegation
that the parent plaintiff was dependent upon the deceased child, and
it being uncertain from the evidence that the deceased contributed
to the support of the parent, a new trial was proper, after a verdict
in the parent’s favor. Clay, 84/345. Cited, 86/237; 89/566;
93/372; 102/160; 104/586; 105/138.
to.

future

31

are

nor the uncertainties or
to be considered.
According to the

past
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In

Daniel, 86/237, it

was

the child contributed to her

held that the mother may reeover where
support and she was substantially de-

pendent upon such child in part for support, although she was likewise dependent upon her husband and her own labor. Blandford, J.,
said: “This court did not mean by the decision in Clay’s case to decide that the mother could not recover unless she was wholly dependent upon such child for a support, but, on the contrary, we think the
meaning of the statute is that a mother may recover for the homicide
of a child who contributed to her support when she was in whole or
in part dependent upon such child for support substantially.
We
think the words used in the statute,

‘who contributes to his

or

her

sup-

father or mother by the child
such as in part sufficient, for
such support; and that the word ‘dependent’ means wholly or in part
dependent materially upon such child for support. For instance, a’
mother may have several children who support her, or contribute to
her support, and she may not be dependent upon one child more than
another; yet if she be dependent upon any one of them wholly or partially, and he contributed to her support, she would be entitled to remean that the contribution to the
need not be wholly sufficient, but only

port,’

cover

for the homicide of such child,

railroad company,

its servants

or

if killed by the negligence of any
Cited, 89/566; 93/372;

employees.”

111/574.
In Johnston, 89/560, it appeared that the son, for whose homicide
the mother sued, was eighteen years of age. He contributed to her
support — she depended on his labor. Her husband, who was fifty-five
years old, contributed to her support.
It was held that, under the
rulings in the Clay and Dame} eases, the mother could recover the
full value of the life.
Cited, 111/574.
Where father and mother and minor children all reside

together,
the labor of the family for support,
a minor child over fifteen years of age, whose labor, or the
proceeds
of it, come into the common stock, is to be considered as contributing
substantially to the support of the mother. Bleckley, C. J., said:
“The father, mother, and minor children all resided together, and were
mutually dependent upon the labor of the family for support. The
deceased child, although not sixteen years of age, performed some
labor, and it or its proceeds went into the common stock. Evidence
to prove all this, or which tended to prove it, was admissible, and, if
this condition of affairs was established, the deceased son might well
be considered as contributing substantially to the support of his
and

are

mutually dependent

upon
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mother.

Members of the

same household, who live by their common
proceeds, have a mutual dependence one upon another.
Certainly so, unless it be affirmatively shown that a particular memher consumes as much, or more, of the common stock than he con-

labor and its

tributes to it. Even that would not be a conclusive test, for the services of a child to a mother, or of a mother to a child, may well be
reckoned as contributing substantially to the support of the recipient
far

beyond

value which the services may have, and the
dependence may be in respect to personal service of
this nature. Moreover, in the case of laboring people, some regard
must be had to the probability of future dependence of an older member of the family upon younger ones. A son between fifteen and sixteen years of age, whose vocation it is to labor for the family, may well
_be regarded as one of the stays and props, both present and future,
of his mother, she being also a laboring woman, and liable to become
disabled by age or infirmity before her son shall have passed the meridian of life.” Glover, 92/132. Cited, 93/372; 111/574.
Where a boy eleven years old, whose labor was worth six dollars per
month, and who resided with his parents, worked with his father on
any money

chief element of

a

farm, and rendered services to his mother about the house, in the

performance of her houshold duties — the benefit of his labor and
services being thus realized by the parents in the support of themselves
and their family, they being laboring people, and mutually dependent
upon the labor of one another for a support —the mother was dependent upon the boy, and he contributed substantially to her support. Gravitt, 93/369. Cited, 105/139; 111/574.
In Glover, 92/132, a mother sued for the homicide of her minor son.
She alleged that she was dependent on him and that he- contributed
to her support.
It was held that evidence of the father’s physical disability to labor is admissible in behalf of the mother, as tending to
show her partial dependence on the minor son whose homicide is
complained of. Bleckley, C. J., said: “There was no error in admitting evidence of the father’s physical disability, and consequent impairment of ability to labor. He was a laboring man, and without
fortune. This being so, anything which reduced his capacity to perform labor whereby to procure the means of support for the plaintiff,
his wife, would render her less independent of any aid from her
children, including the deceased son. The evidence, therefore, would
tend to show her partial dependence on that son for support, present
and future. The disability referred to had its origin long before
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the homicide of the son,
of the homicide, and has

and was in some degree operative at the time
been so ever since.” Cited, 93/372; 111/574.

402.

Subject continued.
Spinks, 111/571, it was held that a man whose earnings are suffieient to adequately support himself is not “dependent,” within the
meaning of section 3828 of the Civil Code, although he may by law
be chargeable with the maintenance of others, for the support of
whom and himself such earnings are insufficient. Accordingly,
a father whose monthly wages were enough to more than afford him
individually a support commensurate with his circumstances and
standing in life was not, under the provisions of the section cited, enIn

titled to

recover

the full value of the life of

an

unmarried minor

son

tortiously killed, and whose mother had died, although, because of the
insufficiency of the father’s wages to support himself and also his
family, consisting of a second wife and minor children, he received

from the son while living. Lumpkin, P. J.,
considerable extent, compensatory in its charaeter.
This being so, what was its design relatively to the eompensation of parents ? We think that in this respect its underlying principie was to provide for parents of both sexes, who, by reason of poverty, age, or physical infirmity, were incapable of supporting-them-*
selves, and especially for mothers without means, who, because of this
and of fheir sex, were so incapable. The condition of dependence
contemplated by the General Assembly was that of the parent with relation to his or her personal need of aid in obtaining a livelihood.
We can not believe it was the legislative intention to assist a selfsustaining father in taking care of others, whose support he had voluntarily undertaken, or with which he was legally chargeable. The
true spirit of the law was to help both mothers and fathers who were
in a substantial degree themselves dependent upon a child, and not to
help members of their families who were dependent upon them or the
child. The cases of Daniels, Johnston, Glover, and Gravitt, supra, do
not conflict with the ruling now made, or with any of the views above
expressed. They are authority for the proposition (1) that, to entitle
a mother to recover for the
wrongful killing of her child, it is not
incumbent upon her to show that she depended
upon him alone for a
livelihood, or that he furnished her entire support, but that partial
dependence upon the child’s labor, accompanied by substantial contribution therefrom to her maintenance, was
sufficient; and (2) that
where a family of
working people, including parents and a minor
contributions in money
said: “The act is, to a

'
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child, were mutually dependent upon the labor of one another for a
livelihood, and the child rendered valuable services, of which the
mother got the benefit, she was dependent upon him, if he thus eontributed substantially to her support. It is to be observed that in all
of these cases the action was brought by the mother. A mother without property is an essentially dependent member of a household consisting of her husband, herself, and their children. She may render
many valuable services and perform many onerous duties, but, when it
comes to obtaining the necessaries of life — food, clothing, fuel, and
the other essentials to human existence — she is, in the very nature of
things, dependent upon each and every member of the family whose
labor produces money or supplies.
This is the way in which every humane person regards a mother in such a situation.
It is ordinarily
quite different as to a father. Manhood, which is self-sustaining, and
more than self-sustaining, is not a condition of dependency.
Minority
is an element of dependency, in both males and females, and the female sex of itself constitutes such an element in adults, but not so as
to the sex masculine.”
Cited, 111/879.
403. Conduct of deceased.
In Plunkett, 105/203, it was held that this being an action by a
mother for the homicide of her son, and the declaration alleging that
the deceased was an employee of the defendant railroad company, and
was engaged as a car-sealer in its
yard, and that his death was brought
about by being crushed between two cars where an opening had been
left in the train of cars for the use of the employees in the yard,
such opening being closed up by a sudden movement of the train without notice to deceased; and the evidence showing that the deceased
was injured while
attempting to go through an opening which was
not left for the use of the employees in the yard, and was only such
an opening as was usual and
necessary front time to time in shifting
cars in the yard — there was no error in
granting a nonsuit. Cobb, J.,
said: “Such being the case, the defendant was under no duty to notify its employees when this opening would be closed up; and therefore an employee who attempted to use such an opening in going from
place to place in the yard took the risks incident thereto, and, if injured, would have no right of action against the company. Cited,
108/795, 798.
It was erroneous, on the trial of an action brought by a mother
against a rafiroad company for the homicide of her minor son, a
youth of sixteen years, to direct a verdict for the defendant, when,
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under the evidence
viz.:

Whether

or

submitted, the following were disputable questions,
not the parents of the deceased consented to his

employment by the company in the work in which he was engaged
when killed; whether or not the deceased was familiar with the duties incident to his employment, and, if not, whether he was or was
not properly instructed and warned as to the dangers attendant upon
a performance thereof; whether or not he was free from negligence
as to the occurrence by which his death was occasioned; and whether
or not the same was caused by the negligence of the company or its
employees. Black, 104/561.
In Raden, 78/47, it appeared from the plaintiff’s testimony that
two boys, seventeen years of age, started from the house of their employer at night to go to the homes of their mothers for the night.
Fifteen or twenty minutes after they left, the service-train on the railroad went by. They had plenty of time to have crossed the railroad
and reached home. They were struck by the train at a public-road
crossing; one of them was killed and the other seriously injured. The
witness, by whom the plaintiffs sought to establish their right to recover, testified that the boy who died had told him that they had
stopped at the crossing, and the witness was satisfied that they were
asleep. It was held that a nonsuit was properly granted; and that
to go to sleep on a railroad-crossing was such negligence and recklessness as would prevent a recovery, even
though the railroad company
might have been negligent. Hall, J., said: “As both parties seemed
to consider and treat the case in the court below that these boys were
injured while asleep on the public crossing, we will so consider the
cases.
It is quite manifest if these boys had been asleep upon the
railroad-crossing, that their parents could not recover, because the
injury was caused by their own negligence. Ordinary care would have
induced any one not to go to sleep on a crossing of a railroad, and
the mere going to sleep on the crossing was great negligence and recklessness.” It does not appear from the report of this case that the
statement by the witness that “he was satisfied that
they were asleep”
was objected to.
Cited, 102/288.
In Littlejohn, 74/396, it was shown that the
plaintiff’s minor son
was employed as a switchman and
car-coupler; while engaged in shoving a car from a side-track to the main track, he was caught between
the tender of the engine and a car, and crushed to
death; he was looking towards the engine, when he should have been looking ahead at
the car before him; if he had been at the place where he should have
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been, he would not have been hurt; no negligence was shown on the
part of defendant’s servants or agents. A verdict for the defendant
was demanded by the evidence.

right is unaffected by residence.
right of action given a mother for the homicide of her son
upon whom she is dependent in whole or in part for support is not
confined to residents of this State, but belongs alike to all mothers
under like circumstances, wheresoever they may reside.
Glover,
404. The

The

92/132.
405. Action

by administrator under South Carolina statute.

At a conductor of a train ejected a passenger so that he was run
ov^r and disabled by such train, and another train of the same road

passing shortly afterwards extinguished what life was left, a right of
action arose whether the actual death was caused by the first or second train. Nix, 68/572. Cited, 73/652.
406. Damages confined to injuries of which pecuniary estimate can
be made.

In actions of this sort the jury can not find vindictive, punitive, or
exemplary damages. They are confined to injuries of which a peeuniary estimate can be made, and can not take into consideration the
mental sufferings occasioned to survivors by the death. Paulk, 24/356.
Cited, 71/422.
The case Killian, 79/234, was brought to recover damages for the
homicide of the plaintiff’s husband. The declaration averred that
the plaintiff had been “deprived of the society, company and companionship of her husband, causing her great pain and suffering, and
leaving their infant child, about twelve years old, fatherless.” On
motion, the averment was stricken, and testimony in support of it
was rejected, on the ground of irrelevancy.
This action of the court
below was affirmed. The case was cited in Chapman v. Telegraph Co.,
88/770, and it is there said: “Statutes have been passed giving recovery for homicide against the slayer; but the policy has invariably
been to confine the right of action to a party sustaining pecuniary
loss. And in actions on such statutes, even by the widow of the deceased, grief and anguish can not come in for compensation.”
407. Measure of damages, rule prior to 1878.
Where a suit was brought by a widow for the homicide of her husband under the law as it stood prior to the Act of 1878, which gave
the right to recover the full value of the life of the deceased, the rule
adopted for estimating the damages to the wife when no fault was
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proven on the part of
a reasonable support,

the deceased, was this: Inquire what would be
according to the circumstances in life of the
husband, as they existed at his death, and as they may be reasonably
expected to exist in view of his character, habits, occupation and prospects in life, and when the annual money value of that support has
been found, to give, as damages, its present worth, according to the
expectation of the life of the deceased, as ascertained by the mortuary tables of well-established reputation. Johnson, 38/409.
Cited,
111/594. In a proper case the rule was amplified and attention called
to the declining years of the deceased, and the probable decrease year
by year of his capacity to labor at his calling. As in case of an engineer the jury should consider his age, and if old, his consequent incapacity to labor long. Roach, 64/635. If the husband was in fault,
the amount to be lessened in proportion to his contributory negligence in causing his death.
Ayers, 53/12. If the right of action
survived to the children, the present worth of a reasonable support for
them during minority was ascertained in the same way. David,
41/223.
408. Rule under Act

of 1878.
(Code, §3828) is constitutional and it clearly gives
the widow the right to recover the full value of the life of her husband for whose homicide she sues; and the jury are to determine the
present value of that life. It was meant to remedy the rule formerly
prescribed by the Supreme Court that the family could only recover
the value of the life to it; that is, the annual support they would get
out of his labor.
Pittman, 73/325. Cited, 77/409.
In Flannagan, 82/579, a case that arose and was tried under the
Act of 1878, the judge gave the railway company the full benefit of
the rule for computing damages laid down in the Rouse case, supra, but
The Act of 1878

went further and treated luxuries which the deceased

to

was

accustomed

being a subject-matter for deduction, the same as necessary expenses.
This was not only fair to the company, but liberal.
409. Rule under the Act of 1887.
enjoy

as

Under the Act of 1887, which is codified in sections 3828 and 3829
of the Civil

Code, the

of the deceased

measure of damages
shown by the evidence,

is the full value of the life

without deduction for necessary or other personal expenses of the deceased had he or she lived.
That the statute prescribes the measure of damages to be the full
value of the life of the deceased, with no deduction for his necessary
or personal
expenses had he lived, does not render it unconstitutional.
as
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The.legislature is not prohibited from prescribing a rule for the meas*
of damages. Clay, 84/345. Cited, 105/138.
The gross annual earnings is the measure under this law. Newton,
85/517.
410. Value of the life of deceased.
In Stewart, 71/427, it was held by a majority of the court that
there is no invariable rule for estimating the value of a man’s life.
Age, health, habits, money made by one’s labor, furnish data from
which such value may be decided by a jury.
Tables of the probable
length of life and its probable worth may be useful, but are not eonelusive or absolutely essential for that purpose. Cited, 86/148;
ure

$6/524;
A

112/936.

jury, when there are sufficient facts in evidence as to the age,
health, physical condition, habits, etc., of a given person, may form
a reasonable estimate as to the value of the life of such person, with■out resorting to the mortality-tables. Simmons, C. J., said: “It was
not essential that the jury, in order to form an estimate as to the
value of the life of the deceased, should have before them the standard mortality-tables usually introduced in evidence in cases of this
kind. On this subject, Jackson, C. J., speaking for a majority of the
•court in the case of Stewart, said: ‘I do not think there is any Procrustean rule in the mode of estimating the value of a life.
The age
•of a man, the health he enjoys, the money he is making by his labor,
his habits, are data from which the jury may argue how long he will
probably live and work, and what his life is worth in its pecuniary
value. I know of no law which requires tables of the probable length
of life and its probable worth to be introduced. They may be a useful circumstance, but are not conclusive or absolutely essential.’ In
the present case there was evidence that the deceased was thirty-eight
or
forty years old at the time of his death, and that, when he was sent
to the chain-gang, he weighed one hundred and ninety-five pounds,
was able-bodied, and,
according to the testimony of several witnesses,
was worth about $100 a
year as a laborer. This evidence furnished
a sufficient basis for an estimate as to the
probable value of the life
of the deceased.” Boswell v. Barnhart, 96/521. Cited, 102/161.
In his declining years, the capacity of the deceased to labor in his
calling and his ability to earn money might have decreased; feebleness
of health, actual sickness, the loss of employment, voluntarily abstaining from work, dullness in business, reduction in wages, and other
causes may contribute in greater or less
degree to decrease the gross
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earnings of a lifetime, and a proper allowance should be made for any
diminution in income from labor which would have resulted from any
of these causes. Moore, 94/457; Burney, 98/1.
The

jury is not confined to any particular rule in measuring the
a life.
The life-tables are an aid to that end, but age, health,,
habits, and the money one is making, are also data from which a eonelusion may be drawn.
The tables prepared for life-insurance do not
contemplate at all ability to work, and how long that ability will eontinue, and how much it will decrease as age increases, but those tablesonly calculate life’s duration, however feeble and incapable of labor
that life will be in old age. In an action by a widow for the homicide of her husband, it was error to charge the jury to calculate the
value of the life of the deceased, with the sum or amount of his annual pecuniary value to the plaintiff and the number of years of his
life-expectancy as a basis, and to omit entirely to submit to the jury
the increasing incapacity of the deceased to work at his trade as a carpenter, or the decrease in ability to labor which age might cause.
No arbitrary rule can be invoked to calculate such decrease in value,
but the jury must approximate it from the facts before them; such
as constitution, habits, heredity, and such experience of the effects of
age on muscle, nerve and endurance, as they themselves have had or
witnessed in their intercourse with men. Thompson, 76/771.
Cited,
value of

86/148.
In Newton, 85/517, it

held that the evidence showing that the
arriving at years of maturity, and
had never followed .any other vocation, it was proper to prove his
mental and physical capacity in order to show his ability to earn money
as a farmer; but it was not admissible for witnesses to
give their
opinions as to the value of his services in occupations in which he
had never engaged.
The amount of his earnings, or the value of his life to his family,
should be based upon his probable earnings in the profession or vocation which he had selected, or was permanently
pursuing at the time
of his death. Of course if the deceased were a child, or a
young
man who had not as
yet selected a profession or vocation, the rule
would be somewhat different. That laid down in Davis, 60/329, and
in Young, 81/397, might then be proper.
Whether a person’s capacity to earn money and labor successfully
would be, depends considerably upon the character of the labor and the
deceased had been

a

was

farmer since
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expectation of life of the person. Jackson, C. J., said: “So far as
plaintiff’s business of taking the number of cars, making a memorandum of them in a book and reporting it, is concerned, he would
last longer probably than one in more active and harder physical labor would retain the capacity to work;, and his trading capacity,
which seems from the evidence to have increased his salary from the
company he served, would also endure longer than the capacity for
hard labor. It is very questionable, to say the most for the plaintiff
in error, whether a better mode of settling such questions could be
desired than by referring them to the jury, under the facts of each
case, in respect to the calling and sort of labor the deceased followfed.” Pittman, 73/325. Cited, 77/409.
the

411.

Subject contimied.
was no error in allowing the plaintiff to testify that her husband, after paying his “cab board,” which amounted to $5, brought
her $59 at the end of every month he was at work, and that he had no
other means or resources except his wages; the evidence being offered
to show what were the earnings of the deceased, and the objection
being that the amount turned over to the plaintiff by her husband at
the end of the month was no standard by which to measure his earnings. Moore, 94/457.
Where the value of a life terminated by violence is to be ascertained,
evidence that the deceased person had engaged at different times in
various pursuits, and of what he made or was capable of making in
each of these, is relevant, although at the time of his death he had
ceased for a number of years to .act in one of them, his capacity to
pursue it not being impaired. What he had earned in it would not
serve as a direct basis for estimating’the value of the life, but might
be looked to by the jury in estimating his capacity to command continuous, profitable employment should he cease to pursue the business
vocation in which he was engaged when he was killed. Evidence that
at that time he held the offices of postmaster and tax-collector, and of
There

the amount of his income from the same, would also be
show pecuniary loss for the unexpired term of office, but
nish

a

basis of direct

90/124.

computation for

any

longer period.

relevant to
not to fur-

Christian,

'

In Newton, 85/517, it was held that in using life-tables as a
for calculation of the value of the life of the deceased, the gross
when
to be

basis
value
ascertained must be reduced to its present value to find the sum
paid to the plaintiff, his widow. If the expectancy of her hus-
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band’s life be twelve years, the verdict should be for a sum not larger
than would be exhausted at the end of that time by expending each

equal to his net earnings, the homicide having occurred
of the statute forbidding any deduction for his expenses. Simmons, J., said: “The rule as laid down by the court, at the
suggestion of plaintiff’s counsel, was the rule to ascertain the gross
amount of the value of the life, when the court should have gone further, and instructed the jury that, after finding this gross amount,
they should reduce it to its present value. The rule as given would
show what amount the deceased would have earned, or been entitled to,
if he had lived to the time the mortuary tables show his expectancy
to be, and had waited for the money until he had earned it; but as
the money recovered by the widow must be paid to her at once, this
gross amount should be reduced to its present value.
The amount of
this verdict, if put at interest at seven per cent., would give to
this widow a sum greater per annum than any amount of earnings
which her husband could have made if he had lived, even admitting
the guessing and speculative opinions of the witnesses. The amount
of the verdict, at seven per cent, interest, would give her $672 per
annum, and, at the end of the twelve years, the expectancy of the life
of her husband, she will have had this $672 annually, for that whole
length of time, and the amount of the verdict $9,600, still in her
hands; whereas, the jury should have given her a sum that would be
exhausted at the end of twelve years, by expending each year an
amount equal to the net annual earnings of the husband.
Such
year a sum

before the passage

would be the full value of his life. This death occurred before the
Act of 1887, which forbids any deduction for the husband’s expenses.
Of course, the gross annual earnings will be the measure in cases fall-

ing under this act.”
In

Perkerson, 112/923, it

cide of

was

ruled that in

an

action for the homi-

railroad

employee, proof of his usual earnings as such employee, within a reasonable period of time prior to his death, is admissible. There is no arbitrary rule which confines the proof upon
this point to what he was actually earning at the very time of his
death. Fish, J., said: “It is pretty well established that in
proving
the value of the life of a deceased employee it is not
competent to
prove that he was in the line of promotion in his calling, and the increased rate of wages which he would have received if promoted. 8
t

a

Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d. ed.), 943, and
Allison, 86/145.

The

reason

for the rule

cases
is

cited.
that

See, also,
the

chances
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for

promotion are too remote, and dependent npon too many
contingencies to be considered. 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d
ed.), 943. It is, however, competent to prove what were the aceustomed earnings of the deceased. Abb. Tr. Ev. (2d ed.) 758; Railroad
Co. v. Clarke, 152 U. S. 230, 14 Sup. Ct. 579, 38 L. Ed. 422; Meintyre v. Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 287, 35 How. Prae. 36. The apparent
reason for this rule is that what a man usually earned, within a reasonable period of time prior to his death, is about as reliable data upon
which to estimate what his

probable future earnings would have been,
It is not permissible to prove what the
deceased could have earned in a calling in which he had never engaged,
but fpr which, in the opinion of witnesses, he was well qualified. Nor,
as we have seen, in the case of an employee to prove that there were
chances of promotion in the service in which he was engaged, and
what his earnings would have been if he had lived and been promoted
to a more remunerative position than he had ever held.
The proof
is not allowed to enter the domain of pure conjecture or speculation.
But it does not follow from this that proof of what a railroad employee earned up to a short while before his death, in his chosen calling, is to be excluded because at the very time of his death he was
not filling the particular position or positions in which these earnings were made. Demonstrated skill and capacity are one thing;
conjectural skill and capacity are another thing. Proof of wages actually earned and received by an employee in a nonpolitieal position,
for which he had demonstrated his fitness, which go to make up his
average earnings, within a reasonable period of time prior to his
death, is different from proof of his probable chances, had he survived, to be promoted to a better position than he had ever occupied,
had he

lived,

as can

be found.

and for which he had not demonstrated his fitness, in which he could
have earned higher wages than he had ever done in the past. In the
one case the proof deals with established facts and demonstrated capacity; in the other it has to do with imaginary facts and speculative
capacity. In the one case the proof shows what a man has actually
earned; in the other it shows what, under speculative contingencies, he
could earn. What were this young man’s accustomed eafnings ?
What was his demonstrated capacity to earn money? It seems to us
that these are questions which a jury could properly consider, along
with others involving his age, his health, his habits, his expectancy
of life, etc., in determining the financial value of his life.”
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for
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gence.

must be capable of rendering
service at the time of the injury.
416. Where child was in the chain-gang at
the time of the injury.
417. Negligence of the father as a defense.
418. Where not necessary for father to allege that he or son was free from fault.
415. Infant

412.
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423. Emancipation of child.
424. Damages computed for remnant of mi*
425.
426.

nority.
Expenses may be recovered.
Rights of father not the same
nor’s rights.

as

mi*

Right of action conferred.

Section 3816 of the Civil Code declares that every person may recover for torts committed to himself, or his wife, or his child, or his

his servant.
contemplated by this section are the class of torts for
which damages could have been recovered at common law for loss of
services of the wife, child, ward, or servant.
Chick, 57/360. The
section should be construed in the light of the common law of force
in this State, as it is declaratory of that law.
Allen, 54/505; Bell,
73/521; Frazier, 101/72.
By the common law a father may sue for injuries to his minor son,
as for injuries to a servant, if the son is old enough to render services.
Shields, 15/349. Cited, 53/685; 54/505; 57/358; 60/321; 64/476;
100/47; 104/811.
The father may sue for any trespass done or damage sustained
whereby he loses the services of the child, as also for any expense incurred resulting from such injury. Brinson, 64/475.
413. Torts to child, loss of service gist of the action.
The loss of the services of the child by the parent is the gist, the
essential ground or object of the action in point of law, without which
there would be no cause of action.
The wrong consists in actual damage by reason of loss of service, or capacity to serve.
While to recover it is necessary to show both the negligent injury or homicide,
and loss of service, the latter being the source of damage as to the
father* is the gist of the action, and the rights of the parties are to
be established by the law applicable under such circumstances in the
relation of master and servant. Allen, 54/505.
Cited, 87/710;
104/811; 100/47; 101/70.
Accordingly, it must be alleged and shown that the homicide — in
case of homicide
resulted in loss to the parent of the services of
the child.
If the declaration merely alleges that the minor child has
ward,

or

The torts

—
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been killed

by the carelessness and negligence of the railroad comdamaged, no cause of action is set out
by. Bell, 73/520. And when the acby a mother and the declaration counted apparently on the

pany, whereby the plaintiff is
and there is nothing to amend

tion

was

homicide, and not
dressed and there
service

or

to

on the loss of service, as the grievance to be rebeing no claim of right in the mother to the son’s

recover

hire for it, the declaration was treated

as

not

amendable.

Smith, 84/183.
Where plaintiff’s declaration claimed damages for the loss of services of her minor son, who was injured on defendant’s road, the
further allegation, by way of showing the aggravated nature of the
case, that death resulted from such injuries, does not change the nature of the action-so

as

to make it

For the former she could recover;

a

suit for the homicide of the

for the latter she could not.

son.

Chick,

57/357.
In Davis

Augusta Factory, 87/648, the plaintiff’s daughter was
of age. Through the negligence of defendant, in furnishing unsafe machinery for her to work with in its cotton-mill, she
was injured and died of the injury.
The action was for the loss of
her labor and services, and for expenses incurred in her last illness,
death and burial. It was held that a father may recover damages
against the wrong-doer for loss of labor and services of his minor child,
and for burial and other expenses incurred on account of the negligent
homicide of the child, such child being old enough to perform labor,
and having lived for several days after the infliction of the injury
resulting in death.
414. Action against physicians for negligence.
Bell v. Wooten, 53/684, was an action brought against the defendants as physicians and surgeons for so unskillfully and negligently
amputating the leg of the plaintiff’s son as to cause death. It was not
alleged that the son was a minor and that plaintiff was entitled to
his services as such minor, and therefore no sufficient cause of action
was shown.
A parent can not recover for the homicide of his son
without alleging facts showing pecuniary damage to have been sustained by him.
415. Infant must be capable of rendering service at the time of the
injury.
The loss of service being the cause of action, it follows that if the
infant is incapable of rendering service at the time of the injury, the
parent can not recover. In Shields, 15/349, the boy was eighteen
v.

fifteen years
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in McDowell, 60/320, the girl was eighteen; in Chick,
of age; in Frazier, 101/70, the boy
was fourteen years of age; in Maloy, 77/237, the boy was twenty years
of age, and, in them all, recoveries were allowed. In Allen, 54/503,
the boy 'was two years old and a demurrer to the declaration was susyears

of

age;

60/357, the boy was twenty years

tained

on

the

time of the

ground that he

was

incapable of rendering service at the

injury.

Sugarman, 94/604, the child was not quite five years old. The
to recover for her services during minority, and the declaration alleged that, “As she advanced in years her services would have
become of great value to the father,” though it did not distinctly aver
that at the time of the killing the child was capable of rendering services of any value. An amendment was allowed alleging that the
child was old enough to render, and did in fact render, certain specified
services, and the same were, at the time of her death, of a stated value
per month.
Cited, 106/879.
In Convenia, 100/46, it was held that although the declaration
stated facts showing the tortious killing of the plaintiff’s child by the
defendant, and alleged that the child “was a boy well formed, precocious, and of strong and robust physical powers for a child of his age;
that he was physically sound in every respect, and was capable of rendering, and did render, to the plaintiff valuable services, by going upon
errands to neighbors residing near to plaintiff’s residence, picking up
and bringing in coal and chips to make and keep burning fires in the
house, bringing the broom and other articles used in house-cleaning to
his mother, picking up and carrying out of the house trash and litter
which tended to render untidy in appearance plaintiff’s home, watching and amusing plaintiff’s younger child while his wife was engaged
in cooking and attending to her household duties; find that these services were worth to the plaintiff the sum of two dollars per month”—
no cause of action entitling the
plaintiff to recover for the child’s services was set forth, it being also alleged in the declaration that the
child was only one year, eight months, and ten days old. The
allegations of the declaration should be construed all together, and the courts
will take judicial cognizance of the fact that an infant of this
age is
incapable of rendering valuable services. Simmons, C. J., said: “In
the case of Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 321, 10
Sup. Ct. 862, Mr.
Justice Harlan said: ‘If a fact alleged to exist,
upon which the rights
of parties depend, is within common
experience and knowledge, it
is one of which the courts will take
judicial notice.’ In Ho Ah Kow
In

suit

was
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Nunan, 5 Sawy. 560, Fed. Cas. 6546, Mr. Justice Field said,
can not shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general
cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench, we are not struck
with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as men.’
In the case of King v. Gallun, 109 U. S. 99, 3 Sup. Ct. 85, it was held
y.

‘We

that ‘the court will take

judicial notice of matters of common knowledge, and of things in common use.’ ‘Courts will take judicial notice of facts generally known as of uniform occurrence, or the invariable action of natural laws.’ 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 196. The
fact that a child of less than two years of age can not perform any services of value to its parent is a matter of common knowledge to all
men.
It is as well known to the judge as it is to the jury. It being
so known to the judge, why should he not act upon it, when he is
called upon to do so by proper pleading? Why is he less qualified
than the jury to declare a well-known fact? Why should he submit
such a question to a jury, when, if they found contrary to this wellknown fact, he would be compelled to set aside their verdict? Why
should he go through the farce of a trial, at the expense of the country in time and money, in order to have a jury decide a fact which is
already well known to every one ? There is no necessity for a jury trial
when there is no issue of fact. In our opinion, there can he no
issue of fact as to the ability of a child two years old to perform
valuable services.
Even if the parent should testify that a child of
that age could render services of the value of two dollars per
month, it would be so inconsistent with every person’s knowledge of
the incapacity of children of that age to render service that such testimony would be unworthy of credit. In the case of Hall v. Hollander,
10 E. C. L. 746, 4 Barn. & C. 660, Bayley, J., in discussing an injury
to a child two and a half years old, said: ‘It is manifest that the child
was incapable of performing any service.’ ”
Atkinson, J., dissenting.
Cited, 100/566; 106/878.
In Arnold, 100/566, where the child was between two and a half and
three years of age, the decision in Covenia, supra, was adhered to, and
Fish, J., said: “The difference in the ages of the children in the two
cases is not sufficient to authorize the application to this case of a
principle different from one which controlled the decision in the other.
The reasons given by Chief Justice Simmons, in the opinion in the
Covenia case, for taking judicial cognizance of the fact that a child less
than two years old is incapable of rendering ‘such services as would authorize the parent to recover’ for the loss of them, are equally applica32
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where the child for whose death

recovery is sought is alleged to have been between two and a half and three years of age. It
follows that the court erred in not sustaining the demurrer to the dec-'
laration.” Cited, 106/878.
In Crawford, 106/870, the child was four and a half years old and
it was held that the question whether a particular child of such age
was capable of rendering any valuable service to its father should be
left to a jury to determine, in the light of the evidence submitted upon
the point. Fish, J., said: “Because a child is too young to exercise
any care for its own safety, we do not think it necessarily follows that
it can not render any services of value to its parents.
It is easy
enough for a court to decide, as a matter of law, that any child of a
given age is incapable of rendering valuable services, notwithstanding
the allegations of a petition may be to the contrary, where the age in
question is such that, according to all human observation and experience, it would be utterly preposterous to believe that a child who had
not passed beyond that age could render such services.
For instance,
no sensible man believes that any child only a year old can
perform
service of value to its parents. But by gradually increasing the age
we must sooner or later arrive at an age which is debatable ground —
where reasonable minds will differ in opinion upon the question
whether any child of that particular age can render service of pecuniary worth. Just when that debatable ground will be reached it is,
in the very nature of things, impossible to determine. When the line
is reached where it seems possible that reasonable minds may begin to
differ upon this question, the only safe course for a court to pursue is
to leave the determination of the question to a jury.”
416. Where child was in the chain-gang at the time of the injury.
In Amos, 104/809, it was held that a tortious act which deprives
a minor of his ability to render valuable services will
give the parent
a right of action against the
wrong-doer, although such tort may
result in the death of the minor, and although at the time of the
injury he may be serving, for a violation of a penal law, a term in
the chain-gang, which expires in a short time, and before his majority. Lewis, J., said: “It is insisted that, inasmuch as the injury

ble in

a ease

to the child occurred at

manded

time when its services could not be

by the parent, there

of this court in the
to sustain this
of the

a

case

a

can

be

of Smith

com-

and the decision
Hatcher, supra, is relied on

no recovery,

v.

position. In that case the suit was for the homicide
child, based upon a new right given by statute to the parent
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Under the Civil Code, §3828,

upon the
child at the time of the injury, and,

dependency of the parent on the

further, upon the fact that the
contributing to the support of the parent. The decision
of the court is expressly founded on the use in the statute of the
words ‘is’ and ‘contributes/ in the present tense, the court simply
ruling that, under the statute as construed, the parent must at the
very time of the injury be dependent upon the child, and the child
at such time must be actually contributing to the parent’s support.
child

was

The action in the

case

now

under

review, however, is not founded

upon this statute, but upon principles of the common law, and hence
the decision above cited in nowise conflicts with the principles herein

announced.

Nor

case of Allen, supra, in
for damages on account of
decision was based upon the
idea that the child, on account of its infancy, was at the time incapable of rendering any service. There is sound reason for that
rule.
It would be a matter of mere speculation as to when an
infant, if ever, would reach an age when it could render service;
and, even if it should reach that period in its life when it would
be old enough to work, the value of such services would depend
upon the contingencies of mental and physical development, which
could not be foreseen. In order to maintain this action, it is necessary that the child at the time of its injury should be actually capable of rendering service to the plaintiff. The contrary rule seems
also to have prevailed in England, but in this country the decisions
have been more liberal to the parent, and it is enough that the
parent retains the right to claim the services of the child. 17 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 385, 386. In the case of Shields, supra,
Benning, J., says: ‘May a father treat his minor son as his servant,
and sue for an injury to the son, as for an injury to a servant? If
the son be old enough to render service, the father may.’ To use an
illustration presented in the argument of counsel for plaintiff in
error:
Suppose a child eighteen years of age is attending college,
and is a positive expense to his parent, and renders no service whatever; we apprehend it would not be seriously contended that there
could be no recovery by the parent for an injury to him. Or suppose
the child should have a spell of illness for several months, and while
in that condition should receive an injury, when at the time it was
unable to render service on account of sickness; certainly this con-

is

the

decision

in

the

was an action by a father
the homicide of his infant child, and the

point.

That
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dition could not operate as a bar to the parent’s
Neither would it affect the right of a parent to have

right of action.
redress for such
injuries because the child is at the time temporarily engaged in the
service of another. In 1 Jagg. Torts, pp. 451, 452, the rule is
expressed in the following language: ‘It is not necessary to show
that the child rendered valuable services. Pouring tea or milking
has been held to be an act of service.
Services may continue,
notwithstanding a temporary absence. Even a married daughter
living apart from her husband may, in this sense, render services
cows

to her father.

Proof of actual service of

Right to service is enough.

an

infant is unnecessary.

If the child is of

there must have
The legal
right of the parent at the time to command the service of the child,
though she resides and is temporarily employed elsewhere, is sufficient.
It rests on his legal obligation to provide for her support
and education, and his consequent right to the profits of her labor.
This fiction of service as a basis of the right of the parent to sue for
wrongs done the child is generally recognized in America, although

been loss of service to entitle the

much criticised.

417.

parent to

age,

recover.

9 99

Negligence of the father a defense.
Hooper, 112/96, the plaintiff sued for injuries to his minor
son, and he alleged:
“Defendant’s railroad runs through petitioner’s farm. There is also a wagon-road running through said farm,
and crossing defendant’s railway upon said farm. As the wagonroad approaches the railroad, it passes over a bridge built by defendant over one of its ditches. The bridge forms a part of the approach
to the railroad, and is entirely upon defendant’s right of way. This
wagon-road has been in constant use by the public, and has been
recognized and kept up by defendant for twenty years or more.” He
then alleged that the defendant negligently allowed the bridge to
become rotten and unsafe, which caused the injury.
The trial
judge gave charges which, in substance, laid down the rule that a
father who used, or permitted his minor son to use, a given bridge,
with full knowledge of specified defects therein, could not recover for
injuries occasioned solely by reason thereof, and they were approved.
418. Where not necessary for father to allege that he or son was
free from fault.
Negligence of the railroad company being presumed when injury
by the running of its train is shown, it is not necessary for a father,
suing for loss of the services of his minor son, not an employee of
In
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the company, who was killed on a public crossing, to allege in his
declaration either that he or the son ^ts in the exercise of due care,
without fault.

or was

fault,

or

Lumpkin, J., said:

“If the deceased

was

in

could by the exercise of reasonable c^re have avoided the

injury, these were matters of defense. Deer. Neg. §400; 3 Lawson,
Rights, Rem. & Pr. §1216; Pierce, R. R. 322. The foregoing
authorities sustain the above rulings, though they show also that, if
the declaration itself alleges facts from which consent to the injury,
negligence on the part of the person injured, or failure on his part to
exercise due

care

to avoid the consequences

of defendant’s negligence

be inferred, then the declaration must go further, and avoid
or explain such facts, and make defendant’s liability appear notwithstanding the same. The presumption under our Code being
against the railroad, if injury and negligence by defendant are clearly
set forth, the declaration is sufficient, as to these points, and need
not, when the plaintiff or person injured is not an employee of the
company, further' allege diligence or freedom from negligence on
the part of such plaintiff or person injured, unless the declaration
itself contains averments tending to relieve defendant of the legal
presumption against it.” Evans, 87/673.
419. Diligence of child.
Where the rule of a railroad company provided that while a
coupler was between the cars, the train should not be put in motion,
a coupler so engaged had the
right to presume that it would not be
moved, and that he could pass between the projecting beam of the
cars, which he could have done if the train had not been moved; and
if, while so passing out, under a signal given by another servant of
the company, the engineer backed the train,- and the coupler was
caught between the projecting beams and crushed to death, if he were
a minor, his father could recover for the loss of his
services; and a
recovery would not be prevented by the fact that the deceased might
have passed under the beams in safety by stooping.
Harrison,
73/744.
Whether after notice from a parent to a railroad company not to
employ her minor son, but it does so and the minor is injured while
in such employment, the company can plead his negligence in defense
to an action for the injury brought by the parent, becomes immaterial,
if the parent allege that the minor was injured through no fault of
may

his own, and the cause be tried upon this issue mainly.

85/195.

Hunnicutt,

§§ 420, 421 ]
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Under the declaration and the evidence, this case

turned,

as

[502

should have

to the question of the defendant’s liability, upon whether

the conductor ordered the

plaintiff’s daughter to jump from the
so, whether the daughter was free
from plain and manifest fault in obeying the order. If the order
was not
given, or if it should have been disobeyed on account of the
obvious danger of complying with it, there could be no recovery;
otherwise there could be a recovery, measured by the loss of services,
reduced to their present net value, from the time of the injury up
to the time when the daughter would attain her majority, to which
should be added any expense to the plaintiff occasioned by the injury.
As the daughter was about seventeen years of age, she should not
be treated, with respect to her duty to care for her own safety, as a
child of “tender years,” but should be treated as a person who is
presumptively chargeable with the exercise of the ordinary discretion
possessed by young persons of her class and condition. Hughes,
92/388. Cited, 97/381; 107/138.
420. Diligence of factory superintendent.
Although an infant employee in a factory may not have been in
the line of her duty at the time of an injury to her, yet if she was set
to work upon a particular frame, and what she did in cleaning the
machinery was done under the direction of the superintendent of the
work, and he did not forbid her engaging therein, he was bound
to ordinary diligence in supervising her conduct, and if necessary to
her protection, he not only might use coercion to restrain her from
risk and exposure, but it was his duty to do so, and for neglecting his
obligation in this respect his principal would be responsible. Sections 2619 and 2620, of the Civil Code, do not lessen the obligation of
the employer to look to the safety and protection of the minor operative, or interfere with the right of the parent to the earnings of
his minor child, but afford another safeguard against the personal
abuse of the minor by limiting the authority over him so far as they
express, but no further. Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72/217.
421. When wife may sue.
A wife, while living in a state of separation from her husband,
who has abandoned and failed to provide for her and their minor
child, having the entire care and custody of the child, is entitled to
maintain an action against a railway company for injuries
negligently
inflicted upon the child since the separation took place, by reason
train while in

motibn; and, if
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deprived of his services.

Smith, 93/742.

Cited,

104/814.

right of action for such a tort when the father has
family and all custody and control of the minor.
The allegation in this petition of such abandonment by the father
is sufficient as against a general demurrer. Lewis, J., said: “It is
further insisted by counsel for defendant in error that the declaration in this case does not sufficiently show that the mother, instead
of the father, had a right of action for this injury to her son. Under
section 2475 of the Civil Code, it is declared that ‘if the wife is
living separate from the husband, she may sue for such torts, and
also torts to her children, and recover the same to her use.’
The
petition alleges that the father had deserted the mother long ago;
that, before the injury to her child, she had received his services,
A mother has

a

abandoned his

and would have continued to receive them had he not been

injured.

This

allegation, under the statute, is certainly sufficient, in the absence of a special demurrer.
The statute only requires the wife to
he living separate from the husband in order to give her the right of
action; and we see no other construction that can be reasonably put
upon the words of the petition except that the pleader meant this
state of separation existed at the time of the commission of the tort
and the bringing of the action.” Amos, 104/809.
In Maloy, 77/237, it was held that where a husband and wife are
living separately, and the wife was using the wages of her minor son
for the support of herself and her minor children, a suit for his
homicide, brought by her in her own name and in the name of her
husband for her use, could be maintained. Her declaration alleged
that he was supporting her as well as three other minor children,
that his services
hundred dollars.

were

due to her and

were

of the annual value of six

The court meant that there could he

for the loss of his services

a

recovery

resulting from the homicide, according to
Smith, 84/185. Cited, 85/195.
422. Action for injury to wife’s person.
In an action brought by husband and wife to recover for an injury
to her by reason of a road-crossing being out of order, it was held
that section 3816, which prescribes that the husband may recover
for torts committed on the wife, does not repeal the common-law
rule of pleading, that the wife should be joined in the action. In
such suits the husband may join the wife. But when recovered by
that mode of suit, the amount is hers. Cox, 57/252. Cited, 73/480.
the distinction in Chick’s

case.
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may sue and recover
tort committed to her person causing special

wife, although living with her husband,
own name

for

a

injury to her. This suit was brought for damages for injuries caused
by falling into an opening in the sidewalk on a street. Dorsey v. City
of Atlanta, 73/479. Cited, 89/829; 111/870.
In an action by a husband for loss of his wife’s services, occasioned
by a tortious personal injury to her, he can recover the reasonable
value of such services

as

have been lost to him from the time of the

injury to the date of trial; and in calculating the amount the jury
may take into consideration the nature of the services, and all the
circumstances of the case. There need he no direct or express evidence of value, either by the day, week, month, or any other
period
of time, or of any aggregate sum. The peculiar relation which the
wife sustains to her husband and his household takes her .services
out of the rules of law which apply to computing the value of services rendered

by hirelings

or ordinary servants.
Bleckley, C. J.,
adjudicating the question, we will observe that our
present opinion is that the court could have gone further in respect
to time, so as to embrace any loss of service which would be reasonably certain to occur on account of the injury after the trial and
during the probable existence of the coverture, the probable duration
being measured by the continuance, according to the mortuary tables,
of the joint lives of the matrimonial pair. Nor did the court err in
charging that in calculating the amount of the damages the jury

said:

“Without

could take into consideration the nature of the wife’s
services, and
all the circumstances of the case. When the loss of a wife's
services,

resulting from

a

personal injury to her, is to be compensated for,

she is not to be treated

ordinary servant or as a mere hireling.
Cooley, Torts, *226; Railroad Co. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. St. 329.
as an

She sustains to her husband and his household

a relation
special and
peculiar. Her place can not. be supplied. No other is capable of
filling it. Some wives perform manual labor, others do not; yet

the husbands of the latter, no less than those of the

former, would

certainly be entitled to compensation from wrong-doers for causing
inability to perform service. The actual facts and circumstances of
each case should guide the jury in estimating for themselves, in the
light of their own observation and experience, and to the satisfaction
of their own consciences, the amount which would fairly and justly
compensate the plaintiff for his loss. Certainly some elements of
loss, such as manual labor, would be subject to estimation by wit-
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and, if evidence of this kind were produced, of course the
jury should consider it together with the other facts. But what we
hold distinctly is that there need he no direct or express evidence
of the value of the wife’s services, either by the day, week, month, or
any other period of time, or of. any aggregate sum. The court committed no error in denying a new trial.” Johnson, 91/466.
nesses;

charge4 upon the measure of damages, the court erred in
omitting to call the attention of the jury to the fact that in his declining years the capacity of the deceased to labor in his calling, and
his ability to earn money, might have decreased, and that they should
take this into consideration in fixing the amount of the damages.
In
In its

view of the facts of this

case

and the amount of the verdict rendered,

trial because of this error. Moore, 94/457.
423. Emancipation of child.
In an action by a father for an injury to his minor daughter,
defendant contended that the father had emancipated her from his
control and that he had relinquished all right to her earnings, and in
support of the contention proved that the daughter received her
weekly wages from defendant; that they were always paid to her
and never to the father, and that the rent of the house which his
family occupied was paid from this source. In rebuttal of this, it was
admissible to show that she regularly accounted for and paid to him
her wages. Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72/217.
424. Damages computed for remnant of minority.
In McDowell, 60/320, it was held that a father can not recover
for the homicide of his minor daughter, but may recover for the
loss of her services to the time of her majority. Warner, C. J., said:
there

ought to be

a new

“Under section 2502 of the Civil Code the child remains under the

control of the
of his labor.

father, who is entitled to his services and the proceeds
The plaintiff’s daughter was of sufficient age to have

performed service at the time of the injury, and he was entitled to
twenty-one years of age. This case
comes within the ruling in Chick’s case, which was based on the
unanimous opinion in Shields’s case.”
Cited, 87/650; 101/73;
104/811.
It would seem that the damages recoverable for loss of labor and
services might be computed for the whole remnant of minority,
though the mother of the child be living, and might, under the Act
of 1887, have a right of action for the homicide; the father’s action not being brought for the homicide, but for the loss of labor
her service until she became

§ 424 ]
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services, caused by the wrongful negligence of which death

of the consequences. Bleckley, C. J., said: “This action
being for the homicide of the daughter, hut for the tort of which
the homicide was only a consequence, and the gist of the suit being the loss of labor and services, the right of action was altogether independent of the Civil Code, §3829, and' the recovery
would embrace damages for the loss of services of the daughter from
the time of the injury until she would have been twenty-one years
of age, according to the ruling of this court in McDowell, supra.
Inasmuch as one and the same tortious act may cause separate and
distinct damage to two persons — as, for instance, to master and
servant (Smith, Mast. & Serv. 173) —it is not easy to see how the
scope of the father’s damage, as recognized prior to the Act of 1887,
would be contracted by the right of action given by that act to the
mother, even where the conditions are such as to entitle the mother
to sue and recover for the homicide.
Her damages are arbitrarily
measured by the statute at the full value of the life of the child;
but this is not necessarily inconsistent with the duty on the part of
the wrong-doer of compensating the father, on the basis of the prjor
law, for the damages sustained by him in the loss of the child’s services up to the period of majority, in so far as those services would
was

one

not

have been of value to him.

dent, might be treated

The tort,

with the homicide

as an

inci-

furnishing a cause of action to the father,
and the homicide itself as furnishing a cause of action in behalf of the
mother.
In prescribing a measure of recovery for the latter, the
legislature could make the value of the life the standard, without
changing or intending to.change the measure of recovery for the
former. It does not appear, however, that the child now in question
left any mother; nor was it needful that the declaration should disclose anything on that subject, the present action not being founded
on the Act of 1887, but on the
prior law. The contention that the
prior law has been abrogated by implication is not sustainable,
though it is doubtless true that a father, when himself entitled to sue
under the new act, would have to elect between the remedy which it
affords and the more restricted remedy afforded by the law as it
stood before the act was passed. He could not sue severally for the
homicide and for the original tort from which the homicide resulted
and recover in both actions.” Davis v. Factory, 87/648.
Cited,
92/143.

as
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Expenses may be recovered.
Although the parent can not recover damages for the death of or
injury to his child unless the child was capable of rendering services,
he can recover the expenses necessarily and reasonably incurred in
the burial of the child, including compensation for the loss of such
time on the father’s part, as was needed for the purpose.
Covenia,
100/46. And also any expense incurred in and about the healing and
restoring the child to health. Brinson, 64/476.
In Douglass, 94/547, it appeared that the minor son, for whose
homicide the suit was brought, was a “hostler” to carry engines to
and from a coal-chute. Plaintiff’s testimony tended to show that
the derailment was caused by a defective track and that deceased was
without fault. Defendant’s testimony was to the effect that the
track was in good condition and that the train was running at an
unsafe speed. It was held that the action being by a father for loss
of service of his minor son, who died in consequence of an injury
received while running a train as locomotive-engineer, and the evidence suggesting that if the accident occurred from fast running by
the deceased, who was a youth between seventeen and eighteen years
of age, his immediate superior, who was on the train at the time,
and whose failure to testify in the case as to the real cause of the
accident is not accounted for, ought to have controlled and restrained
him so as to confine him to a safe speed, the jury were warranted in
finding for the plaintiff as to' his right to recover and in allowing
t

full damages; and

no

direct point

on

the amount of the verdict

being made here, either in the record, the argument of counsel, or
their brief, and, so far as appears, none such having been presented
and insisted upon in the court below, a new trial is not required
merely because this court, on reading the record, has discovered that,
in fixing the amount of the damages, the jury may not have deducted
enough from the wages which the deceased was earning to cover his
personal expenses, more especially as the evidence furnishes no basis
for computing the amount of these expenses, and does not even show
that the daily wages which the deceased was earning were not net,
or in addition to board furnished
by his employer, or by whom,
whether by himself or his employer, board was furnished.
426. Rights of minor not the same as father’s rights.
A suit against a railway company for personal injuries to a minor,
brought in his behalf by his father, as next friend, is not, either as to
cause of action or as to parties, actually or substantially the same
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by the father in his own right against such company for loss
services, occasioned by those injuries. The record of the former of two such suits is not, therefore, admissible in
evidence on the trial of the latter on the theory that the causes of
action were substantially the same.
Nor is the testimony of a
witness who was sworn on the trial of the former, and who afterwards died, admissible in evidence on the trial of the latter, under
Civil Code, §5186. Hooper, 112/96.
as a

of

suit

the

minor’s
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427. What
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torts. A tort is

Runaway horse
Judgment not

rendered.
432. Torts are not
433. Abatement of

general

it

is

assignable.
actions

for

torts.

committed upon the
It may be either: 1. A
the individual. 2. The
infraction of some public duty by which special damage accrues to
the individual.
3. The violation of some private obligation by
which like damage accrues to the individual. In the former ease, no
special damage is necessary to entitle the party to recover. In the
two latter cases, such damage is necessary.
Civil Code, §3807.
When the law requires one to do an act for the benefit of another,
or to forbear the
doing of that which may injure another, though no
action be given in express terms upon the accrual of damage, the
party may recover. Civil Code, §3809.
Private duties may arise either from statute or flow from relations
created by contract, express or implied. The violation of any such
specific duty, accompanied with damage, gives a right of action. Civil
Code, §3810.
In arriving at a correct understanding of the meaning of section
3807, the words “independent of contract” must be understood as
applying to each one of the three subdivisions embraced in that section. Accordingly, the third subdivision means the same as if it
read:
“The violation of some private obligation, independent of
contract, by which like damage accrues to the individual”; and section 3810, in so far as it refers to private duties flowing from “relations created by contract, express or implied,” means the same thing.
Lnmpkin, P. J., Spinks, 104/692.
are

a

legal

injury.
assignable until

causes

wrong

person or property independent of contract.
direct invasion of some legal right of-
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Negligent sale of cartridges; general discussion of the doc-

trine.
In Smith

v.

Clarke Hardware

Co., 100/163, it

was

held that to

a

declaration

substantially alleging that the plaintiff sought to purchase a particular kind of loaded cartridges, and was negligently
given, by defendant’s agent to sell, certain loaded cartridges, which
were represented to be of the kind asked for, and which were alleged
to be very similar in size, make and mark to those desired, but were
in reality of different caliber, and that on account of such difference
in caliber the plaintiff (he being without fault or negligence in handling the cartridges so purchased, and while using the same properly)
was
injured by the premature explosion of one of them, it was
error

to

sustain

That the

a

demurrer

for

want

of

a

cause

of

action.

allegations in the declaration authorized a submission
to a jury to determine the facts involved — among them,
whether or not the injury could have been avoided by the plaintiff in
the exercise of ordinary care. Little, J., said: “Has the plaintiff
suffered at the hands of the defendant the consequences of a tort
arising by reason of the negligence of the latter ? Inasmuch as there
can be no actionable negligence in the absence of the existence of a
duty, and inasmuch as there can be no tort unless in a transaction of
this character the law imposed upon the defendant the duty of exercising ordinary care in the sale of such goods to purchasers, it becomes only material to consider whether there was a duty imposed by
law upon the defendant to exercise such care relatively to the plaintiff. As stated, there can be no case of the negligent injury of one
person by another in the absence of a legal duty from the person
inflicting the injury to the person on whom it is inflicted. 16 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law, p. 415, par. 8, and authorities there cited.
It
must be a duty implied by law, although it may arise out of contract.
Bish. Noncont. Law, §§132, 133. In actions of tort no duty
is considered in law except a legal duty, and all legal duties exist
from implication of law. A contract merely creates this implication.
Whart. N"eg. §24.
In his treatise on negligence (section 24), Dr.
Wharton has well defined a legal duty to be ‘that which the law requires to be done or forborne to a determinate person or to the public
at large, and is correlative to a right vested in such determinate
person or in the public.’
The obligation involved is not a moral
obligation, but it is the obligation imposed on every member of society
by law so to conduct himself and use his property as not to injure
of the

case
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16 Am. &

Eng. Enc.
In every undertaking there arise by implication of
law certain rights and duties.
The duty incumbent upon the party
engaged in the undertaking is to so conduct it that no injury will
result to others; and upon every person holding himself out to the
public as willing to act in a certain capacity, professional or otherwise, and who has induced persons to commit themselves or their
property to his care, there is, by implication of law, a duty to use
proper care in his conduct towards them, and, as a consequence of
this duty, there is a liability to answer for injuries caused by a breach
of it. Id. p. 420, and authorities there cited. Thus, an attorney is
liable for negligently giving improper advice (Moorman v. Wood,
117 Ind. 144, 19 N. E. 739); a physician, for negligence in the treatment of his patient (Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N. W. 417).
It has been held that a caterer is liable for injuries caused by poisonous food negligently furnished by him at a public entertainment;
the court holding that since he assumed to act as a caterer, and was
employed as such, a duty was implied to him by law to perform with
due care that which he had undertaken.
Bishop v. Weber, 139 Mass.
411, 1 N. E. 154. So, also, an apothecary who, by his servant, negligently sold, as and for tincture of rhubarb, two ounces of laudanum,
was held liable for damages resulting from such negligent sale.
Norothers.

non

Law, p. 417.

ton

Sewall, 106 Mass. 143.

In the case of Thomas v. Winchester,
dealer in drugs and medicines who
carelessly labels a deadly poison as a harmless medicine, and sends
it, so labeled, into market, is liable to all persons who, without fault
on their part, are injured
by using it as such medicine in consequence
of the false label; the court further holding that the liability in such
cases arises, not out' of any contract or direct privity between him and
the person injured, but out of the duty which the law imposes upon
him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others.
The imminent danger attending the sale and use of such drugs, and
the great difficulty of detecting their poisonous character, impose
upon dealers the duty of exercising the highest degree of care known
among practical men to prevent injury from the use thereof.
2
Shear. & R. Neg. §691. While, in the sale of cartridges, ammunition, and other devices to be used in firearms, the degree of care
required may not be so great, nor the scope of liability so far-reaching,
as in the sale of poisonous drugs, by reason of the fact that the dangers attending the former are not so imminent as those attending
v.

6 N. Y.

397, it

was

held that

a
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latter, there being in all probability much less difficulty in deteeting the real kind and character of the one than would be true as
to the other, yet it will not be contended that cartridges and kindred
devices are not dangerous explosives; and, being such, they can not
be blindly and indifferently distributed to purchasers, without regard
to the purpose for which they are to be used, or the age and discretion
of the person to whom they are sold. One holding himself out to
the public as dealing in such articles at least owes to purchasers the
duty of exercising ordinary care in the matter of placing into their
hands the kind and character of goods for which they contract. This

duty, of course, exists in a higher degree with respect to latent danwhich are hidden from the eye of the non-expert, and without
the knowledge of the uninformed. In the present case we think the
defendant owed to the plaintiff the duty of exercising ordinary care
in the matter of selecting and selling to him the kind of cartridges
gers

asked for.”
429.

Proprietary medicine causes injury.
Company v. Cooper, 83/457, the plaintiff alleged
that he had been injured by a proprietary medicine, and it was held
that where one prepares a proprietary or patent medicine and puts
it upon the market and recommends it to the world as useful for the
cure of certain diseases, the bottle containing it having therewith a
prescription made by the proprietor of the medicine, in which he states
that it is to be taken in certain quantities, and the medicine with
this prescription is sold by the proprietor to a druggist for the purpose
of being resold to persons who might wish to use it, and the druggist sells it to a person who uses it in the quantity there prescribed,
and the same contains an ingredient, such as iodide of potash, in
such quantity as proves harmful to the person thus using it, the proprietor is liable. The medicine having been put upon the market
by the proprietor, not alone for the use of druggists, but to be used by
the public in general who might need it for the cure of the diseases
for which the proprietor set forth in the label that it was adapted,
it was the same as if the proprietor himself had sold the medicine
to the person who was injured by its use, with instructions and direcIn Blood Balm

tions

as

to how the

same

should be taken.

A medicine known to the

dangerous and poisonous, if taken in large quantities, may
by the proprietor to druggists and others, and if any person,
without more, should purchase and take the same so as to cause injury
to himself, the proprietor would not be liable.
public

be sold

as
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Runaway horse causes injury.
Phillips v. DeWald, 79/732, was an action for a personal injury
resulting from being run over by a horse, and it was held that though
a horse be very sensible, very gentle, and accustomed to stand unhitched at his owner’s door in a busy, noisy street, yet, if he be fancy,
stylish, restless, and very high-strung, the jury may infer negligence
from leaving him loose elsewhere in the same or another street, unattended, except by the owner watching him from a distance of five or
six feet. When a horse attached to a buggy is, by the owner’s negligence, loose in the street, and moving at will, persons who see the
horse thus going at large are at no fault for trying to stop or capture
him, and if by their rush, throwing up of hands, or other demonstrations, they frighten him, and cause him to run away, invade the
sidewalks, and injure a person passing lawfully thereon, the owner
will be responsible in damages for the injury. Bleckley, C. J., said:
“The diligence in securing his horse and preventing his escape, which
the defendant

was

bound to

observe,

was

that

care

which

every

dealing with similar horses,
at a
The omission of that degree of diligence would be negligence, and whether it was omitted
or not in this instance was a question for'the jury.
It is said that
prudent

man exercises or would exercise in
like place, under like circumstances.

the horse

not

vicious, or, if so, the defendant did not know it.
individual of a vicious species, or a vicious
species. This horse was neither, and eonsequently the learning touching vicious animals, whether derived from
statute or judicial decisions, has nothing to do with the case.
Every
horse whatever, no matter how gentle or amiable, must be properly
attended or secured in the crowded business streets of a city, when
there by the act of the owner, subject to his control.
The instincts
common to the species rendered this
necessary, and of these instinctsevery owner must be presumed to have notice.
The qualities of the
individual horse have no relevancy, except as throwing light upon the
means proper to be used to secure
him, and the kind of attendance,
or other
precautions, which common prudence requires. Again, it is
argued that, though the horse may have been loose in the streets by
negligence, it was not that negligence, but the direct acts of others,
which caused him to run away.
Also, that the injury to the plaintiff
was too contingent and
remote, as related in defendant’s negligence,
to be the subject of recovery in
damages. It may be fairly anticipated
by one who negligently leaves a horse and buggy to straggle through
was

A vicious animal is any
individual of a harmless
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city that efforts will be made to stop or capture the horse, and that
efforts, or other movements or noises, may cause him to run
away, and that, if he should run away, some person may be hurt.
Between leaving a horse to go at random where there is great danger of
doing mischief, and hurling a missive at or into a crowd — careless, if
it strike or not
there is but little difference. The horse may be
regarded as a squib — slow at first, but likely to become swift and
a

such

—

destructive.”
431.

Judgment for a tort not assignable until rendered.
judgment recovered in an action for a tort is not assignable
before it comes into being, that is, before it has been rendered or
entered up, although a verdict has been returned upon which judgment
can be and is afterwards signed.
The plaintiff acquires title, not by
the verdict, but by the judgment, and until its rendition he has no
title to assign; until then his action for the tort is not terminated,
but is still pending and in progress. Until the final judgment the
defendant is not subject to garnishment. A garnishment issued and
served after a first verdict for the plaintiff, which verdict is subsequently set aside and a new trial granted, and answered before a
second trial is had, the answer denying indebtedness, seizes nothing
and takes no lien on the final recovery. Gamble, 80/595. Cited,
84/406; 87/389; 96/176.
432. Torts not assignable.
In Central Railroad v. Brunswick & Western Railroad, 87/386, the
A

plaintiff alleged that its engine and its engineer, Scoville, had been
a collision with defendant’s train.
The suit was to recover plaintiff’s damages, and was for the use of Scoville as to the
damage sustained by him in excess of what plaintiff had paid him. It
was held that where a railroad company and its employee are both
injured by the same negligence of another railroad comp an/, the
first company has no right, in an action for its own damages against
the second, to sue also for the use of its employee to recover the damages sustained by him in excess of those already paid to him by the
plaintiff in the action. Simmons, C. J., said: “There can be no question that plaintiff had the right to sue for any injuries to its own property, or for the injury it may have sustained in the loss of its engineer’s
services, and expenses flowing directly therefrom, which may have been
caused by defendant’s negligence. But we are at a loss to perceive
how the plaintiff can maintain an action for personal injuries received
by Scoville for any amount exceeding what it had actually paid him
damaged by
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received by him, and for which no compensation had been made to him by plaintiff, he, and he alone, in
our opinion, would be entitled to sue the defendant.
It is not alleged in the declaration that Scoville assigned to the plaintiff any
right of action he may have had against the defendant, and certainly
plaintiff is in no better position to bring suit for his use than it would
have been to sue in its own right if such assignment had been made.
If it be alleged in reply that plaintiff was seeking this particular recovery, not for its own benefit, but for the use and benefit of Scovilla
himself, the answer is that Scoville was competent to bring suit in
his own name and right, and no reason appears why he should not do
so.
Even if he had attempted to assign his claims to plaintiff we do
not think this could have been done.
Our own Code, at-least by implication, seems to settle the question that causes of action arising
from torts are not assignable.
Section 2243 classes such rights as
choses in action, but the next section provides expressly that choses
in action arising upon contract may be assigned, and is silent as to
the assignment of choses in action arising upon. tort. It would seem,
therefore, under the rule, expressio unius exclusio alterius, that the
latter are not assignable in this State. Such was the ruling of this
court, and we think it sound, in Gamble, supra. The court, therefore,
did not err in sustaining the demurrer to so much of the declaration
as sought a
recovery for the use of Scoville.”
433. Abatement of actions for tort.
In an action for personal injuries, the plaintiff recovered a verdiet, the court granted a new trial and it was taken to the Supreme
on

this account.

Court.

Whilst

For injuries

pending in that court the plaintiff died, the judgment

affirmed, and, as the case had to be tried again, it was held that
as t]ie law then stood the action abated,on its return to the court
below. Thompson, 60/120.
An action against a railroad company for personal
injuries, pending when the act of November 12, 1889, amending section 3825 of
the Code, was passed, was not abated by the death of the
plaintiff;
nor is that act, as
applicable to actions pending at the time of its
passage, unconstitutional. Pritchard, 87/294.
Action for tort does not abate by the death
of either party. No
action for a tort shall abate by the death of either
party where the
wrong-doer received any benefit from the tort complained of; nor
shall any action for the recovery of damages for
homicide, injury to
person or injury to property abate by the death of either party; but
was
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such

of

action, in case of the death of the plaintiff, shall, in
no right of
survivorship in any other person, survive to the personal representative of the deceased plaintiff and in
case of the death of the defendant, shall survive
against said defendant’s personal representative. Civil Code, §3825.
cause

the event there is

CHAPTER 23.
*

PHYSICAL
434.

Physical
3827.

injuries,

Civil

Code,

§§3826,

INJURIES.

I 435. Assault and battery.

|

434. Physical injuries. A physical injury done to another gives a
right of action, whatever may be the intention of the actor, unless he
is justified under some rule of law. The intention should be considered in the assessment of damages. Civil Code, §3826.
What is a tort on person. Any violent injury, or attempt to commit a physical injury illegally upon a person, is a tort, for which
damages may be recovered. Civil Code, §3827.
435. Assault and lottery.
In Tucker v. Walters, 78/232, it was alleged that the defendant
had cut the plaintiff with, a knife.
On the trial it appeared that a
difference arose between the parties; plaintifE made a statement and
defendant responded, “It is not so”; plaintiff said it was so, and upon
the defendant repeating that it was not so, the plaintiff struck him,
and then seized him from behind, catching his arms and crushing
him down upon the floor, and while in this condition, the defendant
took out a knife and stabbed the plaintiff in the leg. It was error for
the court to charge that the words so spoken by the defendant,
whether in a mild, kind or 'insulting manner, were not opprobrious
words, and that the manner in which they were spoken would not
make them so.
It should be left to the jury to determine whether
under all facts and circumstances of the case, the words were opprobrious and abusive or not, and whether or not the battery on the part
of the plaintifE upon the defendant was justifiable. A new trial was
not granted for this erroneous charge because the facts required a
verdict for the defendant. Even if the words were opprobrious and
justified the giving of the blow, the plaintifE followed up his battery
with another without justification; and if it was necessary to the
escape of the defendant for him to use his knife, he was justifiable
in so doing.
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Hicks, 34/259, the plaintiff sued for a battery. It
keeper of a tippling-honse has a right to defend
himself against a dangerous assault made upon him therein by a person who has drunk there to intoxication, although such a house be not
was

v.

held that the

what is termed in. law

a

man’s castle.

CHAPTER
TORTS BY

by wife, child,
Code, §§3817, 3031.

436. Torts

or

£4.

WIFE, CHILD, OR SERVANT.

servant, Civil

438. When
scope

the

servant’s

act

is

within

the

of his duties.

437. Kelation of master and servant must
first be established.

436. Torts

by wife, servant, etc. Every person shall be liable for
by his wife, and for torts committed by his child, or
servant by his command, or in the prosecution and within the scope
of his business, whether the same be by negligence or voluntary.
Civil
Code, §3817.
Trespass of agent. The principal is not liable for the willful trespass of his agent, unless done by his command or assented to by him.
Civil Code, §3031.

torts committed

These sectioqs must

be construed

so as

to harmonize the two and
Tur-

allow both to remain of force, in the cases to which they apply.
ner,

72/292.

437. Relation

of master and servant must first be established.
plaintiff sued for damages sustained from having been pushed
off a car of defendant, while in motion, by a negro, who emerged
from the car and stated that he was in charge of it. The mere declarations and acts of the negro, unless brought to the knowledge of the
company or to their agents, who had charge of their train at the time,
is not sufficient to make the company liable for his acts as their servThe

ant.

The relation of master and servant must first be established

by competent legal evidence in order to make the company responsiLindsay, 46/447. Cited, 69/204.
438. When the servant’s act is within the scope of his employment.
In Wood, 94/124, a girl was struck by a stone thrown from a train
of cars by an employee of the railroad
company. It was held that
the evidence being silent as to the specific duty of the servant of the
railway company, but indicating that he was acting in the capacity of
brakeman, and this servant, while the train was in motion, and he was
upon it, having thrown a stone at a boy who had just attempted to
ble for his conduct.
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or climb upon the train, and who with others
been in the habit of committing or attempting similar

had previously
trespasses; the
stone being thrown after the boy had ceased attempting to trespass
upon the train on the given occasion, and had retreated to private
premises adjacent to the street, and while he was there endeavoring
to conceal himself behind a post; and th'e stone by accident having
missed the boy, and hit and injured another person, who was then on
the same premises — no presumption arises that at the time of throwing the stone the servant was acting in behalf of the company, or
within the scope of his employment, as to anything then done or atswing to

tempted to be done with a view to injure or affect the boy; eonsequently, the company is not liable for the injury thus done to the third
person.
Simmons, J., said: “The evidence is silent as to the specific
duties of a brakeman, and does not show what authority this employee
had from the railroad company to keep trespassers off the train; but,
assuming that this came within the scope of his duties, no presumption arises that he was acting within the scope of his employment in
throwing a stone at this boy, with a view to injuring him, after he had
desisted from the trespass and gone off from the train. A master is
not liable for the acts of his servant when such acts

within the scope of the
If the brakeman, while

are

not done

employment in which the servant is engaged.
these boys were engaged in the trespass, had,
in attempting to prevent the trespass or cause them to desist, injured
one of them through
negligence or carelessness, or by using more force
than was necessary for the purpose, the company would perhaps be
liable. See Wood, Mast. & Serv. p. 537; Rounds v. Railway Co., 64 N.
Y. 129. But, after the boy had desisted, the company would not be
responsible for an injury inflicted on him by the brakeman in attempting to punish him for the trespass. See Golden v. Newland, 52
Iowa, 59, 2 hT. W. 609; Allen v. Railway Co., L. R. 6, Q. B. 65.
Cited, 98/753.
In Thompson v. Wright, 109/466, it was alleged that petitioner
was
engaged as a drayman in the transportation of freight from place
to place in the city of Brunswick, for the purpose of which business
he had a horse and dray, and in pursuit thereof frequented the
wharves, docks and depots in said city for the purpose of soliciting
business. While engaged in this business, the defendant was at the
time the owner of the steamer Hessie, engaged as a common carrier
in running a steamboat-line between the ports of Brunswick and Darien.
Petitioner was at the landing-place of this steamer, and while
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Watkins for the

transportation of certain
place of business in
the city, the hides at the time being aboard the steamer Hessie. For
the purpose of facilitating the loading and discharging of the steamer’s cargoes, the officers and employees would lay its gang-plank from
the deck of the steamer to hnd on the body of the wagons bringing or
carrying away merchandise or other freights. On the occasion mentioned the mate of the steamer placed the gang-plank from the steamer’s deck to the rear end of petitioner’s dray, and kept the same in
this position for the purpose of transferring the hides from aboard
the steamer to the dray. When the loading was completed, petitioner
went to his seat on the wagon and started to drive off, when suddenly,
and without any warning to him, the mate of the steamer (being defendant's employee), having neglected to take in the gang-plank,
wrongfully and negligently caught hold of one of the rear wheels of
the dray, simultaneously uttered a tremendous yell, causing petitioner’s horse to become frightened, from the effect of which the horse
backed himself, hides, and dray overboard into the waters of the bay,
carrying petitioner along with him. The mate was, when discharging the cargo of said steamer, in the regular discharge of his duties
within the scope of his employer’s business, and the.duty devolved
upon him to take in and otherwise attend to the keeping of said gangplank, and petitioner was in no way connected therewith. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained.
Lewis, J., said: “The masone

hides from the dock of the steamer to Watkins’s

ter is not liable for the acts of his servant which

the scope of his
tition is specific,

are

not done within

employment. In this case the allegation of the pethat the negligent acts of the servant complained of

committed while he

in the regular

discharge of his duties
of the business
to take care of
when the same
was being used for the purpose of
loading or unloading the vessel. It
is clearly inferable from the charges in the petition that, at the time
of the negligent acts of the servant which resulted in plaintiff’s injury,
he was engaged in an effort to save the master’s property. In Wood,
M^st. & Serv. §300, it is declared: ‘When a servant finds himself,
or the subject-matter of his labor, in such a situation that in order to
preserve his master’s interests, he must do an act that will most likely
result in injury to others, the master can not escape liability upon
the ground that it was purposely done by the servant.
If it was' done
were

was

within the scope of his employer’s business.
A part
of the servant in this case was evidently to arrange
and protect the gang-plank belonging to his master
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of the servant’s

employment, and in furtherance thereof,
as having been impliedly authorized by
the master.’
Several instances are given by that authority which
show the principle is equally as applicable to the facts in this ease as
it is to the eases cited in the text.
In 14 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p.
810, the same principle is recognized in the following language: ‘It
is also well settled that a master is ordinarily liable for injuries caused '
by his servant in preventing damage or loss to property of the master.’
In Cooley, Torts (2d ed.), *538, it is declared: ‘The master who
puts|
the servant in a place of trust or responsibility, or commits to him
the management of his business or the care of his property, is justly
held responsible when the servant, through lack of judgment or discretion, or from infirmity of temper, or under the influence of passion
aroused by the circumstances and the occasion, goes beyond the strict
line of his duty or authority, and inflicts an unjustifiable injury upon
another.’ It was held that a petition alleging negligence on the part
of an employee in and about a matter falling within the regular discharge of his duties within the scope of his employer’s business, and
consequent injury to the plaintiff, sets forth a cause of action against
such employee’s master.”
course

the law will

regard the acts

CHAPTER 25.
employer’s

liability for the acts of an independent

439. When

employer is liable for the acts
of
an
independent contractor, Civil
Code, §3819.

440. This

section

is

exhaustive

of

411.
442.

contractor.

Independent employment.
Employer is liable when the obligation
is statutory.

the sub*

ject.

439.

Employer, when liable for acts of contractor. The employer
negligence of the contractor (1) when the work is
wrongful in itself, or, if done in the ordinary manner, would result
in a nuisance; (2) or, if according to previous knowledge and experience, the work to be done is in its nature dangerous to others, however carefully performed; (3) or, if the wrongful act is the violation
of a duty imposed by express contract upon the employer; (4) or, if
the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute; (5)
or, if the employer retains the right to direct or control the time
and manner of executing the work; or interferes and assumes control, so as to create the relation of master and servant, or so that an
injury results which is traceable to his interference; (6) or, if the
is liable for the
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employer ratifies the unauthorized wrong of the independent eontractor. Civil Code, §3819.
440. This section is exhaustive of the subject.
In Ridgeway v. Downing Company, 109/591, it was held that
where the owner of a vacant city lot, who for many years has suffered the public to use a thoroughfare over the same, employs an
independent contractor to construct a building thereon according to
certain specifications, including excavations for piling for the foundation, and the contractor digs a trench for such purpose across the
thoroughfare, the owner is not liable for a personal injury sustained
by one who falls into the trench by reason of its unguarded condition.
Fish, J., said: “As section 3819 of the Civil Code undertakes to declare when the employer shall be liable for the negligence of the contractor, and specifically enumerates the instances in which he shall
be, we think it is exhaustive of the subject — that the only instances
in which an employer of an independent contractor is liable for the
negligence of such contractor are those therein enumerated and de'

fined.”
441.

Independent employment.

A railroad company is not liable for injuries sustained by laborers
in the employ of a contractor who was working for the company,

though it

may have furnished implements
formance of the work.
The plaintiff was

bankment

on

defendant’s road with

a

and materials for the
engaged in filling an

dirt-car that fell from

a

perem-

trestle.

The trestle gave way.

The work was let out by defendant to Adams.
paid the plaintiff, and defendant had nothing to do with
hiring him, nor did it have control over the mules, cars, or men, although, in the contract with Adams, it agreed to furnish track, trestie and motive power. Grant, 46/417.
Cited, 62/691.
In McConnell, 87/756, it appeared that the Fulton County StreetRailroad Company obtained a charter authorizing it to build a streetrailroad through certain streets of the city of Atlanta when it should
obtain the consent of the municipal authorities. It seems this consent was obtained by the company, and it made a contract with the
Thomson-Houston Electric Company, another corporation, whereby

His

overseer

the latter undertook to furnish all the material and the entire construction of the road, without any direction or control reserved to the
.

street-railroad company.

During the

progress

of the work

upon

West Peachtree street, the contractor laid the iron rails about eight
feet apart on each side of the proposed road-bed, a considerable dis-
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beyond and ahead of the place where its hands were taking up
pavement and preparing the road-bed for the cross-ties and iron.

tanee
a

The rails thus laid furnished

a

continuous line

on

each side of where

considerable distance ahead of
the hands. McConnell was riding on horseback upon that street, and
in attempting to cross the street where these iron rails were laid, the
horse struck his foot against one of the rails, and fell, seriously injuring McConnell. He brought his action for damages against the streetrailroad company and the Thomson-Houston Electric Company
jointly and recovered against both. It was held that where a streetrailway company, having authority under its charter to construct a
railway in the public street, does the work by an independent contractor, and an injury to a person passing along the street is caused
by the negligence of a servant of the contractor, which negligence consisted in unnecessarily and improperly laying down loose iron rails in
advance of the workmen engaged in constructing the track, the contractor is liable for the consequences of such negligence, but the railway company is not, the latter company not having reserved any control over the conduct of the former in executing the work.
Simmons, J., said as to the electric company: “The testimony shows that
there were two ways to mark the lines to guide the hands — one safe
and the other unsafe. Where a person or corporation is authorized
by law to obstruct the public streets of a city for any purpose, it is
the road-bed

incumbent

was

on

to be

him

or

placed, for

a

it to exercise

great

care

to prevent passen-

gers along the streets from being injured; and if in the progress of
the work it becomes necessary to do a certain thing, and there are two

safe and the other unsafe and unnecessary, if
adopted, and a person is injured thereby, it is
such negligence on the part of the person or corporation performing
the work as would authorize the party injured to recover damages.
Although a person may have authority to obstruct the street for the
purpose of constructing a railroad-track therein, he has no right to
obstruct more of that street than is necessary for the proper performance of his work at that time and place.
He has no right to put obstructions far in advance of the work which is being performed, and
which are unnecessary at that time to enable him to carry on his work.
The people have a right to the use of the streets as well as the streetrailroad companies or their contractors, and neither the companies
nor their contractors have a
right to prevent the free use of and access
to the streets by the people, except at times and places where it is necways

of doing it,

one

the unsafe method is
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for the companies or contractors to occupy them; and if they
place unnecessary obstructions in the street, and a passenger
in the street should be injured thereby, they would be liable, unless the
injury could have been avoided by the exercise of due care on the
part of the passenger. We therefore think the court did not err in
overruling the motion for a new trial as to the Thomson-Houston
Electric Company.” As to the railroad company, he said:
“The
electric company was to furnish all the material, and was not to be
subject to the direction or control of the railroad company. This
made it an independent contractor, and not the servant or agent of
the railroad company, and the testimony does not bring the railroad
company within any of the exceptions to the general rule laid down
essary

should

in section 3818.”

Cited, 106/275; 109/595.
Employer is liable when the obligation is statutory.
In Wilson & Bro. v. White, 71/506, the owner of a city lot contracted with Wilson & Brother to furnish material and lay a pave442.

the street

adjoining the lot. Wilson & Brother hauled the
laying the pavement, and piled them up in the gutter beside
the place where the work was to be done. They engaged the services
of Backus to provide the sand and lay the brick, agreeing to pay him a
stipulated price per yard for the work. Having no lamps of their
own, they requested Backus to provide signal-lights and place them
upon the brick, while the improvement was going on and while the
street was obstructed.
Mrs. White, in going along the sidewalk at
night, and for the want of a light, came in contact with the brick
and was injured.
She sued Wilson & Brother. Among other defenses they set up that Backus was the contractor in charge of the
work, and he was liable and they were not. Two replies were made to
this defense:
First, that Backus was not a contractor, but merely
the servant of Wilson & Brother, who were in fact the contractors and
the responsible parties. Second, that whether Backus was a contrac-

ment

on

brick for

_

tor

or

not

was

immaterial,

as

the material which caused the

Wilson & Brother

were

the

owners

of

injury, and were required by the city ordinances to put lights on the material at dark — and that they could
not escape responsibility by agreeing with another to discharge this
duty to the public which had in express terms been enjoined upon
them by law. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. A new trial
was moved for.
It was denied, and it was held that if an independent contractor is employed to do a lawful act, and in the course of his
work he or his servants commit some casual act of wrong or negli-
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the employer is not responsible; but unless the employee (who
a contractor) had relinquished his control over the work
the subcontractor, and had nothing further to do with it, either
furnishing material or otherwise, except to see that it was done to

gence,
was

to

in

himself

the satisfaction of the person for whom it was
was not an independent contractor,

done, then the subbut was the servant
and agent of the original contractor, his act was the act of the original contractor, and the responsibility was upon the latter to answer
for any damage done to another in consequence of his failure to perform his duty. And where the ordinance of a municipal corporation required the owner of any materials which formed an obstruction
in its streets or sidewalks to prepare and place lights thereon before
dark with such care and diligence as reasonably to secure their burning until daylight, such owner is liable for any injury that arises to
others in consequence of the negligent performance of this duty,
whether it was performed by himself or by a contractor employed by
him.
The foregoing case was decided upon the principle that the person upon whom a statutory obligation is imposed is liable for any injury that arises to others from its non-performance or in consequence
of its having been negligently performed, either by himself or by a
contractor employed by him.
Kimberly, 87/167. Cited, 87/759.
contractor

'

CHAPTER 26.
MALPRACTICE OP SURGERY AND MEDICINE.

Malpractice of surgery and medicine. A person professing to
surgery, or the administering of medicine for a compensation, must bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable degree
of care and skill. Any injury resulting from a want of such care
and skill will be a tort for which a recovery may be had. Civil Code,
443.

practice

§3831.
In Smith

v.

Overby, 30/241, the trial judge charged the jury that

every physician undertakes to bring to
a reasonable degree of care and skill;

the exercise of his profession

he does not undertake to use
the highest possible degree of skill, but he undertakes that he will
bring a fair, reasonable and competent degree of skill. The care required of him should have reference to the nature of the business he
is called on to perform. He is not responsible for an error in judgment, if such error arises from the peculiar circumstances of the case,
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skill on his l?art. This charge
approved by the Supreme Court.
In Moon v. McRae, 111/206, the plaintiff alleged malpractice

and not from want of proper care or
was

which resulted in the loss of

of

an error

♦Tn'Bell

v.

a

limb.

The

case was

reversed because

in the

charge of the court as to pain and suffering.
Wooten, 53/684, the plaintiff sought to recover damages

alleged unskillfulness in amputating his son’s leg. He did not allege that his son was a minor and that he was entitled to his services
for

as a

minor.

It

was

held that

a

demurrer should have been sustained

tp the declaration.
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in

445.

Duty of landlord as to examining

and

repairing the premises.
by tenants against landlords.

446. Actions

444. When landlord is liable for injuries camsed by defects in rented
premises. The landlord, having fully parted with possession and right
of possession, is not responsible to third persons for damages resulting
from the negligent or illegal use of the premises by the tenant. But
he is responsible to others for damages arising from defective construction, or for damages from failure to keep the premises in repair.
Civil Code, §3118.
445. Duty of landlord as to examining and repairing the premises.
A landlord is not liable for personal injuries to a servant of his
tenant arising from a defect in the rented premises, of which the
landlord had no knowledge, and which he had not been notified to
repair. When the tenant is in the exclusive possession and control of
the rented premises, the landlord is under no duty of examining the
same with a view to ascertaining whether or not
repairs are needed,
unless requested so to do.
Lumpkin, P. J., said: “While, under section 3118 of the Civil Code, a landlord is responsible to a servant of
his tenant ‘for damages arising from defective construction, or for
damages from failure to keep the premises in repair,’ he is not liable
because of a failure to repair a defect of which he neither knew, nor
ought, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, to have known. Properly construed, this section does not make a landlord responsible as
an insurer, but liable
only in the event he fails to comply with his
statutory duty of keeping the premises in repair,” Ocean Steamship
Co. v. Hamilton, 112/901.
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446. Actions

by tenants against landlords.
being an action by a tenant against a landlord for personal
injuries alleged to have been occasioned by the defendant’s failure to
keep in proper and safe repair a certain veranda-railing, and the
question of the plaintiff’s right to recover being dependent upon
whether or not he was guilty of negligence in putting the railing *to
an
improper use by sitting upon it, and the evidence for the plaintiff
affirmatively showing that he was in this respect negligent, and might
by the exercise of ordinary care have avoided the injuries, there was
no error in granting a nonsuit.
Balch v. Garling, 102/586.
In Johnson v. Collins, 98/271, a tenant sued for injuries caused
by defective steps. She alleged that she knew the steps were out of
repair and had made several attempts to have them repaired by the
landlord. He did nail the steps to the door-sill, but it was insufficient
to hold them, and only kept them in position for a short while.
She
and her son had worked on them, and she supposed that the props
which they had used to support them would be sufficient. She had no
reason to believe them dangerous.
A demurrer to the declaration was
sustained. Atkinson, J., said: “If the steps were out of repair, but
not so obviously so as that a person of ordinary prudence must have
known they were dangerous, then she was entitled to go to the jury
upon the question as to whether there was an apparent danger in
their use. As long as she did not know they were dangerous, or had
no reasonable ground to suspect such to be the fact, her use of them
could not be legally considered negligent.” Cited, 104/809; 111/150.
In Alexander v. Rhodes, 104/807, it was held that a tenant has no
right of action against a landlord for personal injuries sustained
while attempting to pass from the house rented, when the landlord
had the steps leading therefrom removed for the purpose of making
This

repairs, this condition of the premises being well known to
injury. This is true notwithstanding an emergency to leave at the particular time and place
when egress from the house was sought, which could not have been
foreseen by the landlord in time to prepare temporary facilities for a
safe exit from the house. Simmons, C. J., said: “The landlord was
complying with his duties under the law. He was making needed repairs, which had, doubtless, been demanded by the tenant. There
was no negligence on the part of the landlord in removing the steps
in order to make the repairs.
There was no notice given him, before
the steps were removed or afterwards, of the emergency which necesnecessary

the tenant before and at the time of the
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sitated the tenant’s

leaving the house. Without calling on the landreplace the steps, or to provide means of egress'"
from the house, in order to respond to the emergency, the tenant
undertook to descend ‘by sliding or easing herself down to the ground.’
In so doing, she assumed the risk or hazard.
She slipped and fell,
and was injured in this attempt to lower herself to the ground, and
this fall was clearly occasioned by her own negligence, or was attriblord

or

his agent to

utable to accident alone.

The facts of this

case

differ from those of

the landlord had made repairs, but had done so in a manner so negligent that the tenaht, in
attempting to use the steps, was injured. In this case the landlord
was in the act of making repairs; the tenant saw the danger, and assumed the risk; and we can not see that the landlord was in any
manner negligent, or upon what principle he could be held liable.”
In Stack v. Harris, 111/149, it was held that though a landlord
will not be liable in damages for injuries to a tenant resulting from
the defective condition of a plank in the floor of the rented building,
of which the landlord had no notice, a petition which alleges that the
plaintiff (a tenant) was injured by reason of such a defect, and that
the landlord (the defendant) had notice of the “defective condition
of the floor,” sufficiently alleges, as against a general demurrer, that
the defendant had notice of the defective condition of the plank.
Cobb, J., said: “Although the rule at common law was to the contrary, under our Code, the landlord, in the absence of a stipulation to
the contrary, is bound to keep the premises in repair. He is, however,
entitled to notice from the tenant that the premises are out of repair,
and if, after such notice has been given, the tenant suffers damage on
Johnson

v.

Collins,

supra.

In that

case

account of the failure of the landlord to make the necessary

repairs,
damage thus sustained, provided the
conduct of the tenant was not such as to preclude him from recovering. Under the law of this State, it is presumed that the premises
leased are in a condition suitable for the purposes for which they
were rented; and if such is not the
case, and damage results therefrom to the tenant, the landlord is liable,
provided he has had notice
of the defective condition of the
premises, and has failed after a
reasonable time to make the necessary repairs, and provided also that
the tenant has not been guilty of such
negligence as to bar a recovery
By him. When the landlord is notified that the premises are out of
repair, it becomes his duty to inspect and investigate, in order that
he may make such repairs as the
safety of the tenant requires. It
the landlord is liable for the
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follows, therefore, that when, after such notice, the landlord fails,
^within a reasonable time, to make the repairs, he is chargeable with
notice of all the defects that a proper inspection would have disclosed.

To this extent he

might be charged with liability for injury
hidden so far as the tenant was
concerned.
become out of repair, it is the duty
of the tenant to notify the landlord of this fact, and also to abstain
from using any part of the premises, the use of which would be attended with danger. But even after notice to the landlord the tenant
has a right to use those parts of the premises which are apparently in
good condition, if there is nothing to call his attention to what may
be a hidden defect.” Cited, 112/904.
a defect which was
When rented premises

arising from

CHAPTER 28.
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447. When owner is bound to keep his premises safe, Civil Code, §3824.
448. The principle stated.
449. Excavations adjacent to a sidewalk.

450. Pitfall on uninclosed lot.
451. Nuisance on Inclosed lot.

452. Excavation in rear of a storehouse.
453. Defective steps attached to
a
store*
house.

454. One
was

entered a building
hurt going out.

uninvited and

447. Owner lound to

Tceep premises safe, when. Where the owner
occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads
others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable
in damages to such persons for injuries occasioned by his failure to
exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.
Civil Code, §3824.
or

448. The

principle stated.
for the accommodation of the public, builds
in repair, a bridge over an approach to a
private road-crossing, it is such an invitation to the public to use it as
will render the company liable for injuries resulting from defects negligently permitted to exist or remain in the bridge or approach, and
it does not matter whether the crossing was one that the company was
required by the statute to keep in repair or not. The principle is this:
When the owner or occupier of land, by invitation, express or implied,
induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries occasioned
by the unsafe condition of the land or its approaches, and under such
an express or implied invitation, he must exercise ordinary care and
If

railroad company,
and undertakes to keep
a
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prudence to render the premises reasonably safe for the visit. This
case is distinguished from Cox, supra, 68/446.
Robertson, 95/430.
Cited, 97/721; 98/784; 110/780.
In Hooper, 110/779, it was held that the building and keeping in
repair by a railroad company of a bridge over an approach to a private crossing is such an invitation to the public to use the same as
renders the company liable for injuries resulting from defects negligently permitted to exist or remain in the structure.
In King, 107/754, the plaintiff alleges that he became a passenger
on the train of the defendant at Milledgeville, for the purpose of being carried to Savannah, Georgia, and arrived at Gordon, a station
on defendant’s railroad, in the evening, and having to remain over until
12:15 the next day in order to take the train for Savannah, he went
to a hotel in the town of Gordon. After night, desiring to go to a
particular store in the town, he made inquiries as to the route, and
was directed by a gentleman at the hotel to go to the warehouse across
the railroad-tracks of the defendant, from where he could easily reach
the store which he sought; that at the warehouse there was a' light.
Acting on this information, he started in the direction of the warehouse, expecting to cross the railroad-track, and not knowing that the
track was in a cut, nor of the existence of a brick wall abutting the
street, but before reaching the track he unknowingly stepped from a
brick wall about five or six feet in height, falling that distance to the
ground, in which were the tracks of the railroad company. At the
point on the right of way of the defendant, where the injury was received, the tracks are in a cut, on the northern side of which was built
a brick wall extending along a public street which ran parallel with
the right of way for several hundred feet, the top of which was on a
level with the street in front of the hotel from where petitioner started.
Immediately in front of the hotel, and just at the street, steps were
built by the defendant for the use of the public for the purpose of
ingress and egress to and from the railroad-tracks and warehouse, and
this was the usual route traveled by pedestrians. Little, J., said:
“If the

occupant of lands, by any enticement, allurement,
inducement, causes others to come upon the same, he owes a
duty to such persons to use reasonable care to see that the premises are safe for that purpose, and is liable for
injuries caused by
the violation of such duty to one who is free from
contributory negligence. 3 Elliott on Railroads, §1249. ‘To come under an implied invitation as distinguished from a mere license, the visitor must
or

owner or
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connected with the business in which the occupant
which he permits to be carried on there. There must at
least be some mutuality of interest in the subject to which the visitor’s business relates, although the particular thing which is the subject of the visit may not be for the benefit of the occupant.5 156
Mass. 426. In this ease the plaintiff in error, confessedly, did not
seek to go upon the track nor to the warehouse of the defendant on
business, but, following directions, he sought to reach the warehouse
as being a point near the store which he desired to visit; and his claim
that he went upon the premises of the defendant by invitation is not
sound in law, under the allegation which he makes.
Besides, the
plaintiff in error, even if an invitation had been extended, did not
use the steps by which the invitation was extended.
He wandered
from the path which led to the steps, and failed to accept the invitation, if one had been made by the erection of the steps.”
449. Excavations adjacent to a sidewalk.
In Folsom v. Lewis, 85/146, it appeared that Folsom kept a restaurant on Marietta street. Lewis went there, ate his supper and came
come

'

[ § 449

is

a

engaged,

purpose
or

out upon the sidewalk.
He saw something in a show-window of the
restaurant that attracted his attention. The window was immediately

above

flight of steps leading down from the edge of the sidewalk
building. The cellar was leased by
Folsom and was used by him in connection with his restaurant.
There had been put over the opening made by this stairway a platform of planks, but it did not cover the whole space between the sidewalk and that portion of the building. Lewis stepped up to see what
into

it

a

a

was

into the

cellar of the restaurant

that had attracted his attention in the

window,, and walked

injured. The court charged the jury: “If you
believe that the defendant knew, or by ordinary diligence could have
known of this opening, and negligently permitted it to be there, that
there was a window over said platform, which window was in front
of a restaurant kept by defendant on said premises, that the defendant had, at that time, displayed in said window such articles
as would attract the attention of persons passing along said street
and induce them to approach and inspect the same, and that the plaintiff, seeing these articles and wishing to examine them, walked with
due care upon the platform for the purpose, and fell into the opening
and was injured, you should find that the plaintiff had a cause of
action against the defendant. This would be true though the platform
was not constructed
by the defendant, but by some other person to
34

opening and

was
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privilege of keeping a stand in front of the

window, if the platform was left at times so as to be an approach to
the window.” This charge was held to be correct, and that it was no
defense to Folsom that he let the

opening above the cellar to another
sell various articles,
other; although he

person for the purpose of establishing a stand to
and that the negligence was chargeable to that

might also be liable.
In Collier v. Hyatt, 110/317, it was held that where, in an action
for personal injuries against several defendants, the plaintiff’s petition alleged, in substance, that one of the defendants was the owner
and lessor of a building which abutted upon the sidewalk of a public
street, and, for the convenience and use of the tenants thereof, maintained an excavation or coal-hole opening from the sidewalk to the
cellar or basement of the building, the covering of which hole was on a
level with, and formed a part of, the sidewalk; that by reason of his
negligence such covering was unsafe and dangerous to persons traveling on the sidewalk, and he, having for months actual notice of this
fact, allowed it to remain in this defective and dangerous condition;
that the plaintiff, thinking such covering was securely fixed and safe,
stepped upon it, and was precipitated through the hole to the cellar
below, thereby sustaining serious injuries — a cause of action against
the owner of the building was set forth, and a general demurrer
by
him to the petition was properly overruled by the court.
450.

Pitfall

on

uninclosed lot.

On the lot of the defendant company was a
dry well. It was so
covered by rubbish and grass and weeds growing over it, that
ordinary
care and observation would not have discerned it.
The fence around
the lot was partly down. Plaintiff turned his horse out to

graze, he
lot, fell into the hole and was killed. The owner of
property must so use it as not to injure or endanger the property of
other persons.
This dangerous pitfall should have been securely
inclosed, and it was culpable negligence to have left it in the condition
it was in.
The presumption of law is that the owner of a lot is
acquainted with the condition of his own property, if a natural person, and, if an artificial one, that it has such knowledge through its
agents and employees. Nelson, 48/152.
451. Nuisance on inclosed 'premises.
In Hutson v. King, 95/271, it appeared that the defendant was
the owner of a lot fronting on Broad street in the city of Augusta,
with a door and window fronting on Broad street and immediately
went into the

.
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adjacent to the sidewalk; there was, under the building, a cellar. The
building was destroyed by fire. The defendant left the walls standing
without barricades to the open door and window. The plaintiff, a
visitor to the city, while passing along Broad street, at night, saw
the open door and assuming that it led to some retired spot, he undertook, in response to a call of nature, to enter, and immediately fell
from the sidewalk into the cellar, inflicting upon him bodily injuries.
It was held that the mere maintenance of a dangerous nuisance upon
one’s inclosed premises gives no right of action to another, who, without necessity, and without invitation from the owner, either express
or implied, voluntarily deviates from a
public highway adjacent
thereto, and entering upon such premises, is injured in consequence
of the existence of such nuisance. If the nuisance complained of be
per se of such an obviously dangerous character as that a person of
reasonable discretion, entering upon the premises of another, inclosed
or nninclosed, either from necessity or upon invitation,
express or
implied, could readily perceive its danger, and, in so entering such
premises, should suffer injury which he, by the exercise of ordinary
care, could have prevented or avoided, he can not recover. It is the
duty of the owner of premises so to inclose a cellar thereon which lies
in dangerous proximity to a public street as to afford to one passing
along such street, in the exercise of ordinary care, reasonable immunity against the danger of casually falling therein. If the owner
fail to

perform this duty, and a person exercising such care so falls
injured, he is entitled to recover from the owner damages therefor. Atkinson, J., said: “Every man has a right to presume that
upon his own premises, guarded by a clearly marked and clearly
defined inclosure, other persons will respect his rights of property, and
will not intrude upon the privacy thereof; and if upon such premises
he maintains a dangerous nuisance, as a pitfall or other like contrivance, and a stranger, without invitation, either express or implied,
enters thereon, he should take all those risks resulting from mere negligence of the owner which he may encounter on the venture. With
reference to uninclosed premises, a different rule prevails; and if,
upon such premises, the owner shall maintain a dangerous nuisance,
in such situation as that persons lawfully entering thereon, without
and is

fault upon their own part, suffer injury, he is
The negligence of the plaintiff which defeats
three counts consists in the exposure

hazard of

answerable in damages.
his recovery upon these

of himself voluntarily to the

going into the building at all,

without reference to whether
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using ordinary care in the effort to get in. If a man going
the premises of another should see an open well, and should
voluntarily attempt to descend to its bottom, exercising the most extreme care and caution, but, in the descent, should fall and receive
injuries, he could not recover, not because he was wanting in care or
caution in making the descent, but because it was manifestly dangerous and hazardous to attempt the descent at all.
So, in this case, it
could make no difference how careful this plaintiff was as he walked
along the sidewalk or how carefully guarded were his footsteps as he
walked into the dilapidated building — he could not recover, because,
thus voluntarily exposing himself to an unnecessary hazard, he assumed the risks of the hazard; and, being injured, he must abide the
consequences. Whatever may be the duty of an owner of premises,
with reference to persons who unlawfully intrude thereon, such owner
has no right to maintain upon his premises any dangerous nuisance
which might imperil the lives of those persons who, from lawful necessity or convenience might pass along,^and by accident or some superior
force, and without fault upon their own part, fall or be thrown from
the sidewalk, or from a public thoroughfare, into such excavation. A
man must so
guard his premises situated immediately adjacent to a
public highway as that one who of necessity deviates slightly therefrom may not be injured.”
452. Excavation in rear of a storehouse.
Kohn was the owner of a storehouse and lot in the city of Rome.
He left, at the rear of the house, an excavation walled up for the
purpose of giving light to the cellar. Lovett, on an alarm of fire,
was

upon

went to Kohn’s store, which adjoined the one in
entered at the front door, went through the store

which the fire was,
and the back door
and turned off the gangway, across the opening, fell in, and was
injured. It was held that the digging of the open space by Kohn on
his own ground was a lawful act and he had the right to keep it there
as an
appurtenant right for the use of his property, and, as it was
not near to a public street or crossing, Lovett’s falling in by accident
gave no right to recover damages from Kohn as a wrong-doer.
It
was damnum absque injuria.
Kohn v. Lovett, 44/251.
453. Defective steps attached to a storehouse.
In Archer v. Blalock, 97/719, it was held that the
declaration, as
amended, alleging in substance that the plaintiff suffered personal injuries because of the defective and dangerous condition of certain
steps attached to a storehouse belonging to the defendants, which they
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had rented to

another; that the plaintiff, when injured,

was

using

steps in the due course of his business with the tenant; that
the steps constituted a platform used in common with other storehouses belonging to and occupied by the defendants; and that the
defective and dangerous condition of the steps was well known to
the defendants, and they had sufficient opportunity to have the same
repaired, but had neglected to do so — a cause of action was set forth,
these

and it

to dismiss the

case on general demurrer.
building uninvited and was injured in going out.
One who entered a building undergoing alterations, and who sustained personal injuries because of an attempt to make his exit therefrom through a window the framing of which was insecurely fastened,
could not, though his entry was lawful, and though he honestly believed that in the existing condition of the premises it was safe and
proper to use the window as a means of exit, hold the owner of the
building liable for those injuries, when his presence therein was not
by their invitation, either express or implied, and they in no way
induced him to put the window in question to such a use. Seward v.
was error

entered

a

Draper, 112/673.

CHAPTER 29.
INJURIES CAUSED BY VICIOUS OR DANGEROUS ANIMALS.
455. Vicious

or

dangerous

Code, §3821.
by a ferocious

456. Bitten

animals,

dog in

a

Givil

horse bites
sidewalk.

457. A

one

passing by

on

the

back

yard.

455. Vicious animals.

A person

who owns or keeps a vicious or
dangerous animal of any kind, and by the careless management of the
same, or by allowing the same to go at liberty, another without fault
on his
part is injured thereby, such owner or keeper shall be liable
in damages for such injury. Civil Code, §3821.
A vicious animal is any individual of a vicious species, or a vicious
animal of a harmless species. Phillips v. DeWald, 79/732.
456. Bitten by a ferocious dog in a bask yard.
In Conway v. Grant, 88/40, it was held that one who, in a city,
enters the back yard of another through an open gate on lawful business, and is bitten by ferocious dogs running loose in the yard, of
which he has no notice, has a right of action against the owner if the
latter knew that the dogs were accustomed to bite, and nevertheless
permitted them to run loose in such yard, with the gate of the same
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standing open. Bleckley, C. J.,
is hot that of being a trespasser,

said: “The fault here referred to
but that of being in some way instrumental in provoking or bringing on the attack complained of.
It must, at the same time, he understood that the right of redress of
the injured person will be defeated if the injury was caused by his
own fault.
A person who irritates an animal, and is bitten or kicked
in turn, is deemed in
and can not recover.

law to have consented to the damage sustained,
But if the fault of the injured party had no

natural and usual connection with the injury, operating
produce the injury as cause produces effect, the owner of the animal
will be liable. For example, the defendant keeps upon his premises
a ferocious
dog, and the plaintiff, having no notice that such dog is
there, trespasses in the daytime upon the premises, and the dog rushes
upon him and bites him. The defendant is liable, since it is not the
necessary or natural and usual consequence of a person’s trespassing
upon a man’s premises by day that he should be attacked by a Savage
dog.” Bigelow, Torts, pp. 249, 250. Though the gate was open, and
the plaintiff was on lawful business, it may be that he had no strict
legal right to enter the premises from the rear. But this would be
no justification for leaving dangerous dogs loose on the premises to bite
him or others that might so intrude.
457. A horse bites one passing by on the sideivalk.
In Reed v. Southern Express Company, 95/108, it was held that
where an ordinary draft-horse attached to a vehicle is momentarily
left standing in a street, adjacent to a sidewalk, and bites one passing
by upon the sidewalk, the owner of the horse is not liable for the
injury thus occasioned, it not appearing that the horse was or had
necessary or

to

ever

been of

a

viciou§ nature, or that the owner had any reason to

apprehend the animal would become so. Simmons, C. J., said:
“There is no general propensity on the part of horses to bite persons
who come near them, and, when this is done at all, it is done by
one that is exceptionally vicious.
Where no such disposition has been
discovered in a horse, the owner is under no obligation to anticipate
that it will suddenly bite some passer-by who chances to come within
its reach, and is not bound to guard against such an occurrence; and
if the horse does bite somebody, and is not wrongfully in the place
where this happens, the owner will not be held liable for the injury.
The rule on this subject has been stated thus: ‘If domestic animals,
such as oxen and horses, injure any one in person or property when
they are rightfully in the place where they do the mischief, the owner
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of such animals is not liable for such
are

accustomed to do

and proved.
the

injury, unless he knows they
mischief; and such knowledge must be alleged

But, if they

mischief, the

are

wrongfully in the place where they do

is liable, though he had

no notice that they
Eng. Enc. Law, art. ‘Animals,’ p. 578, and authorities cited. See, also, Cooley, Torts (2d ed.
402), pp. 341, 343. In this case it appears that the horse was in its
rightful place in the street; and it not appearing that the defendant
or its servant in charge of the harse had any reason to suppose, before
the injury occurred, that the horse was vicious or had a tendency to
bite persons, the injury was not one which the defendant was bound
to anticipate and guard against; and the leaving of the horse unattended was not such negligence as would entitle the plaintiff to recover.
Of course, if the horse had before manifested a disposition to bite
people, and the defendant or its servant knew of it, it would be negligence to leave the horse standing near the sidewalk unattended.”
were

owner

accustomed to do

so

before.’

1 Am. &
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458.

Degree of diligence required of keeper
of toll-bridge.
bridge is undergoing repairs.

450. When the

458.

460. When

the relation of the

public is suspended.
negligence

401. Plaintiff’s
fense.

owner

to the

is matter of de-

Toll-bridge — degree of diligence required of keeper.
of a bridge franchise is bound to exercise only such
care and diligence in the construction of his bridge and the keeping
the same in proper order, as every prudent man would exert in
relation to the same property, in view of the object and purpose for
which the same was erected and used by him. Tift v. Townes, 53/47.
Cited, 64/313.
He is only liable for ordinary care and diligence, and beyond this
is not an insurer. If he knows of a defect in the bridge, dangerous to
passengers and likely to result in damage, and the dangerous defect
is not exposed so that the passenger can also see it, and taking toll
from the passenger, allows him to cross without warning, he is liable
for damages; aliter, if the defect is not dangerous and not likely to
result in damage, but in the judgment of the proprietor slight and
thought to have been safely repaired. Stokes v. Tift, 64/312.
The

owner

§§ 459-461 ]
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It is the

duty of the proprietor of a toll-bridge to exercise ordinary
keeping of his bridge in safe condition for travel, but he
is not bound to go beyond this. Tift v. Jones, 74/469. Cited, 95/115.
459. When the bridge is undergoing repairs.
Where a bridge was in an unsafe condition and undergoing repairs,
it would make no difference whether warning to the public was given
or not, if all could see for themselves what was going on, and when
the person injured actually did see the condition of the bridge. Tift
v. Jones, 74/469.
460. When the relation of the owner to the public is suspended.
The proprietor of a toll-bridge is bound bv law to keep the same
in a safe condition, and to make all needful repairs, and he has a
right to take up any portion of the bridge which it may be necessary to
displace for the purpose of making such repairs. While such repairs
are being made, and a
large portion of the flooring of the bridge is
taken off, and the timbers sustaining the floor are removed from their
usual place, so as to be plainly seen by all persons, and the collection of
toll is discontinued, the relation of the owner to the public as proprietor
of a toll-bridge is suspended, and he is not liable to a passenger who
attempts to cross the bridge on foot on planks temporarily laid down
several feet apart, for the use of the workmen, and who is injured
by falling between the planks thus placed, or through an opening
caused by the removal of the timbers. Tift v. Jones, 52/538.
While generally it may be true that, if the rule of this bridge-owner
is to take toll in advance for crossing and recrossing, and this rule is
complied with by the traveler, the payment is as good as if made at
each time of crossing, still if, between crossing and recrossing, the
bridge has been torn up for repairs, and its use as a toll-bridge suspended, the fact that the traveler had paid his return fare when he
first crossed would not, of itself, give him the right to recross, if he
was warned or had knowledge of its unsafe condition.
The payment
of fare at the time of recrossing would have been evidence of the use
of the bridge at the time as a toll-bridge, but the payment of return
fare at the time of the first crossing was not such evidence.
Tift v.
Jones, 74/469. Cited, 95/115.
negligence matter of defense.
When the plaintiff in an action against the owner of a toll-bridge
proves his injury and the owner's negligence as alleged, he is not bound
to go further and prove his own diligence, want of care on his part beCouncil v. Hudson, 88/599.
Cited,
ing matter of defense. City
1
care

for the
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County, when liable to suit. A county is not liable to suit
of action unless made so bv statute. Political Code,

for any cause

§341.
The

liability of counties to be sued for damages is entirely statuThey were not so liable at common law. They are political
divisions, exercising a part of the sovereign power of the State; and
they can not be sued except where it is so provided by statute. County
v. Flynt,
80/489. Cited, 81/48; 85/424; 107/812. To the same
effect, Scales v. Ordinary etc., 41/225. Cited, 106/744.
In Millwood v. DeKalb County, 106/743, the plaintiff sued the
county of DeKalb for damages, alleging that the county authorities
had exercised the right they had under the law to work the convicts
in the county chain-gang upon the public roads of the county; that a
road, which crossed a private way, had been worked by the chaingang in such a manner as that persons traveling the private way were
liable to b'e injured ; that in coming along such private way at night,
having no knowledge of the condition in which the public road had
been left at the point where the private way intersected it, she fell,
and was injured. There were allegations that the county authorities
had failed to provide railings or other safeguards to protect persons
who were traveling along the private way.
It was held that a
county is not liable to suit unless made so by law; and this is true
whether the alleged cause of action arises from the negligent performance of duties which the county authorities are compelled to perform,
or a negligent discharge of duties voluntarily assumed in the exercise
of a discretion vested in them by law. Cobb, J., said: “The correct
position is this: The county being a political division of the State,
is not liable to be sued, unless special authority can be shown, and
it is incumbent upon the person filing the suit to bring his case
within the legislative authority upon which he relies to bring his suit.”
Cited, 111/314.
tory.
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463.

County not liable for tort committed by guard or chain-gang
superintendent.
A county is not liable for a tort committed by a chain-gang superintendent in unlawfully imprisoning one and compelling him to work,
although the same was done in obedience to instructions from the
county authorities. There is, in this State, no statute rendering a
county liable for any such cause of action. Bailey v. County, 111/313.
Nor is a county liable for the tort of one of the guards in unlawfully
beating a convict in the chain-gang, nor for the negligence in the rest
of the guards in not protecting the convict from the unlawful beating. Hammond v. County of Richmond, 72/188. Cited, 106/745.
464. Public bridges; condition of contractor’s bond. When a public
bridge, ferry, turnpike, or causeway is let out, the contractor must in
his bond make a condition also to keep it in good repair for at least
seven years, and as
many more years as the contract may be for: Provided, that such contract may be let out under existing laws without requiring the aforesaid condition in the contractor's bonds, if, in the
opinion of the commissioners of roads and revenue, or of the ordinary
in counties where there

are no

such commissioners, it would

be to the

public interest to dispense with said condition in said bond: Provided,
however, that in every ease the county shall be primarily liable for all
injuries caused by reason of any defective bridges, whether erected by
contractors or county authorities. Political Code, §603.
The two provisos in this section are codifications of the Act of 18S8.
465. What must be shown to recover against a county on account .of
public bridges.
When the suit is brought against the county for damages caused by
a want of proper repairs to a
public bridge, it should appear that the
bridge was erected by letting it out to the lowest bidder, and that no
bond was taken from the contractor faithfully to perform his contract,
and to indemnify for all damages occasioned by a failure so to do,
and to keep the bridge in good repair for seven years, and for such
further time as may be embraced in the contract — and both of these
facts should be alleged in the declaration.
Collins v. Commissioners,
54/25. Cited, 77/251. The declaration must also show that the
claim sued for had been presented to the ordinary for auditing within twelve months from the* time of the injuries, as
required by
section 361 of the Civil Code. The auditing referred to in the Civil
Code is not confined to any particular class of claims, but is
appli-
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County of Randolph, 65/216. Cited, 71/588.
presented, and payment is refused, the claim may be sued
Maddox

v.

having jurisdiction. The court of ordinary has not exclusive

jurisdiction. County of Cobb v. Adams, 68/51.
A bridge spanning a stream, which is crossed by a public road, and
constituting a portion of such road, is a “county bridge,” though the
work of constructing the same be done by private citizens, and a portion of the materials therefor be supplied by them, when the doing
of such work, and the furnishing of such materials, is in pursuance
of an agreement between them and the proper county authorities, who,
under the terms thereof, supply the remaining materials needed for
the structure. Semble, that it would be a “county bridge,” though
the citizens supplied all of the materials and built it with the permission of such authorities, or without such permission, where the latter,
in behalf of the public, accepted the bridge, and allowed it to remain
in place.
A county wherein such a bridge has been erected under
such an agreement since December 29, 1888, is liable for injuries resuiting from the defective construction thereof, or from a failure by
the county authorities to keep the same in repair. Lumpkin, P. J.,
said:
“In the light of the last proviso of section 603, embracing
the positive declaration 'that in every case the county shall be pri~
marily liable for all injuries caused by reason of any defective bridges,
whether erected by contractors or county authorities,’ it seems clear
that the 'authority’ vested in ordinaries by section 602 carries with it
the correlative duty of seeing to it that all county bridges are properly
built and then kept in safe condition. The comprehensive words 'any
defective bridges’ were manifestly intended to include, not only bridges
defectively built, but bridges out of repair, and it was plainly the
legislative purpose to make counties liable for injuries resulting from
a failure on the
part of the proper authorities to observe either branch
of the duty above indicated. The above-mentioned
proviso was introduced into our statute law by the act of December 29, 1888, 'to amend
section 671 of the Code of 1882,’ etc. Acts 1888,
p. 39. That section,
as thus
amended, was codified in section 603 of the Political Code.
The act referred to made a broad and
sweeping enlargement of the
liability of counties with regard to injuries of the character now
under consideration.” Tattnall
County v. Newton, 112/779.
The county is made liable for the neglect of its
officers, or the omission of a legal duty
imposed upon them by law, to wit: The failure
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bond from the contractor.

The contractor is liable whether

a bond or not, and the county is only liable when it fails to
bond from the contractor. In order, therefore, to make'out a

gives

take

a

for recovery

against the county, after proving the injury or
to show that it was injury for which the
contractor was liable, and that the county authorities had failed to
take from the contractor the bond and security which it ought to
have taken. These two facts will fix liability upon the county, and
nothing else will. The person damaged may sue the contractor or
can sue the county, if no bond has been taken from him, without suing
the contractor in the first instance. It is not necessary to sue the contractor to insolvency before he can sue the county. Arnold v. Henry
County, 81/731. Cited, 107/812.
Where, prior to the passage of the act of 1888, a public bridge was
case

damage, it will be

necessary

constructed, under contract with the authorities of

one

county, across

dividing it from another (the authorities of the latter refusing to participate therein), it was the duty of the county authorities
causing the construction of such bridge to take bond in accordance
with section 623 of the Code; and, failing so to do, the county for
which they acted is liable for damages resulting to -a traveler
occasioned by a defect in such bridge, of which these authorities
had timely notice.
Cook v. County of DeKalb, 95/218. This case
again, 97/415. Cited, 107/812.
466. How long the liability continues.
Where a county let out the contract for building a bridge to the
lowest bidder, but took no bond from the contractor, and the fin jury
complained of occurred ten years after the time of building the bridge,
there was no legal liability on the part of the county because of such
injury. The contractor is liable for any damages that may be done
to persons who are injured by reason of a defective bridge; and when
the county authorities fail to take a bond or sufficient guaranty, the
county is also liable. The liability of the contractor is to keep the
bridge in good repair for seven years, whether he gives a bond for
that purpose or not; and the liability on the county does not extend
beyond that. County of Monroe v. Flvnt, 80/489. Cited, 81/733;
95/220; 103/106; 107/812.
In Dorsey v. Counties, 90/72, plaintiff sued Bibb and Crawford
counties for damages from the falling of a public bridge. The bridge
a

stream

was over a

creek which is the line between the two counties.

built about nine years

It

was

previously, not under contract and not under
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which is codified in the two

rotten.

It

was

held that the Act of 1888,

provisos in section 603, is not applicable to
any county bridge erected before the passage of the act, and under the
prior law the counties were not liable in cases like the one embraced
in the record. Cited, 92/131; 103/107.
In Helvingston v. Macon County, 103/106, Simmons, C. J., said:
“It appears from the record that the county of Macon had built, or
caused to be built, a bridge over Camp Creek. The evidence indicates
that there were two portions of the bridge — one over the main stream,
and the other over a slough. This was done in 1882 or 1883. More
than seven years thereafter both portions of the bridge were washed
away — one washed away entirely, and the other so much so that it
was impossible to cross it in a vehicle or on horseback, and difficult to
cross on foot.
The county authorities employed Joiner to rebuild the
bridge. He did so by making an entirely new bridge over the main
stream, and by replacing the arches of the bridge over the slough,
and putting in ‘some new sleepers, a new top, new banisters, and some
abutting boards.’ At the direction of one of the county commissioners, he used some of the old sleepers in rebuilding the bridge over the
slough. These sleepers Joiner thought were insufficient, and defective,
hut he doubled them, so as to make them as strong as their defective
condition would permit. In November, 1894, while the plaintiff was
crossing, on a wagon loaded with cotton, that portion of the bridge
which was over the slough, fell in by reason of the weakness and
rottenness of the timbers, and plaintiff was thereby injured and damaged. She brought suit against the county, and on the trial of the
case the judge, after hearing the facts, granted a nonsuit.
Under
the facts above recited, we think the court erred in granting the nonsuit. We think the question should have been submitted to a jury
for them to determine from the evidence whether that portion of the
bridge which fell in and injured the plaintiff was rebuilt by the county
authorities, or simply repaired by then!. If it was only repaired by
Joiner, the erection of the bridge would date from 1882 or 1883,
when it was first built, and the county would not be liable, because
more than seven years had elapsed from the building to the time of
the injury to the plaintiff. Scales v. Chattahoochee Co., 41/225;
Monroe Co. v. ■ Flynt, supra. If, on the other hand, the bridge
was rebuilt, and was practically a new bridge, and the county did not
let out the building of such bridge to the lowest bidder, as authorized
by law, taking from him a bond of sufficient guaranty, but, instead,
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direction, and without taking such bond,
county would be liable to the plaintiff for such injuries as she may
have sustained, even though the Act of 1888 (Pol. Code, §603) were
not of force.
That act is applicable to bridges built since its passage.
Bibb & Crawford Co. v. Dorsey, supra. If this bridge was built
own

the

by Joiner, this act, which we think constitutional, would be applicable,
and the county primarily liable to the plaintiff.”
Cited, 107/812.
Though it was the legal duty of the county authorities to take from
the contractor for erecting a county bridge bond and good security
to keep the bridge in good repair for at least seven years, yet, where
the bond and security required and taken limited the period to three
years, this, nothing to the contrary appearing or being alleged, may
be treated as a “sufficient guaranty,” contemplated by section 623 of
the Code, so as to exempt the county from liability for damages sustained within such period of three years by one who, in crossing the
bridge, was injured in consequence of its defective condition or want
of repairs, the bond taken being such as section 602 of the Code specifies, and failing to conform to section 603 only as to length of time
for keeping the bridge in good repair.
Mappin v. County etc.,
■

'92/130.
467. A

county bridge within the limits of an incorporated town.
a bridge over a stream crossing a public road is lo■cated within the limits of an incorporated town does not of itself oust
the county of control and management, and does not, therefore, impose
upon the town any obligation to keep the bridge and its appurtenances
in repair, if it be a county bridge.
If it be recognized both by the
eounty and the municipality as the property of the county, the county
is bound to keep it in repair. The fact that the town authorities from
time to time, voluntarily repaired the bridge and worked and kept
up
the embankment leading to it, does not change the title to the
property
or the legal duty
devolving upon its owner, nor does such voluntary
repair and uses make such a case of dedication by the county to the
town as to change the title and legal duty to
repair. A contiguous
embankment necessary to make access to the bridge so as to
pass teams
and wagons over it is a part of the bridge, and title to the
bridge and
the duty to repair, extend to it. If the embankment was not a necessary part of the bridge, but was a part of the streets of the municipality, the town, and not the county, would be bound to keep it in
repair,
-and whether it be the one or the other is a
question of fact for the jury,
Daniels v. Mayor etc., 54/79; 55/609.
The fact that
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and diligence must be exercised by injured

care

per-

son.

Although a county may have failed to take from the contractor building a bridge a bond to keep it in repair, as required by law, yet if a
person, whose mule was injured on such bridge, by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, could have avoided the injury, he could not
recover.
County v. Chapman, 74/107. Cited, 95/290.
One who deliberately and intentionally drove at night upon a county
bridge, with the condition of which he was perfectly familiar, and who,
according to his own testimony, knew that the bridge was dangerous,
because it had no guard-rails, was not, upon a petition alleging no negligence except failure to erect such rails, entitled to recover for injuries
occasioned solely by reason of their absence.
Cooper v. County of
Floyd, 112/70.

CHAPTER 32.
ACTIONS AGAINST MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.

Municipal corporations
discretionary acts.

469.

470. When

not

liable

highways.
471. For negligent
are

fo r

liable

not
failure

to

for
light

exercise of

power

they

liable.

ment.

475. Illegal arrest by officers.
476. Assault and battery by quasi-policeman
477. Injuries to convicts.
478. Legislative and judicial powers.
479. Municipal functions not performed be-

yond the limits of the State.
480. Must use its own property so as
hurt others.
481. When liable for injuries.

not to

482. The general

to the

rule of diligence

as

condition of the streets.

485.
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Streets; obstruction by fire company.
Remedy over against wrong-doer.

Municipal corporations not liable for discretionary acts. Where
municipal corporations are not liable by statute to perform an act,
they can not be held liable for exercising their discretion in failing
to perform the same.
Civil Code, §747.
470. When not liable for failure to light highways.
For discretionary acts, a municipal corporation is not liable; and
when cities and towns are under no statutory obligations to light high-
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failure to do

so.

Gaskins

v.

City of At-

lanta, 73/746.
471. For

negligent exercise of power they are liable.
many acts which are discretionary, and may or may not
be done; as for instance, to open streets, grade sidewalks, dig sewers,
build a bridge, provide water, and many other things for a failure to
do which no action lies, how much soever private interests may suffer;
yet when the discretion is used, and the work is done, if done so negligently, or unskillfully as to damage other parties, then a right of action lies. But in no case, for the simple exercise of the power itself,
disconnected from its negligent or unskillful execution, is the corporation responsible. Rivers v. Augusta, 65/376.
Cited, 73/647; 110/92.
In Tarbutton v. Town of Tennille, 110/90, it was held that there
is no obligation upon the authorities of a municipal corporation, towards any one of its citizens, to exercise the legislative discretion with
which they are invested to enact ordinances prohibiting any specific
act concerning the streets and sidewalks of the town.
Such matters
are left to their discretion, and a right of action against a city does not
accrue to one who was injured by a person riding a bicycle on the sidewalk, because the authorities had failed to prohibit such riding. .
472. For what municipal corporations are or are not liable. Municipal corporations are not liable for failure to perform, or for errors
in performing, their legislative or judicial powers.
For neglect to
perform, or for improper or unskillful performance, of their ministerial duties, they are liable. Civil Code, §748.
The powers and duties of municipal corporations are legislative or
judicial and ministerial. For a failure to perform, or for errors of
judgment committed in performing, their legislative or judicial powers the corporation is not liable.
They are deemed to be a part of the
State’s power, and, therefore, under the same immunity. For neglect
to perform ministerial duties, or for negligent, improper or unskillful
performance thereof, the corporation is liable. Collins v. Mayor etc.,
69/542.
473. When the corporation has immunity in the exercise of its
There

a

are

powers.
A distinction exists between the

public and private powers of a munfcipal corporation. Its public powers concern the general public and
embrace the public peace, the public health, and the like. They arp
governmental in character and in exercising them the municipality acts
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governing agency for the public or general benefit. Its private
relate to the particular municipality. They embrace waterworks, sewers, markets and like matters, from which the municipality
derives some special or immediate advantage.
When the State delegates portions of its sovereignty to a municipal
corporation by granting to it governmental powers of the State, the
municipality is, to that extent, to be treated as if it were a department
of State.
In the absence of legislation to the contrary, it has the immunity of the State, and is not responsible to an individual for the consequences of exercising, or failing to exercise, such governmental powers.
It is upon this principle that sections 744 and 748 of the Civil
Code rest, when they declare that a municipal corporation is not liable
for the torts of a policeman or other officers engaged in discharge of
the duties imposed on them by law. Nor are they liable for failure to
perform or for errors in performing their legislative or judicial powas

a

powers

The

principle is illustrated by the following cases.
pertaining to the health department.
In Love v. City, 95/129, plaintiff alleged that while he was passing
along the streets an animal attached to one of the garbage-carts of defendant was permitted, by the negligence of a servant, to run away and
cause injury to the plaintiff.
It was held that the duty of keeping the
streets clear of putrid and other substance offensive to the sense of
smell, and which tends to imperil the public health, devolves, under
the charter of the city of Atlanta, upon the board of health of that
city; dnd, the functions of this department of the city government being governmental, and not purely administrative, in their character,
it follows that if, in the exercise of such functions, and in the discharge of the duties devolving upon this department thereunder, a
private citizen is injured by the negligence of one of its servants in
and about such work, no right of action arises against the city. Atkinson, J., said: “In the discharge of such duties as pertain to the health
department of the State, the State is acting strictly in the discharge of
one of the functions of
government. If the State delegate to a municipal corporation, either by general law or by particular statute, this
power, and impose upon it, within its limits, the duty of taking such
steps and such measures as may be necessary to the preservation of the
public health, the municipal corporation likewise, in the discharge of
such duty, is in the exercise of a purely governmental function, affecting the welfare not only of the citizens resident within its corporation,
ers.

474. Duties

85
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generally, all of whom have an
prevention of infectious or contagious diseases at any
point within the State, and in the exercise of such powers is entitled to
the same immunity against suit as the State itself enjoys. Such a
duty would stand upon the same footing as its duty to preserve the
public peace, and its liability or non-liability would depend upon the
same
principle which relieves the city from liability for the misfeasance
of a police officer in the discharge of his duty.
It will be observed,
however, that, in order to exempt a city from liability, it is not sufficient to show that the particular work from the negligent performance
of which by the servants of the city a citizen was injured was being
performed under the direction of the health authorities, but it must
be shown that the particular work so being done was connected with,
or had reference to, the preservation of the public health.
If the
health department were engaged in clearing away or removing obstruetions from the street which in no way endangered the public health,
the responsibility of the city then would rest upon the rule of liability
for the work connected with repairing and keeping in order the public
highways. It can make no difference in principle as to the character
of the agents employed in the discharge of this duty with respect to
the public health. The principle of non-liability rests upon the broad
ground that in the discharge of its purely governmental functions, a
corporate body to which has been delegated a portion of the sovereign
power, is not liable for torts committed in the discharge of such duties
and in the execution of such powers.
Cited 97/653; 98/626;
but of the citizens of the commonwealth

interest in the

105/314; 111/363, 477.
So it has been held that

municipal corporation, while enforcing a
requiring citizens and residents of the city to submit
to vaccination, is exercising a governmental power, and is therefore not
liable to a citizen who may sustain damage on account of impure
vaccine matter administered to him by one of the officers or agents of
such corporation.
IVyatt v. City of Rome, 105/312.
475. Illegal arrest by officers.
a

valid ordinance

In Cook

l[ayor etc., 54/468, it was held that, “A municipal corporation is not liable to an action for damages for the illegal arrest of
a citizen by one of the police officers of the
city. For such arrest the
officer is himself liable.” McCay, J., said: “The authorities
place this
kind of a servant on special grounds,
He is a peace-officer; his duties
do not lie in the line of the special private duties or
rights of the cor- v.
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poration, but they are duties connected with the public peace in which
the State is interested, and in a very wide sense he is a State officer;
many of his duties are connected with the prevention and punishment
of crime.”
Cited, 62/290; 65/389; 68/741; 88/455; 111/368.
47$. Assault and'battery by quasi-policeman.
In McElroy v. City Council of Albany, 65/387, the case stood on demurred to a declaration which alleged that a city watchman quasi a
policeman of defendant, willfully and maliciously, while drunk, threw
the plaintiff down and broke his leg.
It was held that a municipal
corporation is not liable for the torts of its police officers; especially is
this the
duties.

case

when the tort

That

was

not done in connection with his official

municipal corporation is not liable for the torts of its
police officers was settled in Cook’s case, supra, though the policeman
was then engaged in making an arrest, and therefore was within the
scope of his agency.
Cited, 68/741; 88/455; 111/368.
477. Injuries to convicts.
In Doster v. City of Atlanta, 72/233, the plaintiff alleged that
when he was placed on the public works as a convict, his fellow convicts, in order to initiate him, strapped him, in the presence of the
guards, with a strap belonging to one of the guards. On demurrer to
a

the declaration the action

was

dismissed, and it

was

held that

a

munic-

ipal corporation is not responsible for a tort committed by one convict,
sentenced to work on the public works under its municipal ordinances,
upon the person of another, nor for a tort committed upon him by the
guard over such convicts.
In Wilson v. Mayor etc., 88/455, it was held that a municipal
corporation is not liable for personal injuries sustained by one prisoner
at the hands of another confined in the same cell or room of the city
prison, notwithstanding the police officer who arrested the plaintiff,
and put him in prison, may have been guilty of wrong or negligence
in confining him with an intoxicated fellow prisoner, who was on that
account violent and dangerous. Cited, 97/653.
In erecting and maintaining a city prison a municipal corporation is
exercising a purely governmental function, and is, therefore, not liable
in damages to a person arrested and imprisoned therein
by its police
officers, for injuries sustained by him, while so confined, by reason of
the improper construction or negligent maintenance of such prison. A
municipal corporation is not liable for the illegal arrest of a person by
its police officers, nor for his consequent imprisonment.
Fish, J., said:
“The general rule is well established that a municipal corporation i£
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damages for injuries sustained by reason of the negligent
improper exercise of a purely governmental power. The preserva-

not liable in
or

tion of the public peace, quiet, good order, etc., of a community, is a
governmental function. Where the legislative authority of a city
passes ordinances for such purposes, it is clearly exercising a governmental power.
When, for the purpose of enforcing such ordinances,
the city erects and maintains a prison wherein to confine offenders, for
the purpose of punishment, or those charged with offenses, for safekeeping until they can be tried, it is exercising the same power. The
enactment of such ordinances, and the provisions made for their enforcement, belong to the police power, which is purely governmental in
character.” Gray v. Griffin, 111/361.
Nor is a municipal corporation liable in damages for the death of one
convicted in a corporation court, and sentenced to work upon the- publie streets, although his death was occasioned while the convict was engaged in such work, and resulted from negligence on the part of the
foreman who had been placed by the municipal authorities in charge
thereof, and from the failure of such foreman to provide the convict,
after his injury, with the proper medical attention and treatment.
Lumpkin, J., said: “The question involved in this case has been too
often passed upon by this court to require further elaboration. Neither the law of master and servant, nor the doctrine of respondeat superior, applies in a case where a prisoner undergoing punishment for
a violation of a municipal ordinance is injured or killed in consequence
of the negligence or misconduct of the officer having the custody or
control of such prisoner. This is true because in such matters the municipal corporation is exercising governmental powers and discharging
governmental duties, in the course of which it, of necessity, employs
the services of the officer in question.” Nisbet v. City of Atlanta,
97/650. Cited, 111/364.
478. Legislative and judicial powers.
A municipal corporation is not liable for damages resulting from a
failure on the part of its council to perform, or an improper performance of, those powers and duties which are
legislative or judicial in
their character. For damages resulting from .neglecting to perform,
or negligence in the performance of, those duties which are
purely ministerial, it would be liable. There is no sound distinction as to such
liability between a failure to pass an ordinance in the first instance and
its repeal or suspension after being passed. Therefore when a city
council passed an ordinance forbidding the running at large of cattle
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streets, but subsequently suspended its operation indefinitely, on

others, that the growth of grass and weeds was too
comfort, health and good appearance, one who was gored
by a cow running at large in the streets would not have a cause of
action against the city.
Crawford, J., said: “The powers and duties
of the city council under its charter consist in acts which are legislafive or judicial in their nature, and those which are purely ministerial.
ground,

among

luxuriant for

For

failure to

perform the first, or for errors in judgment committed
performance, the corporation is not responsible, because they
are deemed to be but the exercise of a part of the State’s powers, and
therefore under the Same immunity. The rule, however, for the last
is different, as damages may be recovered either from the neglect to
perform them, or from performing them in an unskillful, negligent, or
improper manner.” Rivers v. City Council of Augusta, 65/376.
Cited 66/309; 72/420; 73/746; 110/92.
479. Municipal functions not to be performed beyond the limits of
a

in their

the State.
In

City Council v. Hudson, 88/599, it was held
Augusta, being a corporation chartered by the

council of

that the city
State of Geor-

gia, has no municipal functions to perform in the State of South CaroAs the owner and keeper of a toll-bridge over the Savannah
River, it is liable for negligence in failing to keep the abutment resting
lina.

upon the South Carolina shore in safe condition for use by
its ownership and use of the bridge extending throughout

customers,
the whole
length thereof, including such abutment. This liability holds, though
it may be the law of South Carolina that a municipal corporation of
that State would not be liable for such

negligence, touching

a

similar

bridge owned by it. Lumpkin, J., said: “The city council of Augusta
certainly has no municipal or governmental functions to perform
beyond the limits of this State. So far as keeping and maintaining
this bridge for gain is concerned, this corporation entered the State of
South Carolina to engage in a private business and enjoy the profits
thereof.
Consequently it must perform the duties and assume the
burdens incident to carrying on this business. Whatever immunity, if
any, from liability to action of this sort, it may have possessed at
home, as a part of the government, the same was lost when it divested
itself of the attributes of sovereignty by undertaking such a business in
another State. The doctrine here asserted is well supported by authority. See Dill. Mun. Corp. §§966, 980-983, and cases cited; Bank
of United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904; Briscoe
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Bank, 11 Pet. 257; W. & A. R. R. Co. v. Taylor, 6 Heisk. 408,
Same case, 94/136.

414.”

property so as not to hurt others.
Mayor etc. of Savannah, 38/334, was brought
to recover damages for an injury caused by the wife's falling into a
hole or inequality in the pavement of the public market. It was held
that it was the duty of the corporation to keep the pavement in front
of the stalls in good condition, and McCay, J., said: “The market
was the property of the corporation, from which it derived a revenue,
in the way of rents.
Why was it not just as much bound to keep that
safe as the merchant is the floor of his store ? To keep the market in a
safe condition, it being property, and used hv the city for its revenues,
was a private duty.
It was the duty of a property-holder, and the
city stands, in this respect, upon the same footing as an individual.
It must use its own so as not to hurt its neighbors. Whatever was
the condition of the street, it was its duty not to have a trap on its
private property, by which a citizen was injured. The market stood
on a different footing from the streets.”
Cited, 73/99.
In City Council of Augusta v. Owens, 111/464, it
appeared that the
city owned and operated a quarry, from which it obtained rock, to be
used by it in improving its streets. The plaintiff was
engaged as a
laborer in getting out the rock and was injured.
It was held that the
testimony in the present ease showing that the operation by defendant
of the quarry in question was a ministerial act on its
part, and there
being no evidence to indicate that the work in which the city was engaged was governmental in its nature, the court did not err in refusing a request of defendant’s counsel to charge the jury on this subject.
481. When liable for injuries. If a municipal corporation has not
been negligent in constructing or repairing the same, it is not liable
for injuries resulting from defects in its streets, when it has no notice
thereof, unless such defect has existed for a sufficient length of time
for notice to be inferred. Civil Code, §749.
A municipal corporation can not be held liable for damages occurring by reason of a defect in its streets, sidewalks, sewers or bridges,
480. Must

use

its

Cullens and Wife

whSh it has

own
v.

no notice thereof, or when such defect has not existed for
length of time from which notice can be inferred, provided
the corporation has been guilty of no negligence in
constructing or repairing the same. Mayor v. Wilsop, 82/206.
482. The general rule of diligence as to the condition
of the streets.
The general rule is, that a municipal
corporation's bound to keep

sufficient
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its streets and sidewalks in

safe condition for travel in the

ordinary
well as by day, and if it fail to do so, it is liable for
damages for injuries sustained in consequence of such failure. Mayor
v. Perdue, 53/607.
Cited, 55/18; 58/239; 66/309; 78/295. The
rule as thus stated is repeated in Mayor v. Cooley, 55/18; Mayor v.
Dodd, 58/238.
In Bellamy v. City of Atlanta, 75/167, it is stated thus: It is the
duty of a city to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe
condition, so that a person can pass thereon in safety by day or night;
and for neglect to do so it will be liable for injuries caused thereby.
In City of Atlanta v. Buchanan, 76/585, it is held that a city is
bound to keep its streets, sidewalks and bridges in a reasonably safe
condition.
Keeping, as so used, includes the proper construction or
reconstruction of a bridge forming part of the street.
The declaration in Wilson v. City of Atlanta, 59/545, alleged that
he, with his three children, was riding along Harris street when
one of his horses became
frightened at the whistle of an engine thereby and sprang so suddenly forward as to break the singletree. This
increased the fright of the horses and they ran away, without fault on
his part. Harris street was some fifty or sixty feet wide; along the
center of it defendant had built an embankment or grade about ten
feet high and two hundred yards long. This was thirty-five feet
wide, thus leaving a part of the street sunk below its level^ It was
the duty of the city to have placed a railing along the edges of the
embankment, to protect passers. As plaintiff's horses ran, the buggy
was
pulled to the side of the embankment and thrown over, injuring
him seriously. The accident resulted from the defendant’s building
such an embankment and then leaving it improperly exposed. On demurrer to the declaration it was held that though the plaintiff’s horses
took fright, turned over his buggy, and threw it down the embankment
of the street, and thus he was injured, yet if the city was negligent in
constructing the embankment, in not providing it with necessary railing or other means of protection, and in not keeping the street in safe
condition, and such negligence was the real cause of the injury (the
jury being the judges of these matters as questions of fact), the plimitiff has a cduse of action. When the ease was again before the court,
60/473, the following principles were announced: The streets of a
city should be graded so as to be reasonably safe for travel thereon;
and whether so or not must be determined by each locality — the nature of the ground thereat and its surroundings — and not upon any
modes, by night,

as

a
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general plan adopted by the city, even if the record showed evidence of
such a plan. If the city authorities have power or jurisdiction to
erect embankments in the streets, it follows that they have power to
make such embankments safe by side-railings or other suitable barriers; but whether such railings were reasonably necessary for safety
and the city was guilty of negligence in not constructing them, and
whether they actually caused the injury, may well be elucidated by
the inquiry whether the plaintiff would not have been hurt even if they
had been constructed, and that therefore he must show that such barriers would probably have prevented his hurt.
Even in case of accident and the running away of horses with a buggy and injury to plaintiff’s person, there may be a recovery, if, nevertheless, the negligence of
defendant was the real cause thereof, in that the street was not safe for
travel; and the real questions in the case are, first, was this street, considering the width of the embankment, the height thereof, the slope
of descent to the portion not elevated, the condition thereof for
smoothness and ease of carriage, reasonably safe for travel, and
secondly, if it was not, was the damage to plaintiff really caused by its
unsafe condition, or by the running away of the plaintiff’s horses, unaffected by the defendant’s negligence.
Cited, 68/834.
483. Negligence the test of liability.
In an action against a municipal corporation to recover damages
for

physical injury, negligence on the part of the defendant is the
liability. No matter how free from negligence the plaintiff
may have been he would not be entitled to recover unless his injuries
were caused by or were attributable to negligence on the part of the
defendant. And there being no presumption of negligence against
the defendant, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove negligence on
its part.
City of Columbus v. Ogletree, 96/177. It is only negligence in itself, through its officers and agents, that makes the city
liable. Enright v. City of Atlanta, 78/289.
484. Ordinary diligence required as to both parties.
In Wilson v. City of Atlanta, 63/291, it was held that ordinary
diligence on the part of a person driving upon a street, and ordinary
diligence on the part of the city in constructing and repairing the
street, do not imply a like degree of vigilance in foreseeing danger and
guarding against it. And on this point, Bleckley, J., said: “While,
in respect to its streets, a city and a passenger upon them are alike
bound to ordinary diligence, yet the diligence of the former has
relation to keeping the streets in safe condition and repair, and that
a

test of
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of the latter has relation to

walking, riding or driving along them
and with due caution. Ordinary diligence on the
part of the city is that due care which every prudent municipality
takes to put its streets in safe order and keep them so; on thfe part
of the passenger, of average powers and capacity, it is that care
which every prudent person takes to pass over them without sustaining injury or inflicting any. The duty of maintaining a street in a
condition fit for safe use, though limited to ordinary diligence in
those on whom that duty is cast, involves a very different measure
of diligence in foreseeing danger, from‘that which a passenger is
bound to exercise. It follows that a passenger may know the street
or the locality, and yet be free from negligence, while the city, on
the same state of facts, might be chargeable with negligence, even
with gross negligence. In no respect is the vigilance obligatory upon
the one a measure of that which is obligatory upon the other. Each
is bound to the diligence appropriate, not to a common duty, but to a
separate and distinct duty appertaining to a separate and distinct
class. If the passenger has special knowledge which ought to heighten
in proper manner

above that which would be usual and reasonable in those

his

care

less

informed, his conduct should conform to that of ordinary prudent

possessed of like information and placed in like circumstances.
Ordinary diligence involves a reasonable use of all the resources, mental and physical, which are at the passenger’s command.”
485. If plaintiff• fails to shun consequences of defendant’s negligence. If the plaintifE, by ordinary care, could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant’s negligence, he is not
entitled to recover. Civil Code, §3830.
In Wilson v. City of Atlanta, 63/291, it is said that negligence
by the defendant, the consequences of which the plaintiff could shun
by the use of ordinary diligence, goes for nothing.
486. Illustrations of the principle.
Although it was gross negligence for the municipal authorities of
a
city, after causing a ditch five feet wide and three or four feet
deep to be cut across a public sidewalk, to leave it open, in this condition, for several weeks, a female who was perfectly aware of the
existence, width, and depth of the ditch, and who either attempted
to jump across it, or stepped into the bottom of it on a rock, and
tried to step out, and was thus injured, has no
right of action against
the city. It is clear that, by the exercise of
ordinary care on her
men
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part, the injury might have been avoided. Sheats v. City of Rome,
92/535.
In Cooke v. City of Atlanta, 94/613, it appeared that a licensed

plumber had cut

a

ditch entirely

across

the south side of Wheat

street, to within about twelve inches of the street-railroad track,
which was in the center of the street, and from a point about twelve
inches from the track
or

on

the north side thereof to within about

nine feet from the sidewalk

on

the north side of Wheat street.

eight
That

part of the street upon which the railroad was located, and for a
distance of twelve inches on both sides of the same, was not excavated,
hut was tunneled under, the surface being left undisturbed. The
ditch was about two feet wide at the top next to the car-track, and
wider near the north side of the street, and was from eight to ten
feet deep. The street, at the point in question, was one of the public
streets of the
was

city. The way left clear in the center of the street
about two feet wider than the carriage-track. There were no

barriers

guards around the excavation; nothing to put one on

or

danger, except the excavations themselves, and the piles of
dirt and stone on each side of the excavations.
On the day after the
ditch was cut, plaintiff’s servant was driving two horses hitched to
a carriage, and when he reached this place, he stopped the horses,
notice of

Taised himself up, looked forward for a few moments, and then
started his horses in a slow walk along the railroad-track, the carriagewheels

being inside of the rails. He seemed to have the horses under
was driving cautiously.
One of the' horses shied and

control, and

threw himself and the other horse into the ditch.

If there had been

the horses
destination
by other streets without much loss of time. It was held that it is
manifest that, by the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the
servant of the plaintiffs, the consequences of the alleged negligence
of the defendant could have been avoided.
This plainly appears from
the evidence relied *upon for a recovery.
There was no error in

guards or barriers strong enough around the excavation,
could not have fallen in.
The driver could have gone to his

granting
In

a

nonsuit.

Massey v. Mayor etc. of Columbus, 75/658, it was held that a
city is bound to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition for
persons to pass thereon by night as well as by day; but if a person
could have avoided injury from the existence of an open sewer in the
middle of a street by the use of ordinary diligence, the city would
not be liable therefor.
It appeared in this case that the system of
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drainage in Columbus is by open drains in the street running north
There were crossings where the streets running east and
west intersected those running north and south.
The street on which
the plaintiff was hurt had in it a drain that had been there twenty
or
thirty years. There were nearly fifty feet of clear street on each
side of the drain. The drain or sewer was five or six feet wide, and
eight or ten inches deep. Plaintiff at night, when it was dark, left
the track, which was safe and in good order, and drove into the
sewer and was
injured. If he had continued on the street to the intersection of the street running east and west no damage or accident
would have occurred. He lived near the city of Columbus, and testified that he knew there was a low place in the center of the street
by which it was drained, but when he passed that place two days
before there was no ditch there. Cited, 108/273.
In Mayor etc. of Rome v. Dodd, 58/238, the plaintiff was injured
by falling through a hole in a bridge aeross a ditch in one of the
defendant’s streets, and it was held that though the plaintiff might,
in some way, have contributed to the injury sustained by him, yet that
would not prevent his recovery if, by ordinary care, he could not have
avoided the consequences to himself of the defendant’s negligence.
Cited, 73/99.
If a city was negligent in not repairing a hole in one of its sidewalks, and a passenger was injured by falling into it, it is not sufficient to prevent his recovery that he may have been lacking in ordinary
care and diligence to avoid the injury; but it must appear that by the
use of such ordinary care and diligence he could have avoided the
injury. Enright v. City of Atlanta, 78/288.
In Samples v. City of Atlanta, 95/110, it was ruled that although
a traveler may know that because of the defective construction of a
public bridge in a city there is some danger in driving over it, still
he may recover from the city for injuries sustained in so doing if it
■clearly appears that the danger was not obviously of such character
that driving over the bridge would necessarily amount to a want of
ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, and if it also appears
that in driving over the bridge the plaintiff did in fact observe such
care and diligence.
In such case the mere fact of driving over the
bridge would not of itself authorize a finding that the plaintiff by
so doing consented to the injuries thereby occasioned.
Consequently
it was error to charge as follows: “If you believe from the evidence
that the plaintiff was acquainted with the bridge, and knew of the
and south.
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over it, and nevertheless did so, you should find that
he consented to the injury, and therefore that he can not recover;
for it is a principle of law that no man can recover damages from
another where he consented to his injuries.” Lumpkin, J., said: “If

danger of driving

danger arising from a defect in a bridge or other portion of the
highway within the limits of a city is obviously of such character that
no person, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, would attempt to
pass over the same, or, in other words, if such an attempt would, of
itself, plainly and unequivocally amount to a want of ordinary care
and diligence, the court may so instruct the jury as matter of law.
But in other cases the mere knowledge of the existing defect will not
prevent a recovery on the part of one who is injured because of the
defect, if the use of the bridge or highway in which the defect exists
is consistent with ordinary care, and it further appears that the
plaintiff did in fact exercise such care. All cases of this kind should
he submitted to the jury, who in determining what would be ordinary
care in the particular instance should take into consideration and
carefully weigh all the facts and circumstances; and nothing short of
the care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise with
reference to the existing conditions should be held sufficient on the
part of the plaintiff.” Cited, 107/352; 108/273.
In Dempsey v. City of Rome, 94/420, it was held that the evidence
showing that the plaintiff was injured at night by getting his foot fast
in a hole which had existed for two weeks or longer in a plank crossing
upon one of the most frequented streets of the city, the plaintiff at the
time using the crossing, as one of the public, for a footway in passing
over it, the case-was one for submission to the jury on the question
of negligence by the city authorities in having and leaving the crossing in that condition. The evidence further showing that the hole
extended longitudinally along the crossing, and was about ten or fifteen
inches long, three inches wide, and two or three inches deep, and that
the plaintiff had observed it a week or two before he was injured, and
that at the time he stepped into it he “had his hands in his pants
pockets, was walking very peart, and wan’t paying any attention,” it
was a question for the jury whether, under these circumstances, he
was negligent in not thinking of the defect in the crossing,
looking
out for it, and taking care for his own safety.
It was error to grant
a nonsuit.
Cited, 95/119.
In Hendley v. Mayor etc., 101/140, it appeared that the plaintiff,
with her husband, was sitting in a chair in a wagon drawn by a mule,
the
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and when

they came to the bridge which crossed a small stream or
running through a public street in the city the mule shied at
a hole in the
plank of the bridge nest to the ground as they approached,
whirled around, and tilted the wagon so that plaintiff was thrown out
and injured in the manner described.
Neither plaintiff nor her husband saw the hole until the mule shied. It was usually a gentle
animal.
She had driven it many times.
She testified that the hole
“was right along where we travel over. It was not at the end; it was
in the bridge — in the track where they travel over. The mule got
on the bridge right up to the hole.”
Her husband testified that the
branch

mule became scared at the hole and
The rock

weighed forty

or

a

rock which had been set in it.

fifty pounds, but did not completely stop

up the hole, which was about twelve to sixteen or eighteen
wide.
The bridge was from five to seven feet in width, and

inches
ten or

twelve feet

long. The hole was about the center of the wagon-track,
about where the mule would walk. After the accident, they crossed
over with the
wagon.
From other testimony it appeared that the
hole had been made by the

plank having become rotten where the
bridge. It had been noticed by
one witness a week
previously, and by another two or three weeks
before.
It was about a foot and a half long, and exposed the water
in the stream.
The rock had been placed in it by one of the witnesses
to give people notice, this being three or four days before the accident.
The place had been repaired since that time.
There was plenty of
room on the bridge for the animal to have walked around the hole,
but the wheel of the wagon would have gone into the hole, etc.
One
witness testified that the hole was not in the plank of the bridge, but
was where the plank had sloughed off.
It was held that the evidence
made a prima facie ease for the plaintiff, and it was error to grant
wheels of vehicles would strike the

a

nonsuit.
In Skinner

Town of

Douglasville, 108/766, it was ruled that
a municipal corporation for
personal injuries alleged to have been occasioned by a defect in a
street, erroneous to direct a verdict for the defendant, when there was
evidence from which the jury might have found that it was negligent,
and that at the time of receiving the injuries the plaintiff was exercising ordinary care and diligence.
In the case Baker v. City of Rome, 107/347, Cobb, J., said: “The
city of Rome was engaged in a series of street improvements, in the
course of which the sidewalk at the corner of two intersecting streets
it was, on

v.

the trial of

an

action against
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elevated from three and one-half to four feet above the street.

while the work was still in progress, some one Rad
plank, apparently sound, twelve inches wide, and from sixtwenty feet long. One end of the plank rested on the top

At this corner,

placed

a

teen to

of the wall of the sidewalk and the other end extended into the street.
In order to

get upon the crossing leading out from the corner in the
direction in which the plank extended, pedestrians had either to walk
down this plank or get down from the sidewalk into the street before
reaching the corner and go around the plank, which could be done
with little inconvenience and with perfect safety.
There was, however, a well-beaten path leading up to the plank, and while some few
pedestrians used the street as the means of reaching the crossing, the
great majority of them walked to the corner on the sidewalk and used
the plank, which remained in place two or three weeks. There was “a
nick’’ on one corner of the end of the plank resting on the street,

which caused this
defect

corner

to be elevated

a

little above the street.

This

casual observer, and made the plank liable
to rock when used.
With this exception the plank was perfectly
sound. Plaintiff, who was a man about forty years of age, and who
used a stick in walking on account of a slight stiffness in one of his
legs, attempted to reach the crossing of the street by means of the
plank. When he got about one-third of the way down the plank it
rocked with him and threw him off, and he thereby sustained severe
injuries. The city authorities have a right to lay out sidewalks, and
when so laid out it is their duty to see that they are kept in a reasonably safe condition for travel. But in laying out a sidewalk and
in declaring what is a sidewalk they are not given the arbitrary power
to say that any contrivance which suits their whim or caprice is a
was

sidewalk.

not

patent to

a

If the contrivance declared to be

a

sidewalk is

so

mani-

festly unsuited for such use that it would be obvious to any person
of ordinary prudence that its use as such would be attended with
some degree of risk and danger, then such a contrivance would not
be a sidewalk within the meaning of the law which renders a city
liable for failure to keep its sidewalks in a condition reasonably safe
for travel. A plank twelve inches wide and sixteen to twenty feet
long, loosely resting at one end upon the wall of a sidewalk three and
one-half to four feet high, is so manifestly unsuitable for use as a
sidewalk in a populous city that it will not .be so considered unless
it is clear that no other course was open to the city authorities except
to adopt such an unusual device.
It can be safely held as a matter
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can never become a sidewalk except
The present case presents no such necessity.
The risk attendant upon the use of such a contrivance being so
clearly obvious to any person of ordinary intelligence, it will not be
presumed that any such person would treat the same as a lawfully
constructed sidewalk; nor, in the absence of positive proof that the
same was erected by the authority of the city, will it be held that it
was intended
by the persons in charge of the city government, who
are
supposed to be men of at least ordinary intelligence, that such a
contrivance should be treated by the public as a part of the sidewalk.
There being no proof that the city authorities had anything to do
with placing the plank at the place where the plaintiff used it, or
that it was intended by them to be used by the public, and the evidence showing that tire work of improvement was incomplete, and
that only while the work was in this incomplete condition was the
plank ever used, there would be no presumption arising from the use
of the contrivance under such circumstances, no matter how long or
how continuous, that the city authorities placed the plank in position
to be used.
While there was proof that it had been used by pedes-

of law that such

from extreme

trians for two

a

contrivance

necessity.

or

three weeks, and that it was defective and liable to

turn when any one was

walking upon it, and that this defect was not
patent, the contrivance was of such a nature that any person of fair
intelligence was bound to know it could not have been intended by
the city authorities to be used as a sidewalk.
Any person possessed
of ordinary prudence was equally bound to know that its use under
any circumstances was attended with some risk and possible danger.
Such being true, it is apparent that a person possessing the qualities
above referred to who used the

same

would take whatever risk of

injury there might be resulting therefrom. Especially is this true in
case of the plaintiff, who was laboring under a disability in the
use of his lower limbs.
When he voluntarily chose to take a path
which was to a person in his condition manifestly dangerous, when
one which was free from danger was easily accessible to him, he was
guilty of such negligence as precluded his right to recover damages
for the injuries sustained by him in using such an obviously unsafe
and unsuitable contrivance.
See, in this connection, Samples v.
Atlanta, supra; Alexander v. Rhodes, 104/807; Daniel v. Forsyth,
106/568; 48 Ill. App. 166; 59 Ill. App. 446.”
In a suit against a city for damages resulting from falling into
a hole on the sidewalk, it being in issue whether the plaintiff was
the
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under the influence of
was no error

years

in

liquor at the time of the injury or not, there
admitting evidence of repeated drunkenness for some

before the injury and afterwards, the judge having cautioned

jury that unless the plaintiff was under the effects of liquor on
the night of the injury such testimony could not affect his case.
Enright v. City of Atlanta, 78/288.
In Zettler v. City of Atlanta, 66/195, it was held that where one
voluntarily leaves a safe, convenient and well-lighted sidewalk, and
after proceeding several feet therefrom, falls into an excavation, the
municipal corporation is not liable therefor; and on such evidence
the

a

nonsuit will be awarded.

sidewalk that from the

Aliter, if the excavation

was so near

the

ordinary accidents of travel one would be
liable to fall into it while pursuing the ordinary traveled way. Cited,
75/662; 69/622; 73/162.
487. Negligence in constructing and repairing by the city.
Where a municipal corporation gave express permission to an individual to open a ditch across a street in a city, in order to connect
the water-pipes of a private person with the city water-works, this was
in effect the opening of the ditch by the city itself; it was the act of
the city, and it became liable for any damage which might accrue to
any person by reason of the careless and negligent manner in which
the work was done. It was the duty of the city to have
superintended
and overlooked the work which it permitted to be done on its
streets,
and to have seen that it was done in such manner that no injury should
come to passers on the street from, defects therein.
Mayor etc. of
Savannah v. Donnelly, 71/258. Cited, 77/761; 91/716.
In City Council v. Cone, 91/714, on a demurrer to the
declaration,
Simmons, J., said: “The objection of counsel for the plaintiff in
•error was to the
insufficiency, as he contended, of the allegations as to
notice to the defendant of the unsafe condition alleged to exist at
the time of the injury. Under the decision of this court in the
ease of Donnelly, supra, no notice of such condition was
necessary
in order to charge the city with liability.
The declaration alleges
special permission from the city council to do this particular work,
and knowledge of its progress on the day in question, and the ordinance
requires that a certain officer of the city shall exercise supervision
over the work, and see that it is
properly done. This being so, the
city became liable for any damage which might accrue to any person
by reason of the careless and negligent manner in which the work was
done. Jones, Mun. Corp. §81; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th
ed.) §§1024,

561

CHAPTER 32.

]

Actions against

[§488

municipal corporations.

1027; 132 U. S. 295, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; 83 Mo. 345; *43 N. Y.
261; 52 1ST. W. Rep. 833.”
In

action

against a municipal corporation for damages resulting
breaking of a plank in a bridge in one of its streets, it
appeared that the city, by its agent, its employee, put a sappy plank
in a bridge, which broke and caused the injury complained of.
It
was held that the ground of action is either misfeasance on the part
of the corporation, its officers or servants, or of others under its authority, in doing acts which caused the street to be out of repair, or else
neglect by the corporation to put the street in repair, or remove obstructions therefrom, or remedy causes of danger occasioned by the
wrongful acts of others. In the former case, no further notice to
the corporation of the condition of the street is essential to its liability.
an

from the

In the latter

case

notice of the condition of the street, or

what is

equivalent to notice, is necessary. Mayor etc. of Brunswick v. Braxton, 70/193.
In' City of Atlanta v. Buchanan, 76/585, it was alleged that the
injury occurred by reason of a bridge faulty in its construction,
and it was held that if a city constructed a bridge in one of its streets
of loose plank, or upon reconstructing it, the planks were left unfastened by its employees, notice to them is notice to the city.
The
second act of fastening plank upon it and making it safe, is construction, if not of all the bridge, at least of an essential part to safe
passage over it.
488. Negligence in failure to repair, or in remedying causes of danger occasioned by others; sidewalks.
In City of Atlanta v. Milam, 95/135, it was held that the duty of
a
city to keep a sidewalk reasonably safe for public use extends to
all of the sidewalk intended for travel by the public as a thoroughfare,
and is not confined to keeping in a safe condition a special part only
of the sidewalk which happens to be most generally used. The jury
having, at the request of defendant’s counsel, been permitted to personally inspect the obstruction upon the sidewalk which occasioned
the injuries received by the plaintiff, and there being evidence to sustain a finding that because of this obstruction the sidewalk was not
reasonably safe for the passage of pedestrians, and that the city was
negligent in permitting the obstruction to remain, and the charge of
the court having fully and fairly guarded all the rights of the defendant, the discretion of the trial judge in refusing to set aside the
verdict in the plaintiff’s favor will not he overruled. Lumpkin, J.,
36

.
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in most American cities, water-plugs, telegraph and telephone poles, trees, and other things, are allowed upon
the margins of sidewalks, and pedestrians, therefore, are not expected
to use such portions of the same as are occupied by these obstructions,
still there can be no doubt, under the rules of law now settled by
said:

“While, of

course,

repeated adjudications in this and other jurisdictions, that the city
authorities must keep in a reasonably safe condition all parts of its
sidewalks which are intended to be used by the public. It may often
happen that in a particular locality a comparatively narrow portion

,

of a sidewalk, on either side or in the middle of it, is much more
generally used than other portions of the same; but this does not relieve the municipal authorities from liability for negligence in permitting dangerous obstructions to be continuously maintained in places
upon sidewalks over which the public have a right to pass, merely
because those places are not so much used as others.
It appeared in
this case that the obstruction over which the plaintiff fell had existed
for a considerable time, and was located upon a portion of the sidewalk over which he had a right to walk. The evidence as to the
dangerous character of the sidewalk was rather weak — so much so
that we would very probably have set aside the verdict in the
plaintiff’s favor had it not been for the fact that the
jury, at the request
of the defendant, were permitted to
personally inspect the obstruction,
and form their own opinion
concerning it by ocular demonstration.
We are constrained to hold that they were better
judges on the subject after this opportunity of obtaining information than we could
possibly be from a mere paper report of the testimony introduced in
the

case.

It is

We will therefore allow the verdict to stand.”

apparent from the evidence that the proximate cause of the
injury which the plaintiff received was the defective condition of the
street, and that the plaintiff in error was negligent in not repairing
or
protecting the same. Mayor etc. v. Wood, 111/863.
489. Sidewalls; cellar-doom.
In an action against a municipal
corporation for injuries resulting
from falling into a cellar-door on one of its
sidewalks, left open by
the owner of the property on its street, there are two
questions for the
jury: First, is the system adopted by the defendant in regard to allowing cellars on its sidewalks, reasonably calculated to ensure the
safety of those who travel thereon by night or by day ? Second, if so,
is the defendant liable in the
special case by reason of negligence in
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coupled with notice, actual or constructive, to the city?
City of Augusta v. Hafers, 61/49.
The basis of the plaintiff’s right to recover is negligence, and whether
the system of the defendant in regard to allowing cellars on its sidewalks, in front of business houses, is reasonably calculated to ensure
the safety of those who travel on it by day or night, is a question of
fact for the jury, and not a question for the court to decide in its
charge. In passing upon it, evidence that children, upon different
occasions, have previously fallen into such openings, was admissible.
It bears remotely upon the question, and is admissible for what it is
worth.
City of Augusta v. Hafers, 59/151.
The ease of Chapman v. Mayor and Council of Macon, 55/567, was
this: An opening was made by folding cellar-doors in a sidewalk.
They were used by the occupier of the cellar. They had been there for
forty years, and the plaintiff had regularly passed over the sidewalk to
and from his meals daily for a long time. A few moments before the
accident he had procured some eye-water from a drug-store and had
gone to his place of business and applied it to his eyes.
The doors
were then down.
On his return, the eye was smarting and he had
his handkerchief over it.
The other eye, which was not affected,
was kept
by him on the outer edge of the sidewalk so as to keep on
it, thinking he would thereby be safe. One of the doors was up and
open, and stepping on that which was down nearest to him, he made
another step upon the opening made by the other door, or half of the
door, and fell in and was hurt. It was ruled that, cellar-doors opening out on the sidewalk, and frequently or negligently kept or left
open, endanger the use of such sidewalk in the night, and, to persons
of imperfect vision, by day, and the city is liable to suit by persons
falling into the cellars and injured thereby, if it has notice of such
negligent use of the cellars. If this were a single act of negligence
the city would not be held liable, because it would not be charged with
knowledge, nor could notice in fifteen minutes be given t^.it. If the
negligent use has continued a long time notice will be presumed, and
the city is chargeable therewith, without actual proof of notice.
Whether the use of the doors in opening and leaving them open, has
been proper and legitimate for the business of the owner, or capricious
and unnecessary, and if legitimate, whether habitually used so negligently as to endanger the passers-by, are questions for the jury; and
whether the plaintiff was so negligent himself, in venturing out in
his then imperfect sight, as to prevent his recovery on proof of
neglithe owner,

k
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by the use of the occupiers of the cellar and knowledge by the
city, is also a question for the jury, and the court should not decide
these questions itself by granting a nonsuit.
Cited, 59/154; 61/50.
Where, in consequence of the falling in of a gate forming a part
of a railing protecting an excavation in and along the margin of a
public sidewalk in a town, the excavation being used to afford access
to a private cellar, the plaintiff was precipitated into the excavation
and injured, there was no error in declining to charge the jury that,
gence

plaintiff intentionally leaned upon the gate, he could not
from the municipal corporation, or in instructing the jury
that it was a question for them whether or not, under all the circuwstances, the plaintiff was making a proper and legitimate use of the
gate in question. It appearing by undisputed evidence that, at the
instance of the municipal authorities, the gate had been made secure
two days before the plaintiff was injured, and that it was safe on the
evening before the injury occurred, and there being no evidence tending to show that these authorities had ascertained, or by ordinary
care might have ascertained, that it had become insecure at the time
of the injury, the plaintiff was not entitled to a verdict against the
municipal corporation, and it was error to refuse a new trial. Lumpkin, J., said: “It is undoubtedly the duty of municipal corporations
if the

recover

to exercise reasonable

sidewalks, and the law imposes upon
duty of reasonable inspection to guard against danger that
should be expected.
Cellar-ways, constructed for the purpose of
descending from sidewalks to the basements of buildings, are necessities in a city or town; but the corporation should not allow them to
become traps for pedestrians. Sidewalks should be kept reasonably
safe, and openings in the same should be guarded; but whether or
not defects in the means provided for guarding them will make the
municipality liable is usually a question of fact, to be determined
with reference to the surrounding circumstances. An
impracticable
or unreasonable amount of
inspection should not be required of the
corporation, but only such as prudence, good sense, and reason make
necessary.
Jones, Neg. Hun. Corp. §§94, 95, and cases cited.
Where a-defect which might lead to
danger exists in a cellar-way
opening upon a sidewalk, it is the duty of the municipal authorities
to ascertain this
defect, and have it remedied, but a reasonable time
care over

them the

should be allowed for this
purpose.
for only a short time, and the

If the defect had been in existence
or officers of the city had no
knowledge of it, or a sufficient length of time had not elapsed so that
they ought to have known of it in the exercise of ordinary care and
agents
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diligence, the corporation should not be held liable for an injury
resulting because of the defect.” Mayor etc. v. Boone, 93/662.
When the plaintiff showed that the door was left open after dark,
that she fell therein and was injured, and that the occupant of the
store with which the cellar was connected, was fined by the recorder
of the corporation for a violation, on the occasion of the injury, of
the ordinance which prohibits any person from leaving open a cellardoor after sundown, a nonsuit was properly refused. City of Augusta
v.

Hafers, 59/151.
Sidewalks, bridges on.

490.

Where the sidewalk of

a

street

crosses

another street, and the cross-

ing habitually used by foot-passengers is a bridge over a drain, there
being no stepping-stone or other convenient crossing, such bridge so
used is to all intents and purposes part of the sidewalk, and the city
should be held to liability for damages sustained by foot-passengers
on said bridge to the same extent as if the injury occurred on the
sidewalk itself; and if the injury arose from a defect of the bridge,
of which the city has notice, it is liable in damages for the injury sustained.
City of Atlanta v. Champe, 66/659.
In Mayor etc. v. Johnson, 84/279, the plaintiff sued for damages
for injuries sustained by him in falling through a hole in a bridge
on a public sidewalk.
The hole was caused by the removal of a plank
in the bridge, and the hole remaining for from five to twenty days,
on one of the principal streets of the city, and within a short distance
of the market-house. A verdict was rendered for $1,500. The plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured and it was held that
the verdict was not excessive.
Simmons, J., said that, under the
facts disclosed in the record, the jury has exercised great moderation
in assessing the damages.
491. Sidewalks, hole in.
In City of Atlanta v. Bellamy,
72/4^0, the plaintiff sued for damages
resulting from a fall caused by the defective condition of the paving
on the sidewalk of a street.
He stepped into a hole and fell. He testifled that the hole was about four inches wide,
eighteen inches long, and
several inches deep. His witness stated that the hole had been there
seven or eight months, and was not
quite as deep as a brick is thick,
about four inches wide, and about nine or ten inches long — that a
common brick would more than fill it
up.
It was where two flagstones
did not exactly come together, and most of the time a brick was in it.
Hall, J., said: “We think that no encouragement should be given to
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brought against towns and cities for the recovery of damages
resulting from slight depressions or elevations made by displacing paving or flagstones, or bricks used in the construction of sidewalks and
streets. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Crawford, in Rivers v. City
Council, 65/378, ‘Calamities and casualties are common to all, but
because they occur it by no means follows that such as may be so unfortunate are entitled to recover compensation in damages out of some
person, either natural or artificial, who may be able to respond, no’twithstanding it appears that such impressions are beginning to prevail.’ We can not entertain the idea that municipal corporations are
insurers against accidents upon streets and sidewalks, or that every
defect therein, though it may cause the injury sued for, is actionable.
It is sufficient if the streets (which include sidewalks and bridges
thereon) are in a reasonably safe condition for travel in the ordinary
mode, by night as well as by day. It is impossible to ascertain speedily when the bricks, paving and flagstones on the streets are out of
place, and to keep promptly in repair at all times trifling defects
arising from such causes. In all suits for damages resulting from
such causes, these considerations should have weight with juries,
whose peculiar province is to pass upon questions of negligence, under directions from the court.” When this case was again before the
court it was held that if the defect had existed for some time, the city
is chargeable with notice thereof, and if it could have ascertained the
defect, its failure to do so is negligence on its part and its liability is
the same as if it had notice of the defect. And it was error to charge
that the defect must have been of such character, so open and notorious, and must have existed such a length of time, in the judgment of
the jury, to charge the city with notice.
In City of Columbus v. Ogletree, 96/177, the plaintiff alleged that
he had sustained injuries from falling into a hole in a
public sidewalk,
which had been negligently left open by the city. The
judge charged
the jury that if “the policemen, who were the
agents of the city, or
in the employ of the city, had notice of the
dangerous condition of the
street or sidewalk, and they failed to take
steps to repair the damage,
or to
repair the sidewalk so as to make it reasonably safe, then the
city would be liable for injuries resulting therefrom.” Lumpkin, J.,
said: “It does not appear that this charge was based
upon anything
contained in the charter or ordinances of the city of Columbus
making
it the duty of its policemen to look after and
report the condition of
its streets and sidewalks; but it would seem that the
judge was underactions
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taking to state what he regarded as the general rule upon this subject,
without reference to charter provisions or municipal regulations.
Thus regarded, we do not think the doctrine of the charge sound; certainly not to the extent of being alike applicable to all incorporated
cities. In the absence of any ordinance or statutory provision specially defining the powers and duties of policemen, they are, presumptively, as at common law, mere peace-officers. Throop, Pub. Off. §565.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be presumed that a policeman was
specially charged with any duty respecting the streets or sidewalks
of a city; and if, as matter of fact, any such duty did devolve upon
the police officers of a particular city, this fact should be made
affirmatively and unequivocally to appear. In Mechem, Pub. Off.
§884, the rule in the case of an agent acting for a private principal is
stated to be that the law imputes to the principal all notice relating to
the subject-matter of the agency which the agent acquires while acting
as such, and within the scope of his authority, etc.
In section 845 the
same rule is applied to private corporations, and it is further stated
that ‘notice or knowledge must have come to an agent whose powers and authority extend over the particular subject-matter to which
the notice or knowledge applies.’ And in section 846, while the
author remarks that it is not yet fully settled by the authorities to
what extent the rules applicable to private agencies will obtain in respeet to public officers, he does distinctly assert that ‘notice or knowledge in reference to a matter over which a public officer has no
authority, and in respect to which he has no duty to perform, can not
be deemed notice to the public.’ Under these rules, it would seem
that, unless it be affirmatively shown that a police officer has some duty
to perform in reference to the streets or sidewalks, notice to him of
their condition would not necessarily be -notice to the municipal authorities.” And it was held by the court that, it not having been
shown that the duty of looking after and reporting the condition of
the streets and sidewalks of the city devolved upon its policemen, it
was error to
charge that notice to “the police” of the defective condition of a particular street or sidewalk would be notice to the municipal
corporation. On a second trial of this case such an ordinance was
introduced and it was held that an ordinance making it the duty of
policemen to report to the lieutenants of police all footways, bridges,
and sidewalks requiring repairs necessarily renders it incumbent on
the lieutenants to

report

upon

the

same

to the authorities whose

duty it is to have the needed repairs made; and therefore, under such
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ordinance, notice to a policeman or a lieutenant of a defective or
dangerous place in a sidewalk is notice to the city. Cited, 102/293.
492. Sidewalks; roots of a tree.
Where suit was brought against a municipal corporation, for damages incurred by reason of certain roots of a tree having been negligently left projecting above a sidewalk, in which roots the foot of a
pedestrian at night was caught, causing her to trip and fall, and injuring her, it was admissible to show by another person that he was
tripped and thrown down some days previously by the same roots at
the same place. It was a circumstance to show that the sidewalk would
occasion falls. In cases of doubt as to the admissibility of evidence,
the current of authority in this State is to admit it and leave its
an

weight and effect to he determined by the jury.

Gilmer

v.

City of At-

lanta, 77/688.
493. Sidewalks; awnings.
In Mayor etc. v. Caldwell, 81/76, the plaintiff sued the defendant
for

negligently suffering an awning which extended over a sidewalk
unsafe, by reason of which it fell upon the plaintiff and injured
him. It was held that it was the duty of the city to keep the awnings
over the sidewalks safe and prevent them from injuring passers-hy.
494. Sidewalks; a falling wall.
In Parker v. Mayor etc. of Macon, 39/725, it appeared that a
building, which was private property, and which stood at the line of,
but not on, a public street, was burned, leaving some of the front wall
standing. It stood for several months after the fire. It fell upon, and
injured, the plaintiff. It was held that the city has power to remove
buildings or other obstructions or nuisances in the public streets, sidewalks, etc., of the city, and under that power they were bound to keep

to be

the streets and sidewalks in such condition that it

was

safe and

con-

venient to pass

them, and in case of failure they were liable to any
injured by their neglect. If this wall was so much dilapidated
or decayed as to endanger the lives of
persons passing the street, it was
a nuisance and the city should have removed it.
If the wall was
sound and steady and did not, under ordinary circumstances, endanger
any one passing the street, and it should be thrown down by tempest
or other act of God, a person injured by the fall would have no right
to recover damages for such injuries from the city.
Cited 55/568;
73/99; 93/675.

person

495.
In

Sidewalks, excavation in.

Mayor and Council of Atlanta

v.

Perdue, 53/607, it appeared

t
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made in the

sidewalk, by

a party who was erectbuilding, to allow grates to cover the area wall of the building.
The injury occurred in the night, and the excavation had been there
two or three weeks
there was no railing around it, nor were there
any lights there. It was held that if the excavation had existed for
such a length of time as by reasonable diligence in the performance of
their duty the corporate authorities ought to have known of it, notice
to them would be presumed, and proof of actual knowledge would not
be necessary to render the corporation liable for the injury. Warner,
C. J., said: “A municipal corporation is liable for injuries caused by
its neglect or omission to keep its streets and sidewalks in repair, as
well as for those caused by defects occasioned by the wrongful acts of

ing

an

was

a

—

others.

In the latter class of

eases

the foundation of the action is

negligence, and if the defect in the sidewalk or street had only existed
for a short time, as a night or a day, so that the defendant could not
reasonably be presumed to have had any knowledge of it, then notice
to the defendant should be shown in order to make it liable.

the defect in the sidewalk

street existed for such

But if

length of time as
by reasonable diligence in the performance of its duty, the defect ought
to have been known by it, then notice will be presumed, and proof of
actual notice is not necessary.” Cited, 78/295.
In Enright v. City
of Atlanta, 78/288, it was held that while the time during which a defeet in a sidewalk existed may appear to the Supreme Court to be
sufficient to charge the city with notice of its condition, yet it is not
for the presiding judge to prescribe in his charge the length of time
which will raise a presumption of negligence in not taking notice.
Questions of negligence are peculiarly for the jury, and it was not
error to leave to the
jury to say whether or not, under the evidence,
the time was sufficient to show negligence. Jackson, C. J., said:
“These issues of negligence are peculiarly for the jury, and while this
court did hold that two

or

or

three weeks

were

a

sufficient to show notice

and want of

diligence, in the case of Perdue, supra, yet it did not hold
that the presiding judge should prescribe in his charge the length of
time for the presumption of negligence in not
taking notice, and control the finding of the jury on this issue
involving negligence in the
city.”
496. Sidewalks, cotton-bales on.
Sidewalks in front of
of cotton-bales

a

warehouse must not be obstructed

longer than is reasonably

necessary

to

move

by piles
the cotton
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delivery-wagons into a warehouse. A stoppage of any part of
longer than is necessary for such transfer becomes a
nuisance, and if a passer-by be injured by such obstruction without
negligence herself, the warehouseman is responsible in damages.
Even if the cotton-bales be on the sidewalk but a reasonably necessary
time for the transit from the wagons to the warehouse, and yet be
placed on the sidewalk so negligently as to cause injury to the passerby by falling on her, the warehouseman is responsible. Evidence to
the effect that the hales were set upon the ends so as to project from
the sidewalk into the street and thereby a delivery-wagon struck
against them, so projecting into the street, and one fell on and injured
a lady, will support a verdict of negligence, as contrary neither to law
nor evidence.
Maddox & Rucker v. Cunningham, 68/431.
497. Sidewalks, lumber projected over.
Hazzard brought suit against the Mayor etc. of Savannah, 77/54,
to recover for a personal injury, caused by falling over certain lumber
which was lying in a street, and which projected over the edge of the
sidewalk. There was evidence on behalf of the plaintiff to the effect
that the lumber had been lying in the street for about a week, in front
of a building which was being repaired; and that on the night of the
injury the street was not lighted. One witness testified that he noticed
that some of it projected over the edge of the sidewalk two days before the injury to the plaintiff. Another stated that, while walking
along the sidewalk, he had stumbled over the lumber on the night before the plaintiff was hurt. There were three successive verdicts for
the plaintiff — the first for $3,000, the second for $3,700, and the
third for $1,400. The court below granted a new trial each time
and announced that he would do so continuously and indefinitely because, in his judgment on the facts, there could he no recovery.
It was
held that this was error, and Jackson, C. J., said: “The lumber had
lain in the street and a part of it projected over the sidewalk
long
enough, in our judgment, to charge the city with notice; and there being no light from the city lamps, or other temporary light, to warn
citizens or others of danger on a dark night from the obstruction of
the lumber projecting over the sidewalk far enough to cause the disaster, there is evidence of negligence sufficient to support the verdict,
the question of fact being the peculiar province of the jury, and that
body having three times, by three several and different representations
of the jury-box each time, found for the plaintiff, and the last time a
reasonable verdict, the law, which invests that body of men of the vicithe sidewalk
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facts,

as

it does the presiding judge

law, will not permit this court in the last resort to allow the judge
to control the jury ad infinitum upon facts, where there is evidence
(though it be comparatively weak) on which repeated findings may
rest.”
This case, 72/205; 74/377.
498. Streets; bridges.
over

If

municipal corporation does not use ordinary care and diligence
or
keep a bridge over a ditch in one of its highways, whether
constructed by it or not, a safe and convenient crossing for those using
it as a passway over the ditch, both by day and night, it would be
chargeable with negligence, and liable for whatever damages may be
sustained in consequence thereof. Town of Belton v. Vinton, 73/99.
In Mayor etc. of Rome v. Dodd, 58/238, the plaintiff fell through a
hole in a bridge across a ditch in one of the defendant’s streets, and
was injured.
The hole had been there for six weeks. The rule as to
the liability of municipalities, stated in Perdue’s ease, supra, was repeated and enforced. Cited, 73/99.
Although the charter of the city may not, in express terms, confer
the power or impose the duty of keeping the streets and bridges within
the corporate limits in proper condition and repair, yet where the
charter grants to the corporate authorities the power to “impose such
taxes upon all the real and personal estate within the corporate limits
of said city as they shall deem necessary for the support of the government of said city, or for other purposes, and
enforce the
a

to make

■

.

.

.

collection of the

same,” and where these authorities have assumed and
exercised corporate functions over the streets and bridges, and have
negligently constructed or failed to keep in repair a bridge upon one of
the public stftets, whereby a traveler crossing the same sustains a personal injury, the corporation is liable to make compensation in damages, though no right of action be given by the charter or any
statute.
The right to redress for an injury occasioned by a defective
structure erected and maintained by the corporation upon the public
highway within the city is a right derived from the common law, and
may be recognized and enforced under the circumstances of the present
case.
City of Greensboro v. McGibbory, 93/672. Cited, 100/360.
In City Council v. Hudson, 94/135, it was held that according
to the decision in this

case

when before this court the first time

(88/599), it was not incumbent on the plaintiff, in order to establiability on the part of the defendant, to prove “that, under the
statutes of South Carolina, the city is liable civilly for a failure to keep

lish
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bridge in repair.” The approaches to a toll-bridge and its abutas well as the bridge proper, must be kept in repair by the
owner, the whole having been erected by him, and, so far as appears, no
duty resting upon the public to maintain the approaches or abutments
as a part of the highway.
The defect complained of having existed
for a considerable period of time, no question could properly arise as
to the duty of the owner to take notice of it.
An allegation that railing was absent from the abutment of the bridge may be supported by
proof that it was absent from the approach to the bridge. Lumpkin,
J., said: “The evidence shows that the entire bridge structure, including the approaches and abutment on the South Carolina side, had been
erected by the city council of Augusta, and there is not in the record
the faintest suggestion that any duty rested upon the public to maintain either the approaches or the abutments as a part of the highway.
The city council of Augusta being liable as any other proprietor of a
toll-bridge over which the public are invited to cross, they paying for
the privilege, while not an insurer of the persons or property of its customers, was bound, at least, to ordinary care respecting the safety of
its bridge,
1 Thomp. Neg. p. 317, §11. The duty of keeping the
bridge in repair included the duty of repairing its approaches and
abutments, and carried with it a corresponding liability for damages
for non-repair, and also liability for injuries happening in consequence
of the bridge being without suitable railings, or having railings defective or out of repair. Id. pp. 563, 564, §§8, 9, and cases cited. See,
also, 2 Thomp. Neg. 770, and cases there cited. The defect complained
of in this particular case having existed for some time, no question
could properly arise as to the duty of the city council to take notice of
it, and have it repaired. Certainly there was ample time for the municipal authorities to have discovered that the railing was missing, and
to have had it replaced before the time when the plaintiff was injured.
The approaches and abutments of the bridge all constituting, as above
stated, parts of one and the same structure, an allegation that railing
was absent from the abutment was supported by evidence showing that
it was absent from the approach to the bridge. The question now under consideration, with reference to the facts of the case before us, is
by no mean$»the same as that presented in Daniels, 90/608. There,
having reference to the rules of the company, and the statute requiring
trains to slow down to a certain speed before running on or crossing
any drawbridge, it was held that the restriction as to speed applied to
the bridge proper, and not to a long trestle constituting an approach

ments,
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thereto; the obvious purpose of the rules and of the statute being to
prevent the precipitation of trains into the river when the ‘draw5 of
the bridge was turned around for the passage of boats.” See 458.
In Mayor etc. v. Hurst, 111/453, it was held that a city is not
liable for injuries resulting from the defective condition of a bridge
over a road on private property, approached
by a gate, and in no
way controlled by the city or open to the public. This is true although
the bridge is within the corporate limits of the city.
499. Streets,

gullies in.
Mayor v. Cooley, 55/17, it appeared that on a dark, rainy night,
the plaintiff, who was unacquainted with the street, fell into a deep
ditch or gully across one of the public streets of the city, and which
the defendant willfully allowed to remain there. It had been there for
In

some

time and must have been known to the defendant.

evidence which

was

offered to show

a

want of

keep that street in repair, without detriment to
was

means

more

On the trial
with which to

important streets,

held to be irrelevant.

In

Trippe v. City of Atlanta, 68/834, it was held that a declaration
alleging the following facts made a prima facie case and was not demurrable. Plaintiff was riding along one of the streets of the city,
when his horse became frightened and ran away. Plaintiff succeeded
in stopping him, when he began to kick against the dashboard, and
plaintiff sprang from the buggy. The street for some distance in that
vicinity was in very bad condition, and had been so for a considerable
time, and the city had notice of the fact; there were deep and ragged
gullies washed in the street and in the bottom of one of them was a
deep and narrow rut; into this plaintiff’s foot stepped, and being unable to keep his equipoise, he fell, his leg was broken, and he was badly
injured. The injury would not have resulted but for the gully which
defendant’s negligence allowed to remain in its street, and was exclusively and wholly caused thereby.
500. Streets; sewer open; subcontractor.
In Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah v. Waldner, 49/316, it appeared that the city let out to Van Horn the contract to build a sewer.
He sublet the job. The contract stipulated that the work should be
done under the supervision of the city surveyor, to see that th.e contract
was complied with. It contained no provision to the effect that the contractors should erect lights at night.
In doing the work, the subcontractors opened a sewer eight or nine feet deep across a public street.
There were no lights placed at the opening to warn persons passing.
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At night, plaintiff was passing along the street on horseback. His horse
stumbled and fell into the open sewer, and the injury to the plaintiff

followed.

The contest in the

case was

whether the city or the con-

doing the work were liable. The court held: “It is the duty
municipal corporation, vested by law with authority over the
streets, whilst dangerous works, such as sewers, etc., are being constructed across a street, to have proper precautionary measures taken
to prevent accidents to passengers during such construction, whether
the same is being done by the corporation through its own servants,
or
by contract, or by subcontractors under a primary contractor.
Such duty, at least, in the case of independent contractors or subcontractors, is not founded on the principles of respondeat superior,
but is deducible from the authority in the corporation over the streets
and the obligation flowing therefrom to protect the public against
nuisances or dangerous obstructions in the highways of the city.”
Tripp, J., said: “Upon principle and authority we hold that if the
builders of the sewer negligently left it unguarded, by not having
proper barriers, or lights, or other protection against danger, and it
was permitted to continue for an unreasonable or unnecessary time
by the municipal authorities, who had notice, or there are facts from
which notice could be reasonably inferred, they are liable for injuries
resulting from such neglect to perform their duty.” Cited, 66/309.
501. Streets, water-plug in.
In City of Columbus v. Sims, 94/483, the plaintiff sued for injuries
sustained by him by driving his buggy at night against a water-plug
or hydrant in one of the streets.
He claimed that the city had caused
this plug to be placed in the roadway used for vehicles
(the usual
place for locating such plugs being in the center of the streets), and
that there were no lights to give warning of the location of the
plug.
The court charged the jury: “The city having undertaken to
light its
streets, it was their duty, after they undertook to light that street, to
have lighted the street in such manner as
parties could see any obstruction in the street.”
It was held that a city which is under no statutory obligation to light its streets is not, as matter of law, bound, when
lighting them voluntarily, to do it in such a manner as to enable persons
using them to see any obstruction that the city may have placed in
the street, irrespective of whether the obstruction, such as a
water-plug,
tractors

of

a

reasonable and proper one or not.
502. Streets, steps adjoining at railroad.
A street in the city of Atlanta crosses the track of

was a

a

railroad, and
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the railroad company negligently allowed a pair of steps joining a
part of the street where it crosses the right of way of the railroad to be
out of repair and in a defective and dangerous condition. M. was injured by it. He sued the city to recover damages for his injury, and it
was held that a municipal corporation having the care and control of
the streets is bound to see that they are kept safe for the passage of
persons and property.
If this duty should be neglected, and one
should be injured on account of such neglect, the corporation will be
liable for the damages sustained. Railroad Company v. City of Atlanta, 74/774. Cited, 78/287, 780.
503. Streets, railroad-cut in.
In Jackson v. City Council, 88/466, it was shown that the plaintiff’s horse was injured by falling into a railroad-cut which defendant
had allowed to be made across a public street, and which had, with the
knowledge of defendant, remained open without a bridge or road excavation being built or made over or at the cut, and without a guardrail or other thing for the protection of the public.
It was held that
there was evidence on which to submit the case to the jury, and the
court erred in granting a nonsuit.
504. Streets; material used by property-owners.
Property-owners placed material in a street for the purpose of paving in front of their residences. A city ordinance required them to
prepare and place lights thereon during the night, so as to warn persons
passing along the street of the obstructions.' The lights were not
so placed,
and in consequence thereof, the plaintiff was injured
while passing along the street. It was held that if the proper officers
or agents of the
city had notice of the failure and neglect to place the
lights themsel-ps or to require it to be done, or if the failure occurred
for a sufficient length of time before the injury to have required the
proper agent or officers of the city to have known it in the exercise of
ordinary care and diligence, and they failed to place the lights themselves or require it to be done, and the plaintiff when passing along
the street was injured by reason of the failure to provide lights, and
she could not have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care,
then she could recover; but if the officers or agents of the city did not
have notice of the failure to light the obstruction, and such failure did
not occur for a sufficient length of time before the injury, so that they
ought to have known of it in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, then the plaintiff could not recover.
This case is distinguished
from Donnelly’s case (71/258) bv the fact that special permission had

.
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case

to make the improvement.

thus notified of the obstruction.

Lewis

v.

The city was
City of Atlanta, 77/756.

Cited, 93/667.
505.

The

Streets; obstruction by fire company.
primary purpose of a street is for passage and travel, and

unauthorized obstruction of its free

any

within the definition of

as would leave the street in an unsafe
unreasonable manner or for an unreasonable time would render the city liable for any damage resulting
therefrom. But the right of the public to use a street is„subject to
such reasonable and necessary limitations as the city may impose upon
it.
Therefore, so long as an obstruction placed upon a street is ternporary and reasonable in its character, and is intended for the public
safety and convenience, its existence furnishes no cause for complaint.
A good fire department is both necessary and useful to a city, and its
efficiency is promoted by parades and practice. Hence to temporarily
obstruct passage by stretching ropes across a street during a parade or
practice of the fire department does not furnish any ground for damages against a city.
Simmon v. City of Atlanta, 67/618.
506. Remedy over against wrong-doer.
A municipal corporation has a remedy over against a private party,
or railroad
company, who has so used the streets as to produce an injury, unless the municipal corporation concurred in the wrong. In a
a

nuisance; and such obstruction

condition

*

use comes

or

impair its

use

in

an

■

suit

brought by the corporation to recover a sum of money as damages,
corporation has been compelled by suit to pay to one who has
been injured by a defect in the streets, and which injury occurred on a
railroad-crossing, the record of the former suit is admissible evidence,
if the railroad company had notice of the
pendency of the former suit,
and was requested by the municipal corporation to come forward and
defend it. The judgment, notice having been given to the railroad
company, would be conclusive as between the city and the railroad company as to the right of the injured party to recover, and as to the
amount that might be recovered by the
city against the railroad company. But such judgment would only be prima facie true that a recovery could be had against the railroad company for negligent conduct of its agents and employees; it would be
competent for the railroad company to show that it was under no
obligation to keep the
streets in safe condition, and that it was not
through its default that
the accident happened. If it
appears that there was fault, both on the
part of the corporation and the railroad company, the former can not
which the

.

.
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for the reason that one of two joint wrong-doers can
contribution from the other.
W. & A. R. R. v. City of
recover,

not have
Atlanta,

74/774.

Cited, 78/287; 780. The same principle was determined in
City of Atlanta, 78/779.

Faith

v.

CHAPTER 33.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
507. Wbat is accord and satisfaction.
608. To be available as a defense

pleaded.
609. There must

be

a

it must be

consideration for the

511. Where not necessary to refund.
512. When estopped from claiming that
lease is not binding.
513. Attorney’s fees.

re-

release.
6ie. To avoid the release for fraud the fruit
of the contract must be restored be-

fore suing.

is’accord and satisfaction. Accord and satisfaction is
parties, by a subsequent agreement, have satisfied the former one, and the latter agreement has been executed.
The execution
of a new agreement may itself amount to a satisfaction, where it is so
expressly agreed by the parties, and without such agreement, if the
new promise is founded on a new consideration, taking of it is a
satisfaction of the former contract. Civil Code, §3732.
508. To he available as a defense it must he pleaded.
Testimony offered for the purpose of proving an accord and satis‘

507. What

where the

faction is inadmissible in behalf of
set up a

a

defendant whose

answer

does not

defense to which such testimony would be applicable.

In-

gram v.^ Hilton & Dodge Lumber Co., 108/194.
In Clem, 80/534, there was a special plea, which was a

sort of composite plea, Unbracing accord and satisfaction, covenant not to sue,

and

estoppel.

All these special elements rested upon the alleged payconsideration, and alleged acceptance thereof by
the plaintiff.
The plea set up that, in consideration of $100, there
was aD accord and satisfaction, a covenant not to sue, and that the
plaintiff was thereby estopped. Bleckley, C. J., in reference to an
Assignment of error on the charge of the court, said: “The complaint
is that, if there was a contract of accord and satisfaction partly performed, the plaintiff could not rescind as to the part performed without restosing the defendant to its original condition; and this is certainly the ordinary rule of rescission, where it is not a matter of mutual consent. Code, §3712. But the rule does not apply to accord
ment of

37

$100

as a
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and

satisfaction, because, in order for there to be accord and satisfaction, the accord must be executed. That is what makes the satisfaction. As long as the accord is executory, although it is partially performed, the original cause of action is not extinguished, and an action
may be brought upon it, and the remedy for the defendant is to plead
his part performance as satisfaction pro tanto. He gets credit for all
he has paid upon it, but the right of action is not extinguished by an
accord merely without complete satisfaction, where the parol contract
is that

performance is to constitute the satisfaction. If a promise is
performance, then the accord is executed by the
promise; but here there is no plea whatever that any promise was accepted in satisfaction, or made in satisfaction. The plea was that the
payment of $100 — the actual payment — and the acceptance of it,
were the satisfaction.
If there had been a plea to the effect that the
parties made an accord, and that the plaintiff accepted the promise of
the defendant as a satisfaction, which promise was so and so, setting
out the same, and the plea had been supported by proof, so as to come
within the terms of the spirit of the Code, §§3732, 3733, on the subject, then there would have been no power to retreat; but the evidence
indicated that the real contract ultimately made between the parties
was, that the railroad company would pay Clem’s expenses, doctors
bills, drug bills, and continue him on wages while he was disabled, and
afterVards continue him in its employment on wages as long as he
complied with the rules of the company — give him permanent employment. That was the contract which the evidence appears to establish. The right to have wages when he did not work, the right to
have his medical and drug bills paid, and the right to continue permanently in employment, would form a good consideration for relinquishing his right of action for the tort. A promise of these benefits
would suffice for the performance, if accepted as such. It would
give
a
right of action against the company for a breach of the promise.
The making of the promise would be the performance of the
accord,
.

to constitute it before

and would therefore amount to
a

a

satisfaction of the tort.

For such

promise to be available in bar, it must be pleaded and its acceptance

averred.”

509. There must he

consideration

for the release.
Olds, 77/673, the plaintiff applied for a ticket to take him from
S. to L. The agent
gave him one from S. to A., which was*in the opposite direction. On the train to L. he produced the ticket, the eonductor objected to it and put him off. Afterwards the
company reIn

a
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funded the money

he paid for the ticket. When he sued to recover
damages for his injuries, the company plead accord and satisfaction
founded on the return of the money. It was of no avail as there was
no evidence that in receiving the money he intended to settle the
wrongs done him.
Where a railroad company negligently inflicts a personal injury on
one of its employees, and thereupon, has him treated for the injury by
the company’s surgeon, a payment made by the company to the surgeon
even at the employee’s request, is no consideration for a release by the
©mployee to the company for all damages occasioned by the injury, the
company being liable for expenses of treatment which the injury occasioned. Walker, 92/485.
Carlton, 81/531, brought suit to recover damages for injuries sustained while engaged in coupling ears. At the time he was employed
he entered into a written contract which provided, among other things,
that if he was hurt while in defendant’s service, by its negligence, he
should be paid wages until he was- able to work for not exceeding six
months. The injury occurred on the 17th of February, and on the
19th of March, when there was due him for wages up to that date
$32.50, he signed the following paper: “While employed by the Westera & Atlantic Railroad Company upon its road, I was injured on or
about the 17th day of February, by being jerked off a car and having
my hips and back injured, and the Western & Atlantic Railroad Company having agreed to pay thirty-two and 50-100ths dollars in full for
all wages due me to date, and in full for all damage which I have sustained on account of said injury, I hereby acknowledge receipt of said
sum in full satisfaction as aforesaidj and in full of all demands to
this date. Atlanta, Ga., Mch. 19, 1886. S. M. Carlton. Approved,
W. C. Morrill, Y. P.” The court charged the jury that the legal
effect of that contract of settlement barred the right of plaintiff to recover.
The charge was held to be error, and Blandford, J., said:
“What was settled between the parties, and what did the plaintiff receive? He received his wages for one month; the wages which the
company by its contract had bound itself to pay him. Any agreement
on his part to receive his
wages in satisfaction of the damages he might
be entitled to on account of injury sustained by him by reason of the
company’s negligence would be a nudum pactum, and would not bar his
recovery. It does not appear that the wages were in dispute. It was
shown that he was entitled to $1.25 a day; and that he was paid for a
month of working days, which amounted to $32.50. To this amount
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entitled; and he was entitled to more. The company was bound
by the contract entered into at the time of his employment to pay him
his wages for six months, or until his recovery, in case of his being injured by the company’s negligence. And the fact that they paid him
the wages is good evidence that he was injured by the negligence of the
company. Indeed, he showed by his evidence that he was hurt without fault on his own part, and the presumption in such case is that the
company was at fault. But if he received the amount stated, or less
than that, in satisfaction of his wages, he would be bound by it, so far
as his wages were concerned.
But it does not appear that he received
anything at all for his damages. It should have been left to the jury
to determine whether or not the wages, as well as the damages, were
in dispute, and it was for them to determine whether or not the settlement covered all.” Plaintiff in an action for personal injuries, may
testify to the circumstances under which he signed an instrument
ha

was

claimed to be

a

release of the demand sued on,

and that the instrument

introduced

by defendant, to which his signature is attached, and which
he was asked if he had signed, was not in fact the instrument signed
by him, though defendant’s vice-president, who procured the release,
be deceased.
In

Petty, 109/666, it

was

held that

a

contract between

an

employee

and his master, or another acting in the latter’s interest, by the terms
of which the employee, when physically injured, whether as a result of
his

negligence

or not, or when sick, is to receive pecuniary and
benefits, and which stipulates that his voluntary acceptance of any of such benefits in case of
injury is to operate as a release
of the master from all liability on account thereof, is not contrary to
public policy. That such a contract secured to the employee substantial
benefits, and that the master contributed to the fund for the payment
thereof, constituted a valuable consideration, as to the employee; and
this is true though he himself made a small monthly contribution to
that fund.
A contract of this kind is not wanting in mutuality. The
acceptance by an injured employee of any benefit under a contract of
the kind indicated is an election on his part to look exclusively to that
source for compensation on account of the
injury, and amounts to a
complete accord and satisfaction of his claim for damages against his
own

other valuable

master therefrom

arising.
Pugh, 67/430, 71/744, it was alleged that plaintiff
was
employed by defendant as a striker for a blaster, who was also in
the employment of defendant; that by reason of the negligence of the
In Crusselle

v.
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blaster he

injured, and as part compensation for the injury deagreed to let the plaintiff have a certain house and lot for life;
that plaintiff occupied the place for some years, and was then ejected
by defendant. It was held, that a blaster lost his eyes while in the
service of the owner of a rock-quarry, or of his contractor or lessee,
and that the owner gave him a house and lot for life, as compensation
for the injury received, and to prevent any suit against himself or his
lessee, furnished a good and valuable consideration to support a conveyance so made.
The injured blaster having been in possession, under such a settlement, for more than seven years, and being unable to
give security in order to resist, by counter-affidavit, a warrant to dispossess him, if the feoffer caused him to be ejected under such a warrant, it was a tort for which a recovery could be had.
510. To avoid release for fraud the fruit of the contract must he
restored before suing.
In Hayes, 83/558, the plaintiff sued for damages for personal injuries. The defendant pleaded the general issue and accord and satisfaction in this, that the parties had agreed upon a settlement by which
defendant had received $100 in satisfaction of his injuries, and had
also released his right of action for damages. The plaintiff attempted
to reply to this plea by showing that the agreement of settlement was
procured from him by fraud. It was held that he could not successfully reply by showing that the agreement of release was procured by
fraud without also showing that before commencing suit, he had tenwas

fendant

dered to the defendant the

sum

received with demand of return of

what defendant received from him, thus rescinding the settlement.

Blandford, J., said: “While fraud

may vitiate or avoid all contracts,
void, but voidable only, at the instance
of the person defrauded. He who perpetrates the fraud can not avoid
the same, or vitiate it, on account of his own conduct.
It may be a
good contract until it is avoided by the action or at the instance of him
who is defrauded. Though, because of the fraud, the injured party
may in certain cases terminate it, and require a restoration of the
status quo, in technical language, the contract is said to be voidable,
not void. Big. Frauds, 73, 74. Something must be done by the party
the contract is nevertheless not

defrauded before the contract

can

cease

to bind.

When that

some-

thing has been done, and the engagement has been terminated, the
rescinded, and the process by which this
result is effected is called rescission.
Id. 74.
A contract may be rescinded, out of court, at the instance of the party defrauded, when1 an

contract is said to have been

CHAPTER 33.

§510]

[ 582

Accord and satisfaction.

agreement has been made, and something of value has been received
by the defrauded party, whether vendor or purchaser it matters not.
This must, before suit, be tendered back to the wrong-doer in the name
of rescission, with demand of return of what the wrong-doer has received. The object of the tender is to effect a restoration of the status
quo, and in this class of cases it is a condition precedent to rescission.
Id.
This is not an action on the part of the defendant to rescind the

equity, but it is an attempt on his part to
damages which he has by virtue of his contract of settlement
released to the plaintiff in error. It is clear that the contract or agreement of settlement between these parties is binding upon the plaintiff
in error, and could not he rescinded or set aside at its instance.
If it
is binding on one side, it must be binding on the other side, so long as
the same exists. It did exist at the time this action was brought. It
never had been rescinded, and consequently, while it bound the plaintiff
in error, it must of necessity have been binding upon the defendant in
error.
There are exceptions to the general rule as stated; but the
present case falls within the rule stated and not the exceptions thereto”
Cited, 88/598; 97/560; 109/675.
This plaintiff claimed that the company induced him to enter into
the contract by fraudulently persuading him, through its superintendent and employed physician, to believe that his injury was not a material one and would not be permanent, and the allegation was held to
be insufficient, as it was not alleged that any artifice, trick or contrivance was used to prevent him from ascertaining the true nature of
his injury and its probable duration, these matters lying as much
within his knowledge, or means of knowledge, as within the knowledge of the defendant, its officers, agents or employees. Hayes,
89/264. Cited, 102/139.
Where an accord and satisfaction is fully executed, the party reeeiving money from the other can not rescind on the ground of fraud, or
of his own mental incompetency to make a binding contract, without
refunding, or offering to refund, the money which was the fruit of the
accord and satisfaction. If any exception to this general rule results
from inability, by reason of poverty, to restore the money, it is only
where the fraud is not discovered, or the mental disability continues,
qs the case may be, until after the money has been expended, or otherwise put beyond the power and control of the plaintiff. To use and
appropriate the money, with knowledge of the imposition, would be a
contract either at law

or

in

recover

ratification

of

the

settlement.

Strodder, 94/626.

Cited, 95/263.

-
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When this

case was a

second time before the court it

was

held that if

the

general rule that one who, on the ground of fraud or of mental incompetency to contract, seeks to rescind an executed agreement of
which he has received the fruits, must, before bringing his action, make
or offer to make restoration to the opposite party, admits of any exception because of the plaintifE’s inability from poverty to meet this requirement, such exception certainly can not obtain unless the fraud remained undiscovered, or the mental incapacity continued, until after
such fruits had been put beyond the power or control of the plaintiff.
Atkinson, J., dissenting. 99/595.
The evidence for the defendant company showing that the plaintiff
had accepted and receipted for a given sum of money in full settlement of a claim for damages on account of personal injuries received,
and it appearing from the plaintifE’s own testimony, when fairly construed in connection with the undisputed facts of the case, that at the
time of the settlement the company

owed him nothing for

wages;

that

against it, of any kind, other than his aboveindicated claim; and that the settlement was made for the purpose of
satisfying this claim, and it therefore being, in any just view of the
evidence, indisputable that damages resulting from the personal injuries were the subject-matter to which the settlement related, he was
not, under the principle laid down by this court in Hayes, supra,
entitled to recover, it not appearing that before bringing his action he
had tendered to the defendant the money paid him, or had made
any
he had

no

lawful demand

effort whatever to rescind the contract of settlement.
from that of

This

case

differs

Butler, infra. Burke, 97/560. Cited, 109/680.
In Petty, 109/666, it was held that a contract will not be set aside,
on the
ground of fraud in its procurement, at the instance of one who
has neither restored, nor offered to restore, the fruits thereof.
Lumpkin, P. J., said: “As a matter of course, if Petty was, by any artifice or
fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the defendant company or
its agents, induced to sign a contract, the terms and conditions of
which he did not understand and voluntarily assent to, the same would
not be legally binding upon him, and he would be at liberty to
repudiate it at pleasure, provided he offered to restore to the
opposite party
all fruits received by him thereunder. Hayes, supra. In the. present
instance no such offer was made, or excuse suggested why this eminently just and reasonable requirement of the law was not complied
with before bringing suit.
The position taken by Petty at the trial
was that he had a
right to retain all the fruits received by him under
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his contract; ratifying the same to this extent, but repudiating it in so
far as his own obligations thereunder were concerned. That is to say.

he claimed the

privilege of being arbitrarily inconsistent — a privilege
a litigant can not lay claim to as matter of strict
legal right, the same having been long conceded to be a prerogative
belonging exclusively to the judiciary. Nevertheless, in support of
this position, counsel rely upon the case of Butler, infra. There it
appeared that the plaintiff ‘sought to make the question that the written instrument, in the form of a receipt and release, which the company produced, showing on its face an accord and satisfaction touching the cause of action declared iipon, was procured from him by
fraud. The instrument was signed with his mark, and he denied that
he ever entered into such a contract, or that the same was read over to
him.
He admitted that the amount specified as paid to him was paid,
but denied that it was paid on any such contract. He contended that
it was paid upon his claim for wages, and that, in signing the instrument, he thought he was subscribing to an ordinary pay-roll, only.’
In other words, his grievance was, ‘not that he was induced by fraud
to enter into a contract, but that a fraudulent advantage was taken of
him, by procuring his signature to a writing which purported to set
the exercise of which

forth

a

money

contract into which he

he received

been, because

was no

none

such

never

fruit of such
was ever

entered.

On this

theory, the

contract, and could not have
made.’ Accordingly, it was held
a

that, taking as true his version of the transaction, he really received
‘nothing which he ought not to have had independently of any agreement, fraudulent or not fraudulent, touching his claim for damages
on account of the personal injury sued for,’ but
merely what, so far
as appeared, he was strictly entitled to under another and
entirely distinct claim against the company — the contract of settlement, coneerning which the writing did not truly and correctly set forth, but
actually misrepresented. Clearly, under such circumstances, it was not
incumbent upon the plaintiff, as a condition precedent to bringing his
action for personal injuries, to offer to restore the fruits of a settlement of an entirely distinct claim, which he had in good faith accepted, and was undoubtedly entitled to retain, notwithstanding the
alleged fraud perpetrated upon him in procuring him to sign a release wholly different from that which he had agreed to execute. This
case does not come within the letter or spirit of Butler’s ease, infra."
511. When not necessary to refund. .
In Butler, 88/594, it was held that where accord and satisfaction
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are

embodied in

a

written instrument which the

plaintiff has signed

with his

mark, and he denies that he ever entered into such a contract, or that the same was read over to him, and claims that tho
amount paid him was not paid upon such contract, but upon his claim
for wages, and that in signing he thought he was subscribing to an ordinary pay-roll only, it is not necessary for him to refund the amount
received to entitle him to make the question of fraud in imposing upon
him the written contract, into which he did not enter, in lieu of the
actual contract, under which the money was paid to him. Bleckley,.
C. J., said: “It is quite true that if the plaintiff had made any settlement

or

entered into any

accord touching the injury complained of

declaration, and now sought to open the same on the ground of
fraud, he would have to tender back any money which had been paid to'

in his

him in consequence or

by way of execution of the settlement or accord.

supra. The reason is that to attack a contract on the ground
of fraud involves an admission that such a contract was made, and
also an election to rescind it; and the rule of rescission always is that

Hayes,

the opposite party must be placed in statu quo. But where the plaintiff, instead of attacking a contract for fraud, merely attacks a writing which purports to embody such a contract, and alleges that his signature to the writing was appended without knowledge of its contents, and under the belief that he was signing another document, he
neither admits that the contract
His

grievance is not that he

was

was

made

nor

seeks to rescind it.

induced by fraud to enter into

a con-

tract, but that a fraudulent advantage was taken of him by procuring

writing which purports to set forth a contract into
On his theory, the money he received was
no fruit of such a contract, and could not have been, because none such
was ever made.
The money, as he contends, was paid him as wages
which he claimed then, and still claims, as due him under a previous
and wholly different contract. Taking all he says as true, he has received nothing which he ought not to have had independently of any
agreement, fraudulent or not fraudulent, touching his claim for damages on account of the personal injury sued for, and he denies distinctly
that the contract set forth in the writing was ever made. Mullen v.
Railroad Co., 127 Mass. 86. The true question is, therefore, not
whether he could be heard without tendering back the money, but
whether, as a rule of evidence, he is estopped from controverting the
truth of the contents of the writing. That he is an illiterate person is
apparent from the fact that he subscribed the instrument by making
his

signature to

which he

never

a

entered.
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his

he

mark, his name being written by some one else. He testifies that
not read, and that the document was not read over to him, and

can

thought he was signing an ordinary pay-roll.” Cited, 97/560,
109/675. When this case was again before the court it was held that

that he

personal injuries against a
who could neither
released the company from all claims for damages resulting from such injuries, and
had knowingly signed, by making a cross-mark, an instrument of writing to that effect; and the evidence for the plaintiff, if true, showing
that he had not so released the company, and that when he signed the
paper it was not read over to him, but that he was misled by the company's servants as to its real contents, and by them made to believe it
was merely a receipt for money he claimed to be due him as wages;
while the evidence for the company, if true, showed that plaintiff had
released the company, and had signed the paper with a full knowledge
of its contents, and the jury having determined this issue in the plaintiff’s favor
this court, under our system, constituting the jury the
tribunal to decide all questions of fact, and especially to pass upon the
credibility of witnesses, has no authority to set aside their verdict, after
its approval by the court below; it being in all other respects fully supported by the evidence, and there being no complaint that any errors
the main issue

on

the trial of

an

action for

railroad, company being whether or not the plaintiff,
read nor write, had for a specified sum of money

—

of law

committed at the trial.

Butler, 91/52.
estopped from claiming that release is not binding.
In Jossey, 109/439, it was held that one who signs a contract,
which recites that, in consideration of a stated sum paid him by a railroad company, he releases it from all liability for a personal injury,
which he contends was caused by its negligence, will be estopped from
claiming that the release is not binding upon him, because he thought,
when he signed the contract, that it related only to the time he lost in
consequence of the injury, and did not cover damages caused thereby,
when it appears that no fraud of any kind was practiced upon him,
and that, having ample opportunity and capacity to read and understand the contract before he signed it, he negligently failed to do so.
In Cassin, 111/576, it appeared that George Cassin was injured by
the defendant company, May 6, 1892. He instituted suit, and while
the action was pending the company paid him $2,500, taking a receipt
stating that it was “in full settlement of my action against said company now pending in the city court of Atlanta, and also in full settlement of all and any claim for damages on
my part arising out of the
were

512. When
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injury received by me on or about May 6th, 1892.” ‘More than five
years after the injury, Cassin died, and his widow thereupon brought
suit against the company for his homicide, alleging that his death was
caused by the injury negligently inflicted by the company.
She, too,
died, and the suit was then continued in the name of the children. It
was held that an action for the homicide of a husband or father, alleged
to have been occasioned by a physical injury, is not maintainable when
it appears that he, while in life, voluntarily settled with the wrong-doer
therefor, and discharged the latter from all liability for the damages resuiting therefrom. Cobb and Lewis, JJ., dissenting.
513. Attorneys’ fees.
The case of Eagle & Phenix Manufacturing Co. v. Welch, 61/444,
was for a personal injury to an employee engaged in blasting.
The
plaintiff made a settlement with the company by which the latter
paid the physician’s bill, the plaintiff’s wages during his confinement on account of his wounds, paid him $100 and gave him a
suit of clothes. This settlement was made after notice from plaintiff’s counsel of their claim to one-half of what might be recovered
for fees, and with the understanding with the attorneys that the litigation should proceed for the purpose of fixing the amount to which they
would be entitled. An agent of the company went with the plaintiff
to the depot, purchased a ticket for him to Mobile and saw him on the
train. Plaintiff said he was going to Black Hills, and he had not been
seen nor heard from to the time of the trial.
His testimony on a
former trial was offered and admitted over objections.
A verdict was
rendered for $250, “being one-half the damages awarded plaintiff.”
It was held that as the suit was not proceeding for plaintiff’s benefit,
but to enable his counsel to realize their fee, he was upon the footing
of any other witness, and, as he was inaccessible, what he testified upon
the previous trial was competent evidence under section 5186 of the
Civil Code.
The

attorney at law
fees in favor of
he is employed;
but, upon the filing of a suit by him, a lien attaches in his favor upon
such suit, in such manner as that the plaintiff and defendant are not
at liberty to settle the same so as to defeat his claim for fees.
If however, pending the suit, the plaintiff and defendant do in fact compromise and settle their differences, and upon the trial a nonsuit is
awarded, the suit thus commenced is thereby ended; and, if another
mere

engagement by

a

prospective suitor of

an

upon a contingent fee does not give rise to a lien for
the latter upon the cause of action respecting which

’
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action upon

the same cause be thereafter brought, the defendant may
plea'd such settlement in bar of the renewed suit, and as well in bar of
the right of plaintiff’s counsel to prosecute the same for the recovery of
contingent fees alleged to be due. His right to prosecute depends upon
the existence of a lien in his favor. The lien being extinguished by
the nonsuit, whatever would bar the plaintiff's right bars his. Brown,
101/80.
The lien

provided in subdivision two of section 2814 of the Civil

Code in favor of attorneys at law upon a suit does not arise, as against
the defendant in such suit, until there has been either service of procactual notice of the

filing of the petition. It follows, therefore,
plaintiff and the defendant,
and the latter is ignorant that the petition has been filed at the time
of the settlement, such settlement would be a bar to a recovery by the
plaintiff in such suit of fees due by him under a contract with his attorneys. It being apparent from the record that the plaintiff constituted a certain person her agent to receive the money which the defendant had agreed to pay her in its contract of settlement, it was error to
charge the jury that the settlement “was not completed until the consideration to be paid to the plaintiff was paid to her, and accepted by
her in satisfaction.” Such settlement was complete the moment the
agent received payment for the check given him in satisfaction of his
principal’s claim. Reagan, 104/353.
ess or

that where

a

settlement is had between the
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517. Rules of evidence.
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619.

Foreign laws proved by attorneys

principles.

Unless the contrary appears, the common law is
presumptively of
force in any given State whose jurisprudence is founded on that law.
The courts of

Georgia will determine what is the common law.
law, the death of a human being could not be complained
of as injury in a civil court. In such a case, the right to recover fiepends for its existence upon the law of the State where the homicide
At

common

occurred.
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When

an action is brought in the courts- of Georgia to recover damfor a tort committed in another State, and the right to recover
depends for its existence upon a statute of that State, such statute must
be alleged in the declaration, and proved on the trial of the case.
When an action is brought to recover damages for a tort committed
in another State, the rule as to what conduct of the deceased person
shall or shall not constitute a defense to the action is governed by the
law of the State where the injury occurred.
Matters of right are determined by the law of the place where the
cause of action arose; matters of procedure and practice are determined by the law of the forum, and the quantity or degree of evidence
requisite to sustain an action or to change the burden of proof is matter of procedure and practice.

ages

515. The

common

Under the

law.

common

law, which, unless the contrary appears, is pre-

sumptively of force in any given State of the American Union whose
jurisprudence is founded thereon, a carrier of passengers has the right
to make reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of its business.
A rule of a railroad company operative in the State of Tennessee
requiring passengers who fail to supply themselves with tickets sold at
three cents per mile to pay conductors cash fares at the rate of four
ctnts per mile is reasonable.
Coyle, 113/121.
This court is not bound by the interpretation of the common law
made by the courts of Alabama, although the injury for which suit is
brought occurred in that State, but this court will decide what is the
common

law.

As to the construction which the courts of that State

place upon its own statutes or other local laws bearing upon the case,
this court will follow their decision. What the decisions of the courts
the question

of the liability of the master for an
servant by the negligence of another, and who are
fellow servants, is left in doubt.
Krogg, 77/202.
In Tanner, 68/384, it appeared that the contract by which plaintiff was employed was made in Georgia and the injury occurred in
South Carolina. The court said: “Assuming, but not deciding, that
the law of the place of the hurt is the law of the case, the law of
South Carolina, and not of Georgia, will be applied by the courts of
Georgia to the cause when tried in this State, except in so far as mere
modes of procedure and matters of practice in court are concerned.
There being no statute regulating the rights of parties in such cases in
South Carolina, and the common law prevailing (there, the court here,
of Alabama

are on

injury done to

one
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in

liberal

spirit of comity, will apply the construction of the common
by its highest judicial tribunal to the facts of the
pending case?’
516. Right of action and defenses.
Action by a wife for the homicide of her husband depends for its
existence upon the law of the State where the homicide occurred, and
when the right of action is given by the law to the personal reprea

law in that State

sentative for the

alone and in her

use

of the wife and children, the wife can not sue

Strong, 52/461.
Lacy, 43/461, alleged that her husband had been killed in the
State of Alabama by the Selma, Rome & Dalton Railroad Company,
and it was held that an action can not be maintained in this State for
own name.

Mrs.

an

injury done within the State of Alabama without an allegation in

the declaration that the laws of the State
lation to the

injury complained of.

were

similar to

our own

in

re-

In the absence of such an allega-

tion, the courts of this State will presume that the common law is of
force in that State. When the case was remitted to the court below,

plaintiff amended her declaration, by setting forth the law of Alawas supposed to authorize the action.
It gave the right
of action to the personal representative. There being no valid cause
of action in the original declaration there was nothing to amend by.
49/106. Cited, 68/390.
When an action by an employee against a railroad company to recover damages for a personal injury inflicted by the company, through
its agents, while he was in its employ, is tried in a different State from
that in which the contract of employment was made and in which the
injury was received, the right of the plaintiff to recover, and the rule
as to what conduct on his part shall or shall not constitute a defense
to the action, are governed by the lex loci, and not by the lex fori.
Under the constitution of the State of South Carolina, “knowledge by
any employee injured of the defective or unsafe character or condition
of any machinery, ways or appliances, shall be no defense to an action
for injury caused thereby, except as to conductors or engineers in
charge of dangerous or unsafe cars or engines voluntarily operated by
them.” Therefore, on the trial of a suit in the courts of this State, instituted by a coupler or brakeman against a railroad company, to recover damages for an
injury sustained by him while in its service in
the State of South Carolina, alleged to have been occasioned because
of its negligence in furnishing him with unsafe and defective machinery, it was not error for the court to give in charge to the jury the
the

bama which
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above-quoted portion of the fundamental law of South Carolina on
subject. Thurman, 106/804.
The Alabama statute, now embodied in section 2590 of the Code of
that State, rendering a master or employer liable to a servant for an
injury “caused by reason of any defect in the construction of the ways,
works, machinery or plant connected with or used in the business of
the master or employer,” does not prevent the defendant in an action
brought under this statute from setting up as a defense that there was
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Harbin, 110/808.
Cited, 111/713; 112/84.
The plaintiff, an employee of a railroad company, having been injured by a locomotive of the defendant in the State of Alabama, and
the employer being, under the law of that State, liable to answer in
damages for personal injuries received by an employee in the service
or business of the employer, when such injuries are “caused by reason
of any defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery or plant
connected with or used in the business of the
employer,”
and there being evidence introduced by the defendant from which, in
connection with evidence introduced by the plaintiff, the jury could
reasonably infer, that the track of the defendant, at the place where the
plaintiff was injured, was full of coal and coke, in most places as high
as the rails, and in some places higher, and was “dangerous for men
to switch around at night”; that the track had been in this condition
for some time; and that the injuries complained of were attributable
to these obstructions on the track
a verdict in the
plaintiff’s favor
was not unwarranted.
Mitchell, 95/78. Cited, 106/808.
So far as appears, the degree of diligence due respectively between
employer and employee under the laws of Alabama is no more than
ordinary diligence. Ordinary diligence is that care which every prutEe

.

.

.

—

dent

man

exercises under the

same or

similar circumstances.

Mitchell,

92/77.
According to the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in Railroad Co. v. Bridges, 86 Ala. 448, the damages, under sections 25902592 of the Alabama Code, to be recovered against a railroad company for the homicide of an employee, are generally not punitive, but
compensatory. Chaffin, 84/519.
517. Rules of evidence.
In the trial of an action for a tort committed in another State, the
rules of evidence applicable to a tort of like class, committed in this
State, are to be administered, whether the rules of evidence in the other
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in this or not. Bleckley, C. J., said: “Touching
requisite to make a prima facie case in behalf of the plaintiff below, the court gave in charge to the jury the rule of law applicable in this State between the parties where the action is against a
railroad company for a personal injury sustained by one of its employees in consequence of the negligence of the company or of a coemployee. This was correct, although the injury sued for was sustained
in the State of Alabama.
The quantity or degree of evidence requisite to sustain an action or to change the burden of proof is determined
by the law of the forum, and not by the law of the place where the
■cause of action arose.
It belongs not to the law of rights, but to the
law of remedy.
It is matter of procedure and practice, or of the law of
State be the

same as

the evidence

■evidence in its relations thereto.

What evidence, and how much, will

verifying in the courts of this State a right to recover in a
given action or class of actions, is determined by the laws of this State,
suffice for

and them alone.

These courts often have to look elsewhere for the

law of

rights, but they never look elsewhere for the law of remedies,
for any part of the same.
A tort committed in Alabama is proved
here just as the same class of torts, when committed here, are proved.
The same presumptions prevail, and the same measure and degree of

•or

•evidence will shift the burden of

proof from the plaintiff to the deMitchell, 92/77.
518. Suits by foreign administrators.
It is a general and well-settled doctrine, that no suit can be maintained or brought by an executor or administrator, in his official capacity, in the courts of any other country, except that from which he
■derives his authority. Accordingly, when a citizen of Alabama is
killed in the State of Georgia, his administratrix under letters
granted
to her in Alabama, can not maintain a suit in the State of
Georgia for
the killing. Paulk, 24/357.
In Nix, admr., 68/572, it was ruled that as the South Carolina Railroad had been allowed to extend its line into Georgia, with the con•dition attached that suit might be brought against it in this State on
all claims upon it, the right to sue it here was not confined to the citizens of Georgia, but extended to citizens of other States.
Therefore,
a
foreign administrator upon complying with the conditions for the
bringing of suits by such persons, might sue the corporation in Georgia, although the administration was in South Carolina, and the right
■of action accrued under a statute of that State.
Cited, 73/652;
fendant.

101/733.
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A homicide done

by a railroad company of this State upon a line
by it in Alabama is actionable in this State, and
the administrator of the deceased in Alabama, for the use of the widow
and children, could bring suit in this State by complying with the
statutory requirements thereof, and thus having his appointment
quoad hoc ratified in Georgia; but not otherwise. And if an administrator of the decedent be appointed in Georgia, he may bring the
owned and controlled

suit for like purposes. Swint, admr., 73/651.
A temporary administrator is, for the time being,

the “personal repof collecting assets, and
so continues until permanent letters are granted.
He can maintain an
action for the homicide of his intestate, the right to which is conferred by statute upon the “personal representative,” under Code of
Alabama, §2591. Chaffin, 84/519.
519. Foreign laws proved by attorneys.
In Jackson, 86/676, Simmons, J., said: “While the trial judge
might have resorted alone to the statutes and the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, we can not say that it was error to receive
the testimony of skilled attorneys, who practiced in the courts of that
State to aid him in arriving at a proper conclusion as to what was the
law of the State, and especially as to the practice of the courts thereof
in regard to appeals and their dismissal. The testimony was not for
the jury, but for the information of the judge, and he was not bound
by the opinions of these attorneys; but it was his duty at last to decide
the law himself, aided by these opinions and by such other sources of
information as were accessible to him.
Knowing, as we do, the great
difficulty under which courts labor in arriving at the true law of a
case, and especially the difficulty encountered here as well as in the
court below in this case, we can not condemn a trial judge for resorting
to any sources of information which will aid him in coming to a correct conclusion as to the law. The record shows that the judge in this
case did not confine himself to the opinions of the attorneys, but that
the statutes of Tennessee and the decisions of its Supreme Court were
resentative” of the intestate for the purpose

read to him.

Moreover, in

some

States that have

no

statute like

our

quoted above (Code, §3824), evidence of this kind is the proper
mode of proving the law of another State; and the Supreme Court of
the United States has so held.
116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242; 119
U. S. 615, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398.” Cited, 103/480.
own
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CHAPTER 35.
PLEADINGS.
620. When demurrers,
may

be filed.

521. When a demurrer
522. The proper charge
several particulars

general or special,

Amendments; General Principles.

should be sustained.
when negligence in
is alleged.

of
pleadings, when allowed, Civil Code,* §5097.
542. Enough to amend by, Civil Code, §5098.
543. New cause of action or parties not allowed, Civil Code, §5099.

523. When on contract or in tort.

Against Railway Companies by
Strangers.
Negligence in “kicking” a car.
Description of ticket, train, etc.
Impairment of capacity to labor embraced by implication.

Suits
524.
525.
526.
•

By Employees.
527. When a declaration is sufficient.
528. Baggage-master injured by the spout
of a tank.
529. Yardmaster struck by an electric-light

pole.
530. Averments

as

to

time, place, and man-

541. Amendments

544. What facts may

particulars

532.

533.
534.
535.
536.

537.

By Passengers.
Plaintiff’s own negligence caused the
injury.
A violent and unusual jerk.
No authority in flagman to order him
to alight.
Passenger ejected, run over, and killed.
Passenger went into baggage-car and
was injured.

Against Municipal Corporations.
Unprotected mouth of a sewer in the
street.

538.

539.

Street-railway and electric company.
Against Telegraph Company.
Employee killed by the falling of
rotten

pole.
540. Against landlord by tenant.

520. When

a

may

be amplified and

varied.
546.
547.

Subject
Subject
Subject
Subject

continued.
continued.
548.
continued.
549.
continued.
550. Amendments setting out a foreign statute.

551. New and distinct
552. Misnomer may be

cause

of

action.

corrected.

553. New

party not added here.

554. Lex

fori controls

ner.

531. Laborer at a roundhouse failed to show
that he was not a trespasser.

be supplied by amend-

ments.

545. The

as

to

procedure.

Of Justification.
555. Justification

in torts.

556. When a plea amounts to justification.
557. When the doctrine does not apply.
558. Where a trial is had on the pleadings

alone.
559. The general
560. Matter

issue.
pleaded in mitigation.

Allegata and Probata.
561. Parties should be confined to the case
made in their pleadings.
562. No substantial variance in these cases.
563. Substantial variance in these cases.
564. Court should charge as to evidence in
without
objection.
565. Evidence admitted without objection in
doubtful cases.

566. When plaintiff may urge negligence
not declared on.
567. Variance as to the employment.

demurrers, special or general, may he filed.
James, 90/695, it was held that a declaration by a husband, alleging that the plaintiff’s wife, being a passenger on one of defendant's
cars, undertook to alight, and that while so doing and by reason of
defendant’s negligence the ear suddenly started, off, causing her to fall
to the ground, “and thereby producing such serious bodily injuries to
her as to deprive petitioner for a long time of her company and services, and entail upon him heavy expense for nursing and medical attcntion, all to his damage” in the sum of $1,000, sets forth substantially a cause of action, and, though wanting in sufficient fullness and
detail as to the manner in which the
injury was caused, and its consequences, of which advantage could be taken by special demurrer at the
first term, should not, at the trial
term, be dismissed on defendant’s
motion, made on the ground that the allegations as to the nature and
extent of the injuries done plaintiff's wife were too
vague, uncertain
and indefinite to put defendant on notice as to the nature of the case
to be proved.
Lumpkin, J., said: “Under section 4960 of the Civil
In
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Code,
cause

may

every declaration shall plainly, fully, and distinctly set forth the
of action, and this should be done in order that the defendant

without difficulty understand the nature of the plaintiff's charge

demand, and make preparation to meet it. Eor want of sufficiency
in the respects indicated a demurrer will lie, which should be sus-

or

tained unless the

plaintiff, by

his declaration.

Where

proper

no cause

amendment,

cures

the defects in

of action whatever is set forth, the

defendant may move at any term to dismiss
a declaration totally defective in substance a

the action, because upon
motion in arrest of judgment would be good.
Whenever this is true, the plaintiff’s case may
be cut off summarily at any term, and thus save the unnecessary consumption of time in going through a trial which could not result in
any valid judgment; but defects merely of form should be taken advantage of at the first term. Rule 28 of the superior court. Where
a legal cause of action is set forth, formal defects would be cured by
verdict.”

While, under section 4558 of the Code, the defendant in

an

attach-

before final judgment,
in their proper order;
and consequently such defendant can not, after pleading to the merits,
and a term has passed, interpose and have adjudicated special demurrers to the plaintiff’s declaration, relating only to matters of form, and
not vital to the plaintiff’s cause of action.
Lumpkin, J., said: “It is
well settled, in Georgia practice, that in actions either at law or in
equity a motion to dismiss, based upon the ground that the declaration
or petition fails to state a cause of action, may be entertained even at
may appear and defend at any time
all defenses must be submitted and disposed of

ment

case

the trial term.

As to defects of

form, we understand it now is, and
been, the rule that advantage of them must be taken by special
demurrer at the first term.”’ Mitchell, 95/78.
Cited, 101/730.
has

ever

A declaration for

a

tort will not be dismissed

term because of

on

motion at the trial

uncertainty in setting forth the date of the combecause some of the personal injuries complained of are not fully described. Such defects are matter for special
demurrer. Powell, 89/601.
Where a petition contains several paragraphs, some of which set forth
and pray for damages which may be properly said to have arisen from
the wrongs complained of, a demurrer alleging in general terms that
“said items of damage are too remote, and can not be recovered,” is
not good.
If any of such items are too remote to constitute the basis
mission of the tort, or

[596

CHAPTER 35.

§§ 521, 522 ]

Pleadings.

of

a

the

recovery,

same

should be specially pointed out.

Seals,

102/817.
Where there is

no

special demurrer to

declaration, it is not error

a

words, as not relevant either
matter of form or substance, the motion to strike being made orally
the trial. Glover, 92/132.

to refuse to strike from the latter certain
in
at

While the averment of facts contained in

independent counts of

a

not be taken in aid the one of the other, yet if the
pleader, by appropriate averment in one count, adopts as a part of such
count facts stated in another, such facts so adopted may be taken as
stated in the former, without formal repetition; and even though the
declaration may

latter count be insufficient in statement of

former,
of

so

a cause

aided, states

a cause

of action,

of action should be overruled.

521. When

a

If the court

a cause of action, if the
demurrer thereto for want
Hutson v. King, 95/271.

a

demurrer should he sustained.

not say, as a matter of law, that
the declaration do not constitute negligence on the

the facts alleged in
part of the defendant, the case is for submission to the jury, and the demurrer should be
overruled. Wood, 84/363.
A general motion to dismiss a suit “because it is a suit for a tort by
a married woman
living with her husband, in her own name alone,”
was
properly overruled, where the petition set out a cause of action
against the defendant and prayed for certain elements of damage for
which the plaintiff could recover, although it may also have contained
prayers for other elements of damage for which the plaintiff had no
right to sue. A general demurrer should not prevail where any part
of the petition is good.
Mayor v. Smith, 111/870.
When, in an action for damages against a railroad company, the allegations in the plaintiff’s declaration would not entitle him to recover
if established, and they show that he was
guilty of gross negligence, a
demurrer thereto should be sustained.
Richardson, 80/727.
522. The proper charge when
negligence in several particulars is
alleged.
Where

can

a declaration set forth several
particulars in respect to which
alleges negligence, the court in charging the jury may conform its
instructions to those particulars on which the
plaintiff insists at the
trial and upon which, according to the
evidence, the merits of the case
depend, and may treat the others as not involved in the controversy.
Crawford, 86/5.

it
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523. When

Where

a

on

contract

declaration

or

in tort.

against

a common

carrier is susceptible of be-

as an action upon contract or an action of tort
based upon an alleged violation of a public duty by the carrier, and'
the same is not demurred to, the plaintiff at the trial may, at his

ing construed equally
•

option, elect to treat it as either species of action. Pickett, 87/734.
Cited, 102/820, 822.
In Palmer, 89/161, the declaration alleged that the defendant “by
the reckless negligence in running its trains in said county, and
through the lands of petitioner, in the month of October, 1889, did, by
its said agents and employees, and through the instrumentality of its
said trains, kill and destroy five head of cattle, the property of petit.ioner, of the said value of $129, as per itemized account, a copy of
which is hereto attached as a part hereof, and which said defendant
refuses to pay, notwithstanding often asked to do so by petitioner.”
On demurrer it was held that where, in substance, the declaration sets
forth a tort, though the form be in part appropriate to an action on
contract, the declaration may be upheld as one complaining of the tort;
and an account annexed thereto, and referred to in the body of the
declaration, may be consulted to supply a requisite date, which is not
otherwise fully alleged or disclosed.
A petition against a
been occasioned to the

railroad company for damages alleged to have
plaintiff by wrongfully carrying her past the
station to which she had purchased a ticket should, though it sets
forth in general terms a contract of carriage, and alleges facts showing a breach thereof, be treated as an action ex delicto, when it is
manifest from the allegations and prayers of the petition, taken all
together; that the plaintiff is seeking a recovery because of the defendant’s breach of duty, and not on account of its breach of the contract.
Fish, J., said: “Using the language of Chief Justice Bleckley in
Roberts, 91/519, fin such an action as the present, where it is well
founded, a recovery may be had for the injury as a tort, as a breach
of a public duty by a common carrier — a duty imposed by law —
though involving in this breach a breach of contract also.’ See
Brauss, 70/638; Pickett, 87/734. There is no question but what
the plaintiff could have brought suit for a breach of the contract.
The question, therefore, presented by this ground of the demurrer,
is whether the petition of the plaintiff is an action for a breach of
the private contract, or an action for a tort arising out of the breach
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of the

public duty that the defendant owed to the plaintiff as one
This question, we think, should be decided hv
construing all the allegations of the declaration together. In determining whether the action is ex contractu or ex' delicto, we should
not pick out particular paragraphs or allegations of the petition, and
consider them as being isolated from all the others contained therein,
but each of them should be construed in the light of its natural and
logical relations to all of the others. In this case, without the existence of a contract of carriage, the defendant would have owed no
duty to the plaintiff as its passenger; and as it was necessary for her
to show such a duty on the part of the defendant, as a basis from
which the tort for which she sought to recover could have arisen, it
was proper and necessary to allege facts sufficient to show an implied
contract by the defendant to transport her from her point of departure to her point of destination, and to allow her, upon arrival at the
latter, an opportunity to safely alight from the cars. As the allegations of the petition seem to show an intention on the part of the
plaintiff to sue for the recovery of damages sustained by her in consequence of the breach of the public duty arising out of the contract
of carriage, and not for damages resulting from a breach of the
contract, those allegations which set forth the contract may well be
taken as simply intended to lay the foundation for the introduction
of evidence to show the existence of this public duty, preparatory to
the introduction of further testimony to establish a violation of that
duty amounting to the tort, which appears to be the real gist of the
action.
The essential facts which seem to be relied upon for a recovery constitute a tort.
Certainly, as against the demurrer filed by
the defendant, the portion of the petition which sets forth the contract of carriage may be treated as mere matter of inducement, leading up to the real gravamen of the suit — the tort founded upon the

of its passengers.

contract.”

Where

Seals, 102/817.
declaration in

an action of tort is
brought against two deof them is stricken therefrom by amendment, without otherwise altering the language of the declaration, all the substantial allegations are thereafter to be read and understood as if
there had been but one defendant originally. Whitehead, 89/190.
Where, in the county in which a contract of passenger carriage is
to be performed, a suit is brought
against a railroad company upon
a cause of action
arising out of a failure and refusal to perform such
a

fendants, and

one
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contract, and the declaration is so drawn as to be susceptible of two
constructions, under one of which the action could be construed to be
a

suit for

a

suit for the breach of the contract of

a

tort

arising from the breach of duty, and under the other
carriage, and a demurrer is

filed to such action upon

the ground that the court had no jurisdiction

try the cause of action sounding in tort, it appearing that the
wrongful act complained of was committed in a county other than
to

that in which the suit

was

brought; and where, in order to meet such

demurrer, the plaintiff amended his declaration by striking therefrom
the elements of damage alleged to have resulted from the commission
of such tort and, thus electing to proceed as for the breach of a
contract, the plaintiff further amended his declaration by alleging
generally that he had been damaged in the sum of $500 by reason of

by the defendant of its contract, without stating the eledamage, how or wherein they accrued, and a special
demurrer to the declaration as amended was filed, upon the ground
that it did not allege with sufficient certainty the elements of the
damage relied upon by the plaintiff to enable the defendant to
defend the action
the court erred in sustaining the demurrer and
dismissing the plaintiff’s action generally, the declaration as amended
being sufficient to sustain a recovery for nominal damages. Sutton,
the breach

ments of such

—

101/776.
SUITS

524.

AGAINST RAILWAY

Negligence in “kicking"

COMPANIES BY

STRANGERS.

a car.

was brought to recover for the homiplaintiff’s minor son. The declaration alleged that Hudson, the son, was not employed by defendant, but was allowed and
permitted by it to stay in the yard, that he might learn the yard,
and do odd jobs without pay, and had been promised a regular job
by defendant. He had just stepped off of one track in the yard to
avoid a moving train, and had stepped upon another track, and was
watching a train of the Atlanta & Florida Railroad that was moving
through the yard, when defendant’s servants in charge of a switchengine suddenly and without notice or warning to him “kicked" a
freight-car back, on the track on which he was standing, and it ran
over him.
Defendant’s servants were negligent in “kicking" the car
back, instead of moving it in the regular manner, by pushing it with
the engine, and in not seeing Hudson on the track when they ought
to and could have seen him if they had looked.
Neither the conductor, engineer, nor fireman of the engine was on the lookout, and had

The

action, Hudson, 93/816,

cide of the
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put

no one
him to be

else
on

on the lookout.
The train-hand whose duty required
the front or forward end of the train when moving

out of his

place, and on the end of the car nearest the engine,
and did not try to look to see whether any one was standing on the
track. All of said acts and omissions constitute gross and criminal
was

negligence, and show a wanton disregard of the life of Hudson, who
was entirely free from fault, and in no way contributed to the cause
of his death. He was standing, when the car was “kicked” back,
sufficiently far from the end of it for the crew of the engine to have
seen him, and had been standing on the track long enough for them
to know that he was on the track.
He did not know, and could not
have known, that it was their intention to move said car, or “kick” it
over the ground he occupied.
The spot where he was killed was adjacent to the

stopping-place of the Atlanta & Florida and defendant's
passenger-trains, and was the public landing-place where the passengers of said trains embarked and disembarked; and there was a constant by-path used by the public, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the defendant, over the track at the spot where Hudson was
killed.
At the time he was killed, an Atlanta & Florida passengertrain was at said point; and, by reason of all the aforegoing facts, a
greater duty was imposed on defendant to exercise care and caution
in moving trains along at this point.
The amendment offered but
disallowed alleges that when Hudson stepped upon the track on which
he was killed, to avoid the Atlanta & Florida train, his attention was
attracted by said train, and the din and clatter in the yard and the
hissing of steam on said train, and he was looking at it; and that
the employees in said yard constantly walked or stood on said track,
and the public frequently stood there; and the servants of defendant
in charge of the train that killed him knew these facts.
A demurrer
to the declaration

was

sustained, and it

was

held that the court erred

in

sustaining it, as the jury should have been allowed to pass upon
the question whether the company was negligent in “kicking” the
cars at so public a place as the one described in the
declaration, and
upon the question whether there was negligence on the part of the
plaintiff barring his right to recover.
525. Description of ticket, train, etc.
In Dyson, 109/103, the plaintiff alleged that she had been unlawfully expelled from a train. The ticket that she claimed gave her a
right to passage she alleged was purchased from the company’s agent
and

was

described in the declaration

as

“a ticket from Mableton to
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Atlanta, Ga.,
seven

cents.”

over

defendant’s line, paying therefor the

sum

of forty-

The defendant demurred to the declaration

on

the

ground that “there is no description given of the ticket; because it
writing or printing or stamp appeared on said
ticket, nor any of the conditions, dates, or anything going to show
the character of said ticket.”
The demurrer was overruled, which
was reversed by a
majority of the court, and it was held that when
the petition in an action against a railway company for damages
alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff’s unlawful expulsion
from a train insufficiently describes the ticket presented to the conductor as the evidence of the former’s claim of a right to passage,
it is erroneous to overrule a special demurrer properly pointing out
the defectiveness of the petition in this respect.
Lumpkin, P. J.,
is not stated what

“The character of the ticket was of the utmost importance in
determining whether or not the plaintiff was legally entitled to ride
upon the train from which she was expelled.
She claimed to be a
said:

passenger

of the

company

under

a

contract with it evidenced by this

ticket, and surely the defendant, when it, by special demurrer,
called for a description thereof, was entitled to have the same. The
petition did not allege that the price paid for the ticket was at the
maximum rate allowed by law, or that it was unlimited as to time.”
Fish and Lewis, JJ., dissenting, said: “Even if, in such an action,
it was necessary to describe the ticket at all, the description in the
present petition was sufficient. The special demurrer assumed that
the ticket contained conditions, when it did not appear from any allegation in the petition that such was the fact, and therefore in this
respect the demurrer was, in effect, what is termed a ‘speaking devery

murrer.

In

) »

Sims, 111/820, it was held that, in an action against a railroad
company for a homicide alleged to have been caused by the negligent
running of its locomotive and cars, there was no error in overruling
a demurrer to the petition on the ground that it did not allege what
particular train, car, engine, or machinery of the defendant company
struck and knocked the decedent from its track, or in what direction,
north or south, the train was running,, or at what hour the casualty
occurred, or “specify the particular acts of carelessness and negligence
of defendant, and how and in what manner its locomotive, cars, and
machinery was negligent and careless.”
526. Impairment of capacity to labor embraced by implication.
A declaration by a married woman against a street-railway com-
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pany for injury to her person, which alleges a definite personal injury
which incapacitated her to walk without crutches, embraces by necessary

implication the impairment of her capacity to labor.
Cited, 90/508; 107/73.

Jacobs,

88/647.

BY EMPLOYEES.

sufficient.
by an employee of a railroad company to recover
damages for injuries inflicted upon him in consequence of the negligence of a coemployee, which states the nature of the employment,
the character of the work in which they were engaged, the extent
of the injuries, and the amount of the damages, and likewise the eircumstances under which he was injured — the latter being stated
with such particularity as to show that he was himself free from
fault, and was injured solely because of the negligence of his fellow
servants
sets forth substantially a cause of action, and a dismissal
upon demurrer was erroneous.
Maloy, 97/295.
A declaration alleging that the plaintiffs husband, an employee of
a railroad
company, was killed by an engine of the company, setting
527. When

a

declaration is

A declaration filed

—

forth such
the

killing

a

statement of the facts and circumstances connected with

did not of themselves negative the existence of neglithe part of the company, and distinctly averring that the
deceased was without fault, and that the killing was caused by the
negligence of the company’s servants in the running of such engine*,
was not demurrable.
Lumpkin, J., said: “If all the allegations in
the declaration are true, a cause of action is set forth, and it was not
necessary that the plaintiff should minutely and in detail describe
every fact and circumstance in the case which would tend to show the*
want of negligence on the part of the deceased.
The declaration was
sufficiently full and accurate to inform the defendant of the nature
of plaintiff’s complaint, and this is all the law requires.” Hubbard,
86/623.
In a suit against a railroad on account of the homicide of an employee, an allegation that the company did the negligent or careless
act which caused the homicide, or omitted the diligence which would
have prevented it, is sufficient, and is equivalent to an allegation that
the coemployees of the decedent were guilty of such negligence.
Crosby, 74/737.
528. Baggage-master injured hy the spout of a tank.
A declaration alleged in brief as follows:
Plaintiff was a baggagemaster on defendant’s train, and in addition it was his duty to look
gence on

as
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after the condition of the cars,

and generally to do everything in his
to preserve the safety of the trains and passengers. On the
day of his injury he was notified that new wheels had been put under
one of the cars, and that he should look out for them.
Soon after
leaving Atlanta, the new wheels became hot and made a noise; he
went to the side door of the baggage-car to see if they were in a
condition to endanger the safety of the train, and while thus looking
out, without fault or negligence on his part, he was stricken by a
spout of a tank of defendant, resulting from the negligence of the
latter in placing such tank or spout so near as to strike him while
discharging his duty and looking out of said car in an ordinary and
usual manner. It was his duty, and necessary for him to be in the
position he was in at the time of the accident, and he did not and
power

never

that

had known that the tank

was

so near

the track.

It

was

held

substantially made by this declaration and the court
properly refused to dismiss it on general demurrer. Crawford, J.,
said:
“The only defect, if there be any, apparent to us is the failure to allege in connection with plaintiff's want of knowledge as to
the location of the spout and tank, that it was no part of his duty
as an employee of the road to have known where it was located.
A
special demurrer would have reached that defect in the pleadings,
but none such was made, and the court had to pass on that which
went to the whole case, and was properly overruled, as the allegation
that he was without fault or negligence was good on general demurrer.”

a case was

Woodruff, 66/707.

by an electric-light pole.
Blaekstone, 105/380, the petition alleged that while plaintiff'
was in the employment of the defendant as yardmaster, his duties
being to switch, to make up trains of cars in the yard, it became necessary to couple a freight-car to a switch-engine and cars in the yard.
Several attempts were made to effect the coupling, without success,
owing to the difference in the height of the couplers and bumpers of
the cars.
Finally he succeeded in coupling the cars and ordered the
529. Yard master struck

In

train to

move

on.

He mounted the outside ladder of the

car as

it

duty to do, and as cars having bumpers and couplers of
unequal height are liable to become uncoupled while in motion, it was
his duty to look out for such an emergency.
Accordingly, when the
train was put in motion and was running at seven or eight miles
an hour, and while he was
carefully and securely standing on the
ladder and looking back towards said car, as his duty required
was

his
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him to

was struck by an electric-light pole in the yard of the
the side of the track of the road. At the time of the
injury he was in the discharge of his duty and wholly without fault.'
He could not, while attending to his duties, have seen tlie electriclight post, and was not aware that it was so near the track as to be
dangerous to one in the position he oceupied. His injuries were
occasioned solely by the negligence of the company in erecting and
maintaining an electric-light pole in the yard of the company too near
the track. It was held that though the petition of an employee of
a railway company, suing the latter for personal injuries, may contain allegations from which it might be inferred that it was the plaintiff’s duty to have known and to have removed the cause from which
his injuries resulted, yet, when such an inference does not necessarily
follow from the averments of the petition taken as a whole, and it
affirmatively alleges that the plaintiff was “wholly without fault,”
and that at the time he was injured he was attending to. his duties,
and was not aware of the danger to which he was exposed, the petition is good as against a general demurrer. Where, however, the
cause of the injury was alleged to be a pole, concerning which the
petition, in general terms, only alleged that it was “too near the
track,” and the defendant by special demurrer made the point that
the petition did not allege “how near said pole was to the track,”
the petition ought to have been amended so as to set forth the facts
as to this matter more fully and explicitly; and, ip the absence of
such an amendment, this court will not reverse a judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action. Little, J., said: “The
allegation of the petition is that the plaintiff was in the discharge of
his duty when he was injured. It is true that at the time he was
injured he was mounted on a ladder attached to one of the cars
while the train was in motion. Ordinarily this would be held an act
of negligence, but, referring to it, the petitioner alleges that it was
his duty to place himself in that position.
It would also seem, in
the absence of explanation, that the plaintiff could have avoided the
consequences of the defendant’s negligence, if it was negligent, by
the exercise of proper care on his part, but the allegations m the
petition are that the very acts which seem to show a want of prudence
were done
strictly in the discharge of the plaintiff’s duty. We are
not at liberty to disregard such allegations in
construing the petition,
and can not therefore say that
notwithstanding such allegations, the
plaintiff contributed to the injury, or that he could have avoided the

do, he

company, on
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by the exercise of proper care or that the injury was occasioned
by his own negligence; nor can we rule, as a matter of law, that it
was the plaintiff’s duty to have known of the electric pole which
caused his injury, and its proximity to the track. While the petition
sets out the fact that the plaintiff at the time of the injury was yardmaster of the defendant in its railroad-yards in the city of Augusta,
it also sets forth the duties of such an employee; that is, it was his
duty to switch -and make up cars and trains of cars in the yard,
superintend their transfer to the main line of the road, and to do
general yard work. What duties other than those enumerated this
work imposed, we have no means of ascertaining. We of course recognize the principle that if the plaintiff had knowledge of the location
of the electric' pole, or if, from his duties as yardmaster, or his
familiarity with the yard, he was chargeable with such knowledge,
or if he had charge and control of the yard in which the
pole was
located, with power, as the representative of the defendant, to place
such pole in proper position, he would not be entitled to recover.
But the petition does not contain any reference to these facts. On
the contrary it alleges that at the time the plaintiff received the injury he was in the discharge of his duty, and’ was wholly without
fault, and that the injury sustained by him was occasioned by the
negligence of the company in erecting and maintaining such pole at
the place where it was located. Therefore we can not say, as a matter of law, that, because he discharged all the duties of yardmaster,
it was within his power to remove such pole, nor that he was chargeable with notice thereof, nor necessarily guilty of negligence in occupying the dangerous position in which he voluntarily placed himself
at the time of the injury.”
Cited, 112/762.
530. Averments as to time, place and manner.
In Woodson v. Johnston & Company, Limited, 109/454, it was
held that an employer is liable in damages for physical injuries to
an employee resulting from the negligence of one who was the
general superintendent of the business of the former, and who, on the
occasion when the injuries were sustained, was acting as the employcr's alter ego, and not in the capacity of a fellow servant of the person injured.
Though the petition in an action for such injuries
alleged that they were received while the plaintiff was working in the
hold of a ship, it was not essential to set forth its name, or-the names
of his colaborers, or to aver that the defendant was responsible for
the negligence of the latter; the time, place, and manner of the occursame
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giving rise to the cause of action being by means of other allegations sufficiently stated.
531. Laborer at a roundhouse failed to show that he was not a
rence

trespasser.
A declaration in an action against a railway company for damages
resulting from personal injuries did not set forth a cause of action
where its only allegations relating to the circumstances under which
the injuries were inflicted were, in substance, as follows, viz.: That

employee of the defendant, who labored in its
customary for him to walk between its lines
of track so as to reach the roundhouse; that while so walking he was
struck from behind by a moving car, which was being propelled towards him by an engine; that he was not warned of the approach of
the car by the ringing of the bell or the blowing of the whistle of
the locomotive, nor by call of the engineer or fireman, and that the
company was negligent in failing to give such warnings.
These
averments are not sufficient to show that the plaintiff was not a
trespasser, since it might or might not have been necessary for him
to reach the roundhouse by walking between the lines of track, and it
the

plaintiff

was an

roundhouse; that it

was

does not appear whether or not his
or sanctioned by the defendant.

custom in this respect was known
As the declaration does not, by
proper allegations, concerning these matters, affirmatively show he
had a right to be at the place where he was when
injured, it is proper
to deal with him as a trespasser; and, this
being so, the specific acts
which caused his injuries, and which are averred to constitute the
negligence entitling him to recover, were not, relatively to him, negligent at all, for the reason that they involved the breach of no duty
due to him by the defendant.
Construing the petition most strongly
against the plaintiff, it would not follow, as a conclusion of law, that
under the facts alleged he was entitled to a verdict,
and, accordingly,
a general demurrer to such a declaration
ought to have been sustained.
Atkinson, J., dissenting. Chaney, 101/420. See this case again,
102/814.
BY PASSENGERS.

532.

Plaintiff's oivn negligence caused the injury.
Paterson, 85/653, the plaintiff alleged that when the train was
within two or three hundred yards of the
depot at Waynesboro, the
place of his destination as a passenger, the station was called in the
usual way; whereupon plaintiff,
being without baggage, and knowing
that the train would cross Whitaker street before it reached the
depot,
In
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upon which street plaintiff
the ear, with the purpose of

resided, went out upon the platform of
alighting at the Whitaker street crossing.
The train was then moving slowly and at a uniform rate of speed,
so that there was absolutely nothing in his situation to suggest
danger
to even the most cautious.
As he anticipated, the speed of the train
gradually decreased as it neared the crossing, which was within fhe
corporate limits of Waynesboro, and within about one hundred yards
of the depot, where the defendant’s trains were accustomed to stop to
deposit and receive passengers and freight, and where it did stop on
the night in question. The plaintiff could see that the place where
car was clear of obstructions, and he stood
the steps of the platform preparatory to stepping off when the
crossing should be reached. He knew, and defendant's agents and
servants on the train must have known, that by reason of the low
rate of speed required of them when nearing a depot or public streetcrossing, especially within the corporate limits of a city, it was customary for people to stand upon the platforms preparatory to leaving
the trains; and they knew, or should have known, that it was not
unusual, when a train was passing through cities, for passengers to
get on and off at the street-crossings; and plaintiff had no reason
to apprehend that they would, under such circumstances, negligently
imperil the safety of passengers. But while he was so standing upon
the steps of the platform, in the use of all proper precaution, and as
the rear end of the car on which he was standing reached the crossing, the engineer or other servant of defendant, or other person unknown to plaintiff in charge of or upon the engine, needlessly, unskillfully, and negligently put on a great force of steam, and the
train was jerked forward suddenly, and without warning, whereby
plaintiff was thrown from his balance, and the right side of his
head and face came in violent contact with the iron railing to the
steps on platform or other parts of the car, bruising and wounding
the same, and he was stunned and thrown upon the ground. It was
held that the plaintiff's declaration, showing that the injury complained of was caused by his own negligence, and not by that of the
defendant, a demurrer thereto was rightly sustained. The right to
amend this declaration was subsequently denied because the applica-

he intended to leave the

upon

tion to amend

came

A declaration

too late.

87/646.

alleging that the conductor of a passenger-train
agreed with plaintiff to stop the train for him to get off at a point
where there was no regular station, but at which defendant’s road
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grade; that plaintiff paid his fare to this
point; and thJt on reaching the same the train only slowed up, and
did not stop, so that plaintiff, “in order to keep from being carried
beyond his destination, was compelled to get from the moving train,”
and in so doing was seriously injured — does not set forth a cause of
action, it appearing from these allegations that plaintiff’s injury was
caused by his own voluntary act in taking a dangerous risk if the
train was moving so rapidly as to make leaving it unsafe; or, if not,
that the injury must have resulted from a mere accident, or from
crossed another railroad at

plaintiff’s own carelessness in getting off. Barnett, 87/766. Cited,
98/492; 103/571.
A passenger, though a minor about the age of sixteen, who voluntarily alighted from a moving train, was not entitled to a recovery
from the railroad company for injuries thus sustained, it not appearing that he was directed so to do by any agent or servant of the
company, but that, in consequence of a fear that he would be carried
beyond his station, he took upon hjmself the risk of leaving the train
manner.
This is so even though the train was running at a
speed which indicated that it would pass the station in question without stopping.
If the train was moving so rapidly as to make leaving
it unsafe, the plaintiff’s injury was caused by his own voluntary act
in taking a dangerous risk.
If not, then the injury must have resuited from a mere accident, or from the plaintiff’s own carelessness
in getting off. Barnett, supra. Under the facts alleged, the court
committed no error in sustaining the defendant’s demurrer to the
plaintiff’s petition. Jones, 103/570.
533. A violent and unusual jerk.
In Garland, 111/852, it was held that where a petition, in an
action against a railway company for personal' injuries, alleged in
substance that the plaintiff was a passenger upon a freight-train of
the defendant; that, at the request of the conductor, he occupied a
seat in the upper part of the cab, and remained there until the train
reached the outskirts of the town to which he was going, when, the
train coming to a full stop, which the plaintiff thought was for the
purpose of allowing him to get off, he, in order to get his effects
together, preparatory to leaving the train, followed the conductor to
the lower part of the cab, where the conductor left him standing,
saying to him, “Stay here until we pull up to the depot, and you
can then get out”; that the train then moved forward
rapidly, and
plaintiff, for the purpose of seeing when he reached the depot, stood

in this
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window of the cab, holding firmly to the window, in such a posias to protect himself against all ordinary and usual jerks and
jars incident to a freight-train; that while he was in this position the
train, by reason of the negligence of the defendant’s employees in
charge thereof, was suddenly, and without warning, stopped, with
such a tremendous, unusual and unnecessary shock as to jerk plaintiff’s hands loose from the window, so violently wrenching them from
their hold upon the window as to tear a ring and the flesh from one
of his fingers; that the shock overturned buckets of water in the
by a
tion

car, moved several inches an iron stove, which was fastened to the
floor, and threw the plaintiff violently against some obstacle in the
car and to the floor, rendering him for a time unconscious; that he
sustained very serious injuries, the nature and extent of which, his
sufferings therefrom, his earning capacity before, and for a stated

period after, the injury, and the pecuniary amount of his damages,
being all set forth — held, that the petition set forth a cause of action,
and should not have been dismissed upon demurrer.
534. No authority in flagman to order him to alight.
Although the declaration does contain some loose allegations that
the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the employees of the
defendant railway company in certain specified respects, it shows
clearly by other allegations that this negligence was not the real
cause of the injury; and the true meaning of the declaration,
taking
together all of its averments, and fairly construing them, is that
the negligence which did cause the injury was that of a flagman in
ordering the plaintiff to alight from a moving train in the dark at
an unsafe place.
This being the plaintiff’s real cause of action, if
he had any at all, and the declaration failing to allege that this flagman had any authority to
give such order, or that the giving of it
was within the scope of his duties, or that he gave it
by direction of the
conductor, no cause of action was set forth; and, there having been
no offer to amend the declaration, the demurrer to the same should
have been sustained. Even if the evidence introduced upon the trial
was sufficient to show that the flagman, under instructions from the
conductor, in fact had authority to see to the plaintiff’s alighting
from the train, and accordingly to give him the order to do so, and
even if the
giving of the order was, under all the circumstances, negligence, the verdict can not stand.
The declaration not setting forth
a complete cause of action, the trial and its results were mere nullities. Simmons, C. J., said: “The case differs essentially from that
3ft
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Smith, 69/268. There the declaration alleged injuries to the
plaintiff caused by the negligence of the defendant’s ‘agents,’ without specifying who the agents were; and this was held to be good as
against a general demurrer. In the present case the declaration
contains allegations that the plaintiff was injured by certain acts of
negligence on the part of defendant’s employees; but the act of negligence which the declaration shows to be the real cause of the injury
was that of a certain designated employee; and this employee being
a flagman, not presumptively charged with the duty of seeing to the
disembarking of passengers, the declaration ought to have alleged
that his directing the plaintiff to get off was within the scope of his
duties, or that on this particular occasion it was made his duty by
of

the conductor’s order.”

Wall, 96/328.
Passenger ejected and run over and killed.
A declaration alleged that a passenger on a railroad-train in South
Carolina “was violently ejected and thrown from said cars by the
defendant and its agents and servants in the course of their employment, and in being thus forcibly and unjustly ejected from said cars
as aforesaid, was thrown thereunder and run over and killed thereby.”
The evidence showed that the passenger was run over and injured by
this train; that about an hour afterwards another train ran over
the body; whether life was extinguished by the first or the second was
not absolutely certain.
It was held that such declaration furnished
a sufficient basis for recovery on these facts.
If it were necessary to
include any allegation concerning the second train it could be done
by amendment. Nix, 68/572.
536. Passenger went into the baggage-car and was injured.
In Gardner, 94/538, the plaintiff alleged that he entered defendant’s passenger-train at Way cross, at the regular and usual place of
receiving passengers, just before the usual time for the train to start.
No engine was then attached to the train; and, desiring to speak to
the conductor about being put off the train at a point just beyond
Waltertown (a station on said railroad), plaintiff went into the baggage-car for that purpose, and, while thus engaged with the conductor, defendant’s agents and servants, without any notice or warning
to plaintiff, and without the exercise of ordinary and reasonable
care, negligently turned loose an engine at the upper end of the yard,
and said car came down the track, and struck the car in which
plaintiff was standing, throwing him to the floor, and
injuring him in a
manner described.
He had not purchased a ticket, as they sold none
535.
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at that time.

He had money

with which to pay his fare, and had
with the intention of traveling just
beyond the river at Watertown. Before he left the passenger-coach
and entered the baggage-car, he looked out, and saw that there was
no engine at or near the train; and, with- the exercise of ordinary
and reasonable care on the part of the defendant’s agents and employees, the accident could have been averted. The defendant demurred on the ground that the declaration set out no cause of
action; whereupon the plaintiff amended “by striking the allegation
that a car was turned loose from the upper end of the yard,” and
making the declaration read: “An engine, with car attached, was
run down on the track with great and unnecessary force and
speed,
striking the car in which petitioner was standing, thereby violently
throwing him down and injuring him as aforesaid.” He further
alleges that the engine then in use by defendant was an old one,
without the usual and necessary appliances and improvements to its
proper and careful handling in the coupling and drilling of cars and
trains; and that the engine and cars then in use by defendant were
old, and without the needful appliances of air or automatic brakes
and automatic couplers and safety-buffers, such as are usual and
necessary to make the handling of passenger-trains and the carrying
of passengers safe. It was necessary for him to go into the baggagecar to see the conductor, and it was usual for
passengers so to do,
and there were no restrictions on the part of defendant against their
so
doing. It was held that the declaration, as amended, set forth
a cause of action, and it was error to dismiss it on demurrer.
This
case again, 97/482.
entered the train

■

as a

passenger,

against municipal corporations.

537.

Unprotected mouth of sewer in a street.
In Bryan v. Mayor etc., 91/530, it was held that the declaration
sets forth a cause of action, the allegations being in substance that
plaintiff was driving a mule hitched to a buggy in a street of th§
city of Macon. His mule becoming frightened, he jumped from the
buggy; and while his attention was thus directed to his mule, plaintiff, without fault on his part, fell into a hole — the mouth of a sewer
in said street.
The sewer was unprotected, and in a dangerous condition, and had been so for ten days, and its condition was known to
the city, to whose negligence it was due. Bleckley, C. J., said: “It
is not alleged precisely how the sewer was connected with the street
relatively to the position of the opening, but it is alleged that the
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negligence. Can the
that he was without
fault, that the city was negligent, and that a dangerous hole, left
open by its negligence, was the one into which he fell, and yet avoid
liability? Clearly not. The declaration may be defective in form
by reason of not setting out with more particularity and distinctness
the position of the hole, whether at the edge of the street, or how far
inside, etc., but it is good in substance; and to withstand a general
demurrer nothing more is requisite.”
538. Street-railway and electric company.
In Owings, 97/663, it was held that where, in the prosecution of
its business, a corporation employs a wire which, because of its being
charged with a powerful and dangerous current of electricity, is
liable, upon coming in contact with wires of other corporations, to
cause injury or death to employees of the latter while engaged in the
performance of their duties, the corporation first referred to is, relatively to such employee, under the duty of observing at least ordinary
diligence, not only in preventing such a contact, but also in discovering and preventing its continuance, even whi n occasioned by the negligence of others, including that of a corporation whose employees
was due to the defendant’s
defendant admit that the plaintiff was injured,

danger it occasioned

thus

exposed to danger. Cited, 104/62.
v. Telegraph and Railway & Electric Company, 104/56,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendants allowed their wires to come
in contact with each other at a certain named place, and at divers
places in the' city; that one of the poles on which the wires were, fell
across a roadway, and in driving along there one of plaintiff’s horses
stepped upon one of the wires and received a shock throwing it to
the ground.
In falling, the horse tilted the vehicle, and threw plaintiff out and injured him. The case was before the court on a motion
to remove it to a Federal court. Lumpkin, P. J., said:
‘‘The gist
of the present action was the joint negligence of the defendants in
maintaining, rather than in producing, a dangerous agency which was
a constant menace to the life and
safety of the general public, caused
by a contact between their wires, which, though charged with a deadly
current of electricity, were allowed to remain on the ground in a
public thoroughfare for thirteen days, although both defendants had
notice of this state of affairs, and made no attempt to repair the
mischief.
That both of them were equally culpable in thus maintaining this dangerous agency is not to be doubtt d if these allegations
are to be taken as true; and this
being so, it would not matter, so far
are

In Griffith
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their joint liability to her was concerned, which of them was responsible for allowing their wires to come in contact. Indeed, even
were they entirely blameless in this regard, it was the imperative
duty of each to promptly take the proper steps to replace its wires in
a condition of safety so soon as notice was had of the danger thus
created.'"' This case was again before the court, 111/551, and it was
held that, as was, in effect, ruled when this case made its first appearanee here, the plaintiff’s petition set forth a cause of action, and was
not open to demurrer on the ground that, there was a misjoinder of
parties defendant. The plaintiff went even further into detail
than was necessary in describing the location of the wires and poles
belonging, respectively, to the defendant companies, but the petition
was defective in that it failed to state with sufficient particularity at
what points the plaintiff expected to prove that they negligently permitted their wires to remain in contact. They were not, however,
as

entitled to notice

as

to the character

or

extent of the evidence upon

which the

plaintiff expected to rely as showing knowledge on their
part of facts with which they were alleged to have been acquainted.
The petition did not disclose facts showing that the plaintiff was
not entitled to

but

was

recover

expenses

subject to demurrer

expenses was

on

incurred for medical attention, etc.,
the ground that the amount of such

not therein alleged.
AGAINST TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

I

Employee killed by the falling of a rotten pole.
a cause of action against the telegraph
company, the same alleging that the plaintiff’s husband, an employee
of the company, was killed without fault or negligence on his part,
539.

The declaration set forth

and

wholly by the fault and negligence of the company; the homibeing caused by the falling of a rotten pole, which he had
climbed in the performance of the duties of his employment, and its
defective condition being unkpown to him. If the declaration was
defective in matter of form, in failing to allege that the company’s
negligence consisted in keeping the pole in use, either with knowledge of its condition, or negligently, without knowledge, this was
matter for special demurrer.
The declaration being good in substance, the court did not err in overruling a general demurrer thereto.
cide

Wes. Vnion Tel. Co.
540.

v.

Jenkins, 92/398.

Against landlord by tenant.
The plaintiff’s declaration showing that she received personal injuries in consequence of her landlord’s negligence in failing to repair
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the rented

premises, and it not appearing from the allegations of
was guilty of such negligence (if
any) as would entirely defeat her right to recover, it was error to
sustain a general demurrer to the declaration.
The question whether
or not, under the circumstances stated in the declaration, she could,
by the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the injuries complained
of, was one of fact for the jury, and not one for determination by
the court. Lumpkin, J., dissenting. Johnson v. Collins, 98/271.
Cited, 104/809; 111/150.
the declaration that she herself

amendments; general principles.

pleadings, when allowed. All parties,
in the superior or other courts,
whether at law or
at any stage of the cause, as matter of right, amend their pleadings in all respects, whether in matter of form, or of substance, provided there is enough in the pleadings
to amend by.
The defendant after the first term can not set up new
matter by way of amendment, except as provided in section 5057.
Civil Code, §5097.
542. Enough to amend by.
A petition showing a plaintiff, and a
defendant, and setting out sufficient to indicate and specify some partieular fact or transaction as a cause of action, is enough to amend
bv. The jurisdiction of the court may be shown, and the details and
circumstances of the particular transaction may be amplified and
varied by amendment.
If the declaration omit to allege facts, essential to raise the duty or obligation involved in the cause of action
which was evidently originally intended to be declared upon, the
omitted fact may be supplied by amendment.
Civil Code, §5098.
543. New cause of action and parties not allowable.
No amendment adding a new and distinct cause of action, or new and distinct
parties, shall be allowed unless expressly provided for by law. Civil
Code, §5099.
544. MVhat facts may be supplied by amendments.
Under the Code, a declaration which has all the
requisites to make
it good and sufficient in substance, save that it omits to
allege some
fact essential to raise the duty involved in the cause of action which
the pleader evidently intended to declare
upon, is amendable by supplying the omitted fact at any stage of the case. Thus, where the
duty claimed was the duty of forbearing to obstruct a sewer-pipe
which conveyed waste-water from the
plaintiff’s premises and discharged the same on the defendant’s land, the declaration was amend541. Amendments

whether

plaintiffs

of

or defendants,
in equity, may,
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able by alleging an easement subjecting his land to the burden of receiving the water so discharged. Also, in an action by a mother
suing for the homicide of her son, where the fact omitted from the
declaration was that she was dependent upon him for a support, the
declaration was amendable by alleging that fact. Ellison, 87/691.
Cited, 87/764; 88/286, 537; 89/827; 90/697; 92/711; 95/678;
102/260, 773; 106/128; 107/42. The amendments which are allowable under the authority of Ellison’s case are those which simply make
perfect a cause of action which is imperfectly set forth in the pleading
sought to be amended. Davis v. Muscogee Mfg. Co., 106/126.
545. The particulars may he amplified and varied.
In Harris, 78/525, it was held that the cause of action alleged being the homicide of plaintiff’s husband by means of the defendant’s
negligence, the allegations in the declaration touching the specific
acts of negligence, and the manner of causing death may be varied or
added to by amendment during the progress of the trial so as to
adapt the pleadings to the evidence in all its aspects. In this case
there was enough in the declaration to amend by; the amendment did
not introduce a new cause of action.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “The
substance of the original declaration was that the plaintiff’s husband
was killed by the running of the defendant’s train, locomotives, ears,
and other machinery.
His death was the result of no negligence on
his part, but was due to the negligence of the defendant. It was
the result of failure by the defendant to use any of the precautions
required of railroad companies at public crossings; and to use reasonable care to prevent injury to passers-by at Pryor street crossing,
where he was killed. An amendment prior to the one excepted to
had been made, which alleged in substance this: The railroad crosses
Pryor street, and goes to the end of the car-shed. The engine started
on the edge of the sidewalk, and across the walk and street, without
ringing the bell or giving any sufficient signal of an intention to
start.
It started and ran too rapidly, and the circumstances were
such as to require special care by the defendant ; but the defendant
failed to exercise ordinary care, or any care, and this negligence
caused the homicide. The amendment finally made, and the one excepted to, was in substance as follows: The defendant failed to
furnish a safe way for egress from the cars, in this: it placed an iron
rail around the platform of a car, and did not provide steps to another car next to the former, nor proper rails for the protection of
persons on the steps. A number of persons were upon the latter car,
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bidding friends good-by. They were there by permission, express
or implied, of the defendant, and were negligently urged by the defendant from the car, and while they were getting from it the train
started, the conductor not allowing sufficient time for those persons
to descend, nor did he stop the train or use any care to prevent an
accident, though he saw a crowd endeavoring to get off, and saw
that the plaintiff’s husband, in climbing off the platform, had fallen
between the cars, and was hanging to one of the posts of the railing.
These acts were gross negligence on the part of the defendant, and
caused the death of the plaintiff's husband, who was on the train by
the defendant’s permission, and was in the exercise of due diligence.
The cause of action was the homicide of the plaintiff’s husband by
the negligence of the defendant. In setting out that negligence, it
was described in one
way in the original declaration, in another by
the first amendment, and in another by the second amendment. But
it was all the same cause of action. It might be tested thus: Suppose it were lawful to amend indictments for murder, and you had
an indictment for the murder of A.
alleging that it was by shooting,
and the proof disclosed that it was by stabbing, could an amendment
alleging that it was by stabbing be thought to charge another and
different crime? The crime in the supposed ease would correspond
to the cause of action in this.
Would it be charging the defendant
with another crime to add another count, or to allege in the same
count that the death was the result of stabbing, or other means than
shooting — the means first charged? We think not. There can be
but one cause of action for the homicide of any one man, and all
these variations went to the means and mode by which the homicide
was perpetrated; and the present case is a
good illustration of the
propriety of at least a discretionary power of allowing such amendments; because, as the plaintiff understood her case and proved it,
the homicide was the result of an occurrence at the crossing, separated altogether from the cars and the condition of the cars. But
the defendant introduced evidence of which probably the plaintiff had
no knowledge or information before, tending to show that the
killing
occurred in consequence of the husband being upon the train and
attempting to get off, and exposing himself, or becoming exposed,
while in the act of alighting.
It would be a great hardship to make
this action fail because of the difference and the doubt
the death
fendant’s

as

to how

really came to pass, provided that it was the result of donegligence. It was a proper case for amendment, and it
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would have been

an

abuse of the law of amendment had this amend-

ment been disallowed.

Cited, 83/88; 86/630; 106/127; 107/42.
merely amplifies and explains more fully

An amendment which

original cause of action is allowable. Mosely, 112/914.
Subject continued.
Where the homicide is alleged, the mode of committing it may be
particularly specified by amendment without adding a new cause of
action. Kitchens, 83/83.
Cited, 106/128; 107/42.
A declaration, filed by a track-hand of a railroad company, alleg*
ing that plaintiff was injured by a fall of earth, caused by the negligence of the company, its agents and servants, is amendable by setting out the particulars constituting the alleged negligence, and also
by averring that plaintiff himself was without fault. The declaration
as amended, sets out a cause of action, although it does not distinctly
allege that plaintiff was ignorant of the danger to which he was subjected. Smith, 87/764.
The particulars set forth in a declaration by way of inducement,
and as preliminary to the main facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action, may be varied by an amendment so as to accommodate
these allegations to the evidence expected to be adduced. Christian,
the

546.

90/124.
In

Murden, 83/753, it was held that it being apparent from the
original declaration that the cause of action was the expulsion of a passenger from the ears because he refused to pay an alleged overcharge,
consisting of the difference between the ticket rate and the conductor's
rate, an amendment showing more fully why a ticket was not, and
could not be, procured was allowable; and the explanation being that
there was no agent at the station to furnish a ticket, the declaration
as

amended

was

sufficient.

The action

being by an employee against his employer for personal
injuries alleged to have resulted from defective machinery and appliances, which the employee was using in the line of his duty, the
declaration is amendable, at the trial, by varying and amplifying
the particulars in respect to which the machinery was defective, and
in respect to the manner in which the injuries were inflicted, the
amendment evidently relating to the same occasion, the same occurrcnce, the same injuries, and the same machinery referred to in the
declaration.
erence
v.

No

new

cause

of action is introduced, either with ref-

to the statute of limitations

Gate

or

any

City Coffin Company, 92/664.

other rule of law.

Colley
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Subject continued.

In.Cartter

Cotter, 88/286, the plaintiff alleged that he was orby the foreman to work at a certain windlass, which was being used in drawing a pile out of the water below and under the
place where he stood and was required to stand. The windlass was
v.

dered

defective, and in bad order, in that it had no “dog” or brake on it
whereby it could be controlled and managed by the man managing it,
so that when the pile was lifted up by the man at the windlass he had
no control of the same except to hold it up by main strength.
While
petitioner was so drawing up the pile at the windlass as stated, by
reason of
carelessness and negligence on the part of defendants
and their tackle, machines, and workmen managing said pile, it
slipped from its moorings, and, by reason of the windlass having no
dog or brake, the handle thereof was jerked out of petitioner’s hand
very swiftly and violently, and, rapidly revolving, struck him on
the shoulder, knocking him down; that he was injured by the negligence, carelessness, and indifference of defendants by doubling work
on their employees, and furnishing defective machinery, and requiring them to use it;’ and that they and their agents well knew the defective condition of the windlass, and were responsible for the injury.
Plaintiff was allowed to amend by alleging he was informed by the
foreman that the windlass and all the machinery were safe and in order. He, petitioner, was wholly unacquainted with the machinery,
and did not, of his own knowledge, know whether it was safe or
unsafe, and relied upon and trusted the declaration of defendants
and their foreman; nor did petitioner know how many men were
required to manipulate and work the machinery. At the time petitioner was injured the foreman took hold of the windlass with him,
and together they drew up a heavy log, and when they had wound
it partly up the foreman was called off, and left petitioner alone to
hold the windlass, and it was impossible for him to abandon his hold
upon it; and while he was thus holding the windlass the log to which
it was attached gave way, and fell with its full weight upon the
rope, and jerked the windlass from his grasp, and thereby injured
and damaged him. He did not know of the defects in the machinery,
nor that defendants were
working with an insufficient number of
hands, until after he was injured; and defendants, well knowing that
said machinery was defective and dangerous, neglected to repair and
continued to

follows:

He

use
was

it.
a

Plaintiff
common

was

afterwards allowed to amend

laborer, and

was

as

employed by defend-
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ants to do

manual labor

the

bridge. Defendants negemployees adequate, suitable,
and safe machinery and tools, and neglected to inspect and keep in
repair the machinery and tools furnished. They furnished to and
for the use of plaintiff a machine, commonly called a “crab,” which
was defective, broken, out of repair, and dangerous, in that it had
no dog, and was unfit for the use and service to which it was put.
Plaintiff was not a mechanic and was not acquainted with the construction and necessary parts of the crab, and had no notice that it
was defective or dangerous.
Defendants knew it was defective and
dangerous and did not notify plaintiff nor repair it, but knowingly
permitted plaintiff to use it. It was held that under the ruling in
Ellison’s case, the declaration in this ease was amendable, the amendments were properly allowed, and no new cause of action was introcommon

lected to furnish for the

use

on

of their

duced.

against a railroad company for the homicide of plainhusband, which alleged, after describing the manner of the
homicide, that the acts complained of constitute gross negligence on
the part of the company, its agents, servants, and employees, and
A declaration

tiff’s

negligence caused the death, was amendable by strike
ing therefrom an allegation that “the engineer on said engine was
looking, not at the track in front, but towards the fireman, who was
on the opposite side of the engine,” and inserting an allegation that
“said engineer could have seen said Barnett and lumber, and did see
them, in time to have stopped before reaching them, but failed to do
so, and failed to give any signal, and made no effort to stop before
reaching said lumber and said Barnett.” Both before and after being amended, the declaration in this case set forth a cause of action.
The amendment did not introduce a new cause, but only varied the
statement of particulars of which the cause of action, to wit, the homicide of the plaintiff's husband, consisted.
Under the declaration
and the evidence, the plaintiff could recover only in case the homicide was willful on the part of the company’s engineer, or the result
of such gross negligence and recklessness as would be equivalent to a
willful homicide. Barnett, 89/718. This case again, 94/447.
Where the declaration alleged that the employees of a railroad had
violently, unnecessarily and improperly blown the whistle of the engine, thereby frightening the plaintiff’s horse and causing him to
run
away and injure the plaintiff, it could be amended by setting
out more fully and distinctly’ the circumstances and facts of the tort
that said gross
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Such

an

amendment did not add

in substance the

same

tort

as

a new cause

of action.

originally complained of.

It charged

Thomas,

68/744.
548.
In

Subject continued.

Andrews, 89/653, the declaration alleged that there was in the

city of Augusta

a

system of electric wires operated by the defend-

ant, the Augusta Railway Company;

there

was

also another system,

consisting of the fire-alarm wires of the Augusta fire department;
and the plaintiff was employed in putting up wires for a third, that
of a telephone company. In stringing the wires on the poles, it
became necessary at a certain point for the plaintiff, to place the telephone wire above and across the fire-alaTm wire, and for that purpose
he ascended a pole of the fire-alarm system to the height of the wire,
and, while attempting to place the telephone wire over and across the
fire-alarm wire, received from the latter a shock which caused him to
fall to the ground, a distance of some twenty-three feet, by which
means he was seriously injured.
He charges that his injuries “were
caused solely by the carelessness of the defendant company in so negligently constructing, using, and operating what is known as its Teedwire’ as to permit and allow the same to come in contact with said
fire-alarm

wire, at the intersection of” two named streets of the city,

“and

negligently and carelessly failing to separate, and keep separate, at a safe and proper distance, its said feed-wire and said firealarm wire,'at the time and point indicated; that there was being transmitted over said feed-wire, at the time petitioner received said injuries,
a powerful and deadly current of electricity, used to propel the cars
of defendant, which current was carried over said fire-alarm wire
from said point of contact to the place where petitioner was working
as aforesaid, and thence into and
through his body”; and that the
“fact of contact of said

known,
ant.”

he had

or

It

by

feed-wire

and

said

fire-alarm

wire

was

proper diligence might have been known, to the defendheld that the plaintiff’s declaration, not alleging that

was

permission from the

of the electric system, on which
injured, to come in contact with
its wires or to climb its pole in the prosecution of his business for
another company, or that the defendant knew of his
presence at the
scene of the
injury, which was up in the air, some twenty-three feet
or more from the
ground, the declaration set forth no cause of action,
and a general demurrer thereto should have been sustained.
Simmons, C. J., said:
“The plaintiff does not allege any fact going to
owner

he had entered at the time he

was
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show that the defendant company was under any
to protect him at the time or place of the injury.
that he had

permission from those operating

or

duty or obligation
He does not allege
in charge of the fire-

alarm

system to climb its poles in the prosecution of his business.
Without permission, and without notice even, so far as appears from
this declaration, he climbed the pole, and became a trespasser upon
the fire-alarm system. He had no right to go upon the pole without

permission, and when he did so he took the risk incident to the trespass.
If he had obtained permission from those in charge of the
fire-alarm system to climb their poles to carry on his business, he
would have been in a position somewhat analogous to that of a servant of the licensors, and if, while acting in pursuance of the license,
he had been injured by the negligence of the railway company, he
might be entitled to recover. Or if he had been upon the street, or
in any place where he had a known right to be, and had been injured
by the negligence of the railway company, he would be entitled to
recover.
Whatever may be the reciprocal duties of electric eompanies between themselves, as to guard-wires, etc., each must see to it,
up to the measure of full diligence, that, the public is protected, upon
the streets, from the danger of contact with its wires when charged
with the deadly electric fluid. If a person, however, leaves his
proper place in the street, or highway, and climbs a pole twenty-three
feet high, which supports an electric wire, taking with him a wire
to throw across the one on the pole, and does this without permission from the company whose system he has thus entered upon, and,
by reason of the contact of that company’s wire with the 'feed’ wire of
another company, is injured, he can not recover from either company.
If the plaintiff had given the railway company notice that he was
going up the pole, or if it had reasonable grounds to believe that he
was on the pole, and it had known or ought to have known that its
wire was in contact with the other wire, it might be liable to him
for injuries received by him on account of its negligence.” Cited,
97/666. The declaration was amended afterwards, and it was held
that the amendment did not set up a new cause of action, but, by its
allegations, it amplified, enlarged, and made complete the same cause
of action intended to b,e set forth in the original declaration, and
relieved it of the main defect upon which it was adjudged to be insufficient, by alleging facts showing that the plaintiff, when injured,
was not a trespasser upon the fire-alarm pole, but was there by the
permission of its owner, and that his presence there should have been
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anticipated by the defendant. The allegation that permission to
climb this pole had been granted the plaintiff by the “city council of
Augusta, through its duly authorized officers and agents,” was sufficient, without stating the name of any particular official or agent
of the municipal government. Andrews, 92/706.
Cited, 94/435;
101/847.
549.

Subject continued.
damages resulting from the careless and negligent running of defendant’s engine may be amended by setting out negligence in
not discovering and remedying defects on the machinery of the engine,
which, by the use of ordinary care and diligence, could have been
discovered and remedied so as to prevent the accident.
Such amendment does not add a new cause of action.
This declaration alleged
that plaintiff was injured “by reason of the unskillful, careless, and
negligent running of the engine and cars.” The amendment was
this:
“That besides the unskillful, careless and negligent running
of said engine and ears, the said defendant is further guilty of negligence in this, that the drag-bar on the pilot of the engine then and
there being used, upon which your petitioner was standing in the
due and proper discharge of his duty, and without fault upon his
part, was defective, which defect was not known to your petitioner
at the time of the injury aforesaid, and not discoverable by him in
the reasonable and ordinary exercise of diligence in the course of his
duty, and that said defendant was careless and negligent in not discovering said defect, as it was its duty to do, or in failing to remedy
the same.” Dorsey, 68/228.
In the case of Schmidt v. Block, 76/823, the declaration alleged that
plaintiff was employed to labor in defendant’s cracker and candy
factory, and he undertook to place a barrel of syrup in a steam elevator, and while engaged in the act, and before he released his hold
of it, the elevator was improperly put in motion whereby the barrel
was thrown upon him and he was
injured; that the defendant failed
to provide and furnish suitable catches, stops or locks for the elevator, or competent skilled persons to watch or run it, and by reason
of such failure he was injured.
The declaration was amended by
alleging that defendant’s business was complex and dangerous, and he
failed to prescribe rules sufficient for its orderly and safe management; that the elevator was prematurely and recklessly put in motion by the negligence of defendant in failing to provide sufficient
locks and stops and guards to hold and make secure and safely run
A suit for
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it.

On demurrer it

held that while the

original declaration was
plain and distinct as the law requires, yet the
amendment set up clearly two causes of action, and that when knowledge is essential to charge the master, negligent ignorance is equivalent to knowledge.
The original declaration alleging that plaintiff's husband was killed
by the gross negligence of the agents of defendant in running its cars,
etc., there was enough therein to amend by; and an amendment alleging that he was on the railroad-track where persons were accustomed to walk, that he was between the blow-post and the crossing on
said track, and that the agents of said company failed to give any
signals or to blow its engine as required by law, and that they, without any fault on his part, did by said negligence run over and kill
him, to his injury, made the declaration sufficient to authorize a
recovery, if supported by evidence.
Denson, 83/260.
Where, in an action against a railroad company, the petition of
the plaintiff claims damages for pain and suffering occasioned by
a personal injury that had resulted from the negligence of the defendant, it is not error for the court to allow an amendment, at
the trial of the case, to the effect that plaintiff still suffers pain
from the injury, especially when it appears that the court allowed
the amendment and proof thereunder for the purpose of illustrating
the extent of the pain and suffering, and not for the purpose of
showing any permanent injury. Lake, 112/244.
A petition which alleges that a railway company, “by the use and
running of their engines, locomotives, or other machinery, or otherwise, by the negligence of their agents, employees, or servants, set
fire to and destroyed” the plaintiff's property, is amendable by the addition of a paragraph alleging that the fire in question was caused
by the negligence of a section foreman in the employment of the company, and by setting forth the particulars as to the origin of the fire.
Ward, 110/793.
There was enough in this declaration to amend by.
Though in
suits conducted by a next friend, the minors ought regularly to sue
by him, yet, if the next friend sue in behalf of the minors, it is the
same in substance.
The defect in form is amendable by alleging
that the minors sue by their next friend. A declaration at the suit
of children for the homicide of their father is amendable by alleging
that the deceased left no widow, and that the plaintiffs are all the
children which survived him. Van Pelt, 89/706.
Cited, 93/55.
confused and not

was

as

,
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A

declaration, brought by a father to recover “for the services,”

during its minority, of a minor child, negligently killed by a railway
company, in which it was alleged “that, as she advanced in years,
her services would have become of great value to him,” though it
does not distinctly aver that at the time of the killing the child was
capable of rendering services of any value, is amendable by alleging
that the child was old enough to render, and did in fact render, certain specified services, and the same were, at the time of her death,
of a stated value per month. Sugarman, 94/604. Cited, 106/879.
550. Amendment setting out a foreign statute.
Where, in a suit brought in Georgia under a South Carolina statnte which allowed the administrator of
or

wife

or

children to

sue

a

decedent who left

a

parent

for his homicide, the declaration failed to

allege that he left such parent, wife or child, it could be amended.
It could also be amended by setting out the South Carolina statute.
There was enough in this case to show that the plaintiff relied on
the statute.
Nix, 68/572. Cited, 83/660.
In Bolton, 83/659, the plaintiff relied upon a common-law right,
which renders the employer liable for knowingly furnishing defective material to its servants, whereby they are injured.
He averred
all the facts required by the Alabama statute, but the statute was
not mentioned, nor intimated, in the declaration, and he offered to
amend by declaring on the statute which gives employees a statutory
right to recover upon other grounds. The amendment was rejected
on the
ground that it added a new cause of action. Such an amendment might be made if the statute was invoked though defectively —
if the plaintiff, in some way, shows that he relied on the statute
in the original declaration.
551. New and distinct cause of action.
When a declaration claimed damages, on the ground that defendant had unlawfully dug a hole or ditch at the junction of a shellroad and a village-road or path leading thereto, into which the
plaintiff
fell, it could not be amended by seeking to recover because the defendant had removed a certain plank crossing erected by it over a
ditch or hole, by reason of which the plaintiff fell into the ditch.
—

The amendment introduces

a new

way Shell Road Co. v. O’Brien,
Where a declaration claimed

having fallen into

a

and which had been

and distinct

cause

of action.

Skid-

73/655. Cited, 109/606.
damages by reason of the plaintiff’s
well situated on the right of way of a railroad,
carelessly left open and unguarded, an amend-
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ment which

was on the land of the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff’s land without the plain-

alleged that the well

that the defendant entered

on

tiff’s

knowledge or consent, and cut away the vegetable guards and
protection around the well, sought to introduce a new cause of action
and was properly rejected.
If not so, the amendment was immaterial.
The same case was made by the original declaration as would
have been made
The
the

same

by amendment, and its rejection did no injury.
testimony was admitted as would have been admissible if

amendment had been

allowed, and

right was denied the
plaintiff by its rejection. Henderson, 73/718. Cited, 73/657.
In Cox v. Murphy, 82/623, it was alleged fliat plaintiff was attacked in the streets of a city by a wild and furious steer, the property of defendant; that defendant knew the animal was furious, dangerous, and had a propensity for attacking persons, but attempted to
drive it through the streets. Plaintiff amended, first, by alleging
that defendant carelessly kept the steer, well knowing that it was
accustomed to attack, gore and trample mankind, and while so keeping it, it attacked the plaintiff; second, by alleging that defendant
so negligently kept the animal that it
escaped and unlawfully came
upon the street and injured the plaintiff; third, by alleging that
defendant kept a vicious steer, which was known to defendant, which
by the careless management of defendant in attempting to drive it
along the street, was allowed to escape and go at liberty, upon which
it attacked the plaintiff.
It was held that the first and third amendments were properly allowed, as they both alleged that the steer was
wild and vicious, and that this was known to defendant, and it was
error

to allow the second amendment.

tinct

cause

the animal

of action.
was

vicious,

It did not
or even

no

It contained

and dis-

allege that the defendant knew
was vicious.
Under the origi-

that it

nal declaration and first and third amendments it
prove the scienter of
this was unnecessary.

a new

was

necessary to

the defendant; under the second amendment
Cited, 109/606.
A declaration sounding in tort, against a railroad company for
violation of its duty as a common carrier, is not amendable by converting it, in whole or in part, into an action upon contract to carry.
Where the declaration sets forth a cause of action, and lays damages
in general terms, it is not vitiated by a clause which sets up that
“the entire injury is to her peace, happiness and feelings,” although
this theory of the injury be incorrect.
The action is maintainable
40
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injury embraced in the facts set out in the declaration.
Cox, 87/747.
In Williams, 105/70, it was held that where one brings an action
agaiiist a railway company for injuries he sustained growing out of
the' defective construction of a platform' upon which he was engaged
at work as an employee and servant of the company, such a suit can
not be converted into an action against the railway company, as
owner of the premises where plaintiff was hurt, and as landlord of
for the real

the

Simmons, C. J., said:

plaintiff’s employer.

action

as

first instituted

was

that the master had

“The gist of the
negligently failed

to

provide plaintiff a safe place on which to do the work for which
was employed.
These duties grew out of the contract relationship between the master and the servant. When the amendment was
made and allowed, it changed the whole character of the action.
Plaintiff then depended for recovery upon the obligation of the landlord to his tenant and the tenant’s servants to keep the premises in
repair. The two causes of action are quite different, and the rules
governing the obligations of the master and of the landlord under
such circumstances are also different.
In the one, a legal obligation
is upon the master to provide a safe place for his servant to work;
in the other, the obligation is that of a landlord to keep his premises
in repair so as not to injure his tenant or his tenant’s servants.”
In Davis v. Muscogee Mfg. Co., 106/126, the plaintiff alleged that
he was employed to clean and wash window-glass in defendant’s factory, and while so engaged, the engineer, or some other employee of
the defendant operating the engine of the factory, without warning
to the plaintiff and without his knowledge, turned on the steam from
the engine, so carelessly and negligently that the water and steam
went outside of the factory to the window plaintiff was washing, and
thereby, without any fault on his part, scalded and burned him. An
amendment was offered alleging that the defendant was negligent,
in that it kept and maintained a foot-valve, which was liable to get
out of order at any time, and which was well known to defendant,
and which did get out of order, and when out of order a vacuum attached to the engine or attachment of said engine would be broken,
he

and when

so

broken would

cause

hot water and steam to be forced in

pipe running

up the side of the building whereby the plaintiff was
scalded and burned. The amendment was rejected on the ground
that it constituted a new cause of action. It was held that the
a

nal

petition set forth

no cause

of action and there

was

originothing to
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amend

by. The negligence alleged resulted from the acts of the
employees of the defendant, who were the fellow servants of the plaintiff, and such negligence did not give him a cause of action. The
amendment offered alleged that the plaintiff was injured by the
negligence of the defendant in not providing proper machinery —
a new cause of action in no way connected with the
allegations contained in the original petition.
Cobb, J., said: “If the petition
had alleged that the plaintiff was burned and scalded by the negligent conduct of the defendant in the operation of its factory and had
set forth some specific act of negligence, then, under the ruling in
the Harris case, supra, an amendment containing additional acts
of negligence might have been properly allowed. But the original
petition contained no allegation of negligence which was chargeable,
in law, against the defendant, and for this reason the case differs
materially from Harris’s case. This applies also to the Kitchens case,
supra. And there is nothing in it to conflict with the ruling made in
Ellison’s case. If the opinion in that case is construed as a whole
in the light of the record in that particular case, it will be seen that
the amendments which are allowable under the authority of that
decision are those which simply make perfect a cause of action which
is imperfectly set forth in the pleading sought to be amended.” Cited,
109/606.
In

Roughton, 109/604, Fish, J., said: “The negligence complained
the original petition as the cause of the plaintiff’s injury was that the defendant had left cars standing on its
spur-track in such a position that the plaintiff could not get
from Badger street, along which he was passing, to the sidewalk
of Born street, without going into the middle of the latter street
and passing around the cars, and that the ground on which he was
thus forced to walk was rough, uneven, covered with snow and ice,
and slippery; in consequence of which, in walking around the cars,
he slipped and fell, thereby sustaining the injury for which he sued.
The only negligence alleged against the defendant was the leaving
of its cars across the street. It was not alleged that the defendant
was in
any way connected with, or responsible for, the condition of
the street at the point where the plaintiff slipped and fell. The
amendment however alleged that the defendant ‘dumped and left
unscattered a pile of dirt and old brickbats, which had become frozen
and hard where plaintiff was compelled to walk around said cars,
which made the ground rough and uneven,’ and that the defendant
of

in
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left

no signal or warning of any kind to pnt persons on notice of
rough place. This amendment introduced an entirely new item
of negligence on the part of the defendant as the cause of plaintiff's
injury, viz.: in the placing of an obstruction in the street, and leaving it unguarded; thus adding a new and distinct cause of action,

the

which section 5099 of the Civil Code forbids.”

Where

action for

brought against the Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company, and the proof showed
that the injury complained of was by the Western & Atlantic Railroad Company, the court, on motion, should have granted a nonsuit.
Where one railroad corporation is sued for a tort, the declaration
can not be amended by substituting another as defendant, under the
guise of correcting a misnomer. Where the action was against the
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company, and the declaration alleged that “the defendant operates as lessee the Western
and Atlantic Railroad,” an amendment stating that “the lessee of the
Western and Atlantic Railroad sued in this case, and operating said
road at the time of the injuries to the plaintiff, was known and styled
as the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company by virtue of a publie act of this State” did not make the latter company a party to the
action.
Edwards, 91/24. Cited, 110/301.
552. Misnomer may be corrected.
Misnomers in civil suits may on motion be corrected by amendment.
Civil Code, §5102. Therefore, where the petition in a suit
for a tort alleged the Central Railroad and Banking Company of
Georgia to be a corporation existing under the laws of this State,
and that it had, by negligently running its cars, damaged the petitioner in a named sum, and prayed process against it, which was issued accordingly, but was served upon the agent of the Central of
Georgia Railway Company, and where counsel for the latter company
an

a

tort

was

admitted in open court that at the time the suit was filed and process
served there

such

corporation in existence as the Central RailBanking Company of Georgia, but that the Central of Georgia Railway Company had, by means of judicial sale thereof, acquired the railroads, rights, franchises, etc., of the Central Railroad
and Banking Company of Georgia, there was no error in
allowing an
amendment correcting the mistake in the name of the defendant corporation by substituting ‘The Central of Georgia Railway Company”
for “the Central Railroad and Banking
Company ■ of Georgia” wherever the latter
appeared in the petition and process. The ruling
road and

was no
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made in

Edwards, supra, that “where one railroad corporation is sued
can not be amended by substituting another
as defendant, under the guise of
correcting a misnomer,” does not eonfliet with the principle herein announced.
Maddox, 110/301.
for

a

tort, the declaration

553. New

party not added here.
a declaration against the Chattanooga, Rome and
Carrollton Railroad Company by substituting Columbus for Carrollton so as to give the defendant its proper corporate name, was not
adding a new party, but simply correcting a misnomer. Jackson,
86/676. Cited, 110/301.554. Lex fori controls as to procedure.
Amendment of

The

practice of the lex fori in respect to pleadings, amendments and
general mode of procedure will control, if it differs from the
practice of the State where the cause of action arose. Nix, 68/572.
the

OF JUSTIFICATION.

555.

Justification in torts. In every case of tort, if the defendant
by law to do the act complained of, he may plead
the same as a justification; by such plea he admits the act to be
done, and shall be entitled to all the privileges of one holding the
affirmative of the issue; but such plea shall not give to the defendant
the right to open and conclude the argument before the jury unless
it is filed before the plaintiff submits any evidence to the jury trying
the case.
Civil Code, §3891.
556. When a plea amounts to a justification.
The test to determine whether a plea amounts to a justification, so
as to
give the defendant the right to ©pen and conclude, is whether
such plea sets up facts which could riot have gone in evidence under
the general issue. To an action by the father of a factory operafive for an injury to his minor daughter, resulting from the negligenc-e of the defendant’s agents, a plea admitting that, on a day
named, the daughter was employed by the company in its spinningroom, and while so employed was injured, but denying that she was
in the discharge and performance of her lawful duty, or that the
company employed, or continued to employ incompetent agents or
officers, or that their acts were negligent, and asserting that, at the
time of the injury, the girl was acting in violation of her instructions and outside of the scope of her employment, and that the injury
resulted from her own negligence, was not a plea of justification.
Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72/217. Cited, 74/548, 837; 76/340.
was

authorized

§ 55V ]

CHAPTER 35.

[630

Pleadings.

Where a declaration alleged that an infant had been seriously injured through the negligence of the defendant’s servants in not locking or securing a turntable, a plea which admitted that the child

injured by a turntable belonging to and used by defendant at
place alleged in the declaration, but denied that the defendant was at fault or negligent, was not a plea of justification.
To constitute a plea of justification, the facts alleged must be such
as are not admissible under the plea of the general issue.
Blandford, J., said: “The plea denies any negligence on the part of the
defendant. It does not relieve the plaintiff of any burden whatever except as to the injury.”
Chapman, 74/547. Cited, 74/748;
110/171. And a plea that admits only a part of the facts alleged in
the' declaration, and leaves the burden of proving the rest upon the
plaintiff under the plea of the general issue, is not a plea of justification.
Seymour v. Bailey, 76/338. Cited, 81/671.
A plea which admitted that the plaintiff was injured by the train
of the defendant, but denied that it was guilty of negligence, and
asserted that it used all ordinary care and reasonable diligence, and
that the negligence of plaintiff caused the injury, was not a plea of
justification which entitled the defendant to open and conclude the
argument. Williams, 74/723. Cited, 110/171.
In a suit by the widow of a deceased employee of a railroad for
his homicide by the negligence of his coemployees, a plea which
admitted the killing, but did not admit either that decedent was
free from fault or that the other employees were at fault, was not a
plea of justification. When all the evidence, admissible under a plea
claimed to be a plea of justification, would be admissible under a
plea of the general issue, such a plea would not amount to a plea
of justification, or give the defendant the right to
open and conclude.
Crosby, 74/737. Cited, 110/171.
The action being for damages resulting from an
alleged assault
and battery, a plea admitting the beating, and
averring that it
was lawful, because
necessarily inflicted by the defendant’s servant
for the purpose of protecting his master’s
property from an unlawful
trespass on the part of the plaintiff, was a plea of justification, and
consequently defendant’s counsel were entitled to open and conclude
the argument. Strickland, 99/124.
was

the time and

557. When the doctrine does not

apply.
Morgan, 110/168, the plaintiff brought suit to recover for the
killing of a cow. The defendant, in its answer, admitted that it was
In
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corporation, and denied all the other allegations in the petition.

After the conclusion of the evidence upon both sides, the defendant
amended its plea and admitted that plaintiff was the owner of the
cow,

that the

cow was

of the value claimed and was killed by defends
Thereupon defendant’s counsel claimed

ant’s train at the time stated.
the

right to conclude the argument, which was denied. And *it was
ruling was right. Lewis, J., said: “The amendment
offered is not strictly a plea of justification. Pleas of justification
usually refer to such torts as malicious prosecution, assault and battery, libel, slander, and the like, and in them the defendant admits
committing the acts complained of, and claims justification for his
conduct. In this sort of a tort, however, of injuring property by
the running of a railroad-train, we do not well see how there can be
any plea of justification, for all the evidence under the plea as
amended could have been admitted under a plea of the general issue.
A plea of justification is an admission by a defendant that he
purposely committed the acts complained of, and upon which the action was founded, and sets up facts or reasons for justifying such
acts.
The railway company in this case could, of course, not set up
such justification; for under no circumstances could it willfully and
purposely kill stock upon its track. The right to open and conclude,
therefore, in a case of this sort is founded upon the principle that
held that the

the defendant has assumed the affirmative of the issue; and it is

really upon the same principle on which the statute with reference
to pleas of justification is founded; for that statute declares that one
filing a plea of justification is entitled to all the privileges of one
holding the affirmative of the issue. We think, therefore, the manifest
policy indicated in the Act of 1888, amending the original statute on
this subject, is to deny to the defendant in any case the right to open
and conclude, unless he relieves the plaintiff of the burden of making
out a prima facie case, and the admission must be made, and the
right to open and conclude asserted, before the plaintiff submits any
evidence in the case.”
558. Where
In Parker

a

trial is had

on

the

pleadings alone.

Lanier, 82/216, the plaintiff sued the defendant for
shooting and wounding him. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and with it a plea of justification.
Neither party introduced
any evidence, only the pleadings being before the jury.
It was held
that, in an action for tort, where the defendant by his plea admits
and justifies, and no further evidence is adduced
by either party.
v.
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damages may be assessed by the jury upon the admissions contained
plea. Such admissions are to be taken as unqualified by the
connected matters alleged in justification. Punitive as well as compensatory damages may be awarded. Bleckley, C. J., said: “Under section 3891 of the Code, a plea of justification supersedes the
general issue, devolves the burden of proof upon the defendant, and,
if not sustained, entitles the plaintiff to recover general damages.
It follows that such damages may be assessed by the jury upon the
admissions of the plea alone, where no other evidence is before them.
The law furnishes no measure of damages for pain and suffering but
the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors.
Of course, their estimate of the amount must be made upon the facts before them; but
a
plea which expressly admits the facts alleged in the declaration
proves them as effectually as if they were vouched by witnesses.
To
limit the admissions of the plea by the matters set forth as justifiestion would be to cancel their effect altogether. The very thing the
defendant undertakes to do by filing a plea of justification is to qualify his confession by proof as well as by pleading. He confesses certain facts, and offers to neutralize them by proving other facts.
Until he does prove them, the jury can not recognize their existence for
any purpose.
Certainly, if the facts admitted by the plea were verified by a witness, and nothing appeared in mitigation, the jury would
be warranted in treating so dangerous an assault as a tort, attended
with circumstances of aggravation, both in act and intention. If
then,
the truth of the facts was established by the plea itself, and there was
no need for
calling a witness, why might not punitive damages be
awarded upon the plea the same as upon sworn testimony? We think
the jury were authorized to entertain and decide the question of
punitive or exemplary damages on the facts and circumstances of the tort
as they stood confessed in the
plea.” Cited, 83/242; 96/153.
559. The general issue.
Where, to an action for assault and battery, the only plea filed was
that of the general issue, the jury could not consider the question of
justification. Ratteree v. Chapman, 79/574; Kerwich v. Steelman,
44/197.
On the plea of the general issue a railroad sued for killing stock
may show by evidence that the stock was killed on the road of another company, and by the servants of such other company, and not
by its own servants. Buice, 88/180.
in the

,
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560. Matter

pleaded in mitigation.
Conley v. Arnold, 93/823, it was held that matter pleaded in
mitigation of damages is not objectionable as mitigation because it
would not serve to justify.
In an action for a personal injury, where
a plea of justification is filed, and the jury find for the plaintiff damages to the amount of one dollar only, the verdict is contrary to law,
for in such ease failure of the defendant to prove justification entities the plaintiff to a verdict which would carry all the costs of the
action, and, under section 5391 of the Code, a verdict for one dollar
In

and costs would not have this effect.
ALLEGATA AND PROBATA.

561. Parties should be confined to the case made in
When the declaration

their pleadings.

alleges a particular act of negligence on the
part of the company as the cause of the homicide, proof of other
acts of negligence will not authorize a recovery unless the jury be
satisfied, from the evidence, that the negligence charged has been
proven.
Our law requires a plaintiff plainly and distinctly to set
forth his cause of action. And if one bring a suit based on one set
of facts, it is obviously unfair to permit him to recover on another
dropped out incidentally, and perhaps by way of defense. Oaks,
52/410. Cited, 97/769; 86/630.
If the plaintiff fell into the hole described in her declaration,
and that hole was caused by the defendant’s negligence, and if she
could not have avoided it by the exercise of ordinary diligence, she
might recover; but if the hole into which she fell was a different one
from that described in the declaration, or if it was not caused by
the defendant’s negligence, or if she could have avoided it by the
use of ordinary diligence, she could not recover.
Brunswick Light
Co. v. Gale, 91/813.
In Hill v. Callahan, 82/109, the plaintiff brought suit to recover
for the homicide of her husband, an employee of the defendants, who
were engaged in building a railroad.
Tfre declaration alleged in
substance that the defendants ordered her husband to go to a fire and
thaw out some dynamite; that near the fire a box of dynamite caps
had been placed by the defendants, in a negligent manner, so near
the fire that there was danger of their being thrown into the fire or
otherwise exploded; after her husband reached the fire, another employee rushed by and caused the caps to fall into the fire, they exploded, and without fault on his part, and on account of the negligence of placing the caps so near the fire, her husband was killed.
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“You will see whether the dynamite
caps were placed there by order of defendants or their agents whom
they had in charge of these explosives. If they were not placed there by
defendants, or their agents whom they had in charge of these explosives, the defendants would not be responsible for the accident.” The
exception to this chdrge was that the court should have further charged
that if the caps negligently left the possession of the contractors or
their employees in any way, it would have been negligence on their
part, whether the caps were placed there by their order or not; it being
their duty to see that the caps were safely kept. Simmons, J., said:
“The rule of pleading is that the plaintiff should plainly, fully, and
distinctly set forth his cause of action. It will be seen, by reference
to the declaration in this case above set out, that the plaintiff fully
complied with this rule. The acts of negligence which she alleged in
her declaration, and on which she relied for recovery, were the placing by the defendants, either by themselves or their agents or employees, of these dynamite caps so near the fire as to be dangerous.
This is repeated time and again in the declaration.
These were the
acts of negligence which she called upon the defendants to answer.
Upon these alone she sought to recover. No amendment was made
by her during the progress of the trial alleging any other acts of negligence. We therefore do not think that the court erred in confining
her in his charge to the acts she alleged in her declaration. The
pleadings in the case are the contentions of the parties. They make
the issues upon which evidence is to be admitted, and on which the
court is to instruct the jury.
By them the parties must stand or
fall. If the court submits only these issues to the
jury in his charge,
it is not error, and the parties have no right to complain.” Cited,
The court

charged the jury:

107/136; 108/194.
In Nash, 81/580, a new trial was not granted
simply on account
of a charge by the court which seemed to authorize a
recovery upon
proof of acts of negligerfce'not charged in the declaration, it appearing that this impression was not intended to he conveyed by the court
to the jury, and taking the entire
charge together, the evident meaning of the court was that the plaintiff could not recover except upon
proof of the specific allegations in the declaration. Cited, 86/631;
97/769.
562. No substantial variance in these
An

cases.

alleged variance, in that the allegation

was

that the defendant

placed in his show-window certain viands and other

things tending
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to

tempt a passer-by to look into the window, whereas the proof
showed that the window did not contain such things as was alleged,

oysters, boxes, etc., is not material to the merits.
85/146.

Folsom

v.

Lewis,

The declaration alleging that the plaintiff’s hand was crushed and
injured by the falling of an eccentric upon it, proof that the eccentric
in falling knocked his hand upward, and crushed it against other machinery, was not so far inconsistent with the declaration a3 to constitute a substantial variance between the allegata and probata, but if
would have been better to amend the declaration

so

as

to make it

conform

accurately to the evidence. Miller, 90/571.
The declaration alleging that the plaintiff became entangled in a
coil of telephone-wire belonging to the defendant, which it had negligently left lying or hanging in the street, and that, the wire becoming entangled in her clothing, she was thrown violently on the pavement and injured, and the evidence showing that one end of the wire
was fastened to a pole and the other to a tree, that it was about six
or seven inches from the ground, that a parcel of it was tangled up,
and that the

plaintiff became entangled in it, and tripped and fell
was no substantial variance between the allegata and
the probata as to the manner in which the injury was occasioned.
Southern Bell Telephone Co. v. Lynch, 95/529.
over

it, there

563. Substantial variance in these
A

cases.

“jigger” is made by placing two rails, or pieces of lumber, sharpends, parallel with each other, of the same width of the
track and fastened together with a pivot in the center.
It is used
for changing a hand-car from the track to the turnout. The car is
placed upon it and turned on the turnout and when placed on the jigger the car ought to balance.
A declaration alleged that the plaintiff
was injured by
carelessly and negligently running and pushing a certain hand-car upon the railroad-track.
The court below over objection admitted evidence to prove that plaintiff was injured in consequence of the defective construction of a jigger, the pivot of the jigger being four inches from the center.
The testimony should not
have been admitted, as there was no allegation of the fact in the declaration. Thomas, 40/231.
Where the plaintiff alleged that when
crossing at night a little'
bridge or crossway over the sidewalk covering a ditch two feet deep,,
he stepped in a hole between .the outer planks of the
crossing and the
earth, fell into the ditch, and was injured; and the only act alleged
tending to charge negligence against the municipality was that theened at the

CHAPTER 35.

§ 564]

[ 636

Pleadings.

was badly constructed; and the evidence showed that the place
where he was injured was not a bridge, but a sewer a foot and a half
under the ground, and that he was injured by stepping into a hole

bridge

made

by a recent rain on the side of the sewer, and not by falling
through the bridge, nor on account of its being badly constructed; a
verdict in his favor was contrary to law, the state of facts on which
he recovered being different from that alleged in the declaration.
Mayor etc. v. Wilson, 82/206. Cited, 86/631.
An allegation that the railroad company was negligent in not having a key placed in the bolt which fastened the tender of the engine,
in consequence of which the bolt came out, the engine and tender
separated, and the fireman was thrown between them to the ground
and injured, is not supported by proof that the bolt was not long
enough to go through so as to be keyed, and thereby prevented from
coming out, and that the train was stopped and the engineer and
fireman attempted to fasten the bolt, but it was so short that this
could not be done. Whether on proper allegation there could be a
recovery is not decided.
Tompkins, 83/759. Cited, 86/631.
564. Court should charge as to evidence in without objection.
Although the allegations in a declaration may not warrant the
introduction of certain evidence to establish a claim on the part of
“the plaintiff, yet if it be introduced without objection, it is proper
for the court to charge as to its legal effect. In a suit against a railxoad company for causing the destruction by fire of the plaintiff’s
fences and crops, by the careless running of its engines, evidence having been admitted without objection to show that the grass on the
right of way of the railroad was set on fire by sparks from the engine,
and that from this the fences of the plaintiff were burned, such evi•dence tended to show negligence on the part of the railroad. Lawrence, 74/534.
Cited, 90/659.
In Ratteree v. Chapman, 79/574, Simmons, J., said:
“While the
declaration does not charge, in words, that the injuries were permanont, yet, from the allegations therein, it might properly be so construed. Evidence as to the injuries being permanent was admitted
without objection. If proof be allowed to go to the jury without
objection, outside of those alleged, we hardly think that the plaintiff
should be held strictly to the allegata ; no objection having been made
to the admission of the
Teason

evidence, and no motion to rule it out. The
verdict, because, by amendment, the declarabeen amended so as to cover the admitted allegations.”

is obvious after

“tion could have
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In Attaway, 90/656, the plaintiff alleged that his injury was caused
by a piece of steel which flew into his eye in consequence of the negligent use of defective tools by the overseer under whom he was working. The plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that the negligence

consisted in the manner of using them, as well as in the fact of having used them in their defective condition, and this evidence was not
objected to at the trial. The court instructed the jury as to the right
to recover for negligence in the manner of handling the tools, as
well as negligence in having used them in a defective condition.
It
was held that where the declaration alleged that the plaintiff was injured by the defendant’s negligence in using certain defective tools,
the court was authorized to charge as to negligence in using them in
an unskillful manner,
especially as the plaintiff was allowed to introduce evidence on this point without objection.
Simmons, J., said:
“If the allegations in the declaration did not cover negligence in the
latter respect as well as in the former, the defendant ought to have
objected, or moved to rule it out. Had it done so, it would have
been allowable for the plaintiff to amend so as to make the declaration more specific; but, as the evidence on this point was allowed to
come into the case and remain in it without objection, the court was
authorized to charge the jury upon the case as developed by the proof.
Where a party permits evidence to go to the jury without objection,
upon a declaration that is ambiguous, and the jury find on such evidence, the party is not entitled to a new trial on the ground that
the evidence does not correspond -with the declaration, if the declaration could, by amendment, have been made to clearly cover the evidence; and certainly, if the jury could consider the evidence, the
court was authorized to charge upon it as a part of the case.
Cited,

97/669.
565. Evidence admitted without

objection in doubtful cases.
plaintiff’s declaration alleges that her husband was killed
in a specified way by the negligent running of a particular train or
engine of a railroad company, and the proof shows that he was killed
by another engine of the company, and in a manner different from
that alleged, and the evidence is such that, in any view of the case,
the plaintiff’s right to recover is very doubtful, a verdict in her favor
should be set aside.
Lumpkin, J., said: “The plaintiff’s declaration
alleges, in substance, that her husband was employed as a trackhand by the Central Railroad in its freight-yard at Macon; that
while employed and engaged on one of its tracks a train came along
thereon, and it became necessary for him to step from said track
When the
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train; that he did so, and stepped upon another track
defendant, and was run over and instantly killed by another en-

to avoid that

of

gine and train of defendant upon the latter track. The proof
showed conclusively that deceased was walking along a track of the
railroad, and a freight-engine to which no train was attached came
along behind him on that track, and ran over and killed him, and
that he did not in an effort to avoid said engine, step off said track
and get killed by an engine and train on another track. Evidence
showing that the deceased was killed by a different engine, and in a
different manner from that alleged, was admitted without objection.
There being, then, a variance between the declaration and the proof
as to the circumstances of the killing, and the evidence, as stated,
having been admitted without objection, the question is presented
whether or not a verdict in plaintiff’s favor, based on proof not making a- case strictly covered by the allegations of the declaration, should
stand. We are all agreed that in a case like this, where the right to
recover is, in any event, doubtful, the plaintiff should be required to
make his proof correspond strictly with his allegations. That is to
say, in a doubtful case, the defendant is entitled to all his legal rights,
and, accordingly, to be accurately informed by the declaration upon
precisely what state of facts, and for what kind of negligence, the
plaintiff seeks to make it liable. If the plaintiff’s right to recover was
plain and manifest, the rule need not be so rigidly enforced.” Hubbard, 86/623. Cited, 90/575, 660; 93/515.
The action being by S. Herrman & Bro., and the evidence showing
that the horse belonged to S. Herrman, with nothing to show that the
brother had any ownership or interest, the declaration was not supported in respect to the plaintiff’s title; and, as the evidence left it
very doubtful whether the chief injury to the animal resulted from
the defendant’s negligence or from some unknown cause, the court
erred in not granting a new trial. Herrman, 92/384.
In Fitzgerald, 108/507, it was held that on the trial of an action
against a railroad company for a homicide alleged to have been caused
by the negligent “kicking” of a car, it was, in the absence of evidence
showing that a “running switch” and a “kick” were the same thing,
erroneous to admit in evidence
against the defendant one of its rules
which related exclusively to running switches. The more especially
is this true if it affirmatively appeared from the evidence that the
two things were essentially different.
566. When plaintiff may urge negligence not declared on.
A prima facie case of negligence on the part of the defendant,
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■which the

plaintiff’s declaration covers, can not be effectually anhy a given state of facts, if those facts involve a breach of
diligence by the defendant in a material respect; and such breach of
diligence, if shown, may be urged by the plaintiff, not to recover
upon, but to defeat the defendant’s 'justification, although no reference to it is made in the
plaintiff’s pleadings. Lumpkin, J., said:
“One ground of the motion for a new trial assigned as error the refusal of the court to charge the following written request:
‘The
plaintiff is confined to the allegations of negligence made in the petition. There is no allegation of negligence respecting the company’s
leaving any key in the possession of any employee, and you can not
find for the plaintiff on that ground.’ It is true that the plaintiff did
not seek to recover because of negligence on the part of defendant in
improperly leaving one of its switch-keys in the custody of a discharged employee; hut because of the alleged negligent misplacement
of a switch which caused the death of her husband. The plaintiff
proved that the switch was misplaced, and that such misplacement
was the cause of the collision.
The defendant sought in reply to
show that the misplacement of the switch was not due to its fault,
but that the mischief was done by an evil-disposed person, not in
its service.
The plaintiff, in turn, endeavored to meet this defense
by proving that the company was negligent in affording the evildisposed person an opportunity to carry out his designs, and in
not taking the proper steps to prevent their successful accomplishment; in other words, the plaintiff sought to break down the
defense of the company by showing that the facts alleged and
proved by it involved a breach of diligence on its part in a ma_terial respect.
It is quite clear to our minds that the plaintiff
had a right to urge such breach of diligence, not as a distinct
basis of recovery, but for the purpose of defeating the defendant’s
justification, and this the plaintiff could do although she had not
in her pleadings made any special reference to this particular negligence on the part of the defendant.” Kane, 92/187. Cited, 102/338.
567. Variance as to the employment.
A petition alleging that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, and, as such, sustained personal injuries, through the defendant’s negligence, while engaged in the work he was employed to
do, is not sustained by evidence showing that the relation of master
and servant did not exist between these parties, and that the plaintiff
was really the servant of another person, and was doing the work in
question under his employment by that person. Postell, 112/602.
swered
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569. Illustrations
In

of the doctrine.
Harris, 78/525, it was held that, at a former trial a different

theory of defense was relied on was not relevant as matter of evidence, and Bleckley, C. J., said: “We think that the court ruled
properly in rejecting this evidence. Just as the plaintiff may vary a
line of attack (and did it in this ease), so the defendant may vary
his line of defense. Taking position in the field, and fighting one in
that position, will not prevent a change; indeed, in the same trial
the defendant may not only urge different defenses, but contradictory
defenses. He may take all the chances in his favor, just as the plaintiff here relied upon one mode of killing at the crossing and another
by falling from the cars. It is quite right; and there ought to be
no grudging of latitude to bring out the truth, all the truth, and all
aspects of it.” Cited, 86/630.
In Owen, 90/265, the plaintiff was a fireman and he was injured in
a collision of trains.
He alleged that his train, without signal, notice or warning of any kind of the presence of another train or obstruction on the track, ran into a local freight-train that was standing on the track and which gave no notice or warning of any kind to
approaching trains of its presence. The court allowed a witness to
state that “the agent put out no signal, nor gave any warning to the
second train; he never gave any at all; if he did I never saw it.” It
was held that this testimony was relevant and admissible under the
allegations in the declaration.
In Georgia Cotton Oil Mill Co. v. Jackson, 112/620, it was held
that when the parties to an action on trial were at issue as to whether
or not a machine by which the
plaintiff had been injured was, at
the time he was* hurt, out of order, and operating in a dangerous
manner, evidence tending to show that shortly thereafter, and while
in substantially the same condition, this machine operated in a similar manner, and by so doing injured other persons, was relevant.
Lumpkin, P. J., said: “At the same time the court should have instructed the jury that all these witnesses stated with reference to this
matter was relevant solely upon the question as to what was the condition of the machine at the time the plaintiff was injured.”
In the trial of an action for damages by a passenger for being
compelled to ride in a ear occupied by disorderly passengers, evidence
that the conductor in charge of the train had, prior to the time that
the plaintiff became a passenger, made efforts to suppress the disorder
was irrelevant, when the
question to be determined was whether such
41

§§570, 571 ]

CHAPTER 36.

[642

Evidence.

diligent in the suppression of disorder which arose
plaintiff became a passenger. O’Bryan, 112/127.
In Ware, 112/663, a husband sued for the loss of his wife’s services, and a ground in the motion for a new trial was that the court
erred in allowing one of the witnesses for the plaintiff to testify that
a very dim light was kept burning in Mrs. Ware’s room on account of
her eyes, the objection being that the plaintiff did not allege in his
petition that his wife had sustained any injury to her eyes. It appears from the record that on the trial the defendant attempted to
show that Mrs. Ware had not been seriously injured, and was in nowise incapacitated from doing her ordinary household work. To this
end men were employed to watch her room at night, and these witnesses swore that thQ room occupied by Mrs. Ware was very dimly
lighted. The evidence objected to was introduced for the purpose
of removing any suspicion of fraud that might attach to plaintiff on
account of this dim light, and also as tending to show that the witnesses were in error as to the identity of the woman whom they testiffed to having seen actively engaged in work about the house. It
was held that though the petition of a husband in an action for the
loss of his wife’s services, occasioned by personal injuries tortiously
caused, may not allege that a particular physical infirmity resulted
from such irjuries, proof thereof may be received if, during the progress of the trial, the same becomes
collaterally pertinent.
570. Failure to produce evidence. Where a party has evidence in
his power and within his reach, by which he may repel a claim or
charge against him, and omits to produce it, or, having more certain
and satisfactory evidence in his power, relies on that which is of a
weaker and inferior nature, a presumption arises that the charge or
claim is well founded; but this presumption may be rebutted. Civil
Code, §5163.
571. Failure to produce employees or witnesses.
Where it was shown that a cow was killed by a train, the railroad
company should have produced all the witnesses present, to show
that the company was not at fault. Where the
engineer and fireman were
always present on the engine, but only the former was
sworn as a
witness, and the absence of the latter was not accounted
for, this was a circumstance from which the jury might infer that,
had the other witness been
introduced, his testimony might have
shown negligence on the part of the
company; and the verdict against
the company was not without evidence to
support it.
Wall, 75/282.
conductor

after the

was
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This not applicable in a suit for personal
80/749.
If the engineer was introduced as a witness and the fireman was
unaccounted for, this might authorize an inference on the part of
the jury against the road, and they might believe that the fireman
had been kept away because he knew something which might be
detrimental to the company, but they were not compelled so to believe, and could believe the testimony of the engineer if they saw
proper; and where the fireman was accounted for and produced in
court, where he could have been examined by the plaintiff, such an
Cited, 77/442: 102/336.

injury.

inference could not be drawn because he

was

not

sworn.

Davis

v.

Hatcher, 75/645. Cited, 77/440; 102/324, 340.
In Culler, 75/704, it was held that where, on the trial, only the
engineer was sworn for the defendant, to show the use of all ordinary and reasonable care, although he testified that the fireman was
engaged in firing at the time, and where there was a difference of
opinion about the distance at which the mule could have been seen,
and there was some conflict between the testimony of the engineer and
statements testified by other witnesses to have been made by him as
to

reversing the engine and blowing on the brakes, there was no abuse
refusing a new trial on the ground that the verdict
was contrary to law and evidence.
In such a case the presumption
against the company is a troublesome one to overcome, and to rebut
it successfully it is better that the agents of the company stationed
on the engine should all be called.
Cited, 77/440.
In Gray, 77/440, 85/825, the action was brought to recover damages for killing a colt. Hall, J., said: “The company showed by one
of its employees who was on the engine, that the colt jumped on the
railroad-track so near the engine that no diligence would have availed
on the part of those in charge of the train to
prevent the collision.
They did not introduce the engineer or fireman, however, or otherwise
account for them than by showing tAat the engineer had quit the employ men t‘of the company, and gone to Florida, where his residence
could not be ascertained so as to enable them to get his testimony.
The fireman, at the time of the damage, was on the bottom of the
tender, attending to his duties, and could not have seen the animal
on the track; for as it was
approaching the train, which was the fast
mail train of the company, it wa3
running at a high, though not unusual, rate of speed. And it further appeared that the engineer,
had he been on the lookout, could not have seen the animal when it
of discretion in
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the track. There was no necessary conflict in the evidence of
plaintiff and the defendant in this case as to the manner of the
killing, it not being contested that the colt was killed by the running
of defendant’s engine.
The circumstances testified to by the plaintiff, and the account given of the actual occurrence by the railroad
employee who testified, were not opposed to each other, and render
his account of the circumstances of the occurrence altogether probable
and true.
The killing seems to have been the result of one of
those sudden emergencies against which no foresight or prudence
could have guarded. The only contention on the part of the plaintiff
is that the presumption against the company was not overcome, because- of its failure to introduce as witnesses all the persons who were
in charge of the engine and tender; and it was held that a mere failure to introduce the engineer or fireman as a witness was not sufficient to warrant a verdict against the company. Cited, 102/337;
got-

on

the

107/373.
572.

Subject continued.
Holcombe, 88/9, the main question was whether a stool used
for assisting lady passengers to enter the train was in the wrong
place and caused the injury. The servant whose duty it was to look
after the stool, was not offered as a witness, and it was held, it not
appearing that the witness who would ordinarily know the fact in
question, and who was one of the employees of the company at the
In

time the
ant

cause

of action arose, was

inaccessible,

or

that the defend-

ready to produce him, there was no error in calling attention
to his absence or non-production in charging the jury as to a fact tobe considered by them in connection with the case. Lumpkin, J.,
said: “In view of the repeated rulings of this court, we see no reason
why there should be any impropriety in the court’s calling the attention of the jury to the absence or non-production of a witness
who ought to have special knowledge concerning the particular fact
under investigation.
It appears by an affidavit attached to the motion for a new trial that the witness who ought to have known about
the location of this stool at the time of the
injury had been subpcenaed by both sides, and was actually in court;
but, this fact not being known to the court, its charge on this subject was properly given.
The defendant could easily,
during the trial, have informed the court '
of the presence of the
witness; and, if this had been done, the charge
complained of would doubtless have been omitted.
was
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The

defendant,

on

the trial of

an

action against

a

railroad

com-

tending to
the result,
injuries alleged in the declaration to have been sustained,

pany for personal injuries, having introduced testimony
show that the plaintiff’s impaired physical condition was
not of the

but of

rheumatism, which he had contracted, and from the efEects
suffered, long before such alleged injuries occurred,

of which he had

abuse of discretion in

allowing the plaintiff, after testifying in rebuttal that he had never been afflicted with rheumatism
prior to the time he was injured, to account for the absence of his
wife from the trial by stating that she was detained at home by
the sickness of her children, it being manifest she had knowledge
of facts which would make her an important witness concerning tin's
issue, and the court stating, in effect, that the testimony explaining
her absence was admitted only because the non-production of her as
a witness might be the subject of unfavorable comment against the
plaintiff before the jury. Garner, 91/27. Cited, 102/338.
In Morrison, 102/319, it appeared that Waters, who was an employee of the defendant in the capacity of fireman at the time when
the injuries in question were sustained, and who had excellent opportunities for knowing the truth of the matter, was not introduced
there

as

a

was no

witness at the trial.

He was,

however, at the instance of the

company, present in court, and this fact was known to the plaintiff’s
counsel. The latter, in his argument to the jury, contended that
the failure of the defendant to introduce and examine this witness
was a

circumstance from which

he had been

so

an

inference could be drawn that,

if

introduced and examined, he would have testified to

facts

prejudicial to the defendant. The court was requested to compel the plaintiff’s counsel to desist from making such an argument,
on the ground that it was
improper and illegal, and was also requested to declare a mistrial because of such “improper argument.”
The court held that the argument was not improper, and refused to
declare a mistrial because of it. It was urged that these rulings
were both erroneous, for the reason that when the defendant
produced the witness in court, so that he could have been introduced
and examined

by the plaintiffs’ counsel, if he had chosen to do

so,

there could be no proper inference that he knew anything which
would be detrimental to the company. It was held that where, in
the trial of

action for

damages against a railroad company for
personal injuries, the evidence as to the company’s alleged negligence
was conflicting, it tvas
legitimate for the plaintiff’s counsel to argue
an
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jury that the failure of the defendant to introduce and exama witness one of its employees, who was present at the time
when the injuries in question were sustained, was a circumstance
from which an inference could be drawn that, if this employee had
been introduced and examined, he would have testified to facts prejudicial to the defendant. This is so, whether the counsel’s contention
as to this matter was, under all the circumstances
in proof, well
founded or not; nor was such argument out of order because defendant’s counsel had caused the employee in question to be present in
court, so that he could have been introduced and examined by the
plaintiff’s counsel. If, in view of the entire evidence, it was incumbent upon the court to give to the jury any instruction with referenee to the defendant’s failure to examine such
employee as a witness, it was certainly right to refuse to give in charge a request to the
effect that the production of the employee in court by the defendant
was sufficient to relieve it of
any presumption or inference that, in
case he had been examined, he would have sworn to facts
showing
negligence on the part of the defendant. Simmons, C. J., dissenting. Cited, 107/373.
Where it was alleged that a given person got upon the defendant’s
train with the decedent, and on the trial such person was sworn and
called to the witness-stand by the plaintiff, but withdrawn by him
without being examined, and there was nothing to show that he was
in any way under the power and control of the plaintiff, it was error
to give this section in charge.
Anderson, 107/500.
In Winkle, 107/367, it being an action for the killing of live
stock,
the judge charged the jury that “When an accident of this kind
happens, the law makes it the duty of the railroad company to produce
all of its employees who were engaged in running the train.” This
was error, and Cobb, J., said: “The law does not make it the
duty
of a litigant to produce witnesses; and this applies to railroads as
well as to natural persons.
The law will sometimes allow inferences
unfavorable to a litigant to be drawn by the jury from the fact that
witnesses who are accessible are not called and sworn. It is, however,
no breach of duty on the
part of a litigant to fail or refuse to produce witnesses to sustain a complaint or to prove a defense. If he
fails or refuses to produce witnesses that are accessible, he must take
the consequences resulting from the jury drawing an inference that
such failure or refusal was caused by the fact that such witnesses
would, if produced, have testified to facts prejudicial to him. But
to the

ine

as
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presumption will ever arise prejudicial to the party failing to produce the witness, provided the jury are satisfied from the evidence
before them that the party who had such witness accessible has nevno

ertheless

or established his defense. The failure
witnesses who are accessible and peculiarly

proved his claim

to call and have

sworn

within the power

of

party will authorize argument by counsel bethe jury be in doubt as to the truth of the
transaction they might infer that the absent witnesses, if in court,
would have furnished evidence prejudicial to the party who has
failed to produce them. If a litigant sees proper to rest his case
upon one witness, although many others may be accessible, he has a
right to do so, and the law imposes upon him no duty to do otherwise.
Therefore the law does not require a railroad company to
produce all of its employees who were engaged in the running of a
train the operation of which caused damage to any one, when a
suit growing out of such alleged damage is on trial. If the jury
fore

a

jury, that in

a

case

believe that the defense is established out of the mouths of the wit-

called, they should not find against the company solely on the
ground that there were other witnesses to the transaction who were
not produced.
The defendant may invoke and use allegations beneficial to himself made in plaintiff’s declaration without offering the declaration
itself in evidence, or otherwise proving the admissions contained in
such allegations, and no unfavorable inference can properly be drawn
against a corporation because of a failure to call as witnesses its own
employees to prove the existence of facts shown by such admissions.
Kane, 92/187. Cited, 102/338.
573. Burden of proof. The burden of proof generally lies upon
the party asserting or affirming a fact, and to the existence of whose
case or defense the
proof of such fact is essential. If a negation or
negative affirmation be so essential, the proof of such negative lies
on the
party so affirming it. Civil Code, §5160.
What amount of evidence will change the onus or burden of proof
is a question to be decided in each case by the sound discretion of the
court.
Civil Code, §5161.
The case of Davis, 60/329, was brought to recover damages for
an
injury inflicted by a collision of trains. The plaintiff was under
two months old at the time of the injury, and it was alleged that, in
addition to other injuries sustained she had been made permanently
deaf and dumb. Bleckley, J., says: "“The burden of making out a
nesses

§§ 574, 575 ]
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plaintiff. A material part of the case contended
of the child to hear before the injury complained
of was received. There may be a general presumption that the ordinary human faculties are possessed by every individual. But here
there was evidence that the parents of the individual were both deaf
and dumb.
The presumption referred to, thus became entangled
with something like another presumption, that like produces like.
The charge of the court, ‘if the evidence be equally balanced for plaintiff and defendant, on any contested point, the jury should find that
part of the case for the defendant,’ was not erroneous. The great
pressure of the case being on the question whether the child was
deprived by the injury of the sense of hearing.”
The case Howard, 79/44, was brought by the plaintiff to recover
damages for the death of her husband. The defendant requested the
court to charge: “The burden of proving to you that the dead man
was her husband is now on the
plaintiff, and the defendant is not
under the burden of proving that he was not her husband, or of
showing where her husband is. The plaintiff is required to convince you that the dead man was her husband.” Bleckley, C. J., said:
“The court, instead of giving that request, gave, in its general charge,
instructions that to recover it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove
the affirmative of these propositions; in other words, the court told
the jury that the burden of proving these things was
upon the plaintiff. To say that the burden of proving a fact is on the plaintiff implies that there is no burden on the defendant to establish the noncase was

for

was

upon the
the ability

.

existence of such fact.”

574. When the burden is

shifted.
party on whom the burden of proof rests is entitled to the aid
of all legal presumptions arising out of the facts established, and,
if these presumptions, added to the established facts, make a
prima
facie case, the burden is shifted to the other
party. Powell, 89/601.
Cited, 95/687.
575. Positive and negative testimony. The existence of a fact testitled to by one positive witness is to be believed, rather than that
such fact did not exist because many witnesses who had the same
opportunity of observation swear that they did not see or know of its
having transpired. This rule does not apply when, two parties having equal facilities for seeing or hearing a thing, one swears that it
The

occurred, the other that it did not.

Civil Code, §5165.
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576. The rule and illustrations

of it.
equally credible, and their testimony otherwise entitled to equal weight, greater weight and credit should be
given by the jury to those whose means of information were superior; and also to those who swear positively to a fact, rather than to
those who swear negatively, or to a want of knowledge or a want of
recollection. This rule, however, is to be taken with this qualification: Where one or more witnesses swear positively to a fact, such
as that a bell was rung, or warning given by the voice crying out,
and one or more witnesses having equal means of information and
equal opportunity of knowing the fact, whether it occurred or not,
and who bestowed equal attention upon the subject, swear that it did
not occur, both sets of witnesses are to be treated as giving positive
testimony. Freeman, 83/583.
Where the direct issue between the parties in an action for damages
against a railroad company was as to whether on the approach of a
train to a station the company’s agent exhibited only a white light,
indicating that the road was clear and that the train might proceed
without encountering collision or obstruction, or whether the agent
also exhibited a green light under the white one, indicating that the
train should proceed with caution and that there was another train
on the road between the approaching train and the next station, and
'both sets of witnesses testified with equal positiveness, the question
of positive and negative testimony was not involved and a charge
on such question was, therefore, not required.
Bowers, 86/22.
The evidence of a witness who testified that a given thing occurred
is positive testimony.
The evidence of another witness that he was
present on the occasion referred to, and did not see or hear the ocourrence in question, is
negative testimony; nor is such testimony
rendered positive by a mere statement of the witness that such an
occurrence could not have taken
place without his seeing or hearing
it.
To entitle his evidence, other things being equal, to as great
weight as that of the former witness, it must appear that his opportunities for seeing or knowing what occurred were at least equal to
those of that witness, and that his attention was specially directed to
the matter in question. Killian, 97/727.
The general rule as to the probative value of positive and negative
testimony is subject to the qualification that other things are equal
and the witnesses are of equal credibility. Bigham, 105/498.
Where witnesses

are
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positive testimony of witnesses as to the actual
particular occurrence can not be overcome by testimony
which is negative in character, or consists of mere opinions. Hambright, 112/36.
577. Positive testimony overcomes consistent circumstantial testiThe affirmative and

facts of

a

mony.
In Erazier,

plaintiff’s right to
depended upon the establishment of a particular fact, and
the only proof offered for this purpose was circumstantial evidence
from which the existence of such fact might be inferred, but which
did not demand a finding to that effect, a recovery by the plaintiff
was not lawful, when,
by the positive and uncontradicted testimony
of unimpeached witnesses, which was perfectly consistent with the
circumstantial evidence relied on by the plaintiff, it was affirmatively
108/807, it

was

held that when

a

recover

shown that

no

such fact existed.

578. Tickets, existence of, shown by parol.
The fact that a passenger bought a ticket

to pass over various
Macon, Georgia, with coupons
attached, and did so pass, may be shown by parol, independently of
the ticket, the contents of the ticket not being involved. Wolff,
74/664.
579. Experts. The opinions of experts on any question of science,
skill, trade, or like questions, are always admissible; and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses.
Civil
Code, §5287.
580. Laying the foundation for expert testimony.
The rule as to laying the foundation for expert testimony applies
only to one who is unacquainted with the facts and their surroundings. Where one has this knowledge of the facts and their surroundings, he may give his opinion by showing the reason for it, whether
he be an expert or not. Killian, 78/749.
581. Mode of examining an expert.
The proper mode of examining a
physician or expert, where he is
not testifying from his own
knowledge, is to ask him hypothetical
questions. Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Jordan, 87/69.
582. Scope of the rule allowing expert testimony.
In Hicks, 95/301, the plaintiff, an
employee of the railroad company, was engaged as a plumber in placing a gas-pipe, and he alleged that he was injured by the negligence of a eoemployee who was
aiding in handling the pipe. A witness for the plaintiff was asked,
lines of railroad from Hew York to
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experienced plumber, from the statement of facts he had heard
it, what, in his opinion, caused the pipe to fall,
and answered, “I can hardly see any other reason than the way he
describes; that is, his assistant behind him let go the pipe.” He
as an

in connection with

was

further asked:

“What would be the effect of sixteen feet of

would be
shoulder,
as described?” and answered, that as to his own balance, it would
have a tendency to throw him off. The testimony was admitted,
over objection.
It was held that the rule of law which admits as
evidence the opinions of experts is limited in its application to those
cases only where the question at issue is one of opinion, involving
some
particular matter connected with a special art, trade, or science,,
and to the opinions of those persons who from accurate knowledge of
the particular art or trade, or thorough understanding of the particular science, are supposed to be able to speak with precision concerning the same. Therefore, where the question at issue is one of
fact, involving none of the mysteries of a particular craft, but only
such matters connected therewith as are easily within the comprehension of reasonably intelligent men engaged in the ordinary pursuits
of life, opinions of experts thereon are not admissible, though the
fact under investigation may be in some way connected with such
particular trade or calling.
pipe held at one end on a stick if one man let go — what
the result to the man on the ladder if he had the pipe on his

583. Illustrations

Where

a

of the doctrine.

witness testified that he did not know what the rules of

the company were, but proposed to state that formerly he was an offieer of the company, and that no conductor or other officer had the

right to order

employee to get on or off a moving train, and that
given, the employee would not be required to obey
it, such testimony was properly rejected. It is not matter for expert testimony to show that no railroad employee is required to get
if such order

and off

an

were

a train while in motion; that neither the conductor nor
other officer can require an employee to get on and off a moving
train, and that if such order is given, the employee is not required
to obey it.
DeBray, 71/406. Cited, 87/378; 111/713.
Whether or not the plaintiff was an expert, his opinion as to the
propriety of his own conduct on the occasion of the injury, was not
admissible testimony. Hudson, 85/203..
One question in a case being whether an engine could be stopped
under certain circumstances, an expert who testified on that subject
on

any
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could

give his

reasons

for what he stated, and for the

purpose,

illustration, state what he had known to be done under
difficult circumstances. Dorsey, 68/228.

of

by

way

even more

The

opinion of one, who for many years has been a railroad superintendent, in a matter within the scope of his employment, stands
upon the footing of the opinion of an expert; but he can not give his
opinion of the object of a railroad company, with which he had no
connection, in putting up a notice on the doors of its cars that “passengers must not stand on the platform.” The words stand for themselves. The witness was improperly allowed to testify that on railroads with which he had been connected, the object of such notices
was only to keep passengers off the
platforms when the train was
in motion. Johnson, 38/409.
584. Books, and information derived from them.
A scientific expert may testify in respect to the character of cuts
and embankments, slopes, etc., though his information about them
be derived much from books.

This witness

was

a

civil

engineer

who had

surveyed railroads, including the particular road at the
place of the accident involved in this case. Mitchell, 63/173. Cited,
93/664.
Books of science and art

are

not admissible in evidence to prove

the

opinions of experts announced therein. Erickson on Concussion
Spine was offered and rejected in this case. The objections
to the testimony, as stated by Atkinson, J., are that experiment and
discovery are so constantly changing theories on scientific subjects
that the books of last year may contain something which this year
everybody rejects as absurd; that the book may be a compilation of a
compilation, and be thus hearsay evidence of the most extreme kind,
of the

and that the authors do not write under oath and
examined

to the

can

not be

cross-

and

grounds for their opinion. Johnston, 95/685. Cited, 103/386.
It was competent for a medical expert to testify that, in his opinion, a given disease “may be cured by a surgical operation, but it is
very rarely the case that this can be done,” though the witness further testified he had no experience in treating that disease, but deas

rived all his

reasons

knowledge on the subject from reading medical authoriLumpkin, J., said: “Taking, as a whole, the testimony of
the witness as it appears in the brief of evidence, it amounted simply
to a statement by him that, in his opinion, the disease in
question
could, in rare instances only, be cured by a surgical operation, and
ties.
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that this

opinion was based entirely upon his reading medical works
recognized as authorities. We think the evidence was properly received. The opinion of an expert as to what conclusions may be
properly drawn from statements in scientific works pertaining to his
profession amounts to something more than mere hearsay, and may
be very valuable in elucidating a given scientific inquiry. An opinion thus formed and given to the jury is quite a different thing from
reading to them mere extracts from the books themselves. The latter might not be intelligible to the non-professional mind, while the
opinion of an expert, expressed in language adapted to their comprehension, might be easily understood by the jury, and is, moreover,
not only the result of study and deliberation, but an exercise by the
witness himself of his own trained mental faculties upon the question involved. The doctrine is thus broadly stated in Lawson on
Expert and Opinion Evidence (pages 176, 177): ‘An expert may
testify to an opinion of his own derived from books’—and the authorities there cited seem to sustain the text.” Mayor etc. v. Boone,

4

93/662.
585.

Opinions of witness. Where the question under examination,
by the jury, is one of opinion, any witness may
swear to his opinion or belief, giving his reasons therefor; but, if
the issue is as to the existence of a fact, the opinions of witnesses
generally- are inadmissible. Civil Code, §5285.
586. Opinion of witness when facts are stated on which it is hosed.
and to he decided

'

In Johnson, 38/409, a witness was allowed to state over objection:
“It is my opinion Johnson could not have been in his seat at the
moment UT collision, but was at the door or on the platform.” Error

assigned upon its admission. Whether Johnson was standing
platform at the time of the collision was a question of fact
in the case. The headnote on the subject is this: “Though opinions
are not generally evidence, yet, when the truth sought to be ascertained is matter of opinion, a witness, not an expert, may give his
opinion if he states the facts upon which it is based.” What facts
were stated by this witness does not appear in the report of the case.
McCay, J., said: “The precise position of Johnson, at the moment
of the collision, is not positively known. He was found on the
ground; he had been upon the platform very shortly before. The
witnesses stated the facts, where they saw him and where he was
found. It is sometimes very difficult to draw the line between what
is evidence, as a fact, and what is a conclusion of the witness. Much
was
on

the
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of what

we

state

as

fact is, in truth, only the conclusion of our minds

from very conclusive evidence.
an hour in a room, may safely

The statement that a man remained
be made by one who saw him go in
and come out, and who, having good opportunity, failed to see him
come out in the meantime, and yet, after all, it may be, and is, a
mere conclusion.
We think the opinion of the witness is not evidence. If the witness state the presence of the deceased on the platform, at the moment of a collision, as a fact, and it afterwards appears that this is only his conclusion, from his presence there immediately before and his position afterwards, we think his evidence
ought not to be excluded. His statement of the fact is weakened,
it is true, but it is often very difficult to draw the line where, in such
a matter, fact ends and opinion begins.”
In an action brought to recover damages for an injury caused by
■negligence in the construction of defendant’s track and in the running of its cars, any witness may give an opinion as to what caused
the train to run off the track, provided the witness states the reasons
upon which, the opinion is predicated.
One who is an expert may
give an opinion without stating his reasons. It is a general rule
that wherever an expert can give an opinion without the reasons on
which it is based, any other witness who knows facts upon which he
can form an opinion,
may state his opinion, by giving the facts upon
which he bases it. Brown, J., said: “The objection to such evidence
goes to its weight, and not to its admissibility.
The credibility of
all evidence depends, not only upon the character of the witness for
truth, honesty and integrity, but also upon the knowledge the witness has of the facts and
subject-matter about which he testifies;
■and this is more especially true when witnesses are allowed to
give
their opinions upon any subject. If it
appears that the witness
knows but little of the matter about which he testifies, and that
from such want of knowledge, he is unable to
support his

opinion

by good

reasons, the opinion
have but little weight with a

of such

witness would and ought to
jury; while, if he showed that he was
a

familiar with the subject, and supported his opinion by strong
jury would give the opinion of such a witness more
weight. But in either case, it goes to the weight of the evidence,
and not to its
admissibility. We do not mean to say that a witness could give an
opinion upon mere hearsay; he must know the
lads which he states as reasons for his
opinion. An expert may
very

reasons, the
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state of facts testified to by other witnesses.”
Cited, 73/697; 77/436.
A witness may testify to the speed at which a train is moving according to his judgment, giving the reasons for his opinion; it is
for the jury to say how, much weight such opinion is entitled to have.
Therefore, a witness may give his opinion as to speed, based on the
appearance, noise, etc., of the train. Crawford, J., Wyly, 65/120.
give

an

opinion

upon a

Senn, 73/705.

A witness testified

as

follows:

“If steam is shut off from

ears run up on the engine,
to make the cars run up on

an

en-

and the effect of shutting
off steam was
the engine and make a littie ‘slack.’ There was no necessity for the jerk at the place, so
far as he could see; a skillful engineer can avoid jerks to a certain
extent.
He has since had two years’ experience in running an engine.” After testifying to these facts he further stated that, “As
the train passed the switch going up, the engineer was in a hurry to
make a station above, and as he slacked up for the switchman to get
on the train, he seemed to have shut off his
engine, and the cars ran
upon the engine, and he opened his engine right suddenly, I suppose.” The supposition related only to the sudden opening of the
engine, and amounted to nothing more than an opinion that such
was the case.
The testimony was properly admitted. In every instance where the subject under investigation is a proper one to be
illustrated by the opinion of experts, unskilled persons may give
their opinions, provided they accompany them with the facts from
which they are deduced.
Coggin, 73/689.
Expert evidence of blacksmiths or other workers in metal is not
indispensable in order to show that the “spring-rail” of a railroadswitch, the breaking of which caused the accident, was or appeared
to be sound and made of fit material. The jury may regard other
evidence as sufficient to vindicate the company’s diligence. It is a
question on which any practical person of experience in railroading
can give an opinion in connection with the facts on which the opinion
is founded.
Crawford, 86/5.
A passenger by a freight-train takes the risk of the usual and
ordinary jolts properly incident to handling and running such trains,
and, when the nature and degree of the jolt complained of are material, a witness who was present, and had experience in such matters on the same railway, should be allowed to testify in behalf of
the company that the car was not going faster than usual; that the
jolt was not more than ordinary and the shake was not sufficient to
gine, the box
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throw

unless he

standing. This evidence would serve
in appropriate language, some idea of
the nature and violence of the jolt by which the plaintiff was injured.
Mabry, 91/781.
When it is open to question at what a horse became frightened,,
the witness, after stating the facts, may testify he was pretty certain the animal took fright at a particular object. Beauchamp,.
93/6.
The question was whether the plaintiff was blameless in uncoupling a flai car from an engine while standing on the pilot, the trains
being in motion. The plaintiff, and other witnesses offered by him,
claiming to be experts, expressed their opinions that it was perfectly
safe to uncouple from the pilot, the train being in motion. The dea

man,

was

to communicate to the jury,

fendant then offered
witnessed

a

witness who stated the facts of the accident

as

by him, and the court refused to permit him to swear to
opinion and belief whether or not what he saw plaintiff do was
the act of a prudent man in taking ordinary care of himself, and to>
give his reasons for the opinion. The testimony was rejected because he was not an expert.
That was error, and it was held that,
where the opinion of an expert is admissible without giving any
reason, the opinion of one not an expert is admissible with his reasons therefor.
Dorsey, 68/228. Cited, 78/321.
In Huggins, 89/494, a witness who was not a physician or expert
stated that he saw the plaintiff the day after the injury, and that
the latter was then suffering very much from a hurt in his right
side; that he sat with him two nights, and went several times for a
physician; and that when plaintifE was at home and took one of his
spells, which he frequently had, he always sent for this witness, who
found him suffering very much. After testifying to facts of this
kind, tending to shpw that the plaintiff was seriously disabled by the
injury, it was allowable for the witness to express his opinion that
the plaintiff ‘/has been unable to perform any duties which required
the slightest physical exertion, and during his severe attacks he was
unable to do anything, and at best can not do anything other than
jobs of a very light nature.”
Where, in a suit by a car-coupler for an injury sustained by him,
he testified to the injury and the manner of its occurrence, there
was no error in allowing him to be asked what
prevented him from
making a safe coupling, and in admitting his answer that the train
his
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coming back too fast, and that
Bray, 71/406; 77/435.
was

587.
his

Injured
injuries.

It

person may

held in Walker,

was

the whole

not state his opinion

as

cause

of it.

De-

to permanency of

93/462, that it is not competent for a party
witness, testifies to his feelings, pains, and symptoms, to
state his opinion that the injuries which caused the same are permanent.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “The view of the court below was that,
as the question of permanency was one of opinion, the plaintiff, although no expert, was competent to give an opinion in connection
with his reasons for it. In this, we think, the court was mistaken.
Whether the injuries and their effects were permanent or temporary
was certainly matter of opinion; but the jury, in so far as they were
unaided by expert evidence, should have been allowed to form their
own opinion, not from that of non-experts, but from the facts as
proved by the witnesses. The plaintiff was competent to testify to
his feelings, pain, and symptoms, as well as to all the characteristics
of the injury, external and internal. This was the limit of his competeney, and any opinion legitimately arising out of the facts could
be more safely formed by the jury than by him. Scarcely anything
is less reliable than a sick plaintiff’s opinion of his own case, when
he is in pursuit of damages. True, the Code declares that 'where
the question under examination and to be decided by the jury is one
of opinion, any witness may swear to his opinion or belief, giving
his reasons therefor.’ The class of questions here referred to must
be such as lie within the range of common opinion, although they
may be somewhat within the province of scientific opinion, also. A
fair illustration would be .the question of sanity or insanity. Any
witness may give his opinion upon such questions, after stating the
facts on which it is founded. But suppose the question were
whether, in a given case, insanity was permanent or temporary. This
would be a question for scientific experts; and no court would think
of taking the opinion of an ordinary witness upon it, with or without
the facts on which the opinion was founded. Such a witness would
be competent, upon stating the facts, to testify to his belief of the
sickness or health of any one, or that he suffered pain. But this is
a very different matter from
taking his opinion upon the question of
when and how sickness would terminate, or whether a state of pain
/would be temporary or permanent. Non-expert opinion might be
relied on to take the step from observed facts to a present state or
who,

was

as a
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condition, but to pass upon these same facts, the present state
and condition included, to a probable future state and condition,

might be within the competency of expert opinion only. We think
this is so, in such a case as the present more especially, where a
part of the facts are not objective, but wholly subjective, consisting of the feelings and sensations of the witness himself, and being
accessible to no other witness. How could such testimony be answered? How could the opinion of this non-expert be met by a
conflicting opinion of another witness of his own class? No other
witness could possibly know what his sufferings are or have been,
so as

to make them

character,

.

a

basis of belief

or

non-belief

as

to their

permanent

to whether they would be only temporary.

The
surely does not intend that internal facts — facts of mere individual consciousness
shall be used as a basis of the opinion which
it contemplates as being admissible in evidence, where the question
is one of opinion. Both for this reason, and because the question on
which the witness in this case was permitted to give his opinion was a
scientific question, we think the evidence should have been excluded.”
Cited, 110/128.
588. Opinion of the plaintiff as to his damages.
In Kelley, 58/107, on the trial the plaintiff was allowed to swear
that the damage to him from the crushing of his hand caused by the
coupling of the cars was ten thousand dollars. He stated how he
was hurt, but he did not itemize, even in
opinion, the several items
which, in his opinion, made up the ten thousand dollars. This testimony should not have been admitted.
Where the issue is one of opinion, as sanity or insanity, or handwriting, or the value of an animal,
or such matters as are matters of
opinion only, and can be better elucidated in that wav, these experts may give opinions without reasons,
and anybody familiar with the facts may give his opinion with his
reasons.
The damage is to be fixed by the jury, according to their
opinion derived from facts testified to, such as loss of the use of such
a member of the
body as the right hand, the diminution of ability in
a
laboring man to make a living after such loss, the pain and suffering caused by the wound, the bill of the physician and the expense of
nursing, and all other facts and circumstances connected with the
case; and this opinion of the jury should be influenced by the opinion of no witness, given in round numbers, of the amount of the damage, but made up from facts, when capable of proof, of actual damage, and of the enlightened, conscientious belief of impartial jurors
or

as

Code

—
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in

respect to items incapable of exact proof, such as the feelings, the
pain and suffering, of the plaintiff, etc. Cited, 72/287; 77/435.
589. Plaintiff's opinion of her loss by inability to labor.
So in Senn, 73/705, it was held that the plaintiff, as a witness,
should not be allowed to state how much, in her opinion, was her loss
by her inability to labor. The witness can not give an opinion as to
the amount of the damages, but must state facts, and let the jury say
from the facts what is the amount of the damage. Cited, 73/697;
77/436.
590.

Opinion without stating the facts.
an expert as to the subject upon which he is
questioned is incompetent to give an opinion thereon without stating
the facts upon which his opinion is based. Bagwell, 107/157.
It was not admissible for a witness, who was not shown to be an
expert, to testify, over the objection of counsel, that the deceased was
doing the work he was required to do at the time of his death in a
proper or an improper manner; such testimony being an expression
of an opinion, and not a statement of a fact. Brush Electric Light
& Power Co. v. Wells, 103/512.
The action, Gilmer v. City of Atlanta, 77/688, was brought to recover damages for an injury caused by the roots of a tree which projected above a sidewalk and in which plaintiff’s foot caught causing
her to trip and fall. After a witness had, stated the condition of the
roots, he added: “One could very easily trip on them on a very
dark night.” The opinion was properly rejected.
A question to a witness in this form, “If the engineer had paid any
attention to the signals that were given, and stopped the train, would
this man have been killed?” was objectionable, as calling for his opinion, when the facts on which his opinion was based were the proper
objects of inquiry, the conclusion from such facts being a question
for the jury, and not for the witness. Kendrick, 89/782.
The opinion of a witness that the backing of the train was very
carefully done, and that nothing was done carelessly or negligently,
was not admissible.
Ryles, 84/420.
Negligence of the railway company in allowing the surface of the
track to be uneven, so as to endanger walking thereon by employees in
the discharge of their duties, being in question, the opinion of a witness as to the comparison of this track with those of others in the
State generally is not admissible. Chaffin, 84/519. Cited, 86/299.
A witness who is not
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Opinion as to how far a train would knock a man.
In Bond, 111/13, it was held that the rule that where the question
under examination is one of opinion, a witness not an expert is in591.

competent to testify to his opinion without stating the facts on which
based, applies when an attempt is made to prove what distance a
train running at a given rate of speed would “knock” a man struck by
it on the track. Lumpkin, P. J., said: “When the witness expresses
his opinion in connection with the facts which he regards as justifying it, the jury are to judge of the value of it, and this they can not do
in the absence of such facts.
This familiar rule is applicable in the
present instance. No witness could say, as matter of fact, that a
running train would, by the impetus of a collision with a man on the
track, carry him so many feet. What would happen under such circumstances is certainly, so far as relates to the question of distance,
purely a matter of opinion.”
592. Opinion as to matter of fact.
In DeBray, 71/406, a witness testified that the lantern plaintiff
used was furnished him that he might see how to perform his duties
with safety to himself; that he knew the character of the lantern.
Defendant then offered to prove by the same witness that a person in
getting off a train could, by the light of the lantern, readily see any
object near the track; which proof the court rejected. On exception,
the ruling was held to be correct, as the opinion of a witness as to matters of fact is not admissible in evidence.
Cited, 77/435.
593. Declarations as part of res gestse.
In Mitchum’s case, 11/615, it was held that declarations to be a
part of the res gestse must be contemporaneous fact, but to be contemporaneous they are not required to be precisely concurrent in
point of time. If the declarations spring out of the transaction — if
they elucidate it — if they are voluntary and spontaneous, and if
they were made at a time so near to it as to preclude reasonably the
idea of deliberate design, then they are to be regarded as contemporaneous.
And in the opinion, Nisbet, J., said: “In determining
questions about the res gestse, it is error to undertake to test them by
a definition or rule.
For what is the res gestse of a given transaction
must depend upon its own peculiarities of character and circumstances.” This opinion received handsome recognition in 85/775.
it is

Section 5179 of the Civil Code expresses the rule in this way:
“Declarations

accompanying

an

act,

or so

nearly connected therewith

/
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in time

as

to be free from all

admissible in evidence
In Ins. Co.

law

suspicion of device

or

afterthought,

are

part of res gestae.”
Sheppard, 85/775, Bleckley, C. J., said:
as

v.
“What the
altogether distrusts is not afterspeech, but afterthought.”

DECLARATIONS

AS

ADMISSIBLE
THE

MAIN

PART

FACT

594. By a trespasser.
In Gilliam v. Love, 30/864,

OR

OF

THE

RES

GESTjE

OF

ACCIDENT.

the action was for beating the plaintearing down his house, and evidence that the defendant dedared, while committing the trespass, that he was doing it because
the plaintiff traded with his negroes was proper evidence to go in
mitigation of damages.
595. By a person injured.
In Beason, 112/553, it was held that the trial court erred in admitting, as a part of the res gestse of the casualty under investigation, a narrative given by the plaintiff’s deceased husband touching
the manner in which he was injured. Lumpkin, P. J., said: “What
the injured man said to the witnesses was manifestly a mere narrafive of a past occurrence. His statements, notwithstanding the fact
that he was suffering great pain, were made deliberately and connectedly. They were in no sense exclamatory, and manifestly did not
proceed from him as part and parcel of the catastrophe. It is true,
these statements were made within a few minutes thereafter; but, in
determining whether declarations should be received as a part of the
res
gestae of an occurrence, the mere question of the lapse of time is
not controlling.
The real test is, were the declarations a part of the
occurrence to which they relate, or were they a mere narrative concern*
ing something which had fully taken place, and had, therefore, be•come a thing of the
past.”
A young girl received a terrible and painful injury while employed
in a factory, and subsequently died from it; about half an hour after
the injury, upon the return of her father to his home on receiving
information of the accident, she stated to him that they put her to
work on some new frames; that she refused to go, and the second hand
•cursed her and told her to go to work; that this frame was different
from the old frame, and she did not want to run it; that they had to
■“duff” and stop the machinery to clean it off, and that the agent who directed the work at this frame started it without giving the usual signal.
It was shown that she was injured while cleaning machinery, and that
the person named as starting the machinery directed the work of the
tiff and
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operations at that particular frame and gave the signal prior to starting: It was held that the statement was admissible as a part of the
res gestae.
The propriety of its rejection would have been, to say
the least, doubtful, and in cases where the competency of evidence is
doubtful, it should go to the jury, that they may consider how far its
force is impaired by surrounding incidents. The death of the person
making the statements which form a part of the res gestae is no ground
for their exclusion from evidence. Hall, J., said: “It is scarcely
credible that this little girl, while enduring such excruciating pain —
perhaps torture would not be too strong a word to characterize it —
from this frightful wound, would have been capable of framing a
story with a view to her ultimate advantage or gain, or for any other
ulterior purpose.” The Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72/217. Cited,
73/629; 75/640; 79/311; 82/268; 93/787.
In Ferguson, 75/637, it was held, that where a child of ten years
of age was seriously injured at a turntable belonging to a railroad,
and a witness who reached the spot a few minutes after the injury
occurred, and who testified to circumstances tending to show that the
turntable was the instrument by which the child was hurt, such as the
appearance of fresh, warm blood, and pieces of flesh tom from her
limbs being on the machine and in the pit under it and on the end of
the rails, it was error to refuse to allow such witness to testify what the
child said when he reached the place as to how she was hurt. Such
statements were part of the res gestae. Nor did it matter as to their
admission whether the child lived or died. Hall, J., said: “In Augusta Factory v. Barnes, supra, we recently examined this question
with care, and came to the conclusion that declarations made a halfhour afterwards by a child similarly injured, and who died from the
effects of the injury, were so near in point of time thereto as to exelude all suspicion of device or afterthought, and were admissible as
part of the res gestas. We are well satisfied with the conclusion
reached in that case, and can not conceive that the death of the party
makes a difference in the application of the rule. The testimony is

original, and the declaration is not a mere declaration, but being conor nearly so, with the act, becomes a part thereof, and
is a distinct though not altogether an independent fact.” Cited,
93/787.
In Randall, 79/304, it was held that where, in a suit against a
street-railroad company for a personal injury, the plaintiff testified
that, after she was thrown from the car to the ground and immeditemporaneous,
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ately after she had risen, picked up her bundles and brushed herself,
the first thing she did was to secure the name of the driver of the car
(whom she knew very well by sight only) and that she then went to
her house, which was about one hundred and fifty or two hundred
yards away, deposited her bundles and went across the street to
where her sister-in-law lived; and where the sister-in-law testified
that, when the plaintiff reached her house she was greatly excited,
and in reply to an inquiry as to what was the matter, made certain statements as to how she was hurt, whereupon the witness
gave her some brandy and tea and put her to bed; it was not
admissible for the sister-in-law to testify what statements the plaintiff made to her, or that they were the same as what she testified on the trial. Such statements formed no part of the res gestae.
They neither accompanied the main transaction nor were free from
all suspicion of afterthought. Blandford, J., said: “Upon recovering herself, after this occurrence, the first thing she did was to inquire
the

driver's

name

she

name.

of this

What

was

her

purpose

in inquiring the

driver, whom she knew well by sight, and with whom

personally acquainted, having ridden with him frequently on
Is that free from all suspicion that she had an ulterior
purpose or design in making this inquiry ? Does it not give rise to the
suspicion that she was fixing for a case against this railroad company ?
was

the car?

This

was

done after the act

was

over.

She

then

went

to

her

two hundred yards off, and
put away her bundles; then crossed the street, and went to her
sister-in-law’s house, and while there entered into the details of
how this thing occurred. We are of the opinion that the court
did wrong to admit this as a part of the res gestae. It is not connected with the transaction so closely in point of time as to be
free from all suspicion of device or afterthought. The suspicion
might arise in the mind of any man that here was device or afown

house,

one

hundred and fifty

or

She inquired that driver’s name for some purpose.
She had had time to look over the field. She seemed to have known
her rights and to be preparing for them.. Having done this, she
terthought.

went and made this relation to her

mony about
her attempt

sister-in-law, stated her testi-

her having rung the bell, and the car having stopped,
to depart from the car, and the starting of the car
without affording her a reasonable opportunity to get off — the vital
facts upon which the whole case turns. These declarations were
not exclamatory upon her part upon receiving this injury; and we
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can

not

was

artifice

help coming to the conclusion in our own minds that here
or afterthought, or at least that it is not free from all
suspicion. The case of Factory v. Barnes, supra, was much relied
on by the counsel for the defendants in error in this case.
That
ease must rest alone upon its own peculiar facts, and will not be extended beyond them; but it differs widely from this case in all respects except in point of time in which the declarations were made.
The proximity of time in which declarations were made to the main
transaction is not the only test of their admissibility in evidence, but
they must be also free from all suspicion of device or afterthought.”
Cited, 82/268; 92/338; 112/557.
In Holland, 82/257, the plaintiff, a passenger upon a railway, who
left the train late at night, and in so doing was injured by a fall
which broke his leg, having pulled off his coat, detached his suspenders, bound up his broken limb, crawled through a culvert from one
side of the railway to the other, seated himself on the cross-ties, and
cried for help, his account of the manner of his leaving the train and
receiving the injury, given to a person who reached him about half
an hour after first hearing his cries, was no part of the res gestae,
and, being mere narrative of a past event, was not admissible evidence
in his own behalf.
Bleckley, C. J., said: “It is manifest that the
act by which the plaintiff was injured had completely terminated before his declarations were made, and that they were no accompaniment of the same.
Were they so connected with it in time as to be
free from all suspicion of device or afterthought? He had turned
his attention from the act to measures looking to his own safety and
comfort. He had certainly occupied his thoughts with something
besides the facts and circumstances to which his declarations related.
He had full opportunity, although no doubt under great suffering,
to devise a story in his own interest; and there is no reason for coneluding that he did not have capacity to take advantage of his opportunity. He was exposed to the temptation of fabricating a story,

if he needed the aid of

invention; and the exposure was under cirsuspicion that his statement was, or
might have been, referable to deliberation and afterthought, rather
than to spontaneous or instinctive utterance. This does not
imply,
that he did fabricate, for he might not have done so. Truth may
have been with him, and invention unnecessary. But, as his declarations did not accompany the act, they had to be so nearly connected
therewith in time as to be free from all suspicion of device or aftercumstances calculated to excite
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thought. If subject to suspicion at all, they were not admissible, although, in the particular case, the suspicion might be erroneous. In
Factory v. Barnes, supra, the injured person was a child fourteen
years old, and she died from the injury.
Her declarations, made half
an hour after the injury was received, were admitted in evidence
upon
|the ground that they were free from suspicion; this court saying: ‘It
is scarcely credible that this little girl, while enduring such exeruciating pain — perhaps torture would not be too strong a word to characterize it

from this

frightful wound, would have been capable of
framing a story with a view to her ultimate advantage or gain, or for
any other ulterior purpose.’ In considering that case afterwards in
Randall, supra, in which latter case the declarations of a mature woman, not more remote in time, were held inadmissible, the court said:
‘That case must rest alone upon its own peculiar facts, and will not
be extended beyond them.
The proximity of time in
which declarations are made to the main transaction is not the only
test of their admissibility in evidence, but they must also be free
from all suspicion of device or afterthought.’ It is obvious that,
upon this requisite of freedom from suspicion, the age and discretion
of the speaker must be of very considerable importance.”
Cited,
83/88; 92/338; 112/557.
In a suit by a widow against a railroad company for the homicide
of her husband, wherein she-alleged that his death was caused by the
negligence of the company in failing to repair a private crossing
over its track, declarations of the husband, made to his wife and others, after he had ridden half a mile from the crossing, to the effect
that he was riding a mule over the crossing, and that the mule had
fallen because of a hole therein, and had thus injured him, were inadmissible, not being a part of the res gestae. Poole, 92/337;
—

.

.

.

112/557.
In

Roach, 93/785, it

held that declarations made twenty mina locomotive and a buggy, by one who
the buggy, and who was injured by the collision, and who had

utes after
was

in

a

been removed
to

was

collision between

a

considerable distance from the

house in which he

scene

of the collision

being cared for, are not admissible as a
part of the res gestae of the collision, the declarations being in the
nature of a narrative of what had occurred, including statements as
to the cause of the collision, and not spontaneous exclamations made
on the spot, or very near thereto, and not in point of time so immea

was
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diately after the occurrence as to be properly regarded as a part of
occurrence itself.
Cited, 101/802; 112/557.
In Newsom, 66/57, it was held that what the plaintiff said a short
time
some six or seven minutes
after the injury was done, at a
place some four or five hundred yards distant, to which he went, as to
the malice of defendant’s agent in blowing the whistle, was not admissible in his own behalf as part of the res gestae. Nor was what defendant’s engineer said some time after the injury and at a different
place some miles away, indicating the state of his feelings toward the
person injured.
Cited, 92/338; 107/371.
Maloy, 77/237, was an action brought for the homicide of the
plaintiff’s minor son, and it was held that testimony that the son,
prior to his death, made a certain statement as to how the injury was
done, was inadmissible, it not having been made at or near the time of
the accident so as to be admissible as part of the res gestse. Dying
the

—

—

declarations
596.

are

not admissible in civil

cases.

By a spectator.
Davis, 27/113, it is said that declarations of a person who is not
a party, nor the agent of a party to a transaction, and who is a competent witness, not made at the time of the act of which it is insisted
it is explanatory, are not admissible in evidence as part of the res
gestae. These statements were made by Mrs. Winn, who was injured
by the collision, but who was not a party to this action. Cited,
28/95.
In Bagwell, 107/157, the plaintiff was a passenger on a street-car.
A collision occurred and she jumped from the car and was injured.
The trial judge permitted her to testify that just prior to the collision, “People on the street were screaming for the motorman to
stop.” It was held that, “the cries and exclamations of bystanders
upon seeing an accident about to occur may be proved to explain the
state of mind and conduct of a person hearing them and who is injured in the accident.”
After a railroad collision, the passengers signed and issued a card
exonerating the agents of the company. The headnote states that
it was immediately after the collision. The report of the case states
that it was made and signed on the spot, just after the catastrophe,
but how long did not appear; the bill of exceptions says it was fifteen
or twenty minutes
afterwards, and McCay, J., says it was the next
day and after much dispute and crimination, and against the first
In
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impressions of the passengers. It was not evidence as part of the
res gestse.
Johnston, 38/410
597. By a party to a fight.
Sayings uttered after a fight, on the same day, but how long afterwards does not appear, on the opposite side of a public square two or
three hundred yards from the place of the fight, were not part of the
res gestse.
Cherry v. McCall, 23/193.
598. Complaints as part of the res gestse of pain.
In Smith, 76/209, a witness was allowed to state of the plaintiff:
“Indeed, he threatened that if he did not get better, he would take
his life; he contemplated suicide.” The statement was made months
after the accident in which he was injured, and it would seem, from
the opinion in the case, that it was made to a physician with whom he
was consulting at the time, and whose treatment he was endeavoring
to avail himself of.
It was held to be doubtful whether the testimony
was admissible, but that where the admissibility of evidence is doubtful, the rule in this State is to admit it. Hall, J., said: “The general rule, as laid down by writers on evidence, is that ‘the representations by a sick person of the nature, symptoms and effects of the malady under which he is laboring at the time, are received as original
evidence. If made to a medical attendant, they are of greater weight
as evidence; but, made to any other person, they are not on that account to be rejected.’
1 Gr. Ev. §102. But this rule, particularly
its latter branch, is to be very carefully guarded and restricted in
its application, especially where it is apparent that the declarations
constitute no part of the res gestae, and may have been made for the

of promoting some ulterior scheme, as for the purpose of being used in evidence in a contemplated or pending lawsuit brought
to recover damages for the injury from which the party insists he is
suffering.”
Where one receives a personal injury, which causes at first ternporary unconsciousness, and a physician is called, and during his attendance, extending continuously through some weeks, the patient
complains of pain, and indicates the region thereof in her system,
these facts are competent evidence in her favor on the trial of an aetion for the tort causing the injury, when testified to by the physician,
in connection with a description of the symptoms which he observes
in the course of his attendance and treatment.
Smith, 94/580.
In Prisock, 97/643, it was held that exclamations or complaints
made by a person undergoing physical examination by a physician,
purpose
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with

a

view to

ascertaining the.extent of his alleged injuries, and

ap-

parently made in response to manipulations of the person’s body or
by the physician, are admissible in evidence, though such
person was not under the treatment of this particular physician, and
the examination was being made solely for the purpose indicated.
Whether or not the exclamations were involuntary, or the complaints
were bona fide, is for determination by the jury, under all the evidence submitted.
Simmons, C. J., said: “Such complaints are regarded as manifestations of pain, as a part of the res gestae of the
pain, and are not classed with mere descriptive statements. They
are received as original evidence, and may be testified to by any person in whose presence they are uttered.
In Walker’s ease, infra, it
did not appear that the complaints were of this character.”
Since the change in the law allowing parties to testify in their own
behalf, it is not competent for a plaintiff suing for physical injuries
to prove by his wife that subsequently to their infliction he frequently
complained to her of pains and hurts resulting therefrom, and stated
that he suffered a great deal. Bleckley, C. J., said: “The plaintiff’s wife was permitted to testify to his complaints made in her
hearing. She said he complained of his side a great deal, and, being
told to state all of his complaints, she said his head hurt him, and his
side and his leg; he suffered a great deal.
Such evidence as this, by
a witness other than the wife of a
party, was competent and admissible, so long as the law excluded parties from being witnesses in their
own behalf; but now that
they are, by statute, competent to testify,
and where, as in this ease, the testimony is heard from the plaintiff
himself, who knew the facts of pain and suffering, his wife, whose
knowledge of them was derived from hearsay, was not competent to
prove complaints which were no part of the res gestx of the injury.
The ground on which such evidence was formerly deemed competent
was the
ground of necessity. That necessity no longer exists. The
higher and better evidence is that of the person who has actual knowledge of the truth of the pains and other feelings to which the complaints relate. This view is taken by the Court of Appeals of New
York in the case of Roche v. Railroad
Co., 105 N. Y. 294, 11 N. E.
630.
The reasoning of that case is entirely satisfactory, and applies
as
forcibly in Georgia as it does in New York. Indeed, before parties
were made
competent witnesses, the wife of the plaintiff could not
be heard to testify at all in favor of her husband. The same statute
which rendered her' competent to testify for him rendered him commembers
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petent to testify for
99/255; 101/18.

himself.”

Walker, 93/462.

testify

Cited, 97/647;

“I don’t know the
I saw its
her.” It
was held that while a husband is not competent to testify as to oral
complaints made to him by his wife concerning her “pains and hurts”
resulting from a physical injury, Walker, supra> he may testify as to
the physical condition of any of her members of which he had actual
knowledge; and, if such conditiori manifestly caused suffering, he
may so state. Wainwright, 99/255.
599. Statements t>y conductor, engineer and other employees.
PlaintifEs offered to prove the sayings and declarations of the conductor and engineer which were made at a station about a mile below
A husband was allowed to

as

follows:

of it, but she has suffered a great deal from her hip.
swollen condition and frequently rubbed and bathed it for
cause

where the accident

occurred, after the train arrived there and while

stopping there.

It had previously stopped a short time immediately
They were not admissible as a part of
the res gestae, as they were uttered at an indefinite time after the
happening of the thing to which they related. And they were made
when the conductor and engineer were not acting as the agents of
the company. Sims, 28/93.
Sayings of a conductor to a fireman made at the next station and
ten miles from where the accident occurred, were ofEered by the company in evidence. The conductor was dead when the case was tried.
The sayings were inadmissible, especially for the company. They
were inadmissible even against the company, unless part of the res
gestae. Kelley, 58/107.
On the trial of Weinkle, 107/367, the court allowed a witness to
state: “As I came up, the engineer sang out to me, ‘Hello, Cap, it
looks like we have killed some of your mules,’ and I said, ‘They are
not my mules,’ and he then turned to the fireman and said, ‘We have
sure played hell to-night”; the objection to this testimony being that
the engineer was not clothed with authority to bind the company;
and that the evidence was illegal and inadmissible, being no part of
the res gestae, as it appeared that the witness was at his house some
distance away when the mules were killed, and that he walked from
his house to the train before having the conversation above quoted.
Cobb, J., said: “Unless the declarations of the engineer were made
while he was engaged in the transaction of some business of the company with the person with whom he was talking within the scope of
after the accident occurred.
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declarations accompanying an act done by him
duty imposed upon him in his relation as a servant of the company, the evidence was inadmissible and should have
been rejected. It is not pretended that the statements made by the
engineer were made in the course of any transaction with the witness
in relation to the company’s business, and therefore such statements
his

authority,

in

discharge of

do not

or were
some

reason of that rule which permits the declaagent to be introduced against his principal when they
are made dum fervet opus.
Were the statements of the engineer a
part of the res gestae of the occurrence so as to make them admissible
for that reason ? It does not distinctly appear in the record what was
come

rations of

within the

an

the

lapse of time between the killing of the mules and the conversaengineer and the witness; but from what does appear
it must have been such a lapse of time as that the declarations were
not, in any sense, contemporaneous with the act of killing the mules.
The witness was not present at the time that the collision occurred,
tion between the

and it is to be inferred from what is stated in the motion for
trial that when the witness arrived upon

a new

the scene such time had
elapsed that the engineer was in a position to fully realize the consequences resulting to the company from the killing of the mules, and
that therefore the oecurrence which was the subject of the conversation was in the past.”
Cited, 112/557.
In Newton, 85/517, the court admitted in evidence certain statements made after the homicide, by a person alleged to have been the
engineer on the train. This testimony was objected to on the ground
that it was not shown that the person making the statement was an
employee of the defendant, so that his sayings in and about the oeeurrence were competent evidence to bind it.
The court submitted
the question to the jury, for them to find whether the person who made
the statement was the engineer or not. Simmons, J., said: “We do
not think there was an error in admitting this testimony over the
objection that was made to it at the time of the trial. If it was a
doubtful question whether the person who made the statement was
the engineer of the defendant, or of some other person, the court was
right in submitting that question to the jury. If the objection had
been that the statement of the engineer, made after the transaction
had ended, was inadmissible, it would present a different
question.”
A statement made after the injury by another
employee of the company, who was superior to plaintiff, to the effect that it was plaintiff’s duty to examine the cars as he was doing when he was
injured,
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is inadmissible

thing he could
84/711.

as

hearsay.

say

which

He could not bind the company by anynot a part of the res gestae. Howard,

was

A statement made shortly after an accident, by the conductor of the
train, to the witness, of what he heard the engineer state about the

of the

accident, was mere hearsay testimony, and was inadmisMaloy, 77/237.
600. Declarations of agents.
In Wright, 34/330, it was proven that the afternoon of the acci-

cause

sible.

dent the brakeman said that the axle of the car
he had told them

so.

The court said:

was too short and that
“This saying should not have

gone to the jury until it had been shown that it was within his peculiar province to watch over and superintend the condition of the cars

constituting the train and having such a control as to direct which
should go and which not. Beyond the scope of his agency, an agent
can not by his declarations, affect his principal.
And as corporate
bodies, especially railroad companies, have daily hundreds of employees, in various services, with divisions of labor and duty, simple
justice requires that these companies shall not be liable for damages
upon the loose or casual sayings of every person who may be in their
employment.” Cited, 56/276; 77/213; 85/489.
On the trial of a suit against a railroad company for damages to
the plaintiff, an employee of the company, caused by the negligence
of hisTOemployees, it was error to permit the plaintiff to testify that
an assistant superior had told him, after the injury was done, that the
company felt itself under obligations to support him and his family
during life. At best, it was the mere admission of an agent not in
the actual execution of his duty. Duggan, 51/212.
In Blitch, 76/333, the plaintiff was not allowed to prove that the
defendant’s master of trains had agreed to pay all expenses incurred
by him on account of his injuries and illness. This agent had no
power to bind the company by such a promise, and it was not an admission made by an agent dum fervet opus.
That an engine was defective is not established by the testimony of
the plaintiff that the engineer told him some days after the injury
that it had certain defects, although the engineer had testified that he
did not so tell him. Impeaching the evidence of the engineer by contradicting him as to what he had said would not prove that what he
had said was true.
Not being a part of the res gestas they were
clearly inadmissible as declarations or admissions against the railroad
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Such impeaching evidence being the only evidence touching any defect in the engine, there was nothing on which to base instruetions to the jury to “look to the evidence, and determine whether
the engine was defective,
.
.
.
whether there was a leak in the
steam, which escaped into the cylinders, and caused the accident.”
So instructing was consequently erroneous. Maltsby, 90/630. Cited,
company.

95/463.
601. Statements

by president of construction company.
held that sayings of the president of the
construction company which was building and equipping the railroad,
made two or three hours after the accident occurred, at another place,
to a newspaper reporter, that it would be to his interest not to publish too much, that the railroad at the place of the accident had been
laid only temporarily, that he had not had time to put the broad-gauge
ties on it, and did not want public opinion so strong against him, etc.,
were not admissible.
Simmons, J., said: “Williamson was the president of the construction company which was building and equipping
In Liddell, 85/482, it was

the road.

While it is true that the construction company was operpassengers and freight, and
while it is true that the railroad company was liable for the acts of

ating the road in the transportation of

the construction company (as we shall hold later on in this opinion),
and that Williamson thereby became the agent of the railroad company, we do not think that these admissions made by him, under
circumstances disclosed by this record, were admissible as against

the
the
railroad company or the construction company. To make the admissions of an agent admissible as against his principal they must
be a part of the res gestas, or must have been made during the
performance of the agent’s duties. It is clear that the admissions
of Williamson were not made as part of the res
gestae. He was
not at the place of the accident, and, as said
before, it was some
two

or three hours afteT the accident when he had the conversation with the newspaper reporter, and it is
equally clear that they
were not made when in the
performance of a duty to the corporation, or while any duty to the corporation was being performed by
him. It seems to us to have been more in the nature of an
application to the newspaper reporter not to publish too much about the ac-

cident in his paper,

and

more

in the interest of Williamson individ-

ually than of the railroad company.” Cited, 90/632; 107/371.
602. Sayings of employee
offered to impeach him.
Where testimony as to
sayings of an employee of defendant, made
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time when they could not have been considered as a part of the
gestae, was admissible only for the purpose of impeaching such
employee as a witness, the court, upon request of defendant’s counsel,
should have cautioned the jury that they should not consider such
sayings as admissions binding the defendant. Brush Electric Light
& Power Co. v. Wells, 103/512.
603. Where an employee was a mere spectator.
In Marsh, 56/274, a wife sued for the homicide of her husband.
A., who was an employee of the company, was present and witnessed
the occurrence.
The local agent of the company prevented the plaintiff’s counsel from learning what A. would testify. A. made statements to plaintiff and to F. immediately after the occurrence to the
effect that the death was the result of the engineer’s failure to put on
brakes; that the agent would not allow him to communicate the facts
to plaintiff’s counsel until the trial, and he was afraid to tell about it
lest he should be discharged. Plaintiff offered these statements in
evidence and they were rejected. It was held that an employee of a
railroad company who saw another employee killed by the cars can
not affect the company by his declarations, made immediately after
the occurrence, to the effect that the disaster was caused by the negli-<
gence of those in charge of the train, the speaker himself not being
one of the number.
What he, as a mere spectator, reported immediately after the homicide, as to the cause thereof, is not evidence as
part of _the res gestae. And it was further held that improper acts
by an agent touching matters out of the scope of his agency, are not
to be imputed to the principal.
And where the local agent of the
company had interposed to prevent the plaintiff’s counsel from having access to a witness in the employment of the company, it was
ruled that there was no presumption that the act was authorized by
the company; and that unless the delegation of such authority
appeared in evidence, the corporation would be unaffected by the conduet of the agent. Bleckley, J., said: “It is not clear to us how the
agent’s conduct would be any reason for admitting the statements, if
it were conceded that it was improper and that it was not within the
scope of his authority.” And as to the statements being part of the
res gestae he said:
“A. was a mere spectator. His conduct was not
to be illustrated, but the conduct of other persons.
What he said
immediately afterwards could give character to nothing that happened — could neither qualify nor explain it.” Cited, 70/14777/213.
at

a

res
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parts of res gestse of an investigation.
Krogg, 77/202, a suit against two railroad companies, testi-

604. Statements
In

offered by the plaintiff that the general manager, who had
employees upon them, and who
had no superior officer as to the management of the cars, engines and
tracks, and whose duty it was to know everything connected with
the road and to keep everything in proper order, was informed by
the conductor of a train in which he was riding that the train on
which the plaintiff was at work had been wrecked and where it had
occurred, and thereupon remarked that he had told the roadmaster
that those curves were too high; and also that he went to the scene of
the wreck, and after examining as to its cause, and while pursuing
his investigations, went to the plaintiff, who was the engineer of the
wrecked train, and asked him what, in his opinion, caused the wreck;
that the plaintiff said he thought it was a broken rail, but was not
positive; that the general manager said that plaintiff was mistaken;
that the plaintiff asked him, as he had made an examination since
the wreck, what, in his opinion, caused it, to which the general manager responded that it was too much elevation on the curve; that
the plaintiff asked if he was positive about it, to which the general
manager responded, yes, he knew it, and that thereupon he would
remedy that, and would have no more such accidents from that
mony was

full control of the roads and all the

fault.

It

was

held that these admissions

eral manager were
the corporation in

.

or

statements of the gen-

admissible in evidence. He was the alter ego of
this matter. His statements as to the condition
of the road were made while in the line of his duty, it being his business to know the condition of the road, and upon being informed
by an agent of the road of the wreck, what he then said was dum fervet
opus.
It was admissible also as showing knowledge of the corporation as to the improper construction and condition of the road before
the accident. The statements of the general manager to the plaintiff
were admissible further as
part of the res gestse, it being his duty
to investigate the cause of the disaster, and such statements
being
made while he was pursuing his inquiries.
Cited, 82/476; 85/492;
107/371. In Liddell, 85/492, it is said that this ease goes to the
extreme limit. The court meant that the statements were
part of the
res gestae of the
investigation which the agent who made them was
then making in behalf of his
principal, and not as meaning the res
gestae of the accident. Carson, 98/652. Cited, 112/557.
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In

Carson, 98/652, the defendant offered to prove the statements
by one of the employees while investigating the cause of the
derailment that had injured the plaintiff. It was held that they
were inadmissible as
part of the res gestae. Simmons, C. J., said:
“To render such declarations as these admissible as a part of the res
gestae of the occurrence in question, they must be so nearly connected
with the act ‘as to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought.’
Code, §3773. They must be so spontaneous and involuntary, so much
a part of the act itself, as to render it
reasonably certain that they
were not the result of deliberation or reflection.
Certainly this can
not be said as to statements made after the accident and the injury
in question had occurred, by an employee of the party who offered
them, and while he was going over the ground investigating the cause
of derailment, and probably seeking for such an explanation as would
relieve himself and his employer from blame. Counsel for the plaintiff in error relied on what was said in Krogg’s case in regard to
the admissibility of statements of the general manager of the railroad company as to the cause of the accident, made at the scene of
the injury soon after it occurred, and while he was engaged in an
investigation of the matter. The statements referred to in that decision, however, were not, as in this instance, declarations offered
made

by the railroad company in its own favor, but were offered by the
plaintiff as admissions on the part of the company against its interest;
and what was said as to their being a part of the res gestse is to be
understood in the

sense

in which this term is used in the law of

agency, and. as meaning the res gestse of the
the agent who made them was then making in

investigation which
behalf of his principal, and not as meaning the res gestse of the accident. It was not
necessary in that case, in order to render the statements admissible,
that they should be treated as a part of the res gestse of the accident,
for, as will be seen from the opinion of the court, they were clearly
admissible on other grounds.” Cited, 112/557.
605. Where improper admission of statements no cause for a new
trial.

Though declarations be no part of the res gestse, their admission
evidence, unless objected to on the proper ground, is no cause for a
new trial.
Kitchens, 83/83.
in
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606. Acts

of negligence not declared

on

admitted

as

part of

res

gestse- to explain conduct.
Evidence

tending to show acts of negligence not declared upon is
a part of the res gestse of the occurrence under investigation, to explain the conduct of the parties engaged in it. Being admitted, the court should charge the jury that any negligence
shown by this evidence can not be considered as a direct and substantive basis of recovery; but it might be misleading to instruct
them in general terms that they would “have no right to find anything against defendant because of” the same. Bleckley, C. J., said:
“The court admitted evidence, the plaintiff himself being the witness, that ‘the street-car man was whipping the horses, and coming
pushing me; coming across that place, one of the hind wheels crossing from the left-hand side,’ etc. This testimony was objected to
because there was no pleading to warrant it. In admitting it, the
court stated to the jury that it was not admitted as a basis for recovery by the plaintiff against the defendant, but as explanatory of
the circumstances under which the injury occurred.
In this there
was no error.
Whether whipping the horses was or was not negligence, it was a part of the res gestae of the occurrence under investigation, and was relevant to explain the conduct of those engaged in it.
Nor was there any error in declining to charge, as requested, that
‘the jury have no right to find anything against the defendant because of the running or movement of cars, there being no allegation
that their running was in any way wrong.’ The court sufficiently
guarded the jury against treating the manner of running the cars as
a direct and substantive basis of recovery, and this
was enough.
Had the charge been given in the terms requested, the jury may
have understood that in making up their verdict they had no right
to consider the conduct of the driver of the car, even as explanatory
of the plaintiff’s conduct on the occasion.
It is not necessary to allege the whole environment and res gestae of the transaction, in
order to admit evidence of the same, or to authorize the jury to consider and give proper weight to each relevant fact and circumstance.
When negligence, which, together with the injuries sustained from
it, constitutes a cause of action, is properly alleged, acts of defendant, or indeed of any one else, which tend to show why and how
such negligence produced injury to the plaintiff, may be presented
to the jury.
It often happens that one set of acts, in themselves
admissible

as
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lawful and

right, contribute' materially to the production of injury
by another set of acts, in themselves negligent or wrongful.” Walker,
93/462.
607. Admissions.

According to section 5197 of the Civil Code, “All

admissions should be scanned with care.”
There

was

no error

circumstances under

in charging

that the jury should look to the
were made, and ascertain

which admissions

they were freely, voluntarily and
City of Atlanta v. Brown, 73/630.
whether

understandingly made.

a personal injury, it is competent for
that shortly after the injury was inflicted
the plaintiff admitted “that the injury was
wa caused by his own fault,
and that nobody was in fault but himself.” Lewis, J., said: “True, if
the statement were made, it would not be binding against the plaintiff,
and he might show, as a matter of fact, that the injury was not due to
his negligence; but at the same time the defendant was entitled to have
the evidence go to the jury, that they might consider it for what it

In the trial of

an

action for

the defendant to prove

worth.”

Mosely, 112/914.
Ingram v. Hilton & Dodge Lumber Company, 108/194, the
court, over the plaintiff’s objection, allowed Dodge to testify to
statements made to him by the plaintiff, while the latter was confined
by sickness resulting from the injuries, to the effect that the plaintiff
said he would be able to go to work on the first day of the following
November, anrT would be satisfied if the expenses of his illness were
paid up to the time he was able to resume work. This evidence was
held to be admissible, as it had some bearing upon the extent of the
plaintiff’s injuries and the amount of compensation to which he was
entitled, in case the defendant was found liable.
Plaintiff testified that he had a pass on which he was riding.
When he was on the stand testifying in his own behalf defendant’s
counsel, on cross-examination, handed him a paper purporting to be
a free pass on defendant’s railroad, and asked him if his name did
not appear thereon before the printed word, “agent,” as the
person
was

In

in whose behalf the ticket

issued.

Plaintiff’s counsel objected
ground that the paper was the highest evidence of its contents.
The objection was overruled, and the witness answered that his name
did so appear, and he thought that was the pass on which he was
riding 1;he night of the injury. After the testimony closed, plaintiff’s counsel moved to rule out what he stated as to the ticket, it
not having been offered in evidence.
The motion was overruled,
on

the

was
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and it

was

held not to be

error.

Blaridford, J., said:

“This evi-

plaintiff was an admission against himself. Such testimony, when pertinent to the issue being tried, is always admissible.”
Henderson, 73/718. Cited, 74/666.
It was held in Fitzgerald, 108/507, which was a suit by a widow
dence of

to

recover

for the homicide of her

husband, that

an

admission by

a

tending to show that a physical injury received by him, and
subsequently resulted in his death, was caused by an accident,
and not by the negligence of a railroad company of which he was
an employee, was admissible in evidence for the defendant on the
trial of an action for the homicide of such person, brought by his
widow against that companv. Fish, J., said:
“As has been expressly decided, her right to a recovery must necessarily depend upon
a determination of the
question whether or not ‘the husband, had he
lived, would have had such right; and whatever would have been a
good defense to his suit, had he lived, will be equally available against
one brought by her.’
In other words, she is to be considered in
privity with the husband, in so far as her right to complain of his
homicide is concerned. It follows, necessarily, that the company
should have been permitted to show, by any competent evidence at
its command, that the injuries sustained by him were occasioned, not
by the alleged acts of negligence on its part of which complaint was
made, but by other and wholly different causes. Section 5181 of
our Civil Code provides in terms that: 'The declarations and entries
of a person, since deceased, against his interest, and not made with
a view to pending litigation, are admissible in evidence in
any ease’;

person,
which

while section 5193 undertakes to state the rule that ‘the ad missions
of

privies in blood, privies in estates, and privies in law are admissias against’ all persons with whom
they are in privity. Accordingly we think that in the present case the defendant company should
have been permitted to prove that the plaintiff’s husband, in undertaking to state the cause of his injuries, had ‘said he was making an
effort to couple cars, and that his foot struck some obstacle on the
track, and he fell.’ Even were she not a privy in law with him,
this evidence was admissible under the rule that
‘self-deserving5 dec-.
larations made by a deceased person having peculiar opportunities
to know the truth as to the matter under investigation may be proved
even in cases between third
parties, none of whom claim under or
hie
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through him. See Field v. Boynton, 33/239; 1 Whart. Ev. §226 et
seq.; 5 Am. & Eng. Ene. Law (1st ed.), 366, and cases cited.”
Cited,
111/590.
608. Their
Where the
in the Civil

weight as evidence.
judge has substantially charged the law as embodied
Code on the subject of admissions, it is not error for

him to omit to

add, in the

same

connection, that admissions, when

established to the satisfaction of the

jury, constitute a high degree
weight. Lewis, J., said:
section of the Code, nor
in any other statute of the State, which declares that, when an admission is established to the satisfaction of the jury, it constitutes a
high degree of evidence, and the jury should give it great weight.
It may be sound philosophy, founded upon human experience and a
knowledge of human character, that an admission, made voluntarily
by a party against his own interest, constitutes very strong evidence
of evidence, and should be entitled to great
“There is nothing in the provisions of this

■

of the fact admitted.

It is often the

case

that learned writers of

even courts, in the discussion of principles involving
weight of testimony and the credibility of witnesses, advance
ideas, sound in themselves, which are not intended to be declared as

law-books, and
the

positive law, but as a safe rule to guide mankind generally in reaching conclusions upon stated facts; but it does not follow from this
that, however sound the philosophy of such rules may be, a court
should adopt them as positive law, apply them to a particular case,
and give them as rules by which the jury should be governed in
their deliberations. The weight of testimony and the credibility of
a witness are peculiarly and exclusively, under the law of Georgia,
questions for the jury; and, unless the statute expressly specifies
how certain testimony should be received, what weight should be
given it, and whether it should be scrutinized with caution or care,
it is, to say the least, a safer plan always for the judge to express no
opinion upon the subject, but to leave the matter entirely with the
jury. In some instances, no doubt, the admissions of a party against
his interest are entitled to great weight; but what weight should be
given them would depend largely upon the circumstances under
which they were made. As to the effect of such circumstances upon
the weight of the testimony, the jury alone should judge.” Allen,
106/572.
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609.

Credibility of witnesses.
Attaway, 90/656, it was determined that, where the testimony
of witnesses is conflicting, it is not error for the court to instruct
the jury that they should believe the witness or witnesses whom they
consider most worthy of belief, and that, in order to arrive at a conelusion as to which are most worthy of belief, they may look to the
manner of the witnesses while testifying, their means of knowledge
as disclosed by the evidence, and their bias or
prejudice, if any has
been shown by the testimony, and should see to what extent they
have been impeached or corroborated, if at all.
In Maltsby, 90/630, it was held that in so far as the evidence of
an employee of one of the
parties conflicts with that of other witnesses, the jury may look to his employment as a fact which may
affect his credibility.
That some boys pointed out a hole to the plaintiff's husband, and
said it was the one into which the plaintiff fell, and that the husband
afterwards pointed out the same to another witness, and said it was
the hole into which his wife fell, is not competent evidence; but
that a hole was found and examined by the witnesses at the street
intersection where the plaintiff testified the hole was would be competent evidence, it not appearing that there was more than one hole
at this street intersection.
It would be a question for the jury
whether all the testimony referred to the same hole. Brunswick
Light etc. Co. v. Gale, 91/813.
On the trial of an action against a railroad company for personal
injuries, it was improper to admit parol evidence tending to show
that the plaintiff had been charged with or tried for a criminal offense. Simmons, C. J., said:
“A witness may be discredited by
showing his conviction for an offense, but it is not competent to
discredit him by showing merely that he has been charged with and
tried for an offense.
Until there is proof of conviction, he is protected by the legal presumption of innocence. Moreover, the judgment of conviction must be proved by the record.
Rap. Wit. §201,
and cases cited; People v. Elster (Cal.), 3 Pac. 884; Van Bokkelen
v. Berdell, 130 N". Y. 145, 29 N. E. 254, and cases cited.
And see
In

Gardner

v.

State, 81/144.”

Killian, 97/727.
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A false statement in the

testimony of a witness can not be converted
by any amount of corroboration as to other matters; for a
“fact disproved” is not a fact. An attempt to impeach a witness “by
disproving the facts testified to by him” may or may not be suecessful. Barnett, 104/582.
In Stevens, 80/19, Simmons, J., said: “The plaintiff, in his declaration, and in his evidence before the jury, complained that his
spine was badly injured by reason of his fall in attempting to reach
the railroad-track; indeed, that spinal concussion or something of
that sort had been produced by the fall. We think that any evidence going to contradict this would be admissible.
This evidence,
which was objected to and which the plaintiff sought to have ruled
out, was to the effect that the plaintiff had exchanged photographs
with a negro girl on the afternoon before he was injured, and had
made an assignation with her for the next day; and on the morning
of the next day he walked four or five miles in the direction of
where she lived. If he did make the agreement to meet this girl, and
walked that distance for this purpose, it would certainly throw light
upon his physical condition after the injury; and the jury might well
conclude that his spine was not so badly injured as he claimed it to
into truth

be.

We therefore

out this evidence.

see

no

error

It is not

in the refusal of the court to rule

only admissible to throw light upon the
particular injury complained of to the spine of the plaintiff, hut also
upon the general physical condition of the plaintiff after he was injured. The court therefore did right in not limiting the effect of
it to the extent of plaintiff’s spinal injuries.
Being competent and
legal evidence, it was admissible for all purposes, and the jury had
a right to give it such weight as
they saw proper to give it.”
610. Impeachment of witnesses.
Where a witness, by way of accounting for his presence at the
scene of the killing of an animal, states that immediately before going
there he made a particular purchase at a certain store, evidence is
admissible, in behalf of the opposite party, showing or tending to
show that he made no such purchase on the occasion referred to.
While this fact is not directly material on the circumstances of the
killing, it is indirectly material, because it contradicts the witness
as to the train of events which led him to be present, and thus tends
to discredit him as to the facts of his presence.
Daniel, 91/768.
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Though the verdict can not be supported unless the evidence of a
particular witness be true, and though that witness was directly contradicted by two of the employees of the railroad company, and his
character attacked by one of these and two others, and though the
witness admitted that he had signed a false report of the matter,,
written by an agent of the company, yet as the jury, notwithstanding all these discrediting circumstances, believed the witness, and
based their verdict upon his testimony, and the trial judge, by overruling the motion for a new trial, approved the finding, this court,
not being able to know with full certainty where the truth of the
controversy lies, and being disposed, in all cases, to recognize the
right of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, espedaily when the presiding judge is satisfied, will not reverse the judgment denying a new "trial.
Merrett, 92/486.
Unless a particular witness, in behalf of the plaintiff below, testified truly, the verdict would be an outrage upon justice.
The credibility of this witness was attacked by every means known to the law,
including contradiction by another witness, evidence of bad character, and his own previous affidavit to a written report of the facts,
at variance with his testimony at the trial.
Yet the jury, if not
themselves corrupt, must have believed him, for they found for the
plaintiff; and, the court below having approved their finding, this
court is constrained by law to acquiesce.
Relatively to the revising
powers of this court, the jury are the exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses. The law provides for setting aside judgments
obtained by perjury after conviction of that offense.
Barnett,
94/446.
The
own

Cited, 101/20.
testimony of the plaintiff, who

behalf

as

was the sole witness in his
to the circumstances under which he was injured,

making at best a very weak and doubtful case, it being as a whole
utterly inconsistent with itself and self-contradictory as to the most
vitally important facts, and one version of it showing clearly that he
was not entitled to recover, and the defendant’s
evidence, which was
perfectly consistent with this version, establishing a complete defense,
the verdict in the plaintiff’s favor was
unwarranted, and the ends of
justice require a new trial. Evans, 96/481.
611. Examination of plaintiff and
person injured.
In Childress, 82/719, it was held that it is within the discretion

683

CHAPTER 36.

]

v

[§611

Evidence.

of the trial court to

require the plaintiff, suing for a physical injury
alleged to be permanent, to submit to an examination by competent
physicians, at the instance and at the expense of the defendant in the
action, to ascertain the nature, extent and probable duration of the
injury, so as to afford means of proving the same at the trial. By
the Code, section 4047, every court has power to control in furtherance of justice the conduct of all persons connected with a
judicial
proceeding before it in every matter appertaining thereto. Bleckley,
C. J., said: “As to the suggestion made in argument, that the rule
would operate hardly upon delicate and modest females, we can only
say that they would be safely guarded by the discretion of the trial
judge. There would be no danger, we think, in this country, of an
examination being ordered needlessly or where an improper shock
to modesty or feeling of delicacy would be likely. We decide simply
that the power exists, and that in each case it is to be exercised or
not, according to the sound discretion of the presiding judge.”
Cited, 99/255; 109/612.
In Wainwright, 99/255, it was held that the Supreme Court will
not reverse the action of a trial judge in refusing, pending the trial
of a suit for personal injuries, to order a medical examination of the
plaintiff, when it appears that no request for such an examination
was made of the plaintiff before the trial began, and no request to
this effect

was

made of the court until after the

plaintiff’s evidence

had been

closed, and it was then impracticable, without too long a
suspension of the trial, to obtain a satisfactory and competent physician, by whom an impartial examination could be then made. While
the power to order such an examination exists, it is in each case to be
exercised or not, according to the sound discretion of the presiding
judge.
There was' no error in refusing to require the plaintiff, during the
trial, to submit to a medical examination at the instance of the defendant; it appearing that she had previously been several times examined by physicians, one of whom was sworn as a witness for the
defendant. The Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Lynch, 95/529.
In Bagwell, 109/611, it was held that an
the loss of the services of his minor daughter,

action by a father for
occasioned by personal
injuries, should not be dismissed because she, after reaching her majority, refused to obey an order of the court in which the action was
pending, requiring her to submit to a physical examination of her
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by a physician. Lumpkin, P. J., said: “It would be going
great length to hold that such an action by a father should be
defeated by the refusal of the daughter who, though not quite twentyone years old, was practically a grown woman, to submit her person

person
to

a

physician for physical examination. Certainly, if, as was alleged
the physician, though eminent in his profession and a
thorough gentleman, was distasteful to the daughter, it would have
been placing upon the fathejr, even if she had still been under his control, a great and painful burden to coerce her to undergo an examination, or else give up his cause of action. But that is not the case
with which we are now dealing, for the record shows that the refusal
upon which the judge’s order of dismissal was based was made by the
daughter after she had become of age. At that time her father had
no
right or authority to control her person or her movements. His
conduct would have been indefensible, if not criminal, if he had undertaken to compel her, against her will, to allow a physician to examine her. No humane father would, at any cost, attempt such a thing.
It may be that, if he really desired the examination to take place, he
might, by perfectly proper means, have induced his daughter to consent to it.
Be this as it may, we are not prepared to hold that he
was, in any event, bound to pursue such a course; and, moreover, it
distinctly appears, as already remarked, that this case was dismissed
solely on the ground that Miss Bagwell refused to submit to the
examination which the court had ordered to take place. We have no
hesitation in holding that a case should not be thrown out of court
because of the conduct of one not a party to it, and who was neither
legally bound to obey the plaintiff’s orders, nor subject to his custody

to

a

in this case,

or

control.”
612.
In

after

Jury may apply their knowledge of arithmetic.
brought to recover damages for a homicide the trial judge,
telling the jury that a book had been introduced in evidence

a

suit

to aid in calculations which

they would make, charged them: “You
book, or can take any other rules or information that you possess that refer to making calculations.” It does
not appear from the report of the case what book was referred to, but
the charge was approved, and it was held that, in making a calculation, the jury may apply their knowledge or information of arithmetic,
without its being formally introduced in evidence. Pittman, 73/325.
can use

the rules in that
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MORTALITY AND ANNUITY TABLES IN ESTIMATING DAMAGES.

613.

Mortality and annuity tables

admissible in evidence.
that mortality and annuity
tables of established reputation are admissible in evidence in cases of
tort when death has been caused, and also where permanent injuries
have been inflicted causing a total destruction of, or material diminution in, the earning capacity of the injured person.
Oaks, 52/410.
When, in the trial of an action brought by a husband for the loss
of his wife's services, there was evidence to warrant a finding that the
injuries of the wife were permanent, the mortality and annuity tables
were properly admitted in evidence.
Ware, 112/663.
614. The foundation for their admission must be laid.
In Richards, 62/306, a witness was offered to prove the tables.
He
stated that his business was that of a life-insurance agent; that he
was
acquainted with it sufficiently to conduct it, though he would
not consider himself an expert; that he knew the tables used by
insurance companies to estimate probable length of life.
He then
described them and attached copies to his answers. This testimony
was objected to on the ground that the witness was not an expert.
It
was ruled that tables proved to have been used by life-insurance companies by one who had been in the business for years, though not
claiming to he an expert as to the tables, are admissible to show the
probabilities of the duration of life. Jackson, J., said: ■ “He was
expert enough to have been employed for years about the business
of life-insurance and to know what tables were used, and we see nothing wrong in admitting the evidence.”
615. Further foundation must be laid.
Before the tables can be properly admitted in evidence, to show the
expectancy of the plaintiff and aid the jury in arriving at the amount
of damages he should recover for a permanent injury, the foundation
should be laid by proving the plaintiff’s age, or introducing evidence
It has been ruled in

a

are

number of cases,

from which his age could be inferred or
the jury. Beauchamp, 93/6.

approximately arrived at by

evidence, and instructions as to their
inappropriate, unless there be some evidence as to the value
of the plaintiff’s services, or capacity to earn money. Proof of the
plaintiff’s age, and as to the nature of his services, are not sufficient
without proof as to value. Moore, 99/229. And the evidence must
And the tables

use are

are

not proper
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also

ttnd to show, that the state of impaired health and
ability to labor, attributable to the injury, may endure
through life. Powell, 77/192.
The evidence conflicting as to whether or not the plaintiff’s injuries
were permanent, it was not error to admit in his behalf the tables to
aid the jury in arriving at the proper amount of damages in case they
should determine that the injuries were permanent and that the
plaintiff was entitled to recovery.
Garner, 91/27.
Evidence of the condition of the injured party after the suit was
brought, as well as before, is admissible to show the nature and
effects of the injury, and whether temporary or permanent.
Powell,
77/192.
616. The value of the tables when admitted.
The tables are not binding upon the jury and they are not obliged
to use them, or either of them.
Burney, 98/1.
They are not conclusive or absolutely essential, but may be considered by the jury as data on which they may act. Crosby, 74/737.
Stewart, 71/427. The law merely permits jurors to use the tables;
it does not require them to do so.
McLeod, 94/530.
In charging the jury touching the measure of recovery, the court
said: “In determining the value of the life of deceased you consider his age, his expectancy of life, the amount he was earning when
killed, his capacity to earn money in the vocations of life in which he
was engaged.
It is the cash value of the life that is to be given, not
the gross amount he would have received during the term of years
the tables say he could reasonably have expected to live. It is the gross
amount reduced to present cash value.” This charge was subject to
misconstruction. Neither here nor elsewhere was the charge quite
full enough as to the right of the jury to avail themselves of facts
show,

or

diminished

in the evidence

irrespective of the mortality-tables.

Glover, 92/132.

It has been ruled in the United States Court in

Georgia, that the

mortality and annuity tables are founded on observations as
lives, and not as to lives of persons who are non-insurbecause of hazardous employment.

Carlisle

to insurable

able

And it has also been ruled in that court that the rate of interest

present value of an annuity is to be calculated, is a
question of fact which is not to be settled arbitrarily by the legal
rate of interest in Georgia.
It is not within the purpose of this work to enter upon a discussion
of either of these questions.
at which the
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617.

Mortality and annuity tables.
“CARLISLE MORTALITY-TABLE.”

Expectation of life at ages named according to the observations made
by Dr. Heysham. Page 845, 70 Ga. Reports:

at Carlisle

H

Expectation

o

<

w

Expectation

o

Expectation

B

<

Years.

■<

B

o

Years

Years.

Expectation

o

Years.

0

38.72

26

37.14

52

19.68

78

6.12

1

44.68

27

36.41

53

18.97

79

5.80

2

47.55

28

35 69

54

18.28

80

5.51

3

49.82

29

35.00

55

17.58

81

5.21

4

50.76

30

34.34

56

16.89

82

4.93

5

51.25

31

33.68

57

16.21

83

4.65

6

51.17

32

33.03

58

15.55

84

4.39

7

50.80

33

32.36

59

14.92

85

4.12

8

50.24

34

31.68

60

14.34

86

3.90

9

49.57

35

31.00

61

13.82

87

3.71

10

48.82

36

30.32

62

13.31

88

3.59

11

48.04

37

29.64

63

12.81

89

3.47

12

47.27

38

28.96

64

12.30

90

3.28

13

46.51

39

28.28

65

11.79

91

3.26

14

45.75

40

27.61

66

11.27

92

3.37

15

45.00

41

26 97

67

10.75

93

3.48

16

44.27

42

26.34

68

10.23

94

3 53

17

43.57

43

25.71

69

9.70

95

3.53

18

42.87

44

25.09

70

9.18

96

3.46

19

42.17

45

24.46

71

8.65

97

3.28

20

41.46

46

23.82

72

8.16

98

3.07

21

40.75

47

23.17

73

7.72

99

2.77

22

40.04

48

22.50

74

7.33

100

2.28

23

39.31

49

21.81

75

7.01

101

1.79

24

38.59

50

21.11

76

6.69

102

1.30

25

37.86

51

20.39

77

6.40

103

0.83
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TABLE

Showing the value of annuities on single lives according to the Carlisle table of mortality. Page 847, 70 Ga. Reports:
H

N

6 per

7 per

u

H

ct.

7 per ct.

0

10,439

9,177

1

12,078

10,605

27

13,275

11,832

63 9,988

9,205

79 4,040

2

12,925

11,342

28

13,181

11,759

54 9,761

9,011

80

3,858 3,713

3

13,652

11,978

29

13,096

11,893

55 9,524

8,807

81

3,566 3,523

4

14,042

12,322

30

13,020

11,636

56 9,280

8,595

82

3,474 3,862

5

14,325

12,574

31

12,924

11,578

57 9,027

8,375

83 3,286

3,174

6

14,460

12,698

32

12,860

11,516

58 8,772

8,135

84

3,102

2,999

7

14,518

12,756

33

12,771

11,448

59 8,529

7,940

85 2,909

2,815

8

14,526

12,770

34

12,675

11,374

60 8,304

7,743

86

2,739

2,652

9

14,500

12,754

35

12,573

11,295

61

8,108

7,572

87 2,599

2,519

10

14,448

12,717

36

12,465

11,211

62 7,913

7,403

88 2,615

2,439

11

14,384

12,669

37

12,364

11,124

63 7,714

7,229

89

2,417

2,344

12

14,321

12,621

38

12,239

11,033

64

7,502

7,042

90

2,266

2,198

13

14,257

12,572

39

12,120

10,939

65

7,281

6,847

91

2,248

2,180

14

14,191

12,522

40

12,002

10,845

66

7,049

6,641

92

2,337

2,266

12,473

41

11,890

10,757

67 6,803

6,421

93 2,440

2,376

11,779

10,671

68 6,546 6,189

94

2,492

2.419

©

0 per

■4

15

14,126

©

■<

ct.

ct.

©

6perct. 7perct

©

<

6perct. 7perct.

3,883

16

14,067

12,429

42

17

14,012

12,389

43

11,668

10,585

69 6,277

5,945

95 2,522

2,451

12,348

44

11,551

10,494

70 5,998

5,690

96

2,486

2.420

12,305

45

11,428

10,397

71

97 2,368

2,309

46

11,296

10,292

72 6,421

98

2,227

2,177

11,154

10,178

73 5,170 4,927

99

2,004

1,964

18
19

13,956

13,879

5,704 5,420

20

13,835

12,259

21

13,769

12,210

47

12,156

48

10,998

10,052

74 4,944 4,719

100

12,098

49

10,823

9,908

75 4,760 4,549

101 1,175

12,037

50

10,631

9,749

76 4,579

4,382

102

0,744 0,735

11,972

51

10,422

9,573

77 4,410 4,227

103

0,314 0,312

11,904

52

10,208

9,329

78 4,238 4,067

22

13,697

23

13,621

24

13,541

25

13,456

26

13,368

5,162

1,598 1,569
1,159
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618.

Proper method of using the tables.
Burney, 98/1, Lumpkin, J., said with reference to the methods
of using the mortality and annuity tables when, in their complete
form, they were in evidence: “As cases of tort are constantly arising, both where death has been caused, and also where permanent
injuries have been inflicted, occasioning a total destruction of, or a
material diminution in, the earning capacity of the injured person,
and generally, on the trial of such cases, these tables are introduced
in evidence, and as there is much confusion with reference to the
manner of using them, we have concluded to undertake the formulation of instructions concerning their use, which, in each class of cases,
respectively, may be appropriately given in charge. It must not be
understood that in so doing we are presuming to dictate to our brethren of the trial courts as to how they shall charge on this subject, or
to prescribe forms which they must feel constrained to follow; but, as
we have devoted much study and thought to this particular matter,
we venture to hope that the ‘charges’ below suggested may be found
helpful. The plaintiff in the present action sought to recover damages for an alleged permanent diminution in his earning capacity;
and it was not, therefore, a case in which the value of a life was involved. It will, however, in pursuance of the plan we have adopted,
be more convenient to present first suitable instructions concerning
the use of the tables in a case where death was caused, and then conelude with instructions appropriate to a case like the one now in hand.
These instructions, as a whole, can, by making the needed changes in
phraseology, be rendered readily adaptable to a case of tort in which
there was no death, but a total destruction of earning capacity. On
pages 844, 845 and 846, of 70 Ga., will be found, respectively, the
Northampton, the Carlisle, and the Actuaries’ mortality-tables; and
on page 847 is a table ‘showing the value of annuities on single lives
according to the Carlisle table of mortality.’ In order to avoid complication, we shall frame our ‘charges’ upon the assumption that only
the tables on pages 845 and 847 are before the jury, and shall designate the last simply the ‘Annuity-Table.’
Of course, if the other
tables mentioned, or tables which have not been mentioned at all, are
properly in evidence, the instructions may be varied accordingly.
With reference to the 'six per cent.’ and ‘seven per cent.’ columns in the
annuity-table, we have thought it best that juries should be restricted
to the use of the latter only, because seven per cent, is the legal rate of
interest in this State when none is fixed by contract in writing, and
In

44
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calculations of annuities based upon any

other rate would be purely
arbitrary. Indeed, the table in the book referred to might have had,
in addition to those it now contains, a five per cent, column and an
eight per cent, column, or any other number of columns based on different rates of interest, in which event there would have been no safe
criterion save that just indicated, as to which of them a jury should select. With the table as it stands, limited to the two columns, there
is no good reason for taking the one rather than the other, except
that which is stated above.

The instructions

have undertaken

we

to frame for the

guidance of the jury in that class of cases in which
plaintiff seeks to recover for the homicide of another have, of
course, been prepared with reference to the rule of law prevailing in
this State which allows such plaintiff to recover ‘the full value of
the life of the deceased, as shown by the evidence, without any deduction for necessary or other personal expenses of the deceased, had
he lived.’ Code, §3828. Assuming, then, that an action to recover
the value of a life is on trial, and that the Carlisle mortality-table
and the annuity-table are in evidence, it would, we think, be proper
to give the following instructions, which (for the purpose hereinafter
appearing) we will divide, somewhat arbitrarily, into paragraphs, and
designate as ‘Charge 1’:
(1) In case you should find that the defendant is liable, it will
be your duty to determine what amount of damages should be althe

« <

lowed.
« <

(2) Certain tables are in evidence before
mortality-table, and the other is

One of them is
table showing the
value of annuities. We will call the first the “Mortality-Table,” and
the second the “Annuity-Table.” They are not binding upon you,
and you are not obliged to use them, or either of them. If you
use neither, you need not consider the instructions now about to be
given; but as these tables are in evidence, and you have the right
to avail yourselves of the assistance to be derived from them, it
becomes proper to explain them and inform you in what manner
and for what purpose each can be made serviceable. Care, however,
the Carlisle

must be taken to avoid

confusion, and

you.

,

a

should be very particular
ought to be used. You are
also cautioned that you can not advantageously, use both in one and
the same calculation. While the proper use of these tables separately ought to lead to the same result, using them conjunctively or
not to

use one

you

of them where the other
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indiscriminately in the same calculation, or without understanding
the real purposes they are respectively intended to subserve, will surely
lead to

error.

« <

(3) You should ascertain from the evidence the annual earning
capacity of the deceased — that is, seek honestly to reach a just conelusion from the facts before you as to what amount should he regarded as fairly representing his yearly income from his own labor
to the end of his life, if he had not been killed, and, in so doing, give
due weight 'to the various contingencies which will be pointed out hefore concluding these instructions. It is proper to remark just here
that the age of the deceased at the time of the killing, and his probable
expectancy of life, may be considered in arriving at his average
yearly earnings, if in your opinion, in view of all the evidence, his
earning capacity would have varied at different periods of his life between the time he
course
« (

was

killed and the time he would have died in the

of nature.

(4) Another and more direct use which you can make of the figrepresenting such probable expectancy of life will presently be
stated. In fixing upon this expectancy, you may consult the mortalitytable, which will now he explained. This table is designed to show
the expectancy of life which may be entertained by average persons
of given ages. The only material information you can derive from
it is the time which an average person of equal age with the one
under consideration in the present case may be expected to live.
This table has two sets of columns, marked, respectively, “Age”1 and
“Expectation Years.” If it should he desired to ascertain how long
a person of average health and constitution, aged 33 years, would
probably live, you would look for the figures “33” in the “Age”
column; and opposite these figures, in the “Expectation Years” column, on the right of the “Age” column, you would find the figures
“32.36,” which would indicate that such a person probably had 32
and 36-100 years to live. In the nature of things, there can be no
certainty whether any particular individual will live for a longer or
shorter period than the probable expectancy of an average person
of his age, as laid down in this table. In estimating the probable
length of a given man’s life, as compared with the average duration
of life of one of the same age, his health, occupation, habits and surroundings, just as they are disclosed by the evidence, ought to he
considered, and the proper weight should he given to all of these
things in fixing the expectancy of the life, diminishing or increasing
the figures laid down in the table according to the facts in the particuures
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under

investigation. The age “33 years” has been selected
merely for illustration. You, of course, in using the table, would select the age appropriate to the present case.
(5) Having, from the evidence, fixed, as accurately and as fairly
as you possibly can, upon the number of dollars representing the
yearly earnings of the deceased, and having ascertained from the
mortality-table, in connection with all the other evidence, his expectancy (that is, the number of years which he would probably have
lived), you could, by multiplying one of these numbers by the other,
determine approximately what would have been the gross amount
of the earnings of his whole lifetime.
(6) This gross amount, when ascertained, would, of course, have
to be reduced to its present value; that is, to a sum which, paid down
all at once, would be the just and legal cash equivalent of such gross
amount. The present value would necessarily be less than the gross
amount, and the longer the life the greater would be the difference
in these respective sums. If you pursue the course above indicated,
and arrive at the gross amount in the manner which has just been
explained to you, it would then be incumbent upon you to make the
necessary calculations for ascertaining its present cash value.
But,
inasmuch as the proper result can be more readily reached by availing yourselves of the work which has been done in compiling the
annuity table, you may prefer to resort to it. In that event, you
would not find it necessary to arrive at a gross amount, and then reduee it to present value, for the use of the annuity-table enables you
to accomplish the same end by a shorter process. The following illustration will aid you in understanding how to use this table:
(7) Suppose a man thirty-three years old was killed, and at the
time of his death was earning $40 per month, which would make
$480 per year. If it was certain that he would continue to earn this
amount every year as long as he lived, his labor would represent a
yearly annuity of $480; and one entitled to recover the value of his
life would have the right to receive such an amount as would be the
fair cash equivalent of an annuity of $480, payable in yearly installments during the period the deceased would have lived but for the
lar

case

« (

<( i

« c

homicide.
« <

(8) To arrive at such an amount in the case supposed, the annuity-tafile could be made available in the following manner: First,
you would look in the column marked “Age” till you found the figures “33.”
Opposite these figures you would find, in a column marked
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(12)It

“7 Per Cent”

(it being on the right of the “Age” column), the figThe meaning is that an annuity of $1.00 in favor of
an average
person thirty-three years old, and to continue through
life, would, on the seven per cent, basis, be worth, cash down, $11,448.
(9) Therefore, multiplying $480 by the figures “11.448” would
give the'cash value of a like annuity of $480, viz.: $5,495.04.
(10) This annuity-table can be used for any age up to one hundred and three, and with reference to any sum of money representing
or
standing in the place of an annuity. The illustration shows you
how to use the table, but you must not confuse the figures mentioned
in it with the actual figures of the case now on trial.
On the contrary,
you should be governed as to these matters by the evidence.
(11) You will observe that the illustration given is based upon
the assumption that the deceased would have actually earned $480
every year during the entire period of his life, if he had not been
ures

« 6

« e

u <

“11.448.”

killed.
« <

rarely, if ever, happens that a man labors every day undeath, or receives all the while a fixed and regular income
from his labor; nor does his capacity to earn money often remain
undiminished to old age. In arriving at the amount to be allowed as
damages in any particular case, these things should be carefully borne
in mind.
The illustration given is also based upon the further assumption that the supposed person was one whose expectancy of life
was that of an average man.
If, in any case, the expectancy of the
person under consideration would, under the evidence, have probably
been greater or less than that of the average man, the amount of
the damages to be allowed should be increased or diminished accordingly. In applying these instructions to the case which you are
now trying, you will, of course, be
governed by its facts and circumstances as proved.
Feebleness of health, actual sickness, the loss
of employment, voluntarily abstaining from work, dullness in business, reduction in wages, the increasing infirmities of age, with a correspQnding diminution of earning capacity, and other causes, may
contribute in greater or less degree to decreasing the gross earnings
of a lifetime. In estimating damages, a proper allowance and detil his

duction should be made in favor of the defendant for any diminution
in income from labor which would have resulted from any of these
sources.

The defendant is not

acts of others not its

and without reference to

have

come

to pass.

respnsible for the

consequences of the
for results which would in any event
the conduct or negligence of the defendant,

agents,

nor
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(13) In arriving at the cash value of the life of the deceased
fixing the amount of the damages, you should take all these matters into consideration and give them due weight.
(14) If the defendant is not liable at all, the instructions which
have been given concerning these tables should be disregarded entirely. If liable, and you see proper to use the tables, or either of
them, an observance of these instructions will aid you in reaching a
proper conclusion as to the amount of damages to be allowed.’
“(Note.—If the evidence so warrants, an additional instruction,
such as is embraced in the words below quoted, may be added to
paragraph 12. But this should not be done unless, in view of all the
testimony, the propriety and fairness of such an instruction is maniYou should also take into consideration, and give
fest:
the proper effect to any evidence before you, if there be such, tending
to show a reasonable prospect of increased earnings on the part of the
deceased.’)
and

« (

.

.

.

“When the above-mentioned tables
the trial of

action for

are

introduced in evidence upon

personal injuries involving an alleged diplaintiff’s earning capacity, and there is evidence to
warrant a finding that there was such a diminution, and that it will
be permanent (that is, last during the plaintiff’s life), the following
instructions as to the methods .of using the tables may be given. We
will designate the same ‘Charge 2’:
(1) If you find that the defendant is liable, it will be your duty
to fix the measure of the plaintiff’s damages.
Among other things,
he claims that he has been permanently injured, that his capacity to
labor and earn money has been decreased, and that this condition will
continue to the end of his life. If this contention has not been proved
to your satisfaction, you will have no occasion to consult the tables
concerning the use of which you will presently be instructed, and
should disregard them entirely. But if you find that the defendant is
liable, and should believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was
capable of earning by his labor so much per year, and, because of
personal injuries wrongfully inflicted upon him by the defendant,
his earning capacity has been materially reduced, and if the injuries
were of such a permanent and lasting character that this decreased
capacity to earn money will continue through life, the following instruetions will be pertinent:
(2) (Same as paragraph 2 of Charge 1).
(3) You should ascertain from the evidence the annual loss
an

minution of the

(C <

« (

« 4
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which has been occasioned to the

plaintiff by reason of his injuries.
this, you will have to take into consideration his earning capacity before he was injured, and the per cent, (or ratio) in which
that capacity has been diminished.
Seek honestly to reach just
conclusions from the facts before you as to what amount would have
fairly represented the yearly earnings of the plaintiff to the end of
his life, had he not been injured, and as to the proportion — whether
one-fourth, one-half, or more or less than these fractions — in which
such earnings will be reduced because of his injuries. In estimating
To do

what would have been the

plaintiff’s probable earnings through life

if his

laboring capacity had remained unimpaired, you should give
due weight to the various contingencies that will be pointed out to you
before concluding these instructions. It is proper to remark just here
that the plaintiff’s age at the time he was injured, and his then probable expectancy of life, may be considered in arriving at what would
have been his average yearly earnings but for the injury, if, in your
opinion, in view of all the evidence, his earning capacity would have
varied at different periods of his life in case there had been no injury.
(4) (Same as paragraph 4 of Charge 1).
Ci i

« <

(5) Having from the evidence fixed, as accurately and as fairly
possibly can, upon the number of dollars representing the
yearly loss in earnings occasioned to the plaintiff by his injuries, and
having ascertained from the mortality-table, in connection with all the
other evidence before you, his expectancy (that is, the number of years
which, at the time of his injury, he could reasonably have expected to
live, you could, by multiplying one of these numbers by the other,
determine approximately the gross amount of the loss.
(6) (Same as paragraph 6 of Charge 1.)
(7) Suppose a man thirty-three years old, and capable of earning $40 per month, or $480 per year, was s6 injured that he coul'd
earn only $20 per month, or $240 per year, and this decreased capacity to earn money would last during his entire life. If it was
certain that, but for the injuries, he would have continued to earn
the full amount of $480 every year as long as he lived, his loss on account of the injuries would represent a yearly annuity of $240; and,
if entitled to recover for such loss, his damages, as to this matter,
should be such an amount as would be the fair cash equivalent of an
annuity of $240, payable in annual installments, until the end of his
as

you

(( (

u <

life.
• "

<

(8) (Same

as

paragraph 8 of Charge 1.)
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(9) Therefore, multiplying $240 by the figures “11.448” would
give the cash value of a like annuity of $240, viz.: $2,747.52.
(10) (Same as paragraph 10 of Charge 1.)
(11) For instance, you will have noticed that the case supposed in the illustration is one where the earning capacity was reduced one-half. It might be that it was reduced two-thirds, or only
one-third, or one-fourth, or any other fraction. The true per cent,
of the decreased capacity must in each case be ascertained from the
evidence, the question being, “In what proportion does it show the
ability to earn money has been lessened ?” You will also observe that
the illustration given rests upon the assumption that the injured
person would have actually earned $480 every year during the entire
period of his expectancy, if he had not been hurt, and his consequent
loss on account of the decrease in his ability to labor is calculated
upon that basis.
(12) (Same as paragraph 12 of Charge 1.)
(13) In arriving, therefore, at the amount which should be
allowed the plaintiff on account of loss arising from diminished ability
to labor, you should take all these matters into consideration, and
give them due weight.
(14) (Same as paragraph 14 of Charge 1.)
“(Note.—In a proper case, the reading of paragraph 12 of Charge
1 as a part of Charge 2 may be followed by giving the additional
instruction below quoted. In this connection, however, see note at
*
end of Charge 1:
You should also take into consideration
and give the proper effect to, any evidence before you, if there be
such, tending to show that there was a reasonable prospect of increased earnings on the part of the plaintiff in case he had not been
injured.’)” Cited, 99/229; 102/296; 104/614; 110/247; 112/621,
<( 6

a (

« {

« (

(( <

6

915.

The word “measure,” as used in the
ages, was manifestly, from
meant to be understood as

charge in relation to damthe context and nature of the expression,
referring to “amount.” 110/247.

619. A consolidated table.
As confusion often

occurs in the use made of the tables
by juries,
complete tables are before them, and with a view to
simplify their use, the table here given has been prepared. It is
a consolidation of the essential
portions of the Carlisle mortality and
annuity tables.

when both
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TABLE

Showing the expectation of life at ages named, and the value of annuities on single lives, according to the Carlisle Mortality and the
Annuity Tables:
H

©

Expectation

<

Years.

0
1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

47
48
49
60
51

H

7 per cent.

©

38.72
44. G8
47.55
49.82

9,177
10,605
11,342
11,978

50.76
51.25
51.17
50.80
50.24
49.57
48 82
48.04
47.27

12,322

52
53
54
55
56

46.51
45.75
45.00
44.27
43.57
42.87
42.17
41.46
40.75
40.04
39.31
38.59
37.86

37.14
36 41
35.69
35.00
34 34
33 68
33.03
32.36
31.68
31.00
30.32
29.64
28.96
28.28
27.61
26.97
26.34
25.71
25.09
24.46

12,574
12,698
12.756
12,770
12,754
12,717
12,669

12,621
12,572
12,522
12,473
12,429
12,389
12,348
12,305
12,259
12,210
12,156
12,098

12,037
11,972
11,904

11,832
11,759
11,693
11,636
11,578
11,516
11,448
11,374
11,295
11,211
11,124
11,033
10,939
10,845
10.757
10,671

10,585
10,494
10,397

23 82

10,292

23.17
22.50
21.81

10,178
10,052

21.11
20-39

9,749

9,908

9,573

Expectation
Years.

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

19.68
18.97
18.28
17.68
16.89
16.21
15.55
14.92
14.34
13.82
13.31
12.81
12.30
11.79
11.27
10.75
10.23

9.70
9.18
8.65
8.16
7.72
7.33
7.01

7 per

cent.

9,329
9,205
9,011
8,807
8,595
8.375
8,135
7,940
7,743
7,572
7,403
7,229
7,042
6,847

6,641
6,421

6,189
5,945
5.690

5,420
6,162

4,927
4,719
4,549
4,382
4,227
4,067
3,883
3,713

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

6.69
6.40
6.12
5.80
5.51
5.21
4.93
4.65
4.39
4.12
3.90
3.71
3.59
3.47
3.28
3.26
3.37
3.48
3.53
3.53
3.46
3.28
3.07
2.77
2.28

101
102
103

1.79

1,159

1.30
0.83

0,735

3,523

3,352
3,174
2,999
2,815

2,652
2,519
2,439
2,344
2,198
2,180
2,266
2.376
2.419
2,451
2.420
2,309
2,177
1,964
1,569
0,312
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The

table,

as

thus prepared, shows the expectation of life of

a

person of any age from one to one hundred and three years, and it
also shows the present cash value of an annuity of $1.00 to continue

through life in favor of an average person of a specified age. The
figures in the second and third columns; that is, the figures in the
column of “Expectation of Years” and those in the column of “7
Per Cent.” are never to be multiplied the one with the other.
The
amount shown by the testimony to be the annual earning capacity,
and the figures in the “7 Per Cent.” column, opposite the figures
representing the age of the deceased in the “Age” column, are to be
multiplied together. The testimony in the case, aside from these tables, should show the age of the injured person, and also his annual
earning capacity. To illustrate in the simplest manner the use of the
tables as here consolidated, we will suppose that the injured person
according to the testimony was twenty years old, and his annual
earning capacity was $1.00. Those two items we would get from the
proof without going to the tables. We would resort to the tables
to find out how long the person would probably live, and also to get
the present cash value of what he would have earned if he had lived.
To get his probable duration of life we turn to the first column of
the table, which is the “Age” column, and to the figures “20,” that
being the age of the person injured. Opposite the figures ‘20,” and
in the next column, which is the “Expectation of Years” column,
we find the figures 41.46.
That would mean that the person had
41.46-100 years to live.
To multiply the amount of his earning
capacity for one year by the number of years he would probably live,
would give the entire amount of the earnings for his whole lifetime,
which should be reduced to its present value. The third column of
this table is made up from the annuity-table, and it is to be consuited only in reducing the annual income to present value. In the
third column of the table, the “7 Per Cent.” column, and opposite
the figures “20” and “41.46” we find the figures “12.259,” which
is the present value of an annuity of $1.00, in favor of a person
twenty years old. Inasmuch as in the case supposed the income was
$1.00, “12.259-1000” would be its present value. If the proof showed
the annual income to be $500.00 or other sum, the “12.259” would
be multiplied by such sum instead of the $1.00.
The annuity-table can not be rightly used on a basis of earnings
and age, without deducting, first, a due proportion for continuing
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ability to labor; secondly, some amount for probable diminution of
ability by old age; and, thirdly, a due proportion for the plaintiff’s
contributory negligence, if the jury should believe that there was
such negligence. McLeod, 94/530.
620. Charges that should not he omitted.
In Mosely, 112/914, it was held that in charging a jury with re■spect to the six per cent, and seven per cent, columns in an annuity-table, the judge should direct them to use the latter; and, in giving instruetions with regard to using the mortality and annuity tables, he
should call their attention to the decreased capacity to earn money
which will result from increasing age and the infirmity incident
thereto. That instruction is always applicable in suits for damages
on account of injuries alleged to be permanent.
In Austin, 104/614, it was held that there was no error in giving
in charge to the jury the form in relation to the use which may be
made by the jury of mortality and annuity tables. Such form is not
open to the objection that it contains any expression of opinion as
to what has or has not been proved.
Simmons, C. J., said: “The
form of charge suggested is not binding upon the trial judges, but it
was very
carefully and thoroughly considered by this court before it
was adopted and promulgated; and, since these exceptions have been
taken to it, we have again carefully considered it, and we can not
find, either in the portions to which exception is taken or in any
■other part of the charge, any expression of opinion as to what has or
has not been proved. It is simply an explanation of how and in what
manner the tables should be used, if the jury should consider them
at all.
It appears to us that the judge is bound, when these tables
are introduced in evidence, to explain to the jury how they may be
used, just as he should explain a table of logarithms if it were introduced in a case involving questions which that table would illustrate.
And so he should explain an almanac introduced to show the phases
of the moon, or the time of the rising and setting of the sun, etc.”
621. Errors in instructing the jury that did not mislead.
Where there was a verbal inaccuracy in instructing the jury as
to the annuity-table on the subject of reducing to present value the
probable earnings of the plaintiff, and there is no indication in the
verdict as compared with the evidence that the jury used either the
wrong table or the wrong figures, a new trial will not be granted.
Wiggins, 91/208.
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And, although the court may have erred in its explanation to the
jury of the mortality and annuity tables introduced in evidence, and
the methods of their use, such error would be no cause for a new
trial, when it manifestly appears that it in no way misled the jury,
or caused them to overvalue the life of the deceased.
Day, 91/676.
Cited, 108/795.
In Flowers, 108/795, it was held that some of the instructions
given in the present case concerning the annuity-table and the method
of using it were inaccurate; but when the amount of the verdict,
viewed in the light of all the testimony, is considered, it is manifest
that the error committed in this respect could not have resulted injuriously to the defendant, and therefore it affords no ground for
setting aside the verdict, which was well warranted by the evidence.
622. Dangerous custom offered to excuse negligence.
In Mayfield, 87/374, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for an
injury sustained while attempting to couple the engine to a car.
Plaintiff was introduced as a witness, and was asked: “What was
the usual custom in making such couplings of such engines and
cars?” It was held that a custom or usage, obviously dangerous,
and the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s declaration showing that it
would be dangerous, is not admissible to excuse contributory negligence by the plaintiff, more especially where it did not appear that
such custom or usage had been adopted by the defendant, or that
it prevailed at the place or on the particular railway concerned.
Simmons, J., said: “It will be observed that the witness was not
asked as to the custom of this particular railroad, nor as to the custom of the railroads at the particular place where he was injured,
but was asked as to the usual custom of making car-couplings on such
engines. We do not think that this was sufficient to bind the company; the custom, if it existed, being obviously dangerous, and the
declaration alleging that 'the machinery was defective, in that the
foot-board or rim around the pilot, on which plaintiff stepped to
make the coupling, was too narrow to make a secure footing at such
a point of danger.’
As to inadmissibility of usage or custom to excuse negligence, see Deer.
Neg. §9; 107 Mass. 496; 55 Me. 438; 36
Iowa, 32; 5 Hun, 523; 8 Gray, 457; 31 N. W. Rep. 868; 44 FT. W.
Rep. 1078; 25 FT. W. Rep. 104; De Bray, 71/407, and cases cited in
Flannagan, supra.1’ Cited, 88/11.
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623. Common

experience and general custom of railroads, when

inadmissible.

Upon the trial of an action against a railroad company for a homiresulting in part from the misplacement of a switch, it was not
error to refuse to allow the defendant to show “the common experience of railroads” in getting back switch-keys from their employees,
and that all railroads have great difficulty in keeping up with such
keys and having them returned by discharged employees because of
their real or alleged loss. Nor was there error i» refusing to allow
defendant to prove “the custom or usage of railroads in reference
to providing a watchman for each of their switches,” defendant expecting to prove “that the general custom was not to provide a
watchman for such switches.”
Lumpkin, J., said: “Testimony as
to the common experience, customs or usages of railroads, without
reference to whether they are wisely or badly managed, or to their
particular location or surroundings, or to peculiar circumstances,
which, in any given instance, would tend to illustrate the diligence
or negligence of a company in recovering or
failing to recover its
switch-keys, or in guarding or failing to guard its switches, would
be too vague, uncertain and indefinite to aid a jury in determining
cide

trial whether

in

a ease

or

negligent in these respects.

not the railroad company was

diligent
No two cases are exactly alike, and,
the facts and circumstances in each being different in greater or
less degree from those arising in others, the better and safer rule
is to allow the jury, as to questions of the kind presented, to determine
every case upon its own individual merits, and in the light of its
own particular facts.
In some cases the failure to recover a switchkey or to have a switch guarded might involve little or no negligence
whatever. In other cases, such failure might amount to very gross
negligence. This being so, to permit evidence as to the common
experience and general custom of railroads in such matters would
probably be misleading, and certainly would have little weight in a
given ease in arriving at a fair and just conclusion upon the question of negligence.”
Kane, 92/187. Cited, 107/76.
624. Habit of the company with reference to a stool to aid in
alighting.
In Holcombe, 88/9, it was held that where the employee whose business it was to place a stool used for the purpose of
assisting lady passengers to enter the train was not produced or accounted for, there
on

or
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in

rejecting evidence that it was the custom and habit
to have the stool in its proper place up to the time
of the train, there being positive evidence in behalf
of the plaintiff that it was out of place when he was injured, and
only negative evidence to the contrary in behalf of the defendant.
Lumpkin, J., said: “If the servant of the company whose duty it
was to look after this stool had been sworn as a witness, and had testified that when the plaintifE fell the stool was where it should be,
we think it would.have been proper to allow him to strengthen his
testimony by stating, if he could, that he knew the stool was in its
proper place on this particular occasion because it was his invariable
habit and custom to keep it where it belonged, and not to take it up
until the train was about to start. No such witness was offered, and
defendant’s witnesses, who swore concerning the location of the stool,
did not positively say it was not on the platform between the cars.
Their testimony was, at best, only negative on this point, while the
testimony for plaintiff was positive that the stool was on such platform, and that he fell over it. We think that, while a witness may
testify to the existence of a custom or habit concerning which he
has personal knowledge, and with which he had personal connection, by way of strengthening his statement that this custom or
habit was observed on a particular occasion, it would not be proper,
as a general rule, to admit
independent testimony as to what was
or was not the habit of a person or corporation with reference to
a given subject.
79/387; Mayfield, supra. These authorities and the
eases therein cited not only sustain the above view, but an examination
was no error

of the company
of the starting

of them will show that

a

manifest distinction exists between

cus-

toms

which, by reason of their general operation, have the force and
effect of law, and the mere habit of one individual or corporation.
Of course, a custom so well known and recognized within the sphere
of its operation as to become a part of the law of contracts or other
transactions made in

a

particular locality

may

be proved by witnesses

familiar with the existence of the same; but the rule is different in
reference to the

poration

particular

in which a single corkind of business.”
crossing the street in front of

way or manner

or person transacts a specific
625. Usual custom of pedestrians in

dummies.
In
my
was

Johnson, 91/466, the plaintiff sued for injury caused by a dumbelonging to a street-railroad company. Defendant’s engineer
asked:

“What is the usual custom of the way passengers or
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pedestrians act toward these dummies — when you are driving down
the street; what is the usual custom of people when they undertake
to cross the street when dummies are coming along; what has been
your observation?” Plaintiff’s counsel objected to the observation of
the witness or usual custom; and the objection was sustained as to
his observations of the conduct of other people at a previous time.
Defendant, in its assignments of error, alleged that the court erred
in not allowing the engineer to answer the question, because the jury
were to compare Mrs. Johnson’s conduct with that of other people
under like circumstances, and it was competent to show how others
acted under like circumstances, by any one who had observed such conduct.

It

was

held that, on the

trial of

an

action against

a

street-

railroad company

for damages to the plaintiff occasioned by negligent injury to his wife, sustained in consequence of running a dummy
against her while she was endeavoring to cross a street in front of a
train, it is not competent to prove what was the usual custom of pedestrians when they undertook to cross a street along which cars drawn
by dummies were passing. Bleckley, C. J., said: “Their conduct
would be no measure of diligence for Mrs. Johnson, because that
measure is to be found, not in the conduct of such persons merely as
the engineer had observed, but in the conduct of every prudent person
who might be placed in like circumstances with those which environed
Mrs. Johnson at the time of this
not

*

for

occurrence.

This standard

was

proof by witnesses, but was already in the minds of the
jurors. They were to compare her conduct with that standard, and
not with a standard raised in the mind of the engineer, or which
might be raised in their own minds by what he had noticed relatively
to the usual conduct of certain unknown and unnamed persons, who
may have been more or less diligent than prudent persons generally.
For was the rejected evidence relevant touching the company’s or
the engineer’s negligence, for the engineer was bound to anticipate
that Mrs. Johnson would act as a prudent person, according to a legal
or
jury standard, and not merely according to the usual custom of
those pedestrians whom he himself had personally observed. It may
be well doubted whether this testimony was not admissible to affect
the conduct of the engineer.
Of course, it was not admissible to
change the degree of diligence required of either party, for that is
prescribed by law. But what is proper diligence under the circumstances of the case is a question for the jury. This injury occurred
one
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public street where each party had a right to be. It did not
on the defendant’s right of way, where the plaintiff would
have been a trespasser, and the engineer would not have been required
to anticipate her presence.
It does not appear on what ground the
objection to the testimony was based. The assignment of error attempts to support it on the theory that the jury were to compare
Mrs. Johnson’s conduct with that of other people under like circumstances, and therefore it was competent to show how others acted.
Certainly it could not be admitted for that purpose. It will be
observed that the question did not relate to any particular persons,
but to the usual custom of people — obviously meaning the people generally. The question fairly considered, probably meant this: ‘According to your observation, in what way do the people usually act
when they attempt to cross the street when dummies are coming
along?’ The answer would show how the people at large were accustomed to act in the given instance and that the engineer knew
about it. Was he not bound to anticipate that Mrs. Johnson might
probably act as he knew the people generally did under such circumstances? If he was, the testimony was admissible.”
on

a

occur

ORDINANCES.

626. Existence

of an ordinance is referred to the jury.
In Smith, 78/694, it was held that the omission of specific acts of
diligence prescribed by statute or by a valid municipal ordinance, is
negligence per se, and the court may so instruct the jury. In this
case the existence of an ordinance was referred, as matter of fact, to
the jury. Cited, 93/395; 110/247; 111/17.
In Young, 81/397, it was held that it is negligence as matter of
law for railway companies not to use the precautions for safety at
public crossings definitely prescribed by statute or valid municipal ordinance. The existence of an ordinance, however, is matter of fact to
be referred to the jury; the court can not notice it judicially. Such
an ordinance, regulating speed of trains and requiring flagmen or
watchmen to keep at crowded crossings, may be passed and enforced
by a city under the general grant of police powers usually found in
municipal charters. No unreasonable ordinance can be valid. Bleckley, C. J., said: “We will add that the style of the charge in this
case touching the city ordinances, was too absolute and unconditional,
in treating them as law, without any reference to the jury of the
question of fact as to whether there were such ordinances before
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them, and perhaps as to whether they were reasonable.

The

manner

of

dealing with the subject in Smith, supra, was more satisfactory.”
Cited, 88/64; 90/507; 111/17.
627. Municipal ordinance, how proved.
Section 5216 of the Civil Code provides that exemplifications of
the records and minutes of municipal corporations of this State,
when certified by the clerks or keepers of such records under seal,
shall be admitted in evidence under the same rules and regulations
as exemplifications of the records of the courts of record of this
State.
In

Johnson, 90/500, it was held that a municipal ordinance may
proved by the production of the original book of ordinances, identitled as such by the clerk of the corporation, and shown to have come
from his custody; notwithstanding section 5216 of the Civil Code
makes an official certified copy evidence, it is not the exclusive evidence. Cited, 102/297; 104/12.
A book purporting to contain the official minutes of a city council
was, in the absence of the clerk of council for providential cause, he
being the proper custodian of the minutes and records kept by the
council, admissible in evidence upon proof showing that the book
in question had been brought from the clerk’s office by the city treasurer, who was acting in the clerk’s place during his absence, and that
the official signature of the clerk appeared upon the pages of the
book in connection with what purported to be the proceedings of the
council. City of Columbus v. Ogletree, 102/293. Cited, 104/12.
In Hix, 104/11, it was held that an ordinance of a municipal corporation can not be proven by the introduction of a book purporting
to contain the published ordinances of the city, upon the parol testimony of a witness that such book was published by authority of the
city. Lewis, J., said: “The question presented is whether or not
an ordinance of a municipal corporation can be proven by the introduction of a book purporting to contain the published ordinances of a
city, upon the parol testimony of a witness that such book was published by authority of the city. From section 5216 of the Civil Code
and the decision in Johnson’s case, supra, it will be seen that there are
at least two ways in which a municipal ordinance may be proved:
First, by an official certified copy thereof, under seal; or, secondly, by
the production of the original book of ordinances, identified as such by
the clerk of the corporation, and shown to have come from his custody. The ordinance in the present case was admitted in evidence,
be
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over

the

who

swore

objection of the defendant, upon the testimony of a witness
that the book containing the same was a compilation of
the city ordinances of Dalton, published by authority of the city of
Dalton as their laws. That the witness stated simply that this book
was published ‘by authority of the city of Dalton/ would not render
it competent evidence.
It was not even shown that any municipal
ordinance or law was passed authorizing the publication, nor that
it was adopted by the proper city authorities as a compilation of its
book of ordinances.
It was an unauthentic copy, so far as this record
discloses, and was purely secondary evidence.”
In Bond, 111/13, it was held that an exemplification of a municipal ordinance is not admissible in evidence unless duly certified under
the corporate seal. Lumpkin, P. J., said: “The plaintiff’s husband
was killed in the town of Montezuma by a locomotive of the defend-

For the purpose of showing that the train drawn by
was running at an unlawful rate of speed, the plaintiff offered in evidence what purported to be a certified copy of an
ordinance of that town which made it unlawful to ‘run engines and
trains in any part of the town more than five miles an hour.’ This
document was objected to on the ground that ‘there was no seal of
the town attached’ to the certificate which purported to be signed by
the clerk of council. The objection was overruled. It ought to have
been sustained.
The paper offered in evidence was not admissible
under section 5211 of the Civil Code, for that section applies exclusively and in terms to the public officers of this State and the several
ant company.
this locomotive

counties

thereof, and therefore

can

have

no

reference to certificates

signed by municipal officers. Indeed, exemplifications of the records
of municipal corporations were not admissible at all until made so by
the Act of 1891, and it merely provides that they shall be admitted in
evidence when certified under seal. The provisions of this act are
now

embraced in section 5216 of the Civil Code.”

628. The

judge should construe an ordinance.
City of Columbus v. Ogletree, 102/293, it was held that the
duty of construing a pertinent city ordinance which has been introduced in evidence, and of explaining its meaning to the jury, devolves
upon the judge, and a request in effect asking that its construction
be submitted to them was properly refused. Cited, 104/12.
An ordinance limiting the rate of speed in passing over crossings
to ten miles an hour, does not imply that this rate is not to be exceeded between the crossings.
Smith, 78/694,
In

707

CHAPTER 86.

]

[ §629

Evidence.

629. Reasonableness

or

In Central Railroad Co.

unreasonableness

—

how

determined.

Brunswick and Western Railroad

Co.,
held that if a city ordinance regulating the speed of
trains embrace in its language the whole area of the city, and is
reasonable in itself, the court may submit to the jury the question as
to whether, on account of the special local conditions and surroundings, it would or would not reasonably apply to the particular locality
in question, that locality being just inside of the city limits.
Simmons, J., said:
“The court left the jury to determine, in view of
all the facts and circumstances of the case, whether there was a
necessity for the ordinance in this particular locality, and whether
or not the
operation of it at this place was reasonable. This was a
very fair and proper method of disposing of this question.
The
jury, with all the facts before them, were competent to decide it fairly.
The charge submitted to them impartially the contentions of both
sides as to the necessity and reasonableness of the ordinance, and
they were, perhaps, better qualified to reach a just conclusion on the
subject than the judge himself. At any rate, he saw proper to submit this question to them, and we are unable to see that in so doing
he committed any error.
To justify courts in declaring void an
ordinance limiting the speed of trains within a city, its unreasonableness, or want of necessity as a police regulation for the protection
of life and property, must be clear, manifest and undoubted.
31
Minn. 402. In the case just cited, the crossing at which a cow was
87/386, it

v.

was

plat of the city, but the surrounding country was
country outside of the city, and the street similar
to a common country road, there being no graded streets within threequarters of a mile, and no houses within a quarter of a mile, in the
direction of the built-up portion of the city, but the street seems to
have been a good deal traveled. Gilfillan, C. J., remarked: ‘While
it may be true that a higher rate of speed through the portion of the
city in question would be consistent with the public safety, we can
not say it is so clearly and manifestly the case that we can hold the
passage of the ordinance an abuse of discretion on the part of the
killed

was

in the

similar to the open

common

council.’

The fact that the railroad owned the land

on

injury occurred did not relieve it from the operation of
the ordinance.
34 Ind. 397; 88 Mo. 677; 65 Iowa, 658; 38 Hun, 51;
Horr & B. Mun. Ord. §§239, 145. As to reasonableness of ordinances
generally, and rule as to pronouncing void, see Horr. & B. Mun.
which the
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§188 et seq.; 57 Iowa, 555; 19 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 83.

The rule is laid down in Horr & Bemis, supra, that the questioi
whether an ordinance regulating the speed of trains in a city is
reasonable or unreasonable and void is for the court. In this case
the court ruled that the ordinance was, in itself, valid and rea-

particular locality
otherwise according as certain facts

sonable, but held that the application of it to the
in

was reasonable- or
were not established,

question

were

and left it to the jury to determine
We think that in thus acting the
disposed of both questions in the proper manner.” Cited,

or

whether
court

or

not these facts existed.

90/507.

it was held that the reasonableness or uncity ordinance regulating the speed of a train

In Johnson, 90/500,
reasonableness of

upon a
for the

a

street is a question of law for the court to decide, and not

jury, unless it depends, in the opinion of the court, on the existence of particular facts which are disputed.
It was error to
charge that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the ordinance
was a question for the jury.
Simmons, J;, said: “Such an ordinance may be reasonable as applied to one locality and unreasonable
as applied to another.
Although it may be reasonable as to populous
parts of a city, it may not be so with reference to uninhabited districts near the corporate limits.
If the nature of the locality is a
matter of dispute, the court should furnish the jury with the test by
which the reasonableness of the ordinance, as applied to the particular
locality, is to be determined, instructing them as to the conditions under which it would apply and those under which it would not; and
it would be for the jury to say whether or not the ordinance was
reasonable and applicable, according as they might find these condior not.
Central R. etc. Co. v. Brunswick & Western
R. Co., supra, and cases cited; Horr & B. Mun. Ord. §§239, 145.
The expression in Young, supra, to the effect that the court below

tions to exist

ought perhaps to have left it to the jury to say whether the ordinance
reasonable, instead of assuming its legality, and charging them
upon that assumption, yras merely an incidental suggestion, no direct
question having been made which could call for a ruling on this
point. In the present case the court charged that it was for the
jury to decide upon the validity of the ordinance, yet no issue of
fact had arisen which would require the submission to them of the
question of its reasonableness or unreasonableness in its application
to the locality in which the
injury took place. This we hold to be
error.
Cited, 97/648.
was
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Priscock, 97/643, it was held that the reasonableness or unreaa city ordinance, with reference to its application to a
particular locality, not being involved in the case, and there being no
request to charge on this subject, an omission to do so was not error.
Simmons, C. J., said: “Besides, it appears from the evidence that
the place where the injury occurred was near the center of the city,
and in a populous locality, and there could be no question of the
reasonableness of the ordinances as applied to that locality.
In Stafford, 99/187, it appeared that the accident occurred at a
crossing of a public street in the city of Dalton. It was held that,
under the evidence in this case, the court did not err in charging
that a failure of the defendant’s servants to comply with a city ordinance regulating the speed of trains within the corporate limits
was negligence, nor in failing to submit to the jury the question
whether such ordinance was reasonable or unreasonable, with reference to the locality where the injury was inflicted.
630. Companies and employees must take notice of ordinances.
Railroad companies and their .employees using railways in a city
must take notice of all valid city ordinances duly promulgated. Railroad v. Railroad, 87/386.
It is not competent for any purpose to show that a railroad employee who has violated a municipal ordinance was ignorant of its
existence. Lumpkin, P. J., said: “It was insisted in the argument
here that testimony upon this line, though not admissible for the
sonahleness of

.

of excusing the engineer for a violation of the town ordicompetent for the purpose of showing that he was not
grossly negligent in running the train at a prohibited rate of speed.
We can not concur in this view. When a town or city passes an ordinance of this kind, all railroad companies concerned and their agents
and servants are chargeable with constructive .notice of it, and it can
not become material, in any judicial investigation of the question
whether or not the ordinance was duly observed upon a particular
occasion, to inquire whether the company or its employees had actual
purpose

nance, was

notice of the existence of the
A

same or

not.”

Bond, 111/13.

city ordinance which by its terms manifestly relates exclusively
which cars are moved by locomotives propelled by
steam, and which regulates the “running speed of trains and engines” within the city limits, has no application to an electric streetrailroad, and therefore is irrelevant in a trial of an action against
to railroads upon

the latter.

Hill, 101/66.
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Foster, 108/223, it was held that, in a suit for damages against
street-railway company for personal injuries sustained by the running of its cars on a public crossing in a city where the plaintiff’s
petition alleges that the defendant’s car was at the time of the injury running fifteen miles an hour, which “violated an ordinance of
the city of Atlanta which requires the speed of such cars over crossings not to exceed six miles per hour,” it was not error for the court
to admit in evidence ordinances of the city prescribing that the speed
of street-cars should not be more than six miles an hour at public
crossings, and making a violation of the ordinance a penal offense;
the only objection made by counsel to the introduction of the ordinances being that the same were not sufficiently pleaded in the plaintiff’s petition. Lewis, J., said: “No demurrer was filed to the allegations of the petition in this particular on the ground of a want of
sufficient fullness, nor was any objection made that the ordinances
referred to were not set forth in the petition nor copies attached as
exhibits thereto. If there was any defect in the petition on this account, it was the subject-matter oi a special demurrer, and had it
been attacked in this way the plaintiff could have readily met the
objection by offering a proper amendment. A failure on the part
of the defendant below to make its objection in this way amounted
to a waiver of its right to have the ordinances in question more fully
a

described

set

forth, and we know of no law which will allow it to
right simply by objecting to testimony which clearly
tends to sustain the general allegations of the petition.”
631. Habitual negligence at particular times and places.
In Flannagan, 82/579, it was held that it was not error to receive
evidence of doubtful admissibility, and such was the character of the
evidence showing the high speed at which the engine which ran over
and killed the plaintiff’s husband was habitually run by the same
engineer at the same place, and that he habitually neglected to ring
the bell. Bleckley, C. J., said: “This evidence was of doubtful admissibility. The authorities upon the question conflict. Upon so
doubtful a question we think the court did not err in
admitting the
evidence. There are several cases in our reports holding that doubtful evidence is to he admitted rather than excluded.” Cited,
92/192;
94/110; 107/76.
In Kane, 92/187, it was held that though one of the main issues
was whether or not the
engineer for whose homicide the action was
brought was guilty of negligence in bringing about the collision which
or

assert such

a
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resulted in his

death, there

was no error

in refusing to allow the de-

fendant to prove that he “was habitually reckless in running freighttrains at excessive speed, and running too fast over switches,” the
witness’s knowledge not extending to more than two or three instances.

Lumpkin, J., said: “The admissibility of testimony of this
court
speed
at which the same engine was habitually run by the same engineer at
the same place, and that he habitually neglected to ring the bell,
Chief Justice Bleckley characterized this evidence as being of doubtful admissibility, and stated that the authorities upon the question
were in conflict.”
Cited, 94/110.
kind is at best very doubtful. While in Flannagan, supra, this
held that it was not error to receive evidence showing the high

In Ross, 107/73, it was held to be error to allow a witness to testify: “They killed a good many stock out in that way—they kill the
mules and cows.
It has not been a year since they killed a mule
right below where they killed mine.” And Little, J., in speaking of

said: “There the testimony was confined
by the same engineer, on the same street; and
Chief Justice Bleckley cited a large number of cases pro and con. on
the admissibility of such evidence when it was confined to the identical place, and the identical locomotive operated by the same person.
The admissibility of the evidence must have been sustained alone to
show the habitual negligence of the particular person who it was
claimed was guilty of the particular act. The proposition here, in
effect, would be, that all the engines of this company were, by the
different engineers, accustomed to kill mules and cows at this place.”
632. Habits of injured person.
In a suit against a city for damages, resulting from falling into a
hole on a sidewalk, it being in issue whether the plaintiff was under
the influence of liquor at the time of the injury or not, there was no
error in admitting evidence of repeated drunkenness for some years
before the injury and afterwards, the judge having cautioned the
jury that, unless the plaintiff was under the effects of liquor on the
night of the injury, such testimony could not affect his case. Enright v. City of Atlanta, 78/288.
The habit or practice of the plaintiff in departing from cars on other
occasions, either before or after the injury complained of, is not admissible testimony for the purpose of illustrating his conduct at the
particular time under investigation. Bates, 103/233.
Flannagan’s

to the

same

case, supra,

engine,

run
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The deceased not

having been killed while jumping on or off cars,
previous habit of doing so at the public crossing where he was
killed is not relevant evidence. Evans, 87/673.
633. Plaintiff's character for prudence and caution.
In Smith, 94/107, it was held that on the question whether, in
the particular instance, the plaintiff used due care for his own safety,
evidence of his character for prudence or recklessness in the conduct
of such business is inadmissible, either against him or for him. And
Lumpkin, J., said: “One of the contested issues of fact was whether,
on the occasion on which he was injured, the plaintiff used due care
for his own protection and safety. We do not think this question
could be elucidated by evidence, one way or the other, as to the general character of the plaintiff for prudence or recklessness.
Kane,
supra, and the authorities there cited, sufficiently sustain the ruling
now made.
It is true that in one of these cases, Flannagan, supra,
this court sanctioned the admission of evidence showing the high
speed at which the same engine was habitually run by the same engineer at the same place; but Chief Justice Bleckley said it was of
doubtful admissibility, and besides there is some difference between
proving habitual acts of recklessness or negligence at particular times
and places, and proving the general character of a particular person
for recklessness, or the contrary.” Cited, 103/349; 107/76.
Upon the trial of an action for personal injuries against a railroad
company by one of its engineers, after admitting evidence tending to
show that such engineer was experienced and reliable, it was error
to charge that, as throwing light on the question whether or not he
was to blame, the jury might consider his character as an
experienced
and reliable engineer, if such character had been shown by the testimony, the evidence mentioned not being relevant upon this particular
issue. Kent, 87/402.
The suit, Newton, 85/517, was brought to recover damages for the
homicide of the plaintiff’s husband, and the court permitted a witness to
testify that the character of the deceased was that of a prudent and cautious man. This was held to be error.
Simmons, J.,
said: “We think the court erred in admitting this evidence for the
purpose for which it seems to have been used by the plaintiff in the
his

court below.

band of the

One of the theories of the defendant

was

that the hus-

plaintiff could have avoided this injury by the exercise of
ordinary care and diligence at the time he was injured. The ques-
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tion at issue before the

jury, therefore, was as to his conduct at that
particular time, not as to whether he was a ‘prudent and cautious’
man ordinarily or not.
In the case of Morris v. Town of East
Haven, 41 Conn. 254, the court said: ‘Every case has, of course, its
peculiar circumstances, and these must be taken into consideration in
determining whether or not in that particular case reasonable care
was

exercised.

Hence what would be reasonable

care

in

one

case

might fall far short of it in another, and consequently the question
whether it was exercised in one case would throw no light upon

question whether it was exercised in another. ... It might as
proved that a party was negligent on a certain occasion, by
showing that he had been negligent on other occasions where other
parties had been injured.’ In the case of Chase v. Railroad, 77
Me. 62, it was held: ‘In an action for personal injuries received
by a collision at a railroad-crossing, evidence will not be received
to show the general character and habits of the traveler for carefulness, as bearing upon the question of due care on his part,
though the injuries occasioned death before he cou]4 tell how the accident happened, and no one saw him at the time of the collision.
Cited, 87/408.
634. Evidence to show recklessness of deceased.
Where the question is in respect to the fault of the husband of
plaintiff, for whose homicide she sued, or that of the engineer, warnings of the engineer to the conductor, who was the deceased husband, in regard to his imprudence in transactions similar to that
the

well be

9 99

which resulted in his

death,

admissible in evidence. It was a cirlight upon the conduct of the two men
and their character. As well the caution of the engineer or his character therefor, as the disregard of warning, and hence the recklessness of the deceased.
Sears, 59/436.
635. Not competent for plaintiff to testify that he acted cautiously
That the plaintiff acted cautiously is a conclusion, not a mere fact,
and he is not competent to testify in general terms that he so acted.
Mayfield, 87/374.
636. Eepavrs made after the accident.
One issue being whether a
cotton-yard was negligently out of repair, there was no error in allowing evidence of repairs which were
made at the place where the injury occurred,
although made after it
are

cumstance calculated to throw
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happened. Whether they should have been made before or were rendered necessary by the accident was a question for the jury. Gleason,
69/200. Cited, 82/589.
Upon the trial of a suit against a street-railroad company for an
injury sustained by careless driving over a sharp curve and sudden
elevation, it was competent to show that the defendant had altered
the

curve

since the accident.

The alteration

was a

fact which it

was

competent for the plaintiff to prove for the consideration of the
jury, subject to be explained by the defendant why the alteration
was made.
Renz, 55/126, Cited, 82/589.
In

Flannagan, 82/579, it

was

held that it

was

admissible to

prove

that after the

homicide, the engines of the company were run more
slowly along the street which was the scene of the accident. Bleckley, C. J., said: “There is much authority to the contrary (see
Patt. Ry. Accident Law, 421, 422), but we think consistency with
our own decisions requires us to hold that it was admissible to show
that, after the accident, the engines of the company ran more slowly
at the

place of t]je accident than they did previously. The cause of
change of speed was a question for the jury. Renz and Gleason,
supra. The evidence was certainly of very slight value, but its admissibility did not depend upon what it proved, but upon its tendency.”
In Rogers, 104/224, a full report of the facts is not made,
but it was held that if there was any negligence in the railroad
company’s permitting timbers to be placed from its track across
a ditch for the purpose of
facilitating passage over it, such negligence did not contribute to the injury of the plaintiff.
It was
therefore error for the court to charge that, in arriving at a
conclusion whether or not the defendant was negligent, the jury
could consider the removal of such timbers by the-company after
the time of the injury.
And Simmons, C. J., said: “It appears
that two cross-ties had been, prior to the time of the injury to plaintiff, placed across a ditch which ran alongside of the railroad-track
for the purpose of facilitating the passage of pedestrians over the
ditch to the track and that these timbers were in this position at the
time of the injury. Whether they were placed there .by the servants
of the company seems to be in doubt, but it is shown that the servants of the company knew of their
presence, and that they were used
as a
footway. Plaintiff and others frequently used them in crossing
this
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the ditch.

After the

injury to plaintiff, the cross-ties were removed
to show that the presence
sustained by plaintiff.
Under these facts, the court charged the jury that they might consider
the removal of the ties by the company in arriving at a conclusion
as to whether the
company was negligent in the present case. This
court has decided in several cases that where injury was inflicted by
means of a defect in the track or machinery of a railroad company, and
such defect was subsequently removed or repaired by the company, this
fact could be considered as in the nature of an admission of negligence
by the company. I have always regarded this as a harsh rule, for it
may frequently happen that the servants of the corporation may not
know of the defect until after it has injured some one. It seems to
me to be unjust to charge a person or a corporation with negligence
because the defect by means of which the injury was inflicted has
been repaired.”
637. Others injured at same place in same way.
The basis of the plaintiff’s right to recover is negligence, and,
whether the system of the defendant in regard to allowing cellars on
its sidewalks, in front of business houses, is reasonably calculated to
ensure the safety of those who travel on it by day or night, in a question of fact for the jury, and not a question for the court to decide in
its charge. In passing upon it, evidence that children, upon different
occasions, have previously fallen into such openings was admissible.
It bears remotely upon the question and is admissible for what it is
worth. City of Augusta v. Hafers, 59/151.
When suit was brought against a municipal corporation, for damages incurred by reason of certain roots of a tree having been negligently left projecting above a sidewalk, in which roots the foot of a
pedestrian at night was caught, causing her to trip and fall, and injuring her, it was admissible to show by another person that he
was tripped and thrown down some
days previously by the same roots
at the same place.
It was a circumstance to show that the sidewalk
would occasion falls. In cases of doubt as to the admissibility of evidence, the current of authority in this State is to admit it and leave
its weight and effect to be determined
by the jury. Gilmer v. City
of Atlanta, 77/688.
In an action against a railroad
company for the negligent killing of
a cow, evidence that the
company had at different times paid other
company. The evidence does not tend
of the timbers contributed to the injury

by the
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persons for cattle killed
vant and inadmissible.

by its trains at the same place was irreleWalker, 87/204.

638.

.

Viewing the 'premises by the jury.
In Mayor etc. v. Brown, 87/596, Lumpkin, J., said: “The jury,
with the consent of counsel for both sides, were permitted by the
court to visit the scene of the accident and make a personal inspection of the same for themselves. We think this was a good practice,
as it must undoubtedly have materially aided them in arriving at a
correct conclusion as to whether the city authorities were negligent
or not.
In view of the testimony, and of this personal examination
by the jury of the open sewer, we can not say they erroneously found
that defendant was negligent, or that the court abused its discretion in allowing their verdict to stand.” Cited, 97/646.
In Prisock, 97/643, it was held that even if it be within the discretion of the trial judge, over objection by either party, to allow
the jury, in the trial of an action for damages, to inspect the place
where an alleged injury occurred, this court will not reverse his
action in refusing so to do when it affirmatively appears that material
physical changes had occurred in the character of the premises between the time of the injury and the time of the trial. Simmons, C.
J., said:
absence of

“There is
statute

some

conflict of authority as to whether, in the

authorizing a view of the premises by the jury,
competent for the court to order a view against the objection
of a party. See 1 Thomp. Trials, §882; Springer v. City of Chicago, 35 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 183. In the case of Mayor etc. v.
Brown, supra, it appeared that the jury were permitted to visit the
scene of the injury, and make a
personal examination of the premises, and Justice Lumpkin, in referring to this as showing that the
jury had a good opportunity for arriving at a correct conclusion as
to whether the city authorities were negligent or not, remarked incidentally that it was a good practice; but in that case counsel on
both sides consented to the view of the premises by the jury, and no
question was made as to the power or duty of the court in such cases.
Assuming, however, that it is within the power of the trial judge
to allow the jury to inspect the premises, over
objection by either
party, this court will not reverse his action in refusing to do so, when
it affirmatively appears, as it did here, that there have been material
changes in the premises between the time of the injury and the time
a

it is

of the trial.”
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The court erred in not allowing a diagram of the place where the
collision occurred to be sent out with the jury; it having been prepared
a civil engineer, who testified
admitted in evidence.
Stafford,

by

639.

to its correctness, and having been
99/187.

Defective engine compared with other engines of the

same

company.
In

Flannagan, 82/579, the plaintiff’s husband was run over and

killed

by

an

engine.

She alleged that the engine was old and worn

out, with the brakes in bad condition, and difficult to stop, and that

allowed to
one in
question, that had a hand-brake, the objection being that the declaration did not allege negligence in using an engine supplied only with
a hand-brake.
It was held that the declaration alleging that the locomotive was not supplied with proper brakes, evidence respecting its
brakes, as compared with those of other locomotives belonging to the
same company, was admissible.
640. Speed of train, what it was just before, not admissible.
Where the speed of a train at the time of a negligent homicide
occurring upon a public street was material, evidence to show what
the speed was on the company’s property just before reaching the
street was not irrelevant. Bleckley, Ck. J., said: “The speed of the
train in approaching the place of accident, although at the time the
speed was noticed by the witness the train was not upon the street,
but upon the company’s property, was not wholly irrelevant.
The
distance from the scene of the accident was not very considerable, and
the engine was then upon the same journey which in its further
progress resulted in the homicide. There is some little presumption
that the speed of a train, when once shown, continues to be the same,
for a short distance at least, until a change of speed appears from
the testimony; and we do not know that this presumption is varied
by the fact that the train passed in the meantime from the company’s property to the street. As trains do not run alone, but have
one or more persons upon them, it is generally in the
power of the
company to show a change of speed, if any in fact took place.” Flannagan, 82/579.
641. Length of trains, proof of average length not admissible.
Newsom, 62/339, was an action brought to recover damages for the
malicious blowing of the whistle of an engine on the railroad when the
it

was

not

supplied with

state that he knew of

no

proper

brakes.

A witness

was

engine of defendant, other than the
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plaintiff

was

traveling along the public road with his horse and

buggy, thereby causing his horse to run away and injure him. The
defendant insisted that the whistle was blown so as to enable its
hindmost car on the train to stop opposite the platform at a crossing,
for passengers to get off. Thus the length of the train became a material

question.

The court allowed

a

witness to state that the

aver-

age length of defendant’s trains at that season of the year was not
less than a certain number of cars.
The testimony was improper.
The

question

not what

was

was what was the length of that particular
the average length of defendant’s trains.

train, and

642.

Reports of accidents.
Carlton, 81/531, the plaintiff gave the defendant notice to produce a report which defendant by its rules required its conductor to
make as to the circumstances and character of injuries caused by operation of its trains, etc.
No oath was made as to its materiality, or
that it was in defendant’s possession, and the court refused to compel its production. Blandford, J., said: “Had the requirements of
the statute been complied with, we see no reason why the paper
should not have been produced. We do not understand such a paper
to be a privileged communication.”
Cited, 82/473.
This was not a decision upon the question of the admissibility of the
report. It goes no further than to suggest that the report was not a
privileged communication, and, really, even that question was not involved so as to render a decision necessary. 82/473.
In Carroll, 82/452, it was held that reports to the general manager
of the company touching the facts, circumstances and results of a
railway accident, and who was to blame therefor, made several days
after the event, by the superintendent and the conductor, supported
by the affidavit of the latter and of several other employees, are
not admissible in evidence to affect the company, whether such
reports were exacted and made under standing rules requiring the
same, or under special orders for the particular occasion, no question of notice to the company being involved in the controversy.
In

Cited, 85/765.
A

report made to

railroad company by one of its servants of the
an injury received
by him in its employment, is not admissible in his favor in a suit by him against the
company for damages and calls for no response by the company.
Howard, 84/711.
a

facts and circumstances of
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In Whitehead, 90/47, the plaintiff sued the railroad company for
damages for the homicide of her husband, alleging that he was in
the company’s employment as a section-hand, and was at work in the
discharge of his duty, shoveling dirt in a cut and constructing a
drain or ditch at the side of the track, and, while standing at the
end of a cross-tie, performing his work, the defendant’s constructiontrain, with no regular schedule, came backing through the cut at
about twenty-five miles an hour, and struck her husband on the head,
inflicting injuries from which he died; that no signal was given by
the engineer at the road-crossing, which was a short distance from
the cut, the whistle was not blown or the bell rung, and no signal
was
given when the train entered the cut, nor before; that the place
where the deceased was standing when the car struck him was in
a cut and j'ust beyond a sharp curve; and that the train had j'ust
rounded the curve when he was struck, and had given no signal
whatever to warn him, and he was not guilty of any fault or negligence. Over objections, the court admitted the following rules of the

defendant:

“No. 113.

Work-trains will be

run

as

under

extras

special orders, and will be assigned certain limits.” “No. 70. Extra
and delayed trains must sound the whistle frequently on
apgroaching
curves, and before passing obscure places.” “No. 104. When a train
is being pushed by an engine (except when shifting and making-up
trains in yards), a flagman must be stationed in a conspicuous position on the front of the leading car, so as to perceive the first sign
of danger, and immediately signal the engineer.” The objections were
that this evidence was irrelevant; that there was no allegation'predicated upon the violation of these rules, or that would authorize their
introduction; and that it was not alleged or shown that the plaintiff’s
husband knew of their existence
road

or

relied

on

them,

nor

that he

or

the

operating under them. It was held that the rules were
relevant to the negligence charged, and there was no error in admitting them.
643. Identifying a broken axle.
Upon an inquiry as to what caused the breaking of a car-axle,
were

which occurred
train

was

offered

on

the railroad of the defendant at

wrecked, it

was

not

error

a

time when

to refuse to allow

a

a

witness

by the defendant to describe to the jury an axle which had
brought to him, reputed, but not proved, to have come from the
defendant’s railroad, and not identified, either as belonging to the
been
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the one involved in the inquiry, although the deexpected to prove by this witness that the axle he examined “was broken exactly as the other witness saw the axle made by
the wreck, after the injury.” Defendant’s counsel admitted that he
could not identify the axle as the one broken at the accident, and
for want of identification alone, the evidence was rejected. Dottenheim, 92/425.
644. 'Acceptance of ticket as agent estops denial of agency.
If one, as agent of a railroad company, accepted a free ticket
therefrom, and while traveling over the road free of charge, upon
leaving the train near a depot, was injured, he would be estopped from
denying the existence of his agency. Henderson, 69/715; 73/718.
645. Change of road.
A public road had run for years at a particular place.
On the
approach of the railroad contractors to the place the road was turned
so as to take a different route.
They made a cut eight or nine feet
deep where the old road was. The new road led around the cut,
defendant,

or as

fendant also

and crossed the railroad about one hundred feet from the old road.

Two small

saplings and some brush were placed in the old road as
guide t9 the new crossing, but they were insufficient to place any
one on guard at night.
When the new road had been opened a week
or two and had been used by the public, the plaintiff reached the
place on his way to the city of Atlanta at eight o’clock at night.
The night was dark and it was raining.
He knew nothing of the
railroad-cut being there, until his team stopped and refused to go.
He got out of his wagon and went to his lead mule which he found had
turned around. It was so dark he could discern nothing but that the
mule was in the bushes. He retraced his steps around the wagon to
find out what was the matter and fell into the cut, and was
seriously
injured. The point of the defense was that the road was permanently
changed, and that the plaintiff, at the time of the fall, was not in the
legal road. The burden of showing that the route of the road had
been legally changed was upon the defendant, and that could
only be
done by the production of the order, or by proof of such
long-established usage as to justify a presumption of such order. If the road
was
changed without authority of law — a trap dug and carelessly left
open, to the detriment of those who, by night as well as by day, have
a right to
pass over the road — it was a gross wrong. A verdict for
the plaintiff was sustained. Wood, 48/565.
a
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646. Contract

releasing defendant from responsibility.
was a suit to recover damages for killing mules
by a freight-train. The defendant offered in evidence a contract
between plaintiff and defendant for the supplying of cross-ties to
defendant from April to October, 1893, in which plaintiff released
defendant from all responsibility in damages to his stock during
the time he was employed and working under this contract. The objection was that the contract showed on its face that it had expired
before the cause of action arose; defendant proposing to show that
the terms of the contract had been extended by parol, and that it was
in force at the time of the accident, and related to the locality where
the same occurred. The evidence was rejected, and it was held that
where the only objection to the admissibility in evidence of a written
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was, in effect, that
under the limitation as to time therein expressed it had expired,
and was no longer operative as to the matter in controversy between
the parties, and the defendant, in whose behalf it was tendered in
evidence, offered to prove “that the terms of the contract had been
extended by parol” so as to cover and embrace that matter, this
objection should not have been sustained without allowing the defendant an opportunity to show that the contract had in fact been
so extended, no question under the statute of frauds
being involved, *1
647. Base conduct of the plaintiff.
On the trial of a civil action, at which the plaintiff testifies as a
witness in his own behalf, it is competent for the defendant to
prove
that the plaintiff, in furtherance of this identical cause, and for the
purpose of prevailing therein, had been guilty of base, dishonorable or
Wideman, 99/245,

criminal conduct.

Evidence of this character is admissible in behalf

of the

defendant, both to discredit the plaintiff as a witness, and to
throw suspicion upon the justice of his cause of action.
Accordingly the defendant in such case may show that at a previous stage
of the suit the plaintiff made an affidavit in which he denied
the truth
of material statements in another affidavit made
by an adverse witness,
and that the plaintiff
afterwards, when testifying in the cause, admitted that his own affidavit, or a
part of it, was wilfully false. And

where both relevant and irrelevant matters are so blended
in the two
affidavits as to render it necessary that both should be read in
full,
in order to clearly understand what and how much
of the first was
denied in the second, and in order to
apply the substance of the
latter to that of the former, the whole of the two
may be offered and
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received in evidence

together; and it will be no legal objection to
admissibility that some of the contents of one or both, taken
separately, are not relevant, and, if so taken, would not be admissible.
An admission by a party to a cause on trial, made by him
while under examination as a witness upon a former trial of the
same cause, that he had intentionally sworn falsely in an affidavit intended to be used, and which was actually used, in his behalf in resistance to a motion for a new trial, is admissible in evidence against
him, as showing an improper and unconscionable effort on his part to
interfere with the due course of justice, and also to discredit him as
their

a witness at the trial in which evidence of such admission is offered;
and, where the whole of his previous examination relating to this particular matter would better indicate the scope and precise import of
the admission in question than would a part only of such examination, the whole is admissible, although some of it, separately considered, may be irrelevant. It is not essential to the admissibility of
such affidavit and examination, for the purposes indicated, that they
should contain anything in conflict with the testimony of the party
at the last or pending trial, in which they are offered in evidence.
A
party, though introduced as a witness in his own behalf, may, upon
cross-examination as to matters not voluntarily testified about on his
direct examination, decline to give testimony which would tend to
criminate him, or to bring infamy, disgrace, or public contempt upon
himself or his family, notwithstanding the fact that at a previous

trial of the

he had waived his

privilege of remaining silent as
binding upon a witness
at a trial subsequent to that at which the waiver was made.
Lybrend,
99/421. Cited, 103/206.
648. Injured person incompetent witness when engineer is dead.
The locomotive-engineer, from whose negligent act the injury complained of was sustained, is an agent of the corporation within the
meaning of the statute of October 29, 1889,^ and, he being dead, the
person injured is an incompetent witness to testify in his own behalf
to such negligent act, it not appearing that
any surviving officer or
.agent of the corporation was present. Mayfield, 87/374.
649. Compelling female witnesses to come into
court.
In Powell, 77/192, the objection was that as
Mrs. Powell the
case

to these matters.

A waiver of this kind is not

plaintiff, resided in the county and was not unable to attend
her in
terrogatories could not be read and it was held that a female
witness'
though a party to the suit, and residing in the
county, is not obliged
as a
general rule to attend court in order to testify.
Doubtless, for
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,

special reasons shown to the court, personal attendance might b6 required, but the present instance stands on the general rule. Cited,
83/356.
In Denmead, 83/351, it was argued that a colored female witness
whose testimony was taken by interrogatories was of such bad character that if she had been subjected to cross-examination before the
court and jury, the jury would not have believed her.
It was held
that she being a female, the plaintiff, under the law, had the
right
to take her testimony by interrogatories.
If the defendant had desired to have her examined before the court and
jury, the judge had
power to compel her presence, and doubtless would have done scf
upon proper application and the assignment of sufficient reason for
the necessity of her attendance.
In Randall, 85/297, Simmons, J., said:
“Complaint is made that
the court refused to compel two female witnesses to come into court
and testify, or to continue the case in order that their
interrogatories might be taken. Under the facts as stated in this ground of
the motion, we do not think the court erred either in
refusing to compel the two females to attend court, or in refusing to continue the
case that their
interrogatories might be taken. It was not shown
to the court, in a proper manner, what the witnesses would
testify, or
the materiality of that testimony. This not being done, the court
was right in
refusing to compel the witnesses to attend, and in refusing to continue the case. We do not agree with the court, -however,
in the reason assigned by him for not compelling the attendance of
the witnesses. We think every court, in the furtherance of justice,
has a right to compel any witness within its jurisdiction to attend
court, and testify. In the case of female witnesses, we think that
some good reason should be shown to the court why it is
necessary
for the females to attend in person, what they will testify, and the
materiality of their testimony. If upon this showing the court is
satisfied that it is necessary, in the furtherance of justice, for the female witnesses to attend court, he should issue an order requiring
them to attend and testify in the case. The statute does not exempt
females from attendance upon court. It simply permits their interTogatories to be taken. But, while this is true, this provision of the
statute should be followed, unless it is shown to the court that it is
necessary to have the personal attendance of the witnesses.
650. Rule of railroad commission as to interstate passage.
The rule of the railroad commission of this State fixing train rates
of fare is admissible in evidence on the trial of a case involving a
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demand
ticket for transporting him from a

controversy as to what amount a conductor was entitled to
from

passenger without a valid
station outside of this State to
a

112/121.
651. Agent is

a

station within the

same.

Coyle,

competent witness. The agent is a competent witagainst his principal. His interest goes to his
credit. The declarations of the agent as to the business transacted
by him are not admissible against his principal, unless they were a
part of the negotiation, and constituting the res gestae, or else the
agent be dead. Civil Code, §3034.
In Smith v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 112/680, the plaintiff sued for damages
sustained by reason of the homicide of her son.
Cobb, J., said: “It
is alleged that the court erred in excluding the following testimony of a witness for the plaintiff—‘That he heard Dennis say that
he had not been in the employ of defendant but a few days before
Tommie Smith was killed, and did not know what the rules of the
mill and duties of an alley boy were.’ It was admitted that Dennis
was dead, and there was evidence tending to show that he was a
general boss in the mill. It is contended that the court erred in rejecting the evidence, because the same was admissible as the declarations of a deceased agent, and tended to show negligence on the part
of the defendants, in that their agent failed to exercise proper superness

either for

vision

over

the

the deceased to

a

or

deceased, and tended to show that Dennis had put
a

different work from that for which he

was

hired.

It is unnecessary to decide in the present case whether such a declaration as that sought to be introduced is admissible under the provisions

of section 3034 of the Civil Code, which
of the agent as to the business transacted

declares, ‘The declarations
by him are not admissible
against his principal, unless they were a part of the negotiation, and
constituting the res gesfee, or else the agent be dead.’ Even if such
a declaration would
ordinarily be admissible, there was no error in
rejecting the testimony in the present case, for the reason that there
was no allegation that the defendants were
negligent in the employment of their servants who had control

over the deceased.”
And it
held that in the trial of a suit brought
by a mother against a
master for the homicide of her son, where there was no
was

allegation in
negligent in the employment of the servants who had control over the
deceased, it was not
error to
reject the declaration of one of such servants, since deceased,
that he had been in the
employment of the defendant for only a
short time, and did not know what were the duties of
the son.
the

plaintiff s petition that the defendant

was

,
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CHAPTER 37.
DAMAGES.
652. Kinds of damages, Civil
3910.
653. Judge must give the jury
654.

Code,

§§3909,

the rule for
estimating the damages claimed.
General rule, Civil Code, §3905.
Interest

655. Interest

as

as

is

injured or destroyed.
656. Illustrations of the rule.

admitted to show general nature of the pain and suffering.
664. Abortion,
pain and sorrow resulting
from.
665. Injury to pride of manhood.
666. The guide in measuring such damages.
Permanent Injuries.

estimating damages for
permanent injuries.
before and

667. No fixed rule for

668. Medical evidence of condition
after suit brought.

671.

673.

674.
675.

capacity shown by exhibition
of the injured hand.
Previous ill health aggravated by the
injury.
The law does not contemplate absolute
compensation for loss of limb.
When jury should not be instructed to
consider prospect of increased earnings.
Recovery for diminished capacity to labor without proof of value of earnings.
Probability of increase of wages by appointment to office.
Declining- years and decrease in capacity
of

to labor.

676. Diminution in capacity caused by
er

anoth-

hurt.

677. Plaintiff should not conceal fact of previous affliction or wound from the

jury.

678. His vocation before the injury and its
value.
679. Plaintiff’s own testimony as to his diminished capacity to labor.
680. When averments of age and capacity to
labor are not necessary.
681. To throw light on his condition, proof
that he played billiards was admitted.
682. Lost time, nominal damages allowed for
without proof of value.
683. When minor must show that his earn-

ings belonged to himself.

652. Kinds

should conform

married

as to vital organs.
may recover for

woman

expenses.

damages, Civil Code, §3007.
worldly circumstances of the
parties are not involved.
Subject continued.
Vindictive damages allowed where the
conductor was impolite and gruff.
No special damage being proved, the
amount of general damage is for the
enlightened conscience of the jury.
Aggravation, Civil Code, §3906.
The kind of cases to which the section

688. Vindictive

689. When
690.

691.

labor causing mental

distress.

672.

687. When

692.

663. Evidence

670.

and charge

Vindictive Damages.

continued.
Physical Pain and Mental Distress.
658. Physical pain and suffering.
659. Future pain.
660. Mental suffering
of survivors not con657. Subject

669. Loss

proof

to the injury alleged.
685. Hearsay evidence as to age and place
of birth admissible.
686. Injury to particular organs shown under

general allegations

Damages.

damages, where property

sidered.
661. Mental suffering,
662. Loss of ability to

684. The

693.

694.

the

applies.
Subject continued.
“Punishing the defendant,** and “justice
and
the
public good” should be
omitted in charging the jury.
697. Onus is on the plaintiff, and when this
section should be given in charge.
698. When the company is liable for servant’s
695.
696.

699. If

acts.
the

jury may reasonably find there
aggravating circumstances, dam*
be increased.
700. Illustrations of the principle.
701. Other conduct alleged as matter of aggravation.
were

ages may

702. Intention of the conductor.
703. Punitive damages assessed without

ing claimed

eo

be-

nomine in the declara-

tion.
704. Evidence of defendants having been fined
for the offense, admissible.
705. Expense of litigation, Civil Code, §3796.
706. When not allowed.
707. Must be proved in order to recover.

708. Necessary expenses consequent upon the

injury, Civil Code, §3908.
709. An improper charge.
710. Damages for killing or injuring stock.
711. Damages
for negligence causing the

burning of timber, fences, etc.
712. Plaintiff bound to lessen damage, Civil
Code. §3802.
713. Illustrations of the rule.
714. Discretion of the jury as to damages,
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.

Civil Code, §3803.
Explanatory.
Other verdicts as precedents.
General rules.

Writing off

a

portion of the damages.

Verdicts that were not excessive.
Excessive verdicts.
Conclusiveness of verdicts.
When a verdict for the defendant should
not be directed.

of damages. Damages may be either general or speconsequential. Civil Code, §3909.
General damages; special damages. “General” damages are such
as the law presumes to flow from any tortious act, and may be recovered without proof of any amount. “Special” damages are such as,
cial, direct

or
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actually flowed from the act, and must be proved in order to be recovered. Civil Code, §3910.
In County of Bibb v. Ham, 110/340, Simmons, C. J., said: “Under
the definition of general damages in section 3910 of the Civil Code
the law infers bodily pain and suffering from personal injury and loss
of time from the disabling effect thereof.
1 Suth. Dam. (2d ed.)
§421. The present suit was for pain and suffering and loss of time
resulting from the personal injury to the plaintiff. She also sued for
injuries which had disabled or affected her permanently, and as to
such injuries it has been held that The future effect of the injuries
is not special damages which must be alleged, but general damages,
which necessarily flow from injuries received.’ Bradbury v. Benton,
69 Me. 194, 199. Certainly a part, if not all, of the plaintiff’s claims
came within the class ‘general damages,’
which are said to include
‘not only the direct expenses incurred by the plaintiff, but the loss
of his time, the bodily suffering endured, and any incurable hurt inflicted; for these may be classed among necessary results.’ Laing v.
Colder, 8 Pa. St. 479, 49 Am. Dec. 533. See, also, Hopkins v. Railroad, 36 U. H. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 287.”
In a suit where the plaintiff was injured by reason of the negligent
and unlawful leaving of obstructions upon the sidewalk of a city,
it was competent for her to testify that after the injury she had no
means of living, and was
compelled to sell her house and lot to raise
money for that purpose, in consequence of the injury received.
It
was one of the immediate consequences of the injury, and was not
irrelevant in the ascertainment of general damages resulting directly
from the wrong of which she was the victim. Wilson & Brother v.
White, 71/506. Cited, 87/167.
The soundness of this decision may well he doubted.
653. Judge must give the jury the rule for estimating the damages
claimed.
In

action

against a railroad company, where several different
damages are claimed, it is error requiring the granting of
a new trial for the judge to fail, in his
charge to the jury, to give
them any rule for estimating the damages claimed; and this is true
notwithstanding there was no written request made by the defendant
for such charge. O’Bryan, 112/127.
654. General rule. Damages are given as compensation for the injury done, and generally this is the measure where the injury is of
a character
capable of being estimated in money. If the injury be
an

elements of
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small,

the mitigating circumstances be strong, nominal damages
only are given. Civil Code, §3905.
Smith v. Overby, 30/248, was an action brought against a physician to recover damages for neglect and want of care and skill in
or

delivering plaintiff’s wife of a child, and Lumpkin, J., said: “We
apprehend that in most of the cases, when carefully examined, it
will be found, that whether the injury be done to person or estate, the
measure of damage is after all, the actual injury inflicted, neither
more nor

less.”
INTEREST AS DAMAGES.

655. Where

property is injured or destroyed. Unliquidated damarising ex delicto do not bear interest, and in such cases the finding of interest as such by the jury is not legal. The jury may add to
the value of the property injured a sum equal to the interest on such
ages

damages.
of the rule.
McCauley, 68/818, was a suit for killing a bull, and it was held
that in fixing the amount of damages in a suit for destroying property, interest is not recoverable eo nomine, but the jury may consider
the length of time damages have been withheld, the character of the
tort, the conduct of the defendant, and all the circumstances of the
transaction, and may, in their discretion, increase the amount of the'
damages allowed accordingly. Cited, 81/414; 102/15; 104/386.
In an action against a railroad company for killing mules the whole
of the amount awarded by the verdict is damages, although it may
include interest added by the jury to the value of the mules. And if
value and return the whole in

one sum as

656. Illustrations

the amount thus found is in

excess

of the amount claimed in the dec-

laration, there being no amendment to cover the excess, the verdict

illegal and should be set aside unless the court, being otherwise
be written off. Simmons, J., said: “The amount of damages claimed in the declaration is
the limit of the plaintiff’s recovery, and where the verdict is rendered
for a greater sum, the court should set it aside unless the plaintiff
is

satisfied with the verdict, orders the excess to

amends his declaration to

cover

the

excess.

In this

case

there

was no

offer to amend, either before or after the verdict,
to cover this excess of damages; nor did the court require the plaintiff to write off the excess, as he should have done if he was otherwise

amendment, and

no

satisfied with the verdict.”

104/386.

Crawley, 87/191. Cited, 88/67; 102/15;
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In

Palmer, 89/161, the action was for tort — killing cattle — and
jury found interest. Direction was given that it be remitted and
written off, as the finding of interest, as such, was illegal.
The case Brown, 102/13, was to recover damages for killing a jennet. The verdict was for $100 principal and $8.16 2-3 interest. It
was held that as matter of law, unliquidated demands,
arising ex
delicto, do not bear interest, and on a suit to recover the value of
property which has been injured or destroyed the jury can not legally
find a given amount for principal, with an additional amount as interest. The jury may, in the lawful exercise of their power, add to the
value of property destroyed a sum equal to the interest on such value;
but such sum must be found and returned as damages, not as interest.
Little, J., said: “Our Code (§3800) provides that ‘in all
cases where an amount ascertained would be the damages at the time
of the breach, it may be increased by the addition of legal interest
from that time till the recovery.’ This provision applies in a suit
for damages for breach of contract, but in cases arising ex delicto for
the value of property destroyed, where the measure of damage is the
value of the property, the same reasoning would apply the same rule.
McCauley, supra; Sears, infra; Crawley, supra. It is understood
of course, that the interest found, if any, can not be returned as
interest, because it is not interest; the action is one to recover damages, and the item of interest, at the legal worth of money from
the time the property was destroyed, may, in the discretion of the
jury, be added to the value of the property destroyed in ascertaining and returning an amount sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for
the injury sustained. The cases of Young, infra, and Ratteree
v. Chapman, infra, are not in conflict with this
ruling. In the former
case it was ruled that interest can not be added by the jury in their
discretion to discretionary damages awarded by them for a personal
injury, and, in the latter case, that it may not be added where punitive
damages can be allowed. These cases stand for themselves, unaffected
by the ruling in this, which goes only to the extent that under our
law the jury may, in the lawful exercise of their power, add to the
value of property destroyed a sum equal to the interest on such
value; not that they must, but may, in the exercise of their judgment
the

'

and discretion.”

657.

Subject continued.

In the trial of

horse, it'was

error

brought to recover damages for killing a
for the judge to charge the jury that, after ascer-

a

case
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taining the market value of the horse killed, they should add interest
judgment of the court below” to the time of
the verdict. The verdict in the present ease having been returned
for a given amount, with interest from a certain date, and the evidence being sufficient to authorize the finding, so far as the value
of the animal was concerned, and the sum so found being the full
.amount sued for, direction is given that the part of the verdict and
judgment finding interest be written off. Cobb, J., said: “As the
■evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the v’alue of
the animal to be the amount returned in the verdict as principal,
this error will not necessitate a new trial; but the amount found
as interest must be written off.
Especially would this be true in the
present ease, where the amount found was the full sum sued for;
and, even if interest had been psoperly returned, it would have been
necessary to write it off in any event. Crawley, supra. Direction is
therefore given that the judgment be affirmed as to the amount de.scribed in the verdict as principal, and that the verdict and judgment
from the “time of the

be

so

amended

as

to strike therefrom

so

much

as

relates to the sub-

ject of interest, allowing the judgment to stand for the sum of $75.”
Calhoun, 104/384.
Sums ascertainable only by the enlightened conscience of jurors do
not bear interest before verdict, either as interest or as damages, with
or without discretionary allowance by the jury.
Young, 81/397.
Cited, 102/15; 111/17.
In Garr, 57/277, Jackson, J., in treating of the question whether
the verdict was against the evidence, said: “The evidence, we think,
averaging it, and allowing interest to be added as part of the damages, may sustain it.”
It was a suit by a widow to recover for the
homicide of her husband, and no question as to the allowance of interest was made in the case.
Cited, 81/414.
Sears, 66/499, was also a suit by a widow for the homicide of her
husband, and it was held to be error to instruct the jury, as matter
of law, that they should add interest to whatever amount of damages
they might find at the date of the homicide, the question of increasing damages in such a case being for the jury. Simmons, J., said:
"“Until the jury has passed upon the issue, the amount to which she
is entitled, if anything, remains unliquidated, and does not bear interest.
We do not say that the jury, in reaching the amount of
damages, when they have first determined under the law and the
■evidence that she is entitled to recover, would not be authorized to
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consider the

length of time from the homicide to the trial, the characinjury, the conduct of the defendant's agents, and all other
circumstances connected with the injury, in order to arrive at the
proper amount of damages.”
Cited, 68/818; 81/414; 102/15;
ter of the

104/386.

Chapman, 79/574, was brought to recover damcourt instructed the jury that,
interest on the sum awarded at
seven per cent, per annum from the time of the injury to the present.”
This was held to be error and in the opinion it is said: “In a ease
of tort, when the law allows the recovery of exemplary damages, the
allowance of which and the amount thereof being entirely in the discretion, of the jury, we do not think that the law contemplates or will
allow interest to be computed on the sum awarded by them.” Cited,.
81/414; 85/496; 102/15.
Young, 81/397, was a suit by a child nine years of age, for damages for personal injuries.
The court charged to the effect that the
jury might, in their discretion, award damages in the nature of interest computed at seven per cent, from the date of the injury to the
The

case

Ratteree

v.

ages for assault and battery, and the
if they saw proper, “they might allow

time of the trial,

It

held that this

that interest at
legal rate can not be added by the jury in their discretion to discretionary damages awarded by them for a personal injury, and thaf
only special damages computable upon direct or indirect evidence of
actual values can be thus increased. Bleckley, C. J., after citing the
cases of Garr, Sears, and McCauley,
supra, says: “In all these cases
the damages recoverable were special, and had to be preyed by evidence
applying directly or indirectly to values; whilst in the present case
there is no such evidence, and the entire recovery is for damages of a
nature incapable of any standard of measurement external to the
minds and consciences of the jury. In this respect, though they
are not punitive, all claim to punitive damages having been recovered
at the trial, they are as indefinite and indeterminate in their elements
was

was

error;

the

damages of that class. Consequently the case of Ratteree v.
Chapman, supra, which holds that the jury should not be instructed
that they are authorized to add interest in assessing damages, where
punitive damages can be allowed, rules this case. If the time of realizing discretionary damages is to be considered (and doubtless the jury
may consider it), it should be left as one of the terms of the general
problem of damages, unfixed like all the rest of the terms. The rate
of interest as established by law has no relevancy to the matter. Suma
as

are
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only by the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors do
verdict, either as interest or as damages, with
discretionary allowance by the jury.” Cited, 102/15.

ascertainable

not bear interest before

without

or

PHYSICAL PAIN AND MENTAL DISTRESS.

Physical fain and suffering.
the plaintiff proved the nature and extent of hisinjuries. There was no other proof as to the damages. Pain and
suffering were not mentioned. The defendant requested the court to
charge that before plaintiff could recover, it was necessary for him
658.

In Mullins, 30/146,

to prove some

pecuniary damages.

The request was refused, and

judge charged that it was not necessary to prove any specific pecuniary damages, but that they could find such damages as under ali
the circumstances of the case, and the nature and extent of the
injuries, they thought he was entitled to. It was ruled that the
charge was right, and that pecuniary injury is not the only one for
which compensation ought to be allowed in damages. Cited, 51/646;
88/764.
In Drysdale, 51/644, it was determined that pain and bodily suffering, resulting from a tort to the person, might be considered by the
jury in estimating damages, and it was said that the question was
the

settled in the Mullins case, supra.
659. Future pain.

being brought for a permanent injury resulting from a railpain and suffering may form an element in
estimating damages, provided the evidence renders it reasonably certain that they, will necessarily result from the injury.
Johnson,.
66/259. And, in a proper case, it is not error to charge that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover for the pain and suffering he will probably endure in the future. Mabry, 91/781.
660. Mental suffering of survivors not considered.
In an action to recover damages for a homicide, the jury can not
take into consideration the mental sufferings occasioned to survivors
by the death. Paulk, 24/356. And when the widow sues, grief and
anguish can not come in for compensation. Killian, 79/234; Chapman,
v. Tel. Co., 88/770.
Suit

road accident, future

661. Mental

suffering.

In the

of

Mullins, 30/146, the plaintiff was injured in a
The judge had refused to charge that some pecuniary injuries must be proven, and in the opinion, Stephens, J., said:
“Surely there ought to be some compensation for the suffering endured. The pain from the wounds must have been great, and the
case

collision of trains.
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dread of the

approaching collision between the two engines, though
brief, must have been terrible. Mental agony has been known to turn
a head gray in a night, and gray hairs are often but the effervescence
■of some great mental anguish. Shall all compensation be denied to
such

suffering merely because there

can

be

no

adequate compensation?

We think not.”
In

Smith, 83/674, Bleckley, C. J., said: “In collision cases on railthe emotional element is a powerful factor; it enters both into
the question of liability and the measure of compensation.” Then,
after quoting the extract which is given above from the Mullins case,
he adds: “Questions involving deep emotions, and conduct dependent
thereon, are generally not mere questions of law, or such as can be disposed of by the logic of the bench. They can best be determined by
practical jurors on a view of all the facts and circumstances bearing
ways,

■on

the issue.”
Where the declaration did not

complain of mental suffering, it
nothing about it in
the charge, yet, where it was alleged that the plaintiff was, by the injury he had received, deformed, this deformity must of necessity have
produced not only physical pain, but mental anguish, and a reference
to mental suffering was not reversible error.
Lanier, 83/593.
662. Loss of ability to labor causing mental distress.
In Powell, 77/192, a suit by a married woman, it was held that
where there is evidence tending to show that the state of impaired
health and diminished ability to labor, attributable to the injury, may
endure through life, the mortuary tables are admissible in evidence to
aid the jury in dealing with the element of time involved in their computation of the damages. Bleckley, C. J., said: “There was such eviwould have been better for the court to have said

•dence in this case, and the tables were therefore relevant.
to live long in pain is more damaged than! one who has to

One who is
endure suffering but for a brief time. Test this by applying it to two cases, and
■contrasting them — the first in which pain is to last only for a day,
and the second for twenty years. It may be thought that the loss of
ability to labor is not pain, but this is a mistake. There is no greater
blessing of life than ability to labor, even though the proceeds may
belong to another. It is better for happiness, as well as for virtue,
to work for nothing than to be idle.
A physical injury that destroys the power of a human being to labor is one of the most serious
injuries that it is possible to inflict. True, it is not to be measured
by pecuniary earnings where the suit is by a married woman, for
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such

earnings, as a general rule, belong
of action for their loss is in him; but

to the husband, and the right
the wife herself has such ah
interest in her working capacity as that she can recover something for
its destruction; and what she is to be allowed ought to be more or
less, according to the length of time during which her privation is to
continue. Such privation may well be classed with pain and sufferup of established habits.
accustomed to work, enforced idleness is torture.5'

ing, especially where it involves the breaking
To

man or woman

Cited, 85/487; 88/652; 90/508; 111/479.
In Jacobs, 88/647, it was held that it is not an error to describe
as
pain and suffering a loss of capacity to labor occasioned by a
physical injury, nor is it error to call attention to it separately,,
after instructing the jury touching other pain and suffering.
And
Bleckley, C. J., said: “It seems to us that the loss or material impairment of any power or faculty is matter for compensation, irrespeetive of any fruits, pecuniary or otherwise, which the exercise of

produce; and irrespective, also, of any
which the loss or impairment might
occasion. Every person is entitled to retain and enjoy each and
every power of body and mind with which he or she has been

the power or faculty might
conscious pain or suffering

■

endowed, and no one, without being answerable in damages, can
wrongfully deprive another, by a physical injury, of any such power
or faculty, or materially impair the same.
That such deprivation
or impairment can be classed with pain and suffering was ruled
by this court in Powell, supra; and, inasmuch as enforced idleness
or diminished efficiency in offices of labor is calculated to give rise
to mental distress, it is not error to describe the thing by its effects,
and call it pain and suffering. But it need not be so called neeessarily, and consequently it was not misleading ifor the court to
treat of it separately as a subject-matter for compensation in damages, although the plaintiff was a married woman. Touching this
element of her case, the measure of damages would be neither more
nor less than that which the law recognizes for pain and suffering.
There is no standard but the enlightened conscience of impartial
jurors.” Cited, 90/508; 107/73. In this latter case it was held
that it was not error for the trial judge to charge the jury: “You
have the right to give damages for that mental suffering which a
man may have from the consciousness that his earning capacity is
injured for life. That is one element of damage.”
Simonsohn,
107/70.
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663. Evidence admitted to show
mg.
In Jordan

general nature of pain and suffer-

Southern Bell

Telephone Co., 87/69, the plaintiff
damages because of the falling of a telephone-pole upon
him.
The court allowed a physician to state that “the pain suffered
by the plaintiff would perhaps be from some injury to the muscles at
the time the injury was inflicted.” It was objected to on the ground
that there was no allegation in the declaraton under which it would ’
he admissible, there being nothing alleged as to any injury to the
muscles. Simmons, J., said: “The declaration alleges ‘that the pole
fell with great force, striking the plaintiff on the left shoulder and
the collar-bone, breaking the bones thereof, and felling him to the
Tock pavement.’ We think this allegation is sufficient to authorize
v.

sued for

proof of pain in the muscles, without alleging specifically that the
were lacerated and injured.
We can not see how the collarbone could have been broken by the falling of the pole upon it, without
injuring the muscles of the shoulder.”
Although the declaration did not specifically allege any injuries
to the sexual organs of the plaintiff, there was no error in allowing
the plaintiff to testify to such injuries; it appearing that her evidence as to the same was admitted solely for the purpose of throwing light on the general nature of her injuries and her pain and
suffering, and that the jury was instructed not to consider the same
for any other purpose.
Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Lynch, 95/529.
The pain actually suffered was the same, no matter who paid the
physician’s bill; and therefore the fact that it was paid by the defendant had no relevancy upon this particular question. Reynolds,
muscles

99/639.
664.

Abortion, pain and sorrow resulting from.
Liddell, 85/482, Simmons, J., said: “The court permitted a
witness to testify that the plaintiff’s nervous prostration had a weakening effect upon her system; that this injury had required the administration of opiates, and that the plaintiff was acquiring the
opium habit as a result of this trouble by reason of the administration of opiates; that the plaintiff had great pleasure in her household duties, but she does not take that pleasure
now, and she never
will; and that from the effects of this nervous prostration she has
not got the energy to work or to enjoy
society, etc. Judging from
the charge of the court, which is in the record, this
evidence, and
■some other of like character, was admitted, not as an element of
In
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damage, but somewhat in the nature of an index to the pain and
suffering of the plaintiff. Being admitted for that purpose, we can
not say it was error.”
If a person is injured by the negligence of a railroad compan), the
extent of the injury is a proper subject-matter of inquiry. How she
was hurt, whether she had a miscarriage or abortion in
consequence
of the injury, and whether she suffered great pain in consequence
thereof, may all be inquired into, and are not consequences too remote to authorize a recovery. Randall, 79/304.
In Randall, 85/297, the court charged the jury that “any pain and
suffering or sorrow resulting from the miscarriage, the law says is an
element of damage.” Simmons, J., said: 2We would suggest that the
word ‘sorrow’ be omitted from the charge of the court on the next
trial. It is most too remote to be considered an element of damage,
unless it is that sorrow which accompanies the actual injury, and is
suffered at the time of the miscarriage. The loss of a child by a
miscarriage would affect women so differently that it would be hard
for men, sitting as jurors, to estimate it as an element of damage;
and

we

therefore think it would be better to omit, in the

instruction to the

future,

any

jury upon the question of sorrow as an element
of damage.
Pain and suffering give a wide latitude to juries, and
there are very few complaints made of the smallness of the amounts
found by juries upon these two elements of damage. Upon the question of sorrow being an element of damage, see 5 Amer. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 42; Bovee v. Danville, 53 Vt. 190.”
665. Injury to pride of manhood.
In Wood, 48/565, the plaintiff’s right thigh was broken and his
Tight leg was rendered by the injury three inches and three-quarters
shorter than the left. The judge charged the jury that the plaintiff
might be entitled to recover compensation for his bodily and mental
suffering, and for the injury to his pride — his manhood. This language was the subject of criticism. The court held that the measure
of damages was the actual injury sustained, which might include
bodily and mental suffering; that whilst the expression, “his pride
his manhood,” was not strictly accurate, yet as the proof showed
that the plaintiff was permanently deformed by being lamed for life,
the jury might well have understood the court as
referring by his
words to this deformity, and that as the verdict was not
excessive,
it would not be disturbed.
McCay, J., said: “We do not wholly approve the language used by the judge in his enumeration to the jury
—
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of the elements which go

the damages. The physical injuries of the plaintiff, and his mental and physical suffering are
proper elements.
But when the judge added, “pride, manhood,” we
fear he used language calculated in its ordinary signification to open
the door too widely. The injury to the pride, manhood of the plaintiff, depends so entirely upon the character and temper of the plaintiff that it can hardly be said to he the direct result of defendant’s
act.
It is a possible result, hut other contingent circumstances preponderate in making any estimate upon it. But this charge can
only have been understood by the jury in view of the facts, as relating to that injury, which came to the plaintiff by reason of his deformity — the mortification which it put upon him from having to pass
through life deformed, lame, shorn of his full proportions as a
man.
And this was not an improper element in the damages. In
this sense, this is only another way of saying that the plaintiff is entitled to damages for having been rendered deformed by the defendant’s negligence. We do not see that the jury could have considered any such fanciful damages as depend only on the temperament of the plaintiff.”
666. The guide in measuring such damages.
It is left to the jury to decide, according to their own enlightened
consciences, what damage ought to be given for pain and wounded
feelings, and things of that sort — that is to say, the damage for such
hurt is to be fixed by their opinion of the nature of the pain, bodily
and mental, according to their consciences, enlightened by the facts
of the case.
Kelley, 58/107. Cited, 88/755. It is proper, if the
testimony so authorizes, for the jury to allow the plaintiff compensation for the pain and suffering occasioned him, and the enlightened
consciences of an impartial jury is the only guide by which the
measure of such damages can be ascertained.
Abbott, 74/851.
to make

up

PERMANENT INJURIES.

667. No

fixed rule for estimating damages for permanent injuries.
Freeman, 83/583, the court charged the jury as follows: “The
plaintiff says that he has been permanently injured, and that by
reason thereof his
ability to labor and earn money has been impaired. If this be true, and the jury believe that he is entitled to
recover on the case made, he would be entitled to further
compenIn

sation

on

this account,

The burden is

the

plaintiff to show
has been permanently impaired, and the extent of such impairment, or to furnish

the fact that his

capacity to labor and

on

earn money

787]

CHAPTER 37.

[§667

Damages.

data to the

jury, from which they may be able to ascertain his finan>
respect. In passing upon this question, you would
ascertain from the evidence whether the plaintiff’s capacity to labor
and earn money is impaired by his injuries, and, if so, the extent
of such impairment, and whether such impairment will extend into
the future, and through the remainder of his life; and, if you so find,
you would award him such a sum as you think reasonable and just,
in view of the nature and extent of such injury, and in view of all
the facts and circumstances in the ease, as disclosed to you in the
evidence. If you believe from the evidence that plaintiff has not
suffered any permanent injury as a result of the injuries mentioned
in the evidence, you would not allow him anything for permanent
injury. No fixed rule exists for estimating this sort of damage.
The plaintiff’s age, his habits, his strength, sex, vocation, rate of
wages earned in the past by his labor, his prospect of obtaining
steady and remunerative employment in the future, and the like, in
so far as they may be illustrated by the evidence, are all circumstances proper to be taken into account.
Diminution of his ability
to work, if likely to occur by growing years and infirmities of age,
is also to be considered, and any other fact which this evidence discloses that, in the minds of the jury, ought to affect this particular
plaintiff.” The error assigned on this charge was, because the amount
of damages to be found for a permanent injury is governed by fixed
rules as distinguished from the amount allowed for pain and suffering,
which is left to the conscience of the jury; the actual financial loss
must be given.
It was held that the charge was not erroneous.
Blandford, J., said: “We have carefully considered the charge complained of; the main complaint being that the court stated that there
is no fixed rule for estimating damages of this sort. While there may
be a fixed rule as to the compensation which one may be entitled to,
there certainly can be no fixed rule by which the jury must be governed in estimating the damages; and we think that what the court
said was eminently correct.” Cited, 86/145, 148.
In Allison, 86/145, the charge given to the jury in Freeman’s
case was again under review and it was held that no fixed rule exists
for estimating the amount of damages from permanent injuries
to the person.
The amount should be reasonable and just to both
parties, and should compensate the injured one for the loss of
money which he would probably earn had not the injuries occurred.
cial loss in this
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Simmons, J., said: “In the nature of things it is impossible for a
court to

prescribe

any

fixed rule for estimating the amount of dam-

ages from permanent injuries to the person, because it is impossible
to prove such exact data as would authorize a court to prescribe one.

It is impossible for any witness to testify to the exact time that the
injured person would have lived, if he had not been injured. It is
impossible to say whether the person would have remained in good
health during his whole life, or whether he would have lost little or
much time by sickness or idleness or the loss of an opportunity to
labor. It is impossible to say whether he would have continued to
earn the same amount of money during his whole life; whether he
would have earned more, and how much more, or less, and how much
less; whether he would have remained in the same occupation, or
would have abandoned that, and pursued another more lucrative,
or less so.
Unless these and other facts which might be enumerated
could be shown the jury, we do not see how a fixed rule to measure
the damages for a permanent injury could be prescribed to the jury.
It may be said, however, that the life-tables put in evidence would
show a man’s expectancy of life, and that the amount he was earning at the time he was injured would be a sufficient basis upon which
to

prescribe such

all

cases

be

a

rule; but

we

do not think that this would in

fair, either to the plaintiff or to the railroad company.
If the plaintiff were a young man of character and capacity and industry, and had chosen his occupation, and commenced its pursuit,
his yearly income at first might be small, but, in a few years, he
might be able to increase it very largely; yet, under the rule contended for, he would be confined during his life to the small income
he was making at the commencement. On the other hand, if the
plaintiff were an aged or a middle-aged person, making a large yearly
income, it would be unfair to the railroad company to take that income and his expectancy of life as the sole basis to determine the
amount of his recovery; because our experience shows that a man
in declining years has not ordinarily the same capacity to labor and
earn money as a young man.
It is then that sickness, inability, and
indisposition to labor come upon him more and more each year, as
he grows older. These and like facts should then be taken into
consideration by the jury in behalf of the railroad company. None
of these things can be proved with such exactness as would authorize
a court to prescribe a fixed rule.
As was said by the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Railroad Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 554, 7
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Sup. Ct. Rep. 1: 'It has never been held that the rules to be derived
from such tables of computations must be the absolute guides of the
judgment and the conscience of the jury. On the contrary, in the
important and much-considered case of Phillips v. Railway, above
cited (4 Q. B. Div. 406, 5 Q. B. Div. 78, 5 C. P. Div. 280, and 49
Law J. Q. B. 233), the judges strongly approved the usual practice
of instructing the jury in general terms to award a fair and reasonable compensation, taking into consideration what the plaintiff’s income would probably have been, how long it would have lasted, and
all the contingencies to which it was liable; and as strongly deprecated undertaking to bind them by precise mathematical rules in
deciding a question involving so many contingencies incapable of
exact estimate or proof.’ We therefore think that it is better for
both parties to let the jury look at these things as a whole, in the
light of common sense and their own experience, and let them make
■such a compensation in their verdict as would be reasonable and
just to both parties, not giving to the plaintiff a large sum with the
purpose of enriching him, but compensating him for the loss of money
which he would probably earn had he not been injured, and thereby
prevented by the negligence of the defendant. These remarks, of
course, apply only to the measure of damages for the permanent
injury. It is not contended that any fixed rule can be prescribed as
a measure of damages for pain and suffering.
We therefore reaffirm
the ruling in Freeman, supra. On this subject, see 2 Thomp. Trials,
§§2077, 2078; 2 Redf. R. R. 309 et seq.; 2 Wood, Ry. Law, §317;
Whit. Smith, hTeg. 474; Pierce, R. R. 301; 3 Suth. Dam. 283 et seq.;
2 Shear. & R. Neg. §758; Wood’s Mayne, Dam. p. 596, §627; 2
Sedg. Dam. 547; Pol. Torts, 161, 162; Field, Dam. §§614, 615.”
Cited, 89/569; 112/926.
The suit being by an infant child for damages from wounds and
bruises that were cured in a few months, and from the loss of sense
of hearing alleged to have been a consequence of the injury, a charge
on the measure of damages in the terms following was substantially correct: “There is no known rule of law by whioh witnesses
can give you the amount in dollars and cents as the amount of injury, but this is left to the enlightened conscience of an impartial
jury. This does not mean that juries can arbitrarily enrich one
party at the expense of the other, nor that they should act unreasonably through mere caprice. But it authorizes you to give reasonable
damages where the proof shows that the law authorizes it. But the
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jury should exercise common sense and love of justice, and, from a
desire to do right, fix an amount that will fairly compensate for the
injury received.” Davis, 60/329. Cited, 81/419; 85/528.
668. Medical evidence of condition after suit brought and before.
In Powell, 77/192, a suit by a married woman, it was held that
medical evidence of the condition of the injured party after the suit
was brought, as well as before, is admissible to show the nature and
effects of the injury, and whether temporary or permanent. If the injury resulted in abortion, evidence touching the consequences of abortion upon the mother’s future health is evidence relating to the past
injury, and not to future injuries. A question put to a medical witness thus: “How would those troubles affect the nervous system?”
does not inquire for dicta or opinions of the profession at large, but
for the individual opinion of the physician under examination. And,,
though not confined to the nervous system of this particular woman,
the question is relevant as an inquiry concerning a pathological law
to which her

system,

as

being that of

a woman,

is

or may

be subject.

Cited, 85/482.
669. Loss of capacity shown by exhibition of the injured hand.
In Pruitt, 110/577, the plaintiff, a child of thirteen years of age,
had his hand injured in the defendant’s shop.
On the trial he exhibited his hand to the jury. The four fingers and part of thethumb had been cut off. It was shown that his capacity to labor at
the kind of employment in which he had been engaged was entirely
gone.
The report of the case does not show what the charge was.
that was excepted to, but it appears to have been upon the subject
of the diminution of the plaintiff’s earning capacity.
Simmons, C.
J., said: “Complaint is made of the instructions of the court to the
jury as to the manner of using the mortality and annuity tableswhich had been introduced in evidence.
the

charge, abstractly considered,

was

It is contended that while

correct, there

was no

evidence

upon which to predicate it; that there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s
earning
or in part.
was evidence to show that he was totally incapacitated to continue his

capacity had been diminished in whole

work

the machines in the defendant’s

There

shop, or to work on simithis, the plaintiff exhibited his hand
to the jury, showing the loss of the four fingers and a portion of the
thumb. The jury saw his injured hand, and could, in our opinion,
have inferred a partial loss of capacity from its condition, and determined for themselves the extent to which the boy’s capacity to labor,
on

lar machines.

Further than
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then

in the future, was diminished. Had a witness been examined
this subject, and given his opinion, this opinion must necessarily have been based upon the loss of the hand; and we see no
reason why the jury could not form an opinion
upon the same fact.
The injury was not latent or concealed, but was patent.”
670. Previous ill health aggravated by the injury.
Bray et ux. v. Latham, 81/640, was an action by a tenant and
his wife against their landlord, and was based upon an alleged arson,
committed by the defendant, when overinsured upon the premises and
upon a storehouse adjoining, with a stock of goods therein, the imor

upon

pu£ed motive of the burning being to destroy the property and colThe fire occurred shortly after midnight, in
winter weather, and consumed both buildings. The wife, it was alleged, barely escaped with life; suffered from fright, exertion, and
exposure; caught cold in the night-air, while trying, without clothes,
lect the insurance.

to

save

the lives of her children; fainted and was unconscious; was

confined to her bed for

weeks; the fright and exertion brought on
prolapsus uteri from which she still suffers. The court charged the
jury, “If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, prior to
the fire, was not in good health, but was afflicted with falling or
displacement of the womb, to the extent that such sickness or disorder contributed to her unsound condition after the

She could

fire, she could not

only recover for such injuries as you believe
followed upon the fire,” etc. Bleckley, C. J., said: “Putting the jury
to consider how much previous ill health may have contributed to
subsequent ill health seems too much like treating the former as contributory wrong, whereas previous ill health should be considered as
a state
calling for more forbearance on the part of a wrong-doer
than a state of robust health. The invalid is not less, but more
sacred, especially against assault by midnight fire, than a person
free from infirmity. Where the subject, of a tort is already diseased,
the question should be how much, if any, the tort contributed to aggTavate or protract the disorder. There is not to be an. apportionment of damages, as in cases of contributory or comparative negligenee, although the damages are to be adjusted to the agency of
the defendant in making the bad health worse or more lasting. If
this defendant did either by the alleged tort, he is liable. A tort
to health already impaired can not be redressed except by giving damages for any further impairment, and for any obstruction occasioned
by the tort to recovery from existing maladies. To cause sickness
recover.
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wrongfully, or to aggravate or protract it, is an injury to health for
which damages are recoverable.” Cited, 88/771.
671. Law does not contemplate absolute compensation for loss of
limb.

Young, 81/397, it was held that for a personal injury to a child
of age, including deprivation of a member, the law furnishes no measure of damages, other than the enlightened conscience of
impartial jurors, guided by all the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. Among the results of the injury to be considered
are pain and suffering, disfigurement and mutilation of the person,
and impaired capacity to pursue the ordinary avocations of life at
and after attainment of majority. And when this case was again
before the court, it was held that the law does not contemplate absolute, but only a qualified or relative, compensation in damages for
personal injuries resulting in the loss of a limb, there being no money
equivalent for such injuries. Young, 83/512. Cited, 85/528.
672. When jury should not be instructed to consider prospect of
In

nine years

increased
In

earnings.
Jackson, 112/620, it

held that a charge instructing a jury
plaintiff’s “prospects of increased earnings” should not, when there is no evidence to warrant it, be given.
Lumpkin, P. J., said: “The petition alleged nothing as to any
prospect of increased earnings on the part of the plaintiff, and a
diligent study of the brief of evidence fails to disclose that there was
any testimony even remotely tending to show that he had such prospeets. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the charge above quoted
ought not to have been given. While undertaking, in the case of
Burney, to formulate instructions which might be appropriately
given in connection with the mortality and annuity tables, we took
especial pains to state precisely when a charge with respect to increased earning capacity would be authorized, viz., when ‘the evidence
so warrants.’
See page 11, 98 Ga. We added that ‘this should
not be done unless, in view of all the testimony, the
propriety and
to take into consideration

fairness of such
673.

an

was
a

instruction is manifest.’ ”

See 619.

Recovery for diminished capacity to labor without proof of
of earnings.
In City Council of Augusta v. Owens, 111/464, it was held that
a
person whose capacity to labor has been permanently diminished
by physical injury wrongfully inflicted upon him by another can re
cover damages
therefor, notwithstanding there may have been no
value
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proof as to what such person’s earnings were before or after the injury. Hence there was no error, in the light of the pleadings and the
evidence in this case, for the court to charge the jury on the subject of the right of plaintiff to recover for his decreased capacity to
work, if the jury found from the evidence that the injury received
was permanent.
Lewis, J., said: “The objection to this was that
there was no evidence showing how much he had been earning at the
time of the trial, nor was there any evidence to show that his ability
to labor had been diminished. The plaintiff testified that his eapacity to labor was diminished, that it pained him to work in the sun,
and that, while he did labor after the injury, he had to do so to
support his family, but that it was attended with pain. There was
also evidence for defendant tending to show the character of service
and labor that he performed after his injury, and it seemed about as
hard and difficult
no

evidence

as

as

he did before he

to his

was

earnings before

or

hurt.

It is true, there is

after the injury.

This

we do not think authorizes the jury to have any reference to
his diminished earnings, hut it has reference only to his diminished

charge

ability to labor. But there is authority for the position that such
permanent diminution of one’s power to labor constitutes an element of damages, where it is the result of an injury sustained,
though there may be no evidence that it had any effect upon the
earnings of the injured party. See Powell, supra, where the principie is laid down that one who has to live long in pain is more damaged than one who has to endure suffering but for a brief term.”
An employee of a railroad company who has been injured by its
negligence, without fault on his part, may recover general damages on account of pain, physical injury and general depreciation of
power to labor, although no proof of the value of his services as such
employee, or in other business, may be made. If it were necessary
to allege the value of services of a person injured by a railroad, the
point should be raised by demurrer. Crawford, J., said: “The
plaintiff, in his declaration, does not allege the value of his services, but puts his case on the damages which he sustained by reason of the
injury to his body, his pain and suffering, his confinement to his bed, and the actual outlay of expense in and about his
being cured. It doubtless would have been more satisfactory to the
judge and jury below, if the plaintiff had alleged and proved the
value of his services to the road as a brakeman, as well as what his
labor was reasonably worth in other pursuits, but there was no de-
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to the

declaration, and the ease went to the jury upon the
general allegations and the proofs submitted thereunder, and it is
too late after verdict to make the objection.”
Neel, 68/609.
674. Probability of increase of wages by appointment to office.
While it is proper to prove the age, habits, health, occupation, ex
pectation of life, ability to labor and the probable increase or dimi'
nution of that ability with lapse of time, the rate of wages, etc., and
then leave it to the jury to assess the damages, it is improper to allow proof of a particular possibility, or even probability, of any increase of wages by appointment to a higher public office, especially
where the appointment is somewhat controlled by political reasons.
Allison, 86/145. Cited, 112/926.
675. Declining years and, decrease in capacity to labor.
In Mayor etc. v. Johnson, 84/279, it was complained that the
court in charging upon the subject of the measure of damages failed
to charge that the jury should consider plaintiff’s declining years,
and the apparent decrease, year by year, of his capacity to labor;
especially as his means of earning money is by his physical labor.
Simmons, J., says: “This court has held in several cases that it was
proper and the duty of the trial judge to give these infractions to
the jury.” To the same effect is McClure, 94/658.
676. Diminution in capacity caused by another hurt to be considmurrer

ered.
A

the subject of permanent injury, authorizing the jury
diminution in the plaintiff’s capacity to earn money,
caused by the injury alleged in the declaration, as if such diminution would continue, from that cause alone, during the entire period
of his expectancy, and up to the time of his death, and not instructing the jury to take into consideration such diminution as might be
caused by declining years, or by receiving another serious injury,
of which there was positive proof by the plaintiff himself, was erroneous.
It appearing that the plaintiff had been injured in a wreck
on defendant’s
road, and that about two years thereafter he had a
fall which resulted in serious injury to his spine, and the plaintiff
himself testifying that he “got over the first hurt,” a charge based
upon the theory that the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant was permanent, if authorized at all, should have been accurate, both in substance and phraseology. Dottenheim, 92/425.
charge

on

to consider any
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677.

Plaintiff should not conceal fact of previous affliction or
from the jury.
The plaintiff’s cause of action being based upon the theory that
before the injuries therein complained of he was in all respects a
perfectly sound and healthy man, there being nothing either in the
•declaration or the evidence introduced by him to suggest the contrary,
and the newly discovered evidence disclosing that he had previously
been severely afflicted with rheumatism, and had also received a gunshot wound which permanently disabled his right arm, and the newly
discovered evidence further tending to show that the injuries inflicted
by the defendant were not so serious as the plaintiff had testified,
the ends of justice -require a new trial. It is probable, if not certain,
"that, in allowing the amount of damages feund by the verdict, the
jury acted under the belief that the plaintiff, when he received the
injuries for which this action was brought, was a sound and healthy
man, and, consequently, awarded a larger amount than they would
have done had the facts disclosed by the newly discovered evidence
“been before them. Under all the circumstances, the plaintiff could
not, consistently with good faith, withhold and conceal these facts
from the jury. Beauchamp, 93/6. Cited, 96/485.
678. His vocation before the injury and its value.
The declaration alleging that the plaintiff’s injuries had destroyed
his ability to work and pursue his accustomed avocation; that hii
business was that of a granite and stone contractor, requiring him to
be on his feet, and to exert all his physical powers in superintending,
-directing, helping, etc.; and that his average earnings were $150
per month, all of which were lost for all the future — there was no
■error in
allowing him to testify as a witness what work he did individually before the injury, and that its value was $5 per day, the
evidence showing that the work he did individually was done in pursuing his calling as a granite and stone contractor. Beauchamp,
wound

•93/6.
In
it

Bates, 103/333, it appeared that the plaintiff was a banker, and

was

held that in

an

action for

damages for injuries to the

per-

where it is claimed by the plaintiff that his capacity to earn money
bas been diminished one-half, it is not error for the court to admit
testimony as to the value of, plaintiff’s services, before the injury,
son,

in the

particular occupation he was then following.
Plaintiffs own testimony as to diminished capacity to labor.
The plaintiff, after stating his injury, giving all the material facts
679.
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touching his physical condition, his previous capacity and present

allowed to state how
injury. A physician
gave similar testimony.
The testimony of both witnesses was held
to be proper.
Johnson, 66/259. Cited, 89/501.
Where one was injured by an accident on a railroad, after having
shown the nature and character of the injury received and the deduction of his wages growing out of infirmities consequent thereon,
he could testify as to the extent to which his capacity to labor was
diminished in consequence of the injury he had received.
Coggin,
incapacity for labor resulting therefrom was
much less he could do after than before the

73/689.
680. When averments
Where

hand

on

of age and capacity to labor are not necessary.
alleged that plaintiff was employed as a traindefendant’s freight-train, that by the negligence of other

a

declaration

employees the accident occurred by which his fingers and a portion
of his hand were so mashed as to necessitate amputation, and that
his capacity to labor and earn money was thereby permanently diminished one-half, evidence as to plaintiff’s age and capacity to
labor was admissible without more specific allegations in regard to'
them.
Crawford, J., said: “We neither appreciate the importance,
nor recognize the legal necessity in averring in the declaration the
plaintiff’s age, any more than we do that his size, weight, health,
strength, or capacity for physical endurance should have been
averred, before the proof thereof could have been received upon
the issues necessarily raised by the averments which were made.”'
Johnson, 66/259.
681. Proof that he played billiards to throw light on his condition..
In Gamble, 74/586, the plaintiff testified that his spinal column
was badly injured and his nervous system shattered, producing injury to his eyes, ears and head. The court refused to allow defendant’s counsel, on cross-examination, to ask him the following
questions: “Are you not a good billiard-player? Do not you now
frequently play?” This was error. Jackson, C. J., said: “To crossexamine thoroughly any witness is a right guaranteed by the statute
in strong language. It should not be relaxed where the witness is
interested in the case, and still less relaxed where the witness is the

party in the

case testifying to recover damages for himself.
Skill
at the game of billiards would throw light upon the point whether
or not his
system had been so badly deranged and wrecked.”

682.Lost
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time, nominal damages allowed for, without proof of

value.

Where

is tortiously disabled by a personal injury and preattending to his ordinary business for several weeks,
he may be allowed nominal damages, at least for bis loss of time,
although no definite evidence of the value of his time be submitted
to the jury.
City of Greensboro v. McGibbon, 93/672.
It was competent for the plaintiff in an action for damages resuiting from personal injuries to testify that, when injured, he was
earning a stated monthly salary as assistant jailer, it appearing that
because of the injuries, he was deprived of this situation, and his
salary in connection therewith, for three months. The evidence was
admissible, not only to show the actual loss of salary for that period,
as a basis for
computing in part his damages, but also to throw light
generally upon his capacity to earn money. Prisoek, 97/643.
The action being for damages resulting from personal injuries,
and the plaintiff having neither alleged nor proved anything as to
lost time, it was error to charge that the plaintiff “would be entitled to recover, also, for lost time in consequence of the injury
sustained,” and that the jury could “look to the evidence, and see
how much time he did lose, and what his time was worth.” Patillo,
one

vented from

99/97.

earnings belonged to himself
employer on account of lost
time, due to a permanent personal injury inflicted by his employer,
damages for the whole period of his life from the infliction of the injury, he must show, so as to cover the interval between the time of
the injury and the time he would attain his majority, that his earnings for that period, if he had not been incapacitated, would have
belonged to himself and not to his father. Smith, 94/107.
684. The proof and charge should conform to the injury and loss
alleged.
In City Council of Augusta v. Owens, 111/464, it was held that
there being nothing either in the pleadings or the evidence~wTiich
gave the jury a right to find any damages growing out of the diminished earnings of plaintiff for his labor resulting from the
alleged
injury, it was error for the court to charge the jury to inquire whether
there would have been any increase in plaintiff’s earning
capacity if
this injury had not occurred, and to say how much that was affected
by the injury, and then allow what they believed would compensate
683. When minor must show that his
In order for

a

minor to recover'of his
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Aim for that loss.

Lewis, J., said: “While the petition alleges a
capacity to labor, it does not allege any pecuniary loss
resulting to the plaintiff in consequence of the fact of diminished
earnings from labor. It does not allege what he was making before
the injury, nor what he has been able to make since, and there is not
u particle of evidence in the record which throws any light whatever
upon the subject. The error consists, therefore, in opening up to
the jury the right to investigate a matter with the view of increasing
-damages, by suggesting a measure of damages upon which they have
diminished

data whatever to base any

no

It

was

not erroneous,

finding.

in the trial of

an

action for personal injuries

and

pain and suffering resulting therefrom, for the judge, in charging the jury, to omit calling their attention “to the effect of advancing years upon the capacity of plaintiff to labor,” when the declaration did not allege that the injuries complained of were permanent,
and the action was apparently brought to recover only the dam-

ages sustained before the filing of the petition. Pitts, 112/846.
Where in an action for personal injuries the declaration alleges

that all of the

plaintiff’s injuries will continue for a long time, and
prevent her having free use of her person; that the injuries to her
side and arm are permanent; that she will not be able for a very long
time, by reason of said injuries, to discharge her domestic duties;
and that her capacity to earn money has been destroyed for a long
period of time, and permanently decreased one-half—it is not error
to permit a witness to testify that the condition of the plaintiff,
ten years hence, if it continues going on as it is, will be that of a
confirmed invalid; the court instructing the jury that they can not
consider any permanent damage except to the arm and side, and
that evidence as to the duration of other injuries can be considered
only as showing that the injuries will extend for some time in the
future.

Johnson, 90/500.

685.

Hearsay evidence as to age and place of birth admissible.
A witness may testify to his age, without first requiring him to
-show from what source he derived his information, and when and
where he was born. The correctness of his statement may be tested
■on cross-examination
by asking whence he derived his information,
and likewise the time and place of his birth; but on such subjects
hearsay evidence is admissible from the necessity of the case. Coggin, 73/689.
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686.

Injury to particular

organs

shown under general allegation

as

to vital organs.
A declaration

which alleged that plaintiff “in his body, was
violently and grievously bruised, mangled and broken, to wit: I\
and upon his head, arms, legs, and body, and
particularly as to theserious injury and wounding of his internal vital organs,” is sufficient to permit testimony of injury to kidney, urinary organs,
bloody
urinal discharge, and the nervous system.
Mitchell, 63/173.
687. When married women may recover for expenses.
The suit, Lewis v. City of Atlanta, 77/756, was brought by a
married woman to recover damages for a personal injury caused by
obstructions in

a

street.

It

was

held that she could not

recover

for

incurred by her in consequence of the injury, unless actually paid by her, there being no testimony to show that she was
living separate from her husband, that she was a free trader, that
she had any separate property, or that she personally undertook U
pay any of these expenses or in any manner -bound herself to do so.
The married woman’s law does not have the effect of giving her the
right to recover for such expenses without joining her husband in
the action and without any proof upon the points stated.
expenses

VINDICTIVE

DAMAGES.

damages. In some torts the entire injury is tothe peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff; in such cases no
measure of damages can be prescribed, except the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors. The worldly circumstances of the par688. Vindictive

ties, the amount of bad faith in the transaction, and all the attendant
facts should be weighed.
The verdict of a jury, in such a case,
should not be disturbed, unless the court should suspect bias or

prejudice from its excess or its inadequacy. Civil Code, §3907.
689. When worldly circumstances of the parties not involved.
In an action against a railroad company for an injury to the
plaintiff’s eye, caused by a spark or cinder from the defendant’s engine, there was no error in refusing to permit the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant was worth from two to three hundred thousand
dollars. Higgins, 73/149.
Cited, 73/256.
The suit of Homer, 73/251, was brought to recover damages for
On the trial the court adbeing wrongfully ejected from a train,
mitted evidence to show that the defendant was worth about $5,000,000. It was held that the admission of this testimony was error
and that except in cases where the entire injury is to the peace, happiness or feelings of the plaintiff, worldly circumstances should not be
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weighed in the ascertainment of damages. This was
law. Cited, 88/775; 91/813; 93/461; 105/317.
In Brunswick Light etc. Co. v. Gale, 91/813, it was held that the
action being by a married woman for physical injuries and their
consequences, the terms of section 3907 of the Code are not literally
applicable to the same, but the principle of the section, except as to
proving the worldly circumstances of the parties, is applicable: Inasmuch as the earnings of the wife belong to her husband, her individual and personal damages can be measured only by the enlightened conscience of an impartial jury. Simmons, J., said: “It
was error to give in charge this section of the Code as applicable to
the case under consideration, for it is only applicable as a whole to
that class of cases where the entire injury is to the peace, happiness,
or feelings of the plaintiff.
But where, as in this case, a married
woman sues for physical injuries and the pain and suffering resulting therefrom, and can not recover for loss of earnings, medical attention, etc., the principle of the section is applicable, inasmuch as
her damages can be measured only by the enlightened conscience of
an impartial jury.
She is not allowed, however, to prove, nor can
the jury take into consideration, as provided by this section, the
worldly circumstances of the parties, the amount of bad faith in the
transaction, etc.”
In Hardage, 93/457, a married woman sought to recover damages
for wrongful expulsion from a car. The judge gave in charge to
the jury section 3907, and it was held that the terms of that section
are not literally applicable, though the principle of the section, exeept as to considering the worldly circumstances of the parties, is
applicable in so far as injury to the feelings is concerned. Bleckley,
C. J., said: “The letter of this section does not apply, for where a
■common carrier wrongfully expels a passenger the entire
injury is not
to peace, happiness, or feelings.
A part of the injury consists in
the violation of a public duty by the carrier, and in the inconvenience
and delay occasioned the passenger. But the principle of this section, except as to considering the worldly circumstances of the parties, is applicable both as to the measure of damages on account of
wounded feelings, and the weighing of all the attendant facts, ineluding the presence or absence of bad faith. In estimating damages for injury to the feelings, whether the entire injury, or only part
»f it, consists of that element, no measure of
damages can be prescribed, except the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors. The
admitted

the

'

or

common
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it made any refCited, 105/317.
Where damages were claimed, both for physical pain and suffering from wounds received by the plaintiff, and also on account of

charge
erence

was inapplicable and erroneous in so far as
to the worldly circumstances of the parties.”

loss of business and inability to labor, it was error for the court to
charge the jury, without qualification, that “in some torts the entire
injury is to the peace, happiness and feelings of the plaintiff. In
such cases, no measure of damages can be prescribed, except the
enlightened conscience of impartial jurors.” The court should, at
least, have qualified this charge by instructing the jury that, so far
as the
expenses incurred by plaintiff for medical attention and other
expenses of like character were concerned, and so far as she was
•damaged by loss of time, inability to labor and to attend to business,
if they found for the plaintiff, they should find the actual damage
sustained by her, as shown by the evidence, and that they might add
to that such sum as damage for the physical pain suffered by the
plaintiff, and other injuries of that character where the actual damage can not be ascertained by any rule of evidence as in their enlightened conscience they may think reasonable and just. Senn,
73/705. Cited, 79/647; 105/317.
Though where special damages, such as expenses of nursing, physicians’ bills, medicine, etc., are sought, the rule of assessment ac■cording to the enlightened consciences of impartial jurors is not applicable, it is so where the special damages alleged are not insisted
upon, and the only recovery sought is for injuries to the person and
for pain and suffering. Randall, 85/297.
690. Subject continued.
In Bryant, 105/316, it appeared that two young ladies purchased
railroad-tickets over the line of the Southern Railway Company from
Atlanta to a flag-station called “Hamlet.” It seems that the engineer omitted to give the
signal of an approach to Hamlet, by reason
whereof the conductor failed to signal the engineer to stop at that
place. The conductor did not discover that the train had passed
Hamlet until it had gone about half a mile beyond. He then apologized to the ladies for having carried them beyond their station, expressed his regret, and told them that he would either leave them at
the next station, or carry them on until he met the down train, put
them on that, and have them brought back to Hamlet. They chose
to stop at the next station.
On arriving there, they alighted, and
-were carried into the reception-room at the station, where there wai
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good fire and light. There they remained for about three hours,
they boarded the down train. They arrived at Hamlet shortly
before day. There was no one to meet them at that place, and they
walked a quarter of a mile, through a field, to their father’s house.
They brought their actions against the railway company for damages, and on the trial of the case the jury returned verdicts for both of
them
$250 in favor of one, and $300 in favor of the other. The
court gave section 3907 in charge to the jury.
This was error, and
Simmons, C. J., said: “In several decisions of this court it has been
declared error to give the whole of that section in charge in cases
like the ones now under consideration, or even in cases where actual
physical injuries have been sustained. In cases of this character
the worldly circumstances of the defendant should not be considered
by the jury. In these particular cases the question of defendant’s
bad faith should not be considered, for there was no evidence to authorize the judge to charge upon this subject, nor facts shown from
which the jury could properly infer bad faith upon the part of defendant. The plaintiffs do not claim to have sustained any pecuniary injury for loss of time or expenses incurred, nor that they
have sustained any physical injury; and the only part of this section
which should have been given in charge (and even then not in the
words of the section) was that the jury could give such damages as
their enlightened consciences might approve. These sections of the
Code can not properly be given in every case sounding in tort. They
simply announce principles, and, as a whole, are not applicable to
every case. The trial judge may give one principle in one case and
another in another case, giving each as the facts of the ease may require or warrant. It may have been that these erroneous charges
caused the jury to find these excessive verdicts. The jury may have
considered, without proof, the worldly circumstances of the railway
company, and may have thought that a rich corporation had acted in
very bad faith because its engineer had failed to signal the approach to
the station, and may have come to the conclusion from these facts that
these young ladies were entitled to such large damages for a detention
a

■when

—

of three hours in
suffered
ble.

loss,

a

comfortable

room.

The evidence shows that

they

not frightened, were well-treated and comfortaThe conductor was polite, and the agent at the station where
no

were

they stopped over treated them with courtesy. Their only annoyance
appearing in the record was that one of them thought their father
would be disappointed at their not arriving at their home at the
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appointed. We can not conceive how an honest jury, acting
partiality or bias against the defendant, could, under the
facts, have returned such verdicts. There are hundreds and thousands of women, and men, too, in this country, who work daily the
whole year for less than was given by the jury to these girls for the
slight inconvenience of being detained three hours. If these girls
had hired a carriage and driver, and the latter had driven them two
miles beyond their destination as a result of unintentional negligence,
and brought them back after they had waited three hours in a comfortable room, we have no idea that, in suits by them against the
owner of the carriage, these jurors would have returned these ver-

without

diets.

Yet the law is the

same

in both cases.”

The action

being for personal injuries actually received by the
plaintiff, it is not cause for a new trial that the court gave in charge
to the jury so much of section 3907 of the Code as is embraced in
the following words: “In some torts the entire injury is to the peace,
happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff. In such cases no measure of
damages can be prescribed, except the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors”—it appearing that in other portions of the charge
the judge properly instructed the jury in what particulars they should
find only the actual damages sustained, and that he confined the application of the rule embraced in the above-quoted language to the
damages resulting from pain and suffering, and the like. Keating,
99/308.
691. Vindictive

damages allowed where conductor

was

impolite and

gruff.
In

Keeny, 99/266, plaintifE tendered to the street-car conductor a
coin in payment of his fare. It was refused, and
the conductor said to the plaintiff: “You will pay the fare or get
off the car mighty quick.” The car was stopped and plaintiff got
off. The manner of the conductor in addressing the plaintifE was
very impolite and gruff according to the plaintiff’s testimony, which
was denied by the conductor.
The court charged in the language
of sections 3906 and 3907 of the Civil Code, omitting any reference
to the worldly circumstances of the parties.
Error was assigned upon
the charge on the ground that the evidence did not justify any
charge which would authorize vindictive damages. It was held that
there being evidence tending to show that in ejecting the passenger
the conductor used to him insulting language, and was “very impolite and gruff,” the spurt was not unwarranted in charging the

rare
>

but genuine
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upon the
in the case.

jury

law of vindictive damages.

No opinion

was

written

692. No

special damage being proved, the amount of general damconscience of the jury.
the plaintiff held a ticket on which he claimed
the right to ride on a certain fast train. The right was denied by
the conductor, and the plaintiff was expelled.
It was held that a
passenger who brings an action of tort for wrongful expulsion from
a train is not restricted to a
recovery as for breach of contract, but
may recover for his injury as a tort.
The amount of general damage, no special damage being proved, is matter for the enlightened
conscience of an impartial jury. And Bleckley, C. J., said:
“In
such an action as the present, where it is well founded, a recover}
may be had for the injury as a tort, as a breach of a public duty by
a common carrier
a duty imposed by law — though involving in
this breach a breach of contract also. The passenger could elect
to sue only for the breach of contract, and, did he so elect, his recovery would be limited to nominal damages, if he failed to prove
any special damage. But this action being for a tort, and no special
damage being proved, proof of the tort, and the circumstances attending it, would entitle the plaintiff to recover such amount as the
enlightened conscience of an impartial jury would sanction as fit for
the plaintiff to have, and the defendant to pay. There is no other
measure of damages for such a case.”
Cited, 102/819.
693. Aggravation. In every tort there may be aggravating circumage is for enlightened
In Roberts, 91/513,

■

—

stances, either in the act

jury

or

the intention, and in that event the

give additional damages, either to deter the wrong-doer
from repeating the trespass, or as compensation for the wounded
feelings of the plaintiff. Civil Code, §3906.
This section embraces every tort of every character and descriptiom, committed by every kind of wrong-doer.
The aggravating circumstances may be either in the act
itself, or
in the intention of the wrong-doer.
The objects for which the additional damages are given are either:
To deter the wrong-doer from repeating the trespass, or
As compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff.
The damages allowed under this section pass the limit of compensation for the injury actually sustained—they are “additional damages.”
may
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694. The kind

of cases to which the section applies.
Liddell, 85/482, suit was brought for damages to a passenger
from the derailing of the coach on a deflection track, and the court
charged the jury: “If the evidence discloses from all the facts that
have been submitted to you that this railroad was grossly negligent,
then plaintiff would be entitled to recover what we call ‘punitive
damages,” to punish them for that negligence, and there is no measure of damages then.
It is for you to say, from all the facts and
circumstances that surround the case, to what extent you ought to
In

add to your verdict for this plaintiff to punish them.”
said: “We think the court erred in this charge to the

Simmons, J.,

jury. In the
ease of Railroad Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, the Supreme Court of the
United States held: ‘(1) A passenger in a railway-car who has
been injured in a collision caused by the negligence of the employees
of the company, is not, as a general rule, entitled in an action
against the company to recover damages beyond the limit of compensation for the injury actually sustained. (2) Exemplary damages should not be awarded for such injury unless it is the result of
the willful misconduct of the employees of the company, or of that
reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to
an intentional violation of them/
The court, in discussing the question, says: ‘ “Gross negligence” is a relative term. It is doubtless to
be understood as meaning a greater want of care than is implied by
the term “ordinary negligence”; but after all it means the absence
of the care that was necessary under the circumstances. In this
sense the collision in controversy was the result of gross negligence,
because the

pmployees of the company did not use the care that was
required to avoid the accident; but the absence of this care, whether
called gross or ordinary negligence, did not authorize the jury to
visit the company with damages beyond the limit of compensation
for the injury actually inflicted.
To do this there must have been
some

willful misconduct, or that entire want of care which would

raise the

presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.
Nothing of this kind can be imputed to the persons in charge of the
train, and the court therefore misdirected the jury.’ Wood, in his
notes to Addison on Torts (vol. 2, p. 646), says: ‘In order to
warrant a jury in giving vindictive damages, something more than
mere

of

unlawfulness must be shown.

There must be evidence either

oppression. The act must have been
done under such circumstances as show a disregard for the rights of
malice, fraud, wantonness,

or

'
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others,
or

or an

intention to set at defiance the legal rights of others,
obligations of society.’ Under these rules, which
be sound, we do not think the evidence of negligence in
sufficient to authorize the court to charge the jury that

the ordinary

seem

this

to

us

to

case was

they might find punitive damages. Even if it was we would still
hold, under the rulings of this court, that the charge of the trial
judge was erroneous.” The judge charged that exemplary damages
might be given as a punishment of the railroad company, while the
Code says, they may be given “to deter the wrong-doer from repeating the trespass.”
In Harden, 101/263, the plaintiff held a ticket to Reeves Station.
She was carried, against her wish, to a station two miles beyond
Reeves Station.

It

was

held that in

an

action instituted for the

the commission of a mere negligent tort,
physical invasion of one’s rights of person
or property, but which consists in the omission to perform a private
duty springing out of the relation of carrier and passenger, the breach
of which results in damage to the person to whom that duty is owing,
the law of trespass is not involved; and it is therefore error in such a
case for the trial judge to give in charge to the jury that portion of
section 3906 of the Civil Code which provides as follows, “either to
deter the wrong-doer from repeating the trespass, or as compensation
for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff;” but upon the trial of such
a case it is proper to give in charge to the jury that portion of the
section of the Code above referred to which precedes the words above
quoted. Atkinson, J., said: “It can not in any just sense be said that
a mere negligent omission upon the part of a carrier to stop its train
at a given point, to which it has undertaken to transport a passenger,
is a trespass against such passenger. The word ‘trespass’ embraces
only that class of torts which involves a violent, unlawful, physical
invasion of one’s right of person or property; and this classification
necessarily excludes those acts of one person resulting in injury to
another which arise from a mere omission to perform a duty imposed upon the party bound to perform by the terms of a contract
■entered into between them. If, then, the injury complained of consists of a mere omission to perform such a duty, it can
not, in any
just sense, be said that the person complained against has committed
a trespass upon the person of the other;
and, if no trespass has been
committed, surely the court is not authorized to give in charge a provision of the law which is designed to authorize the imposition of
recovery of damages for
which involves no actual
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additional

damages by way of deterring the wrong-doer from the coma trespass only.
There are cases of expulsion from railroad-trains which involve, not only the breach of the contract of
passenger-carriage, but likewise the unlawful invasion of the personal Tights of the passenger in forcibly expelling him from the
train.
Such was the ease of Head, and in such a case it is entirely
proper for the court to give in charge to the jury, not only that portion of the section of the Code above referred to, which authorizes
the jury to assess additional damages to deter the wrong-doer from
repeating the trespass, but likewise authorizes them to give additional
damages as compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff.
The facts of the present case, if the testimony of the plaintiff is to
be believed
and this we take as true
the jury having found in
her favor, make a case of a mere negligent omission properly to perform the contract of passenger-carriage, resulting in inconvenience to
the passenger, and in personal injuries received by her in attempting to alight from the train. The acts of the defendant were acts
of omission only.
No trespass, in a legal sense, was committed upon
the person of the plaintiff; and we are therefore fully persuaded that
the instruction given to the jury by the trial judge which is above
criticised was entirely unwarranted by the evidence.” Cited, 105/317.
This case again, 107/379.
In Bryant, 105/316, two young ladies, who had purchased tickets
to a flag-station called Hamlet were carried beyond that station. They
left the train at the next station. They sued for damages and it
was held that, in an action for damages growing out of a breach of
contract of carriage entered into between a passenger and a railway
company, it was error to give in charge to the jury section 3906 of
mission of

—

—

the Civil Code.

695.

Subject continued.
Hardage, 93/457, it was held that in an action by a married
woman against a common carrier for wrongful expulsion from a car,
section 3906 of the Civil Code may apply, both in letter and in
spirit. Bleckley, C. J., said: “According to the plaintiff's evidence,
her fare had been paid for a passage to the end of the line.
She
and her infant were both sick. They were put off by the conductor,
without any reason or justification whatever, before the end of the
line was reached, and when it was about a mile distant. It does
not appear what the conductor’s intention was, but the act itself was
In
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violation of the duty of the carrier, and
the passenger.”
J., said: “Head’s case involved, not
only the breach of the contract of passenger-carriage, but likewise the
unlawful invasion of the personal rights of the passenger in forcibly
expelling him from the train, and in such a case it is proper for the
court to give in charge, not only that portion of section 3906 of the
Civil Code which authorizes the' jury to assess additional damages to
deter the wrong-doer from repeating the trespass, but likewise authorizes them to give additional damages as compensation for the
wounded feelings of the plaintiff.” Cited, 105/317.
In Brauss, 70/368, plaintiff and his wife entered a street-car, and
presented to the conductor tickets entitling them to ride to their
point of destination. Plaintiff informed the conductor where he
wished to go. Between the beginning and the end of the journey
it was necessary for plaintiff to be transferred from one car to another, and he was transferred personally by the conductor of the
first car, but was given no transfer-ticket, nor did he know that one
was necessary.
Subsequently the conductor of the second car called
for a transfer-ticket or another payment of fare, and in default thereof
ejected the plaintiff and his wife, requiring them to get off the car
an
a

outrage.

It

was a gross

gross disregard of the rights of
In Harden, 101/269, Atkinson,

in the mud

short distance from the

street-crossing, and in the
The conductor's manner was “very
people in the car, and plaintiff testified, over objection, that he was much ashamed and wounded in
his feelings when required to leave. There was no averment of special damage, nor was any actual damage shown. A nonsuit was
moved on the ground that the action was one ex contractu with no
actual damages shown.
It was held that it was not a suit to enforce
a contract.
That it was a tort founded upon a contract; that the
case made was one authorizing
exemplary damages in a suit against
the company, and that testimony of the plaintiff that his feelings
were hurt was properly admitted.
Hall, J., said: “This provision of
our Code is as applicable to the conductors of street-cars as to the
conductors of railways. It is comprehensive in its terms, and embraces every tort of every character and description, committed by
every kind of wrong-doer, and visits upon the offender exemplary
damages, or damages to compensate for wounded feelings.” Cited,
75/202; 77/681.
a

presence of a number of people.
short.” There were about thirty
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In

Head, 79/358, the declaration alleged that the plaintiff condefendant, through its agent at Tallapoosa, Georgia, to
be carried and returned from that town to New Orleans, receiving
a round-trip ticket.
Owing to some mistake in signing and stamping the ticket by the agent, return passage on it was refused by defendant’s agents. Plaintiff complied with every part of his agreement, and the irregularity in the ticket was entirely due to the wrongful conduct of the agent at Tallapoosa. He presented the ticket
to the conductor, who refused to take it, notwithstanding plaintiff’s
statement that its irregularity was through the fault of the agent at
Tallapoosa. The conductor stopped the train and forcibly ejected
the plaintiff. The cars were filled with passengers, and plaintiff was
greatly troubled and his feelings injured by the forcible expulsion
and the rejection of his ticket.
The court charged the jury that
the plaintiff could only recover his actual damages. It was held that
an action on the case by a passenger against a railroad company for
wrongfully expelling him from the train with force and violence,
though the declaration allege a contract of carriage, is not for breach
of the contract, but for a tort by breach of duty, and punitive as well
as actual, damages are recoverable if the circumstances of the particular case warrant suoh recovery. Bleckley, G. J., said: “Where the
plaintiff has a contract with the defendant which generates a relation attended with a public duty, he has his option to bring assumpsit for the breach of the contract, or case for the breach of duty.
Here the plaintiff brought a proper action, the contract being set out
merely as inducement, with a view to raise the relation, the stress
of the action being put upon his expulsion from the train, which, if
wrongful, was not only a breach of the contract, but a violation of a
public duty by a common carrier. Wounding a man’s feelings is as
much actual damage as breaking his limbs.
The difference is that one
is internal and the other external; one mental, the other physical.
In either case the damage is not measurable with exactness. There
can be a closer approximation in estimating the damage to a limb than
to the feelings; but at last the amount is indefinite. The jury would
.have a much wider discretion in dealing with feelings than with an
external injury. At common law, compensatory damages include,
upon principle, and I think upon authority, salve for wounded feelings; and our Code has no purpose to deny such damages where the
common law allowed them.
And suppose we call the’ damages punitive, they are recoverable in such a tort as this if the circumstances
traeted with
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aggravated either in the act or in the intention. Olds, infra.
Putting a man off a train wrongfully is a high-handed measure.”
Cited, 84/417; 101/269; 102/476.
696. “Punishing the defendant" and “justice and the ‘public good”
should be omitted in charging the jury.
In Ratteree v. Chapman, 79/574, the court charged the jury: “If
you believe from the evidence that the defendant, without provocation, assaulted and beat the plaintiff, as charged in the declaration,
and that such assault was a malicious, wanton, and aggravated one;
and if the jury further believe, from the evidence, that justice and
the public good require it — then the law is that the jury are not
confined in their verdict to the actual damage proved, hut they may
give exemplary damages, not only as a compensation for the wounded
feelings of the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant, and to deter
others from the commission of like offenses.” Simmons, J., said:
“This charge was error because the jury had nothing to do with
‘public good/ and had no right to so punish defendant by their verdict

■were

as

to ‘deter others’ than the defendant ‘from the commission of like

offenses.’

We think the

Whatever may have
heretofore as to this

exception made to this charge is well taken.
been the dispute among text-writers and courts
question under consideration, the legislature has

settled it in this State.

It declares that in torts, when there

are

aggravating circumstances, the jury may give additional damages,
either to deter the wrong-doer from repeating the trespass, or as
compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff. The judge,
in his charge, did not confine the jury to the objects set out in the
Code, but allowed them to consider whether ‘justice and the public
good’ required additional damages, not only to deter the defendant
from hereafter repeating the trespass, but ‘to deter others from the
commission of like offenses.’ In our opinion, this was putting a
heavier burden

on

the defendant than

our

law authorizes.

court reversed the court below upon a similar ground
said: ‘It is best that the law of the case, when expressed

he

given

> 39

This

to this, and

in the Code,

Cited, 85/496.
expressed in charge to the jury.
697. Onus is on the plaintiff, and when this section should be given
in charge.
The onus is on the plaintiff to prove aggravating circumstances in
order to entitle him to have this section given in charge, and it should
not be done where there is no evidence of
aggravating circumstances
in the act or intention, or gross negligence. But where there was
as

,
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proof of brutal and inhuman conduct on the part of the agent of the
and of his employment by the company several
days after the transaction, the section was properly given in charge.
The prompt discharge of such an agent by the company upon being
advised of his conduct, and the repudiation of his act would exclude
altogether the right of the plaintiff to recover additional damages
“to deter the wrong-doer from repeating the trespass,” but would not
prevent the jury from giving additional damages, “as compensation
for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff.” Turner, 73/292.
Cited,
75/56; 102/476; 103/126.
698. When company is liable for servant's acts.
If a tortious act of a servant or agent be such, when committed in
the business of the company and within the scope of the servant’s
employment, as would have subjected the servant to exemplary or
vindictive damages had he been sued as principal, the company will
be responsible for like damages, when it is sued for such misconduct
in its business. Gasway, 58/216.
Cited, 70/380; 72/29-1; 86/314;
102/476.
699. If the jury map reasonably find there were aggravating circumstances, damages may be increased.
In Drysdale, 51/644, it appeared that there was a lumber-train
railroad company

loaded with lumber.

It had

a

standard

so

forced out of

an

erect

position that it reached a passenger-train as it passed and broke
plaintiff’s arm. He was trying to close a window in the ordinary
and usual manner and there was some conflict in the testimony as
to whether his arm projected out of the window. The agent in charge
of the freight-train had observed the standard, but thought the cars
could pass. It was held that when the jury may, from the evidence,
reasonably find that there were any aggravating circumstances, such
as gross negligence in the act whereby the injury was inflicted, they
may increase the damages beyond a, mere compensation for the injury
done, and in such a case, where the judge who tries it, refuses a
new trial, the damages given must be grossly excessive before the
Supreme Court will interfere. Cited, 72/296.
700. Illustrations of the principles.
Where a passenger on a railroad-train, who had delivered his
ticket to the conductor, was subsequently ejected by the latter, who
took him by the arm, led him to the platform, and he thereupon got
off, although this was done kindly, and he did not resist so as to require violence, yet the jury might find exemplary damages. The in-
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convenience, insult in the presence of fellow passengers and wounded
feelings of the person ejected could be considered by the jury. Jackson, C. J., said: “All was done kindly, but by the commanding au-

thority of the conductor. The passenger lost nothing by not resisting and requiring force to eject him. On the contrary, he was right
to yield to authority and throw himself for remuneration upon the
law.
Of course, rude and violent conduct would be a circumstance
to demand increase of damages against the company, but more than
actual damage is recoverable for the act of putting off, by the mere
moral force of authority, a passenger who had a ticket and was entitled to ride to Lithonia, before he got there.”
Homer, 73/251.
Cited, 79/648; 86/644; 88/775; 105/317.
The plaintiff purchased at night from the agent of the railroad
company a ticket for passage over its road to Atlanta, paying for
the same. When called upon, she presented this ticket to the eonductor, but it appearing to be for passage to Asheville, North Carolina,
he decimal to allow her to proceed. She stated to him the circumstances under which she bought the ticket, and the fact that her trunk
had been checked to Atlanta

on it (which he subsequently ascertained
himself) and that she had no money with which to pay fare; but
ejected her from the train at a station where there were no accom-

for
he

modations, and from which she had to walk about two and a half miles
to, secure a place to ledge. She was an old and infirm colored
woman, in bad health, and going to Atlanta on account of her hushand’s death. Held, a verdict in her favor for $1,000 damages
was neither contrary to law or evidence, nor excessive.
The plaintiff having applied for the proper ticket, was entitled to rely upon
the one delivered to her by the agent as the proper one, without examining it, there being no intervening circumstances requiring her
to do

so.
The evidence was sufficient to authorize the giving in
charge of sections 3906 and 3907 of the Civil Code on the subject of
aggravation and vindictive damages. Dougherty, 86/744, Simmons,
J., dissenting.
In Morse, 102/302, in concurring, Lumpkin, P. J., said: “Dougherty’s case, supra,, certainly goes quite as far as any court should ever
go in holding that a railroad company should be held liable in
damages for ejecting from its' train a person presenting a ticket
upon which he was apparently not entitled to ride.
There the plaintiff had not entered into any special contract with the company, but
had simply called for an ordinary ticket, and the agent had, by mis-
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take, delivered to her ‘a wrong ticket/ which she, relying upon the
assumption that the agent understood his business, accepted without
examination, being near-sighted and unable to read without her
glasses, which she did, not know whether she had with her on that oc~
casion or not.
This decision has not escaped criticism. In 9 Harv.
Law, Rev. 353, it was said: ‘The weight of authority is against it, and
it seems to have no foundation in principle. It involves a misconception of the true character of a railroad-ticket.’ And see 42 Cent.
Law, J., 117.”
Where a person called for a ticket between two named points on a
railroad, paid therefor, and received from the agent a ticket which
was of a complicated character and not easily understood by persons
unfamiliar with its use, and having started on his journey on board
the passenger-train of the railroad, was ejected by the conductor
before reaching his destination, on the ground that the ticket which
he had did not entitle him to ride between those points, but in aD
opposite direction from his starting-point, he was entitled
recover
damages therefor. He had a right, under his contract, to be on the
cars and to ride the distance between the points the company engaged to carry him. He was entitled to proper evidence of the contract made with it, and his failure to receive it was no fault of his,
hut of the agent issuing the ticket, and the company had no right to
eject him from the cars because of the want of such ^evidence. As
to these matters, the agent and conductor were each the alter ego of
the company.

If the ejection

was

accompanied by circumstances of

aggravation, such as the use of terms of insult and villification by
the conductor, the refusal to put him off when the mistake was first
discovered, but carrying him to the next station, from which point
he had to proceed on foot, although old and lame, and his expulsion in the presence of others, he would be entitled to recover exemplary damages; and a verdict finding for the plaintiff the sum of
$1,000 was not so excessive as to require the grant of a new trial.
Olds, 77/673. Cited, 79/361; 86/644; 102/476.
In Bigelow, 68/219, the plaintiff was wrongfully ejected from the
car, the conductor claiming that plaintiff’s ticket had expired, when
in fact it had not. He recovered a verdict for $1,750.
Speer,
J., said: “Whether the action in ejecting plaintiff was a tort accompanied with aggravating circumstances, was a question for the
jury, and exclusively within their province to decide, subject of
course to the rule that
they are not influenced by ‘gross mistake or

I
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The night was cold, inclement and dark, and it
raining and was then freezing. Without authority of
law, and in violation of its contract, the jtlaintiff, an old man
sixty-five years of age, was put off the cars, between the hours of
nine and eleven o’clock at night, at no depot or stopping-place, with
no shelter or accommodation at which to
remain, and his only chance
was to follow the track of the
railroad, on which he was painfully
injured by falling through a trestle. Taking all the circumstances
together, we are not prepared to say that the damages were so excessive as to justify the inference of gross mistake or undue bias on
the part of the jury. The plaintiff, thus ejected, was put in great
peril, both as to life and limb, and under all the circumstances we
think that he should be properly compensated in
damages, not only
to satisfy his own wrongs and injuries, but to deter the
wrong-doer
from repeating the trespass.” Cited, 75/56.
In Condor, 75/51, it appeared that under the regulations of the
road passengers were allowed to pass, even when the train was in
motion, from one car to another, whenever it was required by a
necessary occasion, or whenever the passenger saw proper to do so,
either for his convenience or pleasure. The plaintiff attempted to
pass from the ladies’ car to another car to get his baggage.
The
hrakeman refused to allow it. An altercation ensued during which
the plaintiff was assailed with coarse and vituperative language and
blows by the brakeman, and probably by the conductor.
The jury
found for the plaintiff $1,000.
It was held that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover
something for the indignity put upon him
by the opprobrious language used, and by the assault and battery inflicted by at least one of the employees of the company while he was
in its care, and entitled to its protection, as a passenger in its cars.
Although there was no loss of time and no hindrance of the plaintiff
in the pursuit of his business, and although there was no considerable amount of physical suffering occasioned him, yet he was subjected
to indignity, his feelings were outraged, and he was degraded in the
eyes of his fellow passengers by being assailed with coarse and vituperative language and blows by at least one of those who owed him
protection and kind and hospitable treatment. In such a case, genera! or exemplary damages was the only compensation he could recover for this violation of his rights, and the measure of such damage is referred by express law to the enlightened conscience of an
impartial jury. It does not appear that this finding was so exces-

undue
had

*

bias.’

been
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sive

or

exorbitant

to show that the jury were

biased in favor of
against the defendant, or that they misconceived their
departed from their duties. Cited, 77/681; 102/476;
as

the -plaintifE or
powers or

103/126.
701. Other conduct

alleged as matter of aggravation.
petition in a suit by a passenger against a railroad company sets forth a complete cause of action for a failure to provide
for the comfort of and to properly protect such passenger, allegations
of other conduct on the part of the employees in charge of the train
amounting to a similar failure of duty on the same trip may be
properly alleged as matter of aggravation. O’Bryan, 112/127.
702. Intention of the conductor.
In Eskew, 86/641, the plaintiff had a ticket from Atlanta to SoWhen

a

cial Circle and surrendered it to the conductor.

The conductor,

through negligence, fell into an error as to the ticket, and expelled
the plaintiff from the train at Conyers, an intermediate point. After the plaintiff alighted from the train, he remarked, in the presence and hearing of the conductor, “it was hard to be put off and
be compelled to pay one’s fare,” to which the conductor did not reply. The court refused to allow the conductor to answer the question, “Whether or not it was his purpose to eject plaintiff from the
train?” It was held that where punitive as well as compensatory
damages are in question, the intention involved in the alleged tort
is material. Whether the conductor intended to expel the plaintiff,
or was misunderstood as to his purpose was relevant evidence on the
claim for punitive damages. The conductor was competent to testify
as to what his intention really was.
In arriving at the conductor’s
intention, the jury could consider that he remained silent on hearing

plaintiff remark, after he alighted from the train, “that it was
put off and be compelled to pay one’s fare.” Compensation for wounded feelings, as well as punitive damages, should be adjusted to all the circumstances of the actual case.
703. Punitive damages assessed without being claimed eo nomine in
the

hard to be

the declaration.
In order for the

action for a
the
enough that the facts alleged and proved be such
jury to

assess

punitive damages in

an

tort, it is not necessary that they shall be claimed, eo nomine, in
declaration.
as

It is

to warrant the

There

assessment. Holland, 82/257.
in allowing the plaintiff to

was no error

testify that at the

place where she was ejected from the car there was no protection
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for ladies
sence

or

strangers, with reference to the police, although the abprotection was not alleged in the declaration. Bleck-

of snch

“The declaration did not allege that at the place
was ejected there was no police protection for ladies or strangers, but it was competent to prove this fact, not to
show any negligence or misconduct on the part of defendant, but
to show the actual condition in which the plaintiff was placed by the
acts of negligence or misconduct which were alleged.
The absence
of police protection, though not imputable in any respect to any
omission of duty on the part of the defendant, would throw some
light on the mental distress and suffering which the plaintiff probably underwent when she was ejected, and immediately thereafter
during the time she was obliged to remain alone in a sparsely populated and unprotected neighborhood.
It surely can not be necessary
to allege all the surroundings which may serve to aggravate an injury, in order to have them admitted in evidence at the trial.” Hardage, 93/457.
704. Evidence of defendant’s having been fined admissible.
On the trial of an action for damages for an assault and battery,
the defendant offered in evidence the record of a prosecution against
him for the assault showing that he had been fined $300 for the
offense. It was offered to protect himself against the payment of exemplary damages. It was admissible for that purpose. By the imposition of the fine the defendant was punished, and the jury should
not punish him again by vindictive damages.
Cherry v. McCall,
23/193. But when the suit is by a widow for the homicide of her
husband, the record of the acquittal of the defendant, under an inley, C. J., said:

where the

plaintiff

dictment for the murder of the

husband, is not evidence for the de-

fendant in the civil suit.

Cottingham v. 'Wee'ks, 54/275.
705. Expense of litigation. The expenses of litigation are not generally allowed as a part of the damages; but if the defendant has acted
in bad faith, or has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the
plaintiff unnecessary

trouble and expense, the jury

may

allow them.

Civil

Code, §3796.
706. When not allowed.

Where not

only the liability of the defendant, but the correct
damages, is fairly open to controversy, and where the
plaintiff has insisted upon too high a standard as to both, and thus
forced the defendant to resort to a
reviewing court, the case is not
one
for the allowance of counsel fees as a
part of the recovery.
measure

of
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says: “Where there is a bona fide controversy for the
settle, and the parties can not adjust it amicably, there
should be no burdening of one with the counsel fees of the other,
unless there has been wanton or excessive indulgence in litigation.”
Tift v. Towns, 63/237.

Bleckley, J.,
tribunals to

707. Must be

proved in order to recover.
In order to recover for expenses of the litigation, the proof must
show what the expenses were, and they are only recoverable where
the defendant has acted in bad faith, or has been stubbornly litigious,
has caused the

trouble and expense. Mayor
Walden, 49/316.
The discretion allowed the jury in this section is not as to the
amount, but as to whether from all the facts and circumstances disclosed on the trial, they will allow any expenses of litigation at all.
If they are allowed the amount must be proved by testimony. Johngon, 90/810.
or

plaintiff

and Aldermen of Savannah

708.

Necessary

expenses.

unnecessary
v.

In all

cases, necessary expenses conse-

quent upon the injury done are a legitimate item in the estimate of

Civil Code, §3908.
improper charge.
In Varner, 108/813, it was held that it was, in the trial of an
action against a railroad company to recover damages for personal
injuries, material error against the plaintiff for the judge, who had
given otherwise a proper charge to the jury, to incorporate therein
the following: “In this case, gentlemen, or in any other, where you
want to give somebody something as a gift, you take it out of your
own pocket and not out of the pocket of some one else; and, where you
want to disregard somebody’s rights, disregard your own rights. In
other words, let’s have fair play about it.” As the plaintiff was seeking to obtain a verdict against the defendant, and the defendant was
seeking to prevent a recovery, the language used was susceptible of
the construction by the jury that a verdict for the plaintiff would be
a gift by them of some part of the defendant’s property to the plaintiff. Simmons, C. J., dissenting.
710. Damages for injuring and killing stock.
In Hudson, 62/679, it was held that compensation in damages for
hurting and wounding a farm-horse, whereby he was temporarily disabled for service in the season of farm labor, includes reasonable hire
for the time during which the disability continued, as well as making
good any diminution in his market value occasioned by the perma-

damages.

709. An
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nent effects of the

injury. Bleckley, J., said: “A limit, as to the
amount, to a sum not exceeding the full value of the animal, with
interest thereon, would seem proper. The limit is reasonable because the capital invested in the property is destroyed in so far as the
injury has diminished its value, just as the whole capital would have
been destroyed if the animal had been killed outright; and the accident that life was spared ought not to subject the wrong-doer to
make a larger compensation in the aggregate than if death had immediately ensued.” Cited, 63/242.
The suit of Tift v. Towns, 63/237, was brought for damages sustained by reason of a wagon and team being precipitated into Flint
River whilst crossing the toll-bridge. The team consisted of four
horses. One waS but slightly injured, another was damaged to its
full value, and the other two were damaged unequally. The wagon
was used for plantation purposes, not for hiring out, and the owner
had other animals from which to make up a team and do the customary hauling.
The court admitted evidence going to show the hire
of the wagon and team, and the cost of a hand to attend to them
while they were disabled from work. The testimony was not relevant and should have been rejected. Bleckley, J., says: “When a
person keeps a wagon and
or disable it, is to cut off

team for hiring out, to break up the team
the income which would result from such

But in this case, the use was alone for plantation purposes,
plaintiff had other animals from which to make up a team
and do the customary hauling.
Moreover, the four horses were damaged unequally. With this inequality, to keep them grouped as a
team, and to charge hire for them as such, is to make a forced computation of the damages, especially in view of her preparation for
supplying their places as a team from other animals on the plantation.
The cost, if anything, of making this change in the constitution of a
necessary team for the accustomed hauling would be an item of the
damages. The hire of the horse, which the injury rendered totally
valueless and unserviceable, was not recoverable on any basis. As to
hire, the investment was at an end, and there was nothing to do
but to pay for him in full, and thus replace the destroyed capital,
with interest, to be invested or not in other property at the owner’s
hiring.

and the

discretion.”
In a suit for damages resulting from killing live stock, where the
only issue for trial was the value of the stock killed, the last original
return of the property for taxes made by the plaintiff,
specifying the
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amount for which the

property was given in, was admissible in eviagainst the plaintiff as a circumstance for the jury to consider
in passing upon the issue submitted.
Simmons, C. J., said: “These
returns were objected to by the plaintiff, on the ground that they
were his original returns, and were not signed by the tax-receiver.
The objection was sustained, and the returns excluded. We do not
understand what was meant by the plaintiff in his objection that
the returns were original — whether they were upon the form of
return furnished by the tax-receiver to the taxpayer, or whether
it was the return digested by the tax-receiver and filed by him in
the proper office as required by law. If the latter, this evidence was
clearly admissible, because the presumption is that the receiver did
his duty, and required the plaintiff to swear to the 'correctness of his
returns before they were placed upon the digest.
If the former, it
was still competent evidence and admissible.
It was at least an admission in writing by the plaintiff as to the value of the stock, and
was, as such, admissible, whether signed by the tax-receiver or not.
This evidence was not, in any sense, conclusive as to the value of the
property, but it was admissible as a circumstance for the jury to
consider in passing upon the credibility of the plaintiff’s testimony
and in seeking to arrive at the value of the stock killed.” Tharp,
denee

104/560.
suit

against a railroad company for damages susby the killing of a horse, it is not error to exclude evidence
offered by the defendant, to the effect that the witness had seen good
mules sold for a sum less than the amount claimed by the plaintiff
for his horse, and that such mules had within two or three years been
sold for a much larger sum, and that he had also seen other horses
and mules sold at the same rate, it not appearing at what place the
sales occurred; such evidence being offered as original evidence to
show the value of the horse in question, and not as reasons of the witness for the opinion given as to the value of the horse.
Calhoun,
In the trial of

a

tained

104/384.
In

action

against a railroad company for damages for killing
injuring another, it was not error to allow the plaintiff
to testify as to the expense of feeding and doctoring the crippled
mule during the time it could not work, as a measure of damages
touching that animal. Warren, 84/329.
Where the court charged the jury that the measure of damages for
an
injury to a horse was the difference between his value before the
one

an

mule and

49
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injury and his value after it, and also that speculative damages could
not be recovered, the failure to charge a request as to a particular
class of speculative damages is no cause for a new trial. In this case
defendant’s counsel requested the court to charge the jury that, if

plaintiff’s estimate of the value of the horse and of the amount of
the damage was based upon the idea that he hoped or expected to
get a premium for the horse by putting him on a race-track, such
damages would be too speculative, and plaintiff could not recover.
Herman, 92/384.
In Warmack, 86/351, the declaration alleged that the defendant’s
train collided with the plaintiff’s wagon and team and demolished
the greater part of the, wagon and badly crippled the four mules used
with the wagon.
The court admitted proof of the value of the hire
of the mules. It was objected to on the grounds that it was illegal
and

was

dence, if

not declared for.
error

at all,

was

It

was

held that the admission of this evi-

not such

error as

would give the

company

right to complain, it not appearing that the jury allowed any damages for such loss of hire, and the amount of damages found being
fully authorized by the evidence as to the injury to the wagon and
the mules, which damages were sufficiently alleged in the declaration.
711. Damages for negligence causing the burning, of timber, fences,
a

etc.

The

case

of Murray, 93/256, was brought to recover damages result-

ing from a fire caused by an engine. The defendant’s counsel requested
the court to charge “that the true test of the damage done to the trees
and timber

the land of the

plaintiff, leaves, grass, and litter on
(not including rails in the fence), is the difference in the
value of the land just before the fire and its value just after the fire;
and if the value of the land was not diminished by reason of the injury to the trees, timber, leaves, grass, and litter by the fire, then
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything on account of the injury by the fire.” Error was assigned on a refusal to give the charge,
and it was held that where growing timber, much of it young and
immature, is destroyed by fire as a consequence of a negligent tort,
and there is no depreciation in the market value of the land by reason
of the destruction of the timber, the measure of damages is the value
of the timber destroyed in its then state as attached to the land on
which it grew, which value is to be ascertained by evidence as to
what the owner of the premises could, under all the circumstanees,
have realized from the timber destroyed, by
appropriating it to use
the land

on
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himself, to the extent of

any demand for it made by his own wants at
and about the time of the fire, and by selling it to others to the extent
of any demand for it which then existed;
at the worth of the timber as it stood upon

the value to be reckoned
the land when it was destroyed, not computing anything additional thereto for the increase
which would have resulted from severing it from the realty, removing it to the place of use or sale, and putting it in condition to be
used or sold. Timber injured by the fire, but not destroyed, is to be
dealt with on the same basis, to the extent of the difference between
its value

as it was before the fire and as the fire left it.
For leaves
and trash which the fire consumed there could be a recovery to the
extent that the owner could have used or disposed of the same in

supplying any demand then existing or near at hand, the measure
being the value of the raw material as it lay on the ground, not ineluding in the quantity to be paid for any of the material which could
not have been used or sold to supply the demand then existing, or
which

arose

soon

thereafter.

For material

which, had it not been

destroyed, would have been mere waste in the woods, there can be no
recovery.
For fencing injured or destroyed the recovery should be
measured by the cost of restoring it and making its condition as good
as that in which it was when injured or destroyed.
This, case again,
97/326.
In Ward, 110/793,, it was held that negligence causing the burning
of a pasture fence does not entitle the owner, to recover from the

wrong-doer the value of the pasture for use and occupation for a
longer period of time than would be reasonably necessary to replace
the fence. An allegation, in a petition for the recovery of damages
alleged to have been caused by the negligent setting out of fire upon
the plaintiff’s premises, that he was “forced to call in his neighbors
and friends to assist him in checking the fire so set out, in order to
save his residence from total destruction, for which labor and service
petitioner is entitled to” a specified amount, is without merit. Cobb,
J., said: “It is not alleged that he has paid his neighbors and! friends
anything for the services rendered by them, nor is it alleged that he
is in any wa*y liable to them. The allegation, taken literally, bears
the construction that plaintiff claims the amount stated for the mere
act of summoning his neighbors and friends to the fire.”
712. Plaintiff bound to lessen damage. Where by a breach of contract or negligence one is injured he is bound to lessen the damages
as far as is practicable by the use of ordinary care and diligence.
But
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this does not

apply in

cases

of positive and continuous torts.

Civil

Code, §3802.
713. Illustrations
In

an

action

of the rule. '
against a city to recover damages for personal injuries

by its negligence in permitting a hole to remain in its sidewas held to be a sound principle of law that it was the
duty of plaintiff to use reasonable means to effect as speedy a reeovery as could reasonably be effected under all the circumstances,
and that if she negligently failed to do so, and negligently failed to
secure the services of a physician in reasonable time, and her injuries
were aggravated thereby, she could not recover for such aggravation.
City of Atlanta v. Alexander, 80/637. Cited, 112/727.
A person upon whom a wrong has been committed is under obligation to lighten the consequential damages as much as he can by the
use of ordinary care and diligence.
To the extent in which his damages are increased by his failure to observe such care and diligence,
they are the result of his own negligence. This applies, in case of an
expelled passenger, to the time and mode of traveling from the place
of his expulsion to the station at which he was entitled to he set down.
It applies also to fatigue, hardship, and injury to his health involved
in reaching there.
Though he could not bq compelled to pay fare to
avoid wrongful expulsion, after being expelled he could not recover
damages for walking, and its consequences, when he might have
reached the station more cheaply and expeditiously, and with less injury to his health, by riding on the same or a subsequent train, or by
securing other conveyance; nor, as a general rule, could he recover for
inconvenience, hardship, or injury to health originating after reaching the station to which he was entitled to be carried, or needlessly
caused by walking and exposure before reaching there. Eskew,
86/641.
In TTsry, 82/54, it appeared that Mrs. Usry in alighting from a
train was injured so that miscarriage ensued. After receiving the injury she was taken in a buggy over a country road three quarters of
a mile to her home.
It was held that it was a question for the
jury
whether, after receiving the injury, the woman could, consistently with
ordinary prudence, undertake a short journey to reach her home,
caused

walk, it

rather than remain at the station, and take immediate
obviate the threatened consequences.
714. Discretion of jury as to

damages.

being

one

for the jury, the court should

precautions to

The question of damages
not interfere unless the

715.Explan tory.
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either so small or so excessive as to justify the infermistake or undue bias. Civil Code, §3803.
Although the amounts of verdicts in other cases
can not be considered by a jury in fixing damages in a particular
'case, and although previous verdicts are of no great value as precedents, still they may be of some value as illustrations of the general
rules controlling the courts when acting on motions to set aside verdiets for excessive damages. And they are of some interest as showing the general course of the juries and courts on the subject. For
these reasons, but with some hesitation, brief statements of nearly all
the cases are here given. It was not practicable, nor was it desirable,
to make a complete statement of the facts in each case.
In each instance enough has been given to show the general character of the
ence

are

of gross

case.

716. Other verdicts

precedents.
Lyon, 89/16, Lumpkin, J., said: “It is needless to cite the numerous cases in which verdicts for large amounts have been rendered
in cases more or less similar to the present one, or to point out the
instances in which they have been allowed to stand, or have been set
aside. As each case must at last depend on its own peculiar facts and
as

In

circumstances and he tested with reference to the same,
are of no great value.”

precedents

of the kind referred to
Decisions

of

the

Supreme Court touching particular amounts
by other juries in other cases as damages, and touching the
question whether such awards were excessive or not excessive, should
not be considered by the jury in fixing the damages to be allowed by
them in the case on trial. King, 88/443.
awarded

717. General rules.
In Owens

Sanders, 44/610, it was held that a new trial will not
granted only because a verdict is too small in trespass vi et armis,
unless it is shockingly against the evidence. Owens sued Sanders for
beating him. The jury found a verdict for $30.00. For error on the
v.

be

trial it

The

was

set aside.

question of damages is

not interfere with the verdict

one
as

for the jury, and the judge should

excessive in amount unless the dam-

ages found are so excessive as to justify the inference of gross mistake
or undue bias.
This court will be more reluctant to interfere with

verdict as awarding excessive damages, where the point was not distinctly made in the court below but was brought up under the gena
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eral

exception that the verdict

was

contrary to law and evidence.

Neel, 68/609.
Whilst this court will

always be careful to protect railroad companies against excessive damages, still when from gross negligence
the lives and safety of passengers are exposed to danger, and injury
results therefrom, it will not interfere with the finding of a jury except when it is apparent that the verdict was the result of passion
or
prejudice. Boring, 51/583.
Courts will interfere cautiously with the verdicts of juries in cases
of tort merely on account of the excess of the damages. They will
nevertheless, set them aside, and send the case back for the consideration of another jury, when the amount is so extravagantly large as
to leave no room to doubt but that the jury were governed by passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption. Winn, 26/250. In this
ease there were two concurrent verdicts for $7,000.
This question
was made on the second trial, and it was not set aside.
Benning, J.,
dissenting.
In Dorsey, 68/228, it was ruled that, whilst the court will never
invade the province of the jury in weighing testimony, yet it would
not hesitate to set aside a verdict in a ease involving vindictive damages, where there was reason to suspect that the same was the result
of bias in favor of one class of suitors, or prejudice against another
class.
In

King, 88/442, the plaintiff sued for damages, because, having
paid his fare over defendant’s road from Brunswick to Atlanta, and
taken passage upon one of its trains, after the train left Macon -a
new conductor, who had taken charge of the train at Macon, demanded payment of fare from Macon to Atlanta and although he
(plaintiff) submitted to such conductor such proof that he had paid
his fare and purchased his ticket as was at his command, the conductor threatened to stop the train and eject him, and compelled him
to pay fare from Macon to Atlanta, etc.
He obtained a verdict for
$500. It was held that the evidence warranted a finding for the
plaintiff; and, though the amount of the verdict is extreme, it is not
so excessive as to require this court to set it aside, over the
approval
of the trial judge. Lumpkin, J., dissenting.
In Lanier, 83/587, the plaintiff was a car-coupler. His left hand
was crushed, causing the loss of h(s second and third
fingers and injury to his first. He was thirty-two years of age, and was receiving
$45.00 per month at the time of the injury. He received a verdict
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for

Blandford, J., said: “The damages, it is true, are
go to the extreme limit, if, indeed, not beyond it;
and in all such cases as this the exercise by the courts trying the
cases of their discretion to grant a new trial would, it seems to us,
$4,000.

quite large.

They

be

eminently proper. While this court rarely interferes with the diseretion of the court below in granting a new trial, or refusing to

grant a new trial, on the ground of excessive damages, yet this court
has the power so to do, and will not fail to exercise it, in a proper
ease.
If parties wish to hold their verdicts in actions of this charac-'

ter, they should see to it that the verdicts are reasonable, and not such
as to shock the moral sense.
But we do not grant a new trial in this
case, although strongly tempted to do so, on account of this verdict.”
The cause of action being traceable to a mistake of the conductor,
and not to his willful or intentional violation of the plaintiff’s rights,
a verdict for $750 damages hasi the appearance of being excessive, under all the facts and circumstances in evidence. Eskew, 86/641.
Cited, 98/684; 95/243.
In Harrigan, 80/602, it was held that a new trial should be granted
for a manifest error, though a minor error of law, where the general
merits of the case as one for recovery at all are doubtful, and where
the damages found are apparently excessive. The error in this case
was

in

allowing the plaintiff, when testifying in his

own

favor, to

say

part of his evidence, that his character for truth and veracity had
never been attacked, and that he boarded with Kennedy, the tailor,
as

who could

testify to his good character. See this case again, 84/793.
Lowry, 83/512, the plaintiff was a boy nine years of age. He ’
lost an arm and recovered a verdict for $13,750. It was held that,
the damages found being extreme, if not excessive, the error of the
court in charging the jury on that branch of the case is cause for a
new trial; the error being in referring the jury to certain elements
of damages as to which there was no evidence, such as habits, avoeation, money made by labor, prospect of increased earnings, prospects
of obtaining steady and remunerative employment, etc., the person injured being a child nine years of age.
718. Writing off a portion of the damages.
Where general damages have been recovered for a personal tort, if
they are so excessive as to lead the court to suspect bias or prejudice,
he may grant a new trial; but the judge has no power to say that
the verdict in such a case should not exceed a specified sum, and to
In

require the plaintiff to write off

a

portion of the damages, and there-
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upon refuse a new trial.
to property, the value of

Aliter, in actions on contracts or for torts
which may be ascertained, and in relation to
which fixed rules for measuring damages are recognized. Hall, J.,
says:
“In 10/45, Lumpkin, J., declared excessive damages to be
good cause for granting a new trial, and that the discretion of courts
may be properly exercised in this respect in two cases: One where the
law recognizes some fixed rules and principles in measuring the
damages, whence it may be known that there is error in the verdict,
‘as in actions on contracts or for torts done to property, the value of
which may be ascertained by evidence. The other includes suits for
personal injuries, where although there is no fixed criterion for assessing damages, yet the court must conclude, from the exorbitancy
of them, that the jury acted from passion, partiality, or corruption.
This

case

furnishes the text of section 3803 of the Code and that in-

eludes both classes of

in which

damage may be given, ^nd prewhich the court may rightfully interfere with
the verdict, in the first class of cases, where there has been gross mistake, and in the second, where the finding has been so excessive as to
justify the inference of undue bias. In the first instance named, it is
an easy matter to correct any excess in the verdict by directing a portion of the same to be written off, for there the law recognizes fixed
rules and principles for measuring the damages, and the evidence accurately ascertains what amount shall be found. ' But in the last, from
the very nature of the case, it is impossible to lay down any such fixed
rules and principles; and in every such case the amount of the finding must be largely in the power of the jury, who have no other guide
but their enlightened consciences. To say, therefore, in such cases,
that this finding shall not have exceeded a certain sum, is to invade
their peculiar province and to assume their functions.” Harper,
70/119.
Cited, 104/659; 91/821; 78/320; 112/933.
Where the
scribes the

tort

to

ground

cases

upon

76/217.
Light etc. Co. v. Gale, 91/813, a married woman
sued for damages for personal injuries. There was a verdict for
$10,000. The judge ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff would
write off $2,500.
That they did, and the company excepted to the
refusal to grant a new trial. It was held that the court having determined that the ground in the motion for a new trial complaining that
the damages found by the jury were excessive was well taken, it was
error not to grant a new trial
unconditionally, there being in the evidence no guide or criterion by which the court could determine the
was

property.

In Brunswick
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amount which should be written off.

of this kind, as we have

Simmons, J., said: “In a case
said, where the action is for a personal in-

jury and for pain and suffering resulting therefrom, and there are no
damage for which a recovery can be had, such as
loss of earning capacity, etc., there is no guide or criterion by which
the amount of damages may be measured except the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors.
There is no criterion, therefore, by which
the court can estimate the proper amount of damages, and he has no
power to reduce the verdict by ordering a certain amount written off.
If the verdict is so excessive as to cause him to suspect bias or prejudice, he can set it aside, and order a new trial before another jury;
but he must do this unconditionally. In actions on contracts, or for
torts to property, in relation to which some fixed rules for the measure of
damages are recognized, he may order a certain amount written off; and in an action for the homicide of a person, where the value
of a life may be shown, according to certain recognized rules, he might
perhaps have power to reduce an excessive verdict to an amount which
would be proper under the proof.” Cited, 104/659; 112/934.
Where, pending a motion for new trial by the defendant to set
aside a verdict for damages consequent upon personal injuries received by the plaintiff, the latter, by his counsel, voluntarily, and
without any suggestion from the court, reduced the verdict by writing
off therefrom a certain sum, and the trial judge subsequently overruled the motion, but it does not appear that his refusal of a new trial
was influenced by such reduction of the verdict, and where this court
can not say that the verdict as originally rendered by the jury was so
excessive as to lead the court to suspect bias or prejudice on the part
of the jury, the judgment of the court refusing a new trial will not
be reversed on account of such voluntary reduction of the verdict.
Lewis, J., said: “The rule in this State being, that where general
damages have been recovered for a personal tort, if they be so excessive
as to lead the court to
suspect bias or prejudice, the judge has no
power to require a portion of the damages written off, and therefore
Tefuse a new trial; otherwise, where the damages claimed are special,,
and from the testimony can, with some accuracy, be computed in dolother elements of

lars and cents
What

was

as

in

cases

said in the

of tortious homicides.”

cases

above

of the judge to reduce
Perkerson, 112/934.
to power

a

Godkin, 104/655.

by Justice Simmons and Lewis as
verdict in cases of homicide is obiter,
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In

Crosby, 74/737, it_was held that where, in a suit by a wife for
husband, who was a railroad employee, the Carlisle tables of mortality were introduced in evidence and the value
of the services of the deceased proved, thereby furnishing a measure
of damages, and after a verdict for the plaintiff for $12,000 and
pending the motion for new trial, counsel for plaintiff voluntarily
wrote off from the verdict $2,000, so as to come within the measure
of damages proved, the refusal of a new trial was not error.
Counsel
for the plaintiff could write off any part of the damages recovered,
and the defendant could not complain, because it was not hurt by
making the judgment less. Jackson, C. J., dissented, and stated that
the other judges held that this case was not controlled by Harper,
supra, inasmuch as the Carlisle table of the expectancy of life fixes
a recognized criterion for measuring damages when used in connection with the annual proceeds of the husband’s labor, and that as damages could be measured by this criterion, and as counsel had the right
to write off any part of the damages, and the railroad company could
not complain because not hurt by making verdict against it less, they
hold the company not entitled to a new trial on this ground. Cited,
91/821; 104/659; 112/934.
The case Glover, 92/132, was an action by a mother for the killing
of her son, and the jury found a verdict for $7,733.98. It was alleged
to be grossly excessive.
After argument of the motion for a new trial,

the homicide of her

but before any

decision

on

the motion, the plaintiff’s counsel volun-

tarily wrote off $905.02. Bleckley, C. J., said: “We can see no objection to allowing plaintiff to write off from her recovery voluntarily any sum whatever. If, by so doing, any excess of damages
found by the verdict is voluntarily relinquished, it would seem that
the amount of the verdict would no longer be a cause for a new trial.
Why should there be a new trial solely for the purpose of reducing
the damages, when the plaintiff had voluntarily relinquished all that
could be treated as excess?” Cited, Mayor etc. v. Tucker, 103/234.
In this latter case the verdict as originally returned by the jury
was for an amount which was unauthorized
hy the evidence, but as
the plaintiff voluntarily reduced it to an amount which was authorized by the evidence, there was no error in overruling the nlotion for
a new trial.
It was an action to recover damages for injury to land.
In Perkerson, 112/923, it was ruled that the trial judge had no
power to order that, as a condition to the refusal of a new trial, a
portion of the verdict shall be written off as excessive, except where,
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from the

application of the law to the evidence, the excess can be aecurately ascertained. Fish, J., said: “After mature consideration,

we_are_of opinion that, upon principle, the rule denying the power
a trial
judge to order a remittitur as a condition to the overruling
of a motion for a new trial in actions for personal injuries should
apply with equal force to an action for a tortious homicide, and, indeed, to all cases where by the application of fixed principles of law
to the evidence the excess in a verdict can not be accurately ascerof

tained.”
719. Verdicts that

were

In Leathers, 92/93,
to be permanent, and

doing work.

not excessive.

the injuries were internal and severe — likely

totally disable the plaintiff,
was for $3,000.

In Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.

v.

as

farmer, from

Jordan, 87/69, the verdict

for $2,000. The injuries were serious.
In Hyde, 87/721, the verdict was for
excessive

a

The verdict

was

$2,433.35 and not being

to shock the moral sense, was

sustained.

Plaintiff

so

was

forcibly ejected from a train and injured.
In Fleetwood, 90/23, the verdict was for $4,375. The plaintiff,
who was a passenger, was assaulted and abused by the conductor of
the train.
In

Clowdis, 90/258,

and she recovered

a

a

wife sued for the homicide of her husband,

verdict for $4,000.

In

Brantley, 93/259, a widow sued for the homicide of her husband, who was a yard-hand. The verdict was for $8,000.
In Rigdon, 85/867, the plaintiff, a train-hand, lost a middle finger
in

coupling
In

cars.

The verdict

was

for $550.

Weaver, 85/869, plaintiff’s arm was mashed.

The verdict

was

for $750.
In
of

an

Mayor v. Caldwell, 81/76, plaintiff was injured by the falling
awning. The injury was a grave one and the verdict was for

$800 to $900.
In

Slater, 92/391, the plaintiff

was struck on the foot by a stick
passing engine. The verdict was for $1,500.
In Ryles, 84/420, the plaintiff was a car-coupler. His thumb and
finger were crushed and were amputated. The verdict was for $5,000.
It was held that “though the verdict is not altogether satisfactory to
this court, inasmuch as it was rendered by the jury and approved by
the presiding judge, and is not palpably unwarranted, it is left to
stand.” Bleckley, C. J., said: “If we were trying the case, we might

of wood thrown from

a
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be much

distressed, to arrive at the verdict which
must be mindful of the difference between their
our own, and as the trial judge was satisfied with the verdict, our dissatisfaction with it, not being of a higher
degree than it is, is of no consequence.”
In Nash, 81/580, the plaintiff sued for the homicide of her hus-

the

perplexed,

even

jury rendered.

band.

But
province and

She recovered

a

we

verdict for

$5,304.

Deceased

was

a

car-

coupler at $45.00 per month, and was thirty-eight years old.
In Williams, 74/723, both of the plaintiff’s legs were crushed, and
one of them had to be amputated.
The verdict was for $6,040.
In Mitchell, 95/78, the verdict was for $8,000.
The extent or
character of the injuries is not shown in the report of the case.
Rhodes was a baggage-master. Seeing that a collision of trains
was inevitable, he jumped from his car, broke
Jus ankle badly, and
was rendered a cripple for life.
The collision was in consequence of
an ambiguous schedule, or because the agents of the railroad did
not understand it.
He recovered a verdict for $6,000. It was held
that this verdict was not excessive, and that when an employee is
shown to have received injuries resulting from gross negligence on
.the part of his eoemployees, the court will not readily interfere with
the verdict.

Rhodes, 56/645.

Duke contracted to sell and deliver wood to the

ing-mill.

He sent his minor

son

owners

to the mill with

a

of

a

flour-

load of wood,

and while he was there the boiler, used by the proprietors of the
mill, exploded and seriously injured him. He suffered intense pain
from the scalding he received and he lost much time. He was making $3.00 per day hauling wood. The mare hitched to the wagon
and the wagon were damaged. The report of the testimony is not
satisfactory. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the father
for $500 and one in favor of the son for $1,000. The two cases
in the Supreme Court were decided together, and it was held that
the verdict in neither case was contrary to the evidence, or so excessive as to require the court to interfere.
McCay, J., said: “We
do not think the jury have so far exceeded the limit as to show passion or prejudice. The permanent injury to the young man
may
not be very great, though from the testimony of the
physician, one
can not but feel that the effect of this accident
may, at any time,
prove very serious, whilst the pain and terror already suffered are, in
themselves, no small matter. At first we were rather dubious
whether the verdict for the father could be so well defended; but,
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further

we think it may.
The loss of his horse,
the loss of his son’s service while laid up,
and the expense of taking care of him and of the horse, are not
all of his injury. If the doctor is right, the son may at any time,
he again prostrate from the effect of his injury, and new loss and
new
expense come to the father.” 50/91.
Plaintiff being fifty-five years old, and previously strong and able
to do all kinds of work, and earn $8.00 or $10.00 per month, but since
able to do only such work as cooking, and having been confined to
her bed for several weeks in consequence of the accident, and having
suffered great pain, which still continues, a verdict for $500 is not
on

the

consideration,

injury to the

excessive.
In

wagon,

Smith, 81/620.

Keating, 99/308, the plaintiff

and he made about $500

wheels of

was a

farmer forty

year. His left foot was
He recovered a verdict for $9,000.

a car.

a

years

of

age,

cut off by the

In

Smith, 84/698, there was a verdict for $7,500. A mistrial
was granted.
On the second trial a verdict was rendered for $7,500,
and a second new trial was granted. It was held that where, according to the weight of the evidence, there is grave doubt whether the
plaintiff ought to recover anything, the court below is warranted in

granting a new trial,
the jury are extreme
and resulted in

a

even a

second

new

trial, if the damages found by

or excessive.
The case was tried again, 86/229,
verdict for $7,000. A new trial was denied and it

held that, the controversy being one of fact only, a third verdict
for the plaintiff, not being excessive in amount, and the evidence, tak-

was

ing it in its utmost force, letter, and spirit, in favor of plaintiff, being
sufficient to warrant a recovery, a fourth trial should be denied. In
dealing with a third verdict, the law is satisfied with the evidence
if, upon the most favorable view that can be taken of it in behalf
of the prevailing party, and counting as naught all conflict, the
jury could have reached the conclusion at which they arrived.
In Elliott, 85/183, a flagman who lost a thumb in uncoupling
cars

In

recovered $500.

Bowers, 86/22, an engineer received a verdict for $2,266.66.
injuries were grave and permanent.
In Ocean S. S. Co. v. Matthews, 86/418, the verdict was for $1,000.
The plaintiff sustained permanent and painful injuries from a falling
bale of cotton while in the lower hold of a ship.
Where plaintiff, a man of twenty-three years of age, was greatly
wounded and bruised, suffering great pain for a long time, and
His
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being compelled to have his right hand amputated above the wrist,
a verdict of $4,700 was not only not excessive, but was quite moderate.
DeBray, 71/406.
Plaintiff, eleven years of age, a passenger on defendant’s train,
was thrown by the backing of an engine against the train so violently
across one of the seats that he shortly after had pains in his left
side and breast, and for months suffered intensely therefrom. It
was claimed that the injury was permanent, and rendered plaintiff

incapable of severe exertion, and decreased his capacity for labor
from one-half to two-thirds; that he had previously been bright and
strong, but since he had been dull and weakly. Defendant’s evidence showed that the engine was backed against the train by an
employee without authority; the plaintiff’s father said, shortly after
the accident, that the plaintiff had merely got a good shaking.
A
physician testified that a month before the accident he had treated
plaintiff; found that he then had a difficulty in breathing and swelling in the left side; that plaintiff looked very delicate; that shortly
after the accident plaintiff was worse, but in witness’s opinion this
was but a continuation of the old trouble, as there was then no evidence of physical injury except from the disease. Other physicians
testified that plaintiff’s trouble was probably from disease, and not
from the accident. Held, that a verdict for plaintiff was warranted,
and in such case, a verdict for $5,000 is not excessive.
Childress,
86/85.
In Dooley, 86/295, it appeared that the plaintiff, when injured,
was in his thirty-third year; he was stout and healthy and was receiving wages of seventy dollars per month. He was thrown out of.the
caboose to the ground, whereby his heart was displaced, his shoulder
dislocated, so that he lost the use of his arm and it was wasting
away, his jawbone was broken, five of his teeth knocked out, and he
could not close his teeth properly to masticate his food, his head, side
and thigh were cut, and his leg and hand skinned. The heart displacement impairs its action and prevents proper circulation of the
blood, rendering it dangerous for him to engage in manual labor requiring exertion or in occupations which he followed before the injury. His weight decreased thirty-five pounds. The heart trouble
had increased. He could not earn more than $20.00 per month. At
the first trial he recovered $15,000; at the second the jury found for
him $16,044.
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In

Richards, 62/306, the plaintiff, who was a railroad engineer,
injured for life, ruined for capacity to work at his trade, suffered
much pain, body and mind, and was but thirty-five years old. The
was

verdict
In

was

for $3,500.

Kicklighter, 63/708, the plaintiff was seriously injured, perhaps permanently, about the breast and spine, besides minor injuries,
without fault on her part. She was twenty-six years of age. The
verdict was for $2,500.
In Johnson, 66/259, 'Crawford, J., said:
“This court is not
permitted to substitute its estimate for that of the jury. We appreciate the extreme difficulty which must attend honest and upright
jurors in determining with accuracy and fairness the real damages
sustained in these cases; their sound sense and deliberate judgment,
based upon all the testimony, must finally determine how much
should be allowed as compensation for the injury suffered.
¥hey
are to be aided in their delicate and responsible duty by the judge,
who should caution and counsel them against excessive findings.
In this ease the judge warned the jury to take care to be reasonably
and just, and not oppressive. They have said how much the damages were, and our law has declared that ‘the question of damages
being one for the jury, the court should not interfere unless the
damages are either so small or so excessive as to justify the inference
of gross mistake or undue bias.
A verdict of $5,500 in favor of a widow who sued for the homicide of her husband was not excessive where it appeared that the husband had an expectancy of over twenty years of life and an annual
income of about $1,000', deductions having been made on account
of contributory negligence, the effect of advancing age, and the
support of the husband himself. Pittman, 73/325.
Where plaintiff receives in his side, just above the hip, a gaping
wound two inches long and three or four inches deep, which causes
him great suffering for six years, and physicians say that the injury
is permanent, and his health destroyed, considering his age and
probable duration of life, a verdict for $9,000 does not show bias or
prejudice on the part of the jury. Lewis, 84/211.
In Moore, 83/453, a boy nine years of age fell or was thrown by
another boy off the front platform of the car and the car ran over
both his legs. According to his testimony he stayed in bed a number
of weeks and suffered most excruciating pain, his legs being terribly
mashed and broken; has recovered his health, but his legs are badly
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bent and twisted, and permanently deformed. Probably the muscles
and bones will never be as strong as they otherwise would have been.
year from school.
He still suffers, and is likely to suffer,
pain from the injury, especially in damp weather. His capacity
for earning money was reduced one-fourth, according to the estimate
of one of his witnesses. The testimony for defendant tended to show
that from the effect of the injury there was a shortening of the right
leg from about a quarter to a half inch, and the left leg was considerably bowed outward, and was somewhat larger than the right leg;
that a large scar had been left on the right thigh; that plaintiff seemed
to walk remarkably well, limped some, but that could be avoided by
an extra sole on his shoe, perhaps one thickness of leather, which
would not interfere with his walk; that, considering his age and the
compensating power of nature, he would be practically almost as
strong as anybody, and his capacity to earn a living not be materially
lessened; and that the deformity would always exist, and, so far as
lifting and getting about were concerned, he would not be as strong
as before, though the strength of the bones was not impaired.
It was
held that, though it is apparent that the plaintiff contributed to the
injury, this court can not be certain, on the facts in evidence, that the
damages were excessive, the injury being immeasurable by a court as
to pain and suffering, and the damages found being $5,000.
In Boston, 83/387, the plaintiff was injured when in the act of
alighting from a street-car. She fell with her left arm under one of
the wheels of the car where it was badly mashed. The shock and
injury caused a miscarriage. Before she was hurt she washed and
ironed for a living, averaging $35 a month, after paying expenses.
She was hurt on the 28th day of November, 1886, and did not get able
to work again until March, 1887, and then went into service at $12.00
a month, but could not do the work,
and^her wages were reduced to
$8.00 or $10.00 a month. Her physician testified that he examined her
the night she was hurt; found the skin torn off the arm, the flesh and

He lost

a

some

muscles of the

mashed and

bruised, and the bone of the upper
scraped as if between two flat surfaces. The wound was a complicated one, and did not heal. She suffered great pain, and had
hysterical attacks. The tissue around the bone was destroyed, and
it caused the bone to decay partially, and to emit an offensive odor.
Partial death of the bone ensued, abscesses formed, and had to be
opened with a knife several times, and the nerves of the arm were injured, which weakened the giasp of the little finger and the finger
arm

arm
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next to it.

He testified that the

injury would

less affect the
proportion of the
capacity to work she had lost. The verdict was for $1,240.
In an action against a railroad company for personal injuries, a verdiet of $2,000 in plaintiff’s favor will not be set aside as excessive
where it appears that, before the accident, plaintiff, whose business
was farming, was a strong man, nearly twenty-four
years old; that he
could then make about $300 per year; that by the accident his arm was
broken in two places — one a common fracture, the other compound;
that he suffered and still suffers in the arm, breast, back, and kidneys; that he had not been able to do any work for six months thereafter; and that his capacity to work had been permanently reduced
fifty or seventy-five per cent. Chandler, 84/37.
In Waldhaur, 84/706, the plaintiff, a boy seven years of age, was
drawing his velocipede over the defendant’s track, at or near a streetcrossing, and was run over by a street-car pulled by two mules. He
recovered a verdict of $4,500; it was set aside and he recovered on the
use

of the

more or

for life; that he could not state what

arm

second trial
In

$2,500.
Williams, 88/16,

who lost

a

verdict for $2,350 in favor of

finger, another

ene

was

a car-coupler,
broken and it and another was

mashed.
In
In

v. Martin, 88/21, the verdict was for $1,000.
dressmaker and was injured by a defective sidewalk.

City of Atlanta

Plaintiff

was

a

Varnadore, 94/639, the plaintiff sued the railway company for

alleged illegal ejection from its car of him while
train, and after payment of fare by him. His pehis testimony showed that he was ejected forcibly
by defendant’s conductor, and the most abusive language was used
to him by the conductor, and that after being ejected he was forced
to walk about ten miles to a station, where he obtained transportation
to Savannah, his original destination. Plaintiff at the time was about
nineteen years old.
For the defendant, the evidence was to the effect
that he did not pay his fare, and was ejected for this reason; that the
conductor stopped the train and put him off at a flag-station; and
that no abuse of any kind was used towards him, nor indignity put
upon him. The verdict was for $800. It was held that though the
amount of the verdict is large, it is not so large as to justify the imputation of bias or prejudice; and, the presiding judge having approved the finding, this court while not fully concurring has no legal
power to interfere.
damages from

an

passenger on its
tition alleged and
a
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In

Thomas, 68/741, the plaintiff claimed damages for injuries

sus-

tained

by him by reason of a violent, unnecessary and improper blowing of the whistle of an engine by the engineer, thereby causing his
horse to run away and injure him. He recovered a verdict for $1,000.
The company moved for a new trial, and it was granted.
On a subsequent trial a verdict was rendered for $5,000, and a new trial was
refused. Thomas, 73/350.
In Singleton, 70/464, it was alleged that by the negligence of the
company’s agents in putting the plaintiff off the train, the plaintiff's
leg was broken and he suffered other injuries. He recovered a verdict
for $6,000, and it was held that while the damages given might be
high, they were not so excessive as to warrant the inference of partiality, prejudice or corruption, on the part of the jury, or to require
a reversal of the
judgment of the court below.
In Williams, 74/723, the plaintiff was fifty-two years of age; his
services were worth $1.25 per day. Both legs were crushed, and one
had to be amputated, and there were injuries to his back and shoulder.
In

The verdict

was

Allison, 86/145,

aside for

error on

ered for $12,000.

for
a

$6,040.
was rendered for
On a second trial

verdict

the trial.

Allison

was a

postal clerk.

$11,250.
a

verdict

He

was

It
was

was

set

recov-

twenty-one

years of age, and was earning $1,150 a year.
There was concussion
of the spine, disorder of the bowels and urinary organs, partial paraly-

sis, shrinking of one leg about one inch, twenty pounds loss of weight,
weakness of nerves, eyesight, and hearing, permanent and almost total

inability to labor, much pain and suffering.
In Wiggins, 91/208, the plaintiff was a postal clerk receiving a
salary of $1,000 a year. His age does not appear from the report
of the case.
His injuries were severe and permanent, totally disabling him from work. The verdict was for $14,375.
Johnston, 89/560, was for the homicide of the plaintiff’s minor
son.
The son was eighteen years old, was making $3.00 a day driving
a wagon.
His average earnings were about $1.25 or $1.50 per day.
was for $5,000.
Howard, 91/99, was a car-inspector. He lost three fingers and
the verdict was for $2,416.50.
In a suit for damages resulting from the negligent conduct of the
agents of a railroad in failing to stop its ears at the depot of a place
where, by a passenger’s ticket, she had a right to depart from the
train, but stopping at another point and causing the passenger to

The verdict
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alight in the rain, whereby she was injured, a verdict for $100 was
Wilkenson, 77/75.
In McClusky, 45/288, the plaintiff, who was a passenger, was carried beyond his station and the train was slackened to let him get off.
Under the direction of the conductor he did get off and in doing so,
injured his ankle. The jury rendered a verdict for $500.
An action was brought for assaulting, beating and wounding the
plaintiff, and a verdict obtained for $750. It was said that if the
jury believed the testimony they were authorized to find against the
defendants and it could hardly be said that they might not find as
much as they did.
The wound was a terrible one. Humphreys v.
reasonable.

Hendricks, 28/157.
In Little v. Carmichael, 32/406, the verdict was for $400.
Lumpkin, J., said it ought to have been doubled, as a more bold and aggravated ease of the indulgence of angry passions, of lawless violence, on the person of a peaceable and unoffending man had never
been before the court.

In Gavan

Ellsworth, 45/283, the verdict was for $3,092.50. By
inflicted on Ellsworth, he was disabled from being
an engineer, and a
physician testified that he believed that the inner
table of the skull was broken, and* was pressing on the brain.
•
In Flander v. Meath, 27/358, a little girl threw herself in the way
of a dray.
She was injured and was wholly at fault. The jury gave
her a verdict for $50. The plaintiff moved for a new trial on the
ground of inadequate damages. The judge thought that if the jury
found for the plaintiff, they were bound to find a larger sum.
The
v.

the blow that

was

defendant

acquiesced in the verdict. The new trial was granted and
Supreme Court reversed the case, stating that when a person voluntarily throws herself in the way of a dray, and an injury ensues,
the jury may find almost nominal damages, notwithstanding they
should be of the opinion that the driver of the dray was slightly more
in fault than the party hurt.
Notwithstanding the jury may think
the person injured altogether in fault, yet, if from pity, or any other
consideration, they should return a verdict for damages, and the defendant acquiesce in it, the plaintiff can not complain, and demand
a new trial.
Thus intimating that had the defendant- sought to set
the

aside the verdict it would have been done.

Brinson, 70/234.

720. Excessive verdicts.

In Sears, 53/631, a

verdict for $10,000 was held to be excessive and
unsupported by the evidence. It was an action by a widow to re-
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The report of the case
testimony was.
Where the damage alleged was the breaking of the plaintiff’s leg,
resulting in permanent injury, he being twenty-one years of age, realizing from $200 to $300 for four months, and being deprived thereafter of employment, a verdict for $14,833 was excessive.
Singleton,
cover

damages for the death of her husband.

does not show what the

66/252.
In Brauss, 70/368, the plaintiff and his wife were wrongfully
a street-car and put off in the mud in the presence of a
people, and the verdict was for “the amount of his attorney’s fees and costs of court and fifty dollars as damages.” It was
illegal as to the attorney’s fees and not excessive as to the damages.
In Strickland, 90/562, the plaintiff recovered a verdict for $1,500.
He was ejected from the train because he did not have a ticket and
would not pay the regular charge for his passage. He claimed to
have used due diligence in the effort to procure a ticket, and that it
was the fault of the company that he had not succeeded.
He had to

ejected from

number of

walk three
verdict
the

or

jury. Cited, 98/684.
Elliott, 58/454, the plaintiff

In

had

four miles to reach his destination. It was held that the
excessive as to suggest bias or prejudice on the part of

was so

on

it

an

the passenger

was traveling on a free ticket which
endorsement in the form of a contract to be signed by

by which the bearer of the ticket' assumed risk of acWhen he presented the ticket to the conductor, the latter asked him to sign the endorsement, telling him that the
regulations of the company required it. The passenger refused to
sign and also refused to pay his fare. The conductor ejected him.
He brought suit and recovered a verdict for $5,000. A motion foi
a new trial on the
ground that the verdict was excessive, and
other grounds, was made and the verdict was set aside.
In Lyon, 89/16, the plaintiff had a ticket to Brooks Station. The
eonductor did not ask her destination, nor did she tell
him, and no
one came to take
up her ticket.
The train passed Brooks without
stopping, it being a flag-station at which trains did not stop unless
signaled to do so for the purpose of receiving pasengers, or when
there were passengers on board bound for such station. The train
stopped at Lake Creek, a mile and a half beyond Brooks. The conductor told her in a loud voice, and in the
presence of other people,
to get off.
She got off and walked up the railroad to Brooks. She
lived in the country and was in the habit of
walking a good deal.
cidents, etc.
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day was pleasant, and she found her way back to the station
easily. A verdict was rendered for $2,000, and it was held to be
grossly excessive. Cited, 89/554; 95/243.
In Foley, 98/678, the plaintiffs ticket was rejected and he was
required to leave the train. He was on his way from Atlanta to Savannah.
At the station where he was put off he found a train on
its way to Atlanta, and he returned on it. He recovered a verdict
for $1,300.
Simmons, C. J., said: “This was grossly excessive.
There were no aggravating circumstances.
His person was not
touched, and there was no insulting language or other improper demonstration on the part of the conductor or any other employee of the
defendants. The conductor simply informed him that the ticket
was bad, and that he would have to pay his fare, or be put off, and,
upon his declining to pay, insisted that he should get off at the next
station, which he did. As already stated, upon his leaving the train
he met another on its way to Atlanta, and returned on it; and on the
next night he resumed his journey to Savannah.
There was no evidence as to any pecuniary loss outside of the amount paid for his
fare. It is manifest, therefore, that the amount of the recovery is
out of all reasonable proportion to the extent of the injury.”
In Jett, 95/236, the plaintiff, a girl of fifteen years, was a passenger on an accommodation-train to Ketts Station.
The train was not
stopped at that station to let her off, and she went on to Stone Mountain with some friends. The next morning she went on that train
The

to her home at Jetts Station.

A verdict

held that the verdict in this

was

rendered for $750.

It

being out of all reason and conscientious proportion to the injury, and so large in amount as to
give reason to suspect bias or prejudice on the part of the jury, the
ends of justice require a new trial. Lumpkin, J., said: “We grant a
new trial in this case because we think the verdict was too large, and
out of all just and reasonable proportion to the injury done to the
plaintiff. We can not help feeling that the amount is so great as to
give reason to suspect bias or prejudice on the part of the jury. An
examination of the evidence will show that no physical pain was indieted upon the plaintiff, no indignity offered her, and that she endured no mental suffering or anxiety. The actual inconvenience to
which she was subjected was very slight indeed, and yet the relatively
large sum of $750 was awarded to her. The evidence as to the alleged ‘aggravating circumstances’ was, in our opinion, very weak indeed. It seems there had been some slight grudge between the conwas

case
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due-tor and the father- of the young

lady, but it is not, in our opinion,
degree probable that the former was at all influenced by
it.
The evidence of the conductor is not entirely clear and satisfactory. It would, perhaps, not be unfair or unjust to say that he evidenced stupidity, both as to his conduct in the transaction under investigation and as to the account of it given by him on the stand.<
"VVe do not think, however, this constitutes any good reason for indieting such a penalty upon the railroad company as the jury have
seen proper to impose.
It is with great reluctance that we ever interfere with the verdicts of juries on the ground that they are excessive, but this is one of the cases in which we feel constrained to do
so.
In this connection, see Eskew, 86/641, where a verdict of the
same amount, under circumstances probably more strongly justifying
its rendition, was set aside by this court.
It was not, it is true, distinctly ruled that the damages were excessive, but Chief Justice Bleckley expressed the view of the entire court when he said: We are
strongly inclined to the opinion that the amount is out of reason able
and conscientious proportion with the magnitude of the injury.
Cited, 98/684.
When the negligence of the defendant, if there was any at all,
seems to have been but slight, and that of the plaintiff appears to
have been greater, a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $10,000 is not
only flagrantly extravagant, but so excessive as to disclose either bias
in his favor or prejudice against the defendant, or that the jury
wholly mistook and misapprehended the instruction given to them by
the court, and a new trial is required.
Smith, 76/209.
Two verdicts, finding heavy damages for the alleged injury having
been rendered, the second for more than twice as much as the first,
the wide difference between them in amount may, in the light of the
whole case, justify the judicial mind in suspecting bias or prejudice,
and the presiding judge having ordered a new trial because the second
finding was excessive, and this court not being thoroughly convinced
that there was error in so doing, affirms the judgment, with the qualification and direction that the plaintiff's right to recover stand and
remain established, and that the new trial be had upon the question
of amount only. Powell, 77/192.
In Goins, 59/426, it appeared that the plaintiff, a girl of seventeen
years of age, held an excursion ticket which entitled her to pass over
the road from Columbus to Opelika and return. It was part of the
contract that the holder might come back on any regular train the
in the least

y »
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appear on the ticket. The agent who made
report it. The plaintiff got aboard the regular
morning train the next day, and the conductor who had no notice of
all the terms of the contract, refused to pass her on the ticket and
next

(lay, but this did not

the contract failed to

demanded the usual fare to Columbus.
nize the ticket.
was on

teetor.

He

was

the excursion with
She walked about

polite.

ticket

no money;

she

friends and without any special promile to the house of a friend and re-

some
one

mained there until time to take the
made the

He had orders not to recog-

The plaintiff had

night train.

The agent who had

contract, reported its terms, and, on the next train, the

recognized and she returned to Columbus. She was delayed twelve or thirteen hours, and the train on which she returned
left Opelika at 11 o’clock at night and arrived at Columbus at 1:30
A. M.
The pecuniary value of her time was $1.30 a day.
She recovered a verdict for $1,000. The court granted a new trial on the
sole ground that the damages were excessive.
In the opinion of the
Supreme Court they were grossly excessive, and it was not only the
right, but the duty, of the presiding judge to order a new trial. The
suit was founded on a breach of contract, and actual damages only
could be recovered; or if none, then nominal damages. Goins, 68/190.
Another young lady of the same party, in the same excursion, and
treated in the same way, recovered fifty dollars, and it was held to be
enough. Hughes, 61/131.
In Humphries, 108/591, the plaintiff was carried beyond the station to which she had taken passage.
She recovered $500 and it was
was

held to be excessive.

721. Conclusiveness

of verdicts.
fairly and fully given in charge, the verdict of
the jury on the subject of negligence, contributory negligence, the degree of each, and the apportionment of damages, or the withholding
any, is conclusive, if approved by the presiding judge, provided there
be evidence enough to support the finding. Howe, 74/426.
722. When verdict for defendant should not he directed.
When there was evidence warranting the finding that the plaintiff
proved his case as laid, directing a verdict for the defendant was erroneous.
Phillips, 112/197.
Where the law" is
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CHAPTER 38.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
723. When
724. Action

right of action
for
personal

727. When the action is

accrues.

injuries,

when

barred.

years

725. An amendment relates back.
726. When lex fori prevails as to tort committed in another State.

723. When

right of action

trial

on

contract, four

bars.

728. Where the defense

was

not made in the

court.

accrues.

In

Peterson, 97/798, it was held that an action brought on the 24th
of October, 1893, for injuries to the person alleged to have been sustained on October 24, 1891, was barred by the statute of limitations.
Lumpkin, J., said: “A right of action ‘accrues’ as soon as the
party is entitled to apply to the proper tribunal. It can scarcely be
doubted that the

plaintiff in this case might properly have filed his
against the defendant on the very day he received the
injuries of which he complained. As he had the right to sue on the
day he was injured, the computation of time against him should begin on that day.”
The right which the statute (Civil Code, §§3828, 3829) gives to
declaration

the widow to

recover

death results from

for the homicide of her husband when his

crime

from criminal

other

negligence, can
actually dead, and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of his death, and not from the time at
which the injury was inflicted which caused the death. The commonlaw presumption in prosecutions for murder, appeals of death, and
inquisitions against deodands, that an injury was not the proximate
cause of the death when the death did not occur within a year and a
day after the injury was inflicted, does not apply to the right of action given by this statute. Bass, 104/390. Cited, 107/43; 111/588.
The widow’s right of action is not barred if it is filed within two
years from the death of the husband, notwithstanding it appears on
the face of the petition that it was filed more than two years from
the date of the injury. And Cobb, J., said: “It is not necessary in
the present case to determine when such an action would be barred,
as in no event is there any statute that could be applicable to such a
case which would raise a bar within a period of less than two years.”
Glover, 107/43; 111/579, 588.
As the loss of service is the damage to the father and is the gist
of the action, the right of the father to the service which he has lost
is to be determined by the laws applicable in the relation of master
a

not exist until he is

or

or
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and servant.
servant.

It

The master has
enures

a

property right in the services of his

to him and his estate in the

same manner

as

any

other interest in

property, and the law limiting the term in which
actions to recover for injuries to personalty may be brought limits
the right of action in such a case. Frazier, 101/70.
724. 'Action for personal injuries, when tarred.
An action for

personal injuries against

a

railroad

company

is

barred after the

lapse of two years from the time the right of action
accrued; and where the person injured, in consideration of a contract
by the company to do certain things for his benefit, and to give him
employment for life, agreed not to bring suit, and refrained from so
doing for nearly eight years, his right of action is not relieved from
the bar of the statute, although the company, in making the contract
with him, did so for the purpose of deterring him from bringing his
action within the time prescribed by law; it appearing also that the
company had complied fully with all its undertakings other than that
of

giving the plaintiff employment for life, and had in fact employed
more than seven years before he was discharged.
If the plaintiff had any right of action at all against the company, it was for a
breach of the contract bv which his original cause of action against it
was compromised and settled.
Kent, 92/782.
Where a declaration filed in due time failed, for the want of vitally essential allegations, to set forth a cause of action, but such allegations were afterwards, by leave of the court, supplied by amendment, and at a subsequent term an order was passed striking the
amendment, whereupon the plaintiff dismissed her action, and afterwards, within six months, brought another action, which substantially
set forth the same cause of action contained in the original declararation as amended, this second action was a renewal of the first, and
was not barred
by the statute of limitations, although filed more than
two years after the cause of action accrued. Smith, 93/742.
Where the plaintiff had a right of action at common law, the statute of limitations in Georgia is the ordinary statute which applies to
actions for tort.
Krogg, 77/202.
Where the statute of Alabama gave the right to sue within one year
from the death, the action must be brought within the year. Lacy,
49/106.
him for

725. Amendment relates tack.
When

a

declaration is

date of the

amended, the amendment relates back to the
filing of the original declaration, and if it be not barred

CHAPTER 38.
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by the statute of limitations the amendment will not be barred. Nix,
68/572. Cited 101/847.
726. When the lex fori prevails as to torts committed in another
State.
In
a

O’Shields, 83/621, it was held that where a right of action for
given by a statute of another State, and no period of limi-

tort is

tation is

prescribed otherwise than by the general law of limitation
prevailing in that State, the lex fori, not the lex loci, applies on the
subject of limitation. Bleckley, C. J., said: ‘‘Where torts are committed in foreign countries, or beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the sovereignty in which the action is brought, the lex fori governs,
no matter whether the legal right of action depends upon the common
law

local

statute, unless the statute which creates or confers the
right limits the duration of such right to a prescribed time. When
or a

that is the case,

after the bar attached in the local jurisdiction the
right would be extinct as well as the remedy.”
727. When the action is upon contract, four years bars.
Where the action against a common carrier is upon the contract to
safely carry, although the breach alleged resulted in injuries to the
person, for which damages are sought to be recovered, the action
is one ex contractu, and is not barred until four years after the
breach, notwithstanding the statute applicable to actions ex delicto
bars actions for injuries to the person unless the suit be brought
within two years after the right of action accrues.
Simmons, J., said:
“Patterson brought his action against the Augusta and Savannah
Railroad Company, alleging that he had made a contract with it,
whereby it agreed for a certain consideration to transport him safely
from the city of Augusta to the city of Waynesboro, on the line of its
railroad, and that there was a breach of’the contract, in that it did
not transport him safely, but that he was injured and damaged by
the loss of his arm. Where a person makes a contract of this kind
with a common carrier, and he is injured by the negligence of the
carrier, he has two remedies — one an action for the breach of contract, the other an action on the case for the wrong — and he may
elect which remedy he will pursue. If he elects to bring an action
for the breach of contract, he has, under the Code, four years within
which to bring it; if he elects to sue upon the tort, he has two years.
Code, §§2923, 3060. If he sues upon the breaeli of contract, and
there is a final adjudication of this suit upon the merits, he can not
afterwards

sue

the

same

defendant

on

the tort.

The

plaintiff in this
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having brought his action for a breach of the contract, and four
not having elapsed before the filing of the suit, he was in time;
and, if he proves the contract alleged with this particular defendant,
or one of its
agents, who was authorized to make it, and the alleged
breach and injury resulting therefrom, we see no reason why he can
not recover.
See Code, §3811; Hutch. Carr, §790.”
Patterson
94/140.
728. Where defense not made m trial court.
A mere failure to prove the time when such tort was committed
will not be cause for setting aside, on certiorari, a judgment in the
plaintiff’s favor, on the general ground that the same is contrary to
'the evidence, there being no plea of the statute of limitations, and it
not appearing that this defense was in any manner made or insisted
upon in the trial court. Wells, 103/209.
case

years

By an accident the
at its proper place.
729.

following

case was

prevented from appearing

Employee must be without fault even when he is acting unof a superior.
In Adams, 55/279, the plaintiff was a track-hand working under
Bennett, a section-boss. The court charged the jury: “If you find
that Bennett had authority to employ and discharge the hands under
him, and had authority over plaintiff with power to discharge him
for disobedience of orders, and you further find that the injury was
caused by the order or direction of Bennett, then plaintiff is not
precluded from recovering, even though he was guilty of some wrong
or fault himself, which contributed to the injury.”
It was held that
an employee can not recover damages from a railroad company for
injuries sustained by him on account of the negligence of a coemployee, unless without fault himself, even though in performing the
act which resulted in the injury he was acting under the orders of a
superior. Warner, C. J., said: “To entitle the plaintiff, an employee,
to recover, he rrjust be without fault or negligence on his part. The
statute makes no distinction between the grades or classes of employees of a railroad company, and therefore the courts are not authorized to recognize any such distinction so as to enable the plaintiff
to recover on the principle of contributory negligence, as assumed in
the charge of the court.”
Cited, 58/490, 63/183, 68/706, 70/678,
.

der orders

80/230, 85/200.

INDEX.
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ABATEMENT OF ACTIONS.
For tort.

433.

ACCIDENT.
Both parties innocent, catastrophe was an accident.
11.
Boy drawn under train by a rope. 66.
Brake applied to prevent a collision.
331.
Casualty, not sufficient that company did not know how it occurred,
when.

149.

Casualty, when company not bound to show how it occurred.
Casualty, pure, no cause of action arises from. 326, 11.
Child went under
Chisel

a

car

for

ball.

a

243.

63.

blurred, and chip of steel injured the

eye.
314.
Circumstances not shown, accident not in the case.
65.

Clinker, stepping on. 322.
weather, effects of on a coupling. 65.
Cross-tie, conductor injured by defective. 245.

Cold

Crowbar falls from

Definition

of

a

258.

hand-car.

accident.

11, 63.

Emergency, inharmonious action of two minds, in. 65.
Fingers caught between door and facing. 66, 149.
Foot slipping and dropping bar of iron.
65.
Inevitable accident, what is.

11.

Negligence in either, not an. 11.
Ore, piece of, turned under the foot. 323.
Remote possibility is within domain of accident.
65.
Reports of, as evidence. 642.
Responsibility, no legal, for. 11, 326.
Rope broke, and injured a well-digger. 65.
Rope drew a boy under a train. 66.
Stirrup attached to a car, fall from. 65.
Unavoidable, causing injury to stock, company not liable.

66.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

Attorney’s fees, effect of, on.
Code sections, defining.
507.

513.

Consideration for release, there must be.

509.

Defense, must be pleaded to be available, as. 508.
Estopped from claiming release is not binding, when. 512.
Fraud, to avoid release for, fruit of contract must be restored.
Refund, when not necessary before suit. 511.
ACT OF GOD.
No

one

held

responsible for. 244.
by unprecedented rainfall, held to be.

Washout caused

797

244.

510.
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ADMINISTRATOR.

Foreign statute, suit by, under. 405, 518.
Right of action does not survive to. 399.
AGENT.

Competent witness, when. 651.
Conductor can not appoint without express power.
16.
Declaration of, when admissible.
600.
Improper person, employment of, when gross misconduct. 371.
Insane, when company liable for his acts. 371.
Ticket accepted as agent estops from denying the agency.
644.
ALIGHTING FROM THE TRAIN.

Assisting in.

See

Passengers.

160.

Care, passenger must use in.

162, 532.
Depots and stations should be made safe and convenient for. 158.
Flagman no authority to order. 534.
Jerks causing injury.
160, 532, 533.
Jumping, whether an act of negligence is for the jury. 26.
Moving train, alighting from, generally affords no cause of action.

75,

532.

Passenger station and depot, duty

as
Place not intended for the purpose.
Place suitable for, must be provided.

Pregnant
Prudent

to.

158.

159.
158.

woman injured.
158.
of means provided

for. 195, 200.
opportunity for, required. 161, 195.
Stations and depots, duty as to. 158.
Stool, to facilitate, custom as to. 624.
Street-car, alighting from. 338.
Visitor, when entitled to notice of starting. 75.
Warning, customary, by conductor to depart. 195.
use

Reasonable time and

AMENDMENTS.
ANIMALS.

See

Pleadings.

See Vicious

or

Dangerous Animals.

APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES.

See

Damages.

APPREHENSION.

Duty and diligence should keep pace with.
Employee yields his under orders. 259.
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES.

See

Contributory negligence and Ap•

portionment of Damages.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
Action for.

87, 98.

435.

Baggage-master and conductor, by. 191.
Baggage-master, to rape. 192.
Conductor, by. 183, 186, 187, 188, 189.

INDEX.
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Lien

for, when it arises.

513.

Settlement

by plaintiff, effect of.
foreign laws by. 519.

Proof of

513.

BAGGAGE-MASTER.
Assault and

battery by. 191.
by. 192.

Assault to rape,

Spout of
BRIDGES.

a

tank, injured by.

See

528.

Crossings.

Approaches to, liability of company as to. 117.
Counties, duty and liability, as to. 464, 4G5, 4G6, 4G7.
Knocked from ear by.
378.
Knowingly using defective. 75.
BURDEN OF PROOF.

See Evidence.

Casualty, when

company not bound to show
Defendant must show diligence when injury

how it occurred. 243.
is proven. 38, 13G.
Ejection, when carrier must show it was lawful. 180.
Employee, as to, when he did not participate in the act. 240, 241, 242,
374.

'Employee, as to, when he participated in the act.
Employee, when on. 240, 241, 242, 324, 374.
General rule

as

to.

240, 241, 242, 374.

573.

Plaintiff must show

diligence was due to him. 64.
Presumption, when employee participated in the act. 240, 241, 242, 374.
Presumption, when employee rests on it. 240, 374.
Rules, when on defendant to establish their existence. 237.
Shifted, when it is. 574.
CAR-COUPLER.
CATTLE.

See

Employees.

See Stock.

CHARGE OF THE COURT.
Definitions should be adhered to.

3.

How sections 2322 and 3830 should be

given in. 41.
Proper, when negligence in several particulars is alleged. 522.
Shall not charge that certain enumerated facts constitute negligence.
25.

Should not omit certain

charges. 620.
objection.

When evidence is in without

CHILDREN OF TENDER YEARS.

564.

See Torts to Wife or Child or Servant.

decide as matter of law. 8, 9, 10.
question for the jury. 8, 9, 10, 348.
Care sfs to, more than as to adults required.
87, 329.
Comparative degrees not applied to. 7, 8, 9, 10, 87.
Dangerous machine, when it should be guarded. 103.
Diligence of. 419.
Capacity, when court
Capacity, when it is

may

a

INDEX.
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CHILDREN OF TENDER YEARS
Drawn under

Due

care

a

train

by

in, defined.

—

a rope.

continued.

66.

7, 8, 9, 10, 301.

Duty of driver

when

Each

facts.

case

or conductor, as to,
dealt with upoji its own

Emancipation of.

the cars.
8, 10.

on

349.

423.

Girl of seventeen years, not treated as.
419.
Judicial notice as to ability to render service.

415.

Master’s exemption from rule of non-liability for coeinployee's act, when
it does not apply.
329.
Moving car, child trespasses on. 103.
Moving train, child pushed from. 100.
Parent or custodian, fault of, when not imputed to child.
12.
Presumption, none that they will get out of the way. 87.
Street-car, injuries by. 348, 349.
Swinging on trains, company not bound to have watchman to prevent.
103.

Track, when on, duty to. 87.
Turntable, injured by. 102, 103.
Warning and instruction as to dangers of employment.
Went under

a car

for

a

ball.

300, 301.

63.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Injury may be proven by. 67, 106.
Overcome by positive evidence.
577.
CITY, TOWN OR VILLAGE.
Bell, ringing in, duty as to.

114, 127.
Blowing the whistle ki, rights and duties of the company,

as

to.

110,

114, 127.
Trains must be checked and

CODE

give warning.

128, 129.

SECTIONS.

Abatement of actions for

torts, §3825.
507.

433.

Accord and satisfaction, §2878.

Admissions, §5197. 607.
Agent, a competent witness, when, §3034. 651.
Aggravation, damages, §3906. 705.
Amendments, §§5097, 5098, 5099. 541, 542, 543.
Apportionment of damages, §t§2322, 3830. 204.
Burden of proof, §5160.
573.
Burden of proof, when shifted, §5161.
574.

Companies, what embraced in §2321.
Construction of §§2322,

3830.

45.

40.

Construed

together, §§3911, 3912, 3913, must be. 14, 39, 41.
exempting master from liability, when void, §2613. 33?.
Contributory negligence and apportionment of damages, §§232?, 3830.

Contracts

204.

Crossings of railroads and public roads, §§2220, 2221, 2222, 2223.
Counties, when liable to suit, §341.

462.

114.

INDEX.
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Damages,
Damages,
Damages,
Damages,
Damages,
Damages,
Damages,
Damages,
Damages,

Damages,
Damages,
Defenses,

aggravation, §3906. 705.
by the running of cars, §2321. 38, 44.
compensation the rule, §3905. 654.
direct and consequential, §3911. 14.
discretion of tft jury, as to, §3803. 714.
expenses of litigation, §3796.
705.
expenses, necessary, consequent upon the injury, §3908.
plaintiff bound to lessen, §3802. 712.
remote, rule to ascertain, §3913. 14.
remote, when too, §3912. 14.
vindictive, §3907. 688.
separate, §§2322, 3830, are. 41.

Definitions in, should be adhered to.

3.

Diligence of plaintiff, §§2322, 3830. 38.
Disorderly persons on trains, Penal Code, §902.
Due

care

in

a

child, §2901.

183.

7.

Employee, injury by -coemployee, §2323. 210.
Employee, liability of railroad companies to, §2297.

Expenses of litigation, §3796.

708.

214.

705.

Expert testimony, §5287. 579.
Extraordinary diligence, §2062. 5.
Failure to produce evidence, §5163.
570.
Gross negligence, §2063.
6.
Homicide, §§3828, 3829. 358.
Imputable negligence, §2902. 12.
Independent contractor, §§3818, 3819. 439.
Injury done by plaintiff's consent or negligence, §2322. 38.
Introductory to §§2321, 2322, 3830. 37.
Liability of landlords, §3118. 444.
Malpractice of surgery and medicine, §3831. 443.
Master’s liability for coemployee's negligence, §2610.
273.
Master’s duty in selecting servants, §§2611, 2612.
281.
Master’s duty in furnishing machinery, §§2611, 2612.
285.
Municipal corporations, discretionary acts, not liable for, §747. 469.
Municipal corporations, ministerial duties, liability as to, §748. 472.
Municipal corporations, legislative and judicial powers, §748. 472.
Municipal corporations, streets, defects in, §749. 481.
Opinions of witnesses, §§5285, 5287. 579, 585.
Ordinary diligence, §2898. 1.
Owners of lands to keep premises safe, §3824.
447.
Passengers, diligence as to, §2266. 139.
Passengers, that may be refused, §2296. 203.
Person and property, §3830 applies to.
42.
Physical injuries, §3826. 434.
Plaintiff must exercise ordinary care, §3830.
29.
Positive and negative testimony, §5165.
575.
Receiver’s liability to employees, §2324. 29, 266.
Res gest*, §5179.
593.
51

INDEX.
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Restatement of §§2321, 2322, 3830. 39.
Torts, §§3807, 3809, 3810. 427.
Torts by wife, child, or servant, §3817. 436.
Torts to wife or child, §3816.
412.
Venue of actions against railway companiH, §2334.
Venue of actions against receivers, §2325.
270.
Vicious and dangerous animals, §3821.
455.

30.

COMMON CARRIERS.

Duty of extraordinary diligence can not be waived. 147.
Judicially noticed, railway companies will be. 50.
Railway companies are, and bound to extraordinary diligence.

50.

COMMON LAW.

Presumption against carriers is from the. 57.
Presumptively of force in certain States. 514.
Recovery for homicide, none by. 514.
What it is, courts of Georgia will determine. 514, 515.
CONDUCTOR.

Agreement to stop at particular place not a station. 197.
Assault on a trespasser, when company is liable for.
100,
Can not delegate to another powers conferred upon himseli.
16.
Couple cars, his duty only in emergency. 380.
Emergency, his duty in. 380.
Fare, agreement as to. 178.
Good faith, his, how regarded.
185.
Jumping from train under his orders. 200.
Mistake, no excuse for illegal ejection. 184.
Passenger’s destination, he should ascertain. 195. 196.
Passengers, mistreatment of. 186, 18^, 188, 189.
Passengers, molestation, must protect them from. 188, 189.
Passengers, promise to wake. 195.
Police officers, has powers of.
183.
Powers and duties.
16, 100.
Rencounter

Represents
Sub-agent,

on

car

with another.

186.

in determining who shall ride. 100.
can not appoint.
16.
Violence, his, wrhen company liable for. 100, 183, 186, 187, 191.
company

CONSENT.

Injury done by plaintiff's consent,

no recovery.

38.

CONTRACTS.

Election, to sue on, or in tort. 164.
Exempting master, when void. 332.
Express, certain rights waived only by. 236.
Express, holder of ticket fails to comply with conditions.
Express, imposing limitations on tickets. 172.

173.
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CON TRAC T S — continued.

Extraordinary diligence, to waive, void.
Ticket, whether it constitutes.

147, 174.

166.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES.

Apportioning, enlighten^ opinion of the jury is the standard for.

40,

211.
Diminished in

proportion to plaintiff’s default.

38, 204, 212.
§§2322, 3830. 38, 39, 40, 41, 204.
Doctrine, when it 'does not apply. 206.
Doctrine, when it should be submitted to the jury. 207.
Employee, doctrine does not apply to, when. 216.
Imperative, section is, and jury should be held to it. 208.
Intoxication, when it should not count against plaintiff. 209.
Jury, enlightened opinion of, the standard. 40, 211.
Jury, when, the doctrine should be submitted to them. 207.
Negligent in proof must contribute to the injury. 213.
Negligence, meaning of, in the statute. 205.
Only case to which doctrine applies. 204.
Doctrine is embraced in

Plaintiff must be less at fault than defendant.

212.

Willful act of

defendant, plaintiff’s negligence no defense to.
When plaintiff may contribute to the injury and yet recover.
40, 41.
Where

agent is in charge of plaintiff’s property.

205.
29, 38, 3?

210.

CONVICT.

Felony, may sue. 111.
Felony, who was not contributing to his father’s support. 400.
Rule that employee who goes into danger can not recover, not applicable
to.

305.

CORPORATION.

Consolidation, effect of. 52.
'hen it becomes

complete.

55.

iTTON-YARD.

Duty of

company as

to keeping it in order.

86.

COUNTIES.

contractors bond, terms of. 464.
defective, when liable for. 464.
how long liability continues. 466.
what must be shown to recover on account of.
I
within an ^fticorporated town. 467.
Convict, when not liable for mistreatment of. 463.
Ordinary care required of injured person. 468.
Political divisions exercising sovereign powers. 462.
Suit, only liable to, when made so by statute. 462.

Bridges,
Bridges,
Bridges,
Bridges,
Bridges,

COUPLING CARS.

See Employees and Rules and

Orders.

465.
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CROSSINGS.
Accidents at public road crossings, statute applies only to.
Accident, not at, use made of section. 131.
Beyond, person injured. 131, 132.
Blowing the whistle, Code section requiring. 114.

122.

Blowing the whistle in city, town or village. 114, 120, 127.
Blowing the whistle is proper diligence, when. 114, 120, 126, 127.
Blowing the whistle, purpose in. 120.
Bridges, approaches to, duty of company. 117.
Bridges at crossings to be built. 114.
Bridges at private crossings on a farm. 115.
Checking train before reaching post. 123.
Checking train, duty of company as to. 114, 120, 123.
Cheeking train in a city, town or village. 128, 129.
City, town, or village, blowing in. 114, 127.
City, town, or village, train to be checked in. 128, 129.
City, town, or village, warning given in. 129.
Code sections.

114.

Collision, liable without actual.
Construed
Cuts

or

124.

strictly, this law should be.

embankments, fences at.

Defenses that company

119.

116.

could make.

136.

Duties, reciprocal, of company and public.

137.
Duty to one on the track not at public crossing. 122.
Duty to one at public crossing or on public road. 122.
Duty, to whom it is due. 122, 124, 131.

Embankment, fences at.

116.
Embankment, required to make.
Extent of crossing.
114, 116.

114.

Failure to observe

precautions may be proved in all cases. 131.
precautions, value of proof of. 131.
Footway used by public, not embraced. 115.
Grade crossings meant.
119.
Misdemeanor, to fail to observe requirements. 114.
Much used crossing, not in city, and not a public road.
138.
Negligence per se, when failure is. 125, 131, 132.
Onus on the company, when.
136.
Ordinary care, after knowledge of failure to observe statute. 135.
Ordinary care by injured person. 134.
Failure to observe

Parallel roads not embraced.

116.

Post, checked before reaching. 123.
Post, to be erected. 114.
.
Precautions, failure to observe, proved in all cases.
Private ways not embraced in §2222.
119.
Private ways,

131.

when to be kept in order. 114.
Protection, for whose the law was passed. 124.
Proximate cause of injury, the failure must be.
133, 135.
Public crossing, train started at.
130.
Public roads only, in §2222.
119.
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Public road

crossings, law applicable only to accidents at. 122.
137.
Reciprocal rights and duties of publie and company, at.'
Res gestae, proof of failure to observe precautions.
131.
Statute, what it requires. 120.
Steps at crossing in a city. 118.
Train must be cheeked in a city.
128, 129.
Trains, to what the law applies. 121, 130.
Traveler on public road, duty to.
124.
Trestle between post and crossing, killed on.
122.
Use of the law and proof of failure when accident did not occur at
public crossing. 131.
Warning to be given in a city. 129.
What crossings are embraced.
115.
What the crossing includes.
116.
Whistle, purpose in blowing. 120.
Whistle, to be blown.
CUSTOM.

114, 120.

See Evidence.

DAMAGES.

Age, averments of, when

Aggravation,
Aggravation,
Aggravation,
Aggravation,
Aggravation,
Aggravation,
Aggravation,
Aggravation,
Aggravation,
Aggravation,
Aggravation,
Aggravation,

unnecessary.

080.

additional, allowed, when. 693.
cases to which the doctrine applies.
694, 695.
charge, when the doctrine should be given in. 697.
fined, proof admitted that defendant was. 704.
intention of conductor, when material. 702.
justice and the public good, improper charge as to. 696.
onus is on the plaintiff to prove.
697.
other conduct alleged as matter of. 701.
punishing defendant, improper charge as to. 696.
punitive assessed without being claimed eo nomine. 703.
servant’s acts, authorize recovery for. 698.
when the jury may reasonably find, additional allowed.

699, 700.

Apportionment of, when made. 38, 39, 40, 41, 204.
Apportionment, rule for making. 40, 211.
•
Capacity to labor, averments of, when unnecessary. 680.
Capacity to labor, another hurt caused diminution. 676.
Capacity to labor, declining years and decrease of, judge should submit
to the jury.
675.
Capacity to labor, plaintiff’s own testimony as to diminished, proper.
679.

Capacity to labor, diminution of shown by exhibition of injured hand.
669.

Compensation is the general rule in estimating. 654.
Consent of or caused by plaintiff, no recovery.
38.
Consequential, definition of. 14, 15, 16.
Diminished in proportion to plaintiff’s fault. 38.
Direct, definition of.

14, 15, 16.
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DAMAGES — continued.
Discretion of the

jury, as to. 714.
jury, general rules as to. 717.
Earnings, minor must show they belong to him, when. 683.
Earnings, office, probability of appointment to. 674.
Earnings, prospect of increased, when not considered. 672.
Earnings, value of, when not necessary to prove. 673.
Earnings, vocation before injury and its value. 678.
Explanatory. 715.
Expenses, necessary, consequent upon the injury, allowed. 708.
Expenses of litigation, allowed when. 705.
Expenses of litigation must be proved in order to recover. 707.
Expenses of litigation not allowed, when. 706.
Expenses, married woman, what she may recover for. 687.
Fences, burning. 711.
Discretion of the

General, definition of. 652.
General rule is compensation.
654.
Giving something, improper charge as to. 709.
Homicide, measure of. 358, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 660.
Interest as, allowed, when. 655, 656, 657.
Kinds of.

652.

Lessen, when plaintiff bound to.

712, 713.
ability to labor causing mental distress. 662.
of capacity shown by exhibition of injured hand.
662.
time, nominal allowed, without proof of value. 682.

Loss of
Loss
Lost

Medical evidence of condition after and before suit.

668.

Mortality and annuity tables. See Evidence.
Opinion of plaintiff as to his -damage, not admissible, when. 588, 589.
Organs, injury to particular shown under allegations as to vital organs.
686.
Pain and mental

distress, recovery for, allowed. 658.
distress, abortion, pain and sorrow resulting from. 654.
mental distress, diminution of ability to labor.
662.
mental distress, future pain.
659.
mental distress, general nature of pain and suffering proved.

Pain and mental
Pain and

Pain and
Pain and
.

663.

Pain and mental
Pain and mental
Pain and mental

distress, guide in measuring the damages. 666.
distress, mental suffering. 661.
distress, mental suffering of survivors not considered.

660.
Pain and mental
Pain and mental
Permanent

distress, pride of manhood, injury to. 665.
distress, sorrow, when it should be considered.

654.

injuries, absolute compensation not contemplated, by law.

671.
Permanent
Permanent
Permanent

injuries, age, averments as to, when not necessary. 680.
injuries, age, hearsay evidence as to, admissible. 685.
injuries, billiards, played after the injury, proof of allowed.

681.
Permanent

injuries, burden

on

plaintiff to

prove

diminution.

667.
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DAMAGES — continued.
Permanent

injuries, no fixed rule for estimating the damage.
injuries, what should be considered in estimating.
Previous ill-health aggravated by the injury.
670..
Previous wound or affliction, fact of, should not be concealed.
Proof and charge should conform to injury alleged.
684.
Proximate cause, breach of duty must be.
14, 15, 16.
Permanent

.Remote, when too.

667.
667.
677.

14, 15, 16.

Rule for

estimating, judge must give the jury.
Special, definition of. 652.
Stock, injuring and killing. 710.
Timber, burning. 711.
Tables, mortality, and annuity. See Evidence.
Verdicts, conclusiveness of. 721.
Verdicts, others as precedents. 716.
Verdicts that

were

excessive.

Verdicts that

were

not excessive.

653.

720.
719.

Verdicts, when not directed for defendant. 722.
Verdicts, writing off a portion of. 718.
Vindictive, allowed when. 688.
Vindictive, allowed where conductor was impolite and gruff. 691.
Vindictive, when no special damage is proved. 692.
Vindictive, worldly circumstances, when not involved. 689, 690.
DEAFNESS.
Does not affect the

Very deaf

person

degree of plaintiff's care. 72.
killed on a pathway that was used by the public.

367.

DEFENSES.

Arbitrarily disregarded, not to be. 70.
Casualty, when company not bound to show how it occurred. 243.
Employee’s prima facie case, what company must prove to overcome.
240, 241, 242.
Entire, should be submitted to the jury. 109.
Homicide, in suits for, same allowed as if deceased had sued. 363.
Line of, defendant may vary.
569.
Open to the company. 39, 41, 63, 69, 136, 240.
Open to street railways. 392.
Open to toll-bridge keeper. 461.
Rule, company must establish, when defense rests on it. 237.
Specific, when it should be given in charge. 65.
DEFINITIONS.
Code should be adhered to.
Direct
Due

damages.

care

in

a

14.

child.

7.

Extraordinary diligence.
General damages.
652.
Gross neglect.
6.
Negligence. 13.

5.

3.
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—

continued.

Ordinary diligence.
Remote

damages.
Special damages.

1.

14.
652.

DEGREES OF CARE.
As

danger increases care must be increased. 287.
Comparative degrees not applicable to children. 7, 8, 9, 10.
Condition contemplated by law.
87.
Diligence proportioned to the danger required of both parties.

Due care,
Due care,

definition. 7, 8, 9, 10, 87.
the rule as to children of tender year?,.

265.

7, 8, 9, 10, 87.

Duty changes with change of condition. 87.
Duty of both parties measured by the same rule. 2.
Extraordinary diligence, definition. 5.
Extraordinary diligence, passenger carriers bound to exercise.
Extraordinary diligence, slight neglect is absence of. 5.
Extraordinary diligence varies with character of train. 147.

5, 139.

Extraordinary diligence waived or released, it can not be. 147.
Extraordinary diligence, what it applies to. 143.
Extraordinary diligence, when not required of railroad companies. 59.
Gross neglect, definition.
6.
Increased danger, increased care by both, and general principle unaffeeted.

Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary

265.

diligence, absence of is ordinary neglect. 1.
diligence, all capable persons must exercise. 87.
diligence at crossings by injured person. 134.
diligence, care must be increased by both parties. 87.
diligence, cause for apprehension, rule as to. 87.
.
diligence, deafness does not affect the degree of care. 72.
diligence, definition. 1.
diligence, definition, judges should adhere to in charge. 3, 59.
diligence, employee must use, to extricate himself from peril.

263.

Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary

diligence, increased care applies to both. 87.
diligence is a legal duty. 87.
diligence, failure to exercise is negligence. 87.
diligence, in acquiring knowledge, as well as acting on it. 87.
diligence keeps pace with cause for apprehension. 87.
diligence, legal standard is invariable. 2, 60, 87, 146.
Ordinary diligence means extraordinary as to passengers. 149.
Ordinary diligence must be appropriate to perilous situation. 77.
Ordinary diligence, negligence, none without failure to exercise. 87.
Ordinary diligence, normal condition as changed, as to. 87.
Ordinary diligence, ordinary neglect is absence of. 1.
Ordinary diligence, plaintiff must exercise to avoid consequences of defendant’s negligence.
29, 37, 38, 43, 73, 74, 75, 87, 206.
Ordinary diligence of prudent man. See Prudent Man.
Ordinary diligence relates to passenger’s comfort and convenience. 143,
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DEGREES OF CARE —continued.

Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary
Ordinary

diligence, relative, not an fc„3olute term. 2, 348.
diligence required of railroads, except as to passengers. 58.
diligence, standard is in the minds of the jury. 3.
diligence, standard increases or diminishes with the danger.

2, 348.

Ordinary diligence, standard not for proof by witness. 3.
Ordinary diligence, trespasser, when duty arises as to. 97.
Ordinary diligence, what amounts to depends on circumstances of the
2, 58.

case.

Ordinary diligence, when plaintiff's failure to exercise defeats recovery.
29.

Ordinary diligence,, when plaintiff’s failure to exercise does not defeat
recovery.
29.
When the rule which requires one to avoid consequences of another’s
negligence does not apply. 29, 73.
When plaintiff sees or has reason to apprehend the danger, he must
avoid

if there is time.
29, 41, 73, 74, 75.
injured person could have avoided consequences, is for the
jury. 76.

Whether

DEMURRER.

See

Pleadings.

DEPOT.
Inclined
Safe and

DILIGENCE.

crossing for trucks, at,

causes

convenient, should be made.
See

injury.

68.

158.

Degrees of Care.

DISORDERLY PERSON.

May be ejected from trains.

183, 203.

DUTY.

Apprehension, must keep pace with. 87.
Cartridges, as to the sale of. 428.
Changes as condition changes. 87.
Drugs, as to the sale and use of. 428, 429.
Legal, exists from implication# of law. 428.
Legal, in absence of, no actionable negligence. 428.
Legal, in all cases to use proper care. 428.
Legal, to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to others.
Licensees, duty to. 87.
Looking out for obstacles on the track. 85.
Negligence is a breach of. 13.
New condition, new duty.
87.
Of both parties measured by the same rule.
2.
Ordinary diligence is a legal duty. 87.
Proximate cause, breach of, must, be.
14, 15, 16.
Public, suit in tort on, or on contract. 164.
Road crossings law, duty under.
131.

428.
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DUTY — continued.

Relatively to persons injured. 13, 122, 131, 145.
Traveler on public road.
124.
Trespasser, as to. 87.
Trespasser, as to, arises when. 97.
DOGS.
Case does not lie for their

negligent, unintentional .destruction.
Property, they are not, within the statute. 112.

112.

DRAWBRIDGES.
Trains must slow down at.
EJECTION OF PASSENGERS.

272.
See

Passengers.

ELECTION, AS TO FORM OF ACTION.
When one may sue on contract or in tort.

164.

ELECTRIC WIRES.
Of different

companies in contact.

538.

EMERGENCY.

Brought about by company. 78.
Brought about by injured person. 77, 380.
Conductor may couple cars in, when.
380.
Employee’s diligence in. 331.
Engineer, when he should jump from his engine, in. 379.
Even if pressing, not duty to do a reckless or imprudent thing.

380.

EMOTIONS.
When allowance should be made for the state of the.

229.

EMPLOYEE.

Alight, flagman no authority to order one to. 534.
Apprehension, yielded his under orders and was injured. 259.
Avert injury, should show what they did to.
83, 84.
Baggage-master injured by spout of tank. 528.
Burden of proof—general discussion of the subject.
240, 241, 242, 374.
Burden of proof, where plaintiff did not participate in the act. 240, 241,
242.
Burden of

Burden of

proof, where plaintiff participated in the act. 240, 374.
proof, when company not bound to show how casualty oe-

curred.
Burden of

243.

proof, when company bound to prove existence of a rule. 237.
Care proportioned to the danger, required of both parties.
265.
Caller falls into a pit between tracks.
257.
Car-wheels, rolling, injury by. 256.
Casualty, when company not bound to show how it occurred. 243.
Class of, that §2297 protects.
214, 215.
Coemployee, has the right to due care by. 218.
Coemployee, injuries by, when company liable for. 216.
Collision, caused by misplaced switch, fireman jumps to avoid. 249.

INDEX.

811

EMPLOYEE — continued.
Conductor

injured by defective cross-tie and no recovery. 245.
appreciably to tbe injury, negligence must, to defeat. 224.
Contributory negligence, when doctrine does not apply. 210, 374.
Coupler, attempts to make coupling when engine is moving. 264.
Coupler, attempts to make coupling, knowing help is deficient. 262.
Coupler, defective hand, duty of both parties. 265.
Coupler, foot caught by defects in track. 245.
Coupler, in perilous situation, must use care to extricate himself. 263.
Coupler may assume that others will observe the rules. 419.
Coupling-stick, fault in not getting it. 235.
Coupling-stick, orders to use. 261.
Cross-tie, defective,'injures conductor’s foot. 245.
Damage, done by, company liable for. 44.
Dangerous machine voluntarily operated. 254
Declaration by, when sufficient.
527.
Defective tools, one of several using. 251.
Defect, when failure to repair is not negligence, relatively to. 246.
Derrick, well-digger injured by. 259.
Disobedience, must show it did not contribute to injury. 231.
Distinction between employee and others as to right to recover. 216.
Duty, killed when not on, apportionment allowed. 383.
Duty, rights not connected with, waived only by express agreement.
Contribute

236.

Duty, voluntarily operates dangerous machine, outside of.
Electric wires in contact.

Electric-light pole injures.

254.

538.

247.

Emotions, allowance made for. 229.
Engineer asleep—fireman’s duty. 228.
>
Engineer, contradictory signals, he should stop.

377.
Engineer, injured by a washout'in the road. 244.
Engineer, killed while running in violation of the rules. 376.
Engineer, sent to haul for another company on its track. 244.
Engineer, when he should jump from his engine. 379.
Engineer, whether at fault, what jury should consider. 226.
Express agreement, certain rights waived only by. 236.
Falling pole, killed by. 539.
Fault, in the work for which he was employed. 221.
Fault, must be without to recover. 216, 240, 253, 374.
Fault, must contribute appreciably to the cause of the injury. 224.
Fault, must be without, to recover, even though acting under orders of
a superior.
729.
Fault, not contributing to the injury. 223.
Fault, operating at the time of the injury. 222.
Fault, without, about the business that caused the injury. 224.
Fault, without, what it means. 217, 241.
Fellow-service, when matter of, immaterial. 215, 219.
Fireman’s duty when engineer is asleep. 228.
Frog, a projecting, causes injury. 246.
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General duties govern

in absence of specific instructions. 233.
recklessly, not relevant, when. 232.
Hand-ear, injured while riding on it. 258.
Hand-ear, section-master injured by. 253.
Imminent danger, reasonable precaution under circumstances of.
228.
Increased danger, increased care by both and general principle unaf-

Habit to act

fected.

205.

Jumping, when collision is impending. 228.
Jumping, when engineer should jump from his engine. 379.
Knowledge of existence of defect, when it defeats recovery. 210, 247.
Knowingly using unsafe track, can not recover. 244.
Liable to, as to passengers, when.
214.
Mail crane causes injury.
247.
Moving cars, conductor orders train-hand to step from. 232.
Moving cars, killed in attempting to board. 382.
Moving cars, night watchman injured by. 252.
Negligence, burden of proof as to. 240, 241, 242.
Negligence, contributory, when doctrine not applicable. 210.
Negligence, contributed to the injury and no recovery. 384.
Negligence of company began after plaintiff fell. 240.
Negligence of other employees not a risk that is assumed. 228.
Negligence, usual or customary, no difference that it had become. 248.
Negligence. See “Fault,” above.
Night watchman injured by moving car. 252.
Notice to officer charged with duty of repairing sufficient.
244.
Obstructions on roadway—skids.
248.
Obstructions too

near

the track.

247.

Orders, apprehension, yields his, and acts under. 259.
Orders, bound to obey reasonable. 231.
Orders, burden on employee to show that disobedience did not contribute to the

Orders,
Orders,
Orders,
Orders,
Orders,
Orders,
Orders,
Orders,
Orders,

injury.

232.

so.

Orders, prohibited
Orders.

231.

conductor right to give, when. 231.
couple cars with a stick. 261.
defective tool used under eye of superior employee. 308.
duty to act when determined by a superior. 232.
fault amounting to rashness will alone defeat when. 232.
general duties done in absence of specific instructions. 233.
injured while acting in line of duty under orders of boss. 232.
moving car, conductor orders train-hand to step from. 232.
not bound to obey where it would be rash and dangerous to do
manner, performing
See “Rules” below.

Orders, when

can

service in,

no recovery.

261.

not presume that corporation authorized the order.

244.

Ordinaries, may assume other employees will observe. 237.
Out of his place.
See the title.
Particular duty enjoined, diligence must be exercised. 23*.
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continued.

Passengers, when on same legal footing as.
Perilous situation, must use care to

214, 215, 221, 240.

extricate himself.

.

263.

Place, proper, for work, company must provide. 245.
Place, proper, must be in. 225, 531, 380.
Platform, improper use of by, no recovery. 250.

Presumption in his favor, when.

240, 241, 242, 374.
what he must prove to make. 240, 241, 242, 374.
Prohibited manner, performing service in, no recovery.
261.
Projecting frog, injures employee who knew of it. 246.
Proper place for the work, company must provide. 245.
Proper place, must be in. 225, 531.
Rainfall, unprecedented, when company liable for effects of. 244.
Reasonable precaution, in circumstances of imminent danger. 228.
Prima facie case,

Relation of master and servant must be shown.

567.

Relation, when it exists. 62.
Repairs, when failure to make is not negligence relatively to. 246.
Risks, agreed to assume all, and knowingly used unsafe track. 244.
Risks, assumed, do not embrace other employees’ negligence which he
is not bound to anticipate.
228, 311.
Risks, assumes those reasonably incident to his occupation. 311.
Risks of the service—falling over lumps of coal.
228.
Road must be kept in reasonably safe condition.
244, 245, 246, 247,
248, 249.
Road, unsafeness in, company liable to employee for. 244.
Road, unsafeness in, must be negligence relatively to plaintiff. 245.
Roadway, skids on, injure train-hand. 248.
Rules, abrogation by non-observance. 235, 261.
Rules, abrogation, non-observance offered to show. 235.
Rules, acquiescence in non-observance in a way to sanction. 261.
Rules, agreement to study and obey, does not extend to rules not made
known to him.

234.

Rules, binding on employees, what rules are.

Rules, book, rules admissible before

or

236, 231.
after proof of knowledge.

234,

235.

Rules,
Rules,
Rules,
Rules,
Rules,
Rules,
Rules,
Rules,
Rules,
Rules,

bound to observe and obey orders. 231.
burden of establishing on defendant, when. 237.
class of persons, not to be evaded by one of, when. 237.
construction by employees, evidence as to. 230.
construed strictly against the company, should be. 230.

contradictory signals, engineer should stop. 377.
coupling by hand in disregard of, no recovery. 201.
coupling-stiek, order to use in coupling. 234, 261.
coupling-stick, fault in not getting it, question for jury. 235.
coupling-stick, to be used until he learned how to couple without
it.

261.

Rules, disobedience, employee must show it did not contribute to the
injury. 231.
Rules, disobedience, engineer killed while disobeying. 376.
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Rules, disregard of customarily by others no difference. 261.
Rules, disregard, the right to assume that other employees will not.

419,

237.

Rules, disregarding, acquiescence in, in a way to sanction it. 261.
Rules, evidence, admissible in, before or after knowledge is shown. 235.
Rules, knowledge of, express or implied, employee must have. 234, 236,
237.

Rules, knowledge of from rumor. 261.
Rules, knowledge of sufficient, no matter how acquired. 234.
Rules, may assume that other employees will observe ordinances and.
237, 419.
Rules, meaning of, not left to the jury. 230.
Rules, non-observance offered to show abrogation. 235, 261.

Rules, promulgation of.

234.

Rules, reasonable, whether they are, left to the jury.
Rules, stick. See “Coupling” above.
Rules, unequivocal, they should be. 230.
Rules.

231.

See “Orders” above.

Safer of two methods must be selected.

227.

Schedules, duty to observe them. 239.
Schedules, who presumed to know them. 238.
Section-master injured by hand-car.
253.

<1

Skids on roadway, train-hand injured by. 248.
Specific instructions, in absence of, general duties govern. 233.
Spike, injury in breaking. 255.
Switch misplaced, fireman jumps to avoid collision caused by.
249.
Terminus and not a meeting-point, what is.
239.
Testimony of, not arbitrarily disregarded. 81.
Track, car-coupler’s foot caught by defects in. 245.
Track, employee of another company allowed to use it. 386.
Track, knowingly using unsafe, no recovery. 244.

Track, obstructions too near. 247.
Track, mail-crane causes injury. 247.
Track, electric light pole causes injury. 247.
Track, unsafeness must be negligence relatively to plaintiff. 245.
Trains, whether connected with running or not, company liable. 220.
Two ways, safer must be selected.
227, 380.
Unloading timber, injured in. 260.
Usual and customary, no difference that negligence had become.
248.
Waiver of rights not connected with his duty.
236.
Washout, liability of company for, discussed. 244.
EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY FOR ACT OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
See

Independent Contractor.

EVIDENCE.

Accidents, reports of. 642.
Admissions in plaintiff’s declaration,
Admissions scanned with

care.

607.

may

be used.

572.
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Admissions, weight as evidence.

608.

Admitted without

objection, court should charge on. 564.
Admitted without objection, in doubtful cases.
565.
Age, hearsay as to, admissible. 685.
Agent, acceptance of ticket as, estops denial of agency. 644.
Agent, competent witness, when. 651.
Arithmetic, jury may apply their knowledge.
Axle, identifying a broken. 643.
Base conduct of

plaintiff in furtherance of his

612.
case,

proof of, admissible.

647.
Burden of
Burden of
Burden of

proof. See Burden of Proof.
proof, carrier to show ejection lawful, when. 180.
proof, casualty, when company- not bound to show how it

curred.

Burden of

<

oc-

243.

proof, diligence, defendant must show when injury is

proven.

38, 136.
Burden of

proof, diligence, plaintiff must show it due to him. 64.
proof, employee, when on. 240, 241, 242, 324, 374.
of proof, generally, on whom.
573.
of proof, rules, when on defendant to establish their existence.

Burden of
Burden
Burden

237.

Burden of

proof, shifted, court decides what amount of evidence will
change. 573.
Burden of proof shifted, when it is.
574.
Burden of proof.
See Employee.
Cautiously, plaintiff' can not testify that he acted. 635.
Change of road after the accident. 645.
Character, plaintiff’s, for prudence and caution. 633.
Circumstances, injury may be shown by. 67, 106.
Circumstantial, overcome by positive. 577.
Complaints of pain. 598.
Contract releasing defendant from responsibility.
646.
Credibility and impeachment of witnesses. 609, 610.
Custom, alighting, stool to aid in. 624.
Custom, dangerous, offered to excuse negligence. 622.
Custom, general, and common experience of railroads, when inadmissible.

623.

Custom, pedestrians in crossing street in front of dummies. 625.
Declarations, admissible as part of the res gestae of main fact, when.
593.

Declarations of

agents. 600.
Declarations, complaints of pain. 598.
Declarations, conductors, engineers and other employees. 599
Declarations, employee who was a mere spectator. 596, 603.
Declarations, employees, to impeach. 602.
Declarations, party to a fight. 597.
Declarations, person injured. 595.
Declarations, president of construction company. 601.
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Declarations, spectator, by. 59G, 003.
Declarations, trespasser, by. 594.
Declarations, parts of res gestae of an investigation. 604.
Employee, testimony of, not to be arbitrarily disregarded.
Engine, defective, compared with others. G39.

81.

Engine, particular one and others causing fires. 107.
Engineer, expert, when he may prove what his duties were. 231.
Examination of plaintiff and injured person.
Gil.
Excitement under which an act is done may be proved, when. 202.
Expert may give opinion, when. 579.
Expert, mode of examining. 581.
Expert testimony, books and information derived from them. 583.
Expert testimony, illustrations of the doctrine. 583.
Expert testimony, laying the foundation for. 580.
Expert testimony, scope of the rule allowing. 582, 583.
Expert testimony, to whom the rule applies. 580.
Failure to produce employees as witnesses.
571, 572.
Failure to produce, no legal duty to produce witnesses.
072.
Failure to produce evidence—the rule declared.
570.
Failure to produce, presumption does not arise when defense otherwise
established.

Failure to
Failure

to

when.

Habit

as

to

571.
a

stool to aid in

Habit of deceased
Habit of
Habit of
Habit of
Habit of

572.

produce, presumption may be rebutted. 570.
produce, rule not applicable to case of personal injuries,

as

alighting.

to recklessness.

624.

634.

injured person, proof of, when admissible. 632.
negligence at particular times and places. 631.
pedestrians in crossing street in front of dummies. 625.
the public in walking at the place where the injury happened.

98.

Habit to act

recklessly, when not relevant. 232.
Identifying a broken axle. 643.
Impeachment of witnesses. 610.
In without objection, court should charge on.
564.
Judicial notice.

See the title.

Length of trains, proof of average length not admissible. 641.
Mortality and annuity tables. See “Tables” below.
Negative testimony, what is. 576.
Negligence, acts of, not declared on, when admissible. 606.
New trial, when improper admission of statements, no cause for.
605.
Opinion of witnesses other than experts—rule stated. 585.
Opinion, facts on which based, stated. 586.
Opinion, facts without stating them. 590.
Opinion, fact, as to matters of. 592.
Opinion, how far a train would knock a man. • 591.
Opinion, injured person may not give as to permanency of his injuries.
587.
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Opinion, plaintiff’s as to his damages. 588, 589.
Opinion, plaintiff’s, as to loss of ability to labor. 589.
Ordinances, existence of, referred to the jury. 620.
Ordinances, judge should construe. 628.
Ordinances, notice of, companies and employees must take. 630.
Ordinances, proved, how. 627.
Ordinances, reasonableness, how determined. 629.
Ownership of property injured by fire, must be shown. 108.
Others injured at same place in same way.
637.
Pain, complaints of. 598.
Pedestrians, custom in crossing street. 625.
Pleadings, evidence should be confined to the issues made by. 282.
Premises, viewing by "jury. 638.
Positive and negative, rule and illustrations. 575, 576.
Positive overcomes consistent circumstantial testimony. 577.
Positive overcomes, when the rule does not apply. 575.
Positive testimony, what is. 576.
Prudence -and caution, plaintiff’s character for. 633.
Record of acquittal of defendant inadmissible.
394.
Relevant, must be and relate to and bear upon the issues being tried.
282, 568, 569.
Relevant, that different theory of defense

was

formerly relied

on,

not.

569.

Repairs made after the accident. 636.
Reports of accidents. 642.
Res gestae.
See “Declarations” above.
Res gestae, acts of negligence not declared on, as part of.
606.
Res gestae, failure to observe precautions at crossings, part of.
131.
Rules of the company,

admissible.

235.

Rules of railroad

companies as to interstate passage, admissible.
Rules strictly construed against the company. 230.
Rules construed, by employees, evidence as to. 230.
Schedules, who presumed to know them. 238.
Speed of train just before the accident, inadmissible.^ 640.
Tables, mortality and annuity, admissible.

613.

Tables, charges suggested by the Supreme Court.

Tables,
Tables,
Tables,
Tables,
Tables,
Tables,
Tables,
Tables,
Ticket,
Ticket,

52

618.

charges that should not be omitted. 620.
consolidated, and method of using. 619.
decreased capacity to earn money, judge should charge on.
errors in charging that did not mislead.
621.
foundation for admission must be laid. 614, 615.
proper method of using.
411, 618.
the tables. 617.
value of when admitted. 410, 618.
existence of shown by parol. 578.
when acceptance of estops denial of agency. 644.

Viewing the premises by the jury.
Witnesses, agent competent. 651.

638.

650.

620.

■
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Witnesses, credibility of. 609.
Witnesses, failing to produce. 570, 571, 572.
Witnesses, female, compelling to come into court.

649.
Witnesses, impeachment of. 610.
Witnesses, injured person incompetent when engineer is dead. 648.
Witnesses, legal duty, none to produce. 572.
Witnesses, waiver of privilege of silence not binding at subsequent trial.
647.

EXCITEMENT.
Under which

act is

an

FELLOW-SERVICE.

done, may be proved, when.

202.

See Master and Servant and Employees.

FENCES.

Companies not bound to fence their lines.
Cuts

or

40, 89.

embankments, not bound to fence along.

116.

FIRES.

Burden, when

on

defendant.

106.

Engines, evidence as to others. 107.
Engine, evidence as to the particular.

107.

Entire defense should he submitted to the jury.

Evidence, may be circumstantial.
Evidence, when sufficient. 106.

109.

106.

Negligence is the gist of liability. 106.
Negligence, presumed when fire traced to the engine. 106.
Negligence refers to condition of the engine or its management.
Ownership of the property injured must be shown. 108.
FLAG-STATIONS.

Stopping at, duty of each party.

196.

FOREIGN ADMINISTRATOR.
When he may sue

in this State.

405, 518.

FOREIGN STATUTE.
Amendment
How

proved.

setting out.
519.

550.

FRANCHISES.

Joint
Use

use

of tracks at terminal

by another

company.

points in

a

city.

47.

46.

FREIGHT-TRAINS.
Commissioners’ rates do not

apply to. 165.
trespasser on. 100.
Extraordinary diligence on, carrier is bound to exercise.
Jerks, jolts and jars, on. 145, 146, 147.
Mixed trains, passengers on, duty of each party.
145.
Conductor assaults

a

147.

106.
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FREIGHT-TRAINS — continued.

Passenger entitled to such security as that mode of
sonably expected to render. 146.
When they should stop.
198.

conveyance

is

rea-

FROG.

Coupler’s foot caught in.
Projecting, causes injury.
Unblocked, of

a

switch.

320.
246.
291.

GARNISHMENT.
Defendant in action for tort not

subject to until final judgment.

431.

HAMMER.
Not included in the term

machinery.

68.

HAND-CAR.

Employee injured by. 258.
Section-master injured by.
253.
HOMICIDE.

Acquittal of defendant, record not admissible. 394.
Action for husband or parent’s death survives, to whom.
Action, right of, conferred. 358.

358.

Action for wife’s death, survives to whom.
358.
Administrator, when right of action does not survive to. 399.
Administrator, under foreign statute, suit by. 405, 418.
Agent, when company liable for homicide by. 372.
Announcement of stations and to get off, difference between.
391.
Bridge, knocked from a car by. 378.
Child, mother’s action for death of not barred by father’s suit for

services.

398.

Child, when mother or father may sue for death of.
Children, may sue for death of mother, when. 395.
Children, number of minor, not in issue. 365.
Conduct of deceased considered

as

if he

was

358, 399.

plaintiff.

Conductor, not to couple cars except in emergency.

363, 366, 384, 403.
380.

Conspirators causing death. 393.
Construction of foreign statutes.
360.
Construction

Contributions

of

statute—child’s

suit for mother’s death.

395.

by the child at the time of the injury. 400, 401, 402.
Contributory negligence, doctrine not applicable to employee. 374.
Criminal, not necessary that wrongful act should be. 274.
Damages, measure of, under present law. 359, 409, 410, 411.
Damages, measure of, under prior laws. 407, 408.
Damages, pecuniary estimate alone. 406.
Danger signal, employee failed to display. 375.
Deaf man killed on a pathway. 367.
Death, cause of, question for the jury. 387.
Debt of deceased, recovery not subject to.
358.
Deceased, conduct of, considered as if he was plaintiff. 363, 384, 366.
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continued.

Deceased, his negligence a question for the jury. 373.
Deceased, negligence of, defeats recovery. 396, 366, 367, 368.
Deceased wife, negligence of, defeats recovery.
397.
Declining years, to be considered. 410.
Defenses, all allowed that could have been made if deceased had sued.
363.

Defenses, and liability of the company. 392.
Defenses, and what the company may make. 392, 396.
Definition of terms.

358.

Dependence and contribution at the time of the injury. 400, 401, 402.
Dependent, in whole or in part, when mother is, she may sue. 401, 402.
Depot-agent kills customer at his office and company liable. 372.
Due diligence by the company shown here.
388.
Duty, employee killed when not on, and damages apportioned. 383.
Emergency, conductor may couple cars in, when. 383.
Emergency, when engineer should jump from his engine. 379.
Emergency, pressing, whether it exists is for the jury. 380.
Employee must have been free from fault. 374.
Employee, when at fault by being out of his place. 380.
Engineer, when he should jump from his engine in case of an emergency.
379.
Family, more prosperous condition, immaterial. 365.
Family resided together and mutually dependent. 401.
Father, when he may sue for death of child. 399, 358.
Fireman killed by pipe of water-tank.
380.
Full value of life of deceased is the

measure.

358.

Husband, may recover for wife’s death. 358.
Husband, widow may recover for death of. 358.
Husband.

See “Widow” below.

Illegal transaction, engaged in, no recovery. 390.
Illustrations of principles.
401, 402.
Insane agent, when company is liable for his acts.
371.
Jump, engineer, when he should from his engine. 379.
Jurisdiction of action against depot-agent for.
34.
Jury, questions that should go to. 373, 387.
Killing must have been wrongful. 362.
Life, full value of without deduction for expenses. 358.
Life, no invariable rule for estimating value of. 410.
Life, value of, how shown and what may be considered. 410, 411.
Master and servant, when relation must be shown.
389.
Measure of recovery.
358.
Mental conviction, degree of required.
361.
Mother's action not bound by father’s suit for services.
398.
Mother, children may sue for death of, when. 395.
Mother, when she may sue for death of child. 358.
Moving train, boarding. 382.
Negligence of deceased defeats recovery. 363, 384, 396, 397, 366, 367,
368, 403.
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Occupation in which deceased never engaged, proof of value of services
in, improper. 410.
Ordinance, violation of, negligence per se. 385.
Ordinary care, if it would have saved deceased, no recovery. 303, 366,
367, 368.
Out of his place and at fault.
880, 403.
Parent, meaning of in the statute. 395.
Passway, killed at place used by public as. 367.
Place, out of and at fault.

380, 403.

Presumption arises when, where employee is killed. 374.
Presumption, not rebutted. 370.
Presumption, relied on and rebutted. 369. .
Rebuttal, testimony in, to meet defense. 374.
Recovery for, laws giving the right of. 357, 358, 359, 360, 399.
Rescuing another. 381.
Residence does not affect the right.
404.
Restatement of sections.

358.

Rules, engineer running in violation of. 376.
Signals, contradictory, when given, engineer should stop.
Stations, announcement of.
4

Statute

377.

391.

giving right to recover, strictly construed.

Statutes, former, giving the right to recover for.
Tables, mortality7 and annuity, value of. 410.

359.
357.

Tracks of different

companies used. 386.
Trains, whether caused by or otherwise, liable. 372.
Trestle, deceased negligently on and no recovery. 368, 396.
Track, walking on at night, ordinary care will generally save from injury. 366.
Value of the life of deceased.
359, 409, 410, 411.
Widow, burden on to show husband faultless or company negligent. 374.
Widow has right of action only when husband would have had.
363.
Widow may recover

for husband’s death.

358.

Widow, recovery held subject to law of descents.
Widow, right vests at death of husband. 364.
Widow, that she worked in the field, immaterial.
Wife's death, joint suit required, when.
358.
Wife's negligence, defeats recovery. 397.
Wrongful, killing must have been. 362.

358.
365.

IMPUTABLE NEGLIGENCE.

Infant, in suit by, fault of parent not imputable to the child.
negligence of one person is imputed to another. 12.

When

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.

Employer, when liable for acts of. 439.
Exhaustive, §3819 is. 440.
Independent employment. 441.
Ordinance disregarded by, employer liable.
442.
Railroad company, when liable for acts of.
441.

12.
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Statutory, when obligation is, employer liable. 442.
Street, unnecessary obstruction of, causes injury. 441.
INSPECTION.

309.

Employee should have time to inspect tools.
Train-hand, skill

to.

309.

INTEREST AS DAMAGES.

See

as

Damages.

INTOXICATION OF PLAINTIFF.
When it does not affect his

right to

209.

recover.

INTRODUCTORY.
To Code sections.
Dominion

over

37.

right of

87.

way.

JERKS, JOLTS AND JARS.
Alighting from a street-car. 338, 339.
Alighting from a train. 160, 199.
Freight-trains. 146.
Gravel-train.

318.

occur until train
Mixed trains, duty and

May

Violent and

is stopped. 199.
liability of the company. 145.
unusual, passenger injured by. 532, 533.

JUDGE.

Charge, scope of. 207.
Negligence per se, charge as to. 18, 125, 131, 132, 385.
Province when question of negligence is before the jury.

17, 24, 25, 26,

27.

Province when
Province when
Province when

question is
question is
question is

on
on

demurrer. 17.
motion for new trial. 17, 28.
motion for nonsuit. 17, 19, 20, 21, 22.

on
Should adhere to Code definition.

Should

give specific charge

When he should instruct

ligence.

as

as
to

>

3.

to distinct matter. 90.
avoiding consequences of defendant’s neg-

73.

I

JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Courts will

take of

a

fact within

common

experience and knowledge.

415.

Railway companies

as common carriers.
50.
That child under two years could not render

service.

415.

JUMPING FROM A TRAIN.

Emotions, allowance made for. 229.
Employee, when collision is impending.
Engineer, when he should jump. 379.
Excitement, under. 202.
Fireman, to avoid collision. 249.

228.
4
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JUMPING FROM A TRAIN—continued.
Imminent

danger, under circumstances of. 228.
danger, defendant’s negligence causes. 228.
Jury, whether it is negligence, is for the. 26.
Minor, under conductor’s orders. 419.
Moving train. 75, 199.
Not necessarily, as matter of law, negligence. 75.
Pay-train. 200.
Street-car, jumping from. 343.
Under orders or with concurrence of conductor.
200, 419.
When negligence that defeats recovery.
199.
Imminent

JURISDICTION.

See

Railway Companies and Venue.

JURY.

Arithmetic, may apply their knowledge of. 612.
Determine whether injured person could have avoided consequences.
Determine whether presumption is rebutted. 79.
How they determine what a prudent man would do.
4.
When exclusive judges of question of negligence. 24, 25, 26, 27.
JUSTIFICATION.

See

76.

Pleadings.

KICKING A CAR.

Negligence in.

524.

LANDLORD’S LIABILITY.
Defects in construction of rented

premises, when liable for.

Defects, not liable unless he knew

or

should have known of.

444.
445.

Examining and repairing, duty as to. 445, 446.
Negligent, whether, in failing to make repairs, is for the jury.

540.

Notice of

defect, landlord is entitled to. 446.
Presumption is that premises are in suitable condition. ■ 446.
Repair, when liable for failure to keep premises in. 444, 445.
Repairing and examining, duty as to. 445, 446.
Tenant injured while steps were being repaired.
446.
Tenant, ordinary care required of in use of premises. 446.
Tenant, negligent or illegal use by, when landlord not liable for.
Tenant, actions by. 446> 540.
LESSEES OF RAILROADS.
Common carriers,

when they are.

50.

Liability of. 48.
Made a body corporate.

54.
possession, no presumption of a lease.
Venue of actions against. 30.
When neither company loses its identity. 51.
Owner in

LEX FORI.

(jontrols

as

to

procedure.

554.

49.

444.

INDEX.

824

LICENSEES.

Duty that the company owes to them. 87.
Express consent as to thoroughfare under cars. 101.
Express license to cross tracks in railroad yard. 101.
Expulsion, what force may be used to effect. 101.
Implied, when license may be. 101.
Implied license is revocable. 101.
Ordinary care, they must exercise. 101.
Servant of the company, licensee is not.
101.
Stone on right of way casually dislodged.
101.
Supplying passengers with lunches. 101.
Unguarded hole in right of way. 101.
Who

are.

87, 98.

LOOK AND LISTEN.

Duty

as

to, before stepping

railroad-track.

upon a

4, 90.

LOOKING OUT FOR OBSTACLES ON THE TRACK.

Duty of the

company, as to.
85, 98.
Should be such as may be reasonably necessary
Street-car conductor’s duty as to. 350.

When

there

MACHINERY.

is

cause

for

apprehension.

at time and place.

60,

87, 98.

See Master and Servant.

Hammer not included in the term.

68.

MALPRACTICE OF SURGERY AND MEDICINE.

Action, right of, conferred. 443.
Judgment, error in, when not responsible for. 443.
Parent must allege pecuniary damage, when. 414.
Reasonable degree of care and skill required. 443.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Accident, pure, no cause of action arises from.

11, 322, 326.
Adult, warning, duty of master. 299.
Assurances that danger shall be removed, employee acts under.
277.
Alter ego, chain-gang boss is.
274.
Burden not carried by simply showing due care on servant’s part.
324.
Burden on servant to show that mster knew, or should have known, of
the defects.

Burden

on

jury.
Burden

on

with

Burden

302.

the servant to show that master’s

negligence caused his in-

14, 324, 325.
servant to show that master
a

defective hammer.

was

negligent in furnishing him

68.

servant to show that there

was negligence in selecting, and
its equivalent. 283.
Burden on servant to show that there was negligence in performance
of defendant’s legal duty to him.
283.
Car, unsafe, when company is liable for. 287.
Casualty, pure, no cause of action arises from. 11, 322, 326.
Casualty, reasonably to be anticipated a3 natural incident embraced in
on

knowledge of incompetency,

risk.

311.

or
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Chain-gang boss is alter

—

continued.

ego

of his employer.

274.

Child, as to, master is bound to higher degree of care. 329.
Child, must use due care according to its age and capacity. 7, 8, 9
10, 30, 301.
Child, when master’s exemption from liability for act of coemployee
does not apply.
329.
Coemployee, master not liable for negligence of. 273.
Clinker, injured by stepping on. 322.
Collision, brake applied to prevent, causes injury. 331.
Compulsory service, relation does not exist in. 274.

Condition of tool, should have time to ascertain.

309.

Contracts

exempting master from liability, when void. 332.
Convict, rule as to going into a dangerous place, not applicable to. 305.
Coupler’s foot caught in a frog. 320.
Danger, employee acts under assurances that it shall be removed. 277.
Danger, going into knowingly and without objection, no recovery. 304,
305.

Dangerous machine, duty of one who sets it up. 280.
Dangerous machine, servant must exercise due care while working with
it.

324.

Dangerous situation, duty to servant in, when master is free from
fault.

328.

Dark, working in, servant bears risk of danger he should have known
of in daylight. 324.
Degree of care required of servant. 330.
Degree of master’s care measured by nature of business and risk. 287.
Defect, character of, may show master’s knowledge. 303.
Defect, latent, that injury results from, raises no presumption. 302.
Defect, servant knew of and made no complaint, no recovery. 325.
Defective tool, machinery, or appliances, knowingly using, no recovery
304, 305, 308.
Defective tool, mere fact that it proves defective not enough.
302.
Defective tool, used under order of superior employee, no recovery.
308.
Draw-bar, defective, when jury might infer it was. 288.
Duty, servant not on when injured, and may recover. 383.
Duties, when servant’s act is within scope of. 438.
Elevator floor, hole in.
296.
Elevator-shaft, falling in. 324.
Emergency, degree of diligence in. 331.
Employment, act outside of scope of. 307.
Employment, when servant’s act is within scope of. 438.
Fellow servant,
negligence of, is a risk assumed by employee. 311, 274.
Fellow servants, rule for determining who are.
274, 275, 276, 277,
304.
Flake from swage

injures employee who was out of his place.

Frog, coupler’s foot caught in. 320.
Frog of switch unblocked. 291.
Hammer with latent defect.

68, 302.

321.
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MASTER AND SERVANT — continued.
Incompetency, burden on plaintiff to show it.

*

283.

Incompetency, master’s knowledge must be shown. 283.
Incompetent servant, knowingly co-operating with. 284.
Inexperienced persons, warning. 300, 301.
Inspection, employee must have time for. 309.
Inspection, train-hand’s skill as to. 309.
Inspection, if by proper, defect could have been discovered, master liable.

303.

Instruction, when no presumption that minor needs. 300.
Insufficient help, knowingly co-operating with.
325.
Jerk of a gravel-train. 318.
Jury, questions that should have gone to. 306.
Jury determine what risks are incident to the service. 312.
Knowledge of master, burden on servant. 302, 303.
Knowingly co-operating with incompetent servant. 284.
Knowingly using defective tools or appliances, can not recover305, 308.
Ladder, defective, and no right to recover. 297.
Lamp goes out, presumption not raised. 298.
Legal objection, master can not shift it upon employee. 277.

,

Lessor not liable to servant of lessee.

304,

280.

Machine, when servant’s duty to observe characteristics in construction
and working.
324.
Machinery, duty of master in furnishing. 285, 286.
Machinery, hammer not included in the term. 68.
Machinery, knowingly using defective, can not recover. 304, 305, 308.
Machinery, master’s knowledge of defects must be shown. 302.
Machinery out of repair, risk in repairing assumed. 313.
Machinery, use not intended by the master, no recovery. 327.
Minor, warning of danger. 300, 301.
Minor, when no presumption that he needs no instruction. 300.
Mistake in judgment by competent employee.
283.
Moving train, attempting to get on. 382.
Nature, laws of, applicable to the subject, servant bound to take notice
of.

•

311.

Negligence, connecting the master with the injury, there must be. 302,
324, 381.
Negligence of coemployee, master not liable for. 273.
Negligence of deceased contributed to the injury and no recovery. 384.
Not on duty when injured, and may recover.
383.
Out of his place, when he might and ought to have been in it, no recovery.
321, 380.
Painful situation, releasing from, duty of master as to.
328.
Powder, more hazardous, causes explosion and injury. 295.
Presumption is that appliances were not defective. 302, 324.
Presumption is that master did not know of defects. 302, 324.
Presumption is that master has done his duty. 302, 324.
Presumption, none in favor of servant, when. 68.
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Protecting servant while conducting the work, master’s duty, as to.
277.

Relation of, must first be established.

437.

Relation, some act of master necessary to create. 280.
Relation, the test whether it exists. 62, 280.
Relation, wheii it does not exist. 280.
Relation, when it must be shown. 389.
Repairing machinery, risk assumed in. 313.
Rescuing another, when defendant not negligent. 381.
Reservoir of soap-manufacturer unguarded.
294.
Risks, agreement to assume applies when running over another road.
328.

Risks, all ordinary, assumed by servant. 310, 311.
Risks, blasting, injured in. 317.
Risks, casualty or ordinary risk, no cause of action arises from.

11

*

326.

Risks, casualty reasonably to be anticipated
the service embraced.

as a

natural incident to

311.

Risks, clinker, stepping on. 322.
Risks, coemployee’s negligence which he is not bound to anticipate, not
embraced.

311.

Risks, coupler’s foot caught in a frog. 320.
Risks, dark, working in the, servant bears risk of danger he should
have known of in daylight.
324.
Risks, fellow servant’s negligence is incident of the service and is assumed.

Risks,
Risks,
Risks,
Risks,

11, 274.
flake from a swage causes injury. 321.
jerk of a gravel-train. 318.
jury determine what are incident to the service. 312.
not assumed when servant acts under assurances that the dan-

ger will be removed.
Risks of employment, duty

Risks,

ore

277.
of each.

turned under his foot.

310.

323.

Risks, repairing machinery, risk assumed in. 313.
Risks, unblocked frog, foot caught in. 320.
Risks, unusual increase of speed on a dangerous track. 319.
Safe place to work, duty of master to furnish.
293.
Selecting servant, duty of master. 281.
Selecting servant, negligence in, not shown by mere proof of incompetency. 283.

servant, negligence in, waived, when. 284.
servant, rule as to master’s duty given only when in issue
the pleadings. 282.
servant, test is, was master at fault. 283.
servant, what must be shown to make master liable. 283.
servant, master’s liability is for failure of duty in selecting and
not for negligence of coemployee.
283.
Servant bound to exercise his own skill and- diligence to protect him-

Selecting
Selecting
by
Selecting
Selecting,
Selecting

self.

310, 330.

INDEX.

828

MASTER AND SERVANT— continued.
Servant knew of defects and made

no

complaint.

325.

faultless, acting under orders and not connegligent one. 329.

Servant may recover when
nected with

of another compamy injured.
315.
Servant of the master sued, injured person
Servant

Shuttle with defective

289.
Spark-arrester, not supplied. 290.
Speed, unusual increase of, on unsafe track.
Stove, unsecured fastening. 292.

must he.

315.

guard.

ft

319.

Sufficient number of servants must be furnished.

277.

Tool, employee should have time to inspect. 309.
Tool, improper, voluntarily selected by employee. 314.
Tracks of different

Train-hanS

companies used.

falls from train.

385.

316.

Trespass by servant. See Torts by Wife, Child, or Servant.
Vice-principal, conductor is, when in control of train. 277.
Vice-principal, engineer, when he is. 277.
Vice-principal, when giving an order is negligence. 279.
Vice-principal, when one is. 274, 276, 277, 278, 279, 329.
Vicious horse, harness for, negligence as to.
287.
Voluntary act outside of scope of employment. 307.
Volunteer, when he can not recover. 280.
Volunteer, one who has interest in
acted, is not. 280.

common

in the business to be trans-

Warning adults, master’s duty. 299.
Warning, dangers incident to employment, master’s duty. 310.
Warning inexperienced persons. 300, 301.
Warning minors. 300, 301.
Warning, presumption that minor needs none, when. 300.
Warning, when it is sufficient. 301.
Warning, when obligation to give does not necessarily follow. 300, 301.
Work, safe place for, must be furnished. 293.
MORTALITY AND ANNUITY TABLES.

See Evidence.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Arrest, illegal by officers, not liable for. 475.
battery by quasi-policeman, not liable for. 476.
Bridges, when liable for defects in. 481.
Construction and repairing, negligence in. 487.
Convicts, injuries to, not liable for. 477.
Diligence, rule as to condition of streets. 482.
Discretionary acts, not liable for. 469, 470, 471.
Failure to light highway. 470.
Failure to repair when others cause danger. 488.
Failure to shun consequences of defendant’s negligence.
485, 486.
Functions not performed beyond limits of the State. 479.
Governmental powers, immunity as to.
473.
Health department, duties pertaining to.
474.
Assault and

INDEX.
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Highways, failure to light. 470.
Immunity, in the exercise of their powers, when they have. 473.
Injuries, when liable for, caused by defects in streets. 481.
Legislative and judicial powers, not liable for failure to perform.

472,

478.

Liability, to what it extends. 472.
Light highways, when not liable for failure to. 470.
Market, to keep in order is private duty. 480.
Ministerial duties, liability as to.
472, 480.
Must use their own property so as not to hurt others.
480.
Negligence in constructing and repairing. 487.
•
Negligence in exercising powers, liable for. 471.
Negligence in failure to repair when danger caused by others. 488.
Negligence, no presumption of. 483.
Negligence the test of liability. 483.
Negligence that plaintiff could shun, goes for nothing. 485, 480.
Notice.

487, 493.

Notice of defects.
Notice of

487, 489, 490, 491, 495, 497, 498, 499, 500, 504.
defects, not necessary, when. 487.

Ordinary diligence, plaintiff must exercise toward consequences of defendant’s negligence.
485, 486.

Ordinary diligence required of both parties. 484.
illegal arrest by. 475.
Powers, discretionary. 469.
Powers, immunity in the exercise of. 473.
Powers, legislative and judicial. 478.
Powers, negligent exercise of. 471.
Powers, public and private defined and distinguished.
Presumption of negligence, none. 483.
Quarry, rock, operating, a ministerial act. 480.
Police officers, not liable for

Remedy

over,

against wrong-doer.

506.

Sewers, when liable for defects in. 481, 538.
Sidewalks, awnings. 493.
Sidewalks, bridges on. 490.
Sidewalks, cellar-doors. 489.
Sidewalks, cotton-bales on. 496.
Sidewalks, excavation in. 495.
Sidewalks, falling wTall. 494.
Sidewalks, hole in. 491.
Sidewalks, lumber projecting over. 479.
-Sidewalks, roots of a tree. 492.
Sidewalks, when liable for defects in. 481, 488.
Streets, rule of diligence as to the condition of.
Streets, when liable for defects in. 481.

Streets, bridges on, liability for. 498.
Streets, gullies in. 499.
Streets, material used by property-owner. 504.
Streets, obstruction by fire company. 505.
Streets, open sewer,

sub-contractor.

500.

482.

473.
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Streets, railroad cut in. 503.
Streets, steps joining at a railroad.
Streets, water plug in. 501.

502.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES.

Construe, judge should. 628.
Employee may assume other employees will observe. 237.
Existence of, referred to the jury.
026.
■Negligence per se, when violation of is. 17, 18, 131, 385.
Notice of, company and employees must take.
630.
Proved, how. 027.
Reasonableness, how determined. 629.
,

NEGLIGENCE.

See

Imputable Negligence.
in absence of legal duty.

13, 428.
Beginning after injury began. 240.
Burden of proving a duty is on the plaintiff.
64.
Charge, proper, when negligence in several particulars is alleged. 522.
Charge, judge should not, that certain enumerated facts constitute. 2»,
Actionable,

none

26, 27.
Circumstances, injury may be shown by.

67.

Consequences of another’s, must be avoided. 73, 29, 38, 74.
Contract of passenger waiving, void.
147.
Contribute to the injury, act in proof, must. 213.
Contributory, first announcement of. 37.
Customary, no difference that it had become. 248.
Defendant’s.
See Defendant’s Negligence.
Defendant’s, plaintiff must exercise ordinary care to shun consequences
of.

485, 486.

duty, no negligence. 13, 61, 64, 122.
legal, as to sale of drugs and cartridges. 428, 429.
legal, burden of proving is on the plaintiff. 64.
legal; exists from implication of law. 428,
legal, exists in all cases to use proper care. 428.
legal, in absence of, no actionable negligence. 13, 428.
legal, to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to others.
Excuse, rarity of injury, does not. 144.
Fact, is a question of. 24, 76.
Definition—no

Duty,
Duty,
Duty,
Duty,
Duty,
Duty,

Fence

track, failure to is not.

Fires,

as

to, must be shown.

Imputable, when.
Intentional wrong

428.

89.

106.

12.
doing, not weighed against.

87.

Judge and jury, respective provinces of. 17.
Jury, when question of, exclusively for. 24, 76.
Meaning of term in the statute. 205.
Must be an act for which negligent employee himself would be liable.
68.
Must be immediate cause of the

injury.

68.
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Must be

negligence as between plaintiff and the company. 13, 61, 64,
122, 131.
Must exist or there is no liability. 13, 63, 81.
Negligent person bound to anticipate negligence in others. 74
New trial, when before the court on motion for.
17, 28.
Nonsuit, how considered when on motion for. 19, 20, 21, 22.
Of another, must be avoided, when.
29, 73, 74, 75.
Ordinary care, it must be a failure to exercise. 87.
Peril, person put in by company. 78.
Per se, an act is, when.
18, 125, 131, 132, 385.
Per se, boarding street-car in act of stopping, is not.
336.
Per se, when violation of ordinance is, relatively to an employee.
385.
Plaintiff's negligence.
See Plaintiff’s Diligence.
Plaintiff’s negligence, when it will not bar recovery. 205.
Platform, defect in. 68.
Presumption arises when injury is shown. 67, 148.
Presumption, may be rebutted by any testimony in the case. 149.
Presumption, none that injury was inflicted. 67.
Presumption, what must appear to rebut. 149.
Presumption that company did not know how accident occurred not sufficient to rebut.
Proximate

Proximate

149.

See that title.

cause.

of the

cause

Proximate cause,

injury, must be. 14.
breach of duty to plaintiff must be.

14, 15, 16, 66, 133.
Relatively to person injured, must be. 13, 61, 64, 122, 131.
Waiving passenger’s, contract void. 147.
When the court may instruct the jury that an act is negligence.
18.
NEW TRIAL.
When

question of negligence is before court on motion for.

NIGHT WATCHMAN.

Injured by

i

moving car.

a

252.

NOISES.
In

a

city, town or village.

Right and duty

as

110.
to making. 110.

NONSUIT.
Goes to the whole
When it should

or

case.

23.

should not be

granted.

19, 20, 21, 22.

NOTICE.
To

municipality of defect in streets. 487, 490.
road, when corporation has. 244.

Unsafeness of

ORDERS.

See Employees.

ORDINANCES.

See Municipal Ordinances.

ORDINARY DILIGENCE.

See Degrees of Care.

17, 28.
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OUT OF HIS PLACE.

380.
380.
Employee voluntarily leaves his place when he might and ought to have
been in it, no recovery.
380, 321.
Brakeman,

on an

engine, no
coupling

Conductor killed in

recovery.
cars.

OWNERS OF LAND TO KEEP PREMISES SAFE.

Bridge over private
Defective steps to a

crossing, liability of railroad
store-house. 453.
Duty of owner. 447, 448.
Enclosed premises, nuisances on.
451.
Excavation adjacent to a sidewalk.
449.
Excavation in

rear

Invitation and

license, distinction.

of

a

store-house.

company

for.

448.

452.

448.
Invitation, express or implied, there must be.
Invitation, implied, what it is. 448.

Principle of liability stated. 448.
Statutory duty of owner. ■ 447, 448.
Trespasser injured going out of a building.
Unenclosed lot, pitfall on.
450.

447, 448.

454.

PASSENGERS.

Accident, not sufficient that company did not know how it occurred.
Agent, can not alter or waive terms of ticket. 165.
Alighting. See Alighting from the Train.
Alighting, assistance in. 160.
Alighting at place not intended for that purpose. 159.

Alighting, customary warning by conductor. 195.
Alighting, flagman no authority to order. 534.
Alighting, hand-baggage, encumbered with. 161.
Alighting, jerks causing injury. 160, 533.
Alighting, must use all care in. 162, 532.
Alighting, prudent use of means provided for. 195.
Alighting, reasonable time and opportunity for. 161, 195.
Alighting, suitable place should be provided for. 158.
Assault by baggage-master and conductor.
191.
Assault to rape by baggage-master.
192.
Bad, dissolute persons refused. 203.
Bad faith, using ticket in.
176.
Baggage-car, went into and was injured. 536.
Boarding the train. 156.
Business, persons seeking to interfere with their. 203.
Care required of.
155.
Charging rule of diligence, bad mode of. 141.
Code section, degree of diligence.
139.
Colored train-hand may assist in ejection.
182.
Comfort and convenience, ordinary diligence as to.
143.
Conductor, agrees to stop at place not a station. 197.
Conductor, agreement as to fare. 178.
Conductor, good faith of, how regarded.
Conductor may eject passenger.
183.

185.

149.
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Conductor’s mistake

no

excuse

for

illegal ejection.

184.

Conductor mistreats passengers. 186, 187, 188, 189.
Conductor must protect passenger from molestation.

188.
promises to wake a passenger. 195.
Destination of, duty of conductor to ascertain.
195, 196.
Destination of, inquiry by conductor as to.
195.
Destination of, making known place of.
195, 196.
Destination of, train must be stopped at. 195, 199.
Diligence, manner of exercise depends upon circumstances of the case.
Conductor

144.

Disorderly persons may be ejected. 183.
Duty of company and passengers as to signals. 153.
Duty of extraordinary diligence can not be waived, or released. 147, 174.
Ejection by employee when not in the line of his'Uusiness. 177.
Ejection, burden on carrier to justify, when. 180.
Ejection, colored train-hand may assist in. 182.
Ejection, conductor may eject. 183.
Ejection, conductor’s mistake no excuse for illegal. 184.
Ejection, conductor’s good-faith, how regarded. 185.
Ejection, conductor, second ejects after surrender of ticket to first. 171.
Ejection, illegal, is actionable. 177, 179.
Ejection, inconvenience put to, by. 179.
Ejection must be in a lawful manner. 183.
Ejection, only necessary force to be used. 165.
Ejection, person ejected need not resist nor require force. 181.
Ejection, person ejected run over and killed. 535.
Ejection, right of action for, when it exists. 177, 179.
Ejection, tender of fare after steps taken. 165.
Ejection, waiting-room, woman expelled from. 203.
Ejection, what constitutes. 181.
Ejection, who may be ejected. 183, 203.
Election to

sue

in tort

or

on

contract.

164.

Excitement, acting under.

202.
Exit from depot over right of way.
157.
Express contracts, imposing limits on ticket. 172, 173.
Extraordinary diligence as to all kinds of trains. 146.
Extraordinary diligence, carrier bound to. 5, 139, 140, 141, 142, 149.
Extraordinary diligence, what amounts to, depends on circumstances of
the

case.

144.

Extraordinary diligence, what it applies to. 143, 153.
Extraordinary diligence, duty can not be waived nor released. 147, 174.
Pare, rates of commission apply to passenger-trains only. 165.
Fare, tender of after steps to eject. 165.
Fight each other and one sues the company. 113.
Flagman no authority to order one to alight. 534.
Flag-station, stopping at. 196.
Freight-trains, jolts and jars on. 145.
Freight-trains, security according to that mode of conveyance. 146, 147.
53
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Freight-trains, when they should stop. 198.
Greatest possible degree of care not required.
140.
Hand-baggage, encumbered with in alighting. 161.
Hand-baggage, helping lady with on mixed train. 145.
Jerks may occur until train is stopped.
199.
Jerks on mixed trains, duty of company.
145.
Jerks, violent and unusual, allegations of. 533.
Jolts and jars, on freight-trains.
145.
Jumping from the train. 26, 75, 199.
Jumping under order or with concurrence of conductor

or

paymaster.

200.

Lapse of time, loss of right to carriage by. 167.
trains, duty of each party as to jerks. 145.
Mixed trains, injured while being helped with hand-baggage.
145.
Moving train, no right to assume it is safe to get off. 199.
Negligence, plaintiff’s own, caused the injury. 532.
Negligence presumed when injury shown. 148, 149.
Negligence, rarity of injury, no excuse for. 144.
Ordinary and reasonable care means extraordinary care, when. 149.
Ordinary diligence as to comfort and convenience, the rule. 143.
Peril, put in by negligence of the company. 201.
Platform, place of danger and rule requires passenger not to stand on,
reasonable.
154, 155.
Presumption may be rebutted by any evidence in the case. 149, 150.
Presumption, what must appear to rebut. 149.
Rates of commission apply to passenger-trains only.
165.
Rebutted, presumption, illustrations. 149, 150.
Refused as, who may be.
203.
Mixed

Regulations, reasonable, adopted by the company. 154.
Relation of carrier and passenger, when it begins.
151.
Relation of carrier and passenger, when it ends.
152.
Robbery, train-hand attempts. 193.
Seats not to be used

Seat,

woman

as

footstools.

150.

with bundles fell from.

150.

Servant, retaining, after tort by.

194.
Signals at starting and stopping. 153.
Signals, ordinary diligence required of both parties as to.
Starting and stopping, signals at. 153.
Stations or depots, duty of company, as to.
158.
190.
Station-agent, assaults by.
Street-railways, carriers of. 333.
Ticket, bad faith, using in. 176.
Ticket, conditions, holder must comply with. 173.
Ticket, construing, the rule for. 169.
Ticket, contract, whether it constitutes. 166.
Ticket, contract, each road the right to stand on. 173.
Ticket, contract or tort, election as to suit. 164.
Ticket, expires, when. 171.

153.
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Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,
Ticket,

express contract placing limitations on.
172, 173.
holder fails to comply with conditions. 173.
holder, original, when right to use confined to. 165.
holder, when and how he should identify himself. 173.
holder, when he is a passenger. 151. ”
lapse of time, loss of right to use, by. 167.
relative duties of holder and, company. 163.
return on particular train, right to. 175.
round-trip. 163.
terms of, when agent can not alter or waive. 165.
transferable, when. 165, 168.
validate, when failure is company’s fault. 174.
with time limits. 170, 174.

Tickets.
Time

See the title.

limits, tickets with.

Train-hand
Who

are

attempts

a

passengers.

170, 174.

robbery.
151.

193.

PAY-TRAIN.

Jumping from. 200.
Trespasser, when one

on

it, is.

95.

PERILOUS SITUATION.
Child

in, unknown to company. 103.
Employee must use ordinary care to extricate himself. 263.
Person who puts himself in, must use appropriate care.
77, 97.
Put in peril by the company.
78, 201.
Street-car, duty to one in. 351.
PERSONAL INJURIES INFLICTED IN ANOTHER STATE.
Common

law, by it no recovery for homicide. 514.
law, courts of Georgia will determine what is. 514.
Common law, when presumptively of force in another State.
514, 515.
Evidence, what rules of, administered. 517.
Foreign administrators, suits by. 518.
Foreign laws, how proved. 519.
General principles.
514.
Right of action and defenses, controlled by lex loci. 516.
Common

PHYSICAL INJURIES.
Assault and

*

battery.

435.
Intention considered in assessing damages. 434.
Tippling-house keeper’s right of self-defense. 435.
Tippling-house not a man’s castle. 435.
Tort upon the person, definition. 434.
Unless justified right of action exists for, regardless of intention.
PHYSICAL PAIN AND MENTAL DISTRESS.
PHYSICIANS.

See

See Damages.

Malpractice of Surgery and Medicine.

434.
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PLAINTIFF’S DILIGENCE.
Can not

recover

Must

use

Must

use

care

if caused by his own negligence. 38.
appropriate to perilous situation he unnecessarily puts

himself in.

77.

ordinary

care

to avoid consequences of defendant’s negligence.

29, 37, 38, ^3, 73, 74, 75, 87, 206, 485, 486.
When his failure to exercise

When failure to exercise

ordinary care defeats recovery. 29.
ordinary care does not prevent recovery.

29.

PIT.
Caller falls into.
On

257.

company’s land.

71.

PLATFORM.

Danger,

place of.

a

154, 155.

Defect in, no

presumption of negligence. 68.
Duty of keeping in safe condition. 104, 250.
Improper use of by employee. 250.
Jerk, while standing on to alight. 532, 533.
Stand on, not for passenger to.
154, 155.
Street-car, standing on platform of. 337.
Use

intended, must be in safe condition for.

250.

PLEADINGS.

Amendments,
Amendments,
Amendments,
Amendments,
Amendments,

allowed when.

541.

enough to amend by, when there is. 542.
facts supplied by, what may be. 544.
foreign statute, setting out. 550.
lex fori controls as to procedure. 554.
Amendments, misnomer corrected by. 552.
Amendments, new parties or cause of action not allowed.
Amendments, particulars may be amplified and varied.

543, 551, 553.
545, 546, 547,

548, 549.
Averments

as to time, place and manner, when sufficient.
525, 530.
Baggage-master injured by spout of a tank. 528.
Capacity to labor, impairment of, embraced by implication. 526.
Case made in the pleadings, parties should be confined to. 561.
Charge, the proper, when negligence in several particulars is alleged.

522.

Contract

tort, when either may be used. 523.
by employee, Vhen it is sufficient. 525.
Demurrer, general, not sustained when any part of the declaration is
good. 521, 528, 539.
Demurrer, when it may be filed. 520.
Demurrer, when it should be sustained. 521, 531.
Description of ticket, when sufficient. 525.
Description of train, when sufficient. 525.
Dismiss, when motion to, may be made. 520.
Electric company’s wire injures employee of telephone company. 548.
Electric-light pole, yard-master struck by. 529.
or

Declaration
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Electric wires of different

companies in contact. 538.
Employee, declaration by, when sufficient. 527.
Employee’s own negligence caused the injury. 532.
Employee should show that he was in his right place when injured.
Employment, variance as to. 567.
Evidence in, without objection, court should charge on.
564.
Evidence in, without objection, in doubtful cases.
565.
Flagman, no authority to order passenger to alight. 536.
General issue, what may be shown under., 559.
Jerk, allegations of violent and unusual. 532, 533.
Justification in torts.

555.

Justification, when doctrine does not apply. 557.
Justification, when plea amounts to. 556.
Justification, where trial is had on the pleadings alone.
Kicking a car, negligence alleged in. 524.
Laborer failed to show he was not a trespasser.
531.
Mitigation, matter pleaded in. 560. >

558..

Negligence, employee’s own, caused the injury. 532.
Negligence, not declared on, when it may be urged. 566.
Parties should be confined to the case made in the pleadings.
Passenger ejected, run over and killed. 535.
Passenger went into baggage car and was injured. 536.
Place, right, employee should show he was in his. 531.
Pole, rotten, telegraph company, employee killed by. 539.
Sewer, mouth of projected. 537.
Tenant sues for failure to repair. 540.
Time, place and manner, averments as to. 530.
Tort or contract, when plaintiff may elect. 523.
Tort, when action may be in, on the public duty. 523.
Trespasser, laborer failed to show he was not a. 531.
Variance, as to employment. 567.
Variance in certain

Variance,

no

Yard-master

cases.

563, 567.

substantial, in these cases. 562.
injured by electric-light pole. 529.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
Dominion

over right of way.
87.
Introductory to Code sections. 37.

PRESUMPTION.

Appliances, that they were not defective. 302.
From failure to produce evidence. 570.
Instruction, none that the minor needs, when. 300.
Master did not know of defects.
Master has done his

302.

duty. 302.
Minor, none that he needs instruction, when. 300.
None, that injury was inflicted. 67.
Schedules, who presumed to-know them. 238.
54

561.

531.
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PRESUMPTION—continued.
Servant has assumed the usual and

Wrong-doer, that

no

one

ordinary hazards.
will become a. 87.

302.

PRESUMPTION OP NEGLIGENCE.

Arises, in whose favor. 68.
Arises only after duty of diligence to plaintiff is shown.
Arises when injury is shown. 44, 67, 148.
Bundles, woman fell from seat. 150.
Company, when against. 38, 40, 63, 68, 69.
Common law rule.

04.

57.

Depot, injury on inclined crossing at, none. 68.
Hammer, track-hand injured by, none. 68.
Employee, when he rests on it. 240.
Hammer, track-hand injured by, none. 68.
Injury, none that it was inflicted. 67.
'Lamp goes out, none raised by. 298.
Municipal corporation, none against. 483.
Master, none against, when. 68.
Onus on the company when injury is shown. 67.
Plaintiff’s right depended on, and it was rebutted.

80.

Platform, defect in, none. 68.
Rebut, what must be shown to. 149.
Rebutted.
82, 149, 150.
Rebut, to, employees should show what they did to avert catastrophe.
83, 84.
Rebutted

by facts out of which it arises, may be. 150.
by uncontradicted employees. 81.'
Rebutted, may be by any testimony in the case. 149.
Rebutted, not, in these cases. 83, 84.
Rebutted, whether it is, is for the jury. 79.
Slave, in case of. 56.
Street-railways, arises against when injury is shown. 335.
Rebutted

PRIVATE WAYS.

See Crossings.

PROXIMATE CAUSE.

See

Negligence.

Boy drawn under a train by a rope. 66.
Breach of duty to plaintiff must be the.
14, 245.
Chief and preponderating cause, must be.
14.
Code sections.
Conductor

14.

injured by defective cross-tie.

245.

Direct and efficient cause, act must be.
68, 81.
Failure to avoid consequences of another’s negligence,

is, when. 87.
Finger caught between door and facing. 66.
Interposition of separate independent agency. 14, 15.
Negligence and injury, must be related as cause and effect. 14, 15, 16, 66.
Road-crossings, failure to observe precautions, must be. 133.

INDEX.
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PRUDENT MAN.
Care

See Degrees of Care.
appropriate to the peril. 77.

Care of, defined. 1.
Care of, varies with degree of danger.
Court can not point out the ways of.

2.
3, 70.

Emergency by his

own act.
77.
jury determine what he would do. 4.
Looking and listening before stepping upon
Peril, care must be appropriate to. 77.
Standard is in the minds of the jury.
4.
Way of, in engineer as to trespasser. 87.
Way of, not for proof by witnesses. 3.
How

RAILROAD-CROSSINGS.
Railroads

cross

Trains must

See

a

railroad-track.

4, 76, 90.

Crossings.

each other.

stop at crossings.

271.

RAILWAY COMPANIES.
Act for which

employee would be liable, must be.

68.
responsible for. 244.
Agents may presume no one will become a wrong-doer. 87.
Boy swinging on a moving train. 103.
Burden, not on company to show how casualty occurred, when. 243.
Burden on company to show what employee did to avert injury. 83, 84.
Burden on company to show diligence when injury is proven. 38, 136.
Casualty, when company not bound to show how it occurred. 243.
Common carriers and judicially noticed.
50.
Companies, what, are embraced in section 2321. 45, 46.
Consolidation of corporations. 52.
Act of

God,

no one

Construction of sections.

40, 41.

Corporation, when it becomes complete. 55.
Damages apportioned, when. 38.
Damages by the running of cars, etc. 38, 44, 68.
Defenses not to be arbitrarily disregarded.
70.
Defenses open to the company. 39, 41, 63, 69.
Defenses, certain sections provide for separate. 41.
Duty, burden of proving on plaintiff. 64.
Duty to one near the track in country and no road. 64.
Egress and ingress, way for must be kept in repair. 86.
Extraordinary diligence not required, when. 59.
Pence their

lines, not bound to. 40.
Franchises, use of by another company. 46.
Ingress and egress, way for must be kept in repair.
Introductory to Code sections. 37.

86.

use of tracks at terminal points in a city.
47.
Judicially noticed as common carrier. 50.
Lease, no presumption of when owner in possession. 49.

Joint

Lessees

of, when liable.

48.

Looking out, such as is reasonably necessary, required.
Negligence must exist. 63.

60.
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RAILWAY COMPANIES — continued.

Negligence relatively to tlie

person injured.
13, 61, 64. •
road, what is. 244.
Ordinary and reasonable care require'd. 58.
Passengers, diligence due to. 139, 140, 142.
Peril, plaintiff’s conduct, when put in, by the company. 78.
Plaintiff’s negligence caused the injury.
38, 71.
Plaintiff, no recovery by, when. 38.
Presumption against the company when injury is shown. 38, 44, 63,
Notice of unsafeness of the

68, 67.

Presumption in

case of a slave.
56.
Presumption, in whose favor it arises. 68.
Presumption of negligence, a common-law rule. 57.
Rainfall, unprecedented, causes washout. 244.
Ratification, applies when injury is willful. 284.
Right of way, dominion over. 87.
Road, when company has notice of unsafeness. 244.
Scope of term, “running locomotives or cars.” 61, 68.
Servant, when one is. 62.
Section 3830 applies to injuries to property as well as to person.

Sections restated.

32.

Standard, legal, of diligence, never changes. 2, 60.
Succeeding to rights of another company. 53.
Turntable, injury by. 102, 103.
Track should be kept in reasonably safe condition.
244.
Venue of suits against.
See Venue.
Washout, duty of company to engineer. 244.
RECEIVERS.

Company’s contract, when binding on. 269
against, how construed. 268.
Employees, liability to. 266.
Suit, when not subject to. 267.
Venue of actions against. 270.
Declarations

RES GESTJE.

See Evidence.

RESIDENCE.
Of

railway corporations. 32.
right to sue for homicide of child not affected by.

Widow’s

RIGHT OF WAY.

See Track and Right of Way and Employee.

RISKS OF EMPLOYMENT.
ROADS.

See

See Master and Servant.

Crossings.

Rule of the road.

355.

SCHEDULES.

Duty to observe. 239.
Who presumed to know them.

238.

404.

42.
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SECTION-MASTER.

Hand-car, injured by.
SERVANT.

253.

See Master and Servamt.

Conductor, when in line of employment. 100.
Direct and efficient cause, act must be to make master liable.
Duty to employ reliable and gentlemanly. 194.
Retaining, after tort. 194.
When one is. 62, 280.
Whistle, blowing maliciously. 110.

68.

Willful act not in line of employment, when company liable for.
SICK PEOPLE.
Entitled to be treated
SIDEWALKS.

See

such.

as

352.

Municipal Corporations.

SIGNALS.

Contradictory, when engineer should stop. 377.
Danger, employee failed to display. 375.
Duties of, respectively of company and passenger.
153.
Ordinary diligence required on both sides, as to. 153.
SLAVE.

Injuries to. 56.
Presumption in case of.

56.

•

STANDARD OF LEGAL DILIGENCE.

Capable persons must conform to it. 87.
Diligence, legal standard of, is invariable. 2, 87.
Prudent man, care of, varies according to degree of danger.
Prudent man, ways of, in the minds of the jury. 3, 4, 87.
Prudent man, ways of, not for proof by witnesses.
3.
STATIONS.
Announcement of.

391.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Action, for personal injury, 'when barred.
Action, right of, when it accrues. 720Amendment relates back.

721.

722.

Contract, when on. 724.
Defense, where not made in the trial court.
Lex fori

as

to torts in another State.

725.

726.

STICK.
Orders to

use

in

coupling.

261.

STOCK.
Distinction

as

to persons

Loose stock not

and cattle
trespassers. 81.

on

the track.

97.

2.

100.
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INDEX.

STOCK — continued.
Mule killed in

a

Owner has the

right to expect company will exercise care.

common

enclosure.

Owners not bound to confine.

66.

66.

40.

STREET-RAILWAYS.

Alighting after stoppage and car has been put in motion. 340.
Alighting, driver struck team not knowing plaintiff was in act of. 343.
Alighting, driver should see that passenger had safely landed before
starting. 340.
Alighting, injured person must use due care to prevent injury. 339.
Alighting, jerk when in act of. 339.
Alighting, reasonable opportunity for must be afforded. 338, 340.
Alighting, reasonable time for while car is at rest must be afforded. 340.
Alighting, reasonable time to one attending a child. 338.
Alighting, safe place and time for, must be afforded. 340.
Alighting, when car stops because of obstruction, not for alighting. 340.
Alighting, relation of passenger exists during act of. 334.
Boarding, duty of driver to take notice of persons, when. 338.
Boarding, something in each hand. 336.
Boarding, when in the act of stopping. 336.
Carriers of passengers and bound to extraordinary diligence.
333.
Child, duty of driver or conductor as to care of when on the cars. 349.
Child, duty to one who suddenly and unexpectedly appears. 348.
Child of eleven years stealing a ride, care due to. 349.
Child, runs from behind a pile of lumber on to the track. 348.
Child, whether it has capacity to appreciate danger is for the jury. 348.
Children, injuries to. 348, 349.
1
Coin, rare, wrongfully rejected for fare. 354.
Collision, after it occurs, defendant’s negligence begins. 351.
Collision between dummy and wagon of another in which plaintiff was
riding. 347.
Collision, driver of wagon was violating ordinance, as to speed. 345.
Conductor, duty of as to observing track in front of car. 350.
Conductor, when his silence will not justify jumping. 343.
Crossings, diligence of both parties at. 344.
Crossings, look and listen, company not bound to stop cars at, to. 344.
Crossings, look and listen, motorman should in approaching. 344.
■(Crossings, look and listen, people intending to cross track should. 344.
Crossings, rule admitted to show that company regarded place as dangerous.

344.

Diligence, plaintiff’s want of. 345.
Diligence, standard of, increases or diminishes with the danger. 348.
Diligence, proof of company’s generally, rejected. 353.
Dummy engine and wagon, collision between. 347.
Duty, one to ordinary traveller on foot and another to passenger. 334.
Extraordinary diligence required of them. 333.
Fare, rare coin rejected for. 354.
Gates, guards or ropes on side next to parallel track, duty as to. 341.
Jerk when in the act of alighting.
339.
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STREET-KAILWAYS —continued.

Jumping from the car, gross negligence, when. 343.
Jumping, when silence of conductor will not justify. 343.
Minor, inexperienced, killed on parallel track. 342.
Motorman, duty as to looking out ahead. 348.
Motorman, must notice presence of vehicles and pedestrians ahead. 348.
Motorman, that injured person thought he would stop the car, admitted.
346.

Motorman, when and how long he may assume that one will leave the
track.

344.

Negligence of

begins after collision occurs. 351.
speed, driver of wagon was violating. 345.
Ordinary care must be observed by injured person. 345.
Ordinary care, standard of, increases or diminishes with the danger. 348.
Parallel lines, diligence due from agents on.
334.
Parallel lines, gates, guards or ropes on side next to.
341.
Parallel lines, inexperienced minor killed on.
342.
Peril, duty to one in. 351.
Plaintiff’s want of diligence. 345.
Platform, standing on in absence of notice, will not bar recovery. 337.
Presumption arises when injury is shown. 333, 335.
Rioters fighting among passengers, duty of company. 333.
Road, rule of the. 355.
Rule, where plaintiff was riding in wagon of another when collision ocOrdinance

as

company

to

curred.

347.

Sabbath

day, lawful to run cars on. 356.
Sagged wire across a street causes injury. 73.
Sick people on cars, how they should be treated.
352.
Track in front, conductor’s duty to observe.
350.
Trespasser of tender years. 349.
SWITCHES.

Frog unblocked. 291.
Misplaced. 249.
Protecting from interference.

105.

TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

Pole, defective,
Wires
TICKETS.

come

one

falls from.

539.

in contact with wires of electric company.

538.

See Passengers.

Agent without authority to alter or waive terms. 165.
Bad faith, using it in.
176.
Construing, rule for. 169.
Contract, two roads, each has the. right to stand on. 173.
Contract, whether it constitutes a. 166.
Election to

sue on

contract

or

in tort.

164.

Expires when. 171.
Express contract, holder fails to comply with conditions.
Express contract, imposing limitations on use. 172.
Holder of, when a passenger. 151.
Identify himself, when and how the holder must. 173.

173.
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INDEX.

TICKETS — continued.

Lapse of time, loss of right by. 167.
Office, keeping open. 163, 165.
Original holder, when right to use confined to. 165.
Rates of railroad commissioners apply to passenger-trains only.
Relative duties of passenger and company.
163, 165.
Return on particular train, right of holder to.
175.
Round-trip. 163.
Surrendered to first conductor.

165.

171.

Time

limits, with. 170, 174.
Transferable, when. 165, 168.
Validate, when failure to, is company’s fault.

174.

TOLL-BRIDGES.

Ordinary

and diligence required of keeper.
negligence is a defense. 461.
Repairs, when the bridge is undergoing. 459.
When the relation is suspended. 460.
care

458.

Plaintiff’s

TOOLS.

See Master and Servant.

DANGEROUS MACHINE.

Defective, used under order of superior employee. 308.
Employee one of several using. 251.
Improper, voluntarily selected by employee. 314.
Inspection, employee must have time and opportunity for.

309.

TORTS.
Abatement of actions for.

433.

Assignable, are not. 432.
Assignable, judgment is, when. 431.
Cartridges, negligent sale of. 428.
Code sections defining. 427.
Damage and negligence must exist to be actionable.
Definition of.

Doctrine, general discussion of.
Election to
Justification

14.

427.

sue

in.

in

or

on

428.

contract.

164.

555.

Proprietary medicine causes injury. 429.
Runaway horse causes injury. 430.
TORTS BY WIFE, CHILD OR SERVANT.
a stone after trespass ended and hit third person.
servant, relation must be shown. 437.
Master’s interest, act purposely to protect. 438.

Employee threw

Master and

Right of
Scope of
Scope of
Trespass,
Trespass,
Trespass,

action conferred. 436.
duties, when servant’s act is within. 438.
his business, when servant’s act is within.
to prevent on master’s property. 438.
to punish trespasser. 438.
willful, when liable for. 436.

438.

438.

INDEX.
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TORTS TO WIFE OR CHILD OR SERVANT.

See Wife.
Action, right of conferred. 412.
Child’s diligence. 419.
Child must be capable of rendering service at the time of the injury.

415, 416.
Class of torts

contemplated. 412.
law, father could sue for loss of service of child. 412.
Common law, statute construed in light of.
412.
Damages computed for remnant of minority. 424.
Defense, when father’s negligence is. 417.
Diligence of child. 419.
Emancipation of child, proof as to. 423.
*
Expenses may be recovered. 412, 413, 425.
Factory superintendent, diligence of. 420.
Father’s implied consent to employment of child.
247.
Father’s negligence a defense, when. 417.
Fault, when unnecessary to allege freedom from. 418.
Judicial notice taken that child was too young to render service.
415.
Jumping from train under orders. 419.
Minor employed after notice not to.
419.
Minor, factory superintendent may restrain from risk. 420.
Minor’s right not the same as father’s. 426.
Pecuniary damage, loss of, must be alleged. 414.
Physician and surgeon, unskillful amputation by. 414.
Right of action conferred. 412.
Service, capacity to render, child must have at time of injury. 415, 416.
Service, capacity to render, when question for the jury. 415.
Service, loss of is the gist of the action, and must be alleged and shown.
Common

413.

Service, loss of and negligent injury, must be shown. 413.
Service, the right to is enough, though child be in the chain-gang.
Services, actual, proof of unnecessary. 416.
Where child lived several days after the injury. 413.
Wife, actions for injuries to, in whose name brought. 422.
Wife, when she may sue for injury to child. 421.
Wife’s services, husband may sue for loss of. 422.
Wife’s services, rule of damages in husband’s suit for. 422.
Wife’s services, value of, what proof sufficient. 422.
TRACK AND RIGHT OF WAY.

See

Employee and also Trespasser.

Cause to

apprehend one’s presence on. 87.
Children on, duty to. 87.
Crossing or using it, diligence required. 90.
Cross-ties, failure of duty as to. 245.
Distinction as to persons and cattle. 97.
Dominion
Drunk

on.

over.

87, 88, 101.

71.

Duty of exercising care, arises when. 87, 97.
Duty to one near the track in country and no road. 64.
Engineer may presume one will get out of the way. 87, 96.

416.
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TRACK AND RIGHT OF WAY — continued.

Expulsion, what force may be used to
Exit for passengers over. 157.

affect.

101.

Fence, company not bound to. 40, 89.
Frog, negligence as to. 246, 320.
Habit of public in walking at that place.' 87, 98.
Joint use of at terminal points.
47, 386.
Licensees.

Bee Licensees.

Look and listen before

*

stepping on. 4.
Looking out for obstacles on. 60, 85.
Lunches, going on with, for passengers. 101.
Notice as to trap or hidden danger.
101.
Obstructions too

near.

247.

Obstructions on, skids.

248.
Pedestrians, not bound to extraordinary care as to. 101.
Pedestrians, use by permission, without invitation. 87.
Platform, improper use of. 250.
Safe condition, should be kept in.
244.
Switch

misplaced. 249.
points, two companies use same track at. 386.
Track of different companies used.
386.
Train-men no reason to expect any one where injury occurred.
Trespasser, duty to. 100, 97, 87, 91.
Trespasser, when he is discovered. 87.
*
Trespasser, who is. 87, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95.
Trespassing on, should be prohibited. 87.
Trestle, gross negligence to walk on. 97.
Unguarded hole where public is in the habit of going. 101.
Used by the public and not prevented.
87.
Watchmen of different companies stand on.
94.
Terminal

TRAINS.

Alighting, assistance in. 160.
Alighting from moving train. 75, 199.
Alighting, reasonable time for. 161, 195.
Boarding. 71, 156, 382.
Boys swinging on. 103.
Crossing law, what embraced in.

121.

Disorderly persons may be ejected. 183.
Draw-bridges, must slow down at. 272.
Ejected, who may be. 183.
Freight-train, conductor shoots trespasser on. 100.
Freight, passenger on. 146, 147.
Jerks may occur until train is stopped.
199.
Jumping from, under conductor’s order. 200.
Jumping, whether negligence is for the jury. 26.
Mixed, passenger on. 145.
Moving, conductor orders train-hand to step from. 232.
Moving, employee killed in boarding. 382.
Moving, no right to assume that it is safe to get off of.

199.

65.
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TRAIN S—continued.

Pay-train, when one on is a 'trespasser. 95.
Rates of commission apply to passenger-trains
Refused, who may be.

only.

1G5.

203.

Return on particular, right of holder to.
175.
Speed, unusual increase of. 319.
Stopped at passenger’s destination. 195, 199.
Stopped at railroad crossing. 271.
Terminus, what is. 239.

Visitor on,

when entitled to notice.

TRESPASSER.

75.

See Track and also

Right of Way.
91.
Care as to, must be commensurate with the danger.
Child attempts to get upon ladder of moving cars.
Child, care due to by street railway company. 349.
Child pushed from moving train.
100.

Body of, thrown against

Conductor assaults

an

employee.

87.
103.

100.

-a.

Crossings law, not applicable to.

122.

Discovered

when he is. 87, 98.
87, 91, 98, 97.

Duty to.
Engineer may assume he will leave the track.
Expulsion, what force may be used to affect.
Habit of

an

individual to

use

the track.

91.
101.

99.

Habit of the

public in walking at that place. 87, 98.
Helpless condition, duty to one in. 91, 87.
Highway, when cars block, pedestrians may walk over company’s grounds.
93.
’

Passenger, when he is not. 92.
Pay-train, seeking to ride on. 95.
Reason to apprehend his presence, duty begins.
87, 98.
Relation of company to, when it begins. 87, 97.
Watchmen of different companies stand on tracks.
94.
Willful injury to, not justifiable.
91, 100, 103.
When the duty of exercising ordinary care arises. 87, 97.
TRESTLE.

Bridge-keeper’s wife killed on. 99.
Duty to one on. 87, 97.
Gross negligence to walk on. 97, 87.
Man and child killed

Woman killed

on.

on.

368.

396.

TURNTABLE.

Principle involved in such cases. 103.
liable for injuries to a child by.

When company
VARIANCE.

See

Pleadings.

102.
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VENUE OF SUITS AGAINST RAILWAY COMPANIES.
Act constitutional.
Act refers to

causes

34.

of action

Construction of section.

originating in this State.

Contracts, actions on. 30, 31, 33.
Homicide, by depot agent. 34.
In any county through which the road may run, when.
In county of the residence of the company, when.
30.
In justice courts.
34.
Injury begun in one county and completed in another.
Injury to person or property. 30, 31, 33.
Lessees, actions against. 30, 32.
Proof of

venue.

See

30.

34.

36.

Receivers, suits against. 270.
Residence of railway corporations.
Waiver of jurisdiction. 35.
VERDICTS.

33.

31.

32, 34.

Damages.

VICIOUS OR DANGEROUS ANIMALS.
Bitten

by a dog in owner’s back yard. 456.
by a horse by the sidewalk. 457.
Fault, injured person must be without, in causing the injury.
Fault, mere trespass is not, within the statute. 456.
Owner or keeper, when liable for injury by.
455, 457.
Bitten

Vicious

animal, what is.

VICE-PRINCIPAL.

455.

See Master and Servant.

VISITOR.
Notice to

alight, when entitled to.

On the train to aid others.
VOLUNTEER.

75.

75.

See Master and Servant.

WAITING-ROOM.
Woman

expelled from.

203.

WAIVER.

Duty of extraordinary diligence,
Of

jurisdiction.

WARNING.

can

not be.

147.

35.

See Master and Servant.

WELL-DIGGER.

Injured by
WHISTLE.
’

a

derrick.

259.

See Crossings.
Blowing in city, town or village. 110, 114, 127.
Blowing maliciously. 110.
Blowing, right and duty, as to. 110, 114.
Blowing, when it is proper diligence. 126, 127.

455, 456.

INDEX.

WIFE.

See Torts to Wife, or Child, or Servant.

Action for

injury to.

Child, when she

422.
for injury to. 421.
for death of. 357, 396.

may sue

Husband may sue

WILLFUL OR WANTON INJURY.

Negligence not weighed against. 87, 205.
applies to. 284.
To trespasser, not justified.
91, 100.

Ratification

When defendant’s act is.
When

one

is liable for.

205.
436.

WITNESS, FAILURE TO,PRODUCE.

See Evidence.

YARD-MASTER.
Struck

by

an

electric-light pole.

529.
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